The men in charge of the defence of Leningrad were Andrei Zhdanov and sixty-year-old Kliment Voroshilov, one of Stalin’s old favourites. Voroshilov had been criticized for his incompetent leadership during the Winter War against Finland and had been dismissed only to be reinstated to save Leningrad. Stalin, aware of Voroshilov’s failings, realized that under such pressure Leningraders would question the regime and his leadership in particular. He needed a man of utter political reliability to instil in Leningrad the right political thinking. And Voroshilov was that man.
Voroshilov and Zhdanov were loyal supporters of the party and devoted to Stalin but, like everyone else, they feared him. Their fear of Stalin overrode all other considerations and directed strategy and policy. When, in July 1941, a convoy of trains carrying vital foodstuff was heading towards Leningrad, the two men, afraid that accepting the consignment might appear to the boss as defeatist, turned the convoy away, stating that the city lacked ‘sufficient warehouse space’. Their political self-preservation was deemed more important than the welfare of their city.
It was on Voroshilov’s orders that the new recruits of the People’s Militia were flung into battle within three days of signing up with precious little in the way of training, uniforms and weaponry. With a shortage of weapons, Voroshilov ordered that they should be ‘armed with hunting guns, homemade explosives, sabres and daggers from Leningrad’s museums.’ Even the ancient guns of the Russian cruiser, the Aurora, were requisitioned for service and placed on the Pulkovo heights overlooking the city. The Aurora, built in 1900, held a special place in Bolshevik history; in October 1917 its crew rebelled against the Provisional Government and joined the forces of revolution.
Such was the shortage of uniforms and clothing for the soldiers, Voroshilov launched an appeal, sending out youngsters to ask civilians directly for donations, either clothes or money. People could ill-afford to give away either but, again, to refuse would raise questions about one’s loyalty. Whatever the shortages, the soldiers – whether Red Army or volunteer – were warned never to do less than the utmost. Those that buckled under the strain faced execution:
The coward and deserter thinks he will succeed in hiding from the people’s censure and anger. He is mistaken. He will be cursed by his own mother, his name will be spoken with loathing by his own children . . . A bullet in the head – that is what such a scoundrel will get. For a dog – a dog’s death!
Voroshilov, who liked to lead by example, was certainly brave, rushing around the front line brandishing his revolver under heavy shelling. His failing was that, despite many years’ experience, he was unable to form any strategy that could stop or even reverse the German approach.
Casualties following the first bombardment of Leningrad, 10 September 1941
RIA Novosti archive, image #888 / Vsevolod Tarasevich / CC-BY-SA 3.0
Stalin lost patience with Voroshilov. Following the losses of Mga and Shlisselburg, Stalin sent him a telegram demanding answers: ‘Will there be an end to these losses? Can we hope for some kind of improvement at the front?’ Lack of foresight on Voroshilov and Zhdanov’s part caused tragic consequences. They had been advised to disperse the city’s main food storage, the Badayev warehouses. Located in the south of the city, the warehouses, stretching over four acres, were made of wood and situated next to one another. They stored virtually all the city’s food reserves. Despite the vulnerability of these old wooden warehouses, neither Voroshilov nor Zhdanov heeded the advice. On 8 September, the warehouses were bombed with incendiaries. Three thousand tons of flour burned, thousands of tons of grain went up in smoke, meat frazzled, butter melted, sugar turned molten and seeped into the cellars. ‘The streets that night ran with melted chocolate,’ said one witness, ‘and the air was rich and sticky with the smell of burning sugar.’ Leningraders were furious that their leaders hadn’t thought to disperse the storage throughout the city. Thick smoke could been seen for miles and with it went the hopes of the city.
Stalin had had enough of Voroshilov’s incompetence. He dispatched one of his ablest generals, Georgi Zhukov, a bull-necked, tough commander, to save the situation. Zhukov was flown into Leningrad from Moscow under the cover of cloud but as the clouds dispersed two Messerschmitts pursued his plane. Zhukov landed, was taken to the Smolny Institute, headquarters of Leningrad’s leadership, and arrived still white of face. Zhukov’s first task was to hand Voroshilov an envelope. In it, Voroshilov received his instructions to return to Moscow immediately. Humiliated and probably very afraid, he did so. Whilst Hitler sacked his generals, Stalin had them shot. Voroshilov, accused of ‘serious mistakes made defending Leningrad’, was transferred to a post in the rear where he could do no more harm, but he was saved the executioner’s bullet.
Zhukov had a major job on his hands, and he immediately set about it with zeal. His first tasks were to control the damage caused by Voroshilov’s most recent orders. He reorganized the defence of the city, made better use of his resources and instilled stricter discipline. His attempts to counter-attack were thwarted by the German decision not to advance any further and instead to dig in. On the 11 September, the Fourth Panzer Division was ordered away from Leningrad and sent south to bolster Hitler’s attack on Moscow. Frustrated, Zhukov nonetheless ordered several attacks but with the Germans already dug in and reinforced the attacks were easily repelled, causing needless loss of Soviet lives. When, on 5 October, Stalin rang Zhukov for an update, he proudly reported that the Germans had halted their advance, implying that it was his own efforts that had brought about this development. Stalin then ordered Zhukov back to Moscow to lead on the defence of the capital. Following Zhukov’s departure, a number of men were offered the post of leading the city’s military. One by one they all turned it down, citing their lack of suitability or experience. No one wanted the poisoned chalice of being held responsible for the defence of Leningrad. Eventually, the baton was passed one Ivan Fedyuninski, the next in a succession of commanders.