I did a twenty-mile run, my longest yet, stopping only once when TB called for a chat re Blix. A combination of Blix and the recent moves by the Iraqis had got us on the back foot again. He felt it was all now about the politics of the UNSC, and would come down to a hard-headed argument for votes. It was all going to ebb and flow but we just had to keep going. He was clear that the consequences of not being with the US now were incalculable. I said I felt there had been various points where we could have done something different vis-à-vis the US. He said no, the only way to have had influence with them was to be clear from the start we would be with them when things got really tough. He was clear our interests were aligned.
Yesterday’s news of the arrest of al-Qaeda’s Number 3 kept the media off our backs for most of the day, but in general I felt things moving away from us again.26 Saddam was definitely outwitting us on al-Samoud missiles and getting us in the wrong place. We didn’t have the armoury to hit back hard. It was partly my fault because I hadn’t been motoring as I had in previous full-on communications situations. We were doing OK on the sustained arguments material, but on the quick tactical stuff I didn’t feel on form, and I think that hit TB’s confidence on some of this too. I had to decide re the FA [chief executive job] because they were starting interviews tomorrow, but I had pretty much reached the conclusion it wasn’t possible. PG said it would be seen as a disaster for TB, just when he didn’t need anything to add to his problems. The latest polling was not as bad as it might have been considering.
TB called me up at 7.45 as he was due to leave for Belfast at 8.15. He was even more worried than he had been on Friday. He felt things just were not where they needed to be. David M and John Scarlett came back from their weekend trip to Mexico and Chile and felt both countries were very firmly on the fence and could see no reason to come off it. TB said it was still possible we could get a majority on the UNSC but if it was in circumstances where people felt we bullied and arm-twisted, the French would be less worried about putting down a veto. The Americans were frankly alienating people by their tactics. David M said the message these smaller countries got was the basic assumption from the Americans that they would come over in the end.
I said to TB that our problem on the communications front was largely caused by US friendly fire. Just when we started to get a message through, they would come up with something different which would pose a real problem for us. They looked the whole time like they were desperate for war. We at least didn’t look like we were desperate for war, but we did look like we were desperate to be with them, so to a lot of people it amounted to the same thing. TB said he would have to tell Bush that it was not possible to get the votes at the moment. It was totally what they didn’t want to hear but they had to hear it from someone. He was very down on the Americans at the moment. I was feeling much as I had done for some time, compounded by another totally useless conference call which was becoming little more than a telephonic multinational diary meeting. Also I sensed they were becoming irritated with us. I told David I wanted to be frank with them that Bush, not just Rumsfeld, was the main communication problem. With TB away [in Northern Ireland] for the next day or two, I did a series of meetings on the structures we had, and also trying to analyse which of our key messages were actually getting through, both here and in the regions.
I had a meeting with Ed Balls, still going on about Peter M urging Milburn to be a rival to GB, still claiming that we were encouraging columnists to write that GB could be for the chop. He claimed GB wanted to do more on Iraq, and I said the more he did the better. But I always felt he would only do it on his terms. I also suggested he and Milburn do something public together in the run-up to the tax rise. TB called in once or twice re Iraq. Blix had effectively become a commentator as well as a player. Saddam’s games were playing well for him and whether they tried or not, the Americans just weren’t helping us in public opinion terms. Sally felt the party was with us up to the point of the destruction of missiles, which tipped the balance towards giving the inspectors more time. TB was moving to the Canadian position of a bit more time to get the questions finally answered.
I was beginning to fear that if we went to war without a second resolution, TB would fail to get it through the Commons, and he would be dead in the water. ‘I’ve just got to tell Bush clearly that if he does this wrong, he’ll have governments toppling all over the place and cause absolute chaos.’ There was a poll in Spain showing ninety-five per cent opposition. Opposition in Turkey was enormous.
TB still in Northern Ireland. The Iraq meeting was fine though I felt we needed to do more to get up the bigger argument about democracies versus dictatorships. We were in a very odd period where there was a strong sense of momentum towards war come what may, but with the dynamics feeling as though they were totally against us. He was doing OK in Belfast, though [David] Trimble [First Minister of Northern Ireland] walked out at 7 and Sinn Fein kept chiselling away. They kept at it till gone midnight and TB didn’t get back till 3am. I had some good cheques coming in – [Michael] Heseltine [former Conservative Deputy Prime Minister], [Jeremy] Paxman [BBC]. Ed Balls called, clearly having spoken to GB, and said he thought if he did something with Milburn, the story would be division not unity. Depends how you do it.
TB had just a few hours’ sleep before his meeting with [Igor] Ivanov [Russian foreign minister]. David M had raised with Condi the idea of TB going to Chile and Mexico and trying to get them to co-present on the day of Blix the idea of a final ultimatum and taking the clusters document [a paper setting out where Iraq had not complied with its disarmament obligations] from Blix to get out what needed to be done. She was not dismissive, though they may be sensing that we felt they lacked the subtlety required. TB felt strongly these countries needed to be given a reason for coming on board more than fear of US bullying. The idea would be to say after Blix reported that it was clear Saddam was not co-operating and now we would set a date by which the UNSC would decide it was clear he had not taken the final opportunity to disarm. Ivanov was clear that Putin would like to be more involved. David felt there was a case for going to Chile as early as tomorrow.
TB was pretty good in the House today, considering how little sleep he had had and how difficult the issues were. France, Germany and Russia issued a joint statement, de Villepin driving it mainly. Earlier Jack came over for a meeting with TB and told him ‘If you go next Wednesday with Bush, and without a second resolution, the only regime change that will be taking place is in this room.’ Written down, it sounds more menacing than it was. He was trying to be helpful. TB’s call to Bush was OK, though as I stayed in TB’s room, I only heard his side, saying we had a real problem with world opinion, that these countries needed a reason to come round, that he wanted to go to Chile and set out the outlines of an amended resolution with a deadline so it was clear there would be war if Saddam hadn’t responded. Blix was out again today, as much commentator as civil servant. TB felt the UNSC had to take control of this now, not Blix.
When the call ended, Jonathan walked in and said that was a ‘fuck me’ call, in that they actually seemed far apart. TB said it was not as bad as that. He told Bush we would be with them come what may but these other countries needed help to come over. He also said Bush needed to work more on Putin, not just write him off. TB then did the [Chilean President Ricardo] Lagos call and put the same idea. Lagos didn’t totally go against it but was not exactly wild and we certainly had to put on hold the idea of going tomorrow. By the end of the day, not only did he think he should go to Chile, but also Moscow and another visit to Bush. So the wanderlust was on. ‘We are in this, and nobody must think we would ever wobble.’ But the Americans were not helping. They claimed they had already slowed down as a result of TB, that Bush had wanted to go as early as yesterday but TB had made sure he didn’t. It was a pretty grim scene, and no matter how grim, TB was still saying constantly it was the right thing to do.
I ran in, slightly different route, almost five miles, then up to see TB in the flat with David and Jonathan. He was looking a bit more worried. He said the frustrating thing is that he felt that if we were in charge of it all, we would have sorted it by now. David said the Americans were much more confident they had the votes for a second resolution. TB was keen the Americans reach out far more, especially to Putin. He was also keen that we ‘rise above Blix’ and a meeting with Lagos might be the way to do that. Jack came over and we discussed pre-Blix positioning. We needed to get out the idea that we wanted the clusters document out there, also the sense that Blix was just inhaling the politics in all this. We agreed we needed to publish a version of the clusters document which would help turn round the argument. I was impressed with Jack at the moment. He could sometimes be very nerdish, and wood-for-trees, but his grasp of the detail was a help, and his political feel was currently good. We discussed with JP the idea of going to Africa to see the three leaders there.27 He was off to New York on Concorde at 9 with the message from TB that we needed to turn the Blix clusters document to our advantage.
Cabinet was scratchy, Robin and Clare both a bit bolder in setting out their concerns, Clare saying that the idea of horse trading and bullying was bad for the authority of the UN. TB hit back quite hard, said it was not just the US who were bullying and intimidating. What about the French telling the Bulgarians they would not be able to get into the EU if they sided with America? Robin was diddling rather more subtly whereas Clare was just doing anti-Americanism. John R hit back hard as well as TB. I walked through with TB to his office at the end. He said ‘God, you wouldn’t go into the jungle with them would you?’ The mood had generally been OK, though there was clearly a lot of concern about our position.
We set off for a studio in Wembley, where he was doing an MTV special. He was fairly relaxed and it helped put out a tough message, the idea that it was going to a vote and people had to decide.28 The audience was pretty good, not the usual rent-a-crowd. He spoke to the Cameroon president [Paul Biya] in the car on the way back and offered him a visit to the UK. Then the call to Lagos, and the idea of the visit was clearly not on as things stood. There was a rumour doing the rounds that Bush was about to address the Americans to say they had captured Bin Laden. I called Dan. It wasn’t true. He intended to say they were confident of a second resolution and he intended to be positive re MEPP. We agreed there may be a case for going for Blix tomorrow.
With the Chile trip off, TB was keen to go and see Bush soon. I said we had to be clear about a purpose, because there would be such focus on the visit. He said it was to get them to do the right thing. I said but they were already very clear about their purpose, which was to go for it. I said ‘Are you not sure that your frustration at the way others are dealing with it is just producing a kind of wanderlust?’ He said no matter how many times you spoke on the phone, there was no substitute for face-to-face meetings. He said don’t worry, we’ll get through this fine. I asked him, if at the end of this he was history before his time, was this issue really worth sacrificing everything? He said it is always worth doing what you think is the right thing to do. Iraq is a real problem, Saddam is a real problem, for us as much as anyone, and it’s been ignored too long.
Up to the flat to see TB with David, Jonathan and Sally. Condi had told David overnight that Putin had been clear with Bush that they would veto the second resolution. Also we still didn’t have a clue whether Chile and Mexico would come over. The mood was gloomier than ever. TB was keen to get up the clusters document and also move towards the sense of an ultimatum. He and David were both now expressing their irritation at the US. David was even of the view that we should be pushing the US to a version of the Franco-German idea of inspections with force, a blue beret [UN] force involved in disarmament. TB spent hours on the phone, including an hour with Putin, a long call with Jack and later with Bush. He wanted to give him a clear message about the political realities, namely that we could not do this without a Commons vote and it was not going to be easy without a second resolution, or with a resolution that was vetoed. The Russian veto was a new element. Everyone expected the French to be ultra difficult but thought the Russians might be more prone to be neutral, but Putin’s position had clearly hardened. During their call, Putin was very clear that he felt taken for granted by the Americans, and he felt he got a lot of talk from them but very little delivery. Jack was doing his UNSC speech and did it well and with passion. Bush was agreeing to a slightly later deadline, March 17.
TB, Jonathan, Sally, Pat [McFadden] and I had a meeting to go through some of the what-ifs, including him going if we lost a vote. TB said he felt that there had to be a vote on a second resolution and if it was about the use of troops and he lost a vote on that, he would have to go. The Tories were making clear they would support us on a war motion but not on a confidence motion. Andrew Turnbull was quietly looking into how a JP caretaker premiership would operate. Even though we were talking about his own demise, TB still felt we were doing the right thing. He said even though we were all rightly irritated by the Americans, it was the French we should be really angry with. Bush told TB he would certainly go for a vote. He was still making clear he didn’t feel he needed a UNSCR but he wanted to go for it.
Jonathan described the whole thing now as an enormous game of diplomatic chicken. TB said we could not flinch now, that if any weakness was signalled, we’ve had it. He was making clear to Bush, not in personal or moaning terms but as a reality, that his job was on the line, that if we didn’t get the Commons vote, there could be no using UK troops, which the Americans needed. Black humour was setting in. TB said his future was now in the hands of the dying president of Guinea [Lansana Conté] and the diplomatic judgement of Jeff Ennis [Labour MP]. We were sending JP to a president’s deathbed to keep the British government alive.
Bush was at least conscious of the difficulties they gave us. He said to TB don’t worry, I’ll be more subtle than you fear. ‘I’m not going to say to Lagos – hey you mutha, I’m gonna crush you like a Chilean grape.’ TB said afterwards that the reason he liked him was that he was actually so straight, and understood his own weaknesses as well as strengths. He happened to be right on the issue even if they didn’t always handle it well. I said all that being said, TB did need to think about his own position, not get pinned into just doing what Bush wanted. TB was clear with him that we needed a bit more time. I reckoned the chances of him being out within a week or two were about 20–1 now. Parliamentary arithmetic was complicated, and not yet entirely clear.
Jack called from New York and pissed me off when he referred post CIC dossier to the ‘discredited Downing Street machine’ and said he didn’t want to put out our short clusters document. We did it anyway, with Tom going over to the gallery after Blix. We were all outraged at the Blix report. TB said it was political and dishonest. Dan Bartlett said we don’t care what he thinks, his job is to tell us what he knows. Scarlett said he was wrong in saying the Iraqis were trying to co-operate more. TB was very philosophical about it all. As I sat listening to him on the phone, I lost count of how many times he said: 1. we are right on the issue; 2. we have to see it through; 3. I’m philosophical about what it means for me and whether I survive or not. TB was keen to push the idea that the only reason the concessions were coming was because of the pressure we were applying. But there were real divisions and dangers and the UN was on very dangerous terrain. There was a very clear picture, clearer than ever, of the US in one place, us in another, the French in another, the Russians in another, and the UN as an organisation really worried about where it was heading.
Blix didn’t come out as badly as it might have done. In a sense he was almost irrelevant now. I spoke to TB to agree the lines to push for the Sundays – namely there are two routes by which he can avoid conflict: 1. he disarms, or 2. he goes. TB was working the phones pretty much flat out, especially Lagos but also the Chinese and keeping in touch with Bush. We were pushing hard for the second resolution. We were discussing whether JP should go to Africa to work the African countries on TB’s behalf. I tried to get Jack out for the Frost programme but he said he was desperate for a day off. I spoke to JP who agreed to come down from Hull to do it. JP was totally onside at the moment. TB felt the PLP was at best shaky. He remained sure we were doing the right thing and it helped internally that JP was as solid as he was.
Later I did a conference call with JP, [Patricia] Hewitt and [Peter] Hain who were also on the [Sunday] programmes and went over some of the problem questions e.g. on second resolution and also the issue of a Commons vote. By the time the papers came in, the main story was a mini wave of threatened resignations by PPSs [parliamentary private secretaries]. JP was totally scornful, said they were cowardly and pathetic. When it was pointed out that Anne Campbell was one of them, JP said ‘Who is she PPS to?’ ‘Me,’ said Patricia. ‘Who is me?’ said JP. ‘It’s Patricia here, John.’ I managed to get in a long run earlier, twenty-one miles or so, and was feeling in good shape pre marathon. But Rory was racing at Brighton and had a massive allergy attack which had Fiona really worried for a while. Again, I felt bad that work had kept me from going down there with him, but he seemed a lot better when they got home. The key now was winning the necessary votes at the UN but in some ways the situation was in limbo. TB was clear we just had to keep our nerve and keep striving to get their votes.
Up to watch JP on Frost. He was fine on the basic lines we had agreed though the resignations were the main news out of it. Andy Reed [PPS to Margaret Beckett] duly resigned as I was driving with Calum, Philip [Gould] and Georgia [his daughter] to Watford. I was troubled all the way by the possible clash between the marathon and the [FA] Cup semi-final if we got through and were playing on the Sunday. But the problem never arose as we played poorly and went down 2–0. I had agreed to do a piece for the Mirror which I dictated rather half-heartedly on the drive back.
TB spoke to Jiang Zemin [Chinese Premier], and the Chinese put out the line that they were calling for more time for inspections. Then at around 5.30, just as I was settling down to do some work upstairs, Clare Short called me. She hardly ever called me, so I was surprised when Switch came on with her. She was friendly enough as we did a bit of small talk, but then got to the point. She had done an interview with Andrew Rawnsley for the Westminster Hour and had said she would resign if we went to war without a second resolution; that we were allowing our own policy to be dictated by the US; and that we were not doing enough in the Middle East. She said it all very matter-of-factly, as though she was telling me a few football results. I was conscious of myself shaking my head as she spoke, and then making a mental note to myself not to let my loathing of her pour out, but I said I was at a total loss to understand how she thought this kind of public conversation helped the government make and implement sensible policy. I also reminded her that nobody, as she herself had said, had done more than TB to get this down the UN route.
She said nothing at first. Then I said I also thought it absolutely extraordinary that she should be saying this to me, rather than to TB. ‘I thought I would call you because I knew you would be angry and I thought I’d rather get the anger direct than through the media.’ The whine in the voice was whinier than ever. As if TB was going to be doing fucking cartwheels. I said I found the whole thing extraordinary. I thought the deal was that if you were a Cabinet minister, you spoke up in Cabinet if you had concerns, that was the place to do it, and then a policy or a line was agreed and everyone stuck to it. I said I had never heard her say in Cabinet she would resign. She said – rich this, considering how often she spoke – that she tended not to speak in Cabinet in case she was briefed against. I said there was no point her talking to me; she would have to speak to TB. I would call him to see if he wanted to speak to her. She said she was going out shopping with her mum but she would take her mobile with her. How considerate.
TB was at church so I sent through a note to be given to him when the service ended. I called JP, who was due to meet TB at 7. He said the whole thing was typical of her – she was a coward, couldn’t cope with pressure, and so ended up doing it like this, hanging her conscience out to dry. Jack called after learning Mike O’Brien was going to be played the tape of her interview on the programme. He said this was the result of years of her being allowed to do what she wanted. It was a disgrace. I spoke to Mike and we agreed he would simply stress the line we were working for a second resolution and not get drawn into a detailed conversation re Clare. TB finally called after he got back to Chequers from church. He was as appalled as I expected him to be. ‘It is disgusting, totally disgusting.’ It was the same word virtually every minister who called to complain used. TB said he was appalled for a whole stack of different reasons: 1. at what she had said and done; 2. that she had done it on the radio rather than talking to him; 3. that she had called me rather than him, and 4. most importantly, that it totally undercut his strategy to build UN support. He felt it showed there was a willingness among some – her included – to push him out over this. I was less sure it was a thought-through thing at all.
I said I cannot see how you can keep her without looking weak. He said in process terms, there was no doubt about that. The BBC had told Mike O’Brien that she called them up and volunteered to go on. He spoke to her later, and said simply he would reflect. We agreed to a public line that simply made clear she had never spoken in these terms within Cabinet or to the PM. There was no point rushing on this. JP spoke to her a couple of times. He said what she was saying was that she didn’t have confidence in the PM’s strategy, or his ability to pursue it. She claimed it had not come out as she intended, which was bollocks. I now had the transcript and went through it with JP. He said he didn’t see how he could keep her in those circumstances. She was clearly limbering up to go. He thought it was not impossible GB knew what she was planning and that she might be thinking in terms of a stalking-horse challenge at conference. I went with Fiona and the kids to Pizza Express, but the phone just never stopped, usually another minister to go on about how beyond the pale she was and had to go.
TB called again, said Saddam would be laughing his head off when he heard about it. Later a secure conference call with Jonathan, David M with Condi, Dan and Andy Card [White House chief of staff] to go through the various scenarios: majority with no vetoes – fine; majority plus veto(es) – manageable but difficult; no vote; no majority. We said if we got a second resolution we would put it to a parliamentary vote quickly. We could live with a French veto, because people expected it, but we couldn’t live without a majority. If that happened, we would probably have to put it to a vote, and if we lost it, there was a danger we would lose the prime minister. The Yanks said that if we got a majority with vetoes, Bush wanted to go straight in, within days, even short of the March 17 deadline, would say the UNSC had failed to act, and get going, on the basis of 1441. We made the point that we needed the second resolution. Without it, we had real problems in Parliament. They said continually they wanted to help us but of course what they really wanted was the use of our forces.
Jonathan and I continually emphasised we needed the second resolution. We had seven definite votes still, but Condi was less confident re Chile and Mexico. She said [Vicente] Fox [President of Mexico] was in a state of torture because it was such a big thing to stand up against the US. They basically wanted by Tuesday/Wednesday to say we had exhausted every effort and now the diplomatic window had closed. We said if we got the majority for a second resolution, even with vetoes we would have to go through it, including with the timetable. Andy Card said he feared the president’s response would be ‘Here we go, another final opportunity, a final final opportunity and this time we really mean it.’ I said TB’s job was on the line and we did not want to lose him. ‘No, nor do we,’ said Condi. I think our concern was probably deeper. I called Jack Cunningham [former Cabinet minister] who was doing the media in the morning. He was scathing re Short, Chris Smith, Kilfoyle, Dobson. There were two groups ranged against TB, he said – those who never wanted him, and those who felt he didn’t share their own high view of themselves. But the mood out there was not good, and this was a ‘dangerous moment’ for TB. I listened to Clare’s interview and the disgusting self-indulgent whine made the words even worse to the ear than they were in print on the transcript. It was clear she was asking to go, but wanting the moral high ground when it happened.
Another rash of ministerial calls after it went out – JP, JR, JS, DB – all saying she was an outrage and there had to be decisive leadership about this. JP said to her afterwards that he had been sitting in the room with TB as he called some of these leaders and she totally undercut his strategy. Phil Webster [Times] told me every single broadsheet had been planning to lead on TB trying to go the UN route, and then Clare does this. I listened in later to the TB/Bush call. TB started by saying he was ‘fighting on all fronts’. ‘Attaboy,’ came the reply, a bit too patronisingly for my tastes. TB said one of his ministers was threatening to resign, also that Chirac told Lagos that the Africans were ‘in the bag’. I hope that’s bullshit, said Bush. TB had spoken to the four leaders who made up the 8 plus 1. [Pervez] Musharraf [President of Pakistan] was with us but it was difficult for him. Cameroon said absolutely. Guinea’s foreign minister coming tomorrow. [José Eduardo] Dos Santos [President of Angola] solid.
TB was doing most of the talking, said he felt Lagos was trying to move. We had been working on the idea of laying out a series of tests re what we meant by full co-operation. He felt Bush needed to work some more on Fox. He felt if we could get them to accept the idea of the tests, other countries would also come with us. But Bush said he was already putting enormous pressure on Mexico. He said he had also been twisting Lagos’ arm, ‘but gently because I respect you’. GWB said he could be in no doubt that if there was a vote, they would have to use it. TB said the Chileans felt any tests should be agreed through Blix. Bush not happy. Bush said Saddam was very adept at exploiting weakness and Blix was weak. These countries need to see we want to do this peacefully. He wants the vote to go through but not on an unreasonable basis.
TB said the public opinion problem stemmed from people feeling the US wanted a war. We have to put up the genuine tests of disarmament, show the determination to try to do this peacefully. Bush said he had never come across a situation where the dividing line between success and failure was so narrow. He said we want it done peacefully, or any other way. His tone was very different to TB’s. Bush was talking the diplomatic talk whilst clearly irritated by the whole thing. His worry was that we were negotiating with ourselves, that we get a resolution with a timeframe, everything they want, and we get nothing for it. He said he couldn’t believe Chirac said he had the Africans in the bag. ‘I can,’ said TB. ‘I have a lot of experience of them.’ He [Bush] was clearly aware of how tough things were getting for TB. He said if the swing countries didn’t vote with us ‘my last choice is for your government to go down. That is the absolute last thing I want to have happen. I would rather go it alone than have your government fall.’ ‘I appreciate that,’ said TB. ‘I really mean that,’ said Bush. TB said it was also important he understood that he really believed in what they were trying to do. Bush – ‘I know that but I am not going to see your government fall on this.’
TB said ‘I’ve got our troops there too. If I can’t get it through Parliament, we fall, and that is not exactly the regime change I want. We have to work out what Mexico and Chile need.’ They agreed to speak again to Lagos and Fox. TB said we were in high-risk, high-reward territory. Bush said he was being eroded domestically by inactivity. He also said he felt the hardest part would be after Saddam. Then Bush did a number on the changes in the Arab world that could follow. TB said the biggest concern in not going with the UN was the lack of support if things went wrong. [US General] Tommy Franks had said ninety per cent of precision bombs are precise. That leaves ten per cent. But Bush was left in no doubt TB would be with him when the time came. Bush said ‘I’m not going to let you down. Hang in there buddy. You are doing great.’ What had been interesting was that Bush listened far more intently to TB. TB did not make too much of his own problems, and was stressing he thought we were doing the right thing.
Needless to say Clare was leading the news, amid lots of assumptions we would sack her. The papers, as expected, were fairly grim. I went up to the flat where David was briefing TB on Jeremy Greenstock’s meeting with Blix. Blix was just about up for the clusters plan. TB wanted Jeremy to work on Blix and [Dimitri] Perricos [Blix’s deputy] to get them signed up to it. It was the only show in town and the only one likely to lead to a majority of the UNSC. He was still working on Lagos and worried about him. Re Clare he said he viewed it as an act of personal betrayal to do what she did, without warning, when he was in the midst of negotiating on this. TB’s real anger with the French had been the sending of mixed messages to Saddam, and that is what Clare was doing too. He was minded to sack her but on the other hand felt there was no point in doing anything other than being totally hard-headed and ruthless about the issue, in which she was something of a sideshow.
I got Jack Cunningham, Bev Hughes [Home Office minister] and Alan Milburn up all making the point that it was odd to do this on the radio rather than speak to the PM about the threat to resign. JP spoke to her twice last night and again this morning and sensed she had concluded we were definitely going to war and she was going to position herself to resign with maximum damage. He even wondered whether she wasn’t setting herself up as a possible challenger to GB. I took JP up to the flat. He said it was on balance not sensible to help turn her into a martyr, which is what she wanted, but instead leave her hanging in the wind for a while. He went off to speak to her again and later TB spoke to her, told her she had committed an act of gross betrayal, that he was at a total loss to understand how she could do that. Her defence was that she felt in recent weeks his approach with her was to listen politely but take no notice. He said to her who do you think got us down the UN route, who is the one still pushing on that, who is the one trying to use this to get the MEPP going again? She was totally beyond the pale. He had decided however that he was not going to sack her. JP and I were usually at the front of the ‘get rid of her’ queue but agreed that on this it would be a mistake. JP said it was all about her position, nothing else. She did say sorry at the end of her conversation, but in that whiney, drippy way that was designed to convey she was sorry that he couldn’t see things as clearly as she did.
Jack C was excellent on the media. TB and I prepared for the ITV programme which was pretty dire because the usual so-called representative audience was packed with the usual activists. TB meeting with Hilary A, John R, David Triesman. Hilary said that if we didn’t get a second resolution, or if there was a French veto, we were in trouble. So the PLP was willing to subcontract foreign policy to Chirac? We headed over to the FCO for the ITV special. I knew the moment we arrived the audience would be a problem. You could smell the mood. They were not so-called ordinary people but a group put together to give TB as hard a time as possible. Trevor McDonald didn’t chair it very well and the whole thing became not just difficult on the substance, but also pretty undignified. When all is said and done he is the prime minister and one or two of them were talking to him like he was a piece of shit on the pavement. He kept calm and dealt with it fine, deciding in the end just to absorb it all but as he came out he gave me a look that could kill. It was a pretty shoddy operation and Peter Stothard [former Times editor], who was following us around for the Times magazine with [photographer] Nick Danziger, reckoned that not only was the audience slanted, but they had wound them up beforehand.
Then a meeting to discuss whether we could get going on a revised amendment with the challenges to Saddam. [Igor] Ivanov had said the Russians would veto and Chirac did the same. Pakistan indicated abstention. TB told Lagos that if Chile and others moved, the French would pull back but that looked doubtful. Chirac was clearly up for the kill on this, really felt he could damage TB and alarm some of his traditional allies. Chirac was now out with the veto message. TB was on and off the phone to Lagos who said he was eighty per cent there but worried about France and Russia. TB spoke to Greenstock, then at 9.50 did a long call with Bush. GWB kicked off ‘Did you save your Cabinet woman?’ TB said she was still in for the moment, that she met every description of self-indulgence ‘but we have to carry on’. TB did most of the talking, set out where he thought all the different players were. GWB reckoned seven votes solid ‘locked up’ but Pakistan and the Latins were difficult. He felt Chirac was trying to get us to the stage where we would not put to a vote because we would be so worried about losing.
TB said he felt Lagos wanted to come, but he needed to be able to say he had achieved something, even winning a few days more. But I could sense in his voice and the manner of the discussion that Bush was less emollient than yesterday. He felt Fox would do whatever Chile did. TB said Lagos wanted to come with us but he was very nervous. TB had spoken to him several times. He was biting but wanted to know what the inspectors would say. Lagos was asking do we have to accept military action if he fails these tests? Bush asked re timeframe. TB said they would want to kick us back a few days as a way of showing they got something out of this.
The French and Russian strategy was to play it so hard that we end up thinking we cannot even dream of getting to nine or ten votes. But TB said if we can shift Chile and Mexico, we change the weather. If we can make these tests the basis of an ultimatum, and then the French and Russians have to veto, with Chile and Mexico behind us, and the numbers right on the UN, I think I have a fighting chance of getting it through the Commons. Bush was worried about rolling in more time. TB held his ground, said the Latins had to be able to say they got something out of all this talking to us. They need to be able to point to something that they won last minute that explains why they finally supported us. Bush said the first resolution was also tough – total and complete disarmament. ‘We can’t weaken.’ 1441, he said, we should just put it down again.
TB felt the second resolution was important and this was the best way to get it. He felt that we needed UN backing, or at least a majority, on the assumption France and Russia would veto. Bush said ‘Let me be frank. The second resolution is for the benefit of Great Britain. We want it so we can go ahead together.’ His worry was that we would get rolled over on timings and also the inspectors would get used by Saddam again. There was something crazy and random about what was going on. It was a pure accident of timing that suddenly made Chile and Mexico the focus of so much diplomacy, TB working on Lagos, Bush on Fox. TB said when this is over, we need to take a long hard look at the reality of how the UN works. These countries suddenly had a lot of power but seemed unsure how to use it. TB felt the Russians, French and Germans now had a bit of a swagger, felt they were showing that the Americans can be taught a lesson. TB felt if we swung over Chile, Mexico would come, then we could go to Putin and say let’s be reasonable.
Bush said he’d had a bad conversation with the Turks. [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan [new President of Turkey] had basically given him a lecture on world events when Bush called for [military] overflight rights. He said he would have to go to Parliament. Bush said ‘It was not friend-to-friend, far from it. Maybe the interpreter didn’t get the nuances, I don’t know, but it was a bad call, no camaraderie.’ He said again we must not retreat from 1441 and we cannot keep giving them more time.
I was by and large signed up for the policy but it did make me feel a bit sick the extent to which our problems were US-created, and our politics now so dominated by their approach. TB had not really wavered at all but as the time got nearer the politics got tougher. Bush said ‘It’s time to do this. We have sent tough signals and he knows that. So no more deals.’ He had told Rumsfeld to move the ships. We had Schroeder coming over and Bush told TB the Germans needed to know the real lie of the land. He said he took Schroeder’s election antics personally.
Bush said again he had no problem with TB presenting him as the US hard cop against his persuading soft cop. He then said ‘It makes me sick the way these people are trying to divide us so that we help save Saddam’s skin.’ Bush said ‘If you ran for president over here, you’d whip my ass.’ Laughter. TB said he was sure we were doing the right thing and we had to see it through but it was going to be really tough. Bush signed off with ‘Hang in there friend.’
Growing sense of crisis, what with the Chirac veto, talk of a challenge to TB and the dynamic moving away from us the whole time. The press was about as OK as it could be re Clare, but generally things were getting more not less difficult. TB was seeing the Portuguese PM [José Manuel Barroso]. I missed the start because I was doing the morning meeting, but went in for the end, and said there was the case for going at the French with the concept of an ‘unreasonable veto’. TB laughed and said to Barroso ‘He is the Roy Keane of the operation.’ When he said that Barroso would be more diplomatic, I said I know, because he is the Eusébio [great Portuguese footballer]. The doorstep was fine, TB saying Chirac risked letting Saddam off the hook by saying they would veto ‘quelles que soient les circonstances’ [whatever the circumstances]. After Barroso left we had a meeting with JP, JR and Hilary A to try to get more politics into all this. The party was going to be important and we were neglecting things.
TB asked if we should not be a bit nicer to Clare and was met with a row of uniformly horrified looks. JP looked at him as though he was mad. TB briefed them on the diplomacy and we agreed I should do a briefing note to go to the whole of the PLP. JP and I also agreed, having persuaded TB to do more difficult TV, that there was a danger it was going too far, that Operation Access had become Operation Masochism and there was something a bit undignified about him getting beaten up too much. [Peter] Goldsmith had done a long legal opinion and said he did not want TB to present it too positively. He wanted to make it clear he felt there was a reasonable case for war under 1441. There was also a case to be made the other way and a lot would depend on what actually happened. TB also made clear that he did not particularly want Goldsmith to launch a detailed discussion at Cabinet, though it would have to happen at some time, and ministers would want to cross-examine. With the mood as it was, and with Robin and Clare operating as they were, he knew that if there was any nuance at all, they would be straight out saying the advice was that it was not legal, the AG was casting doubt on the legal basis for war. Peter Goldsmith was clear that though a lot depended on what happened, he was casting doubt in some circumstances and if Cabinet had to approve the policy of going to war, he had to be able to put the reality to them. Sally said it was for TB to speak to Cabinet, and act on the AG’s advice. He would simply say the advice said there was a reasonable case. The detailed discussion would follow.29
Alan Milburn called me later to say RC told him he would resign if we didn’t get a second resolution. Of the two, RC was easily the more serious and the more thought through. Peter G told TB he had been thinking of nothing else for three weeks, that he wished he could be much clearer in his advice, but in reality it was nuanced. I had a polling meeting with Stan Greenberg. The Lib Dems were on the up a bit. Tuition fees was a growing problem. The figures on right/wrong direction were not great. Asylum was still number one problem area, then crime, and the two were becoming linked in some people’s minds. We were losing young people, London swing voters, plus middle class. The Tories had the beginnings of a message that was getting through. Of those who voted for us last time, only sixty-three per cent were still solid. Stan was very sceptical about what we were doing with the Americans. He felt we were being used as part of a US strategy.
TB did a call with Lagos, who was still moving about, then to a meeting with JS, GH, CDS and the AG re the military plan. GH said he would be happier with a clearer green light from the AG. Andrew Turnbull really irritated TB when he said he would need something to put round the Civil Service that what they were engaged in was legal. TB was clear we would do nothing that wasn’t legal, and gave him a very heavy look. Peter [Goldsmith] did a version of the arguments he had put to TB, on the one hand, on the other, reasonable case. GH raised the US request for use of Diego Garcia and [RAF] Fairford, saying we should not say it was automatic but had to go round the system. TB said he did not want to send a signal that we would not do it. GH and JS were trying to press on him that the Americans were thinking about doing this very soon, i.e. even at the weekend, and that some of our forces would have to be in before.
CDS said his formal military advice would be that it was not sensible to go on the 17th because of the full moon. We would have to get in before any bombs with night vision and buggies. Our forces were to be involved in the operation to secure the oilfields and prevent the Iraqis setting off an environmental catastrophe to hit the oil markets. We desperately needed some change in the diplomatic weather. The best thing may in the end be to go in without a vote because of the timings, and that once troops are in there the mood changes. But short of that, which was risky enough, it was hard to see how the dynamic changed. There was another small step back with the news Guinea would not be coming with us because they were now in the chair. The system is crazy, like pot luck as to who is in a voting seat at any one time, though I guess it is just about the only way they can make all countries feel more or less involved.
Then came another Rumsfeld disaster. He did a press conference at which he said he and Geoff Hoon had just spoken and went on to indicate that we would not necessarily be in the first wave of attacks because of our parliamentary difficulties. It was not entirely clear whether it was deliberate – i.e. a warning shot that they could and would do it without us – or a fuck-up. We all assumed the latter. He just didn’t get other people’s politics at all. David M said it made it virtually impossible to have a shared strategy with them. Hopeless. Yet another communications friendly fire. TB went bonkers about it, then called Geoff, who admitted he had put the thought in Rumsfeld’s head because he was trying to be very explicit about our difficulties as a way of reining him in. Rumsfeld must have thought he was being helpful, God knows. GH got on to the Defense Department and got them to put out a retraction, making clear we were with them. But it was all very ragged, and indicative once more of the difficulties.
TB had an audience with the Queen at the Palace which usually cheered him up a bit, but he came back still in a real fury re Rumsfeld. He spoke to Geoff, then Lagos, before going to JP’s flat where he was having dinner with him and GB. As if he didn’t have enough on his plate he was also in the midst of another ‘let’s sort GB and the future’ phase. He said afterwards it was all very odd because they didn’t really get to the point. He said he felt something close to contempt for GB at the moment, the way he was manoeuvring even on this. Hilary A had told him earlier that there were people in the PLP not sure which way to go because they were unclear where GB was, and whether it would affect their future chances if he took over. It was a bad scene, really bad, and one which TB felt reflected badly on GB’s leadership credentials.
Sally and I were both working late and waiting for his 11pm Bush call. We saw him in the flat when he came back. He said he couldn’t believe how the US kept fucking things up, the Rumsfeld thing just the latest. TB was pretty mellow, probably a bad sign. He had suddenly had a load of energy drained from him. He also took a call from Murdoch who was pressing on timings, saying how News International would support us, etc. Both TB and I felt it was prompted by Washington, and another example of their over-crude diplomacy. Murdoch was pushing all the Republican buttons, how the longer we waited the harder it got.
TB/Bush call, 11pm. Bush referred to Rumsfeld’s latest gaffe. ‘I want to apologise for that – one of those attempts to be helpful that wasn’t very helpful.’ These things happen, said TB, but with enough irritation in his voice for the message to be clear. GWB described his latest calls with Fox and Lagos as ‘difficult’. He had said they had to give us their votes, that we had to get this over with. There were two options – the soft resolution, or no resolution, but there needs to be an up-and-down vote. He was determined we could not let the date slip. He told them they could have a week. He said the Africans were under huge pressure but solid. Pakistan looking for a way back. ‘I just don’t understand these guys.’ He said Lagos and Fox were clearly happier with no vote. TB said we needed to hold their feet to the fire. Bush ‘I’m waiting your instructions. If it falls apart I’m going to make a speech to the American people saying I tried, and now Saddam has forty-eight hours to leave the country.’ TB said he still felt Chile would come round and not walk away.
Bush felt seven days was too big a stretch to give them. He said Congress was getting restless and all the polls were showing criticism of the UN for inaction. ‘We just got to go.’ TB said we had to do something to change the diplomatic weather and get on the front foot but if we can’t get anything, we’re in real trouble and there is no point pushing the UN beyond what it will take. Bush said ‘We know he’s not going to disarm. We already had benchmarks. I said to Ricardo [Lagos] that it is time to stand up and be counted. I want your vote. He said no. I said I’ll tell Tony and he said no, I’ll tell him.’ He sounded pretty much at the end of it. TB said he would speak to him again and that a week’s delay was the top end for us. As Condi had said, the danger is losing altitude but if we were on the front foot we would gain it again. But Bush said these guys were just playing for time. He felt maybe we stand on Thursday and say there could be no new UNSCR, that it had failed in its mission so Saddam has forty-eight hours to leave. He did not feel the need to buy more time. He was more impatient than ever. TB said he felt a bit more give on the last Putin call but Bush wasn’t really listening to this stuff now. TB felt the problem was that the Chiles and Mexicos were not used to making decisions as big as these. But he felt Mexico was making a big mistake siding with the French against the US. Fox was less like a leader than an official. All we got was ‘I’ll get back to you.’
Jack S said that Rumsfeld’s idiotic comments gave us a way out, namely that we could not be involved at the start but could do humanitarian afterwards. TB was not keen but Jack was very blunt. He said we were dealing, however right we thought it was, with a US ‘war of choice’ and we had to understand, as Powell told him the whole time, that some of these people around Bush could not care two fucks about us whatever, and that went for TB as much as the rest of us. Jonathan and I agreed that last night had effectively been a pincer movement. Rumsfeld fucking up had forced us to come out strong. TB felt the Murdoch call was odd, not very clever. Jack had clearly been wound up big time while he was over there. He said we were victims of hopeless bullying and arrogant diplomacy. David M also felt yesterday had been a rather crude attempt to shaft us. He came to see me later and said we really have to work hard to keep TB in position. He was so earnest about it but adamant that both America and France were so capable of doing the wrong things for the wrong reasons that TB was absolutely key to keeping the international community together. David felt he was in a different league to the rest and could not be sacrificed in all this.
David felt we should say to the Americans they could only use our troops after the first effort and also on humanitarian duties. TB did not want to go down that route, no matter how much he agreed the Americans were not being helpful. Jack was absolutely vituperative about Rumsfeld and said we were being driven by their political strategy. TB said maybe, but it was still the right thing to do. After Jack left, we went down for a meeting with JP, HA and JR. TB admitted things were not going in the right direction at all. We agreed we were going to put out six tests30 for Saddam today and also emphasise we were in this because it was right, not because the US wanted it. That was a point I made on the conference call where I didn’t hide how pissed off we were with Rumsfeld, and said we couldn’t have a situation where they were commenting on our politics.
TB had a couple of meetings with GB who was being brought in more closely on Iraq now, thanks to JP’s meeting with him. We agreed that we really had to put it to a vote in the Commons even if we didn’t get a second resolution because that was what we had promised and TB would just have to go and fight for his life on it. JP and Hilary both felt the note I did for the PLP was helpful and suggested I do another to update facts and arguments. I also put round a note to Cabinet on arrangements and structures for communications in the event of war. At PMQs, TB was on form and IDS was awful because he tried to exploit the Clare Short situation. There was a suggestion that the French may try to put down a resolution based on our tests. TB agreed my note on the tests. Jack at the PLP set us up well and we were now clearly saying 1441 gave us the legal cover we needed.
Chirac had effectively said he would veto anything, so even though we were continuing to work for it, it was hard to imagine getting one. The French were clearly worried. Just before PMQs, Matthew Rycroft took a call from [Gérard] Errera to say the Elysée wanted to make clear that ‘whatever the circumstances’ was being taken out of context. They were clearly backtracking. Then to the secure room to listen to the Bush call. Bush said his people had watched TB at PMQs and said he was brilliant. TB said he had spoken to Lagos and the Chileans were buggering about. Bush said Fox had told him he would get back to him within an hour, and then went off to hospital for a back operation. TB laid it on the line that we had to have a vote in the Commons. He said we couldn’t pull the plug on UN negotiating because the bigger the gap between the end of the negotiation and a Commons motion, the worse it was for us. We had to keep trying. Bush said when do you anticipate a vote? TB said we had pencilled in next Tuesday. Bush: ‘Erm.’ Long pause. TB: ‘You want to go on the Monday?’ Correct. TB: ‘My military have given me formal advice re the full moon.’ It’s not a problem, said Bush. ‘What – are they taking away the moon?’ TB said he would have to check it out. There was clear tension between Bush wanting sooner and TB wanting later.
Bush was clear that the French position meant no UNSCR. But we were still trying to be reasonable. He felt that on withdrawal of the resolution he would give a speech saying the diplomatic phase is over, issue a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam, say late Friday, which takes us to Sunday. TB went over the politics here, how we were pulling out every stop. TB said there was a danger the Tories would see this as their chance to get rid of him, support us on a war motion, but not a confidence motion. Bush said they would make it clear to the Tories that if they moved to get rid of TB ‘we will get rid of them’. He said he wouldn’t speak to ‘Iain Duncan Baker’ himself – TB didn’t correct him – ‘but he’ll know my message’.
The French had definitely allowed themselves to be presented as the unreasonable ones, which was probably swinging opinion our way a bit, but it was still very difficult. TB said it was important we still showed we were trying to be reasonable. But he said if Bush could delay his broadcast till after our Commons vote, it would help. Sunday, say you’ve tried, the French are being impossible, we are working the phones. Monday, we take it to Parliament and say we must bring this to a conclusion. Vote Tuesday. Forty-eight hours you go to their people and say war. The best argument we had is that we don’t want our foreign policy decided by the French, though TB was clear again that Rumsfeld’s comments had given us a problem.
He then started to press on the Middle East and said that if Bush would commit to publishing the road map, that would be a big breakthrough. We needed a fresh UNSCR on the humanitarian situation post conflict. Nobody doubts us on the tough side of things, but it’s Middle East, humanitarian, democracy in Iraq, that people here want to hear about. TB spelled out the symbolism in the road map. Bush didn’t quite get it but was willing to do it. He said if you took a poll here they’d think the road map was a local atlas. He said he had never shaken hands with [Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat and he was never going to kiss him either. But TB really pressed on him and he got it by the end. Bush said we had to watch out for the French, that they would be worried they had got themselves in a ridiculous position.
I then had a long call with Dan Bartlett, who said there was some talk of a Bush/TB/Aznar meeting on neutral territory at the weekend to show continuing commitment to diplomacy. TB was now worried that the French would put down their own resolution aimed at getting support for delay and forcing the Americans to veto it. We were now in a position of not having a second resolution put to a vote at the UN, but then having a vote in the Commons for military [action] without a second resolution on the grounds everyone knows the French would veto it. I was very frank with Dan, said that the chief American voices had been doing us real damage. Hilary Armstrong came in for a chat. She was very stoic about it all and said it was going to be difficult.
Greenstock put down the six tests at the UN at 2am. Before anyone had even had time properly to discuss them, de Villepin rejected them, allowing us to go to an aggressive position re French intransigence and their ‘whatever the circumstances’. We needed to keep going on the tests through the day. We also wanted it that Blix wanted the TV address rather than us. I had a brief chat with IDS before he saw TB for a Privy Council talk re where we were. I just could not imagine him in there as PM. Jack and JP had both spoken to Robin and were clear he was going to quit if we didn’t get a second resolution. It was a matter of when, not if, now. TB was due to see Robin and Clare before Cabinet and JP emphasised how important it was to make clear today was not the final Cabinet before any action, that there would be another one if the UN process collapsed. The political argument we needed now was that the French had made it more not less likely that there would be conflict. This was the way some of our MPs could come back. The other thing all of us were pushing on our US counterparts was the importance of publication of the road map. Dan and I had taken to calling it ‘the Detroit A to Z’ as a way of me trying to get them to understand why it mattered so much to us. Jack agreed to go out and do clips on the French.
Cabinet was delayed while TB saw Robin and Clare. When he came in he said ‘Good morning,’ and they all – or almost all – did a schoolkids-type ‘Good morning’ back which at least lowered the temperature a bit. TB talked through Iraq. Gareth Williams [Leader of the House of Lords] said there would be a debate on the legality. Clare said the AG should come to that. TB said of course he would. He said that the French had exposed fully how intransigent they were. Chirac’s ‘whatever the circumstances’ was a mistake, and the wrong approach, and people were angry about it. They had also now rejected the basis of the tests we were proposing without any discussion or consideration. He felt Chirac’s desire for a ‘bipolar world’ was leading him to turn away from discussion of any kind on this. He promised another discussion before a vote. Jack reported on UN activity. Clare chipped in ‘Why can’t the US give more time?’ GB came in very strongly later on, on the French in particular.
RC said we should not ‘burn our bridges’ with the French, made clear that though there may be a legal base for action, there was no political case without a second resolution and we must keep working for it. He spoke very deliberately, as though he had rehearsed and of course everyone was listening for tone as well as content. It was a very clear marker that he would quit if there was action without a second resolution. He felt that without it we did not have the moral, diplomatic or humanitarian cover. Clare was even heavier, said we needed the road map published, lambasted the ‘megaphone diplomacy’ but as ever gave the impression it was just us and the Americans who engaged in it. She said the world community was split because the Americans were rushing. We should not be attacking the French but coming up with a different kind of process. ‘If we can get the road map, we can get the world reunited behind it.’ She was calmer by the end and my sense was RC would definitely quit, but she might stay.
I did a secure call with Dan. They were still keen on another meeting. Bush was prepared to come to London. I said I was not sure that was the right thing to do. The best thing you guys can do for us is publish the road map. I mentioned the idea of the Bush visit to TB. He was tempted but finally agreed GWB on UK soil in the run-up to the vote was not what we needed. The satirists would have a field day, ‘I’ve come over here so that Tony and I could hold joint prayer sessions with your troubled backbenchers, so they can see the light. I like Tony so much because he is so much not a socialist,’ etc. Definitely not what we needed right now.
TB was sure the French had something else tricky lined up. I did a note for TB post the chat with Dan, emphasising the need to keep driving a hard bargain from the position we were in. We agreed a plan – road map Friday, maybe visit Saturday. Talks expected to collapse Monday. Tuesday vote. Action begins immediately after the vote, then war declared, though no bombing yet. Then bombing and the POTUS [President of the United States] call. I went over to SIS to go over a few things, and what they could do to help once we got going. They were focused on the need to make sure the MoD documented properly all the atrocities, WMD, torture incidents etc. They were a pretty impressive bunch. We went over a lot of the obvious stuff, but once the discussion got going, I felt they got far better than other parts of the government machine the importance of dominating the media battle and also the need to stay robust whatever else was going on.
He was due to speak to Bush. Bush said that they could do the road map, give it to the Israelis and Palestinians once Abu Mazen [about to take over as Palestinian Prime Minister] accepts the position. TB said that could make a big difference, anything up to fifty votes. ‘It’ll cost me 50,000,’ said Bush. TB said he had just seen a group of ‘wobbly MPs’ who were all clear the road map would help. There was a totemic significance to this. TB said it might also help him hang on to a couple of Cabinet ministers. GWB suggested he might be better off without them. He clearly could not fathom why the road map mattered so much. He had been reluctant because of Arafat. He then said ‘Tell Alastair, like I’m telling my boys, that I don’t want to read a word about this until I’ve said it. It is in our interests that I come out and say this, and it’s clear I mean it.’ TB said the French thought they had lost the initiative and were getting worried. He felt we had to keep in very close touch with Mexico and Chile over the weekend. He was worried the French would come up with a counter-proposal and win them over. Bush referred to the discussions Dan and I had been having. ‘I guess me coming to London might create a stir.’
They kept going back to the parliamentary arithmetic. TB said it was knife-edge, that we were maybe twenty-five short of comfort. He said I know you think I’ve gone mad about the road map but it really will help. Bush said that Rumsfeld had asked him to apologise to TB. He said after the diplomatic process collapsed he would do his ultimatum speech. Nothing military will happen before our vote. After our vote, if we win, the order goes to Rumsfeld to get their troops to move. Ops begin. He said he would not be doing a declaration of war. Wednesday 8pm in the region, 1pm US, 6pm UK ‘They go. Ten hours of operations before anyone finds out what is going on.’ He intended to wait as long as possible before saying the troops were in action.
Dan called later to say they were postponing the meeting to Sunday because Spain had big demos on Saturday and Aznar felt he should stay for that. Aznar didn’t like the idea of Bermuda so we settled on the Azores.31 I had a meeting with GB and his people to go over all the difficult lines and to engage him in more media. We had to pin this on the French now. Then another chat with Dan to work out how we fill the void in the coming days. I asked him to make sure Bush did not wear any of his bomber jacket-type stuff. Things were pretty rocky with Fiona, who was really pressing for departure now, and I was feeling pretty stressed. I called Neil [Kinnock] in Rome and asked for him to have a word with her, and just spell out the kind of pressure I was under, and why I needed her to hang in just a while longer.
A real sense the diplomatic scene was going nowhere but we kept going with the line we were working flat out for a second resolution. To a meeting with TB, JP and GB. Gordon was far more engaged, pressing for constant meetings, election-type hours, working with me on the arguments and lines, agreeing to do more media. I was keen we somehow avoid the Azores meeting being seen as a council of war but it would be hard. A message came through that Chirac wanted to speak to TB. It was a lot friendlier than it might have been and he said we should strive for good relations. He was straight on to the point TB expected, namely he could see a way of co-operating on the tests but it must be the inspectors who decide if Saddam is co-operating. He said he could not support an ultimatum or anything taken as support for military action.
TB said the problem with that was that it meant he could have as many last chances and as much time as he wanted. There had to be automaticity [trigger for attack]. Chirac said there could not be automaticity. They agreed Jack and de Villepin should talk but TB issued instructions to Jack to concede nothing. There was intelligence suggesting the French were seeking to get the undecided six to go for tests plus more time. TB suspected Chirac would move to a position of automaticity but inspectors are the sole judges of compliance.
Robin called to discuss ‘rules of engagement’ in the event of his resignation. I got Sally to join us when he came over. We were pressing him to stay, saying we couldn’t have the French running our foreign policy, telling him Bush was about to do the road map. He said it would make a bit of difference but not much. He said this went deeper. He felt we were too close to a unilateralist right-wing US government that didn’t care two hoots about the UN and didn’t care two hoots about Tony, other than for his skills as a better politician and communicator than they are. He felt it was dishonest for him to pretend he supported them any more. He couldn’t. He said he did not want to be awkward and was clear he wanted TB to stay. ‘I do not want to be part of a process that sees Gordon become prime minister on the back of this.’
I said I thought if his mind was made up we should tie it all up before Monday’s Cabinet. He said fine, that he was sad but felt a great peace of mind having made the decision. He wasn’t questioning the integrity of those with a different view but he was doing what he felt was the right thing. He said he valued the good relationship we had and ‘Could we agree a pact of no rubbishing on either side?’ Absolutely. ‘Can you ensure John Reid is part of that? The man can start a fight in a paper bag.’ He intended to do a personal statement and speak in the debate. We agreed to consult re draft letters over the weekend. I said I would ensure TB was warm about him and he should be warm about TB.
I then went to another meeting with TB and GB. TB said it was extraordinary how much more dangerous the world seemed, when in fact more people were enjoying peace and prosperity than ever before. He had to leave for a few minutes and GB and I watched Bush doing his road-map statement. He did it pretty well and put the tone in as we had been suggesting. GB asked me what I really thought of Bush. Complicated, I said. Bits of him I like, bits I don’t. But he has got a long way by being underestimated. I was conscious of putting a bit of a line, even with GB, because you never quite knew how he stored these things away and used them. We spoke fairly openly but there was none of the old flow and warmth and laughter. Sad really. I worked on TB’s draft words for the MEPP press conference. The Palestinians were being negative post Bush. TB said if they carry on like this they will lose the opportunity they’ve been given. It had a feel of Northern Ireland about it.
Then to the secure room to listen to another TB/Bush call. He kicked off with a ‘Tell Alastair we’re grateful he didn’t leak anything. Tell him we’re watching his every move, heh, heh.’ He and Cheney had spoken to eight Arab leaders. TB reported on his call with Abu Mazen. Bush said ‘If he plays his cards right he will be here in the Oval [Office].’ Then on to the vote. It was already in the US press that it was on Tuesday. Bush said he was predicting a ‘landslide, baby!’ TB said it was too close to call. Bush was pissed off with Clinton, felt he was being difficult. The Azores was on. TB said we had to be seen striving all the way even if we felt the French had made it impossible. Bush said it was a ‘moment of truth’ meeting after all the previous last chances. TB said we must not let it be built up as a council of war. The more we talk about the UN and the aftermath the better. Bush said Dan and I were working on the outcomes for the media and we were getting Cheney to set the context on the Sunday shows.
TB briefed on the Chirac call, said the divide was between those prepared to consider military action and those who were not, who would give him as much time as he wanted. Bush said he did not trust the French but we had to do a slow waltz with them in the next few days. He felt they thought America was more guilty than Saddam. TB said the French appearing to be so unreasonable had been a big mistake by Chirac. I did another call with Dan re the arrangements for the Azores then a stack of calls, a last meeting with TB and headed home. TB saw Clare again and was confident he could keep her in. He was resigned to losing Robin.
In for 8.30 meeting. Up to see TB in the flat. He was in the bath and Jack was pissed off not to be able to speak to him when he called in from Blackburn. TB was in very odd-looking shorts as he finally came down, said right, sorry I’m late, sat down and got going. He said it was clear now what the French would try – yes to the tests, even to the possibility of military action, but they would push for a later date. We had a pre-meeting with JP, GB and DA downstairs before all the officials came in. GB was beginning to motor a bit, firing with good media and political lines. He also felt we needed to explain more clearly why we had been so keen to get the second resolution when now we were saying we didn’t need one. The answer lay in the pressure we had been putting on the Iraqis, through the building of international support. He also felt we should be pressing publicly over some of the questions he still felt Blix had not fully answered.
Goldsmith was happy for us to brief that in the coming days he would make clear there was a legal base for action. We now had to build up the Azores as a genuine diplomatic effort, which was not going to be easy. It was running as a ‘war not peace’ situation. John Scarlett joined us, reported signs of the Iraqis really hunkering down, said there were reports of summary executions. Godric and I were briefing ministers and then the media re the coming AG advice. A few decisions having been taken, the travel of direction clear, we felt in a stronger position. Robin sent over his draft letter which was pretty negative. I worked on TB’s, set it in a place that would make Robin want changes in both. TB went off to call Lagos. I got home in time to listen to a very long TB/Bush call. ‘Hey Tony, how are you?’ ‘I’m very well.’ ‘That is what I want to hear every time.’ He accepted we had done the right thing pushing him on the road map. ‘Good advice and it has helped a lot.’ The New York Times had it as ‘Blair insistent, Bush responds’ but it was a good move.
Bush was pretty vile about Fox, Chirac and Schroeder and to a lesser extent Lagos. He wanted to go for a ‘coalition of the willing’ meeting next week, but exclude France and Germany. He was venomous re Fox, said he could not believe they were not supporting us. He had guys like the Danes saying they were trying to help but had constitutional difficulties. Or Musharraf with all his problems saying let’s get it over with. TB said it was time for the UN to show it could do its job, Bush that anything that weakened 1441 was not on. His plan now was: 1. get through Monday; 2. get through our vote, then 3. coalition of the willing. He and TB then came up with the idea of doing the press conference before rather than after the meeting in the Azores. I was opposed, felt it would fuel the idea that this was all a bit of a charade. There was the odd flash of Bush humour in there. He said he would call some of our backbenchers and tell them he was converted to Kyoto, planning to go vegetarian, would legislate so that all fertiliser could only come from cows and horses and campaign for an agrarian society.
His main line was that anything that takes us back from 1441 was not enough. This was the final stage of the diplomacy. TB said the UN had to be seen to do its job. Bush felt the TB line re the divisions being between those prepared to use force and those who were not would come best from TB not him. ‘People kind of know where I am on force.’ He said we have come to a conclusion at the UN. If we issue an ultimatum and the prospect of force, and France says no, it becomes impossible. TB said he still thought Chirac might say yes, but with a delay. Bush said if he went for yes with twenty-one days, he would reject it. They are the ones being unreasonable, not us. TB said he would definitely lose one minister, RC. ‘What does he do?’ Was Foreign Secretary, now Leader of the House. Bush said the ranks of the disaffected swell after a time.
Then going over the various timing issues again. TB said he was not sure where Kofi was. Bush said he had totally different problems to us re the UN, that the pressure in the States was to bury it. Then ‘I told Fox he has seriously messed up. He has really let me down on this.’ He then went off on one about the just demands of the free world. Was the UN really serving the world as it should? It had been pathetic in Rwanda. Then a discussion about anti-Semitism in Germany. TB said as things stood he was probably the only EU leader whose natural instincts were to go out and defend Israel. TB said the view here was of an all-powerful Jewish lobby in the States which could prevent a president moving on MEPP. Bush reckoned he had ten to fifteen per cent of the Jewish vote so it was all a bit of a myth. He had a lot less to lose than a Democratic president would.
Briefly they discussed proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not need Saudi Arabia popping up with nuclear weapons, said Bush. The IAEA is pathetic. It’s got Cuba on its board. He said he was convinced we would help world peace and at the end said ‘It has been a great conversation. Let’s get a bit of exercise and rest up for the Azores summit. It will be historic. And I’ll be nuanced, I promise.’ TB: ‘We don’t want anything unnatural now.’ I went out for a longish run before getting back for Neil and Glenys coming for dinner. Neil was pretty much with me on Iraq, Glenys against, but we managed to avoid a big flare-up. Neil told me he had written to Robin saying don’t resign, that he ought to stay in there and be part of the dealing with the aftermath.
In for a long meeting in David Manning’s office after TB came back from church. First just David, Sally, Matthew [Rycroft] and I, then GB, JR and HA joined us. We were trying to boil down the central arguments and dividing lines now. I suggested we say we intend to go back to the French and test their position – do they support any element of what we are saying? Are they really saying there are no circumstances in which they would support anything seen as a threat of military action? If they are, we go. If not, we have to look again. David M said there was no indication the French intended to shift. GB did Frost, and came back saying the really tough questions were in the field of legality. GB also said if we are saying this is the final shot at diplomacy, what are we actually saying we are going to do after today? Bush didn’t want a process story but I suggested one, namely a last round of contacts at the UN post the Azores meeting. I spoke to RC. He said he had thought about the changes I had suggested to his letter. He was happy to say TB had helped keep this on the international, multilateral track. He was happy to make clear he felt TB should remain as leader.
It was now time to leave. There was the usual last-minute stuff to do before we got into the cars and set off for the airport. Pretty big media turnout in the street but we pretty much ignored them. I travelled with TB in the car to the airport and first he spoke to Margaret B, then a call with [Jan Peter] Balkenende [Dutch Prime Minister]. Then we just chatted a bit. This was as tough as any decision we would have to make, he said. He felt it very deeply. It was a tough, tough call. He was still angry at the way the US had handled it. ‘If we had been totally in charge of this, I am absolutely sure we could have won the French round,’ he said. I felt the US and France both, for different reasons, did not want to meet on this. We got on to the plane and for most of the flight were working on other papers and TB’s message for the press event after the summit. It felt a bit insubstantial, especially given where it all now seemed to be heading. It was an opportunity though to set out the whole story, how we got to here, the French intransigence and so on.
It was a four-hour flight and the media were pretty much in ‘council of war’ mode. It was hard to sell this as a genuine diplomatic effort. Clinton sent through a draft of an article for the Guardian. He was trying to say he supported TB but the unspoken message was that he didn’t support the war. TB asked me to work on a different version. I was also working on the Iraq vision document and the RC letters, and shifting paper. Alison [Blackshaw] said she was always amazed how much work we seemed to get through on planes, and this one was particularly prolific. Re RC I put in a reference to his support for Operation Desert Fox [1998 bombing of Iraq], and Kosovo, and also hinted he could go on to another big role, having successfully got the Sunday Times to do a story saying he might go to Europe as a commissioner. We were also still negotiating the texts for the summit. DM felt there were too many references to terrorism and the language – e.g. peace-loving people – was too American. Also on the road map, they were saying it was a prospect. We needed it clearly there as a fact, something that was happening. They were pretty low-key re UN aftermath involvement and David was getting very fed up with them. I said why can’t we just say we will work for new UNSCRs on appropriate post-conflict government? We arrived in the Azores for what was going to be a fairly odd meeting. At the airbase we had a meeting with Barroso, then joined by Aznar. TB spoke by phone to Kofi who was pretty much in agreement that the French had fucked up. He agreed to see him in New York later in the week. Then we heard Chirac was intending to set out a new proposal, but it turned out simply to be calling for more time, thirty days. It was clear now, said TB, that the French did not intend to move.
We hung around for Bush to arrive and once he did we all moved to the US part of the base. TB travelled with Bush in the presidential limo and the ludicrously large motorcade. We sat around a fairly small square table. The mood shifted regularly from serious, e.g. going through texts, running over difficult arguments, to light-hearted. Bush at one point just looked over at me and said ‘You’re just like a faucet. Can’t stop leaking.’ I said we called it tap. Barroso did a long and ponderous opening and said we had to make the last effort for peace. Everyone kept going on about it being ‘the last effort for a political solution’. But there was a more than slight feeling of going through motions. The meeting itself was in an odd room, way too big for the numbers, with a kind of weird grey crazy paving-type set-up on the walls, thick white tablecloths.
Bush talked about it being a last effort. But he said it was important the world saw we were making every effort to enforce 1441. He said everyone had to be able to say we did everything we could to avoid war. But this was the final moment, the moment of truth, which was the line most of the media ran with. He stressed he wanted the UN to play an important role in the post-Saddam era. He was clear we had to emphasise Iraq’s territorial integrity. He was emphasising he would really move on MEPP. He said again TB had been right to push him on the road map, and said he intended to spend a lot of time on this. He said re Chirac ‘I don’t want to provoke him into unreasonableness.’ He was however keen to say he wanted the UN properly involved in the post-Saddam era. He would not deal with Arafat though. Condi and Karen [Hughes, AC’s opposite number] later showed me the current draft of GWB’s ultimatum speech which I felt was a bit too warlike. Too much war, not enough ultimatum.
TB said we had reached the point of decision for people. We had been here before, but there really had to be a decision. How many times could there be a last chance, serious consequences for material breach? He reported that Kofi had said the French and Russians would not rule out force but would not agree to an ultimatum, which was an odd position. He really hit the UN buttons post Saddam, and was trying to force Bush to go further on that. ‘It has to be a UN-authorised government.’ He was also hammering home the advantage on MEPP, but I wasn’t convinced it would happen. We needed some kind of process story. I suggested to TB they all instruct their ambassadors at the UN to have one last go, see if the position of the others has changed. TB was constantly emphasising final appeal, final opportunity for the UN. Bush was scathing re the Turks, said Erdogan ‘just doesn’t get it. The Turkish military are setting him up.’ He was pretty keen to get on with things now, wanted to pull down the SCR now. He then said he would address the American people tomorrow – say diplomacy had failed, issue the ultimatum. He said to TB we should say we were issuing one last set of instructions to UN ambassadors to have a go at securing agreement. Aznar said he was concerned the French, Russians and Chinese would come up with a proposal. Bush said he would be happy to veto if they did. He was even talking about not going to the G8 summit.
Aznar was really pushing the importance of the transatlantic alliance, but he was in even more political hot water on this than we were. I introduced Bush to Godric, said he was our Ari Fleischer. ‘You gotta be bald or something to do these spokesmen jobs? Or is it the job makes you bald?’ TB had vanished to the loo. I said we’ve lost the PM. ‘I hope not,’ said Bush ‘’cos he’s the reason we’re all here on this island on a Sunday.’ He asked about the vote, said he was confident we would win. I said Robin C might shift a few. As we left I said to Bush, if I do a sub-four-hour marathon will you sponsor me? He said ‘If you win the vote in Parliament, I’ll kiss your ass.’ I said I’d prefer the sponsorship. Over to the press conference and now he went into ‘bastards’ mode in a kind of imitation of me. Dan said he was amused by the fact I dealt with the press in the way I did. He saw them as bastards too, but in the US nobody dare say it.
The press conference was very well set up and at least the Yanks knew how to do these kind of things. They did their statements, then one question from each country, and all on-message though Bush went off on one a bit re Chirac. He did his ‘moment of truth’ well, but there was something very odd about his manner today. Bush had just about had enough of the serious talk and we had another half-serious, half-jokey conversation re marathon training. The last hour or so dragged a bit and we were basically just chatting, filling the time while the hacks all filed before getting back on the plane and heading home. In the car to the plane TB seemed to think it had gone OK, though we were all pretty clear the US had decided and nothing that came out of the French or anyone today would have changed their approach. I told him re the kiss-ass threat. He laughed, but then said it is not that often that a major US policy depends on a UK parliamentary vote. Sally reported from Hilary A there had been some movement our way.
We saw the press on the plane, and we were making clear the French had to come back and say whether there were any circumstances at all in which they might support military action. I lost it with the staff when I learned the texts and documents had not been issued at the right time. TB was seeing David Margolick [Vanity Fair].32 TB was still saying it was the right thing to do. I had lost count of how many times I had heard those same words. We started work on his speech for Tuesday, which was going to have to be one hundred per cent.
The summit came out not too bad, Bush’s ‘moment of truth’ the best top line, the overall sense that the diplomatic process was going nowhere and now we had to gear up on the military side. There was the not insignificant matter of our vote, mapping out in my head a note to send to Dan with an overnight press summary, schedule for the day and stressing how important it was that Bush’s 1am speech did not create problems for us. I said GWB was unlikely to pull any of our people back, but he could push them the other way. I leavened it a bit by telling him the Guardian had said Bush was better than Blair yesterday. He called later, said they had built up the ultimatum as I suggested and also injected a lot of conditional material so that it was not simply seen as a declaration of war.
Then to a meeting of TB, JP, GB, JS, JR, HA plus the usual lot to go through the day. Jack was irritating TB a bit by going on about process the whole time and irritating JP who was trying to get a straight answer to the question of whether RC should do a statement tomorrow or today. Jack and I both felt today was better, on a day of massive events, then GWB in the morning, rather than before TB’s speech. We agreed Greenstock would put down the SCR at 10.15 New York time, that we would say at the 11 there would be a Cabinet at 4, Jack’s statement later and also that the Attorney General would publish his view that there was a solid legal base for action. Jack would go through the motions of talking to his opposite numbers but basically the game was up. De Villepin had rejected it again. GB said we needed to get up the Blix unanswered questions as well. TB was fairly quiet, worrying about his speech and about rebels. We agreed Margaret B should do media so I spoke to her to brief her, then sent over the AG’s opinion and our various texts from yesterday.
I was working on a draft exchange of letters with Clare in case she went. JP went off to see her and reported back that she was probably going. It was all playing totally to her attention-seeking. Jonathan emailed me about the draft exchange of letters, saying ‘Probably better not to have them drafted by someone who so clearly despises her.’ Probably true. Robin called re my draft. I had mentioned the various military situations we had been involved in – Operation Desert Fox, Kosovo, Sierra Leone. He was very funny about it, said ‘I can see why in these circumstances you want to present me as a heroic war leader, but I wonder if you couldn’t put in one or two of my humanitarian triumphs as well.’ He was keen that we make mention of Lockerbie and the International Criminal Court, and also wanted to make clear that he wanted TB to stay on as leader. It was so different dealing with him rather than Clare. He felt she was in a totally ridiculous position. TB was working to keep her in, even suggesting we get Kofi to call her. RC came to see TB and they agreed there was no point in him staying for Cabinet. So Robin and I went round to my office to agree the process. We agreed we wouldn’t put the letters out until 4.15, once Cabinet was in.
We joked about the fact that it was the first resignation letter I had not written. ‘I’ll race you to see whose memoirs that appears in first,’ he said. He was very friendly, seemed liberated, also clear that he had a strong if very different political future ahead of him. He was also very nice to me personally, said we had been through some very difficult times together and he always valued my advice and support. He said there was something oddly fitting about the fact that we had worked so closely at the end of his marriage and were working so closely again at the end of his ministerial career. He wanted to leave by the side door so I walked down with him, we shook hands, he said ‘I really hope it doesn’t all end horribly for you all,’ and headed off to Birdcage Walk.
TB started Cabinet, introduced Goldsmith, then Clare came in and asked Sally where Robin was. ‘He’s gone,’ said Sal. ‘Oh my God.’ TB’s only reference to Robin was to say that he had resigned. He said French intransigence had made it impossible to get a resolution. We were at an end of the diplomatic process. We intended to issue an ultimatum and seek an endorsement for action if it was necessary. He said we had tried everything to avoid this course. The other big issue was MEPP, and the US had undertaken to publish the road map. He also emphasised the planning that was going on on the humanitarian front. He said Jack and the FCO team had done a brilliant job but an impasse is an impasse and the French block is not conditional but absolute. Jack said nobody could have done more than TB did to keep things within the UN.
I was in and out agreeing final changes to the article Bill Clinton was doing for us for the Guardian. I got back in as Peter Goldsmith went through the answer on legal authority to use force. Clare asked if he had had any doubts. He said lawyers all over the world have doubts but he was confident in the position. One by one, a succession of colleagues expressed support, then Clare said she owed them ‘a short statement’, that she intended to reflect overnight. She said publication of the road map was significant but we shouldn’t kid ourselves that it means it is going to happen. She said she admired the effort and energy that had gone into getting a second resolution but there had been errors of presentation. ‘I’m going to have my little agonising overnight. I owe it to you.’ JP, John Reid and one or two others looked physically sick.
JR spoke next, said never underestimate the instincts for unity and understand that we will be judged by the Iraq that replaces Saddam’s Iraq, and by the Middle East. Derry said he felt we would have got a second resolution if the French hadn’t been determined to scupper it, and said we had made so much effort to get a second resolution that it had led to people thinking we actually needed one. Paul Murphy was just back from America and said what an amazing feeling there was towards us there. ‘It’s not quite the same here,’ said TB. JP pointed out we were on the eighteenth SCR dealing with Saddam and it was about time we moved to uphold the UN’s integrity. He said the only reason the Americans went down the UN route at all was because of TB and now he is getting them down the road of the Middle East peace process and deserves all the support we can give.
We had agreed JP would speak in the street post Cabinet. I had drafted a script and he went through it with me and Jack. He went and did well. TB felt Cabinet had gone well. JP had been terrific. Only Clare was ridiculous. Fittingly, when she spoke, huge gusts of wind had blown through the open window. TB had another call with Bush, fairly inconsequential, mainly about the vote. TB said at the moment we had 190 backbenchers against us and we wanted to bring it down to 150. Bush seemed genuinely surprised when TB said his comments on the Middle East had helped. They both felt the French had mishandled things. He was in very folksy mode, said that TB had ‘heart in your voice and a spring in your step, so that’s fine by me’. He asked TB if he had to be in there in Parliament for ten hours of debate. TB said you get the odd comfort break. GWB laughed. TB said it was tough and would be tight and that French intransigence, plus the Middle East moves, had helped, but also we had to keep the UN in play. He said a lot of our backbenchers were mildly obsessive about the UN and the post-war issues. Robin did his resignation statement, did it very well, a really powerful Commons moment and got a fairly widespread standing ovation. Margaret [Beckett], who was about to do The World Tonight [BBC Radio 4], was unimpressed. She called me, felt it was typical Robin, said he would support TB and then call directly on people to vote against action, which, if carried, would defeat the PM and the government. She wanted to go for him but I said it was better simply to say that TB would also be going to the House and would make a case that was logical and powerful and strong. I was surprised at how angry she was with Robin. She said she hoped she could hold her tongue. TB was working on his speech for a good part of the day and it was in good shape. Neil [Kinnock] called and said Robin was one of a very small number of people who could bring catastrophe to the government and even though it was difficult, we should try to keep a bridge out to him. It was pretty clear by now that Clare would be on her way too, if with a lot less impact.
Debate day dominant. GWB’s statement overnight had come out fine. They had taken in all our changes, the ultimatum was calm and strong, the tone towards Iraqi people compassionate, the commitment to the Middle East peace process was in there strong, and all the bellicose stuff either taken out or conditional. So to be fair, they had delivered big time for us. The Robin resignation speech, and the standing ovation in parts of the House, was still getting a lot of play but I sensed that was the high point of the rebellion. I ran in, then up to see TB in the flat. He was on the phone to Blunkett who was warning him that John Denham [Home Office minister] would resign. Also Philip Hunt [Lord Hunt, junior health minister] went on the radio to resign. That seemed to be about it at the moment. TB was in a pretty calm mood. He felt we were winning some people over on the arguments, but we had a problem in that there were a lot of our MPs who had promised their local parties that they wouldn’t support without a second resolution. This was the unintended effect of the point Derry made yesterday, that we fought so hard to get one that people assumed we needed one before action.
TB had been up early and had rewritten the speech so it was much more his voice. The only ongoing discussion was about whether to keep in the passage about the 1930s [appeasement], or whether really direct comparisons might backfire. It was not yet clear what Clare intended to do. Then we heard a rumour that she was planning to make a statement, which we assumed was a resignation but then learned was to be an announcement she was staying. We had a meeting to organise a pretty much all-day blitz of the airwaves including getting GB live on some of the bulletins. We had Margaret out and about all day doing well. Whether in the House or out, we were at least making the arguments but Hilary said it was still too difficult to judge the outcome. I worked on the Queen’s message to the troops, and spoke to Dan [Bartlett] a couple of times to go over the exact timings of military action. There were going to be a lot of special forces operations around the oilfields, then wait till Friday for a proper announcement. Clare was making a complete fool of herself. TB had done very well keeping her there, but she was now viewed as humiliated. She was pretty much finished. [William] Hague was on to it, had an absolutely brilliant line in the debate, how TB had ‘taken his revenge and kept her’.
TB’s speech in the House was one of his best.33 Very serious, full of real argument, confronting the points of difficulty and we felt it moving our way. He did a brilliant put-down to the Lib Dems [’unified, as ever, in opportunism and error’] which helped the mood behind him. I did another secure call with Dan. It looked like Wednesday late, special forces. Thursday, preparations underway. Friday, ‘A’ day, first Bush, then TB, recall Parliament. By the time I got back in, Sally said there were definitely some people turning back to us. I got GB out on the media again. He called me into his office for the first time in ages to discuss the line to take on Clare. Stay nice to and about her and not put the boot in. TB’s speech had gone fine and the reaction was good. It was one of those days when people out in the country were actually following what was going on. IDS and Charles Kennedy had both been poor. There had been some excellent back-bench speeches but the interventions didn’t really zing, TB had definitely come out on top.
There were a lot of protesters outside, so I faced a bit of abuse going in, then up to JP’s office to agree the line that we push from the moment the vote was over, that we won the vote, because we won the argument, and now the country should unite. JP asked me to stay back and asked if I had a problem with him. I said no, why? He said he felt I was angry because he screwed up this morning in going for Robin and Hunt and I had kept him off through the day. I said not at all, but it was one of those days when GB seemed up for it and I wanted him out and about as much as possible. We had also used Peter Hain a lot as well. We ended up having a very friendly chat, then going down to wait for the vote, which for the government motion was 412 for and 149 against, and for the rebel motion 396 voting against and 217 for. 139 Labour MPs rebelled. I called Dan B with the result as it came through.
I was in the front office of TB’s Commons office, MPs coming and going, the staff all pretty relieved. TB came back and called everyone in to say thanks. He said we had pulled out the stops and we had to. His own performance today had been superb. All of us, I think, had had pretty severe moments of doubt but he hadn’t really, or if he had he had hidden them even from us. Now there was no going back at all. He had to give authority for our forces to go in and by tomorrow night it would be underway. Everyone was assuming the Americans would start a massive bombing whereas in fact the first action would be some of our forces acting to prevent an ecological disaster. I got to bed by 1am.
TB got the best press he had had for ages, because of the quality of the speech and the fact that he had seen it through. As Bush said on their call later, other leaders would look at what he did, and the power with which he did it, and really learn lessons from it. ‘Landslide,’ he said, referring to the road-map publication as ‘genius’. He referred back to what he called ‘the cojones conference’ at Camp David. ‘You showed cojones, you never blinked. A leader who leads will win, and you are a real leader.’ He said the object is regime change and once Saddam is in hiding, that is the beginning of the change. TB felt the next stage after winning the war would be to work out the geopolitical fallout and repair some of the divisions. Bush said Condi had this line that we should ‘punish the French, ignore the Germans and forgive the Russians’, which was pretty glib. TB didn’t comment at the time but later said he didn’t agree. We should try to build bridges with all of them. We finally got Bush to agree that there was no point TB going to the US at the moment, that we should wait until the fighting starts. ‘You’re one of the few leaders they let me see,’ said Bush.
De Villepin called JS to say that Chirac was ‘pained and shocked’ at the way we had misrepresented what he had said, that this was not what was expected of an ally and it showed TB lacked courage. Chirac was clearly going up the wall and we were getting a lot of signs that he had basically been hoping TB would fall on the issue. Bush said that the Iraqis would now be ‘shredding documents like crazy’. When he heard about the prisoners who had had their tongues cut out, it ‘made me vomit’. He said the road map would be published today when Abu Mazen was confirmed. He would call and congratulate him.
I went to see David Manning then chatted to C and John Scarlett. Desertions were beginning in Iraq. The Republican Guard was moving to Baghdad. Nobody seemed to have a clue where Saddam was hiding. It was possible to feel the planned operation moving through the gears. First we had the ad hoc ministerial meeting where John S went through the intelligence, and CDS was clearly reluctant to go over the military plans in detail. I also found myself holding back with Clare there. TB saw her afterwards to tell her not to worry about the savaging she was getting in the papers at the moment. I felt her credibility was now totally shot but he still wanted to keep her on board and she was off to New York.
Fiona came to see me, said she couldn’t stay in the job any longer and started crying. She said it wasn’t the war per se, but it had been the last straw. She felt it was a waste of time her being here, that she wasn’t happy doing what she did. I said she should go if she wanted to, and if she didn’t support what we were doing, to try not to do it in a way that makes us an issue. She said but you are a big issue, which meant that there was never a right time to go, but she really didn’t want to stay. She went to see Sally, got very upset. Sally said she felt it was as much about Cherie/Carole as being about me. It was about not being valued. I didn’t quite know how to deal with it. It’s true there was never a right time, but this was about as unright as it could be, in terms of us being made an issue. It didn’t exactly help that the message from the security people was that patrols around the house would be stepped up while the conflict was going on.
I wrote letters of complaint to the BBC, first from me to [Richard] Sambrook [director of news] on various issues re [John] Humphrys, [Andrew] Gilligan and Rageh Omaar [BBC journalists] on the nature of their coverage. Then drafted a letter from TB to Gavyn Davies [BBC chairman] and Greg Dyke [BBC director general], attaching articles from David Aaronovitch [journalist] and [John] Simpson [BBC]. PMQs was low-key after all the drama of yesterday but TB did fine, pushed the general vision stuff, also explicit about regime change for the first time. TB called me in later to discuss France, what to do at the summit with Chirac. He was clear we shouldn’t go running after them, that they should come to us. But there was no chance of that at all.
I told TB about Fiona. He reacted, as I knew he would, by saying he couldn’t understand why people got so emotional about this. I said well, it’s going to happen so I have to work out how to handle it. I said it’s true she wasn’t happy with the war, but there were other issues too, chief among them that she now had a bad relationship with CB, despite having successfully helped build a very positive image for her. She felt we had next to no life outside work, and that I gave too much for too little in return. He went into ‘this is ridiculous’ mode. I said Tony, you are talking about Fiona and I won’t have it. He said for God’s sake, I was always saying things about his wife, but this stuff was very difficult, when big political issues were swirling around and they got mixed up with relationships. But if she went and said it was about Iraq, that would look very odd for me because people would think that was my position too.
I said it’s probably a consequence of a build-up of neglect, some of it mine, some of it Cherie’s. He said it was a bit much to have all the things he had to deal with and be expected to keep everyone happy all the time. I had the weekly meeting with Peter M, PG, PH. Peter M was interesting on GB. He felt GB had come back to us a bit because he was worried about Clare, in that if she went it was his last out-and-out support in Cabinet. Whatever the reasons, he was a bit more back on board. TB called me out for another chat on his way up to the flat and we went into the Number 11 study. He said he felt Fiona was probably fed up with being in my shadow and needed a role independent of me. He asked me what I wanted to do. I said if he was going before the election, I may as well go sooner rather than later because I couldn’t imagine working in the same way for a different leader or prime minister. He said in the big moments, like now, I gave real added value, and I shouldn’t underestimate how important that was to him. So all he asked was that if I did go, I helped find someone who could replace me.
I asked what his plans were. ‘I really don’t know. I’ve never really wanted to fight a third election, but I don’t know, I might.’ I asked if he had done a deal with GB. Not at all, he said, but he didn’t rule it out. He said it was interesting that GB had been more co-operative recently and said JP had been the key to that. JP had basically told him that if TB didn’t want him to get the job, and JP was agin it, it would not happen. In the end, he said, I think it’s wrong for me to think I can pick the next leader, or control what he does. But I do worry about him. I worry about the party and do want it to be well led. Things were definitely in flux again, and it was odd how often it was the really big moments that brought out these situations.
It was a friendly enough chat and although inevitably he was thinking about his own interests too, he did seem to be applying his mind to a decent way out for Fiona. As for me, I said I wasn’t that excited about the euro, which might be the next big thing, and I wasn’t sure I could face doing another election in exactly the same job. Maybe I could leave and come back for that. I told Godric about the Fiona situation. He felt it was potentially bigger than Cook going, because it played into so many different parts of the soap opera, which in the end is what the press love most.
After going to bed late last night, then another row with Fiona over my leaving, and her demanding a departure date NOW, I was woken at 3am by Godric. Did I know action had begun? Then media calls started. GWB had gone on TV to say that preparatory action had begun, taking the MoD totally by surprise, and most of us in Number 10. It transpired that Condi had indeed told David [Manning], who had passed it on to TB, but neither thought to pass it on. It meant we were not ready in the way we should have been. We put together a line that said TB was told just after midnight, and when there were operations with substantial UK involvement, we would say so. GWB later apologised to TB who said all he really cared about was that we now got on with it and won. It turned out the US had some late, sudden intelligence re Saddam’s whereabouts and took the decision to go straight away. They reckoned later he may have been injured, and certainly there was real angst and turmoil being reported from his inner circle. I was up most of the night, got a couple of hours’ sleep and then in for a 7.30 meeting.
TB had a meeting of his inner team (Jonathan, DM, SM, AC) with C, CDS, John Scarlett to get a military and intelligence briefing before being joined by JP, JR, GB, DB etc. John said there were reports of growing internal strife, e.g. pilots being ordered to carry out suicide missions; one-fifth of the Republican Guard deserting. We discussed whether TB should do a broadcast. With our Marines due for action taking a peninsula towards Basra tonight, it was madness to think we could wait another day before TB did a broadcast, so we went ahead with setting it up. Peter H had done a draft but TB was keen to do his own, into which I wrote a couple of clips, but it was basically very much his own voice.
We got hold of the Speaker and GH offered a statement. We were clear we would not be giving a running commentary but statements in the House were going to be an important part of the overall communications. Cabinet was fairly sombre and subdued, and so much better without Clare’s constant muttering and interruptions. Sally and I were chatting about what I should do re Fiona. TB, JS and GH all did a fairly basic reporting job on what was happening. Lots of praise for Hilary A on the whips’ operation. There was a pretty united mood and a lot of understanding for the enormity of the decision, and the pressure on TB now. He still hadn’t decided on RC’s replacement. I was feeling the stress today, just a bit wired, and burdened. When these big moments were on, everyone seemed to want to call, or pop in, and it all just added to the sense of pressure.
We recorded the broadcast at 3pm. TB did fine, though he was blinking a lot. We did it in two takes, and I was watching the camera crew to get a sense of their response. They were definitely following the argument, and I sensed the effect was positive. Then straight to the Bush call. GWB reported on the strike, said they very nearly struck lucky. They were still hopeful. They had another discussion re France and Russia, and Bush signalled he really wanted to go over all that in detail at Camp David. He felt it would be a vital discussion for the future of the world, because these relations were central to the direction the world took. He wanted to get back on decent terms with Putin in particular. Then, apropos of nothing, he said ‘And tell Alastair I am NOT going to kiss his ass, even though you won the vote.’ TB laughed, and said ‘I think he’ll be relieved. He was not exactly looking forward to it.’
On the flight to Brussels [EU summit], Jack S and I were chatting re the French. His basic view of Chirac was really negative. At the meeting, Chirac seemed to be avoiding TB, and wanting it to be noticed that he was avoiding him. Later, with Chirac sitting at his desk in the meeting room making a call on a mobile, TB went over and shook him by the hand. But it didn’t exactly warm things. When we left the building at the end of the session, we had to walk by Chirac and his entourage to get to the cars, and on seeing TB, he just turned away. De Villepin did likewise. The atmosphere generally was dire. The meeting room was being kept pretty tight so I was relying on Jack’s notes to follow what was going on. Jack came out to tell us that Chirac was trying to remove any reference to Iraq being responsible for the crisis, and [Costas] Simitis [current EU President] was letting him. TB did not say much, and on the occasions I popped in, they seemed to be splitting into groups rather than getting things sorted round the table. It was not a nice atmosphere at all. But in terms of outcome, it was OK for us, and the French did not have as much support as they had hoped for. I had a chat with Schroeder’s team who thought TB’s speech had been ‘brilliant’.
Nick Matthews [senior duty clerk] called me early to say that eight UK Marines and four US servicemen had been killed in a helicopter crash inside Kuwait. Worst possible start to the day. I went out for a run, then back to see TB in his bedroom. He was getting dressed, and reflecting on the news we’d just had. We agreed he should not say anything about it till the press conference. He said that people will be saddened but they understand that these things are going to happen. I sensed he was hiding how he actually felt. He said what mattered now was that we saw through the military campaign. At the summit centre, Schroeder was the first to come over and offer condolences, followed by others. Chirac wrote TB a little note, which was nice of him, and his words were totally devoid of any side or politics. It was interesting how many of the smaller countries were just not prepared to take the Franco-German line on things, and Chirac was definitely weakened around the place.
TB and I discussed euro/GB. GB had definitely been more co-operative recently, and that was largely down to JP. But GB was now keen to include the euro assessment in the Budget, and TB felt he was going to be in a ‘yes but’ position, that there were a number of changes that had to be made, e.g. to the housing market, before we could consider it. We were in the middle of this conversation, just outside the main meeting room, when Chirac came out to have a pee. He walked past us, went to the Gents, and when he came out he and TB both smiled warmly at each other. Chirac went back into the meeting room, but then came straight back out and walked over to us. ‘Tony, est-ce qu’on peut avoir un mot?’ [Could I have a word?] I stepped back a little, Chirac put his hand on TB’s back and steered him a little way down the corridor, where there were fewer people. But most were looking on, whilst trying to look like they weren’t. They chatted for ten minutes or so, and the body language of both was tense.
Chirac said it was time to calm the atmosphere, lower the temperature, that there was nothing to be gained from the kind of mutual aggression we had been showing. He said he could not understand why we had been so aggressive towards him and it was time to call off the press attacks. TB said he could not understand why they had been so aggressive diplomatically. They agreed it was time to make up. But Schroeder’s people were clear with me that Chirac had been hoping to destroy TB on the back of this, and failed. TB had been down at one point but bounced back quickly and won a surprisingly high number of plaudits from fellow leaders here. On the way out to the airport, he said ‘God, it is awful, this war business.’ ‘Yes, that’s why it is usually best to avoid it.’
Then to the Bush call. He said he was sorry about the deaths, then added ‘It’s called sacrificing for peace and freedom.’ He said he thought they had secured the southern oilfield. Rumsfeld reckoned eighty-five per cent of Iraqi oil was secure, so the danger of a self-inflicted environmental attack, or a huge impact on the markets, was limited. We occupy thirty-five per cent of the country. The Scud baskets are under our control. The ground campaign started early. 45,000 troops, US, UK and Australian forces marking the way. Basra should be surrounded today. The Iraqi Army in the north has surrendered. Inside Baghdad there is chaos. There are defections. Saddam’s circle is fracturing. It all sounded a bit too good to be true.
There were worries re Sunni/Shia divisions, worries re minefields, worries re oil platforms, though he said the Brits had done a brilliant job securing the offshore platforms. Bush sounded very bullish, said that where there had been combat, the force had been overwhelming. TB said it was important that we underclaimed and overdelivered. Bush said ‘Yes, we only have forty per cent of the country.’ It had gone up five per cent in two minutes. TB felt most Iraqis would not be waiting for Saddam to topple, that they did not need to flee. Bush said the Brits had been great. He said Clare Short had been given a briefing and was apparently surprised that the Americans only had one horn coming out of their heads. TB filled him in on the summit, and said how strong the accession countries were generally. TB felt the French were trying to come back to us a little bit. At the War Cabinet, C said there were some suggestions – alluded to by Bush earlier – that Saddam had been hit. He may be injured, and there were definitely signs of the inner circle turning on each other.
In for the War Cabinet. Another helicopter crash, and also Terry Lloyd of ITN [correspondent in Iraq] was missing. News-wise, things had moved to the region and the overall sense was of things going pretty well. TB set off for Chequers, saying he felt we were in much stronger shape than we might have been. I went home, set off for a run but had a bad asthma attack and walked back after a mile or so. Whether it was the air, stress or both, I don’t know.
I got up early, flicked through the papers, but as often when there was a real and moving international story, the impact of the papers was lessened as events drove the agenda. TB called and he wanted to change the planned broadcast to the forces into an interview, so Emily Hands [press officer] and I worked on that. There was a spate of stories of troops being captured, tortured, etc. In the end, we established there were ten US soldiers captured [in an ambush at Nasiriyah] and later they were paraded. The big battle seemed to be taking place around Umm Qasr [port in southern Iraq], and there were pockets of resistance elsewhere. ITN, not surprisingly, were going crazy re Terry Lloyd. Stewart Purvis [editor-in-chief] called to say that the MoD were being hopeless but it seemed that Terry had gone too far behind enemy lines [near Basra] and was shot by US special forces dealing with Iraqi troops at the time. Purvis called again later and said they now had pictures of the body and would be putting out a statement shortly. I said I would organise a TB tribute. I knew Terry reasonably well and liked him.
In then for a War Cabinet meeting. CDS on the military update and the latest on casualties. GH explaining what they had tried to do re Terry Lloyd. C still not clear on Saddam’s whereabouts or well-being. CDS said things were pretty much on track but there had been a number of accidents and the going was hard. As we wound up, the Iraqis were parading the [captured] American servicemen on TV. Dan called to say Bush was intending to go on TV and say this was a flagrant breach of the Geneva Convention. We agreed TB would echo that in his forces interview with BFBS [British Forces Broadcasting Service]. He said to me as we came away from the interview ‘How do you really think it’s going?’ I said from everything we could gather, fine, but it is going to be really tough. There were too many signals that the US did not really want the UN to lead on the humanitarian effort. TB said his next meeting with Bush was going to be vital in terms of all the big strategic questions, and how we planned for the future. He was clearly worried.
At the end of the War Cabinet he had taken Boyce aside for ten minutes or so, just to try to get a real fix on his analysis and how he thought the Americans were doing. Boyce did not hide the difficulties ahead. There had been a bit of street fighting going on. Then we heard that a Red Crescent [medical aid] hospital may have been hit by an RAF bomb, with possibly as many as seventy dead and fifty injured. In briefing, I was simply saying things were on track despite the accidents but there was inevitably a lot of focus on the accidents and less on the ‘on track’. The truth was the strategy was on course, but they were meeting greater resistance than anticipated.
Four days in and our ridiculous media were all on ‘setbacks’. As I said to TB, if we had had 24-hour news during World War Two, we would all be German by now. The main news overnight was two UK soldiers missing, big stuff on PoWs paraded, so all quite tricky. I got the cab in, and up to see TB and Jonathan. He was generally worried. Jonathan and I were both pointing out that this was the fog of war, and it would take time for a rhythm to be established and we had to hold our nerve. The media were pushing hard at the limits of what they should know and then deliver instant comment on everything. At the pre-meeting CDS said things were still going pretty much according to plan though there were Fedayeen [Saddam paramilitary] fighters in Basra causing a fair bit of trouble. C said there were some reports, as yet unclear, of an enormous civilian disaster in Basra, with dozens possibly killed. In general, the bombing campaign was more low-key than people had expected, and very targeted, but the fighting was going to be tough, especially when our forces reached the Medina troops on the road to Baghdad.
Then through to the broader meeting, where John Scarlett ran through things and there was a run round the block on the issues already discussed in TB’s office. These meetings were not great. John and CDS obviously felt they were being asked to repeat themselves; those not at the earlier meeting assumed there was something else going on they didn’t know about. David Blunkett was in a pretty bad mood and went off on one, saying he needed to know whether Basra was going to become like a medieval siege. TB just said ‘No.’ David was so down on his own civil servants most of the time that he had slightly got himself into a habit of messenger-shooting, and these guys didn’t particularly like it. John R asked whether we shouldn’t be moving to messages and tone that suggests longer not shorter term. He felt we had been caught a bit behind the curve and needed to get ahead again. I picked him up on it at the party meeting later, said ‘Aah, the man losing his nerve.’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘just keen to ask questions because we have to make sure we can sell this policy to party and public.’
I said we had to communicate that there was a plan, it was unfolding, there would be mishaps and accidents but the basic plan would be seen through, and this was not a time to communicate nervousness to generals, which I fear is what they took away from the meeting this morning. He and David B both denied panic but it seemed close to it to me. Later another meeting with C and CDS who assured TB things were generally on track, but there was going to be heavy resistance and a lot of fighting. He and C both said that the 24-hour news was making it much harder in the field. We discussed with CDS and GH the idea of the main Baghdad switchboard being bombed, as it was central to the working of the regime. We also discussed a new missile that could wipe out the power to broadcast on Iraqi state TV, but GH was worried about it.
Then working on TB’s statement to the House. He was very focused, but also worried and wanted to walk round the garden to go over it. He was starting to think ahead to the meeting with Bush. He felt Russia had behaved really badly, and though there was an explanation he felt it showed they could not really be trusted to be strategic partners. It was sad, he said, but there we are. We were also picking up all kinds of signals that Cheney and Rumsfeld in particular were not that keen on us being too involved in the UN/aftermath issues. TB felt there was some sense to the really hard US approach. Why should the French and the Russians come in at the end and clean up? Condi was giving the French a very hard time. We were in for a very foggy few days and we were going to need a lot of nerve around the place. I had a long chat with Dan B re the visit and how we intended to handle the public side of things.
I still felt we did not have a big picture out there, and the problem with the embedded media was that they were just putting over little snapshots from where they were, all competing to get on, but with no sense of an overall strategy. I also felt the military were going a bit native with the media, giving them too much access, letting them get in too close. GB asked to see me, and we met next door. He said the War Cabinet meetings were hopeless. You had Clare just blathering away, DB and JR behaving like armchair generals and giving out weakness vibes to the real generals. He felt we needed to structure things much more like a campaign. We needed to be clear what it was we were pushing every day, e.g. today would be push on Baghdad with a line out on humanitarian and reconstruction. The problem was there were currently too many places and people capable of setting an agenda from somewhere. I asked if he thought the party was OK on this. He said the party is fine on Iraq. ‘It’s other things they are worried about.’ He said there were real worries about the direction of domestic policy and I needed to rein him in a bit.
I got back to the pre-meeting at Number 10. There were more friendly fire incidents today, including UK on UK. The Saddam broadcast on Iraqi TV had the effect of pushing the message he was still in power, which might set us back on the internal opposition to him, which had been growing in confidence a bit.34 TB and I agreed that we had to reimpose a big-picture message, and he would have to be the one to do it. I had done a script overnight that set out the overall mission and purpose, update on the military front, humanitarian. The War Cabinet was possibly the worst yet. John S and CDS went through the motions of telling us what they had already told a smaller group of us in the pre-meeting and then we meandered around for a bit, with Clare, JR and DB asking a few questions. I scribbled a note to John S ‘How many of these would you take into the jungle with you?’
They reported that the Fedayeen were being organised by Chemical Ali.35 CDS reported continuing difficulties with the Turks re requests for access. He also warned operations may have to be scaled down because of the weather. David B had a go at one of the UK military spokesmen who had been on. ‘I would get him off the airwaves if you can.’ GB said to me afterwards that TB needed to take DB and JR aside, tell them these were supposed to be meetings on military strategy and we should have a separate meeting on political strategy. John’s and David’s questions did tend to be about the politics of where we were, but the overall impression for the military and intelligence guys was not good. TB went off to the NEC, then back to prepare for the press conference. They were all going to be on the ‘Why is it all getting bogged down?’ theme, which was easy to deal with. The tough questions related to differences with the US on the UN role, where we were not in the same place. We had stated clearly there would be a UN role in the aftermath, but the US signals were not as clear. We just had to go back to the Azores words on this. It would be so much easier if Powell, not Cheney and Rumsfeld, was driving the policy in the States. The press conference seemed to last an age. I watched downstairs. They were running a split screen with TB on one side, and bombs being loaded at [RAF] Fairford on the other. One of the girls in the office said the whole thing was being presented like another form of reality TV show, round-the-clock coverage of anything and everything and the prism was ‘setback’ and ‘bogged down’.
On the conference call, I was pressing for more strategic communication and less focus on one part of the picture. There was next to no context out there for the briefings and pictures. They were like random scenes. The briefings in Qatar, and at the Pentagon, kept taking us to our weak points, e.g. PoWs and casualties. TB did the big picture OK today but there was precious little sign of it anywhere else. Also we had real problems on the diplomatic front, particularly re the UN. We had a good meeting of the Iraq communications group, and we agreed to get a message to all those with access to media in the field about the need to stay plugged in to bigger message and overall strategy. We also agreed to press internally for strikes against Saddam’s TV output, which was integral to his command and control, part of his infrastructure of fear, and a legitimate target.
We had a lot of problems – sense of setback, bogged down; UN role; humanitarian crisis growing; Basra very tricky. It was a good meeting though and I felt if this group was in charge of the whole communications operation, we would be in a better position. We had to step up even further the contacts with the US. I commissioned a message note justifying attacks on their TV station. Then to the Bush call, and lots of comforting noises to each other, TB saying things were going as well as they could be expected to, Bush saying our troops were so much better than theirs and it was going well. TB said there was a chance the whole thing would collapse quickly like a pack of cards, but we shouldn’t bank on it. There would be a lot of fighting, but eventually people would notice change happening, different people in control and if we handled the relations with the Iraqi people well, change could come quickly. Bush said that if the word went round that Saddam was incapacitated, and also when we ‘kick the crap out of the Republican Guard’, that will have a profound effect around the country. He was in pretty bellicose form. They discussed Putin, and Bush said he was going to be looking for advice on how to deal with him from now on in. TB said [Hosni] Mubarak [Egyptian President] was nervous and what these guys wanted more than anything now was for the job to be done quickly.
We then left for the MoD for a presentation by CDS, [General Sir] Mike Jackson [Chief of the General Staff], [Admiral Sir Alan] West, [Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter] Squire and [General Sir John] Reith from PJHQ [Permanent Joint Headquarters]. Reith was very impressive but it was absolutely clear this was going to be a lot tougher. Reith felt the US had been excessively optimistic about the collapse of the regime. The hard core and the Fedayeen were absolutely up for the fight. They had nothing to lose, and would not just give up. TB asked about Baghdad. They said it would be split into forty sectors, and our forces would try to take them one by one, before sending in regulars. It would take several weeks, and there were a lot of dangers attached. Jackson said it was the only possible plan. Reith was excellent on the overview, but said that at Basra for example, it was not yet clear the best way to proceed.
The most important thing for TB was to communicate to the Iraqis that we would see this through, that they would benefit from the fall of Saddam. But we should not expect them to welcome with open arms, because they will find it hard to believe the Saddam era is ending. We were doing OK with public opinion in our own country, but we were nowhere in Iraq. Reith said we had to separate regime from people, and that meant taking out his media. The march on Baghdad was going OK, but they expected a lot more fighting. Our forces were busy in the Western Desert dealing with his Scud facilities to prevent them trying to draw Israel in. West went through the navy role and said [trained] dolphins were being used in minesweeping. Back at Number 10, TB was clear it was going to take longer than anticipated. Shock and awe had not really happened. So we had taken the political hit of a stupid piece of terminology, and then not actually had the military benefits. He felt reassured by the expertise of our military.
More delay in Basra. War Cabinet was awful. C told me later he found the whole thing ridiculous, and it was. It was necessary to involve the key ministers and keep them up to speed with everything, but the nature of the discussion did not inspire confidence. Clare blathered away, DB was a bit better today, whilst JR did come over a bit as an armchair general. The truth was we were not totally clear about the picture out there. TB had a bilateral with JP, who said Clare’s behaviour at these meetings was intolerable and he should not put up with her for too long. TB never quite agreed with us on that and he had another meeting with her later, going out of his way to keep her involved and on board, as much as she ever would be. His concern at the moment was that there might be more support for Saddam than we thought, and that explained the level of resistance. Then later, when a bomb hit a Baghdad market, and the Iraqis started to pump out pictures of it, we were looking a bit shaky.
I was doing an email exchange with Dan on the visit, and it was clear Bush was pissed off at the FT story suggesting TB would press him for a bigger UN role. They were sensitive to the idea that TB was shaping their strategy, which was understandable. TB asked me to send a message back that this was our media seeking to open divisions. We knew of a Rumsfeld memo to Bush saying that TB would demand a bigger role for the UN, but that they should resist. Jack said Powell was on our side in this, and was trying to put a halt to the neoconservative stuff. TB’s worry was the military campaign. He felt the Americans lacked the absolute single-mindedness needed to get the job done quickly. He said it was beginning to remind him of Kosovo. As we headed to the airport, the market attack was really taking off as a media and political issue, though there were suggestions the Iraqis may have been involved themselves.
TB was working on a long note for Bush on the plane, and I left him to it and had a long chat with Jack, going through all the difficult areas. He was worried just how far out on a limb TB was pushing himself, but was still totally on board for where we were. The main message in TB’s note, when you boiled it down, was that there was a lot of support for the aims of the campaign, and we totally believed the policy was right, but there was real concern at the way the US put over their views and intentions, and that rested in people’s fears about their perceived unilateralism. He was urging him to do more to rebuild with Germany, then Russia, then France, and saying he should seize the moment for a new global agenda, one to unite the world rather than divide it. A distorted view of the US was clouding everything – look at how much cynicism there was at their efforts in the Middle East. We had to break that down. Why had Mexico and Chile gone the other way? Why did so much of Europe?
In the end he wrote a twelve-page note that was both subtle and blunt at the same time. It was a good piece of work and if Bush took it on board would have a good effect. But he still had his own internal battles to deal with. I didn’t really feel Bush had the will to deliver on this new international agenda TB was talking about, but we would see.
We landed in pretty miserable weather conditions, then flew down to Camp David, Bush seemed more nervous than usual, and it came out in that over-cockiness that sometimes spills out. ‘We’re gonna win. I’m sure of it. Basra will fall. The people will rise up, and choose freedom.’ Overall, he was confident we were going to win. He made a jokey little reference to the FT story, when TB said we had not been pushing that line. ‘Don’t worry, I blame Alastair.’
GWB had clearly read TB’s note and was going through it virtually line by line. He was fairly strong on MEPP. He said he knew there would have to be a reckoning in their relationships with others. He seemed a lot more on top of the detail and in the discussion on the complexities of the Arab world seemed less one-dimensional than before. TB’s note was saying that in essence the US had a choice about what it wanted to do with its power. They had to face up to that choice. The power was a given but how it was used was a series of choices. Jonathan and I were staying in Redwood – the cabins were all named after trees. We went over to see TB who was worrying about the whole UN scene. I felt we had it parked fairly well and there was no real need to take it forward at the moment. We walked down to Laurel where the meeting was to be. At first there was just me, TB, Jonathan and DM. TB felt on the war that we had reached the point we did in Kosovo where it felt like we were holding back slightly and not really going for it. In Kosovo the point came a bit later but it did feel similar.
On the UN Bush had said last night he was happy for a UN role but he was pretty scathing, said their handling of some issues was woeful, that some of them couldn’t run a garbage service. It was a recurring theme. He just wasn’t up for it really. It was interesting how Bush liked to take in different views and experiences round the table. He wasn’t status-conscious in these meetings. He was also prone to go off on conversational tangents, asked me a few times re my running, and telling me he had been doing seven-minute mile pace round the Camp David track, which was faster than I could. They had another confined session then came out to discuss how we dealt with the press. Condi said we should go over the aftermath issues.
Bush said he understood there had to be some kind of role for the UN but he didn’t trust their competence. He said on Kosovo the UN had been all over the place. Jack said ‘With respect Mr President, Kosovo is not the only model. There is Bosnia, where the UN was light touch. There have been others which they have done well.’ They agreed Sérgio de Mello [UN high commissioner for human rights] would be a good guy to do the UN job [Secretary General’s special representative in Iraq] but Kofi may want him to stay on human rights. Pre the press conference TB was worried re the body language. I said the most important thing was the issue of resolve, and a message to the Iraqi people about seeing it through and being with them for the long term.
As TB walked back to Dogwood cabin afterwards he said to Jonathan and me ‘He’s not wrong about the UN you know.’ I said he may have a point but it doesn’t mean he is a hundred per cent right. We were driven by buggy up to the hangar where the press conference was being held. Dan had told him that I referred to them as ‘the bastards’ and Bush was saying ‘bastards, bastards’ loudly. I had done a script for TB and created a bit of a problem maybe by referring to the dead soldiers being ‘executed’.
TB and Bush went off for a walk and then came back for lunch. Fairly relaxed and informal. GWB was geeing me up re the marathon, said I would love it, that it was one of the best things he ever did. TB and Bush then went out on the terrace for a genuine one-on-one. TB said afterwards they had discussed US politics and the pressures from the hard right. Bush had changed into a tracksuit. He did casual gear a lot better than TB but I guess the White House logo on everything helped a fair bit. He looked very fit for his age though the media had felt he looked tired at the press conference. I had an interesting chat with Dan about how Bush worked. He was a real early to bed, early to rise man. He was obsessed about punctuality and would really go for people who arrived late for meetings. He liked to read a brief, then discuss, then decide. He was open to ideas. He was very religious. He was loyal to friends but once you fell out with him, that was that. We were just whiling away the time while Bush and TB chatted. After half an hour or so they came in and we walked up to the helipad. TB was pleased and excited that Bush seemed to have moved on the road map. He was saying not only that he would publish it but take the lead in implementing it. We had a nice enough journey to New York with a fantastic view out of the helicopter. To the UN to meet Kofi. The main focus was post-conflict and Oil for Food.36 Kofi was really pleased TB had gone to see him rather than the other way round. It was clear the politics were getting harder and harder. Bush was heavy enough but Cheney and Rumsfeld were even heavier. Back to the plane by chopper.
There was definitely a changed mood, lots of it media-driven. The morning meetings were developing a rhythm. First a pre-meeting with TB, GH, JS, C, CDS, John S and the key Number 10 people and then through to the broader meeting. CDS was confident things were going OK though it would be a while before there would be a commonly understood acceptance of military success. The weather was not helping and there had been more resistance than predicted. Not all bad news but there had been another friendly-fire incident. TB felt the Bush visit had been good and yet again today we saw how the propaganda could quickly go wrong. There was another attack on a Baghdad market. No evidence it was ours but the Arab media were straight out saying it was. At the morning meeting, we had a long discussion about how to improve outreach to the Arab media and also how to deal with the embedded media. As I said to TB, the problem was that the military had gone native on the media, rather than the other way round. They were all getting too much access and putting over little snapshots, so that there was very little communication of a big picture.
War Cabinet was pretty grim, with Clare blathering on about the UN. It was quite clear she was going to quit. She kept saying the issue was not fudge-able because it was a question of legality. TB said nobody was saying we were going to do something illegal. But she said there was a US draft that did suggest that. She said it was a matter of principle for her, and it should be for all of us. TB and Jack both had a go, not really clear what she was on about. C and John S said to me afterwards it was extraordinary that she behaved in the way she did. James Harrower [Number 10 security] and Mohny [Bahra, protection officer] called about how to handle demonstrations at home. James said the police were also discussing the possible need for security on the marathon route. TB was planning to speak to Chirac and Schroeder tomorrow. He said we needed to start putting together the main European relationships again. [Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship] Sir Galahad finally docked at Umm Qasr [delivering humanitarian aid, after being delayed by mine clearance].
In for the 9am meeting. The head of the Iraqi air defences had been sacked because of malfunctioning air defences, which may have caused two explosions in Baghdad. 24-hour news was a bit of a nightmare at the moment, as they covered it like any other story, with a mix of hysteria and comment the whole time, and the settled view was that it wasn’t really happening. They seemed to think wars should only last a few days and then they should get on to the next thing. There were suggestions the public were getting sick of all the comment though, and making up their own minds. But a combination of dead soldiers, friendly fire, lack of progress towards Baghdad, Rumsfeld mouthing off re Syria [warning Syria not to aid Iraq] was not great. Dan told me they were delighted that Richard Perle [Rumsfeld-appointed Pentagon adviser and neoconservative lobbyist] was having to resign as chairman of a defence group [Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, Department of Defense], though he was staying on the board.
At the War Cabinet Jack said we would be in a better place if Bush was not surrounded by ‘loonies’. ORHA [Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, established by the US to become a caretaker government in Iraq] was in a state of chaos because of internal US difficulties. They appeared unable to agree on anything. TB asked me afterwards if I thought the propaganda effort was working. I said not. He agreed. The problem was the US were pretty much doing their own thing, and they lacked coherence at the centre. The embedded media were treating the whole thing like scenes from a war movie, and there was no place for the big picture. The media here were pretty much set on presenting things in the worst light. So the mix was not good. We had to raise our own game, but also get the US and the military to raise theirs, and co-ordinate better. The pressure for instant comment and analysis was a real added problem in modern conflict situations.
The papers were not good. The overall impression was that things were not really going our way. TB and I had both come to the view over the weekend that we needed to beef up the whole communications effort. If we were moving from ‘shock and awe’ to a message of steady progress, it required a different communications plan and approach. I went to Greenwich to run the first half of the marathon course with Hugh Jones [runner]. Did 14.08 miles in two hours flat. I quite liked the course and could see no real problems in it.
TB called a couple of times later, as he was preparing another note, including on the media, and we tossed around a few ideas. The Americans were still causing us problems on the media and political front, e.g. Rumsfeld suddenly turning on Syria had apparently also been a shock to the White House. Things not great with Fiona, and were unlikely to improve until I was out of it. Even with all this going on, there was a large part of me wanted out. I had pretty much lost it with the media, had very little time or respect for any of them, which was not a great position to be in, and maybe it was time for someone else.
In for the usual morning meetings, with both CDS and C more hopeful. John Scarlett also reported that the general picture was a lot better. TB later saw CDS and a general from the campaign and said he got more talking direct to the general than he had from weeks of meetings. The truth was that the military and intelligence campaigns had not been wholly successful. The morning meetings were not very productive, and the mood at the War Cabinet was the usual mix of sullen and concerned. Then to TB’s meeting with JR, HA, DA, Peter H, Jonathan, Pat McF, Sally, David Hanson [Blair’s PPS]. TB went through what he wanted on the political and media fronts. It was basically a war room à la Millbank, with all the main tasks being overseen from there, and everyone knowing what was going on in all the different parts of the operation.
I then spent most of the day in a series of meetings working out how to put it into practice. I called in the key people from CIC, FCO and MoD, and explained we needed much more centralised coordination. We were heading for another version of the Kosovo model, though as I pointed out to TB, getting real co-ordination with the Americans wasn’t easy because their own internal co-ordination was not there. Another TB/Bush call, which was basically just going through TB’s note. A lot of the discussion was about presentation and Bush said he would speak to Dan ‘who is kind of responsible for this’. He did so, because Dan called later and said TB had really got GWB ‘spun up’, because he was asking what we were going to do to grip it. I said we had to have a real exchange of people and we also needed them to get their act together internally. He said the reality was they had no real grip of Rumsfeld. The main story of the weekend was division between Rumsfeld and the military over the way the campaign was being waged.
TB called later and asked if I thought it had been OK to raise the comms and media issues like he did. I said it was, but don’t underestimate how hard it will be to grip. We have our own internal problems but they are nothing compared with the Americans’. He had to be more direct with Bush because at least he tended to get things done when he cared enough about it. I sensed on the call today that Bush was maybe sharing TB’s feeling that the military campaign was not quite right. They were both desperate for better communications. The BBC was a bit better today but we had to do more to slow the rhythm. Shock and awehad to become steady progress.
I did a note overnight on the communications effort for TB. Last night had been better but we were still having real problems with the BBC, particularly the reports out of Baghdad and the embedded reporters. TB was involved in a series of meetings with GB re EMU. GB had suddenly announced last week that he wanted to do the euro assessment in the Budget, and say that four out of the five [economic] tests were met, and set out how we intended to meet the fifth, plus there was the suggestion, from us, that we could do the [euro] referendum bill. Andrew Adonis and Peter Hyman in particular were against it, felt it would be seen as sneaky. I felt it was big and bold and TB should use GB’s desire to do it now to extract maximum leverage for a pro position. But then after one of the sessions, TB said ‘God knows what he’s up to. I just can’t work it out.’
The military campaign was going better. There was a classic Clare moment at the War Cabinet when she asked CDS if we shouldn’t be talking to the local military down there. ‘We’re killing them, not talking to them,’ he said. She was more and more ridiculous at these meetings. At the pre-meeting TB raised the Guardian splash that the US was going to run Iraq from Kuwait. We worked up a line ‘Iraq for and by the Iraqi people’. But most of my day was taken trying to set up TB’s war room. I got him to raise it at the War Cabinet so ministers and top brass knew we would be changing things on the comms front. GH said he would like to have it at the MoD.
I chaired a ninety-minute meeting to work through all the things we would need for it and started to bring in the people we would need to drive it. Anne Shevas [chief press officer] found premises at the FCO and rebuttal in MoD. Things were feeling better at the moment, and it was also the case that sometimes if we got the communications right, and the PR situation settled, things then improved in reality because people could focus better. We had intelligence, which I wanted to use, that Saddam was planning to attack holy sites as a way of generating real anger against us, not exactly difficult in the Arab world at the moment. CDS said we had to wait for the US to agree never to attack holy sites, even if they were being used to store weapons.
We had an internal meeting on some of the domestic policy issues, foundation hospitals, asylum, health and NICs. There was a lot to be sorting on the domestic front but most of our time and energies were going on Iraq. At the lobby we were starting to use the basic narrative set out in TB’s note – 1, strategic grip, 2, steady advance then 3, end of regime. It was the best way to slow the media rhythm. I was working on humanitarian stories for tomorrow. Clare did [Jonathan] Dimbleby on ITV and was talking about the illegality of the US approach. We were making good progress finding out what happened at the first Baghdad bombing, enough for Jack to say it was ‘increasingly probable’ it was caused by Iraqi missiles. The sense of strategy was finally beginning to get communicated through the media. I lodged another complaint with the BBC re their output from Baghdad from [Andrew] Gilligan and Rageh Omaar.
Definitely a sense that the military campaign was going better, plus we had a strong humanitarian message running alongside. The major news overnight was the battle getting closer to Baghdad, and also the rescue of a female US PoW [Private Jessica Lynch] by the Marines. Jack sort of got up the holy sites issue on the Today programme. I got a cab in and on the way up the street Alisdair Macdonald [Mirror photographer] showed me a picture he’d taken of Geoff Hoon yesterday as he left Number 10, with a ‘Top Secret’ paper facing the camera, and with the text legible. I thanked him and later spoke to Geoff about it. We had a fairly brief PMQs preparation meeting. TB now had maps of Iraq in his room. At the pre-meeting the picture given was a lot better, particularly in Basra. CDS made a revealing comment when he said in Basra we were using lessons from Northern Ireland. Troops were getting to know people, finding out who the ringleaders were, then seeking them out. ‘Did you do that in Northern Ireland?’ I asked. Laughter.
The War Cabinet proper was the usual blather. At the political meeting we agreed: 1. big push on holy sites; 2. pull back the military narrative so that it did not appear like we were about to win any day now, and 3. more out there re Iraq vs Iraqi people. I was working on a TB speech re a future vision for Iraq. Jack S called to say he was intending to go to ORHA. He said not to mention to Clare because she would want to come and it would change the whole tone and nature of the visit. Then to a meeting with John Reid and Douglas [Alexander] to see how they would fit in the war room. We agreed Douglas would be semi-permanent, JR in and out, though later TB told me he was thinking of moving JR to Leader of the House and Ian McCartney [pensions minister] to party chairman.
Over for PMQs which was fine though it was interesting that there were no questions on the conduct of the war – it was all about the post-conflict questions. I got back and started to insert people into different parts of the war room. The conference call was a mix of wandering conversations and pipe dreams about how well we were doing. I just didn’t see it. I had a separate chat with Dan re the Northern Ireland visit. We were thinking about a joint interview, and also getting over their guy from Homeland Security. TB saw GB again re EMU and was clearly now thinking he was being stitched up to do something he didn’t particularly want to do. I saw Peter M, PG and PH and discussed the BBC coverage. I got a nice letter from Neil [Kinnock] saying his favourite game at the moment was imagining how the BBC of today would have covered World War Two. ‘Hitler would have lived to 1978.’ PG felt the public were making up their own minds and that TB was in OK shape. The public liked TB being so big in the States and he felt we should build that side of the profile even more. My big worry was the Arab media. We were kidding ourselves if we thought we were making real inroads.
TB had issued instructions to ministers in the War Cabinet that they couldn’t go on holiday at Easter. When I mentioned it to Fiona, and said we needed to work out how to handle it if the press came after me when we were away, she snapped back ‘I suppose that’s a polite way of saying you can’t have a holiday.’ I couldn’t understand why she felt we both had to leave. We still had a lot going for us. But she didn’t really believe we could get our lives back until we were both out of their [the Blairs] shadow, and maybe there was something in that. I got Sally to speak to her, and Peter M. Both felt that her anger with me for being a driven, obsessive, selfish bastard had boiled over but because she basically wanted us to stay together she preferred to express it as hatred for TB and CB who in turn gave her lots of ammunition. But it was really grim at the moment.
On the war front, things were going better. The movement towards Baghdad was quickening, more people were deserting, and more was coming out re the nature of the regime. TB was late for the pre-meeting because he had another euro meeting with GB. He was now firmly of the view that GB was trying to bounce him while his eye was off the ball because of Iraq. GB was now trying to make out that he had always intended to do the assessment now, and that TB had agreed to it a while back, which he hadn’t. Also that it was somehow TB’s fault Iraq was ‘taking so long’! And he was back on to a Peter M kick, saying that Peter was responsible for foundation hospitals and the division they were causing. So it went on.
There was an established meeting rhythm now – TB with me, Jonathan, DM, sometimes Sal, then pre-meeting with CDS, C, John S, then the War Cabinet, then a mop-up, and today full Cabinet as well. The mood was OK. TB went through the whole picture and was emphasising steady progress. I helped GH with his Commons statement and then went over to the war room. Dickie Stagg [director of public services and information, FCO] had done a great job and it was pretty much all there now, now needed the fine-tuning and the drive. It would definitely make a difference and we had some good people in there already. I worked on TB’s ‘message to the Iraqi people’ and we brainstormed on the different ways to get it across. TB was out on a troops visit so I tried to clear my in tray.
TB had asked GH and others to work on a counter-plan on the future of Iraq to offer to Bush that was not Rumsfeld’s eccentric ideas. TB said there was no point just going on about Rumsfeld the whole time. We needed a counter-plan. David M, Jonathan and I did a secure videolink with Condi, Dan and Karen. They agreed that on Tuesday we should publish a joint statement similar to the Azores. We also discussed [Bush visiting] Northern Ireland. I asked what the US media would make of GWB pitching up there. They said their approach was to say it was to show those involved in the MEPP that peace processes can work. Good idea. It was a good discussion, pretty frank about each other’s difficulties, so at one point we joked about swapping Rumsfeld for Clare. But I sensed we were at least gripping some of the post-war issues and had a sense of a stronger strategy going forward. Then a rash of calls on the euro, as GB’s lot seemed to be putting it about that there would be something on it in the Budget, which confirmed the suspicions this was an attempted bounce. TB got back at 6 [from Aldershot and RAF Lyneham] and we went through the outstanding issues. HC [Hilary Coffman, special adviser] said he had been terrific with the troops.
More EMU meetings and TB was reverting to his original view that it would be seen as sneaky to do it in the Budget while a war was going on. Jeremy [Heywood] had been up until 1.30 negotiating with Ed Balls and trying to make the language more positive. After all the morning meetings TB called an office meeting and he looked pretty fed up. While GB’s rationale to TB was glass more than half full, it was the empty bits that would get the attention. TB saw him again later and said it was the worst meeting yet (again). GB said the assessment was done and he was not having it rewritten ‘for political reasons’. He was back to speaking in code again. He said ‘I know what your plan is’ – i.e. you are going to sack me. TB tried to get him to say that was what he meant, but he didn’t. TB said he was not prepared to be bounced into something that he felt was wrong. His instincts were telling him this was the wrong way, and the wrong time. He had discussed it with JP who had said he should follow his instincts, and also that there had to be more time for the Cabinet to be brought properly into the discussion.
GB said he was not prepared to let them rewrite the assessment and if that was what we intended, he would have to go. ‘There’s the door,’ said TB. GB claimed he had been trying to have these discussions for ages, which was total balls. The Treasury had already prepared for printing, and now sent to the printers, 3,000 pages of background material. TB said he had been trying to discuss this for months and GB had resisted, all the time preparing for this decision and announcement, and we had to wait for something written by someone called Dave Ramsden!37 Sally said it would be hard to win a referendum campaign without GB. But what he was doing was ensuring there wasn’t one for the foreseeable future.
TB and I went out on the terrace later. ‘One thing is for sure,’ he said. ‘At the moment he is crackerjack. My big worry is that he will bring the whole show down.’ I saw Ed Balls later and although we were able to talk in a civilised way about it, there was no getting away from how grisly things were between them at the moment. I had told TB I was seeing him and he asked me to get over the message that he didn’t want to sack him, they had to work together but he did not fear him any more. I discussed my own situation with TB. He said if things were bad and I was feeling demotivated, I had to decide what I really wanted to do, but he felt I would regret it if I left. The truth was I didn’t really know if I wanted to leave or not. He had a lot on his plate at the moment. Iraq, then the euro suddenly thrown in and I felt bad adding to the problems, but I really need to resolve in my own mind what I intend to do.
The Iraq situation was better. The airport at Baghdad was eighty per cent under control. The Republican Guard was on the run. The broadcasters there were finally beginning to accept that we were doing well. There were signs now of regime collapse. Our main media focus today was the [BBC] World Service Arabic Service and Abu Dhabi TV. The Islamic media team were doing well. We also had some good Iraqi exiles in who were able to talk about the regime far more convincingly than we could. We signed off the TB letter to the Iraqis which we were going to be getting out through the military. The main message for the interviews was that it was a war on Saddam not Iraq. We were also pushing the line that Iraqis wanted to see money spent on schools not palaces. Pictures came in of Saddam out on the streets but it was not entirely clear that it was him rather than a lookalike.
TB did a video conference with Bush. Dick Cheney, Condi and Andy Card were also in the shot. Cheney said next to nothing, just sat there looking menacing. I couldn’t work out whether he always looked like that or it was an effect he sought to create. They went over the Middle East again, Russia, military update, but TB said afterwards he preferred the one-on-one phone calls to the video conference. There was something about it that made him feel constrained, unable to speak freely. There was also something a bit surreal about the fact that while we could see them on the main screen, there was an ordinary TV screen to one side, Peter O’Toole starring in some old-style Zulu war film [Zulu Dawn, 1979].
I saw TB again before he went up to the flat. He was concerned GB was setting himself up to walk by claiming TB had sought to rewrite the euro assessment politically. TB’s view anyway was that it was a political process based on economic judgements. The assessment per se could not decide. That had, ultimately, to be a political judgement. Dan B called as I was leaving to say AP [Associated Press] were on to the Belfast visit. I knocked up a quick briefing note with Ben Wilson [press officer] to use it to get out basic message on Iraq, MEPP and NI.
The military picture was changing fast. As I arrived at the office for the 9am meeting, Sky was showing US tanks going through Baghdad. Things were also going a lot better in Basra and the mood was much improved all round. The regime was refusing humanitarian help. However, the post-conflict issues were looking really ragged. Though we were trying to minimise the differences, the truth was there were differences between us and the US, and differences between the White House, Powell and Rumsfeld. TB said to me he couldn’t understand how I could think about leaving when we were in a position to sort the big geopolitical questions for the next generation, and surely it was right to see the whole thing through.
At the War Cabinet, issues to do with the future of Iraq were becoming more difficult. Clare’s tone was becoming more menacing. Scarlett said there was a possibility Chemical Ali was dead. I went up to Mum and Dad’s with Grace and did the conference call from Robert’s [Templeton, sick relative] bedside. I raised the issue of a planned ORHA briefing for Monday which I said would be a bad thing at the time TB was seeing Bush. Dan and Tucker [Eskew, White House media affairs] both agreed and we would try to move it. The military situation was getting better all the time but as the prospect of winning came closer, the aftermath issues became more pressing.
David M and Matthew Rycroft were pulling together the post-conflict arguments for TB. It was difficult. David called when I was on the train home and said we were meeting a fair bit of American resistance. I got home and Fiona and I had another heart-to-heart. She thought the kids were fed up with it and she was determined that we should leave together. I don’t suppose I handled it very well, just raged about how I hated being pressurised like this when I had so much on my plate at the moment. The reality was I was unsure what I wanted to do. I was very torn.
Fiona picked a fight this morning as soon as I went downstairs with some jibe about ‘the thought police’. I said it was time she got a grip of herself. She ended up calling me a bastard and throwing a cup at me, which smashed on the floor at my feet. She was more angry than I had ever known her and taking it all out on me. Part of me understood. Part of me resented it. But I had a terrible sense of foreboding about it. I left for the office feeling like shit. At the intel meeting, the news was overwhelmingly good. Basra was going according to plan. Around Baghdad the US troops were really going for it now. All our problems really related to the future of Iraq. [Ahmed] Chalabi [expatriate Iraqi dissident], a friend of Rumsfeld and [Paul] Wolfowitz [Deputy Defense Secretary], was putting himself around the whole time as a key player, possible future leader, when the reality was he would be unacceptable.38 The nature of a UN role was becoming the key difficulty. The Americans didn’t want the French in particular to be involved, and because of the reality of the P5 [permanent UNSC members – US, UK, France, Russia and China], that meant the UN. Their general take was that they had given the UN the opportunity to deal with this, the UN had fucked it up, and didn’t deserve to be straight back in the game. But TB was firmly of the view they should be rebuilding relationships, not keeping them broken. He said at one meeting of the inner group ‘I did Iraq because I thought it was right and I am prepared to take whatever comes my way to do what I think is right. But I’m not prepared to stand up for something I think is wrong.’ He was back to the notion that they were doing the right thing in the wrong way. We wanted an interim authority that was mainly Iraqi, then a truly representative government. TB felt his job was still to keep the US focused on the UN route but the pressures in the States were all the other way, to present the UN as a bad thing that shouldn’t be allowed near the place. Dan called to say Bush had agreed to our idea of a joint Iraqi TV broadcast with TB so I worked on a script. Then domestic problems took another bad turn, Fiona sending Jonathan an email saying she intended to resign. TB said he would see her on Wednesday when we got back.
On the flight to Belfast TB worked on a note for Bush setting out why it was so important to get the UN properly involved – to show our commitment to rebuilding after the divisions in the international community, for the Arab world, for Europe. It was a two-page note, very clear and rational. We landed, got a helicopter to Hillsborough. As I was making a few calls in my room, TB called me through to his room. He asked how my situation was at home. I said that unless I had an exit date, I had no ‘marriage’. He said he was really saddened and disappointed, but he understood. He would not put me under pressure to stay. He felt it was a bad move for me, that I would forever regret not seeing the whole thing through to the end. ‘But you need to know you have done more for me than anyone, more than I could have asked for, I could not have done it without you, and I will not feel let down, so let me relieve you of any pressure you may feel on that front.’ But I did feel it, because I knew he valued the close team around him and I knew I made a difference. I felt it very strongly here at Hillsborough because there had been so many good and bad moments here, but I knew I had helped with both.
We stood at the window and I reminded him of the time we came here in Opposition and he looked out over the grounds at Hillsborough and said the Tories were not going to give it all up without a real fight. We had won that fight and I knew a lot of that was down to me and the work I’d done for him, and it was not easy to walk away from it. He asked me when I wanted to go. I said summer at the latest, maybe conference, maybe before. He just nodded. We went round in circles for a while and then he said I would have to help him find a successor. I felt David Hill [former Labour Party chief spokesman] was possibly the only option. We went downstairs to wait for Bush and Co. to arrive. They flew in, then drove up, GWB, Powell, Condi and Andy Card in Bush’s car. TB and Bush having a fair bit of time together. At one point they came back from a walk and Bush was talking about his favourite presidents – Washington, Lincoln, Roosevelt, Reagan. He said Reagan made the country feel good again and he saved the Republican Party.
I tried to go out for a run but was stopped at every second tree by bloody American security men jumping out from trees. Gave up after a couple of miles. Bush seemed to be going in the right direction on MEPP, said he intended to put real pressure on Sharon. He was still not in bridge-building mode elsewhere, said that he didn’t want TB to accept Putin’s invite to meet VP, Chirac and Schroeder at St Petersburg. Meanwhile Clare had sent through a note listing all sorts of points she wanted TB to raise with Bush. Jack was of the view that it didn’t matter too much if she went. TB felt it was a good discussion but he was concerned that Bush was in such a different position re the UN and trying to rebuild relations. Jack felt they really were pressing for a right-wing government there, though Bush seemed to be pretty clear [Ahmed] Chalabi was a non-starter.
TB said ‘this neocon stuff’ was crazy. I had asked Dan last night what ‘neocon’ meant and he said it was the belief that government had a moral purpose. I said does that mean moral purpose can only be right wing? TB felt today’s meeting with Bush was going to be tough. It was clear Condi was pushing a fairly hard line re the UN. We had a fight on our hands to keep in a ‘vital role’ [in the press conference script]. She wanted ‘important’ which sounded too grudging. ‘It’s meant to be,’ she said. My other worry was that it might be briefed they had downgraded it. TB was determined we had to get something out of this and in the end, largely thanks to Bush, we did. Bush was excellent on Northern Ireland, and on MEPP, linked the two well by saying he would spend as much time and energy on MEPP as TB did on NI, then excellent too on the UN role. He was good on the war message too. The general feeling afterwards was that it was the best media performance he’d done.
It was interesting to watch him in the main meeting today, where he was letting TB do a lot of the talking, then taking in Powell’s and Condi’s views in particular, then more or less saying what we expected him to in the first place. He seemed restless too, a bit fidgety. He and TB were in the big armchairs by the fireplace, the rest dotted around the room, Jack and Powell on the sofa together. Powell was talking at one point when Bush got up, got himself a coffee, asked me if I wanted one and came over to talk to me about the marathon. When is it? What time will I do? How much money will I raise? Dan pointed out that I had a piece in The Times on it and Bush picked it up and read it, getting to the end plug for Leukaemia Research. ‘You doing it for leukaemia? Did you know my sister died from leukaemia? Would you like me to give you a cheque?’ I certainly would, I said.
He went to the door giving on to the lounge, opened it and shouted out ‘Blake [Gottesman, aide], get my chequebook.’ Later the cops said he created an absolute stir because nobody had a clue that he had a chequebook with him, let alone where it was, though they did find it eventually, and he wrote out a cheque there and then. He said his sister was called Robin and died aged seven when he was four. ‘I will do this because you are my friend,’ he said, ‘but I am also doing it for her.’ I asked if the charity could publicise it. Sure, he said. TB came over and asked what I was up to. I said the president had just given me a cheque so where’s yours?
Bush seemed seem to buy into TB’s line that he had to develop a bigger international message that was not just terrorism but MEPP, world poverty, environment, etc. He was pretty vile re Chirac, said he felt betrayed, that Chirac had gone against him not on the merits but as part of a general anti-US strategy and he would never forgive that. ‘The only thing that would swing me round to France is regime change.’ Bush said he would maybe rebuild with Schroeder first but he wanted TB to make sure he knew he felt personally affronted and he would only think about putting things back together with them on the clear understanding German foreign policy was not run by the French.
TB seemed to have worked a fair bit of influence on him because the general reaction from the press conference was that Bush went well beyond what was expected. He also tore a bit of a strip off Condi at the pre-meeting when she was still picking away at him, and he suddenly said ‘There is too much tension in here.’ He asked everyone to leave apart from me, Blake and Magi Cleaver [Number 10 press officer]. TB and Bush also had a fairly long stroll, just the two of them while Jack continued to work on Condi, Powell and Dan Fried [National Security Council], saying that the warmer the words re the UN, the greater the influence within it. Jack and I both fought very hard to keep ‘vital’ in the text, and eventually they agreed to it. Later Dan said, only half in jest I think, ‘Can we win any of these arguments at all?’ He obviously had the counter-worry, that if Bush was too warm re the UN, he would get hit at home. TB said to Bush ‘that was a very rash promise’ – to spend as much time on MEPP as he had on NI.
Bush knew he had done pretty well. I was trying to get them up to do the Iraqi TV pieces to camera straight away while they were still in the mood. Bush’s crowd were gathering round him clearly telling him he had gone too far in our direction. Both Condi and Dan looked slightly panicked, though he was holding firm and seemed not to be bothered. During the press conference Powell had slipped a note to Condi saying they would have to send a ‘Rummygram’, to warn Rumsfeld of what he was saying. Jack was trying to joke with Condi about it but she was clearly not happy. She said he had risked bad US reaction re the UN and they would have to make some calls to see how bad it was. Bush overheard and snapped back at her ‘I don’t want any pulling back on this.’ We were due to do the broadcast recording on the same floor as the bedrooms. I went up with them, and went in to TB’s room while he tidied himself up. Bush came in after a while. ‘Hey, they didn’t make your bed yet.’ He said he was getting a bit of grief from his people but he was fine with what he said. TB said it was the right thing to do. We sorted the filming logistics, then down to meet Bertie [Ahern] who was arriving for lunch, and then the other parties. The press conference was running pretty much word perfect for us.
We gathered the parties, including [David] Trimble, [Gerry] Adams, [Martin] McGuinness, [David] Ervine [leader, Progressive Unionist Party] etc., in a rough circle inside the main dining room. Bush did the rounds and was pretty good at it, and did a little general number, saying he was there in the hope he could put some wind in their sails, and that when NI finally moved to lasting peace, it would be seen as a symbol of hope around the world. I was chatting to Powell about the French. He said even he found them impossible to deal with, that he found de Villepin arrogant and condescending. The meeting went fine, and they all seemed to think it had been worth him coming. TB and Bush then walked down the hill to the helicopters. I was following on behind with Condi. We joked about the next venue, maybe Cyprus. I said I thought it had gone pretty well, but said she seemed a lot more wound up than before. They flew off and TB went back in for meetings with Bertie and the parties.
TB was full of himself on the flight home, really felt it had been good and positive, pretty much on all fronts. GWB was definitely moving a bit on the international agenda, and buying into the need for a new approach, but the tensions internally had been very clear. TB felt Schroeder had a chance of getting back in with Bush, but not Chirac. TB was even more firmly of the view now that Chirac’s world view built around rival poles of power was crazy. Chirac had put himself out on a limb and would see France’s power diminish. The question unresolved from today was when to declare victory.
Today was the day when things really started to turn. While we were having a meeting on the humanitarian issues, which I wanted to badge as a return to normal life, the US forces were now motoring big time, and the Iraqis were spilling out on to the streets in greater numbers and with more confidence. The BBC reporters and David Chater [Sky] were beginning to change their tune. The main focus for the media was the toppling of a statue of Saddam, all the more dramatic for the time it took, but the effect ruined in many ways by an American soldier getting up there to put a US flag round his face. They just don’t get it sometimes. I could appreciate the emotion that led him to do something like that, and these guys are soldiers not diplomats, but even so, surely someone nearby would have reckoned on how what plays well in the States goes down like a lead balloon elsewhere. The PMQs pre-meeting was strangely flat and desultory and they could tell TB’s mind was elsewhere now, moving on to the next set of problems.
War Cabinet. Signs of regime collapse were all around now. It was still not clear where Saddam was but they believed both he and Chemical Ali were alive. Clare was rabbiting on more than ever. I slipped TB a note about the time Saddam shot his health minister at a meeting because he was annoying him and did he want me to get a gun? Yes, he scribbled. We came out of the meeting straight into another GB-inspired mini crisis. Jeremy had discovered late yesterday that GB planned to include in the Budget a review by [Sir] Derek Wanless [banker] on health inequalities, obviously with a view to making big changes in the future. He hadn’t discussed it with TB or with Alan Milburn, who hit the roof when told about it, and demanded it be removed from the Budget. Of course GB being GB, it was too late to unpick fully, the background documents having been printed we assumed, and Wanless having been lined up. We did though get it pulled from the statement and got the Treasury to agree Milburn would be in charge of the review.
TB and I were in many ways so used to it that with everything else that was going on, we didn’t let ourselves get too wound up, and we were trying to make light of it when Alan came in to see TB pre Cabinet. He was totally on the rampage. He said it was just unacceptable to have a Chancellor behave like this, to announce major change in someone else’s department without even discussing it. He could see TB was not going to get too wound up and so added ‘And it weakens you in the eyes of others that you let him get away with it.’ He said the NHS was more monitored and reviewed than any other part of government and if this was to be another great review, he would put out a statement denouncing it. ‘I am just not having it.’ We tried to get him down from the ceiling but he said he intended to raise it in Cabinet.
I had to leave to chair my Iraq morning meeting which went on a bit so I missed the start of Cabinet. GB was in full flow when I got back, going through the Budget. He got an OK if not overwhelming response. TB said we were doing better than most countries, but there had to be a continuing emphasis on the changes we needed to make for the future. DB made a joke about being upset at the rise on wine. GB said sparkling wine was frozen. ‘I don’t like that. I like red,’ said David. Charles asked about ‘the speculation that we would be doing the euro tests today and what is the answer on that?’ ‘The answer is no,’ said TB. Then Alan got in there, made a few political points, e.g. that as the Tories tried to stake out a low tax position, we had to win on value for money and he would circulate a paper to colleagues about where the money was going in the health service. He then said he wanted to raise a process point, that there was to be a second Wanless report announced in the Budget. He said that at ten to nine he got a call from Paul Boateng [chief secretary to the Treasury] to say there was to be this review, and it was totally unacceptable and it was unnecessary for the Treasury to operate in this way. Of course having been there as chief secretary, he knew that for something like this to be included in the overall package it will have been known about for some time, and he stated several times it just wasn’t necessary to behave like this.
Ian McCartney [newly appointed party chairman], who was at his first Cabinet after the mini reshuffle involving him and John R, came in with his first intervention, which was pretty telling. He said it was important that colleagues (i.e. GB) did not make things even more difficult than they already were for other ministers. He felt there were sufficient reviews of the NHS going on already. He was not clear what the purpose of this one was, or its agenda. And though at times he was coded, he laid down a marker that he thought GB was exploiting the foundation hospitals issue to be divisive in the party. GB totally ignored the point when he was summing up. As the meeting finished and we went through to TB’s room, TB sat down in the chair by the fireplace, shaking his head. ‘I just don’t know what you do with him. On the one hand, there is nobody else there who has the breadth and the reach that allows you to put together a Budget like that. On the other, why is he incapable of working with other people unless they are wholly owned disciples?’
PMQs went fine. The Budget a bit of a monodrone. Peter M came over for a chat re my situation. The TV was on in the background, Saddam’s statue coming down. He felt Fiona in some ways resented the way I was seen as such a big figure, when she was every bit as political, and she felt let down personally by TB and CB. We perhaps had more realistic expectations because when all was said and done he was a politician and a human being with weaknesses as well as strengths. Fiona was very unforgiving of others’ weaknesses, he said. Also she had got herself into a mindset that could only see the downside. He said I was a figure in political history and that only came about because TB gave us that opportunity.
TB was seeing Fiona and seemingly told her he was sad things had reached this point, that she had done a good job, and he knew these were very high-pressure positions. She felt he was fine about us leaving but not yet. She told him she thought the political side of our operation was weak, that too much fell on me. She said it was fine on one level, but the reality was she didn’t much like him or respect him any more, and she was convinced we had to get out. I felt that considering everything else he had to deal with at the moment, it was a bit much to expect him to be on top of all the internal personnel issues too, even those involving us.
He had a stack of calls post PMQs, including Chirac and Kofi and he was clearly going to be a feature if not the key player in the aftermath. David Blunkett came round for dinner and Fiona was now pretty open about how she felt about things. He said to me when she was out of the room ‘You must not let her push you out. TB has to have you there, and so do the rest of us.’ He was making clear he thought TB had to grip GB. He realised he couldn’t sack him but he could swap him with Jack. GB might see it as a downward step but you cannot be Chancellor forever and Foreign Secretary is the other big job he could do.
Jonathan had stayed out in Northern Ireland trying to get the final pieces in place for a deal but it didn’t work out, so we aborted the plan for TB to fly out. Jonathan called early to say that they couldn’t do it. TB worked on it for a while, tried out various forms of words, but in the end the IRA were not going to deliver. GB got a fairly good press out of the Budget but on Iraq, the media were moving effortlessly from ‘victory’ to lawlessness and humanitarian disaster. Their determination to ensure TB got no credit at all for Saddam’s fall was pretty intense. Jack was chairing meetings on the aftermath issues and said to me later that having Clare there was like having a fifth column, that he felt the whole time she was trying to sabotage.
The mood in the War Cabinet and Cabinet itself was better but still not great considering the progress made. We still had major problems ahead – e.g. where were the WMD? What do we do to repair the divisions in the international community, particularly between the US and the EU? TB had another difficult call with Chirac.
De Villepin told Jack that as far as France was concerned, the US and the UK were ‘the demandeurs’ so they clearly felt it was up to us to make the running in trying to repair things. Schroeder was trying to get back onside. There were signs of Putin doing the same, but they all would delight at the fact that ‘victory’ was messy and not universally seen as such, and that now we had to involve them more. GH said there were plenty of other countries wanting to help but they needed UN cover for their internal politics. It was blindingly obvious and yet we were still struggling with the US on this.
John Scarlett’s military and intelligence update was overwhelmingly positive. By contrast Clare was exacerbating problems as much as she could, winding up the International Red Cross, or being wound up, and the DFID website was pretty much unadulterated bad news, dreadful about everything. After Cabinet I left with Charles Lindsay [one of TB’s protection officers] for the Tower Hotel. Charles was doing the marathon and at the security review it had been suggested he run with me, whilst the cops on the route would also get an alert when I was in their area. Deep down I did not imagine anything would happen, but you couldn’t be sure in the current mood. I did a photocall at Tower Bridge, then a press conference and interviews. The organisers were a good crowd and seeing the HQ brought home how close it was now.
Then an Iraq update meeting. CDS was very clear that a near-philosophical difference between us and the US was responsible for some of the disorder problems we had. We believed in peacekeeping. They believed in war fighting. We were good at both. They were only really focused on one, so didn’t adapt quickly enough to changed circumstances. The Times had done a story re Bush’s sponsorship cheque, and having seen it, TB said ‘I suppose I’d better sponsor you too then.’ He was totally at a loss re GB at the moment. JP had told him it had to be sorted one way or the other, that it could not go on like this much longer. TB agreed in theory but was unsure in practice what that meant he should do. He felt the euro business had become a bit of a nightmare now, and could easily have been avoided if there was genuine trust between them.
A few OK pictures from the marathon photocall. The main news overnight was lots of looting going on in Iraq, the BBC hyping for all it was worth. Gilligan was saying there was more fear there now than there had been before. The main focus both of the pre-meeting and the War Cabinet itself was the disorder, and there were still problems re ORHA. [General Sir] Mike Jackson was saying that if only the US would operate in Baghdad as we were in the south, we would all be better off. But they didn’t, so things were becoming very messy. In reality, the operation had been an enormous military success, but it didn’t seem like that. We were having to dance around perfectly legitimate questions re when ORHA was going to be up and running and what we were supposed to be doing there. I could hardly believe the marathon was just a couple of days away, that I had all this other stuff to keep me awake, but the one recurring dream I had been having was that I lost my race number on the way to the starting line. TB went off to Sandhurst [Royal Military Academy] where he was speaking at the passing-out parade. Geoff Hoon called re Terry Lloyd. It was pretty clear US forces had killed him. Amid all this, we then had the people from The Simpsons in to record TB. The writer [Al Jean] was a really serious type who clearly worried himself a lot about his work. He and I had been batting scripts back and forth and it was fine really, though as TB said, there would be plenty of people willing to slag him off for doing it. But hell, he said, there aren’t many perks to the job worth having, so how can you say no to a bit part on The Simpsons?39
I was determined to be in the best possible shape for the marathon tomorrow so rested up a lot of the day, didn’t go in for the morning meetings, watched Man Utd vs Newcastle on the TV and took Grace to see Maid in Manhattan,40 which had a seriously silly plot, though the relationship between the politician and his spin doctor was moderately amusing. TB left me pretty much alone, though he did call to ask why I hadn’t been to the meetings. I said I really wanted to get my head in gear for tomorrow, and in any event Jonathan had filled me in. Baghdad was still looking grim, though things were getting better in Basra. I was getting loads of Good Luck messages and I was getting really psyched for it. I ate a ton of pasta, then went to bed, after laying out all my gear for the morning. I was really pleased to have got this far, and pretty confident. I think part of me was glad to be doing something to keep John’s [Merritt] memory alive, but part of me was glad too to be doing something that was in a way independent of the job, even though I had managed to raise as much as I had because of that, though the biggest donation was £50k from the Bridges [neighbours].
I had my recurring dream about losing my race number, only this time there was a different twist. It rained at Greenwich, the ink on the number ran and it became illegible and I was stopped from running. Relieved to wake up, I turned on the radio and they were talking about me doing it, which I took as an omen I would do OK. It was a nice day, fresh but looked like it was going to be sunny, and the mood up at the start was terrific. There were two starting points and Charles [Lindsay] and I were starting from the one with the smaller numbers, which was a bonus. We were taken to the VIP tent to wait and I chatted to the Slovak PM [Mikulas Dzurinda] who asked me if I would do a race out there. I was peeing every few minutes, a mix of nerves and all the fluids of the last couple of days.
The start felt great, and I reckoned I was in OK shape for sub four hours, which is what I really wanted. I did the first mile well below eight minutes without even really trying, which was probably the adrenaline getting me to start too fast, the second mile bang on eight, and then into a fairly steady rhythm for a while. After three miles Charles said I ought to run on ahead on my own. The hardest points were nine miles, fifteen and twenty-one, but the bands and the crowds were great. ‘Rockin’ All Over the World’ [hit record by Status Quo] got me through one tricky part. A Jennifer Lopez song playing made me think of Grace at another and got me through. The crowd were fantastic all the way. I didn’t get a single adverse comment, which surprised me considering how much war divisiveness there had been, and loads of encouragement. Philip and Georgia [Gould] popped up a couple of times on the route. Andrew Turnbull, Alun Evans [Cabinet Office], others from the office though I missed Alison [Blackshaw] and her crowd at Canary Wharf. I had been warned Canary Wharf would be quiet but it was about as noisy as anywhere on the route and I got a great lift there. There were no quiet and lonely miles at all. Also, on a couple of occasions when I was struggling one of the other runners would come alongside and help push me on, including a woman from Dulwich who suggested I ‘lock on to her’ and follow step by step which, as she had a near-perfect bum, took me through another tricky mile before I recovered my strength and eventually left her.
The last few miles from the Tower were hard and exhilarating in equal measure. I hit twenty-two miles with fifty minutes left to break four hours so I knew I was going to do it and could relax a bit. The crowds by now were just a wall of sound and encouragement. I was worried I was going to cry on crossing the line, so forced myself to do it as I ran towards Big Ben, lost myself in a crowd of runners, and just let the emotion come out, imagined friends on one shoulder, enemies on the other, friends pushing me on, enemies failing to hold me back; thought about John, thought about how long left my dad had, thought about the kids, really piled it on and cried for a bit as I ran, and then felt fine on the last mile.
I had trained hard in really difficult circumstances work-wise and I felt a real sense of achievement. I wondered around twenty miles if I could beat Bush’s time, but as I tried to pick up the pace, the pain in the hamstrings really intensified and I just went back to my steady plod, and settled for sub four. I didn’t realise the cameras were on me for the last couple of minutes, by which time I was swearing at myself the whole time, push yourself, faster, fuck it, keep going, push, etc. The last few hundred metres were a mix of agony and joy. The pain was pretty intense but by now virtually every second someone was shouting out encouragement, from ‘Do it for New Labour’ to ‘I forgive you everything Tony Blair has done’ to endless ‘Go on, you can do it, not far to go.’
I was siphoned off at the turn into the Mall and could now hear the commentary. I spotted Fiona and the kids right at the end in the stand and ran towards them. They were screaming at me to head straight to the finish but I was seven minutes inside my target and just so pleased to see them. My legs buckled a bit as I stopped and my voice was unbelievably weak, but it felt fantastic to have done it. I posed for a few pictures for the snappers, did an interview with Sue Barker [former tennis player turned sports commentator], dictated my column to The Times, and also did a briefing at the ICA [Institute of Contemporary Arts], by which time my legs had pretty much seized up. We got home, by which time I had a massive dehydration headache, and was drinking gallons of water. We went out for dinner with the Goulds. Philip had reminded me of the Woody Allen character41 today, popping up in incongruous places along the route. But I felt really happy at having done it. Grace said she had felt so proud of me, and did I know what a fantastic thing I did for John? I was really touched, especially as she had never known him.
Good enough coverage of the marathon, including some nice pictures with Fiona. TB was seeing the Slovak PM, and said he hoped that now I would get back to getting HIM good media coverage, rather than me. He said it with a smile though and the response in the office was really warm. Loads more cheques were coming in today on the back of the recent interviews. The war meeting was fairly low-key. TB was getting more and more exasperated with Clare. When CDS and Mike Jackson said that the humanitarian scene was not as bad as the [International Committee of the] Red Cross were saying, Clare snorted and said ‘I believe the ICRC.’ TB said she was a total burden. He also felt that now, if he got rid of her, there would not be too much of a fuss. There was still no sign of WMD, no sign of Saddam, and a considerable humanitarian challenge. A little boy named Ali was getting a huge amount of media attention, and becoming something of a symbol.42 We were going to have to resolve his case pretty quickly.
I missed the Bush call but TB said GWB had said to congratulate me on the marathon and to say that my ‘bleeding nipples’ were all over the US media. TB told him that I had also been covering my balls with large amounts of Vaseline. Bush said ‘I think I have heard enough about his body now.’ The conference call was not great. Syria was a problem43 because it was clear we and the US were in a different place on substance and on how to handle it. Then a TB/Milburn meeting on foundation hospitals. TB felt the whole thing was looking very ragged, that we had made clear the direction of travel we wanted, but the Health/Treasury conflict was forcing us to a bit of a muddled compromise.
Nice email from Keith Blackmore [Times sports editor] who said he thought my pieces for them had been the best marathon column he had ever read, and if ever I wanted a career in sports journalism, I knew where to go. My legs were still stiff and sore and I had to walk downstairs pretty much sideways. I got a cab in and the driver was really friendly, and full of congratulations. He was also totally onside re Iraq. The War Cabinet was OK, though Clare was still causing us as many problems as she could. It was perfectly obvious she was going to end up going. TB wanted me to go on the trip to Germany, but agreed I could come back after that. He wanted to discuss the media and political plans for the next phase, and we often managed to get some decent work done on these plane journeys. By the end of the day I had put together an OK plan for the next few weeks.
As we drove to Northolt he must have said three, maybe four times, that he was just at a loss to know what to do about GB. He felt that he was now of a mindset that he needed to wage war on pretty much every front. To create the circumstances to depose him, he felt he had to create and win power struggles. I felt if that was the case, it was totally the wrong approach. If I were him, I would love TB to death, support him so closely that TB felt a certain pleasure in handing over power. As things stood, he was making it harder and harder for him to do it. He seemed to want not only to get rid of him, but also destroy any sense that TB had a legacy worth the name.
At the War Cabinet, Clare had said she had been talking to the French and German development ministers and ‘they just need lots and lots of talking to’, to which TB replied ‘Well I’m all in favour of therapy but I’m not sure it constitutes a policy.’ I asked if he finally accepted my long-held view that she was bad news. He did. He said what she did re ‘reckless’ was an act of treachery.44 He believed GB was now calculating the potential implications of her resignation, that he wanted her to resign over 1441. TB said he was still of the view he didn’t really want to serve a third term but he couldn’t see how he could hand over to GB.
I was urging the MoD to do something about the young boy who had lost his arms, Ali, who was getting enormous media attention. We flew up to Scotland with Helen Liddell [Scottish Secretary] and Catherine MacLeod [Herald] who was interviewing TB. We landed, drove to the Burrell Collection [Glasgow art museum], where the speech [for the Scottish Parliament elections] went fine, then off to RAF Leuchars [Fife] to see the families of pilots out in the region. The people there seemed genuinely appreciative of the support TB gave them. Of all the various services we came in contact with, I would say the military were consistently the best to deal with. Then to see the team on permanent standby for a terrorist incident or a hijacking. A great bunch of blokes, who admitted that a lot of the time they were bored stiff, but they knew they could be called on any second, and had to keep mentally alert the whole time.
Back on the plane and off to Germany. TB was reading the intelligence and briefings pre the meeting [EU summit] in Athens. Chirac was up for causing as much trouble as possible on Iraq and ESDP. Schroeder was seeking to be more constructive, and even to become the bridge to France/Russia. But Chirac basically wanted us to be left out as much as possible. TB felt it was as though Chirac had ‘found religion’, that he had become fixated on a multipolar vision of the world, and it was a recipe for disaster. ‘It is madness. It is like a rerun of the Cold War, and yet there is no real balance. If you say US or France, what is he talking about, what is the choice?’
Chirac was intending to try to stuff the Americans over ESDP by backing a ridiculous Belgian idea of a four-way defence summit with France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. The French were assuming that we would not want to upset them, and so were intending to try to push the whole defence debate in a different direction. It was the wrong assumption, and the wrong time to make the move. Luxembourg for God’s sake. TB had a good meeting with Schroeder in Hanover. He said he did not subscribe to the Chirac multipolar view and also that he was looking for better relations with the US. Then a three-hour flight to Athens, during which I worked on a note to get TB back focused on some of the domestic issues that had gone off the boil during the height of the Iraq business.
Overnight in Athens and I woke up to open the curtains of the hotel room and behold the most beautiful blue sea imaginable. It was hot without being unbearable, and I sat out on the terrace and finished the note I had been working on on the flight down. Then the media monitoring note came through and Short had given us another problem, this time saying time will tell if TB made the right decision and whether we should have given Blix more time. TB was pretty close to the end of his tether with her.
TB had a breakfast meeting with [Romano] Prodi [President of the European Commission] who was mumbling and rambling more than ever. At the end of the meeting, even his own spokesman said to me ‘What on earth was he talking about?’ TB spent a lot of the meeting just nodding and I don’t think he could hear much of what Prodi was saying either. Very odd. Then to a meeting with Kofi, who made a beeline for me on arrival, said ‘Ah the marathon man, and such a good time.’ I think TB was getting a bit pissed off with the attention it had been getting. To be frank, I was beginning to feel a bit of a void without the training routine and the day to aim for, and would need something else. I had been kind of hoping work would fill it again, but things at home made that difficult. We were due to go off for a week in Majorca and tonight I had promised to take Rory to Arsenal vs Man United and was fretting about getting back in time, particularly when the plane back was delayed. I left the summit early with Kate [Garvey, events and visits team], got to the airport and just made it back. I told Kate I was feeling myself heading towards the exit door.
We had a nice enough week in Majorca, but Fiona and I had said too much to each other that was hurtful in recent weeks and we weren’t really getting on that well. At one point she said in terms that she sometimes felt that I had left her for TB, that that was where all my emotion and energy went, and that any left over went on the kids but not her. It was a pretty harsh thing to say, but I knew what she meant. I could only do the job full on or not at all, and full on meant staying on top of things round the clock. Whenever I didn’t, I felt things slipped backwards. Her view was that I had been to some extent brutalised by politics, that I had put up so many barriers around me as a way of making myself immune to the attacks that came my way, but it had carried over into our home life too.
The kids were brilliant though, and seemed to have a great time. I had a couple of heart-to-hearts with Philip, but his main concern really was that I stay involved. TB called a few times. He had had another session with GB at Chequers which had been better, but then it was all briefed into the FT as a discussion of the euro tests, saying how TB had agreed it would be very difficult to do this parliament. It was intolerable if they could not have private discussions on issues like the euro without it all being spilled into the media.
We got back last night and to Fiona’s annoyance I went in today for a whole stack of meetings, first on health policy, one on foundation hospitals then PCTs [NHS primary care trusts], then Charles C in for a session on the choice agenda for schools, where he and TB pretended to be in the same place but weren’t in reality, then on the euro. TB was determined to ensure a more positive tone to the assessment. He had read all the texts now and felt it was OK and reasonably positive. Arnab [Banerji, economic adviser] was of the view that it would and could be presented as a case for entry. TB also went through how it could be presented positively. But GB would present it in a negative light. TB said we needed to get the focus on fact – he would be saying four out of five tests were met, measures would be taken to meet the fifth, there will be a changeover plan and a referendum bill. Provided there was warm body language alongside that, it could be a big step forward. But it was not clear to any of us that he and GB were on the same pitch. He did the FT interview and though we didn’t really want the euro to be the story, he was pretty forward on it.
Iraq was looking a bit messy though Tariq Aziz [Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister] was in the hands of the US. I went to another meeting on Iraq but wasn’t really focused, and I suddenly realised how much of my thinking was about leaving. When Phil Stephens [FT] pointed out to me earlier that TB had been leader for almost nine years, it came as something of a shock, stated in those terms. I liked a lot of the people in the office, and was pleased with the team I had built, but was that enough to keep me? I don’t think so. Was the closeness to TB and all that meant enough? Not any more.
Then to a reshuffle meeting, TB, Pat McF, Sally, Peter H and I. TB was clear Clare would go, so would Scotland and Wales as separate jobs. He was also intending to reshape the Lord Chancellor’s Department and say farewell to Derry [Irvine], which would be quite a big thing to do. He was clearly feeling in bold mood. But he still felt the difficulty on public services was the paralysing effect of GB when he didn’t want to go with TB’s agenda. Home, and another humdinger of a row. Fiona said either she leaves and I stay, which she thought was a recipe for disaster, or we both go and I always blame her for forcing me out, which did not exactly make her feel good about the future either. A story came in later which would reinforce her view of how CB had changed for the worse, namely that she had been invited to a store [Globe] in Melbourne [Australia] and walked out weighed down by stuff. ‘I wish she didn’t have this thing about a bargain,’ TB said when I told him.
Grimsville at home. I was feeling really down. I couldn’t let things get so bad we split up. I went out for a run, and came across a scene in Golders Green that underlined how much I didn’t want it to happen. A young boy was screaming as his mother tried to hand him over to his dad, because it was ‘his weekend’. We had another flare-up on the way to the Landmark Hotel, where we were due to meet Alex [Ferguson]. We managed to have a nice time despite it all. We met Carlos Queiroz [assistant manager, Manchester United] who seemed a decent sort, Tony Coton [goalkeeping coach] and some of the players. Alex was clearly losing it with [David] Beckham. ‘He’s upstairs preening himself.’ He said when he dropped him Real Madrid knew about it within minutes. He felt Beckham was addicted to the press profile, couldn’t exist without it. He said even Gary Neville [teammate] was losing it with him a bit.
It was a nice enough hotel but he ended up complaining about the wine. ‘Govan boy complains about the wine,’ he said. ‘That’s New Labour.’ Fiona said she held him responsible for me still being there, because he had been so adamant at the time of the election that I should stay. He said ‘No, what I said was do what you’re good at and if you’re still good at it, carry on, but always be in control.’ He reckoned if I knew what else I would rather do, and I would be happy away from it, I should go. Fiona was a lot calmer talking about these things when it wasn’t just the two of us and now she was saying she’d be happy for me to stay till the next election provided she was absolutely clear that that was it. Alex was talking through who might be his successor. Maybe [Roy] Keane [Manchester United captain] – ‘the most intelligent player I ever worked with’. On GB, he felt he was clever but lacked Tony’s presence.
TB called first thing, after two long conversations with GB, and said they’d been awful. On foundation hospitals TB said to him ‘Am I supposed to believe that Frank Dobson and Bill Morris [TGWU general secretary] just stumbled across these arguments against foundation hospitals?’ For example Dobson had written to MPs on foundation hospitals and referred to the J-Curve theory [of how nations rise and fall]. On the euro TB thought that GB was buying into the idea of a rewritten assessment of the euro but when Jeremy went through it with Ed Balls, it went nowhere. It had taken TB almost forty-eight hours to get hold of him. When he did at least they were talking but he said GB was just creating non-arguments. It was draining and on the fundamentals they couldn’t agree.
TB felt GB clearly believed that TB was going to move or sack him and this was all about protecting himself. He’d said to him ‘I know what you’re up to. I know your plans.’ TB said to him ‘I don’t have a plan. I would like to work with you.’ He said it then went into a ‘no you’re not, yes I am’ routine. He said to me later that he was really unsure about fighting another election but he said there were a lot of people in the party saying to him ‘You cannot hand over to this guy. You’ve made your mark but we have to live with him after you’ve gone.’ TB had read the euro assessments himself and actually felt they were broadly positive, but Balls had put enough in there to present as anti. TB said the second of the conversations was ‘monosyllabic’. He said he really didn’t know what to do. He said he had never wanted to fight a third election, but it was difficult to hand over to someone who was behaving in such a crazy way.
We also had the problem of Melbourne and CB’s shopping spree. A clothing company had asked her to look at some goods and she ended up with sixty-eight items and we had another freebie story to deal with. TB suggested to her that she get someone else to help her with the PR and she called David Hill. He, Hilary C and I were all of the view that it was best to do nothing, say nothing, and just wait till it went away. She had told TB that she hadn’t asked for any of this stuff and it just turned up at the hotel. We were heading for a rocky patch all round, and this didn’t help.
Iraq meeting. We were being warned of the possibility that Saddam had got rid of WMD and certainly most of the documentation, before the conflict. How big a problem was it if it turned out to be the case that we found none? Very difficult. It seemed the best we could do was defectors saying that it had all been destroyed. WMD were not being found and that was a problem. At the War Cabinet, Jack S and Clare had their standard row about the ORHA [post-conflict] operation. Clare said Jack wanted to throw people at the organisation ‘regardless of effect’ and Jack said she was talking nonsense. Clare was looking and sounding more and more ridiculous. TB did OK at the press conference and though the BBC decided early on that WMD was the story, later they moved to the domestic agenda stuff. Peter M called me, said re EMU he felt GB was doing the wrong thing for the wrong reasons. He felt we were being cowardly.
Iraq, and where were the WMD, was back as a problem. Yesterday John Scarlett called and asked me how big a problem would it be if we didn’t find any and had to rely on ex-scientists telling what had been there and what they knew. Big problem. I got a cab in to meet up with TB then into the car and off [to Russia]. He said he felt good at the moment but the GB situation was like a permanent dark shadow. ‘I just don’t know what to do about it.’ He said the problem was he just didn’t believe what he said to him any more. ‘I cannot fathom why he has to be so destructive.’ We had a tiny but revealing example. John McFall [Labour MP, chair of the Treasury Select Committee] told us – simply as a matter of fact, no agenda and no reason why it shouldn’t have happened – that he had discussed the TSC report with GB. GB told TB he hadn’t. Why? TB said surely Gordon must realise he is making it harder not easier to hand over to him. What is unfathomable is that it is such a not clever strategy.
The visit had been Putin’s request and it was an OK thing to do but there were some very difficult issues, particularly divisions over the UN role. Iraq generally would be difficult. TB saw the press on the plane and I was warning them not to expect major league front-page stuff. But unbeknown to us Putin was gearing up for a direct big whack on WMD and plenty else besides. TB’s basic case at the moment was that the world had to come together. That the US was the only superpower and it was better that we tried to work together rather than try to be setting ourselves up as rivals. But France, Russia, maybe China and India wanted to check that power as a matter of policy.
On arrival TB, David M and Tony Bishop [interpreter] were taken up to the Putin dacha while the rest of us were taken to another building. We were hanging around with some of the Russian officials and it was a pretty tough atmosphere. When we did the pre-meeting with TB and Putin I was very clear that our press would be looking for the differences on Iraq and WMD. I asked Putin what he was likely to say. He said he would simply say we should carry on looking. But he definitely had the steely look in his eye and TB was looking a bit on edge. When it came to the event he let rip in the opening statement, made clear he doubted WMD were there and painted a comic picture of Saddam in a bunker somewhere sitting on his arsenal. TB was doing his best to look unfazed. The press were suddenly all terribly excited. Trevor Kavanagh [Sun] and Charles Reiss [Evening Standard] had big smiles over their faces as they took notes of what Vlad was saying. They sensed a diplo-disaster which of course it was, especially as Putin had invited TB and we thought we’d agreed lines.
David Manning was taken aback and angry, said he felt it had been deceitful of Putin to agree what he intended to say then go off on one like that, clearly pre-planned. He said the one-on-one session had been very tough and that Putin was in no mood to listen to pro-US messages. I noticed too when they came down that he just looked angrier than before, was less chatty and relaxed. He was also putting on a bit of weight and acting in a much grander fashion. He had his own stables now and had showed off the horses to TB who felt he was showing signs of becoming the traditional Russian leader in terms of interest in lifestyle, luxury and so on. The press conference was pretty stunning. The mood when we regrouped was very chilly. TB took me to one side, said how do we deal with that? I said not much we can do to stop them going into overdrive.
TB said ‘I almost felt like interrupting him and saying “Hey – you invited me out here. I didn’t expect to get stuffed by you like that.”’ Then TB, Vlad, the interpreters and I were taken into a little side room. TB said to me, very deliberately and inviting absolute honesty, ‘What did you make of that?’ I said it was very explosive, our media would be very excited. Putin looked a mix of surly and worried. He could sense TB was angry but he was also totally unapologetic. He said the US had created this situation. In ignoring the UN they had created danger. They were saying there may be rules, but not for us. Time and again he made comparisons with the situation he faced in Georgia, used as a base for terrorists against Russia. ‘What would you say if we took out Georgia or sent in the B-52 bombers to wipe out the terror camps?’ And what are they planning next – is it Syria, Iran, Korea? ‘I bet they haven’t told you,’ he added with a rather unpleasant curl of the lip. ‘Also there is no consistency. Saudi and Pakistan are problems but for different reasons the Americans prop them up’. He said other parts of the world felt pressure to go for Israel. He said he didn’t support that ‘but these are dangerous games’. He said the Americans’ enemy was anyone who didn’t support them at the time. Anywhere from Algeria to Pakistan. Then what about the new powers like India and China, do their views matter, or is it only America?
TB had given as good as he got at the press conference and did so again at the dinner once he realised that the diplomatic approach was not exactly working. He said there was no grand US plan for global domination. There was a series of choices. On MEPP they were deciding whether to engage or not. On Korea they were deciding whether to engage diplomatically. On a lot of other issues they were deciding whether to approach them on a unilateral or multilateral basis. ‘We have to help them choose the multilateral route. But you have to understand that September 11 changed their psychology and it changed Bush’s psychology personally. Before, anti-Americanism was just an irritant that they put up with. Now it became a threat.’ Putin said that meant anyone who disagreed with them on these choices was a threat. ‘That is ridiculous. I am a Russian. I cannot agree with the Americans on everything. My public won’t let me for a start. I would not survive two years if I did that. We often have different interests.’ TB said but you have to build a strategic partnership with them. He said he was tired of trying. ‘They don’t listen. They only hear what they want to hear. Some of them are crazy.’
Putin said the South Koreans had told them the Americans had said they were prepared to use nuclear weapons on the North. Crazy. He said they would end up killing people in the South too, ‘and that is on our border’. Vlad was in full flow. He said they had asked to run reconnaissance flights along the Russian border during the Iraq crisis ‘as a counter-terrorism measure – what nonsense. It was to intimidate us. We told them it was an unfriendly act. They did it.’ TB asked him if Bush knew and Vlad said his people knew, but the question was why did they do it? Because they think they can do what they want. Others have to operate by the rules but not them. China might feel it should be able to sort out Taiwan. But it feels constrained by the UN, by international opinion. India and Pakistan might like to set off nuclear weapons at each other but they feel constrained. Time and again he referred to Georgia and Chechnya and said ‘Why can’t I go in alone – because of international pressure. Yet there are people threatening our people, killing people on our streets.’ TB said Iraq was different because there were nineteen outstanding UNSCRs on Iraq. The UN had made its demands and for once they should be upheld. Putin said the US was thousands of miles from Iraq. So was the UK. Saddam was a monster but he was not a direct threat.
TB went back to his argument about September 11. Putin went back to his line that if we were saying anyone who disagreed was a threat that was ridiculous and dangerous. TB was pretty taken aback by the vehemence. Normally there would be a bit of levity, a bit of banter, or if things were heavy I might throw in something lighter. But this was not that kind of meeting. I could see David [Manning] feeling more and more intense about the whole thing. We agreed afterwards that it had been a real privilege to have been in on a discussion like that, where the raw politics and feeling of a country like Russia came pouring out. There were even short periods of silence as we ate – caviar, a nice enough fish plate then some horrible cold meats including one that looked like dogshit and tasted pretty dreadful too. Then a nice mix of ice creams. Lots of vodka being poured into different glasses but little of it was drunk.
There was no give at all. Putin’s face was tight and his eyes really piercing. His cheek muscles clenched whenever TB defended the US or the policy on Iraq. He said partnership was a two-way thing and the Americans care only about themselves. There had to be a role for both partners, not just one partner doing whatever they wanted. That was the central message, again and again and again. TB kept asking him – so what do you do, how do you resolve it? – and then would come another wave.
I kept thinking of Fiona when she was really angry with me, telling me it was all one way, all on my terms. I took her for granted and she’d had enough of it. This was someone who felt he deserved to be treated as an equal, and he wasn’t being treated as an equal and he was angry, and TB was the person who was going to cop the anger. At one point Putin said the whole post-September 11 response was designed to show off American greatness. They don’t care what anyone else thinks. TB was about to respond but he didn’t let him ‘Don’t answer – there is no answer. That is the truth Tony, and you have to know it. There are bad people in the administration and you know it.’
David said as we left ‘Fascinating, absolutely fascinating.’ I said that was the death of diplomacy. It certainly was, he said. There was no effort at all. TB was a bit subdued as we went to the plane. He said he thought ultimately Putin would do a deal on the UN but he felt Iraq was clearly going to have to be sorted as a coalition of the willing. He felt we should put together a plan that tried to meet the points the Russians were making, but if they were basically just going to bugger about we should say OK, we will have to do it on our own. TB had been taken at one point to see Putin’s private quarters and what he saw worried him. He said it was like something out of the Roman Empire, that it had been transformed. An Olympic-sized pool for his own use only. Stallions. Horses with butlers! I had felt too that Putin was far grander than before, much more up himself, a bit peevish.
I drove to the airport with TB and though we assumed the car was bugged, we had a pretty frank discussion. He was less shocked than David and I had been and said they had an argument different to ours and it was far better we have it out like that. But in the end they are wrong. You cannot just walk away from the US. It is a mistake. The reason they will go it alone on some things is because they can. He was blaming Chirac a bit for getting Putin more wound up. Chirac was even saying the US was a bigger threat than al-Qaeda. He was really keen to see TB fall flat on his face over this one. What was very clear was that it was going to be difficult to put things back together again. These were pretty deep fissures we had been witnessing. By the time we were flying home, TB was saying ‘what a day. He invites me out there. I go. He insults me publicly and privately. Then I come home. Bloody brilliant.’
He thought a lot of it was driven by Russia no longer being seen as a superpower and the anger that aroused. They were angry and humiliated and they needed to let out the anger. I said though that Putin had a point – the truth is the Americans do tend to treat people like shit unless they agree with them and that their vision of democracy was stars-and-stripes-coloured. Everything was seen through their own prism. TB said that the answer was not to rival them, because they were now the only superpower, but to build a partnership, support them but in exchange for support be listened to and gain influence. Tony Bishop felt Putin had missed an opportunity to build bridges and he seemed genuinely disappointed that Putin behaved as he did. The press were as shocked as we were and had loved it.
TB said what it showed was real deep anger but the question was how was it to be channelled? How do we use it to get the world on a better footing? He could see some merit in Putin’s argument but he seemed to be saying the Americans were not entitled to use their power for their own ends. I said he wasn’t saying that, he was saying others had the right to be treated with respect. That their status as the only superpower – something Vlad never actually acknowledged, I noticed – gave them an added responsibility to think of others. I had sat in on so many TB meetings but this had been one of the most memorable. David M and [Sergei] Prikhodko [Putin’s foreign affairs adviser] both agreed afterwards they might as well not have been there because the normal diplomatic niceties were out of the window.
Grace’s birthday, stayed home to do her presents etc., then took her to school. It reminded me how rarely I had done so, whereas with the boys it had been pretty much an everyday occurrence, particularly Rory. The [Middle East peace process] road map was finally being published today but all a bit overshadowed by a suicide bombing [in Israel].45 Then it transpired it was carried out by two men with UK passports, which gave it an added difficult dimension here. TB apparently told the PMQs pre-meeting that he felt yesterday was not as bad as it came across on the media, but though the Russian media was not quite so bad, it was certainly not a diplomatic success story.
I went straight to the Commons where TB was doing the PLP. He said it was better than expected, also that it was more obvious than ever that the anti-foundation hospitals argument was being run out of the Treasury. Hilary A told me that John Healey [economic secretary to the Treasury] had apparently told Jon Trickett [Labour MP] to vote against it. GB was using Healey, Ann Keen, Kevan Jones, Doug Henderson [Labour MPs close to Brown] and others to get up the argument that this was two-tier, divisive. I saw Peter M later and we agreed the time was coming when this had to be exposed for the operation it was, that it all depended on those who knew what was going on remaining silent, including the hacks who got fed this stuff the whole time.
PMQs was a score draw on public services. TB was strong on foundation hospitals but GB was lukewarm at the Treasury Select Committee which was going to spark another TB/GB rift round. Back for an Iraq communications meeting. We agreed to keep them going. I was worried though that ORHA lacked strategic message and capability. Emily [Hands, press officer] was back, and now Ben Wilson was out there and both were saying how hard it was to grip it. But I still felt there were very basic things we could be doing to communicate very basic messages, whatever the security nightmares. Rumsfeld made a visit to Baghdad and [US General Jay] Garner [director of ORHA] did a big chest-thumping number all about being proud to be American. All yuksville stuff for audiences outside the States. Margaret Tutwiler [US State Department] was in charge of the media side of things there and I fixed a call with her for tomorrow.
TB was heavily focused on Northern Ireland, where we were in a bad place again, heading towards cancellation of the elections, which we would do tomorrow. TB said he was determined to treat Sinn Fein politicians like any other. His big worry was that SF would not deliver on the final steps. The other big story was the Times exclusive on Special Branch transcripts of calls between McGuinness, Jonathan and Mo [Mowlam, former Northern Ireland Secretary], clearly genuine.
Peter M had been attacked in the Sun and wanted to do an article. He sent over a draft which said that both TB and GB had said we MUST join the euro and that it was a matter of when, not if. It took me twenty minutes to persuade him this was not the time, that the second line was an important strategic plank of the assessment, and he should wait. He finally, if reluctantly agreed. He was clearly fed up though. Another discussion about the Olympic bid. TB moved from very pro to neutral and back again. He feared a big hit on the whole Pride in Britain theme if we didn’t go for it. On the way out I bumped into Sarah Brown with a group of wives of Norwich City footballers. She introduced them to me as wives of Norwich United players.