5

Battle of Ligny

Throughout the morning of 16 June 1815, the Prussian I, II and III Corps had been taking up their positions above the small stream of Ligny. This was part of the Prussian Official Account of the Battle of Ligny written on behalf of Blücher by his Chief of Staff, General Gneisenau:

The Prussian army was posted on the heights between Brie and Sombref, and beyond the last place, and occupied with a large force the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, situated on its front. Meantime only three corps of the army had joined; the 4th, which was stationed between Liege and Hannut, had been delayed in its march by several circumstances, and was not yet come up. Nevertheless Field Marshal Blucher resolved to give battle, Lord Wellington having already put in motion, to support him, a strong division of his army, as well as his whole reserve, stationed in the environs of Brussels, and the fourth corps of the Prussian army being also on the point of arriving.¹

Wellington had indeed ridden over to discuss operations with Blücher and offer what support he could, as Colonel von Reiche, Ziethen’s Chief of Staff, recalled:

At one o’clock Blücher appeared on the hill by the mill of Bussy, and not long afterwards the Duke of Wellington rode up. He wore a simple blue overcoat without decorations, an ordinary three-cornered hat with three cockades side by side – one black and two red, the Spanish and Portuguese, with a red and white plume, fastened, as was then the English custom, between the two brims of the hat. Otherwise he was very quietly dressed. For this reason none of our troops recognised him for who or what he was; but as I knew him already … I was able to tell them, and every man standing near turned to look at the famous war hero.

After some discussion he was convinced that the enemy’s main force was directed against us and not against Quatre Bras; moreover there could no longer be any uncertainty about the direction of the enemy’s attack.

From the hill Wellington could overlook our positions in every direction, and he enquired what measures had been taken or were in hand. At this moment we noticed in the distance a part of the enemy, and Napoleon was clearly distinguishable in the group. Perhaps the eyes of the three greatest military commanders of the age were directed upon each other.

Having promised support and cooperation, Wellington left soon after half past one to his own army. The horse which he rode on this occasion attracted a good deal of attention. A small valise had been strapped to the back of the saddle, and according to one of his staff officers this contained a change of clothes; in addition, a portfolio and pen and ink had been fastened in place of the pistol holder – indications of the way in which English industry knows how to be compendious and practical.²

Gneisenau’s dispositions for the coming battle were given in brief in the instructions that were issued at 05.00 hours:

1st Brigade to occupy the village of St Amand, 3rd Brigade the village of Brye, 4th Brigade Ligny, and 2nd Brigade is to form up in reserve in the centre behind the windmill hill.

I Corps’ Reserve cavalry is to deploy behind the village of Ligny, leaving the left of it free for the Reserve Artillery to move into position. To cover this movement, the 12-pounders on the Tombe de Ligny are to remain there until it is completed, and should then depart.³

Gneisenau ordered that the two villages should be put in a state of defence, with barricades being formed. Those units not required for the actual defence of St Amand and Ligny were to form up in support behind. These positions were taken up by around 08.00 hours.

Wellington famously disagreed with the manner in which the Prussian army had been deployed, his words having been recorded by the Baron de Ros:

I told the Prussian officers, in the presence of Hardinge, that according to my judgement, the exposure of the advanced columns, and indeed, of the whole army to cannonade, standing as they did so displayed to the aim of the enemy’s fire, was not so prudent.

The marshy banks of the stream made it out of their power to cross and attack the French, while the latter on the other hand, though they could not attack them, had it in their power to cannonade them and shatter them to pieces, after which they might fall upon them by the bridges at the villages. I said that if I were in Blücher’s place with English troops, I should withdraw all the columns I saw scattered about in front, and get more of the troops under shelter of the rising ground. However, they seemed to think they knew best, so I came away very shortly⁴

The Prussian Official Account of the Battle of Ligny, having pointed out that the battle began at 15.00 hours, continues:

The enemy brought up above 150,000 men. The Prussian army was 80,000 strong. The village of St. Amand was the first point attacked by the enemy, who carried it after a vigorous resistance. He then directed his efforts against Ligny; it is a large village, solidly built, situated on a rivulet of the same name. It was there that a contest began which may be considered as one of the most obstinate recorded in history. – Villages have often been taken and retaken, but here the battle continued for five hours in the villages themselves, and the movements forwards or backwards were confined to a very narrow space.

On both sides fresh troops continually came up. Each army had behind the part of the village which it occupied great masses of infantry, which maintained the combat, and were continually renewed by the reinforcements which they received from their rear as well as from the heights on the right and left. About 200 cannon were directed from both sides against the village, which was on fire in several places at once. From time to time the combat extended along the whole line, the enemy having also directed troops against the third corps; however, the main combat was against Ligny.

Things seemed to take a favourable turn for the Prussian troops, a part of the village of St. Amand having been retaken from the French by a battalion commanded by the Field Marshal in person; in consequence of which advantage we had regained the height which had been abandoned, after the loss of St. Amand. Nevertheless the battle continued about Ligny with the same fury.⁵

Major General Baron Willem Benjamin van Panhuys, the Netherlands’ Military Commissioner attached to the Prussian headquarters, watched the battle unfold:

One by one great masses of infantry were directed upon Fleurus … and strong columns of infantry deployed in front of the road from Fleurus parallel with the Ligne stream, which separated the two armies. After being in possession of Fleurus towards two o’clock, he attacked the village of St Amand which was twice taken and retaken, and from that moment until the evening a continuous fire was maintained. The village of Ligny, on which so much seemed to depend the fate of the battle, was taken and retaken three times during a most stubborn contest, during which it was set alight.⁶

Général de Brigade Charles Angélique François Huchet comte de La Bédoyère was one of Napoleon’s aides-de-camp:

At three o’clock the 3d corps reached St. Amand, and carried the same, when the Prussians, rallied by Blucher, retook the village. The French, entrenched in the churchyard, defended themselves with obstinacy; but, overpowered by numbers, were about to give way, when General Drouot, who once more decided the fate of battle, galloped up with four batteries of the guard, took the enemy in rear, and arrested his progress.

At the same moment Grouchy was combating successfully at Sombref, while Gerard made an impetuous attack upon the village of Ligny. Its embattled walls, and a long ravine, rendered the approaches no less difficult than dangerous; but those obstacles did not intimidate General Lefol, and the men under his command, who advanced with the bayonet, and in a few minutes the Prussians, repulsed and partly annihilated, quitted the ground. Blucher, conscious that the possession of Ligny must render the French masters of the field, returned to the charge with a body of chosen troops; and there, to use his own words, ‘commenced a battle, that may be considered as having been one of the most obstinate recorded in history.’

For five hours, two hundred pieces of ordnance deluged the field with slaughter, blood, and death, during which period the French and Prussians, alternately vanquished and victors, disputed that ensanguined post hand to hand and foot to foot, so that no less than seven times in succession Ligny was taken and lost.⁷

Captain von Reuter commanded a battery of Prussian artillery supporting Ziethen’s Corps and was positioned near the Bussy Windmill during the battle:

I suppose it was between two and three o’clock in the afternoon when I received an order to take four guns of my battery and accompany the 4th Regiment in its advance towards St. Amand, while the howitzers and the two remaining guns took up a position opposite Ligny, so as to be able to shell the open ground beyond the village, and the village itself, too, in the event of our not being able to hold it. I halted my guns about six hundred paces from St. Amand, and opened fire on the enemy’s artillery in position on the high ground opposite, which at once began to reply with a well-sustained fire of shells, and inflicted heavy losses on us.

Meanwhile the 14th Regiment, without ever thinking of leaving an escort behind for us, pressed gallantly forward to St. Amand, and succeeded in gaining possession of that part of the village. I myself was under the impression that they had been able to occupy the whole of it. The battery had been thus engaged for some hours in its combat with the hostile guns, and were awaiting the order to follow up the movement of the 14th Regiment, when suddenly I became aware of two strong lines of skirmishers which were apparently falling back on us from the village of St. Amand. Imagining that the skirmishers in front of us were our own countrymen, I hastened up the battery and warned my layers not to direct their aim upon them, but to continue to engage the guns opposite. In the meantime the skirmishers in question had got within three hundred paces of the battery.

I had just returned to the right flank of my command, when our surgeon, Zinkernagel, called my attention to the red tufts on the shakos of the sharpshooters. I at once bellowed out the order, ‘With grape on the skirmishers!’ At the same moment both their lines turned upon us, gave us a volley, and then flung themselves on the ground. By this volley, and the bursting of a shell or two, every horse, except one wheeler, belonging to the gun on my left flank, was either killed or wounded. I ordered the horse to be taken out of one of my ammunition wagons, which had been emptied, and thus intended to make my gun fit to move again, while I meanwhile kept up a slow fire of grape, that had the effect of keeping the marksmen in my front glued to the ground.

But in another moment, all of a sudden, I saw my left flank taken in rear, from the direction of the Ligny brook, by a French staff officer and about fifty horsemen. As these rushed upon us the officer shouted to me in German, ‘Surrender, gunners, for you are all prisoners!’ With these words he charged down with his men on the flank gun on my left, and dealt a vicious cut at my wheel driver … who dodged it, however, by flinging himself over on his dead horse. The blow was delivered with such good will that the sabre cut deep into the saddle, and stuck there fast. Gunner Sieberg, however, availing himself of the chance the momentary delay afforded, snatched up the handspike of one of the 12-pounders, and with the words, ‘I’ll soon show him how to take prisoners!’ dealt the officer such a blow on his bearskin that he rolled with a broken skull from the back of his grey charger, which galloped away into the line of skirmishers in our front.

The fifty horsemen, unable to control their horses which bounded after their companion, followed his lead in a moment, rode over the prostrate marksmen, and carried the utmost confusion into the enemy’s ranks. I seized the opportunity to limber up all of my guns except the unfortunate one on my left, and to retire on two of our cavalry regiments, which I saw drawn up about two hundred paces to my rear. It was only when I had thus fallen back that the enemy’s skirmishers ventured to approach my remaining gun. I could see from a distance how bravely its detachment defended themselves and it with handspikes and their side-arms, and some of them in the end succeeded in regaining the battery. The moment I got near our cavalry I rode up to them and entreated them to endeavour to recapture my gun again from the enemy, but they refused to comply with my request. I, therefore, returned sorrowfully to my battery, which had retired meanwhile behind the hill with the windmill on it near Ligny.

We there replenished our ammunition wagons and limber boxes, and set to rights our guns, and the battery again advanced to come into action on the height. We had, however, hardly reached the crest of the hill when the enemy issued from the village of Ligny in overpowering numbers, and compelled all our troops which were there with us to fall back. The movement was carried with complete steadiness and regularity. It was now about eight o’clock p.m., and the growing darkness was increased by the heavy storm clouds which began to settle all round us.

My battery, in order to avoid capture, had, of course, to conform to this general movement. I now noticed that there was an excellent artillery position about 1,500 paces behind the village of Brye, close to where the Roman road intersects the road to Quatre Bras … I made for this point with all haste, so that I might there place my guns and cover with their fire the retreat of my comrades of the other arms.

A hollow road leading to Sombreffe delayed my progress some minutes. At length I got over this obstacle and attained my goal; but just as I was going to give the word, ‘Action rear.’ Von Pirch’s infantry brigade began to debouch from Brye. The general saw in an instant what he took for a selfish and cowardly movement on my part, dashed his spurs into his horse, and galloped up to me nearly beside himself with passion, and shouting out, ‘My God! Everything is going to the Devil!’ ‘Truly, sir,’ I said, ‘matters are not looking very rosy, but the 12-pounder battery No.6, has simply come here to get into a position from whence it thinks it may be able to check the enemy’s advance.’ ‘That then is very brave conduct on your part,’ answered the general, at once mollified; ‘cling to the position at all hazards, it is of the greatest importance. I will collect a few troops to form an escort to your guns.’

While this short, but animated discussion had been going on his brigade had come up close to where we were. He formed it up to cover us, and sent everyone who was mounted to collect all retreating troops in the neighbourhood for the same purpose, while, as they came up, he called to them, ‘Soldiers, there stand your guns; are you not Prussians!’

During the time that a sort of rearguard was thus formed, the battery had opened fire on the enemy’s cavalry, which was coming up rather cautiously, and had forced them to fall back again. Later on, a 6-pounder field battery and half a horse artillery battery came up and joined us. The fight then became stationary, and as the darkness came on, fighting gradually ceased on both sides.⁸

The French Official account of the ‘Battle of Ligny-under-Fleurus’, the name that they gave to the Battle of Ligny, was published in Paris on 21 June 1815:

On the morning of the 16th the army occupied the following position: – The left wing, commanded by the Marshal Duke of Elchingen, and consisting of the 1st and 2d corps of infantry, and the 2d of cavalry, occupied the positions of Frasnes.

The left wing, commanded by Marshal Grouchy, and composed of the 2d and 4th corps of infantry, and the 3d corps of cavalry, occupied the heights in rear of Fleurus.

The Emperor’s head-quarters were at Charleroi, where were the Imperial Guard and the 6th corps. The left wing had orders to march upon Quatre Bras, and the right upon Sombref. The Emperor advanced to Fleurus with his reserve.

The columns of Marshal Grouchy being in march, perceived, after having passed Fleurus, the enemy’s army, commanded by Field Marshal Blucher, occupying with its left the heights of the mill of Bussy, the village of Sombref, and extending its cavalry a great way forward on the road to Naimur; its right was at St. Amand, and occupied that large village in great force, having before it a ravine which formed its position.

The Emperor reconnoitred the strength and the position of the enemy, and resolved to attack immediately. It became necessary to change front, the right in advance, and pivoting upon Fleurus. General Vandamme marched upon St. Amand, General Girard upon Ligny, and Marshal Grouchy upon Sombref. The 4th division of the 2d corps, commanded by General Girard, marched in reserve behind the corps of General Vandamme. The guard was drawn up on the heights of Fleurus, as well as the cuirassiers of General Milhaud.

At three in the afternoon, these dispositions were finished. The division of General Lefol, forming part of the corps of General Vandamme, was first engaged, and made itself master of St. Amand, whence it drove out the enemy at the point of the bayonet. It kept its ground during the whole of the engagement, at the burial-ground and steeple of St. Amand: but that village, which is very extensive, was the theatre of various combats during the evening; the whole corps of Gen. Vaudamme was there engaged, and the enemy there fought in considerable force.

General Girard, placed as a reserve to the corps of General Vandamme, turned the village by its right, and fought there with his accustomed valour. The respective forces were supported on both sides by about 50 pieces of cannon each.

On the right, General Girard came into action with the 4th corps, at the village of Ligny, which was taken and retaken several times.

Marshal Grouchy, on the extreme right, and General Pajol fought at the village of Sombref. The enemy showed from 80 to 90,000 men, and a great number of cannon.

At seven o’clock we were masters of all the villages situated on the bank of the ravine, which covered the enemy’s position; but he still occupied, with all his masses, the heights of the mill of Bussy.⁹

As mentioned in the account of the Battle of Quatre Bras, Napoleon requested the help of d’Erlon’s I Corps to strike the right flank of the Prussian positions, which would have turned the Prussian defeat into a disaster. This is the first of these instructions that Soult sent to Ney from Fleurus at 14.00 hours, before the fighting had begun:

Monsieur le Maréchal. The Emperor entrusts me with warning you that the enemy has gathered a corps of troops between Sombreffe and Brye and that at 2.30 p.m., Maréchal de Grouchy will attack them with III and IV Corps. His Majesty’s intention is that you should also attack what is before you and that, after you have vigorously pushed the enemy, you should fall back on us to concur in the envelopment of the corps which I have just mentioned. If this corps is burst through before that, then His Majesty will have a manoeuvre made in your direction to hasten your operations also. Instruct the Emperor immediately of your dispositions and of what goes on in your front.¹⁰

In simpler terms, the message was stating that if Napoleon is successful he will send Ney help and if Ney is successful he should send troops to help the Emperor. Just two and a half hours later Napoleon changed his mind. This order was sent by Soult at 16.30 hours from Ligny:

Monsieur le Maréchal, I wrote to you an hour ago [sic] that the Emperor would have the enemy attacked at 2 p.m. in the position he had taken between St Amand and Brye. At this moment, the engagement is very pronounced. His Majesty entrusts me with telling you that you must manoeuvre instantly in order to envelop the enemy’s right and fall with might and main on his rear. This army is lost if you act vigorously.

The fate of France is in your hands. So do not hesitate for an instant and do operate the movement which the Emperor orders you to make on the heights of Brye and St Amand in order to concur in what will perhaps be decisive victory. The enemy is caught red-handed at the moment when he seeks to re-unite with the English.¹¹

Exactly what happened next still remains something of a mystery. All that is known for certain is that an officer from Soult’s or Napoleon’s staff, usually stated to be General La Bédoyère, rode over to the closest of Ney’s formations to Ligny. This was d’Erlon’s Corps which, by 16.00 hours, was moving up to Quatre Bras and had reached Gosselies.

D’Erlon rode ahead to tell Ney that he would soon be arriving at the battlefield. During his absence the staff officer from Ligny came across I Corps and with, supposedly, a note written in pencil that he claimed was from Napoleon, persuaded d’Erlon’s divisional commanders to turn round and march towards Ligny. When d’Erlon rode back to his corps he found it already in motion eastwards. This note has never been found but it supposedly was as follows, timed at 15.45 hours, though the timing of the message is somewhat suspect.

In front of Fleurus, Monsieur the Count d’Erlon. The enemy lowers his head into the trap that I intended for him. Bring at once your four divisions of infantry, your division of cavalry, all your artillery, and two divisions of heavy cavalry which I place at your disposal, carry you, say I, with all these forces the height of Saint-Amand and melt on Ligny. Mister the Count d’Erlon, you will save France and will cover yourself with glory. Napoleon.¹²

So off marched I Corps, coming within sight of the battlefield at Ligny just after 17.00 hours. Ney, however, learnt of d’Erlon’s march to Ligny from d’Erlon’s chief of staff. He was mad with rage at this movement which he had not been informed of and he sent Delcambre (or d’Elcambre) off with orders for d’Erlon to return immediately to Quatre Bras. D’Erlon wrote the following explanation of the affair in a letter to Marshal Ney’s son:

Towards 11.00 a.m. or midday, Marshal Ney sent me the order to place my army corps under arms and to direct it towards Frasnes and Quatre Bras, where I would receive further orders. Therefore my army corps began to move immediately. After ordering the general in command of the head of the column to make haste, I went on ahead to see what was happening at Quatre Bras, where it seemed to me that General Reille’s corps was engaged

Beyond Frasnes, I stopped with some generals of the Guard, where I was joined by General La Bédoyère, who showed me a pencilled note that he was bearing to Marshal Ney and which enjoined the marshal to direct my army corps on Ligny. General La Bédoyère informed me that he had already given the order for this movement by changing the direction of my column, and he indicated to me where I could rejoin it. I immediately took this road and sent my Chief of Staff, General [de Brigade Victor-Joseph] Delcambre, to the Marshal [Ney] to inform him of my new destination.

Marshal Ney sent him back to me ordering me imperatively to return to Quatre Bras, where he was heavily engaged and counted on the cooperation of my army corps. Hence I had to imagine the situation was desperate, since the marshal had taken on it himself to recall me, although he had received the note about which I have spoken above. In consequence, I ordered the column to make a return march. But in spite of all the haste that could be put into this march, my column could not appear to the rear of Quatre Bras until nightfall.

Did General La Bédoyère have the authority to change the direction of my column before having seen the marshal? I do not think so. But in any case, this circumstance alone caused all the marches and counter-marches that paralysed my corps on the 16th June.¹³

I Corps consequently spent the entire day marching forwards and backwards without being able to influence the outcome of either of the battles being fought. D’Erlon’s intervention at Ligny or Quatre Bras might well have changed the course of the entire campaign.

Such confusion need not have arisen if Napoleon had deployed his forces differently, according to General Joseph, vicomte de Rogniat, the chief engineer (commandant du génie) of l’armée du Nord:

We arrived upon their right flank; reason counceled us to attack this wing; in this way we should have avoided in part the defiles of the brook [the Ligny stream]; we should have approached our own left wing, which was fighting at Quatre Bras, so that both armies could have helped each other, and finally we should have thrown the Prussians far from the English, in forcing them to retire on Namur.

Napoleon later explained in writing the reasons behind his decision not to adopt this seemingly wise course of action:

The question in this battle was not that of separating the English from the Prussians; we knew that the English could not be ready to act till the next day; but here the point was to hinder that part of the IIId Corps of Blücher which had not joined him by 11. A.M., and which came by way of Namur, and also the IVth Corps, which came from Liége by way of Gembloux, from uniting [with the I and II Corps] on the field of battle. In cutting the enemy’s line at Ligny, his whole right wing at St. Amand was turned and compromised; while by simply becoming masters of St Amand, we should have accomplished nothing.¹⁴

The result of Napoleon’s decision was a direct assault upon Ligny, where the fighting was particularly brutal, as Richard Wellmann of the Prussian 29th Regiment experienced:

In the streets of the village, we fought with clubbed muskets and bayonets. As if overcome by personal hatred, man battled against man. It seemed as if every individual had met his deadliest enemy and rejoiced at the long-awaited opportunity to give expression to this. Pardon was neither asked nor given; the French plunged their bayonets in the chests of those already falling from their wounds; the Prussians swore loudly at their enemies and killed everyone that fell into their hands.¹⁵

Captain Fritz of the 4th Westphalian Infantry Regiment of Landwehr described the condition the troops were in after a day’s heavy fighting:

The light of the long June day was beginning to fail when our very depleted infantry brigade was sent back into reserve … The men looked terribly worn out after the fighting. In the great heat, gunpowder smoke, sweat and mud had mixed into a crust of dirt, so that their faces looked almost like those of mulattos, and one could hardly distinguish the green collars and facings on their tunics.

Everybody had discarded his stocks; grubby shirts or hairy brown chests stuck out from their open tunics; and many who had been unwilling to leave the ranks on account of a slight wound wore a bandage they had put on themselves. In a number of cases blood was soaking through.

As a result of fighting in the villages for hours on end, and of frequently crawling through hedges, the men’s tunics and trousers had got torn, so that they hung in rags and their bare skin showed through.¹⁶

The French Official account of the ‘Battle of Ligny-under-Fleurus’ continues its description of the events in this manner:

The Emperor returned with his Guard to the village of Ligny; General Girard directed General Pecheux to debouch with what remained of the reserve, almost all the troops having been engaged in that village. Eight battalions of the Guard debouched with fixed bayonets, and behind them, four squadrons of the guards, the cuirassiers of General Delort, those of General Milhaud, and the grenadiers of the horse guards.

The Old Guard attacked with the bayonet the enemy’s columns, which were on the heights of Bussy, and in an instant covered the field of battle with dead. The squadron of the guard attacked and broke a square, and the cuirassiers repulsed the enemy in all directions. At half past nine o’clock we had forty pieces of cannon, several carriages, colours, and prisoners, and the enemy sought safety in a precipitate retreat. At ten o’clock the battle was finished, and we found ourselves masters of the field of battle.¹⁷

Gneisenau’s official account of the events of the day, predictably, painted a slightly different picture, but accepted that the battle had indeed been lost:

The issue seemed to depend on the arrival of the English troops, or on that of the 4th corps of the Prussian army; in fact, the arrival of this last division would have afforded the Field Marshal the means of making immediately with the right wing an attack, from which great success might be expected. But news arrived that the English division destined to support us was violently attacked by a corps of the French army, and that it was with great difficulty it had maintained itself in its position. – At Quatre Bras, the 4th corps of the army did not appear, so that we were forced to maintain alone the contest with an enemy greatly superior in numbers. – The evening was already much advanced, and the combat about Ligny continued with the same fury and the same equality of success. We invoked, but in vain, the arrival of those succours which were so necessary.

The danger became every hour more and more urgent, all the divisions were engaged or had already been so, and there was not any corps at hand able to support them. Suddenly a division of the enemy’s infantry, which, by favour of the night, had made a circuit round the village without being observed, at the same time that some regiments of cuirassiers had forced the passage on the other side, took in the rear the main body of our army, which was posted behind the houses. This surprize on the part of the enemy was decisive, especially at the moment when our cavalry, also posted on a height behind the village, was repulsed by the enemy’s cavalry in repeated attacks. Our infantry posted behind Ligny, though forced to retreat, did not suffer itself to be discouraged, either by being surprized by the enemy in the darkness, a circumstance which exaggerates in the mind of man the dangers to which he finds himself exposed, or by the idea of seeing itself surrounded on all sides.

Formed in masses, it coolly repulsed all the attacks of the cavalry, and retreated in good order upon the heights, whence it continued its retrograde movement upon Tilly. In consequence of the sudden irruption of the enemy’s cavalry, several of our cannons, in their precipitate retreat, had taken directions which led them to defiles in which they necessarily fell into disorder; in this manner 15 pieces fell into the hands of the enemy.

At the distance of a quarter of a league from the field of battle, the army formed again. The enemy did not venture to pursue it. The village of Brie remained in our possession during the night, as well as Sombref, where General Thielmann had fought with the 3d corps, and where he at day-break slowly began to retreat towards Gembloux, where the 4th corps, under General Bulow, had at length arrived during the night. The 1st and 2d corps proceeded in the morning behind the defile of Mount St. Guibert. Our losses in killed and wounded was great, the enemy, however, took from us no prisoners, except a part of our wounded.

The battle was lost, but not our honour. Our soldiers had fought with a bravery which equalled every expectation; their fortitude remained unshaken, because everyone retained his confidence in his own strength. On this day Field Marshal Blucher had encountered the greatest dangers. A charge of cavalry, led on by himself, had failed, while that of the enemy was vigorously pursuing. A musket-shot struck the Field Marshal’s horse; the animal, far from being stopped in his career by this wound, began to gallop more furiously till it dropped down dead.

The Field Marshal, stunned by the violent fall, lay entangled under the horse. The enemy’s cuirassiers following up their advantage, advanced; our last horseman had already passed the Field Marshal; an Adjutant alone remained with him, and had just alighted, resolved to share his fate. The danger was great, but Heaven watched over us. – The enemy pursuing their charge passed rapidly by the Field Marshal without seeing him; the next moment, a second charge of our cavalry having repelled them, they again passed by him with the same precipitation, not perceiving him any more than they had done the first time. Then, but not without difficulty, the Field Marshal was disengaged from under the dead horse, and he immediately mounted a dragoon horse.¹⁸

The Battle of Ligny was a victory for the French but it was destined to be Napoleon’s last triumph. For now, though, the French could celebrate their success, as indicated by the following letter which was written from the French camp at Fleurus on 17 June:

The French armies have again immortalized themselves on the plains of Fleurus. We entered Belgium on the 15th. The Enemy was thrown in a first affair upon every point where he attempted to resist as.

Before Charleroi, several of his squares were broken and taken by some squadrons only: one thousand seven hundred prisoners only could be saved out of five or six thousand men, who composed those squares. Yesterday (the 16th) we encountered the whole of the Enemy’s army, in its position near Fleurus; its right, composed of English, under the command of Wellington, was in front of Meller, its centre at St. Amand, and its left at Sombref, a formidable position, covered by the little river Ligny.

The Enemy occupied also the little village of Ligny, in front of this river. Our army debouched in the plain, it’s left under Marshal Ney, by Gosselies, the centre where the Emperor was, by Fleurus, and the right under General Girard, upon Sombref. The actions began at two o’clock upon the left and centre. Both sides fought with inconceivable fury. The villages of St. Amand and Ligny were taken and re-taken four times. Our soldiers have all covered themselves with glory. At eight o’clock the Emperor, with his whole guard, had Ligny attacked and carried. Our brave fellows advanced at the first discharge upon the principal position of the Enemy. His army was forced in the centre, and obliged to retreat in the greatest disorder; Blücher, with the Prussians, upon Namur, and Wellington upon Brussels.

Several pieces of cannon were taken by the Guard, who bore down all before them. All marched with cries a thousand times repeated of ‘Vive l’Empereur!’ These were also the last words of the brave men who fell. Never was such enthusiasm; a British division of five or six thousand Scottish was cut to pieces; we have not seen any of them prisoners. The Noble Lord must be confounded. There were upon the field of battle eight enemies to one Frenchman. Their loss is said to be fifty thousand men. The cannonade was like that at the battle of Moskowa.¹⁹

Understandably, the author of the official French report on the actions of the 16th adopted an equally triumphant tone:

General Lutzow, a partisan, was taken prisoner. The prisoners assure us, that Field Marshal Blucher was wounded. The flower of the Prussian army was destroyed in this battle. Its loss could not be less than 15,000 men. Our’s was 3,000 killed and wounded.

On the left, Marshal Ney had marched on Quatre Bras with a division, which cut to pieces an English division which was stationed there: but being attacked by the Prince of Orange with 25,000 men, partly English, partly Hanoverians in the pay of England, he retired upon his position at Frasnes. There a multiplicity of combats took place; the enemy obstinately endeavoured to force it, but in vain.

The Duke of Elchingen waited for the first corps, which did not arrive till night; he confined himself to maintaining his position. In a square attacked by the 8th regiment of cuirassiers, the colours of the 69th regiment of English infantry fell into our hands. The Duke of Brunswick was killed. The Prince of Orange has been wounded. We are assured that the enemy had many personages and Generals of note killed or wounded; we estimate the loss of the English at from 4 to 5,000 men; ours on this side was very considerable; it amounts to 4,200 killed or wounded. The combat ended with the approach of night. Lord Wellington then evacuated Quatre Bras, and proceeded to Genappes.²⁰

News of the French success was relayed to Paris and then at 04.00 hours on the morning of the 17th was transmitted on from the French capital to Lille and then Boulogne:

On the 15th the French army forced the Sambre and entered Charleroi, made 1500 prisoners, took 6 pieces of cannon, and destroyed four Prussian regiments. We have lost very few men.

On the 16th, his Majesty the Emperor gained a complete victory over the English and Prussians united, commanded by Lord Wellington and Prince Blucher.

The Prussians were indeed heavily defeated, and were forced to retreat in some disorder. Everything now depended on the direction of their withdrawal and how quickly Blücher and Gneisenau could regain control of the badly scarred divisions.

Unfortunately, Blücher had been injured and was no longer in contact with his headquarters. How this occurred was related by Major General Baron Willem Benjamin van Panhuys, the Netherlands Military Commissioner attached to Prussian headquarters:

At half past eight the enemy passed the Ligny stream with several columns of cavalry, totalling some 6,000 Cuirassiers. The Feldmarschall acknowledged that he had not half this number of cavalry to oppose the enemy and those at his disposal were for the most part light cavalry, and so the two parties were unevenly matched.

With his usual bravery, he placed himself at the head of one of the squadrons and drove into the enemy, but was taken in the flank by another column; at this moment he fell beneath his horse which had been killed. The enemy passed and re-passed without noticing his person and he returned miraculously from the affair.²¹

Having achieved his strategic aim of separating the two Allied armies with his victory at Ligny, Napoleon then needed to keep Wellington and Blücher apart. This task was handed to Marshal Grouchy, who was given the following instructions:

My Cousin, I send to you Labédoyère, my aide-de-camp, to carry you the present letter. The major general has to make known to you my intentions; but, as his officers [have] bad mounts, my aide-de-camp will perhaps arrive first.

My intention is that, as commander of the right wing, you take the command of the 3rd corps which is commanded by general Vandamme, the 4th corps which is commanded by General Gerard, the cavalry corps of generals Pajol, Milhaud and Exelmans; that should not make far from 50,000 men. Rendezvous with this right wing at Sombreffe, Make leave consequently, and pursue the corps of Generals Pajol, Milhaud, Exelmans and Vandamme, and, without stopping, continue your movement on Sombreffe. The 4th corps, which is in Chatelet, receives the order directly to go to Sombreffe without passing by Fleurus. This observation is important, because I am posting my headquarters in Fleurus and the [traffic] congestion should be avoided. Send an officer to General Gerard at once to make known to him your movement, and that he executes his own at once.

My intention is that all the Generals take your orders directly; they will take mine only when I am present. I will be in Fleurus between ten and eleven o’clock; I will go to Sombreffe, leaving my Guard, infantry and cavalry in Fleurus; I will lead it to Sombreffe only in case it is necessary. If the enemy is in Sombreffe, I want to attack them; I even want to attack them in Gembloux and to also seize this position, my intention is after having seen these two positions, to leave to night, and to operate with my left wing, commanded by Marshal Ney, towards the English. Do not lose a moment, because the more quickly I make my decision, the better that will apply to the continuation of my operations. I suppose that you are in Fleurus. Communicate constantly with General Gerard, so that he can help you to attack Sombreffe, if it is necessary.

Girard’s division is in range of Fleurus; do not dispose of them unless absolutely necessary, because they must march all during the night, also leave my Young Guard and all its artillery at Fleurus.

The count of Valmy, with his two divisions of cuirassiers, will go on the road to Brussels; he is to link up with Marshal Ney, to contribute to this evening’s operation on the left wing.

As I said to you, I will be at Fleurus at ten to eleven o’clock, Send me reports on all that you learn. Take care that the road to Fleurus is free. All the data which I have found [says] that the Prussians cannot oppose us with more than 40,000 men.²²

Everything, it seemed was going almost exactly as Napoleon had planned, despite Ney’s disappointing result at Quatre Bras. The Emperor could now concentrate on defeating Wellington whilst Grouchy pursued the Prussians relentlessly to prevent them from rallying.