DURING 1864, ABRAHAM LINCOLN had preoccupations that were bound to distract from Indian affairs. The election, western development, and the transcontinental railroad were all major concerns.
His overwhelming obsession was the War for the Union. This was the year it became evident the North could win. Ulysses S. Grant was appointed leader of that effort on 9 March 1864. Grant began to use his superior numbers to pound the Confederacy into submission. All else was subordinated to winning the war. When Lincoln noticed Indians at all, it tended to be in the context of larger military concerns.
For the most part, the president left Indian matters to the Indian Office. This was a return to normalcy. Lincoln had never really given Indian affairs high priority. The refugees, the Minnesota war, and the executions had forced him out of his normal pattern. Once those matters were past the crisis point, he left them and the difficulties therein largely unsolved. He confined himself mostly to ceremonial duties. In July, Dole wrote Lincoln concerning a visiting Indian delegation: “Will you be kind enough to take these Indians by the hand this evening. I wish them to start home by the early train in the morning.”1
Dole and Concentration Policy
Left to his own devices, Commissioner Dole actively promoted his concentration policy. Dole had long been angry with the state of Indian affairs in California. While never an outstanding advocate of wholesale reform of the Indian System, Dole thought that California could provide a model of modest reform. The California reform, however, retained little of the idealism of Bishop Whipple’s reform movement. It was designed to save money, eliminate inefficiency, and end the more outrageous forms of fraud. Where two superintendents existed previously, only one would serve. Other jobs were eliminated. Most important, the tribes of the state were to be consolidated onto no more than four reservations.
Dole obtained the full support of the Senate Indian Committee for his concentration policy in California. Senator Doolittle justified it both because the old system was “altogether too indefinite, too expensive, too loose in its administration” and because it was best for the Indians. The California Indians “have been fading away as the white population has been advancing upon them,” said Doolittle. The only way to save them was to remove and concentrate them. The California reform passed the Congress in spring 1864.2
Dole’s plans for concentration extended beyond California. In his 1864 report, he advocated concentrating all Indian tribes in the nation onto as few as three to five reservations. Dole’s arguments showed that he was more in agreement with Wilkinson and Doolittle than he was with the reformers. He said that the loss of Indian country was inevitable because of “the peculiar character of Indians, that they should retire as their country became occupied by whites.” To Dole, segregation was the only answer. American history showed “that the white and the red man cannot occupy territory in common, and it follows that a policy which shall be adequate, and adapted to the requirements of the case, must provide for each race a separate abiding-place.”3
Militarism and Indians
In the context of a struggle to win the Civil War, this concentration policy took on a harsh character. Interior Secretary John Usher stated it plainly: “This Department will make provision for such Indians as will submit to its authority and locate upon the reservation. Those who resist should be pursued by the military, and punished.”4
This was the tough policy of a government at war. Usher worried about Indian threats to overland mail routes and the construction of the transcontinental railroad. Insurrection anywhere, whether in the South or by Indian tribes, was not to be tolerated. The massive warfare by Grant, the expeditions across Dakota, and developing military policies toward Indians in New Mexico and Colorado were all cut from the same militaristic cloth.
The real author of this uncompromising policy was Abraham Lincoln. In his 1864 message, his top priority clearly was winning the Civil War.5 He explicitly rejected “negotiation with the insurgent leader.” Said Lincoln of Jefferson Davis: “Between him and us the issue is distinct, simple, and inflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried by war, and decided by victory.” The president underlined his resolve, “The public purpose to reestablish and maintain the national authority is unchanged and, as we believe, unchangeable.”
This attitude cannot be directly linked to Indian policy but the priorities therein dictated much of what happened in 1864–1865. Lincoln’s determination to develop the West was tied to a commitment to win the war. He perceived the exploitation of the minerals and the railroads located in Indian territory as necessary resources to accomplish that end. He was therefore exultant that “the steady expansion of population, improvement, and governmental institutions over the new and unoccupied portions of our country has scarcely been checked, much less impeded or destroyed, by our great civil war.” Lincoln noted “indian hostilities” that hampered organizing governments in Idaho and Montana, but he believed those governments would soon go “into speedy and full operation.” He praised “the great enterprise of connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific States by railroads and telegraph lines.” Gold and precious metals were being discovered all over the West. A nation at war was becoming richer and more powerful.
It was in this context that Lincoln spoke of Indians. The very order of his topics demonstrated Lincoln’s priorities—new territories, railroads, minerals, and finally Indians. While he spoke of “the welfare of the Indians,” his first concern for the West was “to render it secure for the advancing settler.” Then and only then could Lincoln view the war effort with this perspective, “The national resources … are unexhausted, and, as we believe, inexhaustible.” Come what may, this president was not going to let Indians get in the way of obtaining those resources.
Thus, Indians were treated increasingly as a military problem. Many troop contingents, like the Iowa Seventh Cavalry, never saw action in the South. Instead, they spent the years 1863–1865 in Dakota, Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, and Nebraska.6 Lincoln himself revived the once-stymied Confederate prisoner-of-war project in September 1864. Secretary of War Stanton opposed using them to fight Indians, and Lincoln personally went to the War Department to order Stanton to comply.7 By 1865, the government had twenty thousand troops on the frontier, a large army considering the needs of the war in the South.8 Lincoln’s government never officially adopted John Pope’s proposals for military control of the Indians. It did, however, adopt a de facto policy of militarism toward Indians. This policy was to provide a test of Pope’s belief that military men would treat Indians better than civilians, with the laboratories in New Mexico and Colorado.
Military Concentration in New Mexico
The great Civil War gave military men everywhere a special stature. Gen. James Carleton was given a relatively free hand when he went to New Mexico in the spring of 1862 to deal with the Indian situation. He found a situation where white and Indian relations were very bad.9 To further complicate the situation, gold had been discovered on Indian land.
Commissioner Dole had advocated a concentration policy in New Mexico as early as 1861. He called then for the use of “military force” to punish the tribes for “the barbarous atrocities they are continually committing.” Battles were also fought with Confederate soldiers in New Mexico during 1861 and that brought General Carleton into the territory.10
Carleton acted decisively. Under his auspices, Kit Carson launched expeditions against the Apaches. Carson’s orders resembled those given by General Pope in the Minnesota war: “The Indians are to be soundly whipped.” Women and children were to be taken prisoners and “all Indian men of that tribe are to be killed whenever and wherever you can find them.” Carson was to “lay waste the prairies by fire.”11
Carleton drew up plans to concentrate the Navajos on the Bosque Redondo, a reservation on the Pecos River. He set 20 July 1863 as the deadline for the Indians to surrender. Carson was then sent on a similar scorched-earth campaign against the Navajos.12
Carleton was not just being a good soldier. He had a passion for gold. He begged for funds to build a road to gold fields in Navajo country. Carleton plagued his superiors with stories of “extraordinary discoveries of gold and silver in Arizona territory.” The general sent gold nuggets to cabinet members and even asked Salmon P. Chase to “give the largest piece of gold to Mr. Lincoln.”13
Under Carleton, New Mexico became a major theater of conflict between Indian officials and the military. Michael Steck, the superintendent, objected to Carleton’s methods, his waste of money, and his selection of the Bosque Redondo as a reservation for the Navajos.14 Carleton, however, refused to back down. By early 1864, he proclaimed a victory over the Indians. The general congratulated himself on subduing “this formidable band of robbers and murderers.” The Navajos, he proudly announced, “will have abandoned an area of country larger than the State of Ohio, to the pastoral and mining purposes of our citizens.”15
Carleton completely misled Washington officials. He told them there was plenty of good land for the Navajos to sustain themselves at the Bosque Redondo. Commissioner Dole was led to believe that the Indians there “will soon become self-sustaining.” In fact, just the opposite was true. The Indians began to suffer intensely and Carleton’s fight with the Indian Office officials only made the situation worse.16 The Carleton operation cost nearly a million dollars the first year, and it became a focus of national controversy. It merged into the debate over control of the Indians between the War and Interior departments.17 Congress argued that question in May 1864 when the Indian Office requested $100,000 to settle the Indians on the Bosque Redondo. Senators were shocked to learn that the military had four thousand prisoners. Nevertheless, the appropriation passed the Senate.18
Carleton’s policies produced a disastrous situation. Secretary of War Stanton ordered an investigation of the large contracts Carleton had made. By July, Carleton had more than six thousand captives. In August, the number had grown to seventy-five hundred, including twelve hundred children. Carleton called them “the happiest people I have ever seen.” That was not quite accurate. In September 1864, Carleton admitted having eight thousand prisoners, including “hundreds of naked women and children … likely to perish.” Winter was approaching. Carleton became desperate, “Now the cold weather is setting in, and I have thousands of women and children who need the protection of a blanket.”19
It wasn’t until three investigations had been conducted that Carleton was relieved of his command. In September 1866, the War Department reversed his concentration policy, and the Navajos were returned to their own country.20 Carleton continued to advocate General Pope’s proposal to isolate and concentrate Indians behind military posts as a shield behind which Indians would be taught to farm and acquire the arts of civilization.21 However, no one man did more to discredit these ideas.
The New Mexico situation confirmed Commissioner Dole’s conviction that military control was a bad idea. In his 1864 report, he lashed out against the militarists and used New Mexico as an example. He compared it to the Indian Territory, which was managed by civil authorities. This comparison presented “a fair practical test of each line of policy.” In New Mexico, there had been continuous war. In the Indian Territory, only the Confederacy had disrupted the peace. To Dole, New Mexico proved the bankruptcy of the military control plan.22
Militarism in Colorado
Colorado provided the second major arena of military confrontation with the Indians in 1864. The impetus for the crisis was similar to elsewhere. Discoveries of gold brought large numbers of white immigrants into the territory. The Indian System in Colorado was typically corrupt. Agent Samuel Colley was a gold prospector and politician before being appointed agent by Lincoln—on the recommendation of his cousin, Commissioner William P. Dole. Colley became one of a number of agents notorious for corrupt involvement with the Indian trade in Colorado.23
Like Minnesota and New Mexico, the Colorado situation was shaped partly by the Civil War. Washington officials were concerned about protecting mail routes, railroads, and telegraph lines as actual and symbolic links to northern unity. In April 1862, Lincoln authorized Brigham Young to raise a hundred men for ninety days to protect these routes against Indians. Also, there were rumors that the Confederates were plotting with the plains Indians. These worries grew because of the Minnesota war and because General Sully’s expeditions in Dakota drove some of the Sioux into the region, resulting in violence and destructive raids. The Cheyennes and Arapahos were blamed for most of these incidents.
These matters came to a head in 1864 because the Colorado government, under Gov. John Evans, embarked on a concentration policy. In mid-1863, Evans had held unsuccessful council meetings with tribal leaders.24 In December 1863, Evans claimed there was a conspiracy to form “an alliance of several thousand warriors” among the Sioux, Cheyenne, Kiowa, Comanche, Apache, and Arapaho tribes. He sought troops and arms from the War Department. In June 1864, Evans warned that “the Indians of the Plains are combining together for the purpose of waging war against the whites.”25
During the summer of 1864, Colorado was in an uproar. Ranches were burned, livestock were stolen, and prisoners were captured by the Indians. Agent Colley concluded about the hungry Indians, “I now think a little powder and lead is the best food for them.” The Indians were equally fearful. The Cheyennes heard that “the Big War Chief in Denver, [Col. John M. Chivington] had told his soldiers to kill all their squaws and papooses,” and their fears were not groundless. Chivington was reported to have made a speech in Denver advocating the scalping of Indian infants.26
The crisis reached its peak in August. Evans sounded desperate: “We are left almost defenseless when the most powerful combination of Indian tribes for hostile purposes ever known on the Continent is in open hostilities against us.” The War Department received reports of attacks on the overland mail route.27 However, Washington officials had read similar reports from Minnesota two years earlier only to find out later that they were exaggerated. Evans did not wait for reluctant officials in Washington. He issued a proclamation on 11 August, calling on whites to “kill and destroy as enemies of the country wherever they may be found, all such hostile Indians.” Evans implied that friendly Indians should not be killed, but citizens found it safer to kill Indians first without waiting to ask who was friendly. That inclination was encouraged by Evans’s offer to let them retain any property retained as a result of killing the Natives. A war of defense merged into a war of plunder and extermination. When the War Department authorized the creation of a militia force for one hundred days, to be employed exclusively in killing Indians, the stage was set for a bloodbath.28
Officials in Washington, including Lincoln, paid little attention to all this. They were more concerned with Grant’s battles with Lee in Virginia and Sherman’s march into Georgia. The momentum of the Civil War was shifting toward the North. Unlike 1862 and the Minnesota war, Lincoln and his subordinates did not intend to let an Indian war in Colorado distract them from winning the War for the Union.
That left the initiative in Indian conflicts with military men in the field. On 28 September 1864, Gen. Samuel Curtis gave a fateful order to Colonel Chivington and the Colorado militia, “I want no peace until the Indians suffer more.” Governor Evans confirmed the harsh policy they had adopted, “A peace before conquest, in this case would be the most cruel kindness and the most barbarous humanity.” The Indians were to be sought out and punished. Militarism had triumphed in Colorado.29
A Distracting Election Campaign
The Lincoln administration paid little attention to what was happening in Colorado. There was an election campaign going on and it was one more reason not to notice the situation in Colorado. There was a growing peace movement in the country in 1864 and Lincoln had significant opposition, even in his own party. The Democratic party had nominated Gen. George McClellan as its candidate, and with the growing peace sentiment, it appeared possible until September that McClellan might unseat the president. Then, Sherman’s dramatic triumphs in Georgia began to reverse the trend of public opinion.
Commissioner Dole paid little attention to Colorado because he was too busy with the election campaign. As a political appointee, Dole had work to do. He was very busy with his “political file” and corresponded almost more often with John Usher and Lincoln on political matters than on Indian affairs. Dole paid special attention to New York and Kansas, where agents kept him informed as to “the true friends of the President.”30
The busy Indian commissioner did not write his annual report until the week after the 1864 election was over. In it, he praised “the energetic action of Governor Evans” in Colorado. Dole took note of the hundred-day volunteers and the military actions taking place. He also expressed some doubts, “I am unable to find any immediate cause for the uprising of the Indian tribes of the plains, except the active efforts upon their savage natures by the emissaries from the hostile northern tribes.” Dole feared that the chance for peace had been lost, “It is a great deal cheaper to feed them … than to fight them.”31
Chivington and Evans had no intention of pursuing a policy of peace. “What shall I do with the Third Colorado Regiment if I make peace?” asked Evans. “They have been raised to kill Indians, and they must kill Indians.”32
Sand Creek and the Discrediting of Military Control
On 9 January 1865, a shaken Sen. James Doolittle rose in the Senate to introduce a bill to investigate “the condition of the Indian tribes and their treatment by the civil and military authorities.” Doolittle informed the Senate he had received news to “make one’s blood chill and freeze with horror.” Doolittle said that Colonel Chivington and his soldiers had attacked five hundred unsuspecting Indians at Sand Creek, Colorado, in November of the previous year. They had killed one hundred and fifty Natives, mostly women and children.33
News of Sand Creek brought a sharp public reaction. Three different investigations were launched, and all agreed that Sand Creek was a “massacre,” an unusual label to be attached to the actions of white soldiers. Black Kettle, leader of the Cheyennes, had raised a white flag and an American flag—to no avail. Chivington had told his men, “I want no prisoners.” Eyewitnesses reported the slaughter of children, the scalping of women, the butchering of pregnant women, and castrations. The atrocities were, in Agent Colley’s words, “as bad as an Indian ever did to a white man.”34
Chivington and Evans defended their actions. Chivington called his performance “an act of duty to ourselves and civilization.”35 The public did not accept this. Besides the investigations, there was talk of court-martialing Chivington. The Congress passed Doolittle’s bill with a fifteen-thousand-dollar appropriation and provision for three senators and four representatives on a joint committee to investigate Indian affairs.36
The scandal over Sand Creek produced debate in the Senate. On 13 January 1865, the senators argued a resolution to suspend pay of the officers and soldiers involved with Sand Creek until the investigations were completed.37 The promoters of the action included Indian Committee members who had been normally unsympathetic to Indians and opposed to reform.
Sen. James Harlan attacked the militarism exhibited at Sand Creek. He labeled it a departure from previous benevolent policies. “That policy is being reversed without any authority from the Federal Government by the agents of the Government remote, away from the capital.” Harlan called it a plan for the “extermination of the Indians,” a war to end all wars. The Iowa senator directly linked Sand Creek with the actions of General Carleton in New Mexico.
Senator Nesmith opposed suspending pay for the soldiers and condemned such “misguided sympathy for the Indians.” He called Indians “a degraded, thieving, murdering, plundering race” incapable of civilization. White men had long endured atrocities by Indians. “Most of my sympathy is on the side of the white man,” declared the senator, “because I believe he has generally been in the right and has only resorted to this sort of retaliation as a matter of self-defense.”
The debate grew more heated. Sen. John Conness of California raged at the unjust treatment of the Indians:
And I say these wars have been fomented by the miserable kind of human fungi that now hang upon the vitals of the nation making money and crying for money when no man could tell whether the nation should live or die; and they were instituted for plunder, carried on with the hand of murder, maintained by the basest cowardice that the human mind can conceive, because the blows were directed at those who could not and had not the power to strike back.
Even Charles Sumner, lion of the Radicals, jumped into the debate. Sumner normally held his peace on Indian issues, but the heated exchange drew him in. The man who had made “the crime against Kansas” household words pronounced Sand Creek “an exceptional crime; one of the most atrocious in the history of the country.”
Senator Doolittle demonstrated how thoroughly militarism in Indian affairs was discredited by Sand Creek. Doolittle denied “any overweening sympathy in behalf of the Indian race.” Indians were a dying race. That was inevitable given the advance of civilization. Nevertheless, Doolittle concluded: “I am unwilling that the flag and the Government of the United States shall be stained by any outrages such as it is alleged have been perpetrated by Colonel Chivington and the men under his command in this expedition.”
Doolittle had once been an advocate of military control of Indians. The chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee changed his mind when confronted with events in New Mexico and Colorado. He condemned the military in both places. “It is time,” he said, “the country should wake up to these military expeditions inaugurated, in my judgement, without the direct authority of the War Department here at Washington, against these Indian tribes.”
The pay suspension measure passed the Senate but was defeated in the House of Representatives. Chivington was already out of uniform and beyond the reach of military law. Congress salved its conscience by providing $39,050 in the next session in gifts to the Cheyenne and Arapaho bands attacked at Sand Creek.38
The blunders and brutality of the military did what the reformers, with Lincoln’s help, had been unable to do. They moved the power structure in the Congress to launch serious investigations that promised change in Indian policy. While the controversy over civilian and military control continued for another decade, the actions in New Mexico and at Sand Creek did much to discredit John Usher’s idea that all Indians “should be pursued by the military, and punished.”
1. William P. Dole to Abraham Lincoln, 8 July 1864, Roll 77, Abraham Lincoln Papers, LC.
2. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 18 March 1864, pt. 1:1184, 21 March 1864, pt. 2:1209, 11 April 1864, pt. 2:1523.
3. AR, CIA, 1864, pp. 148–49.
4. AR, SI, 1864, pp. 21–22.
5. LAM, 1864, pp. 2–4.
6. Eugene F. Ware, The Indian War of 1864, pp. xi, 176.
7. Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 5:531; Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, 3:501–5.
8. Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The U.S. Army and the Indian, 1848–1865, p. 216.
9. Edmund Danziger, Indians and Bureaucrats: Administering the Reservation Policy during the Civil War, pp. 73–75.
10. E. R. S. Canby to The Adjutant General, 1 December 1861, OR, 1:4, pp. 77–78; AR, CIA, 1861, p. 636; Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, p. 20; these conflicts may have nourished Lincoln administration illusions about Confederate activity in the Minnesota war.
11. James Carleton to Kit Carson, 12 October 1862, Report of the Joint Committee on the Condition of the Indian Tribes in the United States, Senate Report 156.
12. Brown, Bury My Heart, pp. 22–25.
13. Carleton to Henry Halleck, 10 May 1863, p. 110, Carleton to Halleck, 14 June 1863, pp. 113–14, Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, 2 August 1863, p. 122, Carleton to Salmon P. Chase, 20 September 1863, p. 140, all Report on the Condition of the Tribes.
14. Michael Steck to Dole, 19 September 1863, AR, CIA, 1863, pp. 228–29; Edmund Danziger, “The Steck-Carleton Controversy in Civil War New Mexico.”
15. Henry Connelly to Edwin M. Stanton, 12 March 1864, Roll 553, M234, LR, New Mexico Superintendency, OIA, RG75, NA.
16. Carleton to Thomas, 6 September 1863, Report on the Condition of the Tribes, p. 134; Dole to John P. Usher, 4 April 1864, Senate Miscellaneous Document 97, 1:2; Carleton to Thomas, 12 December 1863, Roll 551, M234, LR, New Mexico Superintendency, OIA, RG75, NA; H. D. Wallen to Ben F. Cutler, 12 February 1864, Roll 283, M619, LR, AGO, RG109, NA; Danziger, “The Steck-Carleton Controversy,” p. 104.
17. Steck to Dole, 10 October 1864, AR, CIA, 1864, pp. 327–31; Carleton to Thomas, 19 March 1864, Report on the Condition of the Tribes, pp. 168–69; William B. Baker to Dole, 27 March 1864, Roll 552, M234, LR, New Mexico Superintendency, OIA, RG75, NA.
18. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 9 May 1864, pt. 3:2172–74.
19. Stanton to E. A. Hitchcock, 20 July 1864, Letterbook 43, Edwin M. Stanton Papers; Carleton to Thomas, 6 March 1864, p. 163, Carleton to Thomas, 8 July 1864, p. 187, Report on the Condition of the Tribes; Carleton to Usher, 24 August 1864, Roll 21, M825, LR, ID, OSI, RG48, NA; Carleton to Dole, 16 September 1864, p. 197, Carleton to Thomas, 30 October 1864, p. 207, Report on the Condition of the Tribes.
20. Danziger, “The Steck-Carleton Controversy,” p. 111; Brown, Bury My Heart, p. 33.
21. Carleton testimony, 25 July 1865, Report on the Condition of the Tribes, p. 437.
22. AR, CIA, 1864, p. 150.
23. Harry Kelsey, “The Background to Sand Creek,” p. 298.
24. G. Wright to J. W. Nye, 22 November 1861, AR, CIA, 1861, p. 360; Frank Fuller (et al.) to Stanton, 11 April 1863, Brigham Young to John N. Bernhisel, 14 April 1862, AR, CIA, 1862, pp. 356–57; Lincoln to Stanton, 26 April 1862, Basler, ed., Collected Works, 5:200; Danziger, Indians and Bureaucrats, p. 32.
25. John Evans to Stanton, 14 December 1863, Roll 64, Lincoln Papers, LC: Evans to Dole, 15 April 1864, Uriah Curtis to Evans, 28 June 1864, Roll 197, M234, LR, Colorado Superintendency, OIA, RG75, NA.
26. Kelsey, “Sand Creek,” p. 284; H. T. Ketcham to Evans, 1 July 1864, Roll 197, M234, LR, Colorado Superintendency, OIA, RG75, NA; Brown, Bury My Heart, p. 89.
27. Evans to Dole, 9 August 1864, Roll 197, M234, LR, Colorado Superintendency, OIA, RG75, NA; S. E. Curtis to Halleck, 10 August 1864, JCCW, p. 63.
28. Danziger, Indians and Bureaucrats, p. 38; Evans testimony, August 1865, Report on the Condition of the Tribes, p. 85.
29. Curtis to John M. Chivington, 28 September 1864, AR, CIA, 1864, p. 365; Robert Mardock, The Reformers and the American Indian, p. 19; Evans to Dole, 15 October 1864, AR, CIA, 1864, p. 366.
30. Dole to Usher, 20 February 1864, Roll 68, Lincoln Papers, LC; Simeon Draper to Dole, 3 March 1864, Roll 69, Lincoln Papers, LC; Thomas Ewing to Dole, 26 August 1864, Roll 80, Lincoln Papers, LC; Ewing to Dole, 21 September 1864, Roll 97, Lincoln Papers, LC; J. S. Emery to James H. Lane, 23 November 1864, James H. Lane Papers; Dole to Lincoln, 18 June 1864, Roll 76, Lincoln Papers, LC; Draper to Dole, 7 September 1864, Roll 81, Lincoln Papers, LC; William Frank Zornow, “The Kansas Senators and the Re-election of Lincoln.”
31. AR, CIA, 1864, pp. 167–68.
32. Brown, Bury My Heart, p. 79.
33. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 9 January 1865, Pt. 1:158; Marvin A. Garfield, “Defense of the Kansas Frontier, 1864–65,” p. 144.
34. Kelsey, “Sand Creek,” pp. 279–80; Samuel G. Colley testimony, 7 March 1865, pp. 29, 34, Cramer testimony, 27 July 1865, p. 74, Robert Bent testimony, 22 [?] June 1865, p. 96, all Report on the Condition of the Tribes.
35. Evans testimony, 8 March 1865, Report on the Condition of the Tribes, p. 49; Chivington testimony, 26 April 1865, JCCW, p. 104.
36. Garfield, “The Kansas Frontier,” p. 145; U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 2d sess., 19 January 1865, pt. 1:326; the House passed it 24 February 1865 (pt. 2:1057) and the conference report was adopted 3 March 1865 (p. 1380).
37. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 2d sess., 13 January 1865, pt. 1:250–56.
38. Garfield, “The Kansas Frontier,” p. 145.