7
The Battle of Waterloo: Morning
By 18.00 hours on the 17th, Wellington’s wet and muddy force had reached the place that the Duke had ear-marked earlier – the ridge of Mont St Jean to the south of the village of Waterloo. The position was well described by Lieutenant Colonel (later Field Marshal) John Burgoyne of the Royal Engineers:
It was not that commanding kind of position that is sometimes found, and which strikes the eye at once; on the contrary, the ridge occupied by our army is lower than the heights a mile of two in front, from whence the French army advanced. But it still had many of the essentials of a good fighting position. The flanks were on commanding points, that discovered the ground well all round them, at a fair distance from the main road by which the enemy approached and would have required him to make a considerable detour across country to have turned them … the whole being about a mile and a half or two miles in extent; it, therefore, was very compact.
In front of the left the ground was well discovered, and with no very favourable points for the enemy’s artillery. A road ran along the line in this part with thin hedges along it and a very slight bank, affording some little cover to the infantry if they laid down. This road continued along the centre and right of the position, out of sight of the enemy in those parts, but not affording any cover. The ground in front of the centre and right was more broken … The whole line was on a ridge, which rounding back to the rear, covered the troops from the sight and from the direct fire of the enemy.1
Another description of the battlefield was given by Captain George Ulric Barlow of the 2nd Battalion, 69th Foot in a letter to his father on 7 July 1815:
The position of Waterloo upon which the destinies of Europe was about to be fought, was nothing more than a range of moderate rising ground, touching upon the pavé leading from Nivelles to Brussels & extending on the left to the high road from Genappe & conducting to the same metropolis. Here two routes formed the summit of an angle, meeting near Braine l’Alleud, to which the position of the British army served as the base, or third side, its flanks leaning upon & thus covering either approach.
It was fine commanding open fighting ground, but traversable in all directions by cavalry and cannon. The French artillery lined the whole summit of these heights. The army was drawn up in order of battle behind them a little way down the reverse of the slope so as to be perfectly concealed from the enemy who could by no means get sight of its force or dispositions and according to his own, confirm he was kept in perfect ignorance of its intentions.2
We are led to believe that Wellington had earlier reconnoitred the area and, having seen the Mont St Jean position, he allegedly claimed ‘I have kept it in my pocket’ just in case Napoleon attempted to seize Brussels from the south-east.
Much is made of Wellington’s choice of ground at Waterloo. The position of his troops along and in the rear of the Mont St Jean is considered to have been one of the principal reasons for his success on 18 June. However, it would appear that Wellington originally had in mind the ridge to the south of Mont St Jean, where the inn of La Belle Alliance stood. The Duke had sent his Quartermaster-General, Sir William De Lancey, ahead of the retreating army early on the 17th with instructions to mark out the ground for the approaching troops to take up. Wellington arrived in the area later in the afternoon, as FitzRoy Somerset, the Duke’s aide, explained:
On arriving near La Belle Alliance he [the Duke] thought it was the position the Qr.M. Genl. would have taken up, being the most commanding ground, but he [De Lancey] had found it too extended to be occupied by our Troops, & so had proceeded further on & marked out a position.3
Wellington himself described the position of the Anglo-Netherlands army in his official despatch to Earl Bathurst:
The position which I took up in front of Waterloo crossed the high roads from Charleroi and Nivelles, and had its right thrown back to a ravine near Merke Braine, which was occupied, and its left extended to a height above the hamlet Ter la Haye, which was likewise occupied. In front of the right centre, and near the Nivelles road, we occupied the house and gardens of Hougoumont, which covered the return of that flank; and in front of the left centre we occupied the farm of La Haye Sainte. By our left we communicated with Marshal Prince Blücher at Wavre, through Ohain; and the Marshal had promised me that, in case we should be attacked, he would support me with one or more corps, as might be necessary.4
Another soldier who was present on the field of Waterloo described the position of the French, ‘which was also a ridge’, as being,
immediately opposite to that we occupied, and differing in distances at different parts, but generally, I should say, about 1000 or 1200 yards distant, perhaps a little more. The ground was stronger than that we held, the ascent to it being longer than to ours. The head-quarters of Bonaparte, on the night of the 17th, were at Planchenoit, a farm some little distance in the rear of the French line;- and Mont St. Jean was in the high road, immediately in the line of their advance.5
The weather, as much as Ney’s reluctance to attack Quatre Bras, considerably helped the successful withdrawal to Waterloo, as Général La Bédoyère recalled:
The night of the 17th was dreadful, and seemed to presage the calamities of the day, as the violent and incessant rains did not allow a moment’s rest to the army. The bad state of the roads also prevented the arrival of provisions, and most of the soldiers were without food.6
The ferocity of the weather may have helped Wellington but his men suffered just as severely as the French. The following was written by an unnamed officer from the camp at Clichy to his friend in Cumberland:
The whole of the 17th, and indeed until late the next morning, the weather continued dreadful; and we were starving with hunger, no provision having been served out since the march from Brussels. While five officers who composed our mess were looking at each other with the most deplorable faces imaginable, one of the men brought us a fowl he had plundered, and a handful of biscuits, which, though but little, added to some tea we boiled in a camp- kettle, made us rather more comfortable; and we huddled up together, covered ourselves with straw, and were soon as soundly asleep as though reposing on beds of down. I awoke long before daylight, and found myself in a very bad state altogether, being completely wet through in addition to all other ills. Fortunately I soon after this found my way to a shed, of which Sir And. Barnard (our commandant) had taken possession, where there was a fire, and in which with three or four others I remained until the rain abated. About ten o’clock the sun made his appearance, to view the mighty struggle which was to determine the fate of Europe; and about an hour afterwards the French made their dispositions for the attack, which commenced on the right.7
The troops had bivouacked overnight close to the positions they were to take up during the battle, though at daybreak there was some re-adjustment as the regiments moved to their assigned places in the line. Following the wet night was a cold morning, as one Highlander recalled:
I never felt colder in my life; everyone of us was shaking like an aspen leaf. An allowance of gin was then served out to each of us which had the effect of infusing warmth into our almost inanimate frames … We remained on the ground till about six o’clock, when we were ordered to clean ourselves, dry our muskets, try to get forward, and commence cooking.8
Another wrote that at dawn,
in the fields of rye along the southern edge of the forest of Soignes, you could hear a murmur like the sea on a distant shore. This was the blended voices of 67,000 men, grumbling, yawning, shivering, stretching cramped limbs, joking as people do when they share discomfort, and arguing about what would happen next.9
During the Revolutionary Wars, the territory that is today known as Belgium was overrun by the French and absorbed into the French Republic. The Netherlands was, at that time, the ‘United Provinces’, a republic with a prince bearing the title of Stadtholder. When this was also taken over by the French, the Stadtholder, William V of Orange, fled to Britain. The Netherlands was at first called the Batavian Republic under French domination, but, in 1806 this was changed by Napoleon into the Kingdom of Holland, with his brother Louis Bonaparte on the throne. Louis tried to act independently of Napoleon, the result of which was he was forced to abdicate and the territory was incorporated into France. The soldiers of these states fought with the French Army for a number of years and their loyalty to the recently created Kingdom of the United Netherlands was, before the Waterloo campaign, considered questionable – a point raised by Wellington shortly after arriving at Brussels:
They are completely officered by officers who have been in French service … It is very well to employ them, but I would not trust one of them out of my sight.10
Wellington had therefore decided to integrate the Dutch and Belgian divisions with the British divisions throughout his defensive line. He also arranged many battalions to be formed into what has been described as ‘oblongs’. The reason for these oblong formations was explained by Captain James Shaw Kennedy on Wellington’s Quartermaster-General staff:
The French cavalry had, on the 16th, proved itself very formidable at Quatre Bras in its attack … That cavalry, in immensely augmented numbers, was now forming opposite … and the ground between them and us presented no obstacle whatever. It was at the same time evident, from the way in which the French guns were taking up their ground, that the [army] would be exposed to a severe artillery fire.
It was therefore of the highest importance that the formation[s] … should be such that … [their] passing from line into a formation for resisting cavalry should be as rapid as possible … To carry these views into effect the strong battalions formed each an oblong on the two centre companies, and when the battalions were weak, two were joined, the right-hand battalion of the two forming left in front, and the left-hand battalion right in front, each in columns of companies.
The fronts of the oblongs were formed by four companies; the rear face of the oblongs by the same strength; and the sides of one company each, which were formed by the outward wheel of the subdivisions. It will be observed that, when a battalion forms oblong in this manner upon two centre companies, the formation is made in less than half the time in which it would form a square on a flank company; and the same applies to deployment.11
Amongst the troops in the centre of the Allied line was the 1st Brigade, of Perponcher’s 2nd Netherlands Division, commanded by Generaal-Majoor Williem Frederik van Bylandt. Much has been written about the deployment of Bylandt’s brigade, with most accounts stating that, unlike the rest of the main Anglo-Dutch line, it was posted on the forward slope of the ridge, in a highly exposed position. It was positioned there, states one authority, to keep up a communication between La Haye Sainte and the main allied line.12
The scene that morning was described in a graphic account which was published in the Caledonian Mercury of 5 October:
The line being formed about six o’clock, our rear towards Brussels, the artillery in front on a small height, the infantry close columns behind us, with the cavalry in the intervals – (I had every opportunity of seeing the disposition of both armies, having occasion to go with messages from one part of the field to another) – the line of infantry was under cover of the eminence where the artillery was posted – a smart cannonading commenced on both sides, which lasted till dark. It had rained all this day, and at night fell in torrents. I never saw it rain more tremendously. We had not our tents pitched. I lay down for some time under one of the carriages, but was soon forced to rise, being in danger of drowning, as we had retired from the height at the close of the engagement, and lay in a kind of valley all night.
After such an awful night, the morning dawned with gloomy aspect. All over the field, where countless thousands lay, not a whisper was heard. Our fires, which had been long extinguished by the torrents of rain, were rekindled, and we made shift to dry our clothes a little. At day-break the artillery took up the position it had quitted the evening before. About midday the signal gun was fired. Then began that ever memorable battle, so glorious as well as so fatal to the British army.
The actual number of troops taking part in many battles is often hard to ascertain with accuracy. Historians usually act cautiously and use such words as ‘approximately’ and ‘around’. With the Waterloo campaign we have very precise figures from the British Army, and details of the French Army were revealed in the Hampshire Chronicle of Monday, 7 August 1815, under the headline ‘From French Papers, Paris, July 31’:
The second number of Buonaparte’s Portfolio, taken at Charleroi on the 18th of June, has appeared at Brussels. Among the different articles of which it consists, is one entitled, ‘Enumeration of some corps of the Army’ it is a paper in the hand-writing of one of Buonaparte’s Officers, and exhibits a statement of the force of the corps which fought at Waterloo. The Duke of Wellington was attacked by the 71,000 men comprehended in this statement, viz. 48,000 infantry (including 18,000 of the guard); 16,500 cavalry (including 4000 of the guard); 7000 artillery, and 270 pieces of cannon.
The first and second corps, commanded by Generals Reille and d’Erlon, are comprised in this account. Marshal Grouchy acted on his side with the corps of Vandamme and Gerard, which comprehended together 6000 horse; including infantry, they must have had a force equal to the first and second, that is from 24 to 27,000 men. He had also the 1st and 2d cavalry corps under Excelmans and Pajol, which may be assimilated with the 3d and 4th, stated in the table at 8000 horse each. All this agrees with the numbers that were seen to pass through Namur, and make a general total of 110,000, which, according to the first report, and the accounts of the prisoners, passed the frontiers.
An officer of the 1st Guards, wrote the following in a letter – an account which details both some of the preparations for battle and the dispositions of those involved:
In the morning of the 17th, the Enemy made no further attempt against us; and as the Prussians had retired during the night, we did the same very leisurely, about 11 o’clock, taking up a position in front of a village called Waterloo, at a point where the high road or chaussee to Brussels crosses that from Nivelle to Namur. Here we remained quiet through the night, except that it rained more furiously than I ever experienced, even in Spain. We were quite wet through, and literally up to the ancles in mud. The cavalry were considerably engaged during the day of the 17th, but the Hussars could not make much impression against their heavy-armed opponents. The Life Guards behaved most nobly, and carried everything before them. The morning of the 18th dawned full of expectation of something decisive being done.
But first I must give you some idea of our position. It ran from the Brussels chaussee to the right, about a mile and a half in length, and then turned very sharply to the right and crossed the chaussee from Nivelle to Namur, which two chaussees cross each other, so that we were nearly in a quarter-circle (like an open fan, the two outside sticks being the chaussees.)
At the turn and at the bottom of a slope was a farm and orchards, called Mount St. John. This was the key of our positions, and in front of our centre. On this point the most serious attack was made.
At twelve o’clock the columns of the Enemy moved down from the heights which they had occupied … The British infantry were drawn up in columns under the ridge of the position. We were at the turn or knuckle with two battalions of Brunswickers. The Third Regiment of Guards were in columns in front of the turn, and the Coldstream at the farm-house. The light infantry of the division were to defend the orchard and small wood next to it. The third division were in squares to the left of our squares, and under cover of the ridge.13
This French account was actually published in Paris on 21 June 1815 under the heading of News from the Army:
At nine in the morning, the rain having somewhat abated, the 1st corps put itself in motion, and placed itself with the left on the road to Brussels, and opposite the village of Mount St. Jean, which appeared the centre of the enemy’s position. The second corps leaned its right upon the road to Brussels, and its left upon a small wood within cannon-shot of the English army. The Cuirassiers were in reserve behind, and the Guard in reserve upon the heights. The 6th corps, with the cavalry of General D’Aumont, under the order of Count Lobau, were destined to proceed in rear of our right, to oppose a Prussian corps which appeared to have escaped Marshal Grouchy, and to intend to fall upon our right flank – an intention which had been made known to us by our reports, and by the letter of a Prussian general, inclosing an order of battle, and which was taken by our light troops.
The troops were full of ardour. We estimated the force of the English army at 80,000 men. We supposed that the Prussian corps, which might be in line towards the night, might be 15,000 men. The enemy’s force then was upwards of 90,000 men; ours less numerous.14
Napoleon could not be certain that Wellington intended to stand and fight at Mont St Jean and so, at 01.00 hours, he walked out with Count Bertrand and his escorting Guards to examine the Anglo-Netherlands’ position:
The forest of Soignies looked as if it was on fire; the horizon between this forest, Braine-la-Leud and the farms of La Belle Alliance and La Haye was aglow with bivouac fires; complete silence prevailed … Several officers who had been sent out on reconnaissance, and some secret agents returning at half-past three, confirmed that the Anglo-Netherlands troops were not making a move … The day began to dawn. I returned to my headquarters thoroughly satisfied with the great mistake which the enemy general was making.15
Wellington had made no mistake because he knew that he would not be fighting alone. Müffling had sent a message to Blücher asking the Prussian Field-Marshal what course of action he intended to follow. At around 02.00 hours on the morning of the 18th Müffling received a reply:
I wish to report to Your Worship that, as a consequence of the news received from the Duke of Wellington that he intends to accept battle tomorrow in the position from Braine l’Alleud to la Haye, that I will set my troops in motion as follows:
At daybreak tomorrow [the 18th] Bülow’s Corps will leave Dion-le-Mont, and march through Wavre towards St Lambert to attack the enemy’s right flank. II Corps will follow it immediately, and the I and III Corps will hold themselves ready to follow this movement. As the troops are exhausted, and some have yet to arrive, it is impossible to leave earlier. I would request Your Worship to report to me in good time when and how the Duke is attacked, so that I can adjust my measures accordingly.16
Sir James Shaw Kennedy, the Third Division’s Assistant Quartermaster-General, confirmed the reasons for Wellington’s decision to stand and fight at Mont St Jean:
In order at all to understand the views of the Duke of Wellington as to accepting battle on the field of Waterloo, it is essential to keep this arrangement [with Blücher] fully in view; otherwise the Duke might be justly accused of the utmost temerity and folly in accepting battle, as much of the greater portion of his army consisted of mere Landwehr and of Dutch-Belgian troops.
The latter, from political and other causes, could not be depended upon; which, in fact had already been proved on the 16th. It would be an error to suppose that it was from any want of courage that the Dutch-Belgian troops could not be depended upon; proof enough exists that the people of those countries are capable of the most heroic and persevering exertions when engaged in a cause that they care to support; but under the circumstances in which they were placed on this occasion, they were without confidence, were not acting in a cause which they cordially supported, and showed that it was not one in which they wished to oppose themselves seriously to French troops.17
A few hours later Napoleon was alarmed when he received a report saying that Wellington was withdrawing. The vastly experienced d’Erlon, whose corps held the front line, knew this not to be the case. Nevertheless, as d’Erlon later described, Napoleon rode out to see for himself:
The Emperor came immediately to the advanced posts. I accompanied him; we dismounted in order to get near the enemy’s vedettes, and to examine more closely the movements of the English army. He perceived that I was right, and being convinced that the English army was taking position, he said to me: ‘Order the men to make their soup, to get their pieces in order, and we will determine what is to be done towards noon.’18
After his inspection of the Allied positions, which in truth he could see little of because so many of Wellington’s men were out of sight behind Mont St Jean, Napoleon ‘reflected’ for some time before giving his orders for the attack.
Once the whole army is ranged in battle order, at about 1 p.m., and when the Emperor gives Marshal Ney the relevant order, the attack will begin in order to capture the village of Mont St Jean, which is the road junction. To this end, the 12-inch [12-pounder] batteries of II Corps and VI Corps will regroup with those of I Corps. These 94 cannon will fire on the troops of Mont St Jean, and Count d’Erlon will begin the attack by bringing forward his left wing division, supporting it, according to the circumstances, by the other I Corps divisions. II Corps will advance so as to keep at the level of Count d’Erlon. The sapper companies of I Corps will be ready to entrench themselves immediately at Mont St Jean.19
Napoleon describes the formation of his army which he stated was in eleven columns, as it formed up ready to begin the battle:
It had been arranged that, of these eleven columns, four were to form the first line, four the second line, and three the third.
The four columns of the first line were: the first, that on the left, formed by the cavalry of the 2nd Corps; the next, by three infantry divisions of the 2nd Corps; the third, by three infantry divisions of the 1st Corps; and the fourth, by the light cavalry of the 1st Corps.
The four columns of the second line were: the first, that of the left, formed by Kellermann’s corps of cuirassiers; the second, by the two infantry divisions of the 6th Corps; the third, by two light cavalry divisions, one of the 6th Corps, commanded by the divisional General Daumont, the other detached from Pajol’s corps and commanded by the divisional General Subervie; the fourth, by Milhaud’s corps of cuirassiers.
The three columns of the third line were: the first, that of the left, formed by the division of mounted grenadiers and the dragoons of the Guard, commanded by General Guyot; the second, by the three divisions of the Old, Middle, and Young Guard, commanded by Lieutenant-Generals Friant, Morand, and Duhesme; the third, by the mounted chasseurs and lancers of the Guard, under Lieutenant-General Lefebvre-Desnouettes. The artillery marched on the flanks of the columns; the parks and the ambulances at the tail.
At 9 o’clock, the heads of the four columns forming the first line arrived at the point where they were to deploy. At the same time the other seven columns could be seen not very far off debouched from the heights. They were on the march, the trumpets and drums summoning them to battle. The music resounded with airs which brought back to the soldiers the memories of a hundred victories. The very soil seemed proud to support so many brave men. This was a magnificent spectacle; and the enemy, who were situated in such a way that every man was visible, must have been struck by it. The army must have seemed twice as big as it really was.20
The following was published in the Lancaster Gazette of Saturday 21 October under the headline ‘BATTLE OF WATERLOO: Faithfully and interestingly detailed, Village of Gommignies, June 22, 1815’:
Our position was a very compact one, the extreme left resting on La Haye, the left centre on La Haye Sainte, and the right centre on Hougomont, and the extreme right was thrown back to a certain degree in consequence of a ravine which would otherwise have laid it open to the enemy. We were posted near Hougomont, into which the four light companies of the division of Guards, under Colonel McDonald and Lord Saltoun, were thrown. The house had a large garden attached to it, laid out in the Dutch fashion, with parallel walks and high thick hedges, and was surrounded by an orchard. As the army fell back the enemy’s cavalry attacked the rear, and there were constant skirmishes and charges of cavalry during the day.
Towards seven o’clock in the evening the French cannonaded Hougomont and our position for near an hour and a half, and were answered by the guns on the top of the hill in our front. We were moved back a little distance to get out of the exact range of the shot, and after continuing during the time I have above mentioned, eagerly awaiting a further development of their attack, the firing ceased, and we continued till the morning in the situation we now held. The weather, which had hitherto been showery, became settled into a decided and heavy rain, which continued in actual torrents the complete night through, accompanied by a gale of wind and constant thunder and lightning.
Such a night few have witnessed, it was one that imagination would point as alone fit for the festival of the demons of death, and for the fates to complete the web of those brave souls whose thread of life was so nearly spun. After such a night of horrors and contending expectations, the dawn of any kind of day was welcome; it seemed however with difficulty to break through the heavy clouds which overhung the earth, and appeared so slowly, that it seemed as if Nature reluctantly lent her light to assist at the scene of carnage and distress, which was to mark the history of this eventful day. Our artillery, which had the night before so admirably answered the fire of the French guns, was all placed on the heights in our front.
It is here necessary for me to remark, that our position comprehended the two roads from Charleroi and Nivelle to Brussels, which united at the village of Mont St. Jean, and formed rather an acute angle. The Prince of Orange’s corps composed the first line, with the whole artillery in its front, and Lord Hill’s corps the right flank and second line.
Jardin Ainé, was, as mentioned earlier, equerry to the Emperor Napoleon and therefore well placed to detail some of the events that day:
On the 18th Napoleon having left the bivouac, that is to say the village Caillou on horseback, at half-past nine in the morning came to take up his stand half a league in advance upon a hill where he could discern the movements of the British army.
There he dismounted, and with his field glass endeavoured to discover all the movements in the enemy’s line. The chief of the staff suggested that they should begin the attack; he replied that they must wait … Napoleon rode through the lines and gave orders to make certain that every detail was executed with promptitude; he returned often to the spot where in the morning he had started, there he dismounted and, seating himself in a chair which was brought to him, he placed his head between his hands and rested his elbows on his knees.21
The Battle of Waterloo was about to begin.