Page numbers refer to the print edition but are hyperlinked to the appropriate location in the e-book.
Abd al-Salam Faraj, Muhammud, 95
Abu Graib prisoner abuse scandal, 100
Aden Emergency, British withdrawal in, 143–44
Afghanistan, al-Qaeda in, 95
Afghanistan, British COIN in: “lost” COIN tradition and, 122–24, 146–47; original deployment as poorly planned, 141; and political will, 141; U.S. nation-building mission and, 147
Afghanistan, COIN in: challenges faced by, xi; components of, 83; costs of, 179; disillusionment with, ix–x, xi, xiv, xx; goals of, 30, 206n120; ineffectiveness of, 79; long-term, questionable rationale for, 30; as nation building, 83–84, 147; negative consequences of, 47; Obama administration review of, 29–30, 32; overgeneralized COIN tactics and, 86; passing of into history, 179; and proportionality, loss of, 34, 47; strategies used in, xii–xiii; U.S. strategic inflexibility and, 26; and U.S. model of modernization, inapplicability of, 66, 67. See also Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Afghanistan War: as component in U.S. COIN strategy, 174; original goals of, as accomplished, 30
Algerian War: French characterizations of Indochina War and, 12; French strategic inflexibility and, 26; as historical basis of COIN theory, 79, 99–100, 181; and neoclassical COIN theory, 76; overgeneralization of tactics and, 21
al-Jihad (organization), 95
al-Qaeda: appeasement of, as tactic, 109–11; as challenge to international order, 110; escalation of insurgency by, 175; irrationality of, according to COIN analysis, 16–17, 106–7; rise of, 92–95; and rise of global school of COIN, 95–99; and rise of modern counterinsurgency theory, x–xi, 179; strategies for addressing, x. See also Islamist jihadism
al-Qaeda in Iraq: escalation of insurgency by, 176; global school of COIN and, 98; and postwar disorder, xii; U.S. COIN tactics against, 174–75
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1974 (UK), 168
Argentine Dirty War (1976–1982), escalation in, 165–67, 170
The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (McCuen), 76
Asian state modernization: and democratization, pressure for, 65; and state stability, as issue, 63
asymmetric war: lack of preparation for, 24–25; as synonym for insurgency, 3, 157–58, 177
Balkans, British COIN and, 133, 136
Bassford, Christopher, 154
A Better War (Sorley), 50
Blitzkrieg, as type of war, 12
Bloody Friday (Northern Ireland), 171–73
borders, secure, as tactic against jihadism, 113
British Army: culture of, colonial legacy and, 73–74; Petraeus on capabilities of, 222–23n6; political definitions of victory and, 145–46; record of, as variegated and contingent, 147–49; replacement of political with tactical methods, 121; reputation for rapid institutional learning, xviii, 74, 132, 135, 137, 140–41, 148; successes of, political will as key to, 140–42, 145, 147–48, 148–49, 183; two components of, after World War II, 139; withdrawals by, and political calculation, 135, 142–45, 146, 148
British Army COIN theory: difficulty of absorbing COIN lessons, 75; emphasis on long-term commitment, 74; emphasis on proportionality, 74; failure to engage political dimension of counterinsurgency, 43–44; history of colonial involvement and, 50–51, 73–74, 120, 121–25; and political goals of COIN, failure to engage, 46–47; rejection of Clausewitz, 105–6
British Army Countering Insurgency manual: on basic principles of COIN, 199n93; on British COIN tradition, 119; and COIN colonialist narrative, 51; definition of insurgency, 2, 33; as effort to bridge past and future conflicts, 45; and global school of COIN, 106; and political goals, failure to consider, 46; and political motives of opposition, underappreciation of, 21–22; rejection of Clausewitz in, 105–6
British Army Field Manual: on British COIN tradition, 119, 121–22, 131; on contingency and common sense, 140
British Army in Afghanistan: “lost” COIN tradition and, 122–24, 146–47; original deployment as poorly planned, 141; and political will, 141; U.S. nation-building mission and, 147
British Army in Iraq: collapse of order in Basra and, 123, 133, 134–35, 144–45, 148; initial COIN success of, 130, 131, 134–35; “lost” COIN tradition of, 122–24, 134–35, 136, 146–47; U.S. nation-building mission and, 147; and withdrawal, political calculation in, 135, 144–45, 146, 148
British COIN tradition: basic principles of, 119, 122, 126, 128, 130, 131, 136–39, 199n93; British Army Field Manual on, 119, 121–22, 131; British statements on, 108–9, 124, 129, 130–31, 131–33, 137–38, 140, 146, 148–49, 183; construction of, Iraq COIN and, 131–34; invocations of, 119–20; “loss” of, 120–21, 122–24, 134–35, 136, 146–48; “loss” of, rhetorical purposes underlying claims of, 146–47; as model for COIN theory, 38–40, 73–74, 76, 83, 108–9, 119; as myth constructed by commentators, 120, 122–25, 128–31, 139, 146, 148–49, 182–83; as non-existent before 1990, 125–28, 204n90; Northern Ireland COIN and, 126–28; political will as key to success of, 140–42, 145, 147–48, 148–49, 183; 21st-century revisionist views on, 136–39, 146, 215n66; as unstructured collection of experience, 120, 121–25; violence of, revisionist emphasis on, 136–39, 146
British Counterinsurgency, 1919–1960 (Mockaitis), 128–29, 130
Brush Fire Wars (Dewar), 128
Bunch of Five (Kitson), 126
bureaucracy: as mechanism of modernization, 63; and overgeneralization of tactics, 21
Bush, George W.: and American system as universal model, 66; and COIN as narrative of triumph over adversity, 50; and Iraq invasion, xi; on war on terror, 194n6
Canada, escalation against Front de Liberation du Québec, 173
capitalism, as grievance of Islamist jihadists, 109–11
Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, 53
Center for International Studies, MIT (CIS), 57, 59
China, support of Viet Minh, 11
Clausewitz, Carl von: applicability of to insurgencies, 106, 210n66; on clarity in perceiving goals of war, 116; COIN’s rejection of, 43–44, 46, 105–9, 152; critics’ misunderstanding of, 43, 106–7; critiques of, 16, 17; on escalation, 159, 161, 176–77; global COIN’s rejection of, 105–6; and impossibility of COIN theory, 43–44; on innovation in war, 10; on nature of war, xxi–xxii, 4–6, 44, 153–54, 158; on social and cultural influences on war, 17, 106; on strategy, necessity of context-specific judgments in, 24; on uniqueness of every war, 4–6, 22–23, 27–28, 35–36, 44, 154, 178, 184–85; on war as coercion, 158, 159; on war as rational pursuit of political goals, xxi–xxii, 4–6, 44, 153–54
“clear, hold, and build” tactic: ineffectiveness of, 79–80; lack of political component in, 85, 181–82
Cold War, end of: and asymmetric warfare, lack of preparation for, 24–25; and asymmetric warfare, rising importance of, 72–74; and move toward democratic universalism, 66
Cold War ideology, and “insurgency” as term, 12–14
Committee of Comparative Politics (CCP), 57, 61, 62, 63, 65
communication: as mechanism of inclusion in modernization theory, 60–61; war as, 151–52
Communist guerrilla movements: in Argentina, suppression of, 165–67, 170; and development of “insurgency” as type of war, 7–8; in Southeast Asia, U.S. opposition to, 84; strategy of, 162; as target of neoclassical COIN theory, 70–71, 98–99
comparative politics, rise of as discipline, 59
Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (Paget), 126
counterinsurgency tactics, as discipline: as fallacious scientization of war, xix; rise of concept, xv; and technocratic posture of COIN, 42–43, 80–81, 81–82. See also specific tactics
counterinsurgency tactics, overgeneralized: as closed system of thought, 86–87; COIN in Afghanistan and, 86; generic disease models of insurgency and, 20–23; replacement of political understanding with, 78–87, 105–9, 121, 181–82; uniqueness of wars and, 2, 17–23, 41, 54; in U.S. doctrine, 33, 37–38, 47–48, 85, 180–81; in Vietnam War, 21
counterinsurgency (COIN) theory: ambiguity of purpose and practices, 30–31; apparent early success of in Iraq, xi–xiii, 31–32; British COIN tradition as model for, 38–40, 73–74, 76, 83, 108–9, 119; as cult of modernization theory, 57–58, 66–67, 182; disillusionment with in Afghanistan, ix–x, xiv, xx; early practitioner-theorists in, 38; as effort to bridge past and future conflicts, 45; fictitious account of history created by, 182–83, 183–84; first wave of, x–xi; as generic injunction to embrace flexibility, 51–53; impossibility of within Clausewitzian framework, 43–44; as insoluble paradox, 54; and insurgency as undefinable concept, 1–4, 32; as intellectually incoherent, xx; as interpretative filter for past, 180; and Islamist jihadism, outlines of effective global response to, 111–17; as narrative of triumph over adversity, 49–51, 180–81; as not-doctrine, 34–38; as not-strategy, 31–34; ongoing debate about, 179–80; as political religion, 55–58, 86–87, 184; as political spin, 53–54; as practitioner-led theory, 38–42; rejection of Clausewitzian theory, 43–44, 46, 106–9, 152; as response to perceived end of classic interstate war, xiii–xiv; rise of, after September 11th attacks, x–xiii, 179; second wave of, xi–xiii; as statement of obvious general principles, 52–53; technocratic posture of, 42–43, 80–81, 81–82; traditional authorities in, 38. See also British COIN tradition; global school of COIN; historic conflicts underlying COIN theory; neoclassical COIN theory; U.S. COIN
Counterinsurgency Warfare (Galula), 76, 82
counterterrorism, vs. counterinsurgency, xxii
critical school of international relations, 110
cultural influences on war, Clausewitz on, 17
cultural knowledge: COIN’s failure to exploit, 80–81; emphasis on in neoclassical COIN theory, 72, 74, 75, 78, 80–81, 96, 129
Darul Islam movement, 104
decontextualization of war, as consequence of identifying insurgency as type of war, 2, 17–20, 36–38
Defeating Communist Insurgency (Thompson), 125–26
democracies: legitimacy as constraint on COIN tactics in, 169; moral constraints on COIN tactics in, 167–69, 170, 175; tolerance of violence in, 168
democracy: as grievance of Islamist jihadists, 109; Islamist jihadism as threat to, 114, 116
democratic citizenship, as mechanism of inclusion in modernization theory, 60
democratic enlightenment, as implicit goal of COIN, 56–57
democratic universalism, post-Cold War impetus toward, 66
destrategization of war, as consequence of identifying insurgency as type of war, 2, 23–27
development syndrome (Pye and Coleman), 62–63
Dien Bien Phu, battle of (1954), 11
doctrine: COIN as not-doctrine, 34–38; definition of, 34–35; as guide facilitating rapid action, 45–46, 48; judgment necessary in application of, 46, 48, 54; as source of decontextualized, overly-broad answers, 35–38
Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, 160
economic participation, as mechanism of modernization, 62, 64–65
education: as mechanism of inclusion in modernization theory, 60; as mechanism of modernization, 62
Ejèrcito Revolucionario del Pueblo, 165
equitable resource distribution, as mechanism of modernization, 63
escalation: Clausewitz on, 159, 161, 176–77; consequences of, as unpredictable, 161, 162–63, 169–70, 171, 175–77; definition of, 151; as dynamic inherent in war, 159; as form of communication, 151–52; as means of achieving goals, complex calculations involved in, 151–52, 161, 169–70, 175–77; political constraints of, 159–60; proportionality as constraint on, 159–60, 165, 169, 177, 182; stages of, 160; strategic inflexibility and, 26; theory of, as undeveloped, 160; thresholds as constraints on, 160–61, 163, 167–69, 170–71, 177–78
escalation by counterinsurgents: in Argentine Dirty War (1976–1982), 165–67, 170; in Canada, 173; constraints on, 164, 165, 167–69, 170–73, 177; cost-benefit calculations in, 164–69, 177, 178; covert intelligence activity as, 172, 173–75; in Iraq, 174–75; in Northern Ireland, 165, 167–69, 170–73; types of, 166; by U.S., after September 11th attacks, 173–75; in West Germany, 173
ethnic wars, characterization of as irrational, 15–17
exceptionalizing insurgency, as analytical error, 2, 6–14
field manuals, as closed system of thought, 86
flexibility, COIN theory as generic injunction to embrace, 51–53
Fourth Generation Warfare, Gulf War (1990–1991) and, 72–73
Front de Liberation du Québec, Canada’s escalation against, 173
Fukuyama, Francis, 66, 91
globalization: as capitalist imperialism, 110; critical school of international relations on, 110; critics and opponents of, 91–92; impact of, 90–91; of insurgency, media and, 97; as product of modernization process, 91; and rise of Islamist jihadism, 92–95; and transnational reach of national internal wars, xv
global school of COIN, 101–5; as appeasement, 108–11; avoidance of political dimensions by, 105–9, 111, 114, 116–17; critics of, 97–98; emergence of, 89–90, 95–101; and ideological motivation of jihadists, failure to adequately address, 103–5, 107, 112, 113, 114; on Islamist jihadism, 71; limitations of, 101–5; overview of, 71; as reformulation of neoclassical concepts, 101, 108–9; rejection of Clausewitz, 105–6; as response to Islamist jihadism, 71, 90; transformation of world order as goal of, 111; U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual and, 97–98
government, legitimate: creation of, as COIN tactic, 22, 57, 67, 79–81, 83, 89, 119; definition of in U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 89; as tactic in modernization theory, 61, 67. See also security, provision of
grievance resolution as counterinsurgency tactic: as de facto nation building, 81, 83–84, 182; emphasis on in modern COIN theory, 26–27, 40–41, 57, 67, 79–81; failure to consider political goals in, 27, 40–41, 116; in global COIN theory, 108–11; validity of grievance as issue in, 109, 110–11. See also modernization theory; rebuilding infrastructure and economy, as COIN tactic
Grob-Fitzgibbons, Benjamin, 215n66
guerrilla warfare: as synonym for insurgency, 3–4; as tactic, not type of war, 18–20, 155
Gulf War (1990–1991), and Fourth Generation Warfare, 72–73
harsh measures, tolerance of, political will and, 141–42
historic conflicts underlying COIN theory, xi, 181; Algerian War as, 79, 99–100, 181; British COIN and the Balkans, 133, 136; British COIN in Northern Ireland as, 72, 74, 76, 133, 136, 181; as colonial conflicts, xii, xiv–xv, 38; critiques of selections for, 181; dubious usefulness of, 79; historical meaning of, as ex post facto imposition, xix, 12; Malayan Emergency as, 38–40, 73–74, 76, 83, 108–9, 125–26, 129, 181; misrepresentation of, 39–41; reliance on, as substitution for judgment and prudence, 48; Vietnam War as, 39, 181
House of Commons Defence Committee (UK), 131, 132–33
humanitarian crises, post-Cold War strategic inflexibility and, 24–25
imperialism, perception of globalization as, 92, 110
Imperial Policing (Gwynn), 138
India, British withdrawal from, 143, 144
Indochina, French war in: and Fourth Republic vacillation, 11; as historical basis of COIN theory, 79; and origin of “insurgency” as type of war, 7–11; political motives for French mischaracterization of, 11–13; as traditional war, 10–11; Viet Minh force strength vs. French, 10–11
industrialization, as mechanism of inclusion in modernization theory, 60
insurgency: and coercion through threat, 153, 162; definitions of, xxii, 1, 33; globalized, media and, 97; grievances as causes of, in COIN theory, 26–27, 40–41, 57, 79–81; necessity of defining, 1; synonyms for, 3, 13, 154–55, 180; as type of communication, 153; as undefinable term, xix, 2–4, 32, 37, 180
insurgency, as type of war: as asymmetric war, 157–58, 177; characteristics of, 153, 157–58; and dynamics of escalation, 152; errors inherent in effort to define, 2, 6–28, 157; and implied lesser importance, 156–58; impossibility of defining, 2–4, 122, 154–55, 156–57; increasing frequency and importance of, 13–14, 68, 72–73, 155–56, 202n57; origin of in mischaracterization of French defeat in Indochina, 7–11; and political instrumentality of war, 15–17; political motives for creation of, 11–13
intelligence activity, as COIN tactic, 172, 173–75
Internal Security Act (British Malaya), 40
internal wars: as category, 37; globalization and, xv
international relations, critical school of, 110
Internet, and growth of radical Islam, 93
interstate war, classic, COIN theory as response to perceived end of, xiii–xiv
Iraq, British COIN in: collapse of order in Basra and, 123, 133, 134–35, 144–45, 148; initial COIN success of, 130, 131, 134–35; and “lost” COIN tradition, 122–24, 134–35, 136, 146–47; U.S. nation-building mission and, 147; and withdrawal, political calculation in, 135, 144–45, 146, 148
Iraq, COIN in: apparent success of Surge, xi–xiii, xii, 31–32, 70, 181; British critique of U.S. tactics, 132, 133–34; and COIN as narrative of triumph over adversity, 49–50, 51, 180–81; costs of, 179; and cultural knowledge, emphasis on, 72; development of, and British COIN tradition, 129–30; initial British success as model for, 130; and myth of British COIN tradition, 131–34; as nation building, 147; passing of into history, 179; and proportionality, loss of, 34; U.S. change of tactics in, 134; and U.S. model of modernization, inapplicability of, 66, 67. See also British Army in Iraq
Iraq War: and American system as universal model, 66; and apparent success of counterinsurgency theory, xi–xiii, 31–32; and revival of U.S. COIN capacities, 69–70, 74–78
irregular warfare, as category: and artificial limiting of strategic options, 24; and implied lesser importance, 156–58, 177
Islamist jihadism: appeasement of, as tactic, 109–11; and challenge of integrating diaspora states, 101–2; and global school of COIN, rise of, 71, 90, 95–99; as neo-Maoist type of threat, 112, 114–15; outlines of effective global response to, 111–17; response of global school of COIN to, 101–5; rise of, 92–95; state as site of conflict against, 112, 113–17. See also al-Qaeda
Islamist jihadism, religious and ideological motivations of: as anti-democratic, 113, 116; COIN’s failure to address, 103–5, 107, 112, 113, 114; necessity of addressing, 112, 113–14, 116; recognition of by law enforcement officials, 112–13, 114; as source of international threat, 113; tactics for addressing, 113–14
Israel, and radical Islam, 95
jargon of COIN theory, 82
Jemmat-i-Islami (Islamic Party), 93
Johnson administration, and modernization theory, 57
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), COIN operations in Iraq, 174–75
Karzai government, xi, 30
Kennedy administration, and modernization theory, 57, 65
Kilcullen, David: on al-Qaeda’s lack of rational objectives, 106–7; definition of insurgency, 2; on “disaggregation” of Islamist jihadism, 102, 112; on grievance resolution in COIN, 40–41, 57, 67, 80, 108; on grievances of Islamist jihadists, 109–10; on motivations of jihadists, 104–5; and rise of global school of COIN, 96–97; as soldier-scholar, 38; and writing of U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 209n31
law enforcement officials, on religious and ideological motivations of Islamist jihadism, 112–13, 114
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Nagl): on British vs. U.S. military styles, 73–74; on military flexibility in COIN, 51–52; and myth of British COIN tradition, 129, 130, 132; on Vietnam War, lessons of, 39
Lebanese civil war, intervention in, 69, 144
The Lexus and the Olive Tree (Freidman), 91
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 65
Losing Small Wars (Ledwidge), 122–25
Low Intensity Operations (Kitson), 126
Malayan Emergency: and appeasement as COIN tactic, 109; British withdrawal and, 99; as central case in COIN theory development, 38–40, 73–74, 76, 83, 108–9, 125–26, 129, 181; and COIN as narrative of triumph over adversity, 50; misrepresentation of British tactics in, 39–40, 136, 138; treatment of as source of methods and tactics, 39
managerial rationalism underlying COIN theory, 81–87, 107–8
manifest destiny: COIN narrative and, 49; post-Cold War impetus toward democratic universalism, 66; and U.S. impulse toward nation building, 84
McFate, Montgomery: on al-Qaeda, irrationality of, 106; on British COIN, 74; and counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, 129; emphasis on cultural knowledge, 72, 74, 75, 78; focus on British COIN in Northern Ireland, 72, 74, 129; and neoclassical COIN, 72, 73, 99; rejection of Clausewitz’s definition of war, 16, 43; and writing of U.S. Counter-insurgency Field Manual, 43, 209n31
media: globalized insurgency and, 97; and Iraq counterinsurgency, xiii; as mechanism of modernization, 62
medical metaphors for counterinsurgency, 20–23, 37
middle class, and pressure toward democratization, 65
military expedience, tension between political goals and, 44–45
Military Review (periodical), 77
military’s warrior ethos, and dislike of COIN, 68–69
modernity, globalization of, Islamist jihadism as response to, 92–95
modernization theory, 58–66; academic critiques of, 65; and American system as universal model, 59, 65–66; British industrialization as model for, 63; COIN as cult of, 57–58, 66–67, 182; COIN as imposition of, 80–81; cybernetic models of, 60–61, 62; developing state stability as issue in, 63–65; and elimination of political component in COIN, 85–86; on elite guidance, necessity of, 57; and globalization, 91; history of, 57–58; influence on U.S. COIN theory, 57–58, 66–67, 77–81, 182; Kennedy foreign policy and, 65; on mechanisms of modernization, 62–65; as nation building, 81, 83–84, 182; and neoclassical COIN theory, 71; as policy instrument, 62, 65; on political pressure toward democracy, 65; on political systems required for modernization, 59–61; research agenda of, 58–59; resistance to imposition of, 80
Muslim Brotherhood, 94, 95
Nagl, John: on British vs. U.S. military styles, 73–74; definition of insurgency in, 2; on grievances as cause of insurgency, 41; influence on U.S. COIN theory, 75; insurgency as type of war in, 20, 39; on military flexibility in COIN, 51–52; and myth of British COIN tradition, 129, 130, 132; on Petraeus, COIN tactics of, 55; as soldier-scholar, 38; on U.S.’s necessary revival of COIN capacity, 69–70; on Vietnam War, lessons of, 39
national identity: creation of, modernization theory on, 60–61, 63; cultivation of, as tactic in conflict against Islamist jihadism, 113; as necessary prerequisite for COIN effectiveness, 80
NATO inflexibility, during breakup of Yugoslavia, 24–25
negotiations, difficulty of, in environment of predetermined strategy, 26
neoclassical COIN theory: anti-Maoist orientation of, 70–71, 98–99; critics of, 99; and cultural knowledge, emphasis on, 72, 74, 75, 78, 80–81, 96, 129; and developing state stability, as issue, 63; globalization of insurgency threat and, 95–101; historical cases influencing, 72–74; influence on U.S. COIN theory, 74–79, 89, 96–100, 103; and Iraq occupation failures, efforts to explain, 100; and jihadism, 95–97; and modernization theory, 71; overview of, 70–71; and political and social conditions, importance of, 70–71; priority of holding territory in, 99; rise of, 71–78; and state as site of conflict against Islamist jihadism, 112, 113–14
neoconservatism, and American system as universal model, 66
neoliberalism, and globalization, 91
nonstate actors, irrationality of, according to COIN analysis, 107
Northern Alliance, support in overthrow of Taliban, xi
Northern Ireland, British COIN in: constraints on British escalation, 165, 167–69, 170–73; influence on COIN theory, 72, 74, 76, 133, 136, 181; as myth constructed by commentators, 126–28; as process of learning and adaptation, 149
North Vietnamese political goals and values, U.S. failure to consider, 25
Notes on Imperial Policing (Gwynn), 121
Notes on the Tactical Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion (Dill), 121
Obama, Barack: and Afghanistan strategy, review of, 29–30, 32; and assassination of bin Laden, 30
Operation Motorman (Northern Ireland), 171–73
overprescription in war, typological categories of war and, 2, 20–23
Pakistan, political goals of Afghanistan War and, 47
Palestine, British withdrawal from, 142–43, 144
Palestinian problem, and radical Islam, 95
The Passing of Traditional Society (Lerner), 57, 62
paternalism of COIN’s underlying assumptions, 80–81
personality cult, COIN as, 56
Petraeus, David: on British capabilities, 222–23n6; and COIN as narrative of triumph over adversity, 49, 50; and COIN as personality cult, 56; on effectiveness of COIN, 29; Kilcullen and, 97; new U.S. Field Manual and, 53–54; and success of COIN in Iraq, 31–32; on tactics of COIN, 29, 55; and U.S. turn to COIN, 76–77
philosophy of war, depreciation of, as consequence of identifying insurgency as type of war, 2, 14–17
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen, 91
political acceptability of COIN: COIN as cult and, 56; misrepresentation of British tactics and, 39–40; and political will to tolerate harsh measures, 141–42
political dimension of COIN: and definitions of victory, 145–46; global COIN’s avoidance of, 105–9, 111, 114, 116–17; ineffectiveness of COIN practice without, 42–43; necessity of in democratic society, 42; and proportionality, preservation of, 23, 34, 47, 182; as question unaddressed in COIN theory, 34, 42–44, 46–48, 181–82, 197n52; replacement of with technique and tactics, 78–87, 105–9, 121, 181–82; as underappreciated, xx
political goals, war as pursuit of, 26; British recognition of, 148; Clausewitz on, xxi–xxii, 4–6, 44, 153–54; and danger of strategic inflexibility, 26; and doctrine as source of decontextualized answers, 35–38; insurgencies as purported exception to, 15–17, 106–7; and tolerance of harsh tactics, 142
political goals and values of opposition, knowledge of: importance of as underappreciated, xx, 21–22, 25; as key to effective counterinsurgency, 21
political goals of war: awareness of, as necessity in applying strategy, 46, 48, 54; central importance of in shaping conflict, 44; grievance resolution and, 26–27, 40–41, 116; strategy as bridge between tactics and, 44–45, 53; tensions between military expedience and, 44–45
political order, Western, as grievance of Islamist jihadists, 109–11
political participation, as mechanism of modernization, 62, 63, 64–65
political will: British losses of, 142–45, 146, 148; British loss of in Iraq, 135, 144–45, 146, 148; as key to British success in war, 140–42, 145, 147–48, 148–49, 183; as key to success in war, 121; and time to learn and adapt, 141, 148
politics: definition of, 43; technocratic approach to in COIN, 80–81, 81–82
Politics and the Stages of Growth (Rostow), 84
The Politics of Developing Areas (Almond and Coleman), 62
population-centric counterinsurgency strategies, generic, ineffectiveness of, 22
Powell-Weinberger Doctrine, 69
proportionality: British emphasis on, 74; as constraint on escalation, 159–60, 165, 169, 177, 182; loss of, in Afghanistan counterinsurgency, 47; preservation of, as role of political dimension of COIN theory, 23, 34, 47, 182
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 39, 79
psychological attrition, as goal of insurgencies, 162
The Rape of the Masses (Chakotine), 8
rationalism, managerial: as ideology underlying COIN theory, 81–87, 107–8; as quasi-religious ideology, 82–83
rebuilding infrastructure and economy, as COIN tactic: as classic form of COIN, 55; as de facto nation building, 81, 83–84, 182; ineffectiveness of, 79; modernization theory as basis of, 79–81
repressive legislation as counterinsurgency tactic: downplaying of in modern COIN, 40–41; in Malayan Emergency, 39–40
revolutionary war (guerre révolutionnaire): French characterization of Indochina war as, 7–11; political motives for introduction of concept, 11–13
Revolution in Military Affairs, Gulf War (1990–1991) and, 72–73
Rwandan genocide (1994), and Western strategic inflexibility, 24–25
savior generals, trope of, 56
The Saviour Generals (Hanson), 56
scholarship by COIN supporters, as pseudo-academic, 56
security, provision of: as COIN tactic, 31–32, 55, 57, 67, 77–78, 80–81, 108; for home populations, necessity of in struggle against Islamist Jihadism, 115. See also government, legitimate
September 11th attacks: al-Qaeda escalation and, 175; and global school of COIN, emergence of, 89; Kilcullen on, 104; and rise of modern counterinsurgency theory, x–xi, 179; U.S. COIN escalation following, 173–75, 175–76; and U.S. COIN tactics, ethical issues in, 175; and U.S. system as universal model, 66
small wars: as acts of policy, 121; and British COIN tradition, 124; British success in, as function of political will, 140–42, 145, 147–48, 148–49, 183; definition of, 124
Small Wars (Callwell), 121, 140
Small Wars and Insurgencies (periodical), 138
social science(s): American, and modernization theory, 57; imprecision of, xxi
Social Science Research Council, 57, 62
Southeast Asia, U.S. anti-Communist intervention in, 84
Soviet Union, conflict following collapse of, as model for future internal wars, 73
state: legitimacy of, as mechanism of modernization, 63; as site of conflict against jihadism, 112, 113–17; tactics in conflict against jihadism, 113–14
strategic theory: definition and nature of, xx–xxi, xxiii, 33; as framework for analysis of COIN theory, xx, 180; as value-neutral, xxii–xxiii; and war as rational, goal-oriented practice, xxi–xxii
strategy: as bridge between tactics and political goals, 44–45, 53; COIN as not-strategy, 31–34, 41; definition of, xx–xxi, 33–34; degeneration into dogma, 46, 47–48, 54; necessity of context-specific judgments in, 23–27; objects of consideration in, 23
strategy, inflexibility of, as consequence of identifying insurgency as type of war, 2, 23–27, 31
tacticization, as product of categorizing types of war, 27
Taliban, difficult of completely neutralizing, xi
terrorism, as coercion through threat, 153
“Twenty-Eight Articles” (Kilcullen), 67, 96–97
United Kingdom: assimilation of second-generation Muslims as issue in, 113; economic decline of 1970s, 126; review of Iraq War policies, 70. See also entries referring to the British Army and British COIN strategies
urbanization, as mechanism of modernization, 62
U.S. Army War College, and COIN as strategy, 31–34
U.S. COIN: assumed irrationality of al-Qaeda in, 16–17; escalations after September 11th attacks, 173–75; impossibility of avoiding, 69; incompatibility of culture with COIN population-centered activities, 67, 73–74, 76; influence of modernization theory in, 57–58, 66–67, 77–81, 182; influence of neoclassical COIN theory on, 74–79, 89, 96–100, 103; necessary revival of capacity for, after Iraq invasion, 69–70, 74–78; overgeneralized COIN tactics in, 33, 37–38, 47–48, 85, 180–81; post-Vietnam distaste for, 68–69; Powell-Weinberger Doctrine and, 69; tactics after September 11th attacks, ethical issues in, 175; two schools of thought in, 70–71. See also Afghanistan, COIN in; global school of COIN; Iraq, COIN in; neoclassical COIN theory; The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
U.S. military: definition of doctrine, 35; Powell-Weinberger Doctrine, 69
U.S. military culture: flexibility of in turn to COIN after Iraq invasion, 75–78; incompatibility with COIN role, 67, 73–74, 76
U.S. system as universal model: COIN and, 66–67; critics of, 66; and globalization as imperialism, 92, 110; inapplicability to Afghanistan and Iraq, 66, 67; modernization theory and, 59, 65–66
The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: and COIN as cult, 56; and cultural knowledge, emphasis on, 72, 75; definition of counterinsurgency in, 33; definition of insurgency in, 1, 33, 37; definition of legitimate government in, 89; and democratic modernization as goal of COIN, 57; as effort to bridge past and future conflicts, 45; emphasis on generic flexibility, 51; and global COIN, 97–98; on grievance resolution as counterinsurgency tactic, 26–27; influence of modernization theory on, 67, 80–81; influence of neoclassical COIN on, 78–79, 89, 96, 97–99, 103; Kilcullen’s contributions to, 97; McFate’s contributions to, 43, 209n31; Nagl’s foreword to, 55, 75; overgeneralized counterinsurgency approach of, 33, 37–38, 180–81; and political goals of COIN, failure to engage, 47–48; and political motives of opposition, underappreciation of, 22; as product of political spin, 53–54; publication of, 70; rationalist assumptions in, 83; and religious motivation of jihadists, failure to adequately address, 103; separation of counterinsurgents and Host Nation in, 89; Sewall’s introduction to, 67, 97–98, 112, 119; statement of obvious general principles of war in, 52–53; on winning of hearts and minds, importance of, 86
Vacca, W. Alexander, 24, 26
Vietnam War: British refusal to join, 144; and COIN as narrative of triumph over adversity, 50; in COIN theory development, 39, 181; and modernization theory, 61; myth of British COIN tradition and, 126, 146; nation-building forms of COIN and, 81, 83–84; North Vietnamese political goals, U.S. failure to consider, 25; overgeneralization of COIN tactics and, 21; political motives for characterizing as insurgency, 12–13; U.S. strategic inflexibility and, 25, 26; and U.S. military’s distaste for COIN, 68–69. See also Indochina, French war in
violence, primordial, as component of war: Clausewitz on, 4, 44; and irrationality of ethnic wars, 16–17
war: Clausewitz on components of, 4, 22–23, 44; Clausewitz on nature of, xxi–xxii, 4–6, 44, 153–54, 158; as communication, 151–52; as interdependent dynamic, 158, 161; political will as key to success in, 121, 140–42, 145, 147–48, 148–49, 183; as rational pursuit of political goals, n Clausewitz, xxi–xxii, 4–6, 44, 53–54
war, conventional vs. nonconventional: equating of with rational and irrational conflicts, 15–17; as nonsensical distinction, 5, 6–7, 13–14; as product of Cold War ideology, 13–14
War of the Flea (Taber), 99
The War of the Running Dogs (Barber), 126
warrior ethos, and dislike of COIN role, 68–69
wars, categorization by type: errors inherent in, 2, 6–28, 36; as issue in strategic studies, 5; as substitute for analysis, 37; as theoretical impossibility, 5–6
wars, uniqueness of: Clausewitz on, 4–6, 22–23, 27–28, 35–36, 44, 154, 178, 184–85; and doctrine as source of decontextualized answers, 35–38; escalation and, 178; and fallacious scientization of counterinsurgency tactics, xix, 27–28; and impossibility of COIN theory, 43–44; and over-generalization inherent in “insurgency” as analytic category, 2, 17–23, 41, 54; and planning, difficulty of, 36; political dimension of strategy and, 34
Western movies (genre), COIN narrative and, 49, 50
Western values, apparent early triumph of in Iraq, xiii
West Germany, escalation against left-wing insurgency, 173
Westmoreland, William, 50
“winning of hearts and minds” as counterinsurgency tactic: British COIN and, 136, 137, 139, 141–42; centrality of to U.S. COIN strategy, 86; emphasis on in modern COIN theory, 40–41; global COIN rhetoric on, 108; and Islamist jihadism as neo-Maoist type of threat, 114–15; limitations of, 26–27, 79, 83; modernization theory underlying, 80–81; origin of in British tactics in Malayan Emergency, 38–39, 39–40; in struggle against Islamist jihadists, 115–16; vs. troop surges, 171, 172; validity of grievance and, 111. See also grievance resolution as counterinsurgency tactic
World War II: and Blitzkrieg, as type of war, 12; “guerrilla” warfare as tactic in, 19, 155
Yugoslavia, breakup of: conflict following, as model for future internal wars, 73; and ethnic wars as irrational, 15–16; NATO strategic inflexibility and, 24–25
al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 94, 95, 96