18. THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

On 4 December 1918 President Wilson boarded the SS George Washington to cross the Atlantic and attend the Paris Peace Conference. He ignored advice from Robert Lansing, who said he would dilute his influence by going to France instead of dictating his wishes from a distance.¹ But Wilson held the Allied purse strings and controlled fresh military power, whereas Lansing was only his Secretary of State. He and not Lansing occupied the White House and he insisted on going to France. A terrible war had been brought to a close; a second one must be prevented.

Although Wilson was being lionized on the Paris boulevards, he cut an unimpressive figure in the closed proceedings of the conference. His ‘Fourteen Points’ had prescribed no practical policy, only a set of objectives. Even his ideas about Germany lacked exactitude and he made things worse by forbidding his delegation to carry out preparatory discussion and drafting. ² He recognized his own lack of detailed knowledge about European controversies. His habit was to defer to Allied committees of experts, and Clemenceau and Lloyd George were adept at imposing their projects.³ Wilson’s ultimate passion was to gain approval for a League of Nations. The other delegations offered a flattering opinion of this project, and whenever they wished to obstruct one of his ideas they used the device of suggesting that only the League could resolve its complexities. The President forfeited advantage by never even raising his voice. His failing health was also finding him out and he simply lacked the energy for political disputes. He guarded his own counsel; even his confidant Colonel House had lost influence. French and British leaders saw that the President was a fading force and got used to agreeing the plans in advance of meeting him and gaining his imprimatur.

‘Reparations’ were on the lips of nearly every French politician except those few who sympathized with Lenin. Clemenceau aimed to make Germany incapable of striking France ever again. John Maynard Keynes offered this portrait:

[Clemenceau] carried no papers and no portfolio, and was unattended by any personal secretary, though several French ministers and officials appropriate to the particular matter in hand would be present round him. His walk, his hand and his voice were not lacking in vigour, but he bore nevertheless, especially after the attempt upon [his life], the aspect of an old man conserving his strength for important occasions. He spoke seldom, leaving the initial statement of the French case to his ministers or officials; he closed his eyes often and sat back in his chair with an impassive face of parchment, his gray gloved hands clasped in front of him. A short sentence, decisive or cynical, was generally sufficient . . . ⁴

Clemenceau behaved with elaborate courtesy, always asking Wilson for his opinion. But this was a feint: he wanted Germany punished.

In this environment there was little scope for the Western Allies to give careful consideration to Russia and its communist leadership. French, British, American and Italian forces were masters of the continent. They were determined to finish their business in central Europe first and foremost. The Allied Supreme War Council, founded on Lloyd George’s initiative in November 1917 to oversee military strategy as well as plans for peace, did not entirely ignore the Russian question but quickly found it difficult to handle. There was no opportunity even to hear representations from Russia without offending one group or another. The Supreme Council (as it became known) began by keeping Sergei Sazonov, the tsar’s Minister of Foreign Affairs till 1916 and now fulfilling the same role for the White Russians, at arm’s length.⁵

On 16 January 1919, Lloyd George spoke in the Council of Ten—representing the main victor powers—at the Quai d’Orsay. While arguing that something had to be done about Russia, he depressingly stipulated:

• Firstly, the real facts are not known;

• Secondly, it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is to adjudicate the question; and

• Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general misgovernment and starvation. It is not known who is getting the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik Government would collapse had not been realized.⁶

Intervention on an adequate scale would mean an occupation: ‘The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness.’ And in any case it was almost inevitable that Allied troops would mutiny against any order to deploy them in yet another war, and a permanent blockade was objectionable since it would lead to mass starvation. The chances of the Whites overthrowing the Bolsheviks were therefore not the brightest. Lloyd George therefore felt it preferable to call the various sides in Russia’s armed struggles to the negotiating table in Paris and get them to agree on a definitive settlement under the eyes of the victor powers .⁷

President Wilson agreed. In a memorandum of 19 January 1919, he urged the need to pull out the Allied expeditions as soon as possible: he had no intention of letting himself be ‘led further into the Russian chaos’. This was the dominant opinion in the US delegation expressed by General Tasker Bliss and Herbert Hoover. When Bliss heard of Marshal Foch’s proposal for a multinational army to invade Russia after the signing of the German peace treaty, he argued for American financial power to be brought to bear against it. Most countries in Europe, including France, were bankrupt. Even the United Kingdom would ruin its economy if it started a Russian crusade. Bliss argued that the US should use its economic strength to enforce the withdrawal of troops from Russia.⁸ Hoover too opposed the idea of an American invasion, telling Wilson that ‘our people at home’ would look askance at US soldiers being assigned to assist the reactionary Whites. Kolchak and Denikin, he maintained, had a poor reputation in America and Wilson would be wise to take account of public opinion. Hoover added that the arrival of American soldiers in Russia would have the counter-productive result of uniting the Russians behind Lenin and Trotsky. His advice was to put aside the Russian question until such time as peace prevailed in the rest of the world. Diplomatic pressures were desirable; big armies were not.

But Allied officials who thought military intervention was the solution were still vociferous—and demanded to be heard. Joseph Noulens had left Archangel in mid-December, and on 20 January 1919 he addressed the conference with a plea for the violent overthrow of Soviet tyranny and terror since the communists were enemies of the Entente.⁹ The Danish ambassador Harald Scavenius took the same line. As the latest of the foreign diplomats to leave Petrograd he was up to date with recent news and stressed Moscow’s intention to spread its revolution abroad by whatever means came to hand.¹⁰

President Wilson would have none of this, however, and determined instead to send an emissary to Moscow to explore whether the Soviet leadership was willing to end the Civil War. William C. Bullitt came into the reckoning. Impressed by his State Department reports on Europe, Wilson had included him in the American delegation to Paris and made him head of the Division of Current Intelligence Summaries.¹¹ The President thought him just the person, despite his lack of diplomatic experience, to go and talk directly to Lenin. Wilson and Bullitt agreed that peace could come to Russia if the contending ‘Russian factions’ were put in a room together and asked to settle their disputes. Lansing gave his assent to the dispatch of Bullitt even though he lacked any optimism about the outcome.¹² The Council of Ten convened on 21 January to discuss Wilson’s proposal. Lloyd George gave his support, arguing that the Bolsheviks would lose influence if the Russian people felt that they had received a fair hearing in Paris. Clemenceau objected. Averse in principle to negotiating with Bolsheviks, he warned that Bolshevism was already spreading westwards. But when Wilson and Lloyd George combined against him he was forced to give way.¹³

Wilson’s spirits were rising. W. H. Buckler, an attaché at the US embassy in London, discussed American peace proposals with Litvinov in Stockholm. Even though Litvinov had to leave for Russia—together with Vatslav Vorovski and Arthur Ransome—when Sweden broke relations with Sovnarkom in January 1919, he had responded enthusiastically to Buckler, and the President was excited by the report he received.¹⁴ Litvinov now wrote to Wilson indicating that American companies could do good business in Russia. He urged Americans to hear the arguments of all the belligerents in the Civil War. He promised that Soviet communists, in the event of a peace being agreed, would desist from subversive propaganda in the West. He warned that a White military victory would open the door to the Romanov dynasty ’s restoration. He expressed confidence in ‘the good will of the American Government’.¹⁵ Litvinov’s letter impressed Wilson and Lloyd George, and the proposal for a conference of Russia’s warring sides was prioritized. The Prime Minister had wanted to summon the Russians to Paris whereas the President preferred to assemble them on the largest of the so-called Princes Islands—Büyük Ada or Prinkipo—in the Sea of Marmara off the coast of Constantinople; Lloyd George gave way to him.¹⁶

The impetus for a Russian conference appeared unstoppable until Winston Churchill, the recently appointed Secretary of State for War, arrived in the French capital on 14 February. This happened to be the date when Wilson, who was constitutionally obliged to limit the duration of his foreign stays, was scheduled to leave for the US. Harold Nicolson, a member of the British delegation, recorded:

Meet Winston Churchill in the hotel passage. ‘Hello,’ I say to him. ‘Have you come over to hurry us up?’ Things are very slow at the Paris Peace Conference.

‘No,’ Churchill answers. ‘I have come to get myself an army.’¹⁷

Towards the end of that long day at the conference, Churchill caught sight of Wilson rising to leave for the Gare du Nord and asked: ‘Could we not have some decision about Russia?’¹⁸ Wilson rested his hand on Clemenceau’s chair and said that he was putting his hopes in holding peace talks off the Turkish coast. He was willing to go there in person. Although his priority was to get out of Russia entirely, he commented that if his Russian initiative came to nothing he would ‘do his share with the other Allies in any military measures that they considered necessary and practicable to help the Russian armies now in the field’.¹⁹

Even Churchill still stopped short of calling for an Allied crusade—the quips he made in conversation tended to disguise this. His preferred alternative was to give aid to the Whites while forming an alliance of the states on Russia’s borders, and General Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, supported him on this. Wilson was strongly suspicious of Lloyd George, sometimes finding him ‘pronouncedly Bolshevist’.²⁰ Careful husbandry of resources would be essential for Churchill’s scheme and he suggested withdrawing British forces from the south Caucasus and assuring Turkey of London’s friendly intentions. The United Kingdom’s huge post-war surplus of munitions should be delivered to the Whites along with a contingent of British officers.²¹

Churchill aimed to get the Allies to establish a Council on Russian Affairs and ascertain what resources could be made available for action of every kind—military, political and economic—in Russia. Balfour liked the idea, and Churchill went back to Lloyd George to argue that, if the Prinkipo project fell apart, the Allies would be in a position ‘to take a definite decision’. ²² Behind this measured statement lay Churchill’s desire for action. If the Bolsheviks rejected the call for an armistice in their Civil War, he wanted the Allied powers to declare and increase military support for the Whites. Lloyd George wrote to his private secretary Philip Kerr expressing displeasure. Churchill was becoming a pest. The Prime Minister wanted to avoid political trouble and an unsustainable budget at home; he required proper evidence that the Russians wanted foreigners to interfere in matters relating to their governance. He probably also felt the need to guard against Churchill trying to increase the size of the Allied forces in Russia; and he knew his friend too well to believe that he would quietly abide by whatever policy emerged from the Allied Supreme Council.²³

On 22 February 1919, Bullitt set off for Russia with his friend Lincoln Steffens. Both were pro-Soviet and had grandiose ideas about what they could achieve, even though Lansing’s letter of assignation specified only ‘the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic’—Wilson had characteristically left the drafting to the State Department.²⁴ Bullitt was anyway not of a mind or character to defer to Lansing. His ambition was to settle the Russian question on terms acceptable to the Soviet authorities, and he thought well of Lenin even before encountering him. In his pocket he had Colonel House’s written assurance that if the Sovnarkom agreed to the American terms, the US would resume trade with Russia, institute a food-relief scheme and withdraw Allied troops. Bullitt had orders to avoid discussing the paying off of Russian state loans. The British were to be informed of the negotiating tactics but not the French. Wilson and Lansing knew that Clemenceau would make a fuss about the need to raise the grievances of French investors.²⁵ Bullitt consulted Philip Kerr before departing. In this way he felt satisfied that whatever he accomplished would enjoy endorsement from Lloyd George and Balfour.²⁶

It was Bullitt’s first trip to Russia; he spoke no Russian and his understanding of Russia’s politics was less than deep. Yet he suffered no deficit of confidence in his talks with the Soviet leadership. With his flimsy acquaintance with Bolshevik history he was convinced that they were men of their word and open to peaceful compromise.²⁷ Lenin and Chicherin warned that if they were to sign an armistice, they needed ‘a semi-official guarantee’ that the Americans, British and French would enforce it on the White side as well.²⁸ The week of conversations was thrilling for Bullitt, who thought he had obtained a watertight deal he could take back to Wilson and Lloyd George in Paris. He and Steffens left Moscow on 15 March, escorted by Arthur Ransome and Bill Shatov.²⁹

But back in Paris things did not turn out as Bullitt expected. George Hill was there on a Secret Intelligence Service assignment, under orders to put his special knowledge of Russia at the disposal of the British delegation.³⁰ When he discovered that Bullitt was pressing the case for recognizing the Soviet government, Hill contacted the anti-communist reporter Henry Wickham Steed—and the two of them conferred with Sidney Reilly, who was in France after a brief trip to Russia.³¹ Steed had information that Lloyd George was close to approving Wilson’s ideas on Russia. He was determined to thwart such an outcome. On 28 March 1919 the Daily Mail published an editorial by him fulminating against Lloyd George for betraying the White Russians and falling victim to a conspiracy by ‘international Jewish financiers’ and Germans to assist the communists in holding on to power in Moscow.³² The tirade shook Lloyd George. When he breakfasted with Bullitt that morning, he said that the Mail’s editorial made it impossible for him to support the proposals he had brought back from Russia: ‘As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing how can you expect me to be sensible about Russia?’³³ Bullitt had no greater success with his patron Woodrow Wilson. The Prinkipo project was scuppered before ever coming before the Allied Supreme Council.

Bullitt had overestimated his right to speak in the President’s name. He was also credulous about Moscow. If Lenin was willing to call a truce in the Civil War and attend a conference, it was only because the Red military position was bad at the time. Sovnarkom would have benefited from another breathing space. Only a fool could believe that Lenin would not rip up an agreement when it suited him. It was equally unlikely that Kolchak would remain content with what he held in the Urals or that Denikin would stay put in southern Russia; and the National Centre leaders had no hesitation in rejecting ‘artificial’ attempts at peace-making.³⁴ They knew their Lenin and Trotsky better than Bullitt did.

Wilson was not without his devious side and was already giving consideration to Kolchak’s request for military supplies. William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State during Lansing’s absence in Paris, wanted to take the side of the Whites and help them to victory. Wilson and Lansing asked for time to consult General William S. Graves who led the US expeditionary force that had landed in eastern Siberia in August 1918. When Graves answered positively about Kolchak, Wilson authorized financial credit to be provided to the White Army for 260,000 rifles on condition that Kolchak pledged to prevent a return to power of the Romanovs, hold free elections and honour Russian state debts. Kolchak gave his assent, and weapons, clothing and food were shipped to Siberia, albeit surreptitiously since Republican Congressmen were already criticizing the administration for interfering in the Civil War. The US administration hit on the device of using Boris Bakhmetev, the Provisional Government’s ambassador to Washington. Bakhmetev retained the right of access to the bank accounts of the Provisional Government. Collaboration with him obviated the need to apply for funds and permission from the US Congress.³⁵

Wilson at the same time remained adamantly opposed to an Allied invasion. Francis, after surgery in London, accompanied the President back to New York. He proposed sending 100,000 US troops to Petrograd to oversee fresh elections.³⁶ Francis was to recall how he explained the obstacles:

The President replied that he had mentioned my recommendation to Lloyd George and that Lloyd George’s expression was, if he should order any British soldiers to go to Russia they not only would object but refuse to go. The President furthermore stated that he had mentioned the same subject to Clemenceau, and he had met the reply that if Clemenceau should order French troops to go to Russia they would mutiny, but the President said he would give further consideration to my recommendation.³⁷

Whether this was the real reason for American inactivity is doubtful. Wilson knew that so large a contingent would be practically an invasion force, and he wanted nothing to do with it. He preferred Hoover’s idea of offering food aid to Soviet Russia on condition that Lenin promised to cease fomenting revolution across his borders.³⁸ There was no objection from Britain and France, and Wilson invited the Norwegian polar explorer and philanthropist Fridtjof Nansen to head the relief mission to Russia. It was Nansen who radioed the proposal to Lenin in April 1919.

The Russians replied on 14 May, welcoming the offer of food supplies but refusing to cease fighting.³⁹ By then Kolchak was on the retreat. Lenin was not covetous of foreign grain at the expense of throwing away victory over a White army. Nor was Kolchak any more enthusiastic about Wilson’s initiative. He judged that the difficulty of crushing communism would increase if food relief arrived under a communist administration. The White Russian ambassador Sergei Sazonov cabled from Paris advising him to be more tactful in his dealings with the Allies. Kolchak’s response was to ask Sazonov to come to Omsk and see the Russian situation for himself.⁴⁰

Churchill had so agitated Lloyd George that the Prime Minister asked him to provide a paper costing the military options for Russia. Churchill havered, arguing that the Allies needed to fix a clear political line before he could offer any financial accountancy.⁴¹ This pleased Lloyd George, who felt he was denting Churchill’s aggressive inclinations. The French leaders were as anti-Bolshevik as Churchill. In public, Clemenceau and Poincaré denounced the iniquities of Bolshevism—and they were eloquent about the Soviet expropriation of funds belonging to hundreds of thousands of French investors. But privately they admitted that a war against Soviet Russia would be as onerous for France as Lloyd George saw it would be for the United Kingdom. France had defeated Germany at the cost of ruining the French economy and could not start another big war. And when Béla Kun established a communist regime in Budapest in March 1919 the limits of Allied power were made manifest. American officials in Paris suggested to Marshal Foch that the Hungarians should not be left to their fate at Kun’s hands. Foch’s reply killed off any illusion about France’s preparedness to intervene. He said that he would need a minimum of 350,000 troops to invade and occupy—and he could no longer muster so many soldiers.⁴²

Captain T. C. C. Gregory of the American Relief Administration scoffed that ‘a battalion and a bugle under the Stars and Stripes’ would be quite enough to do the job.⁴³ Whether this was overly optimistic did not matter; Wilson was never going to agree to such an expedition. The President was exhausted and under attack from all quarters. His former admirer William C. Bullitt resigned from the State Department on 17 May 1919. In his letter of resignation, he told the President that the Allied peace settlement could never hold—it was unfair to so many countries. Bullitt went on to say that the President should have ‘made your fight in the open’ and kept faith with the millions of people who had been willing him to stick by his principles.⁴⁴ He wrote to Lansing more respectfully but ended with a plea against both the German peace terms and America’s entry into the League of Nations: he could see no good coming from either.⁴⁵

The German treaty was the first to be concluded at the Peace Conference. Clemenceau had worn down Wilson sufficiently to persuade him to accept terms that were deeply shocking for most Germans. Vast reparations were to be paid and war guilt was to be admitted; and Germany and Austria, regardless of what their peoples wanted, were forbidden to merge into a single German state. Wilson had considered lining up with Lloyd George against Clemenceau in order to soften the treaty, but the negotiations behind the scenes proved fruitless. Tired out and drained of practical ideas, Wilson gave up the struggle and, whereas the British and French experts remained active, American influence declined as the President faded.⁴⁶ The treaty was solemnly signed in Versailles’ Hall of Mirrors on 28 June 1919. The choice of place was deliberate. It had been there in 1871 that the French had been humiliated by the victorious Prussians. Germany had become a pariah power, its only consolation being that German ministers knew exactly what the Allies were demanding of them. Soviet Russia, the other pariah power, still had no idea what the Allied intentions towards it might ultimately be.