INTRODUCTION
ROBIN FEUER MILLER
The greatest part of a writer’s time is spent in reading, in order to write: a man will turn over half a library to make one book.
—James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson
A legendary scholar and teacher, both in Columbia University’s Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures and in its trademark Core Curriculum, Robert L. Belknap (1929–2014) also served as acting dean of Columbia College, director of the Harriman (then Russian) Institute, and director of the University Seminars. His written work ranges from intensely focused books and essays on single works by single authors to a treatise, Tradition and Innovation: General Education and the Reintegration of the University, coauthored with Richard Kuhns, which embraced in the broadest terms the institution and goals of the university and of education. In the last decades of his life, Belknap was at work on his magnum opus—his book on plot. Having heard his lectures on various aspects of his work, I, like many others, began to imagine a voluminous tome in the making, almost a textbook or an encyclopedia of plots—a work unlike Belknap’s other idiosyncratic, creative, and forcefully argued writings, more oriented toward collecting and synthesizing past theories and knowledge.
Collect and synthesize the volume certainly does, but like Aristotle’s Poetics, this book is short, fiercely and economically argued, and, above all, persuasive, punctuated with the kinds of “aha” moments that Belknap had described in other contexts. He even presents his reader with a kind of meta “aha” moment when he defines two kinds of recognition that readers may experience: “If the audience knows what one or more characters do not, the audience experiences the powerful effect of dramatic irony. If the audience does not know, it experiences its own ‘aha,’ rather than a vicarious one” (56). In Plots, he has brought his focus to bear not only on particular works, but also on the broad question of plot—plot as it plays out in monumental, profoundly complex works. Always intrigued by theory, diagram, design, and structure, Belknap was also a critic of these enterprises when they failed to elucidate, became artificial, or simply functioned as ends in and of themselves. He always retained his capacity to see and to acknowledge if the emperor was wearing no clothes. How typical of Belknap to produce a magnum opus that is particular, profound, original, and short.
Beach-walkers who collect shards of beautifully polished sea-glass, molded and smoothed by sea and sand, its transparency rendered into translucence, find it increasingly difficult to come upon such treasures, probably because plastic bottles now substitute for glass and float on the sea in indestructible hordes or wash up onto the sand as non-degradable trash. Plots is a rare sea-glass, emerging from the ocean ready to be picked up by any walker who likes to traverse that boundary between sea and land, between the ocean of literature and experience and the drier sands of discourse about them. The sea-glass is a result of them both.
Belknap’s Plots is both pragmatic and philosophical. It abounds with trenchant definitions and bold epigrams while probing and appreciating paradox and mystery. Belknap asks the kind of questions most of us avoid because they are simultaneously too difficult and too basic to answer: What is an incident? Can an incident be as large as a whole novel or as small as three sentences? What is a summary? Are plots fractal? Most tautly argued literary theories find short or minor works to serve as elucidating examples. Belknap cheerfully tackles King Lear and Crime and Punishment to test his propositions.
Plots is as pithy as its title. In it, Belknap distills a lifetime of abundant reading and creative thinking about what plots are and how they work. Consider whether the following three paragraphs are a summary of Belknap’s book or a map of what is to come:
Literary plots deserve still more study. Plots arrange literary experience. Plot summaries need more serious study. The fabula arranges the events in the world the characters inhabit; the siuzhet arranges events in the world the reader encounters in the text. Authors can relate one incident to another only chronologically, spatially, causally, associatively, or narratively. Plots are fractal, formed from incidents that are formed from small, similarly shaped incidents. The best authorities consider plots and incidents to be tripartite, with a situation, a need, and an action. But siuzhets and the incidents that form them have two parts: an expectation and its fulfillment or frustration.
The plot of King Lear operates purposefully but also reflects the creative process. For integrity of impact, stages, actors, and the audience need a unity of action. Shakespeare replaced the Greek unity of action with a new thematic unity based on parallelism. Shakespeare uses conflict, the righting of wrongs, the healing of an inruption or disruption, and other standard plotting devices, but his recognition scenes move us most. Shakespeare prepares for his recognition scenes with elaborate lies. In King Lear, Shakespeare used elaborated lies to psychologize the Gloucester subplot. Tolstoy and Tate preferred the comforting plots of Lear’s sources to Shakespeare’s, but Shakespeare had considered that variant and rejected it.
The plot of Crime and Punishment draws rhetorical and moral power from the nature of novel plots and from the European and Russian tradition Dostoevsky inherited and developed. European novelists elaborated or assembled incidents into plots long before critics recognized the sophistication of the new genre in plotting such subgenres as the letter novel and the detective novel. Dostoevsky shaped and was shaped by the Russian version of the nineteenth-century novel. In reinventing the psychological plot, Dostoevsky challenged the current literary leaders. The siuzhet of part 1 of Crime and Punishment programs the reader to read the rest and to participate actively in a vicious murder. The one-sidedness of desire and violence in Crime and Punishment is more peculiar to Dostoevsky’s plotting than Dostoevshchina. Critics often attack Crime and Punishment for a rhetoric that exploits causality in ways they misunderstand. The epilogue of Crime and Punishment crystallizes its ideological plot. The plots of novels teach novelistic, not poetic, justice.
Belknap would sometimes paraphrase, in all seriousness, Samuel Johnson’s irreverent witticism about an unread book: “I’ve not read it, sir, but I have held it in my hand.” Belknap agreed with Johnson that holding a book in one’s hand is in fact a significant prelude to actually reading it. Readers who have already held Plots in their hands, perhaps admiring its neat, handy, and compact size, may have also glanced at its table of contents and noticed its eighteenth-century-like chapter headings. They will recognize the three paragraphs above as those titles converted into narrative.
When rendered as a set of paragraphs rather than chapter headings, these sentences become a summary of Belknap’s overall argument rather than the mapping of chapters for a reader moving through the text in time. They are also, Luther-style, the propositions that Belknap nails to the critical wall, propositions simply and boldly stated at the outset, defended with seriousness, logic, and learned irreverence in each of the chapters. Any one of these sentences or headings could serve as the operating thesis for a much longer study; yet Belknap achieves, even with his self-imposed constraint of brevity, a completeness for each argument. Are we willing to accept that plots are fractal? Have we ever thought that the incidents forming the siuzhet of a narrative might have only two parts, instead of the customary three? Do lies really fuel the plots of so many of William Shakespeare’s tragedies? Are desire and violence truly one-sided in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novels and more essential than suffering for his plots? What is novelistic justice as compared to poetic justice? How can such a small book formulate and pose so many questions, let alone dare attempt to demonstrate solutions to them?
Belknap does not shy away from unfashionable words like “great” or “monumental.” Neither will I. (By reveling in such words and using them appropriately, he reminds readers of their value, of their moral and aesthetic weight.) Belknap was one of the finest and most original writers on Dostoevsky in the twentieth century. Bucking the trend of lengthy books about lengthy novels, his two books on The Brothers Karamazov, both small and concise like this one, remain essential reading for inquisitive readers of that great Russian author. For generations of Karamazov readers, Belknap has somehow merged with the novel, becoming a shadowy but intermittently observable figure, almost like the eponymous Kugelmass in Woody Allen’s early story, “The Kugelmass Episode,” whom readers discover lurking in Madame Bovary. Many of Belknap’s students and readers find him lurking in the corners of Dostoevsky’s works, shaping our reading.
Belknap’s distinctive style reflects his intellect; his predilection for reducing complex incidents to their elemental units not to simplify so much as to expose their intricacy; and his talent for marshaling evidence from numerous sources, high and low, in his task of persuasion. He also casually uses words that send readers to the dictionary and reward us for the effort—for example, “inruption” (already cited in the table of contents of this book), “achrony,” or “proairetic,” all useful words that make one wonder at the rarity of their general usage. Likewise, among the many other works of fiction, drama, philosophy, history, and criticism to which he will allude lightly but meaningfully are some about which the reader may well have been completely ignorant. Take, for example, his passing allusion to Mary Cowden Clarke’s The Girlhood of Shakespeare’s Heroines: A Series of Fifteen Tales: although cited in the context of a discussion about motivation in Shakespeare, it may inspire the reader to think in different ways about Dostoevsky’s heroines as well. For example, what did little Dunya and Raskolnikov fight about as children? How did little Sonya react when her mother died? “In fiction,” Belknap tells us, “an unknown or assertedly nonexistent cause is not just unknown but simply not there” (100). Though we may choose to ponder such hypothetical questions, we cannot answer them. They are simply outside the causal system of the work at hand. Earlier, Belknap had argued that “fiction obviates much of the philosophical debate about causation” (22). In a novel or play, on the contrary, causation is “by fiat” (24).
Among those readers who are also teachers of literature, how many of you, like me, hasten in your introductory lectures to get definitions and discussions of plot out of the way at the outset so as to focus on more interesting and seemingly complex questions about such matters as character, motivation, space, narration, discourse, metaphor, and detail? Perhaps you teach your students about the differences between the fabula and the siuzhet, making passing reference to the Russian formalists or to René Wellek and Austin Warren’s Theory of Literature. Your students may memorize the definitions of these two moderately useful terms and quickly come to substitute in their minds the narration for the siuzhet, or some similar formulation. Then it is on to other matters. The notion of fabula gets even shorter shrift. As merely the incidents or events of the story in the chronological order in which they actually occur, the fabula may seem to operate as a simple background that allows the author to create the intricate narrative fabric of what is generally assumed to be the far more interesting siuzhet.
Within a few pages of reading Belknap’s work, however, one begins to be persuaded that in fiction the plot—in its various manifestations of summary, of fabula, of siuzhet, of the relation of incident to incident, or of parallel plot to parallel plot—is the heart of the matter. Belknap defines the fabula as “the relationship among the incidents in the world the characters inhabit” and the siuzhet as “the relationship among the same incidents in the world of the text, a one-dimensional array of words encountered one after another in the time system of the reader” (16–17). A plot suggests a path that can lead to the understanding of a particular work that is more telling and even more significant than the ending of a work (a place where one routinely looks for meaning). Plot is most certainly not an element to be whisked to the periphery. Moreover, the fabula, “where causation plays a crucial structural role” (17), is at least as complex and slippery to define as the siuzhet. Throughout, Belknap demonstrates how the fabula is frequently pitted against the siuzhet because it is multidimensional in space and time, whereas the siuzhet is not.
Belknap’s book will undoubtedly be read in conjunction with other general works on plot and narration, especially the now classic Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative by Peter Brooks. At the outset, Brooks writes:
This is a book about plots and plotting, about how stories come to be ordered in significant form, and also about our desire and need for such orderings. Plot as I conceive it is the design and intention of narrative, what shapes a story and gives it a certain direction or intent of meaning…. Plot is so basic to our experience of reading, and indeed to our very articulation of experience in general, that criticism has often passed over it in silence as too obvious to bear discussion. Yet the obvious can often be the most interesting, as well as the most difficult, to talk about.
(Brooks, xi)
Belknap, albeit undoubtedly in agreement with much of what Brooks has suggested, builds up to a discussion of plot from its most discrete elements, incidents. He emphasizes its most fundamental definition: “Plots are ways of relating incidents to one another…. Plots are purposeful arrangements of experience” (3, 4). Moreover, he sees a special urgency in coming to terms with a fuller understanding of plot as we have known it up through the present day because of the “huge array” of new questions emerging from ubiquitous new technologies that offer interactive possibilities of plot which have yet to be explored.
Few theorists have addressed the question of plot summary with the sustained scrutiny that Belknap brings to bear upon it. From the outset and throughout the book, Belknap contends that “plot summaries deserve serious theoretical attention” (7). “Like a translation,” he maintains, “a plot summary tries to represent a text…. Indeed, some argue that the summary of a book is the plot of the book, with all the burden of significance and power that implies; others argue that the only proper summary of War and Peace is the book itself, that summary is impossible.” Summary, in his view, aspires to the same accuracy as translation but is equally subject to the imprint of the summarizer’s or translator’s tastes and idiosyncrasies: “Like translators and other writers, summarizers may fail to see or understand the thing they are presenting, may intentionally or unconsciously impute their own ideas or obsessions to their subjects, or may construct straw enemies to attack as a way of satisfying their social cultural, psychological, or other needs.” At this point the reader-critic may squirm or smile, for of course all of us, Belknap included, are to some extent both summarizers and translators. At various moments throughout, Belknap wittily illustrates his own sharp insight about the paradox—both the distortions and the potential illuminations—plot summaries can offer by presenting summaries either by others (most notably Tolstoy’s of King Lear) or his own.
While Tolstoy’s dislike of Shakespeare, especially King Lear, is well-known, Belknap exposes the tactics Tolstoy uses, unfairly, to express his dislike (and perhaps hide his jealousy). “Unlike CliffsNotes,” as Belknap points out, the kind of summary Tolstoy employs in King Lear presupposes the reader’s acquaintance with the text and is thus “a text about a text” (72). Belknap argues that Tolstoy particularly hated the plot of the play, and by analyzing Tolstoy’s summary of it, he exposes the precise nature of Tolstoy’s detestation. He observes, for example, that Tolstoy’s summary of the tragic moment when Lear brings Cordelia’s body on stage is actually eight words longer than the passage it is summarizes. Tolstoy writes: “Lear enters with the dead Cordelia in his arms, notwithstanding the fact that he is past eighty and sick. And Lear’s horrible delirium begins again, which makes one ashamed, like an unsuccessful joke. Lear demands that everybody howl, and sometimes thinks Cordelia is dead, sometimes that she is alive. ‘Had I,’ he says, ‘your tongues and eyes I would use them so that the heavens would crack’ ” (Tolstoy, PSS, 35:235, quoted at 71). I leave it to readers to savor the trenchant analysis that follows as well as the general insights about plot in both King Lear and its sources.
Of course, Belknap himself frequently proposes his own summaries, which are no less idiosyncratic and instructive than Tolstoy’s. His summary of King Lear includes the following: “The symmetries are constructed to confront the audience with two old sinners whose wicked children play on their overwhelming credulity to gain their property and then destroy them, despite the self-sacrificing efforts of their faithful, loving children” (64). As this example demonstrates, Belknap’s persistent habit of carefully reducing things to elemental units frequently results in a deeper understanding of a complex set of interrelated incidents, i.e., a plot. Later, when analyzing the plots of The Arabian Nights and Don Quixote and how they are recycled to some degree in Dostoevsky’s fiction, he concludes with another summary: “The grinding paradox of Crime and Punishment—that we care about the well-being of a calculating, self-absorbed hatchet-murderer—rests in part on the picaresque way the narration obsessively focuses our attention on him as he rushes from crisis to crisis” (83–84). Moreover, he demonstrates how the readers of the novel become “accessories after the fact” (106) following the murder, so that we slip into the same algorithmic alternations as Raskolnikov.
Belknap often deploys humor to clarify and sharpen his argument. The reader thus encounters a series of cheeky moments along the way. In discussing, for example, the diverse meanings that the terms fabula and siuzhet have acquired during the decades of critical scrutiny of them, he writes, “For the purposes of this study, the best translation for fabula is ‘plot’ and the best translation for siuzhet is also ‘plot’ ” (16). Then follows a sober explanation of why this is so. I am reminded of the moment in Gogol’s Dead Souls when the inveterate liar Nozdryev drags his exhausted guest Chichikov to the boundary marker at the edge of his huge estate only to tell him that everything on this side of the marker is “mine,” and everything on the other side of it is “mine” too. By defining both fabula and siuzhet as “plot,” Belknap demonstrates the interdependence between these two terms and emphasizes that the most important aspect of plot is perhaps the relationship among incidents. As he observes, the fabula and the siuzhet in fact often strain against each other: “The reader can come to know the fabula only through the siuzhet, and the author cannot imagine a siuzhet without some fabula to express; an account has to be of something” (17). What Belknap labels as the “literariness” of any work comes from the interplay between the two. Likewise Nozdryev, the liar and gambler, perhaps owns nothing on either side of that marker.
Before embarking on the insightful readings of King Lear and Crime and Punishment which form the second and third parts of this book, Belknap offers up a humorous but illuminating consideration of “a small work of art.” It is indeed small; Belknap cites it in its entirety. It comes from Rabelais’s Gargantua: “The appearance of St. Gertrude to a nun of Poissy, in labor” (39). I won’t give away his reading of this “work” in terms of its fabula and siuzhet, but readers will discover in it the ideal prelude to the extended analysis of the two monumental literary works which follows.
Belknap hypothesizes that Shakespeare “sacrificed the causal tightness that had served classic drama so well in order to build thematic tightness around parallel plots” (50). He scrutinizes the varieties of lies and lying operative in King Lear, the lines of causality they create, and the kinds of recognition scenes they engender both in the characters and the audience. He suggests that in Shakespeare’s plays, “except in a single play,…virtually every recognition scene is generated primarily out of a lie, not an error” (59). He explores the reasons that Shakespeare may have preferred lies to errors as an instrument for complicating and generating plots. Moreover, he notes that “each lie is a little drama, with at least the rudiments of a plot” (61). Many readers may find themselves ready to accept Belknap’s surprising, speculative claim “that Shakespeare, having created the central canon for the English sonnet and the central canon for English comedy and tragedy—history plays having been in place before him—was preparing himself to invent the modern English novel when he was cut off by death” (58).
Belknap’s propensity for humor does not obviate his capacity for high solemnity. As he prepares for his excursion through Crime and Punishment, he writes, “A great book is a fearsome thing, and always tempts a reader to talk about something else” (80). Although his profession demands “that I seek order in the text,” he knows that “texts, like the world, aren’t orderly—they’re messy.” It has been customary among many scholars who have written about the evolution of Dostoevsky’s narrative style and his plots to rather quickly dispense with what has been considered the outmoded eighteenth-century epistolary form that Dostoevsky used for his first short novel, Poor Folk (1846). Belknap, however, discovers in this early epistolary work both the bedrock for Dostoevsky’s subsequent plots as well as for his own argument, extending through the great writer’s entire oeuvre, that Dostoevsky did not, contrary to a persistent popular notion, glorify suffering as an ennobling way-station on the path to virtue and salvation.
Before laying out his reading of Crime and Punishment, Belknap also anchors Dostoevsky in the Russian tradition that preceded him, ranging from Karamzin through Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol (“The plot of all of Gogol’s greatest works is very simple: ‘Paradise Lost’ ” [96].), and Chernyshevsky, although “Dostoevsky challenged them all by psychologizing their causal systems”—their plots (100). He cites what he labels Henry James’s “cardinal rule” for narrators—that they be consistent: “James’s narrators may be wise or foolish, even insane or fanatic, but must be consistently whatever they are, so that ‘the interest created, and the expression of that interest, are things kept, as to kind, genuine and true to themselves’ ”(92). Belknap compellingly demonstrates how, in marked contrast, a hallmark of Russian narration is the constant violation of this rule in myriad ways, thus linking the development of the Russian novel to the eighteenth-century European tradition of “more flexible narrators” that was increasingly rejected by European novelists of the nineteenth century but embraced by the Russians. Belknap’s reading of Gogol’s “The Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich Quarreled with Ivan Nikiforovich” humorously, movingly, and incisively illustrates these points, and I urge readers to give special attention to it.
Belknap offers several readings of the plot of Crime and Punishment, each of which leads to different outcomes. In one of these, part 1 of the novel becomes a novel called Crime, and the remaining parts are Punishment; in another, Dostoevsky’s epilogue is its own work of art to which the novel proper is but a “massive prologue.” “This prologue loads the names, the events, and even certain words with meaning that enables Dostoevsky to address his readers with great economy of exposition after hundreds of pages spent training them” (127). Needless to say, each of these plot-focused readings is convincing. Surprisingly, Belknap turns back to the little-read work of Ernest Simmons to find a counterpoint to many of his arguments—especially for his reading of the epilogue—rather than to some of the more recent critics of Dostoevsky. I expect that Belknap was perhaps being diplomatic in his choice of “straw men,” although his fellow critics might well have welcomed a more frontal engagement. Belknap’s extended reading of the controversial epilogue to the novel, which Konstantin Mochulsky has vividly described as a “pious lie,” becomes an occasion for his important ruminations about confession and repentance. Raskolnikov repents in the epilogue after an intricate series of largely incomplete confessions throughout the novel proper. “Confession is not the result of repentance. Rather, it is the means to it” (125). It is has been frequently noted that Raskolnikov rehearses his crime, but Belknap delineates how he also rehearses his confession and his repentance.
Perhaps what is most exciting about Belknap’s Plots is that it rewards the reader with a plot of its own. How many works of criticism have a plot? At the outset of his study, Belknap declares that the distinction between fabula and siuzhet, while a standard part of the critical vocabulary, has most often been regarded as “an interesting peripheral concern” (18). By the end of this book, he will likely have persuaded many readers that this very distinction often “leads to the most useful ways of understanding large works of literature.” By choosing King Lear and Crime and Punishment as his “case studies” and subjecting them to probing, close readings that examine chains of causalities, parallel plots, and depictions of how the reader, in a plot of her own, must unceasingly negotiate among all these plots, Belknap has marshalled irresistible evidence to argue that plot—more than character, setting, detail, or conclusion—is the sine qua non.
In his final chapter, Belknap permits himself a last big question: “After many pages discussing what plots are, how they work, and what they can accomplish, it is time to address a final question, what plots mean, and the attendant hermeneutic question, how that meaning is knowable” (129). Belknap unpacks the question of meaning by discussing examples of both low culture (James Cameron’s film Titanic) and high culture (Anna Karenina). In both cases he asks the question of “whether or in what cases we can use the ending of a work of literature to learn the meaning of the work” (132). Suffice it to say, Belknap answers this question (I will not be a spoiler here) through an exposition and analysis of genre and plot. As Belknap concludes his book with a stunning discussion of how novelistic justice is different from poetic justice, the reader may begin to think of actual, personal, human experience in terms of the endless, creative tension between fabula and siuzhet. It is a current but vague cliché that one forms and embraces “one’s own narrative.” Belknap indirectly but powerfully offers us a jagged, vital example of what that might mean—where fabula and siuzhet are as operative in real life as in fiction, and where different kinds of time, space, lies, truths, memories, desires, and recognitions collide and coalesce into something experienced simultaneously by each individual as both a narrative and a plot.
WORKS CITED
Allen, Woody. “The Kugelmass Episode,” in Side Effects, 59–79. New York: Random House, 1981.
Brooks, Peter. Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. New York: Random House, 1984.
Wellek, René, and Austin Warren. Theory of Literature. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1949.