CHAPTER 5
The first three pages of the Utah Beach landing plan embody the overall plan for the 70th, with details down to company level. The code word “BIGOT” was the highest level of security, higher than top secret. Page 1, item 2, indicates that the 70th was attached to Regimental Combat Team 8 (CT8), which had as its core the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division. The landing plan on the following page shows that Company A was to land at a beach code-named “Tare Green,” Company B at beach “Uncle Red,” Company C at “Tare Green” and “Uncle Red,” and Company D at “Uncle Red.”
The maps to be used by the 70th were the Geographical Section General Staff (GSGS) (MI4) maps from the Directorate of Military Survey, War Office, London 1943, #4250, scale 1/50,000. These maps, developed by the British, were a standard at the Normandy invasion. They were divided into several sheets and used with onion-skin paper overlays to describe tactical situations in the field.
Unfavorable weather plagued the initiation of the Overlord operation, arguably the most complex amphibious landing in the history of warfare at that time. Since ocean tidal actions were favorable for a landing and such a condition would not exist again for several weeks, the order was given to load landing craft and prepare for the invasion. On 3 June 1944, the 70th Tank Battalion was ordered to ports of embarkation in Devonshire County, England.
Company A loaded LCTs 592, 593, 594, and 595. Company B loaded LCTs 510, 531, 596, and 597. LCT 510 was loaded with tanks B6 through B9 and 2nd Platoon, Company B leader Lieutenant Casteel and crews. LCT 531 was loaded with tanks B1 through B4 with Lieutenant Kirkpatrick and the 1st Platoon, Company B. LCT 596 was loaded with tanks B5, B10, B15, and B16 with Captain Songer and crews from various platoons. LCT 597 was loaded with tanks B11 through B14 with Lieutenant Townsend, 3rd Platoon leader, Company B, and crews.
Company D loaded onto three LCTs. LCT 2424 contained the 1st Platoon, Company D, plus tanks D15, D16, and the T-2 recovery vehicle. LCT 2040 was loaded with the 2nd and 3rd Platoons of Company D, minus Tank D15. LCT 2135 was loaded with vehicles of the 4th Reconnaissance Troop along with Tank D17. Companies A, C, and D departed from Dartmouth. Company B departed from Torcross.
After loading the LCTs, the 70th sailed out of the harbor at approximately 1645 on 3 June and joined the invasion convoy. The 70th was assigned to land on Utah Beach, on the Cotentin Peninsula. The other major landing beaches were Omaha (American), Juno (Canadian), Gold (British), and Sword (British), all east of the 70th’s landing beach. Because of the weather delay and stormy conditions in the English Channel, many of the tankers became seasick and began to care little about where they were heading. They spent 4 and 5 June in a holding pattern off Portsmouth, England, in rough seas. According to the Company B diary, by this time most of the 70th crewmembers were seasick and not up to having a meal with the 10-in-1 rations on board ship. At about 0300 on 6 June, during a lull in the weather, bombardment of the French coast began and everyone watched the “show.” C47 transport aircraft were seen retiring from the Normandy area.
At 0500, word was given to prepare for landing. The tank engines were started and warmed up while the water skirts on the DD tanks were made ready for launching. Tank engines used in World War II required warming up in order to operate smoothly when needed. A cold engine could sputter, foul up the spark plugs, and stall at a critical time. Many crews went to the galley to get a cup of hot coffee before launching the DDs. After an air corps bombing attack on the beach, accompanied by heavy gunfire from Allied battleships, the 70th launched the DD tanks in rough seas in support of Combat Team 8.
The guideboat for the LCTs carrying Company A was hit and sank immediately. A signal was given to form up on LCT 593 prior to launching the DDs. On the way in, LCT 592 (carrying four tanks of 2nd platoon, Company A) struck a mine, broke in two, and sank. Only one out of twenty 70th tankers (Sergeant Gibson) survived the sinking of LCT 592. Tank A6 was hurled about a hundred feet into the air as a result of the explosion. LCTs 593, 594, and 595 started launching DDs at about 0600, approximately four thousand yards from the beach. Tank A16, first to be launched, sank at about 0614 as a result of sea motion from a craft firing rockets nearby. All other tanks reached shore, with Tank A3 being the first at 0632. Sgt. Henry V. Nothel of Tank A3 was first to fire on an enemy position after breeching the seawall. Tanks A3, A5, and A11 were stuck in mud along with dozer Tank DT1. It is not clear when and where they got stuck. Company A then formed up with 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, and moved to Ste.-Marie-du-Mont to de-waterproof and reorganize. Company B landed successfully and advanced toward Ste.-Marie-du-Mont. Company B tanks B2 and B16 were disabled on the causeway near the beach. Company C landed with dozer tanks and conventional tanks with water fording gear, which was different from the DD tanks. The fording gear allowed the vehicle to travel in deep water with intake and engine exhaust vents, but not to float like a DD tank. Company C was supposed to land after Companies A and B, but due to the “fog of war” it landed first. The force proceeded through Les Dunes de Varreville on the road to St. Martin-de-Varreville.
Upon landing, tanks from Companies A, B, and C moved inland, clearing out pillboxes and enemy pockets of resistance. There was a huge traffic jam at Exit 2 since the Germans had flooded the countryside, and the roads were the only way inland toward initial objectives. Many of the infantry soldiers had to wade through water to get farther inland. The battalion overcame obstacles such as blown bridges, and moved up in support of the 8th Infantry Regiment. At the end of the day, Company A reached the objective at Turqueville and Companies B and C reached their objectives near Pouppeville. On the first day of operations, the 70th lost sixteen medium tanks, eight of them at sea. Casualties (both KIA and MIA) of the sinking of the LCT were 2nd Lt. William S. Kline and the following enlisted men: Sgt. John A. Callahan, Sgt. John W. Clarke, T/4 Glenn E. Berg streser, T/4 Bert J. Clear, Cpl. Albert J. Jensen, Cpl. Stanley J. Marszalek, Cpl. Donald R. Neal, Cpl. Nicholas W. Rhimer, T/5 Francis W. Goble, T/5 Guadalupe P. Hernandez, PFC Lawrence J. Coughlin, PFC Hugh S. Gosnell, Pvt. Norman B. Foster, Pvt. Stephen W. Jaskulski, Pvt. Charles E. Metz, Pvt. Robert H. Moyer, Pvt. Gerard K. O’Brien, and Pvt. Lewis Saray.
Others were lost along the causeways toward the objective to antitank fire and mines. Company D immediately moved inland to support the 101st Airborne Division, which landed at drop zones near Saint-Côme-du-Mont. Contact with friendly forces in the 101st zone was difficult because the Airborne Division was scattered, causing difficulty in communicating with the 101st headquarters.
On 6 June 1944, while Companies A, B, and C were attacking to the north and west of Exit 2, Company D supported the 101st Airborne in the vicinity of Vierville, which is southwest of Exit 2. Company D, equipped with the light tank M5A1, aided the 101st by knocking out pockets of enemy resistance such as machine-gun positions and roadblocks. There were no defined enemy lines and the tactical situation was fluid. Company D tanks were subjected to attacks by handheld antitank weapons.
For many years, historical discussions have centered around the identity of the dead man in Tank D12. The following analysis sheds light on who may have been in the tank on 7 June.
Capt. Gordon R. Brodie was the commander of Company D during Operation Overlord. Company D landed at Utah Beach on 6 June and was assigned to the 101st Airborne Division, which was engaged with German infantry in and around Saint-Côme-du-Mont as well as other small towns in the area. Captain Brodie most likely delegated the writing of the Company D diary to a company clerk who made entries, but not necessarily on the date the event occurred. Battalion headquarters had mandated that unit activities be documented for future historical records.
An S-4 report (logistics material report) showed two D Company tanks lost as of D+2 (June 8). One of these is Tank #12. D Company clerk documentation lists an entry on 14 June that Sgt. Anthony Tomasheski and Pvt. Aaron D. Curry were killed in action on 7 June. The morning reports were written in England at the time, since many of the support units had not yet arrived. The 14 June report shows Sergeant Tomasheski and Private Curry killed in action on 7 June. The morning report lists 1st Lt. Walter T. Anderson killed in action on 8 June. Individual Deceased Personnel Files (IDPF) show 1st Lieutenant Anderson’s date of death to be 8 June, Sergeant Tomasheski’s 7 June, and Private Curry’s 7 June.
From 6 June to 8 June, D Company was attached to the 101st and immediately traveled toward Vierville. On 7 June, two light tanks were lost during engagements supporting the 101st southwest of Vierville. Tank #12 was destroyed by antitank fire, while Tank #10 appeared to have been hit by a large-caliber projectile but was later repaired. Sgt. Frank E. McNally, Sergeant Tomasheski, and Private Curry were killed.
From the history of the 70th Tank Battalion, the fact that only two light tanks were destroyed on the second day is consistent with Tanks #10 and #12 referenced in the Company D diary. Tanks #10 and #12 were disabled on 7 June. Tankers with date of death on that date are likely crewmembers of Tank #10 or #12. Three tankers (Private Curry—KIA, Pvt. Jack Hughes—WIA, and Sergeant Tomasheski—MIA) are mentioned as being a mile northeast of Carentan, which is consistent with the approximate location of Tank #12, although Dead Man’s Corner is located north of Carentan, rather than northeast. There are no roads northeast of Carentan where the 70th traveled. Private Curry is probably one of the crewmembers of Tank #12, since he had received tank training and a tank driver badge while in England. He died from severe burns on 7 June, which is consistent with an antitank rocket attack as shown in the U.S. Army photo of Tank #12 on page 134. Private Hughes is a possible survivor of Tank #12 (assistant driver). Sergeant Tomasheski is reported MIA at the same location as Private Curry. According to the casualty lists in the History of the 70th Tank Battalion, morning reports, and the IDPF, Sergeant Tomasheski was killed on 7 June 1944 and is probably the commander of Tank #12.
There were two tiers of enlisted ranks in the U.S. Army during World War II. There was technician grade, which would be a specialist (engine mechanic, tank driver, ammunition technician, etc.), and command grade. Ranks of a regular sergeant or corporal were command grades who had authority to command troops. T grades such as T/3, T/4, and T/5 were technicians and did not have command authority in a tank company. Typically, a T-grade enlisted man was with maintenance or some specialty that supported the company. T/4 Ross was the driver of a T2 tank retriever since he was considered a skilled driver. The T2 retriever was a specialty maintenance vehicle that reported to Headquarters Company only. A typical light-tank crew consisted of a driver (technician grade), assistant driver (private), gunner (corporal), and commander/loader (sergeant). Privates were occasionally used as drivers for tanks. It should be noted that some gunners were corporals, which differed from the then-current U.S. Army Table of Organization & Equipment.
According to the Company D diary, those killed in action from 2nd and 3rd Platoons were Sgt. Frank E. McNally, Sgt. Anthony I. Tomasheski, and Pvt. Aaron D. Curry. Tank #12 was in 3rd Platoon. Tank #17 had been missing but was later found along with the body of 1st Lieutenant Anderson. The mention of the knocked-out Tank #17 and death of 1st Lieutenant Anderson in the same sentence in the Company D diary suggests that the events are related.
Since platoons of the 70th were often split up between infantry units, it was not unusual for a company commander not to immediately know of information on 70th casualties. Also, enemy lines were undefined in this area, making communications difficult. Since Tank #17 was the only 70th tank on LCT 2135, it most likely got separated from D Company upon landing.
T/5 Ross was in the headquarters section and knew 1st Lieutenant Anderson. An excerpt from the biography of Francis Ross recounts that Anderson was a tank commander and wanted Ross to be his driver. Ross preferred to stay with the T2 tank retriever. In a telephone interview conducted by the author with Francis Ross, he stated that Anderson was in Tank #17. Since Anderson was the executive officer, it would be logical that he would be in Tank #17, as it was in the headquarters section. The Ross diary also indicates that 1st Lieutenant Anderson was killed by a mortar round landing directly on the turret of his tank. Tank #12 was disabled by antitank rocket fire.
The weapon penetration near the driver’s compartment in the U.S. Army photo (see page 134) is consistent with that of an antitank rocket attack. The simulated photo of the likely orientation of the Panzerfaust projectile location (see photo below) shows a probable impact point on Tank #12. Note that this penetration is right by the driver’s head, and a shaped charge would most likely have killed the driver. It should also be noted that the tank hatch on the driver’s side in the U.S. Army photo is not open and is probably locked, since an unlocked hatch tends to bounce, increases the difficulty in viewing through the hatch periscope, and interferes with turret traverse. This suggests that the deceased driver was probably still in the driver’s seat when this photo was taken. The right-side assistant driver’s hatch is open, suggesting that the assistant driver escaped.
Other crewmembers may have also sustained wounds from the antitank attack. Although Sergeant McNally was killed on 7 June in the vicinity of Dead Man’s Corner, the description of how he died (sniper fire) does not appear to be consistent with riding in a tank that was suddenly hit by an antitank rocket.
The preponderance of the evidence indicates that 1st Lieutenant Anderson—who was listed in the IDPF, morning report, and History of the 70th Tank Battalion as killed by mortar fire on 8 June—was actually killed while commanding Tank #17, not as a crewmember of Tank #12. Private Curry and Sergeant Tomasheski are most likely crewmembers of Tank #12. Tomasheski is the likely commander of Tank #12. Curry was most likely still in the tank and may be the dead man from which Dead Man’s Corner got its name. Tomasheski may have escaped since the commander’s hatch is open and the antitank rocket penetrated at the left front of the tank near the driver and away from the commander. It should be noted that tank commanders often had their hatches open to assess situations since the periscopes were limited in visibility. There is the possibility that Tomasheski was still in the turret basket but not visible in the U.S. Army photo. It is also possible that he died after exiting the vehicle.
On 7 June 1944, Company D attacked southwest of Vierville in support of 101st Airborne units. In addition to the deaths of McNally, Tomasheski, and Curry, T/5 Tadeus J. Wozny, Pvt. Ray Bonzo, and Private Hughes were wounded during the engagement. Along with the loss of Tank #12, Tank #10 was hit by a projectile that drilled a hole through the front glacis plate, but was later repaired. Company D returned to Culoville for the night. Tank #17 had not reported in since the landing. Below is an original overlay of the enemy situation on 8 June from the National Archives. This overlay would be placed on a GSGS (MI4) map from the Directorate of Military Survey, War Office, London. These maps use a special grid coordinate system, as shown in the upper left and lower right of the overlay. This overlay fits GSGS map sheet 6E/324 with a 1/50,000 scale.
With the beachhead and nearby areas well established, the engagements moved from the flooded areas to hedgerow country, which again strongly favored the defenders. The hedgerows, piles of stone with hedges intertwined that separated various farm fields, were formidable obstacles and slowed the Allied advance. Tanks were forced to drive up and over them, with a high probability of getting stuck.
On 7 June, Companies A and B moved with the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division in an attack on Ste-Mère-Église. The companies engaged the enemy about a thousand yards south of town and linked up with the 82nd Airborne Division at Ste-Mère-Église at about 1445 hours with heavy enemy resistance. The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment had captured the town on D-Day. The companies moved to the north side of the city to form a defensive perimeter for the evening.
Sgt. Ralph Erickson was a member of Headquarters Company, 70th Tank Battalion, and took several photos on approximately D-Day+1 of wrecked armor on Highway N13. This photo, taken by him, is of a German Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) knocked out on Highway N13 just north of Ste-Mère-Église. The StuG III was a formidable assault gun that was often encountered by the 70th.
Soldiers spent 7 June mopping up pockets of enemy resistance near the beachhead and causeways leaving the beachhead. The 8th Infantry Regiment, supported by the 70th, attacked and captured enemy forces in Écoquenéauville and then relieved the 82nd Airborne in Ste-Mère-Église. The attack continued and forced the enemy west of the Montebourg Highway with over 300 German soldiers killed and 174 taken prisoner.
On 8 June, Companies A, B, and C left Ste-Mère-Église at 1600 hours, advanced in line formation, and engaged enemy positions near Azeville at 1730 hours in support of the 22nd Infantry Regiment. Companies A, B, and C disengaged from the fight and returned to the assembly area at 2200 hours. Lieutenant Songer and PFC Joseph R. Rayner were slightly wounded in action. Tanks #1 and #3 of Company B received direct hits from “88s.”
On 10 and 11 June, the battalion attacked objectives southwest of Montebourg on the way to Cherbourg. From 12 to 19 June, they cleaned up pockets of enemy resistance and traveled through Montebourg and Valognes. Each of these towns was nearly destroyed during bombing and fighting. The enemy was ordered to hold Cherbourg at all costs, which explained the heavy resistance encountered on the way to that city. On 28 June, Cherbourg fell to the Allied advance, with many German prisoners taken.
From June 12 to 19, the 70th engaged enemy forces in Quineville. Heavy bombing and Allied engagements virtually destroyed Montebourg. The battalion then attacked northeast through Valognes, another city reduced to ruins.
Toward the end of June the 70th attacked Cherbourg, which was captured on 28 June. Captain Taynton visited the Cherbourg area and took photos of Battery Hamburg, a formidable fortification just to the east of Cherbourg that was firing on U.S. ships bringing supplies to the various landing beaches. In the above photo, the weapon appears to be a naval gun, as evidenced by the characteristic turret and armor design (24cm SK L/40 naval gun used on 1890 vintage German and Austro-Hungarian cruisers).
As Company A approached the coast near Cherbourg, the lead tank was taken under fire by five German E-boats. The company withdrew to protected positions and fired at the E-boats. Allied air support was notified of the location of the enemy vessels, and within fifteen minutes, aircraft attacked and drove off the Germans. However, while near V-1 launching sites at Cherbourg, the battalion was mistakenly bombed by Allied aircraft, a common problem with quick advances and rapid enemy withdrawal.
During the Normandy Campaign, twenty-nine 70th soldiers were killed in action, thirty-one were listed as missing, forty-eight were wounded, and thirty-two tanks were lost with some salvaged and repaired.
The 70th then turned southwest on 6 July toward Periers, with Company B supporting the 12th Infantry Regiment and Company A in support of the 8th Infantry Regiment. The terrain included nearly impenetrable hedgerows, resulting in slow progress. The attack toward Periers was a slugfest in support of the 4th Division and required all available tanks from the battalion.
Company B lost four tanks on 7 July, and in the following days up until the fall of Periers, all remaining tanks were in action supporting the 4th Infantry Division. The enemy resisted with everything they had, including mines, mortars, small arms, machine guns, artillery, and tanks.
For a short period of time (16–18 July), the 70th was attached to the 83rd Infantry Division. On 17 July while bivouacked near Culot, a gas attack false alarm occurred, during which all 70th members struggled to put on gas masks.
On 25 July, the 70th supported three infantry battalions along the St. Lô–Periers Road. The objective was to take the highway and attack south of Marigny, which was achieved despite heavy resistance in the form of artillery and mortar fire. Casualties were heavy, and replacements arrived in numbers higher than normal. New men were given a short orientation and immediately put into tanks that rolled out for the next battle. At least one dozer tank each day was knocked out. The Allies had air superiority during the day, but at night German aircraft appeared overhead, dropping bombs.
Shortly after D-Day, Command determined that Allied armored vehicles were not as well camouflaged as that of the enemy. A test was performed to observe how camouflage could be improved. C Company tank Columbia Lou (C15) was used as a test rig to prove the concept. Sommerfeld netting was placed around the tank so that tree branches could be inserted to camouflage the vehicle. Command felt this was an effective method, and it was adopted by many Allied armored units.
During this period, Sgt. Curtis Cullen of the 102nd Cavalry Squadron developed a hedgerow cutter that attached to the front of Allied tanks. This device allowed tanks to quickly blast through the hedgerows without having to climb up and over the obstacles, which would expose the vulnerable underbody to enemy fire. Many tanks were fitted with hedgerow cutters for the launch of Operation Cobra. Sergeant Cullen received the Legion of Merit for this development. Relatively few 70th tanks were equipped with the Cullen device—the dozer tanks of the 70th worked as well or better.
