2

Peace and War

Wellington arrived in Brussels on the evening of 4 April 1815. The only military force there was assembled from the body of the army which had taken part in Sir Thomas Graham’s unsuccessful attempt to seize Bergen-op-Zoom the previous year. This force, composed mainly of British and King’s German Legion regiments, had been broken up following Napoleon’s abdication, but the nucleus remained in the United Netherlands to ensure the peaceful transition of that country from the rule of Napoleon to that of the House of Orange.

To this was added a number of troops from the new Netherlands Army which consisted of an approximately equal number of veterans who had, until his fall from power in 1814, served under Napoleon, and of raw recruits. The British contingent amounted to six regiments of cavalry, twenty-five battalions of infantry and supporting artillery, numbering, in all around 14,000 men. As Wellington was to explain to his Government, this force was wholly inadequate for the task ahead. He wrote to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, the Earl of Bathurst, on 6 April:

I arrived here the night before last, and received from the Prince of Orange your Lordship’s letters; and a dispatch from H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, containing His Majesty’s Commission of Commander of the Forces on the Continent of Europe, and His Royal Highness’ instructions for my guidance. Although I have not yet formally taken upon myself the command, I have inquired into the state of the forces here, upon which subject I will address your Lordship hereafter; and now enclose the copy of a letter which I have thought it proper to address to Gen. Ziethen, who commands on the Rhine and Meuse.

Your Lordship will see by my letter to Gen. Ziethen in what state we stand as to numbers. I am sorry to say that I have a very bad account of the troops; and he appears unwilling to allow them to be mixed with ours, which, although they are not our best, would afford a chance of making something of them. Although I have given a favorable opinion of ours to Gen. Ziethen, I cannot help thinking, from all accounts, that they are not what they ought to be to enable us to maintain our military character in Europe. It appears to me that you have not taken in England a clear view of your situation, that you do not think war certain, and that in your message to Parliament, by which measure your troops of the line in Ireland or elsewhere might become disposable; and how we are to make out 150,000 men, or even the 60,000 of the defensive part of the treaty of Chaumont, appears not to have been considered.

If you could let me have 40,000 good British infantry, besides those you insist upon having in garrisons, the proportion settled by treaty that you are to furnish of cavalry, that is to say, the eighth of 150,000 men, including in both the old German Legion, and 150 pieces of British field artillery fully horsed, I should be satisfied, and take my chance for the rest, and engage that we would play our part in the game. But, as it is, we are in a bad way.

I beg that your Lordship will take this proposition into consideration. I beg you also to send here the Waggon train, and all the spring waggons for the carriage of sick and wounded; and that you will ask Lord Mulgrave to send here, in addition to the ordnance above mentioned fully horsed, 200 musket ball cartridge carts at present, and as many more hereafter; and an intrenching tool cart for each battalion of infantry, and 200 more for the corps of Engineers, and the whole corps of Sappers and Miners. It would be also desirable that we should have the whole Staff corps. I request your Lordship likewise to mention to Lord Mulgrave that it is desirable that measures should be taken to horse the 40 pontoons already here, and that 40 more should be sent out immediately, fully horsed. Without these equipments, military operations are out of the question.¹

Having set out his requirements, Wellington began to organise all around him with his usual energy, and despite the size of the army under his control, and regardless of what he had just told Bathurst, the Duke began to consider attacking Paris before Napoleon had fully reestablished himself. He explained his plans on 10 April to the Earl of Clancarty, who was both a Dutch and an Irish peer, who had taken over from Wellington at the Congress of Vienna.

I went to Ghent on the day before yesterday to pay my respects to the King of France, and I returned yesterday, having acquired there some information with which it is desirable that the ministers of the Allied Powers should be made acquainted.

It appears certain, from all accounts, that the great majority of the population in France are decidedly adverse to Buonaparte, and that many General and other officers, the whole of the National Guard, and even some of the regiments of the line, have remained faithful to the King. The National Guards and population of all the fortified towns on this frontier are in favor of His Majesty, and hopes are entertained of being able to get possession of some towns, of which Dunkirk is particularly mentioned as one.

35,000 men are stated to be in arms in the West, under the directions of the Duc de Bourbon; and the Duc d’Angoulême is in the South, at or near Nismes, where he is making some progress in organising a large force. The Duchesse d’Angoulême has certainly been obliged to quit Bordeaux. It would appear that, notwithstanding what is stated in the Paris newspapers regarding the defeat of the force under the Due d’Angoulême, it still gives some uneasiness to Buonaparte’s government; as a person employed by me, who left Paris on Wednesday last, the 5th, states that all the troops of the line in and about Paris broke up on the preceding day, and marched on the road towards Fontainebleau.

I enclose the report made by this person; and I likewise enclose a memoir given to me by the Duc de Feltre, regarding the state and distribution of the French forces. In my opinion, this memoir gives an erroneous idea of their strength. I am certain the regiments of infantry have more than 1000 men each. Those which I saw last autumn at Paris, before they were completed to the peace establishment, had more than that number; I should say 1200 men on an average; and I should imagine they cannot now have fewer than 2000 each regiment. I believe the account of the cavalry, artillery, &c., to be correct.

With this information before them, the ministers of the Allied Powers, and the august Sovereigns, will see how important it is that no time should be lost in commencing our offensive operations. This point is so clear, that it would be a useless waste of your time and mine to discuss it; but there is a period approaching, before which it is desirable that our forces should enter France, and that France should see what she has to expect from the government of the usurper.

He has called together for the 15th May, what he denominates ‘An ‘l’ Assemblée du Champ de Mai,’ and it must be expected that his means and resources will be thereby considerably augmented, particularly in men; which augmentation, owing to the general detestation of his government, the resistance to it in some parts of the country, and the necessity under which he labors to employ his troops to overcome that resistance, he cannot obtain in any other manner.

It remains then to be seen with what force the Allies can commence their offensive operations on the 1st May.

The British, Hanoverian, and Dutch Corps will at that period consist of about 60,000 men, of which about 9000 will be cavalry; and not reckoning the contingents of Saxony, Brunswick, Oldenburg, Nassau, and the Hanse towns, eventually destined to join this army. Towards the latter end of April, the Prussian army between the Rhine and the Meuse will consist of 63,000 men, as appears by a letter from the Earl Cathcart of the 1st inst.; and there will be on the Upper Rhine an Austro-Bavarian corps, according to the same authority, at the same period of time, consisting of about 146,000 men; so that at the end of April the Allies could enter France with 270,000 men.

As well as I can recollect, the Russian troops will then begin to arrive on the Mayn; and it appears by Lord Cathcart’s report that, by the middle of May, the Prussian army will be augmented to 156,000; and the contingents above referred to, probably to the amount of 30,000 men, and other reinforcements from England, &c., probably to the amount of 10,000 more, will have arrived in this country.

It remains then to be considered whether it will not be expedient to commence our operations on the 1st May, considering the relative force of the two contending parties at that period, rather than wait till the middle of May, and thus give to Buonaparte the advantages which he will certainly derive from the ‘Assemble du Champ de Mai.’²

The assembly of the Champ de Mai that Wellington referred to was a form of national gathering in which Napoleon was formally adopted by the people and where he re-distributed the Eagles to each regiment of the Army and the National Guard. This latter act signified the dissolution of the Bourbon forces and the re-establishment of the Napoleonic army.³

Napoleon once famously said that ‘it is with baubles that men are led’ and the whole event was conducted with the usual Napoleonic pageantry and drama, the Emperor himself sitting on his throne dressed in Imperial robes:

Soldiers of the National Guard of the Empire! Soldiers of the land and sea forces! To your hands I confide the Imperial Eagle with the National Colours. Swear to defend it with the sacrifice of your blood, against the enemies of France, and of this throne. Swear that it shall always be your rallying signal.

Predictably, the soldiers responded with ‘We swear it.’ Napoleon then went to another gilded throne on the Champs de Mars, a large public green space in Paris, to actually hand over the Eagles:

Soldiers of the National Guard of Paris! Soldiers of the Imperial Guard! I confide to you the National Eagles, and the National Colours. You swear to perish, if necessary, in defending them against the enemies of the country and the throne.

Once again the troops shouted out their allegiance. Drums then rolled to quieten the excited soldiers. Napoleon then continued:

You swear never to acknowledge any other rallying sign. You soldiers of the National Guard of Paris swear never to suffer foreigners again to pollute by their presence the capital of this great nation!⁴

After more vocal demonstrations of their support for Napoleon, the solders marched past their Emperor. Despite this display of martial might, Napoleon claimed that he wanted the position of a constitutional monarch, declaring that, ‘I am growing old. The repose of a constitutional king may suit me. It will more surely suit my son.’ In declaring that he was no longer interested in wars and conquests, he said, ‘Can one be as fat as I am and have ambition?’⁵ He wrote to Viscount Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, stating that he had,

No other wish, than … the blessings of a happy tranquillity. It is to the duration of peace that the Emperor looks forward for the accomplishment of his noblest intentions. With a disposition to respect the rights of other nations, his Majesty has the pleasing hope, that those of the French nation will remain inviolate.⁶

Napoleon, though, would not be allowed his happy tranquillity and he knew only too well that if he wanted peace he had to plan for war. Wellington was making his own plans, especially as he had been told that he was to be given supreme command of all the Allied armies in Belgium.

The decision to increase the number of troops for the coming conflict was debated in Parliament and, perhaps surprisingly, it met with a degree of opposition. Samuel Whitbread was against a ‘fresh crusade for the purpose of determining who should fill the throne of France’. Sir Francis Burdett argued that if Napoleon was ‘the French people’s choice’, Britain had no right to interfere and that an invasion of France was ‘an unjustifiable and ruinous enterprise’. Castlereagh put the Government’s case for intervention:

It might be thought that an armed peace would be preferable to a state of war, but the danger ought fairly to be looked at: and, knowing that good faith was opposite to the system of the [Napoleonic] party to be treated with, knowing that the rule of his conduct was self-interest, regardless of every other consideration, whatever decision they came to, must rest on the principle of power, and not on that of reliance on the man.

Britain was justified, Whitbread declared, ‘in holding Buonaparté out as an object of terror, and in endeavouring, by all legitimate means, to destroy and extinguish his power’.⁷

When all was said and done, when the House divided, 273 were in favour of deposing Napoleon and seventy-two against.

To help the Duke in extinguishing Napoleon’s power, as many troops as could be spared were despatched to Belgium from the UK, including the Household Cavalry and a large number of other cavalry and infantry regiments including the 23rd Regiment of Foot, otherwise known as the Royal Welch Fusiliers. Amongst their number was Drummer Richard Bentinck, speaking in the third person to an interviewer:

They landed at Ostend, the first Regiment at the rendezvous. After one day’s delay they proceeded by canal to the ancient city of Bruges, remained there for about a week and then, making room for troops that by this time were rapidly coming up, they pushed on to Ghent. They were then overtaken by the 51st Regiment, whom they then kept company with for a fortnight, before marching rapidly on up the country. They found the inhabitants were kindly disposed and were well treated by them.⁸

Captain Cavalié Mercer’s troop of the Royal Horse Artillery was one the units which were ordered to join Wellington’s force:

On the 8th of April, the post brought our order to march forthwith to Harwich, there to embark for Ostend – an order received with unfeigned joy by officers and men, all eager to plunge into danger and bloodshed, all hoping to obtain glory and distinction.

On the morning of the 9th, the troop paraded at half-past seven o’clock with as much regularity and as quietly as if only going to a field-day; not a man either absent or intoxicated, and every part of the guns and appointments in the most perfect order. At eight, the hour named in orders, we marched off the parade.⁹

Captain Digby of the 7th Foot was an aide-de-camp to General Hill who was to take command of the Anglo-Dutch II Corps. He noted the following on his arrival at Ostend on 31 March:

We arrived here this evening at 5 o’clock … The whole town was in confusion from the number of English troops lately disembarked, all of whom, true to their English nature, were wandering about with their hands in their pockets, and their eyes and mouths wide open, staring at the wonderful sight of a few dozen heavy stupid Flemmings.¹⁰

Despite the transporting of such troops, Wellington was far from impressed – as he made clear in a letter to Lieutenant General Charles Stewart on 8 May:

I have got an infamous army, very weak and ill equipped, and a very inexperienced Staff. In my opinion they are doing nothing in England. They have not raised a man; they have not called out the militia either in England or Ireland; are unable to send me anything; and they have not sent a message to Parliament about the money. The war spirit is therefore evaporating as I am informed.¹¹

Happy or not with the force at his disposal, Wellington had already begun to consider how his troops would be organised. This was relayed to key individuals, including the Earl of Clancarty:

H.R.H. the Prince Regent having appointed Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington to be Commander of His Majesty’s s forces on the continent of Europe, all reports are in future to be made to his Grace … t being desirable to amalgamate the two armies, Anglo-Hanoverian, and that of the Netherlands, in order that the troops which are to act together may be accustomed to each other, and that the whole consolidated force may with facility move in one uniform manner, having one great object in view:

The infantry and artillery, therefore, of the allied armies, will for the present be divided into two great corps; the first of which will be under the orders of H.R.H. the Prince of Orange, and the second under the command of Lieut. Gen. Lord Hill.

The 1st corps will be composed of the troops Anglo-Hanoverian, as follows, viz.: The 1st and 3d divisions of infantry, with the artillery attached to them, and the following troops of the Netherlands, viz., the 2d and 3d divisions of the army of the Netherlands, with a battery of foot artillery, and a battery of horse artillery, and the division of cavalry of the Netherlands. The 2d corps will be composed of the troops Anglo-Hanoverian, as follows, viz.: The 2d and 4th divisions of infantry, with the artillery attached to them, and the 2d brigade of cavalry of the King’s German Legion, and the troops of the Netherlands as follows, viz., the Indian brigade and the 1st division, with a battery of foot artillery, and a battery of horse artillery. H.R.H. Prince Frederick of Orange will command the troops attached to H.R.H. the Prince of Orange, and His Royal Highness will have the goodness to make arrangements for attaching to the 2d corps such Staff officers as may be necessary.

Notwithstanding this amalgamation, everything which regards the discipline of the officers and soldiers of each nation, the provisioning, the clothing, the equipping, the means of transport, &c. &c., will be under the direction of the officers, civil and military, of each nation. The General commanding each corps d’armée will give orders for all other matters.¹²

As soon as he had notified the respective commanders of the nature of his reorganisation, Wellington set out his plans for the invasion of France, with his intention of pre-empting any moves made by Napoleon, spelling out these in a memorandum, once again to the Earl of Clancarty:

The object of the operations … to be undertaken by the corps of the Allies, which will probably be assembled in Flanders and on the Rhine in the end of the month of April, is, that by their rapidity they might be beforehand with the plans and measures of Buonaparte. His power now rests upon no foundation but the army; and if we can introduce into the country such a force as is capable either to defeat the army in the field, or to keep it in check, so that the various parties interested in the defeat of Buonaparte’s views may have the power of acting, our object will be accomplished. The Allies have no views of conquest; there is no territory which requires in particular to be covered by the course of their operations; their object is to defeat the army, and to destroy the power of one individual; and the only military points to be considered are:

1st; To throw into France, at the earliest possible period, the largest body of men that can be assembled:

2dly; To perform this operation in such a manner that it can be supported by the forces of the Allies, which are known to be following immediately:

3dly; That the troops which shall enter France shall be secure of a retreat upon the supporting armies, in case of misfortune. The troops to be employed in this operation should be the allied British, Hanoverian, and Dutch troops, under the command of the Duke of Wellington; the Prussian troops, as reinforced, under the command of Comte Gneisenau; the allied Austrian, Bavarian, Wurtemberg, and Baden troops, to be assembled on the Upper Rhine, under Prince Schwarzenberg. The two former should enter France between the Sambre and the Meuse; the Duke of Wellington endeavoring to get possession of Maubeuge, or, at all events, of Avesnes; and Gen. Gneisenau directing his march upon Rocroy and Chimay. Luxembourg; and, while his left should observe the French fortresses of Longwy, Thionville, and Metz, he should possess himself of the forts of Sedan, Stenay, and Dun, and cross the Meuse. The first object would then be accomplished, and we should have in France a larger body of troops than it is probable the enemy can assemble.

It is expected that the British and Dutch army would be followed in the course of a fortnight by about 40,000 men, and the Prussian army in the same period by 90,000 men; and that the allied Austrian and Bavarian army would be followed by a Russian army of 180,000. Supposing, then, that the enemy should have the facility of attacking the line of communication of the English, Hanoverian, and Dutch army, by Maubeuge, and that of the allied Austrian army from their fortresses on the Upper Moselle and Upper Meuse, they could not prevent the junction of those troops. It must, besides, be observed, that the enemy could not venture to leave their fortresses entirely without garrisons of troops of the line, on account of the disgust which the usurpation of Buonaparte has occasioned universally; and the operations upon our communications will therefore necessarily be carried on by a diminished body of troops.

However inconvenient, then, they may be to those troops which will have advanced, they can neither prevent the junction of the armies which will be following the first that will enter France, nor can they prevent the retreat of these upon those which are moving to their support. According to this scheme, then, we should have in the centre of France a body of above 200,000 men, to be followed up by nearly 300,000 more, and their operations would be directed upon Paris, between the Meuse and the Oise.¹³

From the above it would seem Wellington still believed that, despite the remarkable nature of his return to power, Napoleon did not command the support of the French people. That view was about to change, as he told the Earl of Clancary the following day:

I now enclose the plan according to which I conceived it possible to carry on our operations against the enemy with the force which the Allies would have at their disposal for that purpose in the latter end of April and beginning of May. Since I wrote to your Lordship, however, some important events have occurred to increase it at an early period. You will see, by the enclosed papers, that … Buonaparte, besides having called for the soldiers recently discharged, amounting, as I understand, to about 127,000, of which 100,000 may be deemed immediately disposable, has organised 200 battalions of grenadiers of the National Guards. I imagine that the latter will not be a very formidable force; but still numbers were too nearly equal.¹⁴

It was far from being all work and no play though for Wellington and the British soldiers stationed in Brussels. Cricket matches became a frequent distraction for the troops, prompted by the Duke of Richmond, who commanded a reserve force at Brussels and was a keen cricketer and the man who formed the MCC. There were also parades and reviews as well as regular horse races, but with a large part of London Society having followed its aristocratic officers to Brussels the Belgian city was alive in the evenings with great social events, as Captain Digby Mackworth wrote on 27 May:

Lord Wellington gave a grand ball yesterday at which all the principal people in Brussels were present, a most magnificent supper was prepared and the gardens so well illuminated as almost to resemble day. The Duke himself danced and always with the same person, a Lady Caroline Webster to whom he paid so much attention that scandal who is supreme Goddess here, began to whisper all sorts of stories.¹⁵

Wellington’s behaviour was the subject of much interest and intrigue amongst the social elite, as Lady Caroline Capel wrote:

Balls are going on here as if we had had none for a year. Nothing ever was so fine or so magnificent as the review of English cavalry 3 days ago … The Duke of Wellington has not improved the morality of our society, as he has given several things & makes a point of asking all of the ladies of loose character. Everyone was surprised at seeing Lady John Campbell at his house and one of his staff told me it had been represented to him her not being received for that her Character was more than suspicious. ‘Is it, by God,’ said he, ‘then I will go and ask her myself.’ Upon which he immediately took his hat and went out for the purpose.¹⁶

There was a popular ‘dark walk’ close to the Parc de Bruxelles, the latter being a city park in the centre of the city:

There his Grace of Wellington is sometimes to be seen with a fair lady under his arm. He generally dresses in plain clothes, to the astonishment of all the foreign officers. He is said to be as successful in the fields of Idalia as in those of Bellona, and the ladies whom he honours with his attentions suffer not a little in their reputation.¹⁷

Clearly concerned less with Brussels gossip than with how many troops Napoleon was raising, Wellington sought to bring every soldier he could into the field to crush the Emperor before the French forces became too formidable. He knew, however, that despite his rapidly growing strength Napoleon did not have the resources to fight on more than one front and so Wellington urged the Portuguese Prince Regent to open up a second front in the south. The following was sent to H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal from Brussels on 16 April:

Your Royal Highness will have learned that I signed, on the 25th March last, with the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as the Plenipotentiary of His Majesty, a treaty of alliance and cooperation, applicable to the circumstances of the moment in Europe, occasioned by the return of Buonaparte to France, and of the usurpation of the supreme power in that country. All the Powers of Europe are invited to accede to that treaty; and I imagine that the Plenipotentiaries of your Royal Highness consider themselves authorised to accede to it on the part of your Royal Highness. The object of the treaty is to put in operation against Buonaparte the largest force which the contracting or acceding parties can bring into the field; and that upon which I wish to trouble your Royal Highness is the seat to be chosen for the operations of your Royal Highness’ troops.

The natural seat for their operations would be the frontiers of Spain; but I am very apprehensive that the financial resources of His Catholic Majesty are not of a nature, nor in a situation, to enable him to equip and maintain an army to co-operate actively with that of your Royal Highness; and yet, without that co-operation, and the assistance which your Royal Highness would expect to derive from the country, it does not appear that your Royal Highness’ army could carry on their operations with their accustomed credit in that quarter. Under these circumstances, it has appeared to me that it would be expedient, and I have recommended to your Royal Highness’ ministers at Vienna, and have requested His Majesty’s ministers to recommend to the Regency at Lisbon, that your Royal Highness’ troops should be employed with the allied army assembling in Flanders, and destined to act, under my command, against the common enemy.

I need not point out to your Royal Highness’ penetration the advantages to your Royal Highness’ reputation of appearing in the field in this part of Europe; but as your troops cannot serve actively in the natural seat for their operations, and they will serve here with their old companions and under their old commanders, it appears to me that this measure is to be recommended, if only as one of military expediency. I trust, then, that your Royal Highness will approve of my having recommended it to your ministers and to the Regency.¹⁸

Until he was in a position to mount an offensive into France, and with the likelihood that Napoleon would seize the initiative and take the offensive before the Allied armies were fully deployed, Wellington had to look to the defence of Belgium. This was explained to H.R.H. the Prince of Orange, on 17 April:

As I passed Ghent yesterday, I went to look at the works which had been executed by your Royal Highness’ orders at the Tournay gate, which are nearly completed, and perfectly answer the purpose for which they were intended. In order, however, to complete the scheme at Ghent, it would be necessary to strengthen the Bruges gate, and to repair the works of the citadel; and I should then consider Ghent quite secure from any attack likely to be made upon it, under existing circumstances.

Adverting to the King’s objections to occupy any of these works, and feeling that I cannot occupy them with the troops under my command with justice to the King’s Allies, who have really but a secondary interest to that of His Majesty in their occupation, I have not thought it proper to give the engineer any directions regarding the continuance of the works at Ghent; and I beg your Royal Highness to make me acquainted with His Majesty’s wishes upon that point, and that you will also take His Majesty’s pleasure respecting the mode of defending the works already executed at Ghent.

His Majesty should, in my opinion, consider that he has but a small and very young army to oppose to possibly a numerous and well disciplined one; and that he has a large extent of country to cover but lately brought under His Majesty’s government, whose inhabitants are supposed to be very well disposed towards it. I know of no mode so well calculated for the defence of such a country by such an army, as works well chosen.

In the supposition that the Allies will enter France, including those more immediately allied to His Majesty, and his own army under your Royal Highness, it must be expected that the enemy will keep his fortresses on the frontier well garrisoned. If these garrisons should collect to the amount only of 15,000 men, after the Allies shall have passed them, and should make an irruption into His Majesty’s dominions (an event by no means improbable), will His Majesty, under existing circumstances, have in his power the means of stopping them at least short of Bruxelles? In my opinion, certainly not, unless he should occupy Ghent, Tournay, Ath, and Mons. There is no danger of any of these points being seriously attacked; and they will be so strong that, unless seriously attacked, they cannot be carried; and there is no chance that such an enemy as I have supposed may make an irruption into the country, will venture to pass them.

This is my decided opinion regarding these posts, and it rests with His Majesty to occupy them or not, as he may think proper. As far as the King’s Allies will be concerned, I shall take measures to render it a matter of total indifference to their particular interests, whether the enemy does or does not occupy Bruxelles as soon as we shall have advanced.¹⁹

One of Wellington’s principal concerns was with the lack of artillery available to him, especially being aware that Napoleon, an exartilleryman, always sought to employ more guns than his opponents, as indeed would be the case at Waterloo. He wrote on this subject to the Earl of Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, on 21 April:

I have received a letter from Lord Mulgrave of the 15th, from which I see that, after doing all he can for us, we shall have only 84 pieces of artillery equipped, instead of 150, for which I asked. We have now only 72, including German artillery, 30 pieces, leaving 42 as the number which the British artillery can supply!

Then for the musket ball cartridge carts, intrenching tools, carts for the engineers, pontoons, and the heavy artillery to move with the army, I must call upon the Commissariat for horses. We shall easily purchase the number of horses required at the rate of 25 guineas each, which money for the exchange will cost the country about 30 guineas; but I had already stopped the purchase because we had no drivers to take care of them. I conclude that, in consequence of the reduction, they can no more furnish drivers than they can horses; and, that being the case, I beg leave to point out to your Lordship that, as the drivers of the country cannot be depended upon, and as at all events I have not time to form them, I have no other means of providing for this absolutely necessary service, than to take soldiers from the British infantry to perform it, and that very badly. If you will look at our returns, you will see how little able we are to afford a soldier to take care of each pair of horse we require.

Our demand for horses for the whole equipments demanded was above 6000, of which above 4000 deficient. As the equipment is reduced to the amount of half the field artillery, which would have required about 1200 horses to draw them, we shall have about 2800 horses to purchase, for which we shall want 1400 soldiers to take care of them, or about four regiments of infantry of their present strength. I hope that government will be able to adopt some measures to relieve us from this demand. The only thing I can suggest is, to send us dismounted dragoons to perform this service. In the last war I used the Portuguese dismounted dragoons to perform the service of the artillery, and I now recommend that some dismounted dragoons may be sent, with a proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers, to take charge of them.

I assure your Lordship that the demand which I have made of field artillery is excessively small. The Prussian corps on the Meuse of 40,000 men has with it 200 pieces of cannon; and you will see by reference to Prince Hardenberg’s return of the Prussian army that they take into the field nearly 80 batteries, manned by 10,000 artillery. Their batteries are of 8 guns each, so that they will have about 600 pieces. They don’t take this number for show or amusement; and, although it is impossible to grant my demand, I hope it will be admitted to be small.²⁰

Wellington continued to press his Government with demands for more of everything, and to urge his allies to greater efforts, particularly as evidence was mounting that Napoleon was gathering his forces on France’s border with Belgium. The following is a secret memorandum that he sent on 1 May to the Prince of Orange, and to his senior commanders, the Earl of Uxbridge, who commanded the cavalry and who was nominally Wellington’s second-in-command, and to Lieutenant General Roland Hill, who commanded II Corps and was described by Wellington as his ‘right hand’:

1st; Having received reports that the Imperial guard had moved from Paris upon Beauvais, and a report having been for some days prevalent in the country that Buonaparte was about to visit the northern frontier, I deem it expedient to concentrate the cantonments of the troops, with a view to their early junction in case this country should be attacked, for which concentration the Quarter Master General now sends orders.

2d; In this case, the enemy’s line of attack will be either between the Lys and the Scheldt, or between the Sambre and the Scheldt, or by both lines.

3d; In the first case, I should wish the troops of the 4th division to take up the bridge on the Scheldt, near Avelghem, and with the regiment of cavalry at Courtrai, to fall back upon Audenarde, which post they are to occupy, and to inundate the country in the neighbourhood.

4th; The garrison of Ghent are to inundate the country in the neighbourhood likewise, and that point is to be held at all events.

5th; The cavalry in observation between Menin and Fumes are to fall back upon Ostend, those between Menin and Tournay upon Tournay, and thence to join their regiments.

6th; The 1st, 2d, and 3d divisions of infantry are to be collected at the head quarters of the whole to be in readiness to march at a moment’s notice.

7th; The troops of the Netherlands to be collected at Soignies and Nivelles.

8th; In case the attack should be made between the Sambre and the Scheldt, I propose to collect the British and Hanoverians at and in the neighbourhood of Enghien, and the army of the Low Countries at and in the neighbourhood of Soignies and Braine le Comte.

9th; In this case, the 2d and 3d divisions will collect at their respective head quarters, and gradually fall back towards Enghien with the cavalry of Col. Arentschildt’s and the Hanoverian brigade.

10th; The garrisons of Mons and Tournay will stand fast; but that of Ath will be withdrawn, with the 2d division, if the works should not have been sufficiently advanced to render the place tenable against a coup de main.

11th; Gen. Sir W. Ponsonby’s, Sir J. Vandeleur’s, and Sir H.Vivian’s brigades of cavalry will march upon Hal.

12th; The troops of the Low Countries will collect upon Soignies and Braine le Comte.

13th; The troops of the 4th division and the 2d hussars, after taking up the bridge at Avelghem, will fall back upon Audenarde, and there wait for further orders.

14th; In case of the attack being directed by both lines supposed, the troops of the 4th division and 2d hussars, and the garrison of Ghent, will act as directed in Nos. 3 and 4 of this memorandum; and the 2d and 3d divisions, and the cavalry, and the troops of the Low Countries, as directed in Nos. 8, 9,10,11, and 12.²¹

Wellington also wrote to Lieutenant General Sir William Stewart on 8 May, revealing both his hopes and his fears:

I have received your letters of the 28th April, for which I am very much obliged to you; and I have perused with the greatest attention the memorandum which you enclosed. I saw Clarke [the Duc de Feltre, the French Minister of War under Louis] yesterday, and he told me that a person of the War Office, upon whom he could depend, had informed him that on the 30th April the enemy’s regular army amounted to 130,000 men; and the Guard to 25,000; the gendarmerie and national guards raised, and expected to be raised, would make it 280,000. This was the utmost expected.

Beurnonville, who ought to know, told me this day that we ought to reckon that the enemy had an effective force of 200,000 men. He says the King had 155,000 when he quitted Paris, and that he had granted above 100,000 congés, which had been called in; but that not above half could be reckoned upon as likely to join. I understand, likewise, that there were above 100,000 deserters wandering about France.

In reference to these different statements, I beg you to observe that Clarke speaks from positive information; Beurnonville from conjecture. According to Clarke’s account, the army gained in strength only 3000 men in the last 15 days; but then it must be observed, that the Guard have gained about 19,000, being the difference between 6000, which they were, and 25,000, which they are now.

In respect to periods of commencing operations, you will have seen that I had adopted the opinion that it was necessary to wait for more troops, as far back as the 13th April. After, however, that we shall have waited a sufficient time to collect a force, and to satisfy military men that their force is what it ought to be to enable them to accomplish the object in view, the period of attack becomes a political question, upon which there can be no difference of opinion. Every day’s experience convinces me that we ought not to lose a moment which could be spared.

I say nothing about our defensive operations, because I am inclined to believe that Blücher [Generalfeldmarschall Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, Commander of the Prussian Army in the West] and I are so well united, and so strong, that the enemy cannot do us much mischief. I am at the advanced post of the whole; the greatest part of the enemy’s force is in my front; and, if I am satisfied, others need be under no apprehension. In regard to offensive operations, my opinion is, that, however strong we shall be in reference to the enemy, we should not extend ourselves farther than is absolutely necessary in order to facilitate the subsistence of the troops. I don’t approve of an extension from the Channel to the Alps; and I am convinced that it will be found not only fatal, but that the troops at such a distance on the left of our line will be entirely out of the line of the operations.

We are now, or shall be shortly, placed on the French frontier in the form of an echelon, of which the right, placed here, is the most advanced of the echelon, and the left, upon the Upper Rhine, is the most retired.

Paris is our object, and the greatest force and greatest military difficulties are opposed to the movements of the right, which is the most advanced part of our general line. Indeed, such force and difficulties are opposed to us in this part, that I should think that Blucher and I cannot move till the movements of others of the allied corps shall have relieved us from part of the enemy’s force opposed to us. Then, it must be observed that we cannot be relieved by movements through Luxembourg.

In my opinion, then, the movement of the Allies should begin with the left, which should cross the Rhine between Basle and Strasbourg. The centre collected upon the Sarre should cross the Meuse on the day the left should be expected to be at Langres. If these movements should not relieve the right, they should be continued; that is to say, the left should continue its movement on both banks of the Marne, while the centre should cross the Aisne; and the distance between the two bodies, and between each and Paris, should be shortened daily.

But this last hypothesis is not probable: the enemy would certainly move from this front upon the earliest alarm of the movements on the Upper Rhine; and the moment he did move, or that the operation should be practicable, Blücher’s corps and mine should move forward, and the former make the siege of Givet, the latter of Maubeuge; and the former likewise to aid the movement of the centre across the Meuse.

If the enemy should fall upon the centre, it should either retire upon Luxembourg or fight, according to the relative strength; and in either case Blücher should act upon the enemy’s communication upon the Aisne.

But the most probable result of these first movements would be the concentration of the enemy’s forces upon the Aisne; and accordingly we hear of the fortifications of Soissons and Laon, of an entrenched camp at Beauvais, etc. etc. We must, in this case, after the first operation, throw our whole left across the Marne, and strengthen it if necessary from the centre, and let it march upon Paris, between the Seine and the Marne, while the right and the centre should either attack the enemy’s position upon the Aisne, or endeavor to turn its left; or the whole should cooperate in one general attack upon the enemy’s position.

I come now to consider the strength required for these operations. The greatest strength the enemy is supposed to have is 200,000 effective men, besides national guards for his garrisons. Of this number it can hardly be believed that he can bring 150,000 to bear upon any one point.

Upon this statement let our proceedings be founded. Let us have 150,000 men upon the left, and 150,000 men upon the right; and all the rest, whatever they may be, in the centre; or after a sufficient centre is formed, let the remainder be in reserve for the right, left, or centre, as may be most convenient for their march and subsistence, and I will engage for the result, as they may be thrown where we please. Let us begin when we shall have 450,000 men. Before the Austrians upon the left shall be at Langres, the Russians will have passed the Rhine, and the whole Prussian army will be in line.

These are my general ideas … Mind, when I think of the siege of Givet and Maubeuge, I don’t mean by the whole of the two armies of the right, but to be carried on by detachments from them. The centre should seize Sedan, which is not strong or garrisoned, and observe Longwy, Thionville, and Metz. The left will have to observe Huningue and the fortresses in Alsace.

In regard to the force in Piedmont, I confess that I wish that the whole Austrian army in Italy was actively employed against Murat, with the exception of the garrisons. Murat must be destroyed early, or he will hang heavily upon us. If any force should be employed from Piedmont, its operations should be separate from those of the great confederacy. They cannot be connected without disconnecting those of what I have hitherto considered the left from the remainder of our great line, however they may be calculated to aid that left, particularly by being directed upon Chambery, or by keeping that post in check. Their basis is, however, different, and cannot easily be made otherwise.

These opinions are for yourself; God knows whether they can be acted upon, or whether the Allies will allow their forces to be divided as I suppose; and particularly whether the Prussians will act in two corps, one under Blucher here, and another from Luxembourg with the centre; or whether the other Allies will like to commence till the whole Russian army is en mesure. But I am convinced that what I have proposed is so clearly the plan of operations, that I don’t doubt it will be adopted, with but little variation.²²

Wellington refers here to Joachim Murat, Napoleon’s brother-in-law, who was the King of Naples. Napoleon knew that he could count on Murat’s support and before the Emperor had left Elba he had warned Murat to prepare for war, but not to take any action until Napoleon instructed him. The small and unreliable Neapolitan Army had little fighting value, but it could well play an important role in the coming conflict. Italy was in Austria’s sphere of influence and if Murat took to the field the Austrians would have no choice but to despatch an army to deal with the Neapolitans. Though Murat was certain to eventually be overwhelmed, he would be able to tie down the Austrians during the initial, and most important, stages of the coming war

Murat, always headstrong and unpredictable, did not follow Napoleon’s instructions. As soon as he heard that the Emperor had landed in France he declared war on the Allied Powers. As soon as his army was ready for operations he sent a detachment of some 10,000 to 12,000 men to take Rome whilst he personally led his main force of around 30,000 men up the Adriatic coast.

Taking the Austrians by surprise, Murat advanced northwards, and seized Bologna before uniting his whole force on an assault upon the powerful fortress-city of Mantua. Napoleon needed Murat to stay in the field as long as he was able in order to keep as many Austrian troops occupied as possible. Throwing his army against the strongest fortification in northern Italy was exactly the opposite of what Napoleon wanted.

Predictably, Murat failed to take Mantua and he had to fall back. On 2 May he met the Austrians at Bianchi. In a two-day battle the Neapolitans were defeated, losing approximately 4,000 men. Murat’s army broke up in disarray, with thousands of his soldiers deserting. Napoleon was furious at Murat’s stupidity and he refused to meet him or give him a command in the French Army. Napoleon had lost his only ally. He stood alone against the combined might of Europe.²³

The following note was sent on 16 May to Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Harding who had served with Wellington in the Peninsular War and who was given command of a brigade for the coming campaign:

I enclose a memorandum which I have drawn from intelligence I have recently received, from which the Marshal will see the strength and disposition of the French army; and that with the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 6th corps, and the Guard, and the 3d division of cavalry of reserve, we have a good lot of them in our front. I should think not less than 110,000 men.

I heard yesterday that Vandamme’s corps had moved to its left, and had brought its right upon Givet. There are a great number of troops about Maubeuge, Avesnes, &c.

I heard also that measures had been taken to move the Guard from Paris to Maubeuge in forty-eight hours; and that an aide de camp of the Emperor was there on the 12th. It is reported, also, that Soult has accepted the office of Major General, which is important, as it will induce many officers to serve Buonaparte; and I believe it to be true, as I see that Mortier is employed.²⁴

Wellington was surprisingly accurate with his assessment of the strength of Napoleon’s l’armée du Nord. Altogether, this amounted to 83,753 infantry, 20,959 cavalry and 11,412 artillery, engineers, and wagon-train personnel. Wellington mentions Marshal Mortier, duc de Trévise, who was given command of the newly-raised Young Guard.²⁵

Wellington may well have been well informed, but there was very little information being leaked to the newspapers, as the Haarlem Courant, of 20 May would seem to show:

The main body of the French force that was about Valenciennes has marched, according to a telegraphic dispatch, in three columns of 10,000 men each, towards the Maese, taking the direction of Givet. This movement, the object of which it is hard to conceive, has been executed with remarkable precipitation. The Prussian army on the Meuse has again been reinforced by a great many troops, particularly cavalry. Charleroi and the Sambre are covered with a powerful force. The English and Hanoverians continue to concentrate their army on the frontiers. The French have broken down all the bridges on the whole line from Donay to Gravelines.

Wellington was anxious that with Belgium having until the previous year been under French control, there would be very many French sympathizers across the country who would try to pass on intelligence concerning the nature and disposition of the Anglo-Dutch forces to Napoleon. With all the appearances being that Napoleon was preparing to take the offensive into Belgium, Wellington issued strict instructions concerning border security. Under the heading ‘The Adjutant-General to Major-General Dörnberg and Officers commanding at Ypres, Tournay, and Nieuport’, these were dated 20th May, 1815:

I am commanded by the Duke of Wellington to desire that you will take the most effectual means in your power to prevent all communications between this country and France on the line of the frontier, excepting under the following regulations: viz., That no person shall be permitted to pass from this country into France without a passport signed by the Field Marshal, or by Monsieur de Nagell, or Baron Capellan. Should any persons attempt to pass from France into this country, you will be pleased to cause them to be arrested and conveyed under escort to Brussels to be delivered over to the Mayor. You will, at the same time, have the goodness to report to me, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, the names and qualities of the persons arrested under this order.²⁶

Tension was quickly mounting, as the following commentary which was printed in The Times of 12 June 1815 indicates:

Every day may be expected to bring news of the actual commencement of hostilities. BUONAPARTE having at length put into action the machinery of the rebel government, has formally announced that he will soon put himself at the head of the army … The report which was prevalent on Saturday, of an attempt to assassinate BUONAPARTE by a sort of infernal machine, turns out to be a very accident which befell a Saxon chemist, who accidentally exploded some fulminating powder near the Chamber of Representatives.

Wellington, however, presented a calm facade, as the Reverend Spencer Madan, tutor to the children of the Lennox family (the Duke and Duchess of Richmond), disclosed in a letter dated just one day after the above featured edition of The Times:

Though I have some pretty good reasons for supposing that hostilities will soon commence, yet no one would suppose it, judging by the Duke of Wellington. He appears to be thinking of anything else in the world, gives a ball every week, attends every party, partakes of every amusement that offers. [Yesterday] he took Lady Jane Lennox [daughter of the Duke and Duchess of Richmond] to Enghein for the cricket match, and brought her back at night, apparently having gone for no other object but to amuse her. At the time Bonaparte was said to be at Maubeuge, thirty or forty miles off.²⁷

The Duke, of course, was fully aware that Napoleon might attack at any moment. That moment came just four weeks later and despite all the plans and preparations, he would be taken by surprise.

As late as 13 June, just two days before Napoleon launched his offensive, Wellington wrote to General Thomas Graham (later Lord Lynedoch):

There is nothing new here. We have reports of Bonaparte’s joining the army and attacking us; but I have accounts from Paris of the 10th, on which day he was still there; and I judge from his speech to the Legislature that his departure was not likely to be immediate. I think we are now too strong for him here.²⁸

The next few days would put Wellington’s confidence to the test.