13

The Arrival of the Prussians

La Haye Sainte was at last in French hands, and the Anglo Netherlands’ centre was now exposed, but Napoleon could not use all his remaining strength to attack Wellington as the Prussians had appeared on the battlefield. It may be recalled that Grouchy had been told to pursue the Prussians ‘without stopping’. So what had gone wrong? And where was Grouchy with the rest of l’armée du Nord?

Further instructions had been sent to Grouchy at 11.00 hours on the morning of the 17th:

Proceed to Gembloux with the cavalry corps of Generals Pajol and Exelmans, the light cavalry of IV Corps (Gérard), the Teste infantry division and the III (Vandamme) and IV Infantry Corps. You will reconnoitre in the direction of Namur and Maastricht and you will pursue the enemy. Scout out his march and inform me of his movements to enable me to penetrate his intentions. I am transferring my headquarters to Quatre-Bras, where the English still were this morning. Our communications will therefore be by the paved road of Namur.

If the enemy has evacuated Namur, write to the General commanding the 2nd Military Division at Charlemont in order to have this town occupied by a few battalions of the National Guard. It is important to penetrate Blücher’s and Wellington’s intentions and to know whether they propose to re-unite their armies to cover Brussels and Liége by tempting fate in a battle. In any case, keep your two infantry corps constantly together in two and a half miles of ground with several retreat exits; post intermediary cavalry detachments to communicate with General Headquarters.¹

Though fairly detailed, nothing in these instructions actually stated that Grouchy must make sure the Prussians should be prevented from joining Wellington. Furthermore, quite how Grouchy was expected to penetrate Blücher’s and Wellington’s intentions is a mystery.

Nevertheless, Grouchy set off in pursuit of Blücher with around 30,000 men, Napoleon having reduced his force by subtracting a division of infantry and one of cavalry. At 22.00 hours on the 17th, Grouchy sent his first report from Gembloux, though it was not received at Napoleon’s headquarters until 04.00 hours on the 18th:

Sire, the enemy, 30,000 strong, continue to retreat. It seems from all reports that, from Sauvenières, the Prussians have divided into two columns. One must have taken the road to Wavre through Sart-a-Walhain, the other seems to have taken the direction of Perwès [Liége]. A third one, with artillery, is retreating on Namur. One can infer that a portion is going to join Wellington and that the centre, which is Blücher’s army, retreats on Liége. If the Prussians’ mass retires on Wavre, I shall follow it in this direction to prevent it from reaching Brussels and to separate it from Wellington. If on the contrary, their principal forces have marched on Perwes I shall follow them in pursuit through this town.²

Though the Prussians had undoubtedly been badly beaten at Ligny, and in the chaos of battle Blücher was nowhere to be found, the various divisions were still organised and under the control of their officers, as can be seen from the assesment of Oberstleutnant Ludwig-August- Friedrich-Karl von Reiche. At the end of the Battle of Ligny, he states:

the village of Brye was still held by troops of I and II Corps, and III Corps remained unaffected in its position at Sombreffe, while the troops ejected from Ligny, mainly from I Corps and II Corps, had been forced back to the cobbled road running from Nivelles to Namur and, from there farther back to the old Roman road. As the IV Corps was not going to arrive in time for the battle, it had been sent orders to leave the Orneau valley and Gembloux to its left and to move to the plateau Artelle.

With the exception of those units that had just come from the combats around Ligny, the troops were in good order, and still capable of fighting. This was not the case for those who had fought around Ligny, but that was to be expected.³

There were many crucial moments during the Waterloo campaign and none was of greater significance than the decision that was taken by General Gneisenau as his army fell back from Ligny. The natural line of retreat for the Prussian army, and the safest one, was back along its communications eastwards towards Namur. This, however, would have taken it away from Wellington.

Gneisenau decided, in his commander’s absence, to withdraw towards Brussels where, he hoped, he would be able to make contact with the Anglo-Dutch army. When Blücher eventually resurfaced, after being roughly handled during the latter stages of the Battle of Ligny, he confirmed Gneisenau’s decision.

Whether or not the Prussians would be able to join forces with Wellington’s army depended on Grouchy. Napoleon had been unusually slow to put the two wings of his army into motion on the 17th. As a result Grouchy was left far behind when the Prussians retreated from Ligny. It was not until the early morning of the 18th that Grouchy was able to provide accurate information concerning the direction in which the Prussians were moving, and it was not good news for Napoleon to whom he submitted the following report at 06.00 hours:

Sire, All my reports and information confirm that the enemy is retiring on Brussels to concentrate there or to give battle after joining Wellington. I and II Corps of Blücher’s army seem to be marching, the first on Corbais, the second on Chaumont. They must have started yesterday evening (17 June) at 8 p.m. from Tourinnes and marched all night; fortunately the weather was so bad that they cannot have gone very far. I am leaving this instant for Sart-a-Walhain and from there to Corbais and Wavre.⁴

Though Grouchy said that the Prussians had not gone far, they were, though, well ahead of him and Blücher had already set in motion the arrangements for his army to join Wellington at Waterloo, after the Duke had informed the Prussian field marshal that he intended to give battle on Mont St Jean. Confirmation of this was sent to Müffling just before midnight on the 17th:

I have the honour to report to Your Excellency that, following upon information I have received that the Duke of Wellington intends tomorrow to meet an attack in his positions from Braine L’Alleud to La Haye, I have arranged to dispose my troops as follows: von Bülow’s [IV] Corps will march tomorrow at daybreak from Dion-le- Mont, through Wavre towards St Lambert, in order to attack the enemy right flank. II Corps will follow him immediately, while I and III will hold themselves in readiness to follow up this movement.

The exhaustion of the troops, some of whom have not arrived [i.e. the last of IV Corps], makes it impossible to move any earlier. I beg your Excellency, however, to let me know in good time when and how the Duke is being attacked so that I may make my dispositions accordingly.⁵

Grouchy would have to move very quickly if he was to prevent the Allied armies from joining forces. He did not and has been roundly condemned by many for this, including Napoleon. Yet there may still have been time for Grouchy to march directly to Waterloo and thus play a part in the battle if he was instructed to do so. This is Napoleon’s reply to Grouchy from his post at Caillou, timed at 10.00 hours on the morning of the 18th, written by Soult, as Napoleon was preparing to attack Wellington at Waterloo:

Marshal – The Emperor has received your last report dated from Gembloux. You talk to His Majesty of two Prussian columns which have passed at Sauvenières and Sart-a-Walhain. However, some reports say a third column, quite a strong one, passed through Géry and Gentinnes marching towards Wavre. The Emperor enjoins me to warn you that at this moment he is about to have the English army attacked at Waterloo near the Forest of Soignes where it has taken up position. His Majesty therefore desires that you should direct your movements on Wavre so as to come nearer to us, to establish operational and liaison contact with us, pushing in front of you the Prussian army corps who have taken this direction and who might have stopped at Wavre, where you must arrive as soon as possible.

You will have the Prussian army corps who have taken to your right followed by some light corps so as to observe their movements and to gather their stragglers. Instruct me immediately of your dispositions and of your march as well as of the information you possess on the enemy, and do not neglect to bind your communications with us. The Emperor desires to have news of you very often.⁶

Grouchy, therefore, drove his troops on towards Wavre to face General Johann von Thielmann whose Prussian III Corps had been handed the task of delaying the right wing of l’armée du Nord. Mean while Bülow’s corps was nearing Waterloo. Just as Napoleon was anticipating the start of d’Erlon’s great attack upon the Anglo-Netherlands’ centre, troops were spotted in the distance on the French right. Fearing that these might be Prussians, Napoleon immediately told Soult to write the following to Grouchy:

At 6 o’clock this morning, you wrote to the Emperor that you were marching on Sart-a-Walhain. Thus, it was your plan to move to Corbais and Wavre. This movement conforms with His Majesty’s dispositions which have been communicated to you. However, the Emperor orders me to tell you that you must always manoeuvre in our direction and seek to come closer to us in order to join us before any corps can come between us. I do not indicate any direction to you. It is for you to see the point where we are, to regulate yourself in consequence and bind our communications, as well as always to be in a position to fall upon any enemy troops which would seek to worry our right flank, and to crush them. At this time, the battle is engaged on the line at Waterloo in front of the forest of Soignes. The enemy centre is at Mont St Jean, so do manoeuvre to join our right.⁷

Before the message could be sent, the following incident occurred – an event later described by Pharmacien Aide-Major Fée:

It was then that a gendarme d’élite brought in a Prussian officer as a prisoner. I noticed his shortness and undistinguished face. The cavalryman [who had brought him to Napoleon], to make him arrive more quickly, lifted him off the ground for five or six paces and, with a strong arm, pushed him forward. The emperor had him questioned.⁸

Napoleon himself would later write of this unusual meeting:

This hussar was the bearer of a letter. He was extremely intelligent and gave by word of mouth all the information that could be desired. The column which was to be seen at Saint Lambert was the advance guard of the Prussian General Bülow, who was arriving with 30,000 men; it was the 4th Prussian Corps which had not been engaged at Ligny.⁹

Napoleon responded quickly by adding the following note to Grouchy’s message:

A letter has just been intercepted states that General Bülow is about to attack our right flank. We believe that we notice this corps now on the heights of St Lambert. Do not lose a moment in drawing near to us, and effecting a junction with us, in order to crush Bülow whom you will catch in the very act of concentrating [with Wellington].¹⁰

Colonel Marbot had been detached with his regiment of the 7th Hussars plus a battalion of infantry at the start of the battle to the right to watch for the arrival of Grouchy. His instructions ‘prescribed to me to leave the bulk of my command always in view of the field of battle, to post 200 infantry in the Wood of Frishermont, one squadron at Lasne, having the outposts as far as St Lambert’.

Marbot learnt from some of the locals that Grouchy’s force was likely to cross the Dyle at Limale, Limelette and Wavre. He passed this information on to Napoleon who ordered Marbot to reconnoitre in those directions:

I proceeded to St. Lambert with a squadron to reinforce the troops there. I saw in the distance a strong column, approaching St. Lambert. I sent an officer in all haste to forewarn the Emperor.

Napoleon did not want to his men to know that the Prussian army was breathing down their necks, so he told Marbot

… to advance boldly, that this body of troops could be nothing else than the corps of Marshal Grouchy, coming from Limale, and pushing before it some stray Prussians of whom the prisoners I had just taken were a part.¹¹

Bülow’s men had struggled along narrow roads entirely unsuited to the passage of an army, as Reiche subsequently described:

The march to the battlefield was extremely difficult. Bottomless paths, cut into deep defiles, had to be followed. The ground on both sides was almost all wooded, so that there could be no question of evasive action, and the march was very slow, particularly since at many places men and horses could move only in single file and the artillery could be brought up only with the greatest difficulty. As a result the columns became very stretched … any attempt to keep them closed up had to be abandoned and we had to be content if only the brigades and regiments just remained together as units.¹²

Napoleon needed to hold back Bülow until Grouchy could arrive. To accomplish this he despatched the light cavalry divisions of Domon and Subervie and Lobau’s VI Corps. He also moved part of the Imperial Guard infantry to La Belle Alliance to show a solid front to Wellington. As Ney was leading the masses cavalry charges at the Anglo-Netherlands squares Lobau came under fire from the leading units of Bülow’s corps, as Chef d’escadron Dupy of the 7th Hussars of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division described:

Until towards 4 pm, we remained peaceful spectators of the battle. At this time, General Domon came to me; the fire of the English had almost ceased. He told me that the battle was won, that the enemy army was in retreat, that we were there to make a junction with Marshal Grouchy’s corps and that by evening we would be in Brussels. He left.

A few moments later, instead of meeting Marshal Grouchy’s troops, we received the attack of a regiment of Prussian uhlans. We repulsed them vigorously and chased after them. But we were forced to retreat by case shot fired by six guns, behind which the uhlans retired.¹³

Throughout the battle, Müffling sent despatch officers in ‘continual succession’ to keep Blücher informed of the progress of the battle. He wrote:

After 3 o’clock the Duke’s situation became critical, unless the succour of the Prussian army arrived soon. On the receipt of my reports, it was resolved not to await the arrival of the whole of Bülow’s corps on the plateau, but to advance out of the wood as soon as the two twelve-pounder batteries arrived.

At four o’clock the Field Marshal began his cannonade, as well as his advance against Planchenois [Plancenoit] … and as the advance guard of the 1st corps (General von Ziethen) had already appreared in the position on the nearest height, I begged Generals Vandeleur and Vivian to hasten immediately with their six regiments of English cavalry to the assistance of the distressed [Anglo-Netherlands] centre, on account of the arrival of the Prussian corps they were no longer wanted on the left wing.¹⁴

Lieutenant Henry Duperier was with the 18th Hussars, which formed part of Major General Sir Hussey Vivian’s 6th Cavalry Brigade:

All the light cavalry and hussars were withdrawn and put for a very few minutes under a hill considerable on our right and entirely under the position of our army, being as we wise creatures usually do, our left flank open … it was to make place for 5,000 of Prussian cavalry.¹⁵

Müffling continued with his narrative:

Almost simultaneously with the movement of these regiments [Vandeleur’s and Vivian’ s Hussars], the enemy advanced with infantry against the left wing at Papelotte.

General Ziethen’s advanced guard, which I was expecting with the utmost impatience, suddenly turned round, and disappeared from the height just as the enemy took possession of Papelotte with his Guards. I hastened after this advanced guard on the other side of the height, from whence I saw them in full retreat.¹⁶

What had caused Ziethen to retreat at this vital stage of the battle? ‘By this retrograde movement of General von Ziethen,’ Müffling wrote, ‘the battle might have been lost’.

The man responsible for this near disaster was Ziethen’s chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel von Reiche. He had been told by von Müffling that Ziethen should ‘link up’ with Wellington’s left wing:

With these instructions I hurried back to the column and having decided not to waste time by first looking for General Ziethen, who was further back, I gave the advance-guard the appropriate direction in the light of Müffling’s instructions … I was hurrying back towards the corps in order to report to General Ziethen, when Captain von Scharnhorst … on Prince Blücher’s staff, dashed up to me, shouting that the 1st Army Corps must push on immediately to Blücher beyond Frichermont, because things were beginning to go badly there …

Never in my life have I found myself in such a difficult situation. On the one hand Blücher’s order … and the thought that our troops were perhaps in danger there and could not hold out any longer. On the other hand the certainty that Wellington was counting on our arrival … General Steinmetz, who commanded the advance-guard, came up to the halted troops at this very moment, stormed at me in his usual violent manner, and insisted upon an advance … My embarrassment increased not a little when General Steinmetz let the head of the column resume its march and himself went past the point where the road to Frichermont branches off.¹⁷

This is what Müffling had witnessed – what appeared to be Ziethen’s Corps retreating, though it was actually marching away from Wellington’s left wing towards Frichermont. At that moment Ziethen appeared and Müffling was able to help clarify the situation. I Corps turned back and marched to link up with Wellington’s left. ‘Nobody,’ wrote Reiche, ‘could have been more pleased than I was’. The official Prussian account continued:

It was half-past four o’clock. The excessive difficulties of the passage by the defile of St. Lambert had considerably retarded the march of the Prussian columns, so that only two brigades of the 4th corps had arrived at the covered position which was assigned to them. The decisive moment was come; there was not an instant to be lost. The generals did not suffer it to escape. They resolved immediately to begin the attack with the troops which they had at hand. Gen. Bulow, therefore, with two brigades and a corps of cavalry, advanced rapidly upon the rear of the enemy’s right wing. The enemy did not lose his presence of mind; he instantly turned his reserve against us, and a murderous conflict began on that side. The combat remained long uncertain.¹⁸

Jardin Ainé, equerry to the Emperor Napoleon, was a spectator to the dramatic events of that fateful afternoon and left an insightful eyewitness account:

At three o’clock [sic] an aide-de-camp from the right wing came to tell him that they were repulsed and that the artillery was insufficient. Napoleon immediately called General Drouet in order to direct him to hasten to reinforce this army corps which was suffering so heavily, but one saw on Napoleon’s face a look of disquietude instead of the joy which it had shown on the great day of Fleurus. The whole morning he showed extreme depression.¹⁹

The fighting on the French right flank centred around the village of Plancenoit and, with Prussian pressure mounting, Napoleon sent in his Young Guard, which counter-attacked and seized the village. The Prussians, though, were not to be stopped, as Colonel von Hillier described:

In the second assault two battalions of the 14th Brigade also took part [as well as the 15th Brigade], while I kept the 1st Silesian Militia regiment in reserve. This attack was also repelled, but the troops did not lose their morale. Lieutenant General Gneisenau was also here. With his influence and that of the officers of the 15th regiment it was possible to lead up the columns for a third time and with great success.²⁰

Behind Bülow the Prussian I Corps and II Corps were moving towards the French right flank and rear. Unless Napoleon could do something spectacular, he would soon be swept away by the Prussians. With his cavalry weakened and exhausted by their attacks upon the British squares, Napoleon had only one body of men left – the infantry of the Middle and Old Guard.