Every book has its history and Guerrilla Warfare is no exception. Together with its sequel Terrorism and two companion volumes (The Guerrilla Reader and The Terrorism Reader) it was part of a wider study such as had not been attempted before—to give a critical interpretation of guerrilla and terrorism theory and practice throughout history. It did not want to provide a general theory of political violence nor did it give instructions on how to conduct guerrilla warfare or terrorist operations. It was read in various countries and established itself as a text. I hope it contributed to the clarification of certain issues not widely understood at the time among the public at large. The book certainly failed to bring about greater semantic clarity; there had been a widespread tendency in the media and our public discourse to equate great war with small war, guerrilla, terrorism, civil war, and banditry (social and asocial), and this has not changed since this book first appeared in 1976. On the contrary, unsuspecting readers consulting major public libraries for guidance on the subject of guerrilla warfare will find under this heading books on the theater, on business practices (especially sales strategies), on education, and on many other fields of human endeavor. The term guerrilla has become very popular; but in the same measure as the application has multiplied, the meaning has become even more diluted. In addition there has been the widespread use of the unfortunate and misleading term "urban guerrilla" as a euphemism for terrorism. Guerrilla has a positive connotation, by and large, whereas terrorism has not, hence the misapplication.
While the word guerrilla has been very popular, much less attention has been given to guerrilla warfare than to terrorism even though the former has been politically more successful: Most terrorist groups have failed; many guerrilla movements have succeeded. The reasons for the lack of attention are obvious: Guerrilla operations, in contrast to terrorist, take place far from big cities, in the countryside, in remote mountainous regions, or in jungles. In these remote areas there are no film cameras or recorders. This fact has been recognized early on by some guerrilla leaders who decided, unwisely in some cases, to transfer their activities to the big cities. As an Algerian militant put it, if his fighters killed thirty soldiers in a village, this would be reported in a few lines on the back page of the world press, whereas the noise of even a small bomb in a big city would reverberate throughout the world and make headlines.
Has there been more or less guerrilla warfare during the last two decades? The days of the classic, major guerrilla wars seem to be over, no new Mao or Ho Chi Minh, no Tito and no Castro have appeared in our age. The gradual liberation of territories, the establishment of counter institutions and the transformation of guerrilla bands into regular army units has been rare in our time. The war in Afghanistan is probably the only major exception; the list will also include Chechnya (1994-95), but one cannot think of many others. On the other hand, there is a long list of guerrilla wars which have not led to victory: This includes the Kurds in Turkey, the Karen in Myanmar, the rebels in Tajikistan and Southern Sudan, the Tamil in Sri Lanka, the EZLN (the neo-Zapatistas) in Mexico, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Hizbollah in Lebanon, the various guerrilla groups in the Horn of Africa, various small Punjabi and Kashmiri groups, to mention a few. Some insurgents have used both guerrilla and terrorist strategies; this is true, for instance, with regard to Algeria. In other cases, regular armies have not been strong or well equipped and for this reason were compelled to apply, on occasion, guerrilla tactics as in the former Yugoslavia. The same is true with regard to civil wars as in Rwanda and Zaire. In fact, "pure" guerrilla warfare has become fairly rare. If Mao or Tito were to reappear they would probably not approve of the actions of their descendants, but it is not clear what advice they would offer to cope with conditions quite different from those in which they operated at the time; there is no big war in progress which provided welcome cover for the guerrillas sixty years ago.
A review of strategies and the fate of guerrilla movements during the last two decades shows certain common features. In their great majority they consisted of nationalists fighting for independence whether against foreign occupants or against another ethnic group in their own country. Communism or Maoism did not play a key role as in the 1940s; true, Sendero Luminoso and the Mexican EZLN are social movements, but at the same time they are ethnic rebellions of Indians against the white upper and middle classes. The only exception is the Colombian FARC which at one time gave up armed struggle, but following its electoral defeat in 1992 it resumed it. However, the Colombians became involved with some of the drug cartels to improve their financial condition and while this might be justified from their point of view by pragmatic reasons it has nothing to do with the Marxist-Maoist tradition. Virtually all other conflicts are ethnic in essence except those carried out by Islamic fundamentalists (such as in Algeria) or against fundamentalist regimes (as in Sudan).
Only in two major cases have guerrillas been successful, in Afghanistan and in Chechnya. Victory was achieved because the rebels faced an enemy which had the power to smash the guerrilla but not the political will. These two guerrilla wars happened to coincide with the collapse of the Soviet empire; the Soviet Union had, of course, the power to destroy its enemies but the war was as unpopular as the Vietnam War was in the United States, nor was the regular army prepared for a guerrilla war. Topographical conditions in Afghanistan favored a guerrilla war and in addition there was a tradition of such a war in this country. The war had lasted for years until it was ended by an armistice which provided for the evacuation of all Soviet troops in 1989. However, there was no common front of Afghan resistance fighters which could have effected a smooth political transition. In these circumstances, facing a population tired by war and antagonized by the ambitions of rival war lords, the fundamentalist Taliban, with massive help from Pakistan, occupied Kabul (in October 1996) and large parts of the country.
In most other instances guerrillas were less successful; they caused considerable harm to their enemies (as in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Algeria, Israel, and some other countries) but failed to gain decisive victories. In some instances guerrillas transformed themselves into political parties (as in Nicaragua and San Salvador) without, however, making significant political progress. The PLO and the African National Congress were more successful but they had not been primarily guerrilla organizations; to the extent that it had been a guerrilla organization the PLO had been totally defeated and compelled to leave Lebanon for Tunis. But it still made a political comeback not as the result of terrorist attacks but of mass action.
Most guerrilla movements had substantial help from abroad and it is doubtful whether they would have been able to continue their struggle but for this assistance in money, arms, and by other means. This refers to the Afghan rebels and the Palestinians who received large amounts of money from the Arab states. The Tamil Tigers were supported by Tamils in India; the Chechens received Turkish help; the Algerian fundamentalists were helped by fundamentalists in the Arab world and Iran. Hizbollah in Lebanon receives its budget from Tehran. Taliban received not only arms but also money from Pakistan. Not much is known about the financial sources and resources of the Latin American guerrillas; they did not have much foreign help and were among the proletariat of the global guerrillas. But even they probably did get help from abroad even though they got most of their money from internal sources.
Historical experience shows that guerrilla movements have prevailed over the incumbents only in specific constellations: If Chiang Kai-chek's government would not have been weakened by the Japanese invasion, if the Germans in the Second World War had been able to deploy more regular units in Yugoslavia, neither Mao nor Tito would have entered history as the great victors. There are exceptions such as Cuba under Batista where a regime in time of peace collapses as the result of its lack of popular support. But these are the exceptions, and in the current state of the world there have been few such exceptions. While the weapons of the guerrillas have only marginally improved, modern means of observation have become more sophisticated and effective. They still do not offer panaceas, whatever the advocates of modern technology may claim; much still depends on the terrain, the fighting spirit of the guerrilla, and other factors which cannot be quantified. But while small units can move as effectively as they could fifty or a hundred years ago, it is far more difficult for bigger units to assemble and operate. They have become more vulnerable than in the past, hence the great difficulties guerrilla movements have faced in seizing and holding territory and establishing a standing army. It could well be that the classical model of guerrilla warfare is no longer applicable in the modern world; even Mao admitted that what could be done in China might not be feasible in Belgium. Now it might not be possible in China.
All this does not mean that tactics akin to guerrilla warfare have no future, but it signifies that they will probably be modified in accordance with technical developments. We may witness a combination of political warfare, propaganda, guerrilla operations, and terrorism, and, in some cases, this could be a potent strategy not in the most developed and densely populated countries but quite possibly in the rest of the world. It is too early to write off guerrilla warfare, despite the trend of urbanization all over the world, and the range of possibilities is almost endless. We may witness small groups of sectarians, religious or political, directing their aggression not inwards, that is to say, committing collective suicide, but outwards, against the rest of the world. We have certainly not seen the last of separatist guerrillas, provided topographical conditions favor this kind of warfare. A new criminal guerrilla cannot be ruled out for instance in collaboration with drug producers especially in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Such guerrillas may eventually have at their disposal very sophisticated weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, which would open new and dangerous prospects.
These are trends and possibilities, not certainties. But it all means that in some parts of the world, at the very least, small wars will continue, even if big wars have become too expensive. And it is useful to remember that historically and etymologically guerrilla means precisely this—small war.