Failure and success in doing more
with less
Defence planners, naval practitioners and maritime security experts frequently bemoan the fact that European naval power has been in constant decline since the end of the Cold War.1 With no small degree of nostalgia, pundits look back upon the naval heydays of yore. Comparisons are drawn between the former order of battle and the current size of naval fleets. The common verdict: European navies are smaller and, hence, less capable of addressing the broad range of maritime security challenges than any time in recent memory.2
At first glance, there appears to be some substance to this claim. The two largest navies in Europe, the British Royal Navy and the French Marine Nationale, have suffered significant reductions since the conclusion of the superpower conflict.3 Other regional powers with relatively well-balanced fleets, Italy and Spain, have also found it challenging to maintain their full-spectrum naval forces. Meanwhile, the German and Dutch ‘mid-sized regional fleets’ maintain insufficient numbers and lack the readiness to conduct assigned duties in times of relative peace.4 At the end of the Cold War, the Royal Netherlands Navy figured prominently in the discussion of global naval power.5 Today, its truncated fleet qualifies to be discussed in this book on small navies. But what about the many naval services of small states across the European continent; which are all too often overlooked in the discussion of great power politics?
‘In many respects small navies are simply big navies in miniature’, Geoffrey Till explained.6 They face much of the same problems in ‘balancing resources against commitment’ as do their larger counterparts.7 Because the majority of European states significantly cut their defence spending in the decades following the demise of the Warsaw Pact, one might assume that ‘truncation’ and ‘decline’ must be the logical labels that describe the evolution of all European navies, large and small.
This article will outline the challenges small(er) European naval forces have faced in the post-Cold War environment. It will describe how small navies have navigated through a period of financial austerity on the one hand and a growing range of duties on the other. Finally, it will discuss the consequences this development has had within the context of maritime security and provide an outlook on Europe’s small navies as we move forward.
The end of the Cold War (1989–1991) constituted a watershed moment in history and ushered in a fundamental change in the global security environment.8 The indivisible threat to survival of the states on both sides of the Iron Curtain faded in lockstep with the thawing of East-West relations.9 In the absence of an imminent and existential threat, states identified new risks and threats to Europe’s security.10 Consequently, naval policies were revisited to address these perceived challenges.
On the one hand, navies had to continue showcasing ‘traditional’ warfighting capabilities to ensure a measurable degree of conventional deterrence.11 Furthermore, as part of the ‘military aid to civil authority’ as Ken Booth called it, the protection of territorial waters and the policing of EEZs remained a basic mission of naval forces.12 One the other hand, against the backdrop of a broadening and widening security agenda, an increasing number of governments sought to project security beyond Europe’s borders. In order to shape crisis abroad and prevent them from having an adverse effect at home, European naval forces also had to fulfil new and often unfamiliar roles.13 Power projection, in the form of military interventions, peace support operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, grew in importance.14 Many of these expeditionary operations took place at great distance from home and outside NATO’s traditional area of operation (i.e. ‘out-of-area’). Due to their inherent flexibility, scalability and the relative low risk attributed to this sort of deployment, naval forces provided a useful political tool to project power abroad. Increasingly often, European navies were called upon to conduct naval operations over great distances and for prolonged stretches of time.
In this period of relative peace, and in the absence of a peer competitor, the idea of ‘maritime security’ gained salience among Western defense planners.15 Under the impression of the attacks on 11 September 2001, the initial focus lay on countering the threat of terrorism.16 Soon other threats and risks were subsumed under the concept of ‘maritime security operations’ (MSO). This includes piracy and armed robbery; illegal trafficking of humans, narcotics and arms; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; illegal fishing and the illegal exploitation of maritime resources; as well as the damage to the marine environment.17 European naval forces often shared the burden of managing these risks with other agencies, such as coastguards, custom agencies and non governmental organisations. To this day, the division of labour, avoiding a duplication of efforts and integrating various maritime actors prove to be some of the knottiest problems to overcome.
While the scope of naval missions clearly expanded, defence spending dramatically decreased. With few exceptions, European governments readily re-appropriated funding to non-defence related areas as part of the so-called ‘peace dividend’.18 Consequently, military procurement was curtailed and force structures truncated. Unable to replace ageing platforms (ships, submarines, helicopters etc.) on a one-for-one basis, naval forces shrunk in size – or, more precisely, in numbers.19 The widespread shift from conscription to professional militaries resulted in a significant portion of the military budget being consumed by pay and pension; money that would otherwise be allocated to maintenance, modernisation and operations.20 Moreover, shortages in personnel caused further maintenance problems and readiness gaps. Consequently, naval forces, large and small, across Europe had to do more with less.
Confronted with these opposing trends, ‘European navies – as part of their national defence establishment – [were] tossed between the horns of several dilemmas’:21 (1) How to identify and translate security interests into meaningful strategic guidelines. And how to align them with the ‘core business’ of naval forces, namely war-fighting. (2) How to square the circle of a growing range of naval duties but decreasing levels of defence spending. (3) How to use and deploy naval forces in the so-called ‘post-heroic’ era, in which European societies are less willing to put their soldiers and sailors in harm’s way.22
During the Cold War, geopolitical constraints informed European naval policies.23 Although these constraints were removed after 1991, some states enjoyed greater local and regional ‘geopolitical freedom of action’ than others.24 Denmark, for example – her territory no longer threatened by invasion from the East – almost instantaneously shifted toward an expeditionary-minded defence policy. Norway, meanwhile, remained ‘wary of engaging in post-Cold War euphoria’.25 The country’s proximity to Russia and its different strategic culture meant that the political and military leadership remained less willing to abandon its traditional focus on territorial defense.26
The degree to which navies shifted their priorities was dependent on a host of factors: geographic and topographical considerations, economic and industrial capacity, interest and influence abroad, the political system, military culture and leadership, and not least history.27 Frankly, there are countless trajectories along which naval forces can develop. As Jan Breemer argued, ‘the number of ways in which European states could organize for [individual and] collective naval action is almost infinite’.28
Despite this fact, naval forces are commonly juxtaposed to each other to assess their capability and rank. ‘Ranking has important consequences in terms of categorising navies and more importantly their states: simply put, there is a general correlation between ranking of a nation’s navy and a nation’s status in the international system.’29 From this follows, the wish to identify paths to success; in other words, the ‘paradigm navy’, which to model other navies after.30 Where small navies are concerned, the Singapore navy, the Israeli navy, or New Zealand’s navy are often considered exemplary and worth emulating.31
However, it is important to note that there is ‘no one ideal navy, no single model, that can suit the needs and expectation of the great, major, medium, and minor powers […]’.32 Ian Speller stressed the fact that ‘[one] must avoid the assumption that there is one particular route to success, or that there is an ideal-type “paradigm navy” and that others can be judged according to how closely they adhere to this model’.33 This, however, does not mean that developing comprehensive naval policy and building naval fleets tailored to the needs of small states does not underlie certain commonalities.
Historically, small states have been able to draw larger powers into war. And small navies have had significant impact on the outcome of conflict.34 However, states that operate small navies are rarely powerful actors in international affairs. In fact, during much of the modern era they disposed of limited capacity to shape events both at home as well as abroad. Despite the previous assertion that all navies face similar challenges, many smaller European navies under discussion have specific, inherent limitations.
First, Till identified a ‘limited independence of strategic decision’ among small navies, particularly, ‘when up against, or operating in the presence of, much larger ones with incongruent national interests’.35 Second, small navies lack, what he called ‘critical mass’.36 Maintaining and operating small number of forces is less economic while strategically more risky. Third, small states with a small defence industrial base are also more dependent on help from abroad. Therefore, small navies often rely on foreign naval designs and systems as well as training and support. This also implies that
in dealing with new and unknown technology, […] they can afford to back fewer horses in the race than can richer countries. For them, playing with unproven technology is particularly hazardous; it is safer to wait for someone else to take the risks.37
Last but not least, national defence is a matter of money. The lack of resources has a particularly detrimental effect on naval posture.38 Warships are are among the most expensive weapon systems a state can procure and particularly manpower intensive to maintain and operate. While rich states, such as Israel or Singapore, can acquire the most sophisticated technology and most advanced military systems with relative ease, financially challenged states, such as Latvia or Ireland, cannot hope to buy large and powerful warships bristling with advanced sensors and weapons. As a consequence, states with small navies seek solutions that will hedge against these limitations as well as offset and mitigate strategic risks.
Over the past decades, sweeping budget cuts have been the norm rather than the exception for European navies of all sizes. In a comprehensive article on European naval power from 1996, Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes provided four possibilities for navies to deal with financial pressures.39
1 Settle for less: The easiest and most obvious solution is for states to cut back on what they expect of their navies.40 This can mean that a navy’s warfighting capabilities are consciously reduced or that expensive power projection and sea control missions are replaced by a less complex territorial defence and sea denial posture. Assigning navies ‘only modest missions, such as peacetime patrolling of European exclusive economic zones’ is another option.41
2 Jointness: The second solution is to create synergies through inter-service cooperation and integration.42 Daniel and Hayes explained that the ‘basic theory behind jointness is to reduce, if not eliminate, redundancies in service capabilities in order to reduce costs while maintaining capabilities’.43 They noted that interoperability has the potential to be a ‘force multiplier’ where, as Norman Polmar argued, ‘the whole is greater than the sum of the parts’.44
3 International cooperation: Integration also lies at the heart of the third solution. Technical interoperability, common operational language and procedures, unified command and control, shared rules of engagement, free exchange of intelligence, and concerted naval procurement and planning, are but some of the prerequisites for successful multinational (combined) maritime operations.45 Once political and military cooperation is well-established, small navies can pursue niche-specialisation. They can develop skills in specific areas while relegating more complex missions, ‘in which they struggle to maintain a competency because of a scarcity of resources’, to more powerful allies and partners.46 The ability to pool and share is a further consequence of bi-lateral and multinational naval cooperation.47 While it helps to ‘rationalize defense efforts and reduce costs’, it cannot compensate for ‘sustained drops in defense spending’, a RAND study pointed out.48
4 Asymmetric strategies and leapfrogging: This solution goes hand-in-hand with the idea of niche-specialisation. Unable to compete with larger powers for naval parity, small states can ‘rely on “short-cuts”, that is, to outflank the quality-quantity dilemma by adopting weapons or doctrine which can [deter] stronger potential enemies’.49 Leapfrogging – jumping several stages of technological evolution – allows states to cut defence expenditure while remaining invested in high-end defence technology.
Broadly speaking, all European naval forces have sought and implemented the above-mentioned solutions throughout the past three decades. However, against the backdrop of declining budgets and increasing costs to procure and operate naval platforms, downscaling measures were largely inevitable. Defence planners tried to compensate for the reduction in numbers by emphasising quality over quantity and by investing in state-of-the-art technology (leapfrogging).50 Furthermore, as a consequence of the widening concept of (maritime) security and the concomitant shift toward constabulary and other low-intensity operations, comprehensive warfighting skills were left to atrophy. States settled for less.
European naval policies also placed increased emphasis on naval cooperation and integration. They did so to compensate for shrinking numbers and to close capability gaps; but, also as a result of changing perceptions regarding the role of naval forces. Unlike during the Cold War, navies no longer had to ‘limit themselves to the classic roles of naval forces (i.e., protection of sea lanes, delivery of combat power ashore, etc.)’, Sebastian Bruns emphasized, ‘but [could rather] guard the global system and its underlying values’.51 ‘Traditional’ naval missions and functions, such as sea control or naval diplomacy, took on new shapes and guises.
Interestingly, a case can be made that this development benefited Europe’s small navies while it was of greater detriment to the larger maritime forces on the continent. A smaller navy can be more efficient and effective than a larger navy, Germond pointed out.52 While quantity, in material terms, has a quality of its own, it does not necessarily represent the most important criteria. ‘The critical thing is not the simple number of assets a navy has, but how that balances against commitments that it has to meet and the roles that this requires it to perform.’53 A large and powerful navy that is assigned a broad range of missions can be less effective in providing the desired deliverables relative to a small navy that has to merely conduct a limited number of missions.54 This is then often perceived as a small navy ‘punching above its weight’.
From the start, many of the small and smallest navies under discussion had limited national ambitions and foreign policy aspirations to satisfy. On the contrary, for most of the larger European powers, the demise of the Soviet Union provided a welcome opportunity to free themselves from their parochial Cold War duties and to capitalise on the gains of projecting political influence abroad.55 They readily embraced a vast range of military missions far afield; occupying a significant portion of their shrinking fleets. To no small degree, this also justified their existence in the new unipolar era. In effect, they shifted from a largely defensive-minded posture to so-called ‘projection activities’, which included, ‘expeditionary warfare, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and counter immigration’.56 For Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, the effort necessary to satisfy global and ‘supra-regional’ ambitions accentuated the loss of capabilities as a result of rash defense cuts.57
In contrast, the widening maritime security agenda provided opportunity for small navies to become more visible actors within the European and global context. By contributing to multinational naval operations, they could profit from collaborating and integrating with more powerful navies. Furthermore, small states were able to expand their maritime portfolio with relatively little risk involved – solving the dilemma of how to deploy naval force in a post-heroic era.
As Germond and others have pointed out, ‘[today] a growing number of so-called […] “small” navies possess the capabilities to operate within coalitions (interoperability), often under the auspices of international organizations such as the UN, NATO, or the EU’.58 What is more, ‘Small navies can […] reasonably compensate for their smallness, if they feel they need to, by banding together and learning best practice from each other.’59 The three Baltic States, Sweden and Finland, or Belgium and the Netherlands are good examples.60
In order to trace the broad development of Europe’s small naval forces over the period of time under discussion, it is important to distinguish between the different ‘categories’ of small navies in Europe. Brendan Flynn proposed a three tiered model: (1) navies of states with an annual defense budget in excess of €1 bn (e.g. Norway, Sweden, Belgium, etc.), (2) those with less than €1 bn (Ireland, Baltic States, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia) and (3) those with less than €100 m (Malta, Albania).61 All small navies are either: adjacent force projection, offshore territorial defence, inshore territorial defence, or purely constabulary navies; to use Eric Grove’s vernacular.62
Endowed with relative wealth, the largest among Europe’s small naval forces have been able to retain small, but still discernible, advantages over most counterparts around the globe.63 For comparatively rich states such as Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Greece and Portugal, membership in NATO, close ties to the US and access to leading defence technologies has offered some respite in austere financial times. Similarly, both the Swedish and the Finish navies are highly professional services, which operate cutting-edge forces, despite justified calls for greater defence allocation.
As maritime security operations have grown in importance throughout the first decades of the twenty-first century, even the most territorial defence-oriented navies have begun to deploy ‘out-of-area’. The Swedish navy, for example, has contributed to both the UN peacekeeping operation off the coast of Lebanon since 2007 and the EU’s anti-piracy operation Atalanta in the Western Indian Ocean.64 Meanwhile, the Irish Naval Service recently took part in its first multi-national naval operation (EU-led operation Sophia). Aimed at combatting illegal human trafficking, Finland has also deployed a boarding team to operation Sophia in the Mediterranean.
Admission to the EU and NATO has offered Latvia, Croatia, Romania and others the opportunity to partake in cooperative naval development (contributing to NATO’s standing naval forces or EU’s naval operations). However, for many former communist countries – some of which only gained independence in the 1990s – building and operating naval forces proved to be a much greater challenge. Fiscal limitations stand in the way of these small navies effectively addressing a greater range of maritime security challenges.65 More importantly, some states (particularly Bulgaria and Romania) suffer from systemic problems, i.e. flawed structural reform, lack of oversight and wide-spread corruption.66
Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the consequent return of great power competition, naval forces across Europe must again entertain the possibility of waging high-intensity warfare at sea. This applies especially for the small navies in close proximity to Russia (North Atlantic, Baltic Sea and Black Sea).
To address the perceived challenges that Russia’s military forces pose, NATO is seeking to re-vitalise collective defence.67 Meanwhile, Sweden and Finland are pursuing closer cooperation and integration with the alliance.68 Rather than focusing on peace support operations and the soft-end of maritime security spectrum, many European states are re-emphasising territorial defense, maintaining sea control or denying it to others. The greater the proximity to the sharp end of the conflict between Russia and the West, the less ‘geopolitical freedom of action’ states enjoy and the more compelling the need for credible warfighting capabilities.
Consequently, the Scandinavian states are in the process of shifting back to more traditional interpretations of naval power. Reintroducing conscription, standing-up coastal defences, investing in high-end platforms and strengthening military interoperability are attempts at offsetting perceived disadvantages. It is important to note that these rich countries can take technological risks and modernise their fleets more easily than can the other small navies under discussion. Moreover, the respective militaries already deploy a range of multi-purpose assets which can effectively operate in contested environments.69
For some of the financially challenged littoral states of the Baltic Sea and Black Sea, attaining credible warfighting capabilities is a far more troubling proposition. While naval capabilities of the past might have been sufficient for peace-time operations, they need to be reshaped to address future challenges. It will be a tall order to acquire the offensive and defensive weapon systems that can provide a credible deterrent vis-à-vis Russia in the respective theatres. Procuring modern anti-ship missiles, much less capable surface combatants, submarines, helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft appears to be beyond the reach for some of these countries.70
Further afield, the small navies of other NATO members are also refocusing on fulfilling their treaty obligations. However, being located at some distance from Russia’s borders – and under the impression of a host of different security concerns – their respective shift towards the high-end is less pronounced. The Portuguese navy, for example, has successfully recapitalised its fleet.71 Today, relative to other navies, it showcases a greater proficiency in conducting both low-end as well as high-end missions than its predecessor three decades ago.72 The Slovenian naval service, meanwhile, has displayed impressive resourcefulness by deploying one of its two small patrol boats as part of a multinational operation in the Mediterranean. Following on its heels, Croatian navy missile boats have joined NATO exercises and operation Sea Guardian.
This brief overview suggests that declining defence budgets did not necessarily translate into small(er) navies surrendering their ability to address Europe’s security challenges. In fact, it is no stretch to say that small naval forces have enjoyed a measurable degree of success in addressing maritime security challenges over the past three decades. Despite an austere financial environment, some states have been able to comprehensively modernise their small fleets. Others have expanded the breadth and reach of naval operations, by assuming considerable responsibility in NATO-, EU- and UN-led maritime operations. In fact, it can be argued that small naval services today are capable of conducting a wider range of maritime missions together with other military services and civilian agencies of allies and partners than their Cold War equivalents. Thus, they have added a net value to Europe’s security.
However, by emphasising missions on the lower end of the intensity spectrum for more than two decades, all navies under discussion relinquished critical capabilities, necessary to prevail in high-intensity warfare. Even for the richest among Europe’s small states, regaining some of these proficiencies promises to be an arduous and protracted process. In the case of the former communist states, the lack of resources and systemic problems linked to structural deficiencies already limit their ability to maintain modern and relatively well-balanced navies. The need to reinvest in the high end throws their material and structural weaknesses into stark relief. A detailed analysis of each navy would take us outside the confines of this chapter. However, the case studies provided elsewhere in this book provide valuable insight in understanding the role and capabilities of smaller European naval forces.
As we look toward the future, the range of duties will hardly decrease. Despite the current shift back toward warfighting, ‘contributing to the preservation of a dynamic global maritime system in cooperation with others’, as Niklas Granholm put it, is unlikely to lose any of its relevance.73 Security challenges related to migration, illegal trafficking of arms and terrorism will warrant close attention. Basic constabulary duties and protecting sovereign rights at sea will remain a ‘core function of smaller naval powers’, and must be understood and conceptualised as such by scholars and practitioners alike.74
In the long run, states will no longer be able to settle for less, as they have done in the past. In order to address the shared maritime security challenges of the twenty-first century, Europe’s small navies must maintain the willingness and capacity to conduct low-end missions. At the same time, they need to expand their capabilities to hold their own in high-threat environments. Their success will continue to depend on the levels of defence spending, adroit appropriation and allocation of available funds, prudent procurement decisions and oversight, as well as increased collaboration and integration with allies and partners.
1 Stephan F. Larrabee et al., NATO and the Challenges of Austerity (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2012). Bryan McGrath, ‘NATO at Sea: Trends in Allied Naval Firepower’, www.aei.org/publication/nato-at-sea-trends-in-allied-naval-power/; Terjesen, Bjørn and Øystein Tunsjø, ed., The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline (Oslo, 2012), https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/99815/OF_6_2012_nett.pdf?sequence=1.
2 Overview of development and assessment can be found in Jeremy Stöhs, ‘Into the Abyss? European Naval Power in the Post-Cold War Era’, Naval War College Review Volume 71, no. 3 (2018), pp. 13–39.
3 The Royal Navy operated an escort fleet of 48 large surface combatants. By 2018, it has shrunk to 19. The Marine Nationale counted 38 cruisers, destroyers and frigates. Meanwhile, this number has been scaled back to 15.
4 ‘Operationally, the strain on the [navies’] depleted front-line forces has been demonstrated by the “gapping” of certain standing commitments to allow warships to be released for increasingly important NATO taskings. Offshore patrol vessels and auxiliaries have also been allocated to duties previously assigned to frigates and destroyers.’ Conrad Waters, ed., Seaforth World Naval Review 2017 (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2016), p. 73. Naval Today, ‘Dutch naval ships will not take part in Atalanta in 2018’, navaltoday.com, 9 March 2018, https://navaltoday.com/2018/03/09/dutch-naval-ships-will-not-take-part-in-atalanta-in-2018/.
5 Bernard Prezelin, A.D. Baker and Jean Labayle Couhat, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 1990/91: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament, 8th English-language ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. xvi.
6 Geoffrey Till, ‘Are Small Navies Different?’, in Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller (eds.), Small Navies. Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace (London: Ashgate, 2014), p. 31.
7 Ibid.
8 Joachim Krause, ‘The Times They are a Changin’ – Fundamental Structural Change in International Relations as a Challenge for Germany and Europe’, SIRIUS, no. 1 (2017), www.degruyter.com/view/j/sirius.
9 ‘As the risks were essentially of a regional character, there was no longer certainty of identical responses to them in the various [capitals in Europe].’ Willem van Eekelen, ‘Which Security Strategy for Europe?’, in Gert de Nooy, The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 12. Jan Breemer, ‘European Naval Power after the Cold War: Some not so Common Interests and Risks’, in de Nooy, The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, p. 55.
10 Willem van Eekelen, ‘Which Security Strategy for Europe?’, in de Nooy, The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, 11f.
11 Anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, mine warfare, amphibious assault, naval gunfire support.
12 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, [1977] 2015), p. 17.
13 HM Ministry of Defence, ‘Strategic Defence Review’ (London, 1998), chapt. 5.
14 Basil Germond expands on the projection of normative power beyond Europe’s border in Germond, The Maritime Dimension of European Security (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 51f.
15 Ian Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 150f. Christian Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security?’, Marine Policy, Volume 53 (2018), pp. 159–64.
16 Ibid., p. 159.
17 Ibid., p. 162.
18 Both Greece and Turkey increased defense spending both in per cent of GDP as well as in overall terms throughout the late 1990s and up until the financial crisis in 2008–2009. Based on SIPRI data see Jeremy Stöhs, The Decline of European Naval Forces: Challenges to Sea Power in an Age of Fiscal Austerity and Political Uncertainty (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), pp. 107–24.
19 It is important to note that while the number of vessels might have decreased, the total tonnage of some navies has actually increased over time. In 1990, all vessels (excluding tugs etc.) of the Bundesmarine figured for a combined displacement of roughly 156,000 tons. Much criticised for its ‘small’ size, today’s Deutsche Marine weighs in at an accreted 185,000 tons – an increase of nearly 20 per cent.
20 Cost for personnel commonly amounts to more than half of a navy’s budget. For example, the Irish naval service spends more than 50 per cent on pay and pension whereas overhead costs for personnel has at times consumed more than two-thirds of the Italian navy’s budget.
21 Gert de Nooy, ‘Introduction: The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War’, in de Nooy, The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, p. 6.
22 Ibid., p. 6.
23 James D. Watkins, ‘The Maritime Strategy in 1984’, in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, Naval War College Newport Papers 33 (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2008), p. 84f.
24 Håkon Lunde Saxi, Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy: A Comparative Study of the Post-Cold War Era, Defence and security studies 2010/1 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2010), p. 13f.
25 Ibid., p. 10.
26 Ibid.
Certain states have, for various reasons, eschewed traditional naval expansion. The two classic cases are Japan and the Federal German Republic. Both have been considerable sea powers in their time and both could be greater sea powers than they are today if they chose.
Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1990), p. 227
28 Jan Breemer, ‘European Naval Power after the Cold War: Some not so Common Interests and Risks’, in de Nooy, The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, 76
29 Germond, The Maritime Dimension of European Security, p. 46.
30 The US Navy, its fleet structure and operational procedures are widely emulated by other large and medium-sized naval forces, the Chinese Navy (PLAN) being a noteworthy example. In Europe, the Royal Navy has built a fleet ‘that looks strikingly like the US Navy, except a fraction of its size’. McGrath, ‘NATO at Sea: Trends in Allied Naval Firepower’, np.
31 Swee Lean and Collin Koh, ‘“Best Little Navy in Southeast Asia”: The Case of the Republic of Singapore Navy’, in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, pp. 117–132. Ross Gillet, ‘The Royal New Zealand Navy: The Best Small Nation Navy’, in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad Waters (Barnsley, England: Seaforth Publishing, 2013), pp. 42–51.
32 Donald Daniel quoted in Jan Breemer, ‘European Naval Power after the Cold War: Some not so Common Interests and Risks’, in de Nooy, The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, p. 57.
33 Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare, p. 197.
34 The role of the Continental Navy during the American War of Independence is a case in point.
35 Geoffrey Till, ‘Are Small Navies Different?’, in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, 23.
36 Ibid., p. 23.
37 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 99–100.
38 The difficulty of some of the Black Sea littoral states to find a replacement for their ageing surface combatants is indicative of this problem.
39 Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes, ‘Towards a West European Navy: Organizational and Operational Issues’, in de Nooy, The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, pp. 90–91.
40 Ibid., p. 90.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Norman Polmar, ‘The Measurement of Naval Strength in the Twenty-First Century’, in The Changing Face of Maritime Power, ed. Andrew M. Dorman, M.L.R. Smith and Matthew Uttley (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 1999), p. 141.
45 DoD Dictionary defines the term ‘combined’ as ‘two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies operating together’. Department of Defense, ‘DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’, p. 43.
46 Chris Pagenkopf, ‘Cooperation Is the Key to NATO’s Future’, Naval Institute Proceedings, September (2014), np.
‘Pooling & Sharing’ is a […] concept which refers to Member States-led initiatives and projects to increase collaboration on military capabilities. The pooling of capabilities occurs when several Member States decide to use capabilities – either nationally owned or multi-nationally procured – on a collective basis. Sharing or more precisely role-sharing is when some Member States relinquish some capabilities with the assumption or the guarantee that other countries will make them available when necessary.
European Defence Agency, ‘EDA’s Pooling & Sharing: Fact sheet’
(Brussels, 2013), p. 1
48 Larrabee et al., NATO and the Challenges of Austerity, p. xvii.
49 Daniel and Hayes, ‘Towards a West European Navy: Organizational and Operational Issues’, in de Nooy, The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, p. 91.
50 The numerous sophisticated air-defense frigates and destroyers that were introduced throughout Europe during the late 1990s and early 2000s are examples of this process. The extensive measures of signature reduction applied to Norway’s Skjold-class FAC and Sweden’s Visby-class corvette are aimed at offsetting capability gaps.
51 Sebastian Bruns, US Naval Strategy and National Security: The Evolution of American Maritime Power, First edition, Naval policy and history (London: Routledge, 2018), 185.
52 Basil Germond, ‘Small Navies in Perspective: Deconstructing the Hierarchy of Naval Forces’, in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, p. 37.
53 Till, ‘Are Small Navies Different?’, in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, p. 24.
54 Till, Seapower, p. 119.
55 Geoffrey Till and Martin Robson, ‘UK Air-Sea Integration in Libya, 2011: A Successful Blueprint for the Future?’, Corbett Paper, No 12 (2013).
56 Germond, The Maritime Dimension of European Security, p. 57.
57 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin, 1994). Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, ‘Defense White Paper 2000’ (Centro de Publicaciones, Madrid, 2000).
58 Germond, ‘Small Navies in Perspective: Deconstructing the Hierarchy of Naval Forces’, in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, pp. 40–41.
59 Till, ‘Are Small Navies Different?’ in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, p. 29.
60 All three Baltic States have focused on mine warfare capabilities. While they contribute to NATO’s standing mine countermeasure group, all three navies lack the funds to develop significant capabilities in other areas. Meanwhile, Finland and Sweden have been deepening their defence cooperation in the maritime realm in recent years. While both are members of Northern Defense Cooperation, the two states have agreed to create a bilateral standing Naval Task Group. Finally, Belgium and the Netherlands have probably the most comprehensive naval cooperation to date. They have placed their naval forces under a single command as part of BeNeSam (Belgisch-Nederlandse marinesamenwerking). Anselm J. van der Peet, Out-Of-Area: De Koninklijke Marine en multinationale vlootoperaties 1945–2001, Werken uitgegeven door de Commissie voor Zeegeschiedenis XXIII (Franeker: Uitgeverij Van Wijnen, 2017).
61 Brendan Flynn at Small Navies Conference, 17 January 2018, Kings College London.
62 Ranking proposed in Grove, The Future of Sea Power, 236–41. Qualifying remarks by Grove in Eric Grove, ‘The Ranking of Smaller Navies Revisited’, in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, 15–20.
63 Compare Terjesen, Bjørn and Øystein Tunsjø, The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline.
64 On increased demand for international missions see Niklas Granholm, ‘A Small Navy in a Changing World: The Case of the Royal Swedish Navy’, in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, pp. 175f.
65 See Deborah Sanders, ‘Small Navies in the Black Sea: A Case Study of Romania’s Maritime Power’, in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, pp. 151–66.
66 See Deborah Sanders, Maritime Power in the Black Sea (Ashgate Publishing Group, 2014). On systemic problems in post-communist states see: Thomas-Durell Young, Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2017). On Greece see Jeremy Stöhs, The Decline of European Naval Forces, p. 121.
67 John A. Olsen, ed., NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence, Whitehall paper 87 (2017).
68 Stefan Lundqvist, Continuity and Change in post-Cold War Maritime Security: A Study of the Strategies Pursued by the US, Sweden and Finland 1991–2016 (Åbo: Åbo Adademi University Press, 2017).
69 Beth Stevenson, ‘Saab readies new anti-ship missile for Swedish Air Force’s Gripen fighters’, DefenseNews.com, 19 July 2018, www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/farnborough/2018/07/19/saab-readies-new-anti-ship-missile-for-swedish-air-forces-gripen-fighters/.
70 Jeremiah Cushman, ‘Resources, Limited Capabilities Challenge Baltic Navies as Russia Threat Grows’, cimsec.org, 1 April 2017. http://cimsec.org/resources-limited-capabilities-challenge-baltic-navies-russia-threat-grows/31550.
71 Kate Tringham, ‘Fleet regeneration: Portugal shapes up a modern, balanced fleet’, Jane’s IHS Markit, 2017.
72 António de Sousa Leitão, ‘The Portuguese Navy and the Portuguese Strategic Triangle’, NATO’s Fifteen Nations, Special Issue 2: NATO’s Navies in the 1980s, Vol. 27 (1982), pp. 72–74.
73 Granholm, ‘A Small Navy in a Changing World: The Case of the Royal Swedish Navy’, in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, p. 179.
74 Michael Pugh, ‘Policing the Seas: The Challenge of Good Governance’, in de Nooy, The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, p. 130.