The valleys of Jordan are a supremely arresting geography. Great rust-red outcrops of raw geology are up-thrust into a mellow blue sky, riddled with cracks you can just about drive a Toyota Hilux through. The edge of the Jordan Rift Valley forms a forbidding wall that occupies the entire eastern horizon as you drive south along the Dead Sea Highway from Amman, slowly encroaching on the flat, salted-earth badlands, riddled with unexploded mines left in the aftermath of the Arab–Israeli wars, and on towards Wadi Arabah. The closer the highway presses against the side of the massif, the more obvious the small cracks in the mountain landscape become. These are channels and rivulets worn by water, time and tectonics that provide the only access for Bedouin, camel or truck into the hidden world of the valleys beyond. Because, although the bleached yellow-grey of sparsely vegetated rocky hillsides and the bitter salt spread of the Dead Sea shore suggest an unforgiving, inhospitable landscape, the truth is that this desert country is home to one of the earliest experiments in what was to become a major human revolution: settling down.
I had plenty of time to make these observations in January of 2012, wedged firmly into the jump seat of a reasonably late-model pickup, one of three four-by-four vehicles borrowed from the Council for British Research in the Levant. At the wheel was the regional director of the Council, Bill Finlayson, who had organised a sightseeing trip for a ragtag bunch of archaeologists participating in a conference session on the Neolithic in the Near East during the seventh annual World Archaeological Congress. I’d left my own rental car in the hotel car park and was packed in with some of the most knowledgeable experts in the region – academics whose careers are dedicated to unpicking the secrets of the human transition from hunter-gather lifestyles to settling and living, year-round, in a single place. We’d had a fantastic session discussing details and discoveries, even though everything that year carried a sombre undertone as the situation in Syria finally unravelled. A 15-minute report on a site in Syria turned into a heart-wrenching 30-minute discussion about the safety of the site workers and last-heard-of’s. Everywhere in Jordan that year, white UN refugee tents had been popping up like mushrooms: the 200,000-plus seasonal workers from Syria who normally came south to work in Jordanian fields had refused to return home, and their tents had taken on semi-permanent, lean-to aspects – a strangely nostalgic nomadic trajectory in a country that spent years trying to get the Bedouin out of their traditional tents and into settled villages.
This slow transition of the no-longer-seasonal workers from temporary tents to more sturdy semi-permanent shacks and huts is a very modern phenomenon, but it does strangely mirror the very process we were all driving through Jordan to understand: the act of staying put. As we moved south down the Dead Sea Highway in our convoy of mismatched trucks, Bill, who has worked in Jordan off and on for most of his professional life, explained the unexpected geopolitical repercussions of Jordan’s booming produce sector and Syria’s burgeoning civil war. It struck me as a strange juxtaposition. Here we were, setting off on a tour of some of the very earliest permanent settlements known to humankind, all while driving through a landscape littered with signs of twenty-first-century nomads, both Bedouin and migrant workers. Looking at the forbidding landscape, you’d be forgiven for wondering why anyone would want to settle here, of all places.
It’s a question that only became more pressing as the cars turned east onto the flat belly of one of the many little inlets into the rocky foothills, about halfway down the highway towards the Red Sea, and started rumbling gently over the grit and sand that blew incessantly across the snaking strip of paved road. Facing away from the sea at last, with the mountains temporarily held back by the intervening basin, the vista was of yellowish gravel and sand interspersed with occasional patches of date palm, cradled by rapidly rising purple-grey foothills. An extraordinarily photogenic camel and her progeny, a gangly fellow about as tall as the Toyota and roughly 80 per cent knees, watched expressionlessly as we meticulously followed the hairpin curves of the road as it twisted and turned across the flat, featureless valley floor. I wondered (vocally) at the time, wedged as I was with my knees up against the bench seat and with Mihriban Özbaşaran and Güneş Duru, director and co-director respectively of the excavations at Aşıklı Höyük in Turkey,1 squashed in next to me, why there was quite so much meandering involved in traversing such a flat plain. This, it turns out, was a very foolish question. No sooner had we passed what I can only describe as a Bedouin car boot sale, with the cars in question actually small pickups loaded with sheep or serving as hitching posts for bored-looking camels, that Bill brought the whole convoy to a gravelly halt.
Out we all piled, a reverse clown-car manoeuver with more North Face than face paint, considering the high field-archaeologist quotient we were hauling, to confront the obstacle. Here, camouflaged by the invariable beige-ness of the landscape, was an abrupt and unarguable hole in the road. The hole was actually more of a ditch, if you’ll accept something around half a metre (2 feet) deep and 5 metres (16 feet) wide as a ditch. Bill stared at it. We stared at it. The four-by-fours behind us all stopped, emptied, and the rest of the group gathered around and stared at it. Slowly, I realised that what I was looking at wasn’t just an inconvenient hole randomly targeting our road: this was the very nature of the valley floor. The valley we’d been driving through was absolutely riddled with the aftermath of the violent, earth-carving torrents of water that stream down from the hills and fill these dry, rocky valleys with life. Snow from high up on the Jordanian plateau trickles down into rivulets, which build into streams as the water comes crashing down, careening through a successive series of canyon valleys. These flash floods might wash out roads every year, but they are key to letting life flourish in this hard, rocky landscape.
These valleys are called ‘wadi’ in Arabic, and they form the cornerstone of an ecosystem that held a unique appeal for humans thousands of years ago. The wadis provide a mix of environments to exploit, and the Jordanians of prehistory were canny enough to realise this. They exploited not only easy access to water, but also easy access to the many animals that came for the water. Water flowing down off the high Jordan plateau would have run down into the arid valleys, briefly bringing a flourish of vegetation and life totally absent on a January morning. Haunting the edges of different ecozones where different resources can be found is a traditional hunter-gather strategy, to position yourself for ease and opportunity where different types of resources meet – for instance, the edge of a river, situated between uplands and lowlands. The confluence of water has actually been a feature of many early experiments in sedentism – one could point to the Cahokia Mound Builders of the Mississippi River, or the Shangshan site on China’s Yangtze River. All cities need a river. But Bill was taking us to see something else, something new; well, something thousands and thousands of years old, but a revolution at the time.
First, however, we needed pickaxes. Approximately equal numbers of senior academics hacked away at the impromptu obstacle as advised from afar on how best to hack away. This saw us clear the first hurdle in under 30 minutes, after which the washouts were all surmountable by the much-abused four-by-fours. We managed to cross about half of the valley floor before coming up on a new-build Bedouin village, a neatly organised grid of dusty pink and yellow houses. Here we were waylaid by colleagues and friends of Bill’s, and I learned that what I think of as coffee is nothing like actual coffee – at least the way the Bedouin make it. Bedouin coffee is a weak greenish liquid, served scalding hot and drunk in a rapid, throat-burning gulp from a tiny cup about the size of a thimble, which you are meant to drain in one and then pass on to the next person. The flavour is immense, however – the coffee itself is made from fresh rather than dried beans, and like everything else in Jordanian cuisine, has cardamom added to give it a heady, spicy kick. There is an art to drinking anything that hot, and I’m not sure I managed with any grace, but at least we got through the valley and up to the foothills themselves without causing mortal offence.
After leaving the relatively hospitable valley floor, with its adorable baby camels and occasional patches of greenery poking through the grey rock, we drove up Wadi Faynan, home of Bedouin coffee pushers.2 Finally, we managed to ford a number of water-free streambeds to arrive at the important early site of Wadi Faynan 16 at a slightly higher elevation, overlooking the main canyon. This was one of those early experimental villages, dating back 11 millennia, and it is impossible to describe how bleak and desolate an environment that forlorn hilltop overlooking the wadi appeared in mid-January. The ground is a sort of uniform grey, and the only colour comes from the minerals in the wadi sides as they descend down to patchy greenery clinging to the path of the springtime floods on the valley floor below. But here, we have good evidence of year-round inhabitation of the little round houses dug halfway into the earth and bolstered up with mud brick. The Wadi Faynan 17 archaeological project has actually reconstructed one of these ancient houses, and we all had the opportunity to crawl down a narrow defile cut into the earth, ramping about 1.5 metres (5 feet) down into a round inner room with cold mud-brick walls and a low straw ceiling overhead. It didn’t fit many people at once (in fact, someone with a long reach could probably have simultaneously touched opposing walls), and would have been a health and safety nightmare with a hearth fire going. This is one of the advantages of experimental archaeology: pointing out obvious flaws in our imaginings of the past by, literally, smoking them out.3 Currently, the site interpretation seems to be that fires, cooking, grain-grinding, etc. would have happened outside; the big grinding stones used to mash figs, pistachios and wheat into edibility are found outside these little shelters. It seems that this early experiment in settling down would actually not have looked too different from the seasonal occupations that have been found in this area before, with lots of communal activity taking place in a shared, open environment. The exciting difference at Wadi Faynan 17 is that this shared social space was being broken up into smaller ‘house’ units that, instead of lasting a night or a season, seem to have been occupied all year round.
As the four-by-fours dropped into low gear and we began our slow, steady climb up the side of the wadi, there was plenty of time to think about the people who had lived here, in this beautiful but harsh land, millennia ago. For long periods in the human past, this area was sparsely inhabited by fairly mobile hunter-gatherer groups. About 12,000 years ago in the Levant, which encompasses the fertile landward part of the Eastern Mediterranean, the first archaeological evidence of longer-stay human occupation patterns begins to emerge. The Natufian culture of the region seems to settle itself into the landscape a bit more permanently, building drystone-walled shelters in and around cave systems, burying its dead in recognisable cemeteries and installing the ancient equivalent of large, immobile white goods: grinding stones and storage pits. Some 3,000 years before the development of agriculture, its seasonal camps started to take on a more permanent feel, and even the tiny bones of house mice have been used to suggest a more long-term occupation strategy.
After a millennium or two, however, the world these groups inhabited began to shift around them as the climate slowly turned over the course of a thousand-year spell of global cooling known as the Younger Dryas. Vegetation changed, animals changed and the resources that human life depended on changed across the landscape. The Natufian cultural markers become associated with less permanent-looking settlements once more, and the early period of sedentism seems to evaporate as a failed experiment. While no one agrees exactly how much this shift impacted human behaviour, or how settled the early Natufians really were, there are fairly clear archaeological indications that as climate shifted, there were real changes in the way people lived.
After many millennia of seeing intense hunter-gatherer activity, increased rainfall seems to coincide with the emptying of the Wadi Faynan area during the Pre-Pottery Neolithic A. It isn’t until the Pre-Pottery Neolithic B between roughly 10,500 and 9,500 years ago, a more arid period, that we see the thin scars of temporary seasonal encampments that littered the wadi replaced by the heavier footprints of solid buildings. These were occupied all year round, as we can see from the materials and effort that have gone into their construction, as well as the evidence from the small finds. There are a lot of fire pits with a lot of radiocarbon-dateable charcoal, as well as a wealth of animal bones, lithic tools and even tiny micro-artefacts like the pollen spores of long-dead plants. All of these tell a story of a year-round settled people. Looking at the bones of the animals they killed and the residue of the food they ate, it becomes apparent that the newly settled groups were still relying on hunting and gathering strategies for subsistence. Specialist analysis can reveal if the shape of a tiny flake of plant remains comes from a wild or domesticated variety, and the same is true of animals – more on which in later chapters. The final change from the Mesolithic world of long-ranging mobile groups to the stationary Neolithic can be seen in the people themselves, or rather, in their numbers: settlements hold not the tens of people seen in modern-day hunter-gatherer groups, but hundreds and possibly thousands of people. But what possessed all those people to hunker down and stop wandering the landscape? And where did they all come from?
We can start to understand this early experiment in ‘staying in’ by looking at what it means, physically, to be a hunter-gatherer. Take everything you’ve ever heard or read about ‘palaeo’ diets, exercise routines and lifestyles in the popular press, and please repress it. Severely. What we do know about the Palaeolithic lifestyle has to be painfully reconstructed from rare, fragile archaeological finds – the tiny fragments of bird bones, for instance, which only recently came to light and show that pigeon was a (rather unexpected) part of Neanderthal diet on Gibraltar. Or the chemical evidence of different types of isotopes that settle into bones and teeth at different rates depending on the food you eat. We can build a wonderful picture of different proportions of meat and plant food in the diet, which only holds up until a study from just the next site over points out that your signal looks like it came from a grass-munching cow that had just digested a voracious meat-eating lion.4 But if we really want to understand changes in human behaviour, we need to look at the actual humans: the evidence of individual lives and group survival … or failure. So what was hunter-gatherer life like in the austere wadis and high plateaus of Jordan?
Well, for one thing, it was probably longer. From the get-go, settling down into hamlets and villages seems to have shortened life expectancy. Trying to understand how long people lived in the past can be incredibly difficult, because the only evidence we have is … dead people. This is the fundamental challenge of the academic discipline known as palaeodemography. There are no orderly census records for us to consult to see how many people were born or died, or to judge how old they were in a given census year. All we can do is extrapolate the numbers from groups of skeletons that happen to survive in various parts of the landscape, and I think we can all agree that a population of skeletons isn’t likely to be normal.5 In a normal living population, we see a sort of bell-shaped curve (Figure 1, below) if we lay out the whole population according to age, from birth to death. At the extremes, however, the numbers trail off because people either grow out of infancy or die out of the oldest age bracket. You wouldn’t expect more babies than numbers of reproductively active females alive at any given moment in time, and the things that kill us off do tend to affect older people (e.g. cancers, heart disease). Sometimes the bell curve will skew younger or older, indicating that there has been a baby boom (the curve skews to the left), or some previous boom is heading towards greying out of existence (the curve skews to the right).
A palaeodemographic curve, however, is the exact opposite. It’s a u-shape, with spikes at the very end of the age extremes. Does this mean that the past was entirely populated by newborns and oldies? No, of course not. What it means is that newborns and the elderly are the ones who die. Before the advent of modern medicine, a large percentage of children died in the first four years of life. The World Health Organization still gives the mortality rate for infants under the age of one in some parts of the world as nearly 1:100. Aside from complications of birth, such as oxygen starvation, death of the mother or infection, there are a host of childhood illnesses, particularly diarrhoeal ones, that, coupled with undernutrition or lack of resources, still cause a depressingly high number of child deaths.
Figure 1 Demographic curves, idealised for a living population (left) and a dead one (right).
This brings us to the concept of mortality risk. At birth, mortality risk is very high, because there are a great many things that newborns can die of. This drops a bit after the first two weeks, then further after the first year or so, and finally reaches a sort of plateau around about four years old – or so we can estimate from a hodgepodge of census records, surveys and, of course, archaeological data. Mortality risk rises again at particular times in life; for instance, a male of draft age in a group that does a lot of fighting or a female of childbearing age in an era before antiseptics and antibiotics will both have significantly higher risks of dying than a teenager, despite what the parents of most teenagers may think. After this last peak in mortality risk, however, there is a bit of a plateau again, followed by a gentle ramping up of risk until, in the end, the curve peters out. What archaeologists uncover is this u-shaped distribution of dead people, which describes not the total number of people alive at any given time, but is rather related to mortality risk. The trick, then, is to try to work backwards from the number of infants and old folks to arrive at a reasonable approximation of the living population. It’s not nearly as easy as it sounds, and already it sounds far too statistical for most people’s tastes.
If you think about how a Christian church cemetery, for instance, comes to be filled, you can see the problems immediately. In many Christian traditions, children who died before baptism were not buried in the main burial ground – archaeologists might not ever see them. So, can we assume that there were no babies ever born in the entire history of the church? Again: no, of course not. We might instead turn to the ages of the folks whose bodies we do have. If the average age of burials is low, we might guess that life expectancy was also low –and hope that no one hid the bodies of all the old people (if they can hide all the babies, is it really so unreasonable to wonder whether they hid the elderly?). A low life expectancy suggests that mortality risk was high; otherwise, more people would have made it through into old age. Archaeologists examining the skeletons of hunter-gatherers and the more settled groups that followed them (or rather, refused to follow them and stopped somewhere nice) have searched for a difference between the average age at death for hunter-gatherers versus settled groups. Some of the latter seem to have lower mean ages at death than their non-settled predecessors in the same region – something that has led researchers to suggest that settled people typically suffer from higher mortality risk than their free-range forebears. The counter-argument runs that settled groups experienced more baby booms (on average everyone was younger), and therefore left a bigger pile of youngish skeletons behind. The sedentary trend did take off fairly quickly in archaeological terms, coming hot on the heels of a few hundred thousand years of determined meandering by our hominin ancestors. Was it all due to the birth of an immense cohort of fixed-abode evangelists?
The palaeodemographer Jean-Pierre Bocquet-Appel and colleagues have studied the age profiles of skeletons buried at sites from all areas of the world and from the periods in each region where people began to occupy the same sites year-round. They have concluded that the higher proportion of immature skeletons must be the result of more children being born (and therefore, at risk of dying). The evidence from burials also shows a more general population increase that, taken in conjunction with the number of sub-adult skeletons, suggests that the massive change in human numbers they observe across the globe during the transition to the settled Neolithic period is actually a result of increased female fertility. This increase in female fertility is seen in turn as the result of a better balance of maternal energetics – the cost of bearing and feeding an infant against the mother’s own calorific needs – for sedentary women.
Having a baby is a very expensive prospect, a well-worn sentiment that has probably seen little change since our ancestors developed the ability to reflect on existence, and coming well before the advent of currency and competitive consumption of Mothercare products. The biological expense is greatest of course for the mother, as she bears the direct costs of providing enough nutrition and energy to the developing infant, both before and after birth. In situations where the mother herself does not have access to unlimited calorific resources,6 she has to maintain a very delicate balance between reproduction and survival.
We primates are pregnant much longer than other mammals growing similar-sized infants: we take two to four times longer than would be predicted from the normal mammal ratio of gestation time versus body size. Of course, we also have single or very occasionally low multiple births of babies who are born with eyes and ears open, unlike, say, mother cats do. The rate of development of the foetus is slower, which means that the energy we need to devote to it is actually lower, something that could have been a very useful survival strategy in species with fluctuating food resources. Humans slow-grow even larger babies, however, than most of our nearest primate relatives: a baby gorilla will weigh about 2 per cent of its mother’s body weight, and a human a whopping 6 per cent. Chimps also have babies that weigh about 6 per cent of the weight of their mothers, but interestingly, human babies clock in at roughly 15 per cent fat, whereas other primates are closer to 4 per cent. Our fat babies cost quite a lot to grow, too – it takes an estimated 77,500 calories (about 240 calories a day in a modern English sample) to carry an infant to term. Some researchers have argued that this is directly related to the relative fatness of human women,7 but it’s very difficult to extricate how much of our fat stores are dependent on modern obesogenic diets and how much on our evolutionary history; captive primates also put on considerable fat stores. Feeding the babies once they are born is another expensive prospect – the energetic ‘cost’ of lactation is about 500 kilocalories per day, which human mothers meet by increasing energy intake, limiting physical activity, or a combination of the two.
Bocquet-Appel has theorised that settling down is exactly what allowed humans to tip the energetic balance in favour of more babies. In primates with lower body fat stores, it takes longer for the undernourished to return to fertility, and in humans, nutritional shortfall can lead to amenorrhoea8 and temporary infertility. Settling down, by this reckoning, must coincide with a net energetic gain for mothers. This assumption has been borne out by the anthropological literature to some extent: in some ethnographic examples, there is a clear trend for mobile groups to have children more widely spaced apart. For instance, the Ache people of Paraguay were, until the 1970s, highly mobile foragers. They were gradually settled over the course of a decade, but still frequently participated in foraging activities. Women with infants devoted an intense amount of energy to their offspring and spent approximately 90 per cent of foraging time in direct skin-to-skin contact with their children, never letting them get more than a metre away. By contrast, when the Ache were present at their settled home (a mission), children roamed freely and were frequently supervised by other community members or siblings. The time between the births of successive children among the Ache fell from 3.2 to 2.5 years after settling down.
The origins of the theory of the Neolithic Demographic Transition actually come from observations made by anthropologists Lewis Binford and W. J. Chasko of Inuit communities moving from a mobile to a sedentary lifestyle in the 1970s. They found that the subsequent baby boom could be attributed to the availability of new foods and different demands on mothers’ energy. Across the world, mobile groups have more widely spaced children than settled groups, averaging around four years between each birth. Generally, children are breastfed until the mother’s next pregnancy, and so are weaned after at least 2.5 years. However, this is highly variable, and the difference between modern farmers and hunter-gatherers is actually not statistically significant. It should also be remembered that these observations were not made in some sort of pristine primitive vacuum, but among groups being more or less forcibly settled.
What is clear is that somehow, human populations began growing in the run-up to the Neolithic. Evidence of increasing numbers in the shape of numbers of bodies and increasing settlement size has been seen in South America, China and the Near East as each region transitioned to settled life. Many authors argue that this population boom was part of what carried the revolutionary ideas of the Neolithic – settled life and agriculture – to new places; the baby boom that followed mothers finding a chance to put their feet up meant a burgeoning population overflowing into adjacent territories. This slow ooze of Neolithic ideas is an intensely studied (and intensely contested) part of how settled life came to take over most parts of the globe. Similarly, the role of farming in the first wave of sedentary lifestyles in the human story is sufficiently complex that the next chapter in this book deals exclusively with what we know about the pros and cons of making a living from the soil. However, what is clear is that, come the start of settled life in the Natufian period beginning some 14,000 years ago in the Levant, we start to see a lot more people. Population growth kicks off in a way that floods the landscape with settlements, with burials and, of course, with bodies. This fertility revolution, unchecked, had the capacity to launch modern humans into the demographic stratosphere, after hundreds of thousands of years of more or less stable numbers. And while there was a definite boom in population, something did check our numbers, keeping us from the growth that could be predicted from increased female fertility. That something was, of course, the same thing that has kept its Malthusian thumb on the human population for as long as we’ve been around: death and disease.
The advent of settled life brought with it an increase in the risk of settled death. The problem of course, mentioned above, is that it’s usually very difficult to ascertain an actual cause of death from the human remains encountered in archaeology. The vast majority of things that kill us leave no trace on the skeleton; only chronic conditions affect us long enough to produce a response in the bones that archaeologists find. Flu, measles, plague, typhoid, cholera or any of the terrible pandemic diseases that have such an effect on human populations are largely untraceable from bones alone (though we’ll see in later chapters how we can trace them). Heart attacks, drowning, poisoning and even violent deaths might leave no trace at all. Given all this, if we want to understand what kept a lid on the fertility explosion of the Neolithic, we have to extrapolate what the overall risk of dying was.
There are ways to try to access this kind of information about mortality risk, embedded in the bones and teeth of people from early settled communities. For instance, locked into the shape, size and left–right balance of your skeleton are a host of indicators about health that can be teased out via bioarchaeological investigation. These physical signs can tell us about when circumstances got in the way of normal health or growth. This book will talk about them again and again, because it’s our only way of getting past the silence of prehistory and all those people history didn’t much bother with, and of really accessing the reality of life as a biological organism during our many adaptive escapades. So when we look to the edges of the last 10,000 years to understand whether settling down increased humans’ risk of dying early, we need to start talking about physical changes from head to toe.
What is different about a hunter-gatherer’s skeleton? Well, we can start from the toes on this one – or at least the lower limbs. This is the conclusion reached by researchers like Noreen von Cramon-Taubadel, who compiled a huge number of skeletal measurements of hunter-gatherer and sedentary groups from different places and times across the Near East and Europe. Her research looked at how the varying size and shape of human heads and limbs might have changed as the new trend of settling down and farming spread across Europe, pushing the hunter-gatherer lifestyle out and making way for new Neolithic settlements. You would expect to see some diversity across that much time and space (it took thousands of years for the full package of Neolithic innovations, including farming, to turn up in the remote corners of Europe), which she and colleagues duly found. But what they also reported is that, overall, hunter-gatherers had larger lower limbs than non-hunter-gatherers. They had bigger legs, even after accounting for the types of things we know have a relationship with the skeleton beyond simple genetic inheritance, like climate and latitude. Many physical anthropologists have linked the size of limbs, or their general robusticity, to patterns of activity, but understanding how activity affects the human skeleton is quite a bit more complicated than that. So while it’s tempting to simply chalk up our increasingly scrawny legs to just not logging the hundreds of miles a hunter-gatherer might, other factors such as a person’s ability to put on muscle (not to mention our ignorance of what the marks a lifetime of a no-longer-practised lifestyle would look like on a skeleton) prevent an easy interpretation of the data.
Skinny legs aren’t the only interesting clue to life in the Neolithic that can be found by measuring skeletons, however. In the Near East, where our story starts (but also from across the globe, as sedentism and farming get going elsewhere), researchers have observed that everyone, everywhere, appears to have started shrinking once they settled down. Bioarchaeologists estimate adult height by using a series of formulas based on the long bone lengths of known-height individuals. To estimate height (or ‘stature’) accurately, the ideal is to have several limb-bone measurements, each with a bit of an error range, and then to hone in on a realistic guess for overall stature based on those limb-bone lengths. Even so, while the evidence of the archaeological record can be frustratingly ambiguous, it seems clear that, with the arrival of a Neolithic lifestyle, people became shorter. As this occurred thousands and thousands of years before the advent of the computer and the adoption of the hunch-shouldered, screen-staring posture so beloved by many of us today, it’s difficult to know how exactly we managed to shrink. Were the populations who settled different than the hunter-gatherers, and therefore perhaps genetically predisposed to achieving different heights? Basically: did already short populations settle and then outbreed the taller populations nearby? Ancient DNA studies (‘aDNA’) have shown that a lot of Mesolithic groups – hunter-gatherers who lived either before or even alongside settled Neolithic groups – are genetically fairly separate from later Neolithic populations.
There are, however, other factors that can determine adult height. The big red flags here are malnutrition and other types of growth disruptions that occur during childhood, or even in the womb, but set an individual up for a lifetime. These growth disruptions actually form an important source of evidence for life in the past, and we’ll come back to them in later chapters. We know from modern growth studies that stunted growth can be caused by lack of resources, particularly food. A further clue comes from the relative female- or male-ness of skeletons that come from the period right after the first Early Natufian experiments in settled life. The Natufian period is broken into two sections, with the later part subject to the climatic upheaval of the Younger Dryas period. In the Late Natufian there are signs that the populations were under considerable stress, and the experiment with sedentism was called off in most regions as people returned to a more mobile way of life. As pressure on the Natufians increased, sexual dimorphism (the difference in body shape and size between males and females) also decreased, something which happens when a growing body is under enough pressure that resources that might go towards increasing dimorphism are diverted to the rather more pressing case of survival. Many of these skeletal changes are of types that can be related to developmental stress, which we will come back to time and time again in the story of our urbanisation; and when you put together the evidence for shrinking villagers with the other skeletal clues, the story of the Neolithic transition sounds like a pretty rough ride.
And it’s a rough ride trying to understand all of this, especially squashed in the back of a Toyota making its knuckle-whitening way from the Dead Sea coast upwards some 1,200 metres (4,000 feet)9 to the Jordanian plateau. After our encounter with the semi-subterranean roundhouses of Wadi Faynan 17, we headed over the edge of the Jordanian plateau and towards some slightly later sites, where Bill had promised some excitingly square houses – a later adaptation in the early days of settling down. Around halfway through the climb, however, one of the four-by-fours managed to finally rattle a battery free of its (in retrospect, poorly designed) plastic casing, causing the whole convoy to come to a shuddering halt on a hairpin bend, deep into the winding, rocky, Martian landscape of the wadi. The clown-car scenario repeated itself, as each of the trucks disgorged its quota of academics, all of whom took a deep interest in the stress mechanics of engine plastics but professed an embarrassing ignorance of how to deal with a truck battery no longer at one with its truck. But the wadis are never as empty as you would think – no sooner had people started talking wistfully of lunches then a little white pickup came roaring up the valley. Its driver was an unbelievably resourceful teenager, son of one of Bill’s acquaintances from the Bedouin village. He popped out of the pickup (leaving a younger brother in the cab) and began an animated discussion with those members of the party who spoke Arabic. This led to the rather surreal tableau of a perhaps 13-year-old boy explaining to a bunch of middle-aged professors how to tie a battery up with string, which our pint-sized saviour handily accomplished. A quick phone call to his father to arrange for a new battery at the top of the hill and we were off up the valley again, while he reversed backwards down one of the most terrifying ridges I have ever been driven along. We just about caught sight of his father in the horrendous dust cloud he raised, a tiny speck in a black galabeya, standing on the valley floor and surrounded by his goats, waving his mobile phone in the air in greeting and, to all appearances, laughing uncontrollably in our general direction.
Soon enough we crested over the top of the plateau, ending up in the lonely and wretched semi-abandoned stretch of tourist-trap restaurants outside the entrance to Petra.10 Cold glasses of lemonade with shredded mint (a strong contender for the title of world’s best non-alcoholic beverage) were handed around, and the group began working its way through falafel, pizza and other traditional foods as we waited for the battery to be replaced. This was as informal a place as any for discussion of those big questions I had contemplated during the journey, so I spent the otherwise pleasant meal demanding answers from this gathered group of experts based on the myriad of sites they’d worked on. If we’d just seen the early experiments in settled living – and there’s such a tranche of bioarchaeological evidence suggesting that settling down wasn’t all that great health-wise – well … how could we make sense of it all?
The answer, for me, is to go back and look at those resources. How did sedentary communities manage their resources, and what effect did the major new resource of farmed food have on how they did this? Also, what about domesticated animals – meals on the hoof, so to speak?11 For bioarchaeologists, the big question comes down to biology, and humans who as biological organisms either eat well or don’t, grow well or don’t, but either way leave telltale traces in their bones and teeth for me to find, thousands of years later. Even within that group of experts, who between them have probably dug up more evidence on the early Neolithic than any other conglomeration of humans alive, there were no easy answers. What drove the success of settled groups? How successful were they really, if they shrank in height and didn’t live as long? What we do know is that the answer is more complex than just counting the bodies and measuring them up. We’ve got to delve even deeper into these Neolithic lives (and deaths) to understand the pretty radical trend of staying put.
1 Güneş Duru is also the lead guitarist in the Turkish rock band Redd, which suggests that either archaeology or rock music in Turkey is underpaid.
2 I came to realise that there are very few Jordanians who do not appear to have made it their mission in life to introduce you to delicious coffee, up to and including bored military personnel on the midnight desert road shift who invite you to have coffee with them in the tank they are using as a windbreak. Thanks guys!
3 I am reliably informed that this experiment actually took place. No archaeologists were (permanently) harmed.
4 This is a facetious comment. Not to be confused with the evidence from actual faeces, which is actually incredibly useful in reconstructing diet.
5 This is, by far and away, the funniest joke it’s possible to make in palaeodemography, and I’ve nicked it from Professor Tony Waldron of University College London. I’m sorry.
6 See for instance: nutrition information, Ben & Jerry’s Chunky Monkey ice cream.
7 Human females apparently have a higher body fat percentage than every other mammal besides the Djungarian hamster.
8 When the menstrual cycle stops.
9 Yes, the Dead Sea is below sea level: 420 metres (1,400 feet) below; only one of the many things wrong with that particular body of water.
10 The Syrian situation had already deteriorated a great deal, and tourism was essentially flatlining; also, it was January and snowing in places, but that is an entirely different driving-related disaster story.
11 Lots of people had ordered the köfte (meatballs); it was on my mind.