The strategic role of the
Royal Norwegian Navy
This chapter will explore, explain and attempt to rationalise the strategic roles of the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) as a tailor-made navy for Norway’s specific strategic environment and strategic requirements, hereunder the balancing act between existential military-strategic requirements and other maritime and security interests that Norwegian naval forces must protect. According to Corbett, the strategic role or roles of a navy is determined by what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces, as, according to him, it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone.1 However, rather than a universal truth, Corbett’s revelations are merely rough guidelines applicable under specific conditions as, in the case of Norway, Corbett’s views on the relationship between land and sea power may arguably be inversely applied. First, as great power rivalry in northern waters is mostly maritime, the strategic interests of others do in fact determine the operations Norwegian armed forces must conduct and thus the kind of war Norway might have to fight. Second, by virtue of its geography, economy and culture, Norway as a coastal state is an overwhelmingly maritime nation with a distinct maritime outlook.
Therefore, any conflict in the Norwegian region will be dominated by maritime strategic thinking and have a significant maritime component. Norwegian maritime strategy is thus not subordinated to national military strategy as it, rather than merely complementing it, is a constant, central component within it. Consequently, Norwegian military strategy is maritime strategy. Ergo, any explanation of the Norwegian Navy’s strategic roles must necessarily discuss Norway’s strategic environment and geography, its grand strategy and how Russian strategy specifically and directly shapes Norwegian strategy. The chapter will approach the subject through evaluating empirical data on the basis of existing concepts and theory, using a strategic thinking model.2
The most common approach to explain a navy’s role in strategy is by using sea power theory grounded in definitions from the late nineteenth century when naval thinkers such as Corbett and Mahan developed similarly-minded, historical approaches to describe the broad roles and functions of navies by explaining sea power and its strategic role, use and purpose.3 Taken together, the reflections of classical naval theorists offer a wealth of information and knowledge on various aspects of naval warfare and have, for better or worse, influenced generations of practitioners and theoreticians. Thus, naval warfare and maritime strategy cannot be fully understood without a thorough understanding of the ideas of both great and lesser naval thinkers.4
Unfortunately, these sea power theories all have their origins in syntheses of historical events as naval history constitutes the experience and practice used to verify them. In effect, therefore, sea power theory has an empirical basis but no scientific verification given that their scope, that is, under what conditions and when they apply, remains scientifically unverified.5 One must therefore question whether these theories may be considered normative. Moreover, while Mahan and Corbett’s theories do appear and are generally accepted as general theories, they remain so only from a great power and open sea perspective.6 Consequently, sea power theory is indeed strategic thinking, yet they are developed for a specific context and a specific public. Thus, in validly inferring from contemporary naval strategy and application of maritime power, Mahan and Corbett’s theories – and other sea power theories – do not properly cover the role of small navies in general and the Norwegian Navy in particular.
Similarly, a common assumption in naval thinking is that a lesser sea power must necessarily compete symmetrically with its stronger opponent in order to accomplish their goals.7 That is a dangerous and erroneous idea – small navies have distinctive purposes, functions and characteristics in and of their own. As a small nation, Norway’s military-strategic aims are limited and distinct, allowing tailor-made naval forces for definite strategic circumstances and objectives – thus they do not have to engage symmetrically to have a strategic effect. Yet, even if sea power theories do not explain or clarify the strategic role of a small navy, they do provide us with a conceptual framework usable for explaining and clarifying this role, but only if we combine these concepts with other theories and a broader strategic outlook.
According to Lawrence Freedman, ‘Strategy is about getting more out of a situation than what the balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power.’8 If strategy is the art and science of using military force to achieve political goals by use of or threat of violence, maritime strategy is those principles governing a war where the maritime is a substantial factor.9 Determined by sea power’s role in overall strategy, maritime strategy thus prescribes the application of sea power to influence events ashore through what happens at sea or are delivered from the sea.10 A common claim is therefore that an ideal maritime strategy is fully complementary to national military strategy in describing how naval forces can make a strategic difference.11
To understand what this role is one must look at strategy as what connects strategic purposes, i.e. what one wants to achieve, and strategic conditions, i.e. those endogenous and exogenous conditions framing a state’s strategic options. Strategic conditions are nothing but the sum of strategic dimensions such as national policies, foreign politics, command and control, geography, financing, logistics, preparations (administrative, recruiting, training and structure), operations, technology, information and intelligence, the enemy, friction, uncertainty and time.12 Amongst these, geography takes precedence in defining, influencing and delimiting most other dimensions.
However, employing such an approach alone could result in the perception of strategy as a rather linear affair, and thus forgetting about what Edward Luttwak calls strategy’s ‘inherent paradox’ where the irrationality of logical contradictions is rational only when achieving strategic ends. Resulting in the main from the interaction between different actors and parties causing strategy to be highly dynamic where actors both adopt and improve while circumstances change, an established fact or way of handling the situation cannot therefore in strategy remain static.13 To that end, strategy is never linear, there is always a thinking, reacting and acting opponent and thus the logical solution is not always, and often not at all, the most effective solution. Consequently, this paradoxical logic in strategy exists regardless of actors or the conflict itself.
As per the longstanding Norwegian security policy doctrine, Norway attempts to maintain regional peace and avoid war in the north through what is often-times referred to as ‘the dual balancing act’, balancing relations with Russia between deterrence and reassurance achieved in the main through its NATO membership in balancing between integrating and screening alliance commitments.14 While simultaneously striving to develop and maintain armed forces that can successfully fight – alone and with allies – if war is unavoidable, the paradoxical logic of strategy is thus of the outmost importance in Norwegian strategy and strategic thinking.
As a small state, Norway’s strategy as an overall defensive or status-quo approach in its relationship with other states is to a very large degree determined by others’ interest in its territory, airspace and waters rather than Norway’s own ambitions beyond its interrelated grand-strategic aims of securing its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom of action.15 It is therefore Norway’s absolute and relative geographic position vis-à-vis major powers in combination with its strategic resources that determine whether, with what and to what degree other states might use military power against it.
All of Norway’s grand-strategic objectives – which the Norwegian armed forces should contribute towards in interaction with Norway’s financial, diplomatic and psychological means – are by nature defensive. As per the latest Defence White Paper, the Norwegian armed forces’ main raison d’être is to deter potential aggressors and to defend Norway and its allies against external threats and attacks. The White Paper claims that a modern force will – as part of a strong and credible alliance – deter potential adversaries and thus reduce the likelihood of a situation where Norwegian or allied security is challenged to a degree where it must be defended militarily.16 Furthermore, Norway must be able to handle security crises and attacks below a certain threshold by themselves, and maintain preparedness enabling its armed forces to engage an opponent in all domains. According to the Norwegian government, such an ability will, together with a clearly communicated allied commitment, deter potential adversaries.17
Such deterrence is achieved and operationalised through the concept of threshold defence, depending in full on allied support to withstand a military attack.18 From it, four levels may be deduced, all mutually-dependent and with necessary components of the systematic defence scheme the concept prescribes. At its foundation, allied support functions as the concept’s necessary foundation securing credible deterrence through the collective military capacity of NATO, which can be triggered through NATO article five.
The subsequent level prescribes necessary reinforcement, demanding plans for their transportation, reception, staging and utilisation. As such, strategic warning time is of the essence and a significant, determining aspect in affecting both the composition and capabilities of Norway’s own defence and what resources and timeframes are realistic regarding reinforcements. Alignment of Norway’s ability to receive reinforcements with its allies’ timeline concerning both force availability and ability to project them is therefore key.
The following level concerns maintenance of the national first line defence: as allied forces are not present in Norway on a permanent basis, and as reinforcements will not appear overnight, Norway’s first line of defence is in the end its own armed forces – the credibility of which rests on its ability to engage immediately and efficiently in all domains. As such a defence for obvious reasons cannot include marked weaknesses for an opponent to exploit, it must therefore be complimentary and balanced between both domains and possible threats while including a wide spectrum of capabilities and means developed in peacetime.
Meanwhile, the top level of the Norwegian threshold defence concept figures the continuous and ongoing activities relating to intelligence and surveillance. Aiming at recognising and identifying any preparations for the use of force against Norway as early as possible, it is on this information the timely manner of any effective and efficient utilisation of Norway’s military capabilities and simultaneous commencement of its reinforcement plans ultimately depend.19
Norway’s military strategy is thus in sum primarily about visualising and communicating that the cost related to violating its sovereignty or infringing on its territorial integrity is larger than the benefits an aggressor may achieve.20 Norwegian strategy has revolved around such a paradigm for 50 years with the sole purpose of preventing war in or against Norway.
Unfortunately, the reality markedly differs from the idealised and utopian perceptions upon which the Norwegian threshold defence concept is based. An aggressor’s cost-benefit calculation of the Norwegian deterrence scheme is not limited to the sum of Norwegian destructive power versus their expected losses in obtaining their strategic objectives. In addition, different force structures and capabilities offer varying abilities to inflict damage while simultaneously influencing the opponent’s threat evaluation – in other words to what extent it considers Norway an interesting, prioritised or even necessary military target in a great power conflict. What deters bilateral use of military power against Norway is thus not the same as what deters aggression against Norway in a great power conflict. Furthermore, a force structure effectively contributing towards preventing war is not necessarily the most effective structure to attain Norwegian strategic objectives in war.
In the main, deterrence may be regarded in its simplest form as threats – the essence of which is balance between losses one would risk and benefits one could attain – in order to prevent your opponent’s willingness to act. As risk in this instance is cost multiplied with probability, the purpose of deterrence is to prevent the use of power through presenting the aggressor with an unfavourable ratio of cost versus benefit.21 While considered the traditional view of deterrence, it is also an approach fraught with danger: Given the impossibility of measuring the effect of deterrence, the only viable measurement parameters are retrospective and non-conclusive. Deterrence thus rest on beliefs and assumptions rather than validated theories and established facts.22
Another approach to understand deterrence is to view it as part of a strategy to manage conflicts. Deterrence then no longer concerns solely a cost-benefit calculus, but also efforts in controlling military, political and economic relationships and dimensions in a conflict so that one may prevent escalation into war until an opportunity to resolve the conflict arises. In such a perspective, deterrence becomes a means towards controlling a conflict, not preventing it. As there is always some degree of conflict between nations, preventing conflict altogether in all domains and dimensions is accordingly impossible. Instead, a state may only influence what means and methods opponents use to achieve their goals.
Furthermore, as the world is a closed system with complex relationships between different conflicts affecting, reinforcing and changing each other in turn, focusing singlehandedly on one actor, threat or scenario alone will likely ignore other relevant, external factors. Moreover, conflicts between countries are not static: even small and unimportant conflicts may escalate into full-scale warfare as even abstract but important factors such as national honour come into play. Thus, conflicts have an inherent tendency to escalate, particularly considering the actions of the opponent as out-of-hand or if their actions influence events well beyond the scope of the conflict itself.23 Deterrence through cost-benefit balancing and calculation is obviously a main component in any conflict management strategy, however, is not the only component. Other viable deterring tools include canalising the conflict, reassurance and appeasement, coercion, persuasion and even preventive warfare. Only when considering these other means in combination may any given state design a war-preventing policy and strategy that is both credible and lasting.24
Regardless of whether viewing deterrence in isolation or as part of a comprehensive strategy for conflict management, deterrence in essence is about punishment and denial. Whereas deterring through punishment entails maximising the cost an opponent would suffer if resorting to arms, the alternative of deterring through denial aims at minimising the advantages the opponent could achieve.25 Even if deterrence strategies may vary in means – including operational and tactical choices – their effectiveness ultimately depends upon the perception of credibility, namely the mutually-dependent relationship between the capacity to use force and the will to use it if necessary. For this reason, if a state’s capacity or will is lacking, a credible threat of potential costs and suffering for an aggressor does not exist and hence deterrence measures as part of any overall deterrence strategy is in vain.
Simultaneously, both credibility factors depend on communication. Deterrence usually fails because of deficient ability to communicate capacity, will or expectation. Theoretically, one can differentiate between deterrence resulting from observable facts and deterrence resulting from a clearly communicated strategy. While a state’s perception of another’s communication may not be as intended by the communicator, a communicated deterrence strategy at any rate remains more predictable, thus both cheaper and more credible. In consequence, evaluation of how communications are internalised is important to avoid miscommunication, misunderstandings and failing deterrence. Thus, a state must strive to ensure that the recipient rationalises their behaviour according to the intended objective. To achieve successful communication, therefore, strategists must balance between both identification of red lines and their communication and balance escalation and de-escalation. If the deterring state does not get these balances right, then deterrence is likely to gravely fail and in fact promote rather than prevent conflict.26
If Norway is to prevent war through deterrence, it must work to deter two very different threats. First, it must deter a bilateral conflict – which ostensibly the threshold defence concept is well suited for if the assumptions it rests upon are valid. Unfortunately, however, several assumptions in the Norwegian approach do lack credibility. Whereas the collective capability of NATO requires that NATO is both capable and willing to assist, prerequisites for receiving reinforcements include that allied forces are both available, that they are allocated to Norway’s support and that Norway itself can receive and use them in a timely and secure manner. Meanwhile, the current preparedness levels and lack of resilience in Norway’s armed forces as the first line of defence necessitate rapid escalation on Norway’s part – even if the conflict is small-scale and non-existential. If not, Norway may easily end up in a fait accompli situation.
Finally, regardless of how solid Norwegian intelligence and surveillance is as the top level of the threshold defence concept, warning time is arguably an outdated concept. From the New Look reforms underway since 2008 emphasising increased readiness and combat ability, Russian forces have become highly able, capable, mobile and proficient in a wide range of offensive operations commenced without warning.27 Combined with Norway’s lacking preparedness levels, a strategic surprise attack is rendered both worthwhile and potentially a coup de grace.
Moreover, in international power politics there are no friends, there are only partners gaining from supporting other states through common interests. Thus, if the costs of supporting Norway outweigh the potential benefits or relevant interests, possibly no allies would come to its aid in the event of conflict in the north. Obviously, such an assertion is somewhat bombastic and there are of course many moderating circumstances and factors to consider when predicting future conditions, of which perhaps the foremost are reputation and national honour. A major power that does not stand by its allies or its obligations would lose credibility and thus also power on an unprecedented scale. While most senior political leaders understand this and do adhere to such Realpolitik realities, one should nonetheless refrain from excluding the possibility of state leaders yet again falling for the allure of appeasement – especially if viewing their nation’s power as unimpeachable or if the cost-benefit analysis is too superficially calculated.
Second, another kind of conflict Norwegian deterrence strategy must be prepared to deal with is wars and conflicts originating elsewhere – commonly and infamously referred to in Norwegian defence debates as the scenario of horizontal escalation. As escalation dominance depends on the ability to deploy dominant capacities successively so that one may maintain initiative in a conflict, Russia would, in a conflict with NATO, rapidly depend on her strategic nuclear arsenal to maintain any prospect of escalation dominance. To that end, Russia is likely to take preventive action to secure their Ballistic Missile-Carrying Submarines (SSBNs) and associated infrastructure in the North before a conflict renders offensive action against these key Russian assets likely, thus implementing their so-called Bastion Defence whenever they view an armed conflict with NATO as likely or if it has already erupted. From such a strategic dynamic, NATO does in fact not deter Russia from establishing and extending their Bastion in the north, NATO causes it. Given that the balance of interests would be in Norway’s disfavour, Norway similarly fails to deter Russia from implementing and expanding the Bastion and its corresponding A2/AD zones in Norway’s adjacent waters and territory.
In sum then, the above considerations demonstrate that deterrence by Norway alone is neither a relevant nor credible tool to avoid war in and by itself. Norway fully depends on its allies to deter and may employ deterrence only as one of many tools in its conflict management strategy.
The meaning of the very name ‘Norway’ as ‘the fairway to the north’ partly explains the RNoN’s strategic role. Norway is not a continuous piece of territory, but numerous small and scattered settlements along a coastline stretching across 100,915 km and 239,057 islands. Land communications are few and concentrated near the coast, and in many instances dependent on ferries to cross fjords. In fact, much of Norway’s long land frontier and territory is mostly impassable for large military units given that the territory is mostly mountain and forest.
However, if one sees the seaboard as a ‘frontier’, it becomes glaringly obvious that Norway has an extremely unfavourable ratio of circumference to area. Peoples such as the French and Russians can abandon their peripheries and fall back into the heart of their countries. This Norwegians cannot do, the bulk of their population lies along the coastline. Almost all the towns and practically the entire economic base is located here.
Thus, geostrategically, Norway is inside out: the seaboard is not the country’s outer shell but its living heart and a sea power can assault this long, exposed heart wherever it wishes. Within Norwegian territory, moreover, the sea does not divide, but links together so that a maritime invader may outflank any landbound defender. A strong maritime power is therefore Norway’s most dangerous opponent as it would master the approaches to its longest frontier and strategic centre of gravity.28
Norwegian military geography and what it entails has, since the Napoleonic Wars, where Norway suffered famine and economic collapse because of blockade by the dominant sea power, caused Norway to consistently aim at neutrality or being allied to the greatest sea power in the region. If Norway and its allies lose control of the maritime domain, Norway could be defeated regardless of developments ashore in Norway. Without access to maritime communications, the Norwegian economy would collapse, its people starve and its political freedom would become severely restricted or quickly coerced into submission. However, as 1940 demonstrated, if the Norwegian Navy and its de facto or formal allies are incapable of denying an enemy access to the strategic Heartland, then being on the right side does not help.
Today Russia is the only state constituting a major military threat to Norway’s existential political aims, although others like the US and many European states also have substantial interests in who controls Norway as controlling Norwegian territory and its adjacent waters provides the ability to threaten both Western and Russian strategic centres of gravity.
The Russian strategic deterrence concept is not only a matter of preventing use of force but also aims at limiting the potential for use of force against Russia through combining deterrence and coercion in one package, not only to prevent war but end the conflict on terms favourable to Russia in war.29 Strategic and sub-strategic nuclear weapons remain vital for Russia’s deterrence strategy in allowing Moscow to achieve escalation dominance and thus key in their ability to use military power to promote political objectives all over the conflict scale.30
As the possibility of a total war with a full-scale nuclear exchange would bring Ragnarok to both sides and mutual assured destruction (MAD), a war between nuclear powers will, hopefully, eventually force the opposing parties to seek negotiations. Consequently, short wars – preferably fait accompli engagements – for definite and limited strategic objectives will likely be the norm in the future according to many Russian analysts and Russian doctrine.31
To that end, nuclear weapons are useful to deescalate when objectives are reached or operations have reached a culmination point. Thus, with a nuclear threat, one can abruptly force the opponent to negotiate on basis of the de facto situation on the ground.32 In such instances, the overall balance of power is arguably not as relevant as the parties will likely fight with high-readiness forces already in theatre with most outside reinforcements likely arriving too late, i.e. after warfighting has ended and negotiations commenced. In such a perspective, then, war is not a continuation of policy with other means, but a means to improve the state’s negotiation leverage in diplomatic exchanges.
By such a logic, Russia considers conventional armed force as a feasible means to attain strategic objectives also against countries and alliances that do possess nuclear weapons.33 However, the key prerequisite for using escalation to deescalate is sustainment of retaliation capability and, to that end, Russian strategic submarines (SSBN) constitute the most resilient and important aspect of their nuclear triad. Thus, functioning in effect as the Russian centre of gravity, it is vital for Russia to ensure the SSBNs’ operational freedom and to secure their supporting infrastructure – both of which are in Norway’s backyard at or off the Kola Peninsula. In the case of an actual or possibly imminent great power conflict, Norwegian waters as such become strategically vital areas for Russia, the US and NATO, regardless of whether the conflict originated in the region or not. To that end, sea power remains NATO’s most potent military means relative to Russia.
As a continental power, maritime power projection against Russia mostly influences events ashore directly through attacking shore targets from carriers and submarines and indirectly through targeting their nuclear deterrence. Other forms of maritime power are not very useful against a state that does not rely on maritime communications unless the war is protracted in time. It is, however, commonly claimed that sea powers hold a critical advantage over land powers that eventually will make them prevail as it enables a maritime combatant to protract a war in time, extend it in geography and assemble a coalition able to field a superior landward fighting instrument in the end.34 With the advent of nuclear weapons this advantage was to a certain degree nullified as protracted wars would likely end in nuclear exchange, i.e. the more long-term effects of sea power have lost much of its relevance as a war-winning tool.
Though Russia possess significant long-range precision strike capabilities offering limited offensive power in the maritime domain, Russia does not have the capacity to utilise the oceans for projection of substantial power against other great powers beyond their nuclear weapons. Hence, Russian strategists still, as they have traditionally done, consider the ocean foremost as a moat and not a bridge.35 There are, however, some deviations from this generalisation. Use of the oceans for logistic support and for flanking manoeuvres supporting their land forces remains key, but such activity would, due to very limited capacities, be limited to coastal and local waters in immediate vicinity of own forces and under a defensive shore-based air defence umbrella.
The Russian concept for securing operational freedom for their SSBNs is commonly referred to as ‘the Bastion Defence’, originating from the dynamics of the Cold War in the 1970s.36 In the literature, the concept includes a Russian ambition to conduct denial operations forward to the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) line and to establish sea control east of the North Cape. Such a view is not only axiomatically held by researchers and experts, but remain the benchmark understanding of the concept in official Norwegian and NATO strategic documents and white papers – and thus also remain a dimensioning influence of national and allied defence plans.37 At an overall level, however, such an understanding, though not wrong, is arguably oversimplified and does not properly reflect the operational consequences of the Bastion Defence concept.
The claimed Russian ambition for control east of North Cape is imprecise at best, first and foremost given how sea control does not serve any purpose by itself but rather functions as a mean to allow operations at or from the sea. In the Russian case, sea control aims to allow both for operational freedom for its strategic submarines and the ability to conduct operations deepening and strengthening A2/AD capabilities – in other words pushing forward A2/AD systems and neutralising NATO capabilities already in theatre while denying operational freedom for Western submarines in the region.
While such objectives require sea control, the operations required to achieve them only require sea control when and where operations are to take place as opposed to permanent and all-encompassing sea control. The main challenge is thus not to control a definite water and air space, but rather to maintain a level of denial for a protracted period. Should Russia endeavour to establish general and lasting sea control throughout the Barents Sea as the commanding understanding of the concept suggests, they would gain no or insignificant strategic advantages, but increase the likelihood for loss of sparse capabilities.
Thus, as an all-domain sea control is not required to achieve Russian objectives, it suffices for Russian armed forces to ensure that any strike or theatre ASW capacities may only operate against the Bastion at high risk. If the cost-benefit balance gets sufficiently negative, NATO will either abstain from challenging the Bastion or be forced to accept losses to such a degree that their forces will quickly crumble away.
The purpose of Russian denial operations southwards towards the GIUK gap is likewise aimed at denying operational freedom in the region to NATO capabilities capable of threatening or striking their SSBNs and associated infrastructure. Other NATO maritime operations in the Atlantic are of less importance. Thus, NATO’s renewed efforts to strengthen the transatlantic link in securing transatlantic SLOCs are arguably erroneous unless one expects or assumes that war will be a protracted affair. In a short conflict, transoceanic SLOCs will not provide any substantial operational advantage and will as such unlikely be a prioritised target for Russia. Russian sea denial ambitions are therefore far from an all-inclusive ambition: sea denial is, as always, about raising risk to a level where probable losses surmounts likely benefits – but in this instance mainly aimed at NATO maritime strike and ASW capacities. Some commentators, and rightfully so, claim that the Soviet navy also was tasked to target NATO maritime communications, but not to an extent that would sever them. The operational idea was as a diversion and a method to reduce the concentration of NATO combat forces.38 Although this option remains viable on a theoretical basis, it is hardly so when considering the number of available submarines.
However, should a conflict between NATO and Russia develop into a prolonged, violent affair, the strategic basis for Russian naval operations will necessarily change as, in such an instance, interdicting transatlantic SLOCs becomes important and not only as a diversion. Still, regardless of the expected duration of actual warfighting, targeting harbours and railroads etc. facilitating movement of reinforcements would likely be more credible and efficient rather than going after ships at sea.39
Nevertheless, deterring or denying naval forces would neither suffice to protect the Bastion nor the military infrastructure on the Kola peninsula. Russia must also prevent projection of long-range air power and establish a favourable air situation throughout the theatre. Considering the military balance, they would likely aim at suppressing or destroying air bases and command and control infrastructure preferably through employing long-range precision guided munitions (PGMs).40 Never before in history has a surprise attack been so likely to succeed as now and with such serious consequences for the receiving party. Given the – almost – complete lack of protective precautions throughout NATO territory, massive use of PGMs in combination with strategic surprise may as such have significant and destructive consequences for the European continent as a whole.
In the maritime domain, a temporary or permanent elimination of NATO long-range airpower would contribute to Russian establishment of sea denial while simultaneously allowing Russian submarines and long-range bombers unhindered at worst or low-risk access at best to the Atlantic. Thus, not only enhancing their sea denial capabilities, in such a scenario Russia may possess the ability to project power – although limited and only destructive – towards the US homeland and NATO’s potential reinforcement forces. As it would allow a gradual influx of less capable Russian denial capabilities, i.e. units that otherwise would operate at high risk in an initial phase, a sustained Russian sea denial in the North Atlantic would consequently strengthen itself and gradually consolidate.
In conclusion, Russia will initially not attempt to establish permanent and all-encompassing sea control east of North Cape, nor will they pursue efforts in denying all kinds of NATO naval operations in the North Atlantic. What they will aim at is to deter NATO from projecting power against and into the Bastion while eliminating or neutralising those NATO capabilities that already hold access. To that end, the following operational concept for Russian forces may be deduced from the foregoing analysis of Russian room of manoeuvre:
• Massive, preferably without warning, use of armed force in simultaneous and multiple rather than sequential attacks against NATO air stations capable of projecting air power in the European Arctic.
• Presence of the Russian Navy’s most capable attack-submarines in the Atlantic – not necessarily to hunt down targets, but to raise the opponent’s operational risk and thus predominantly deny access through influencing NATO’s cost-benefit calculations.
• In due time, if the initial endeavour succeeds, strengthen sea denial capability through deploying less capable units as follow-on forces in a force dispositioning, not only providing resilience in their defences, but also potential destructive power projection well into the Atlantic and even towards key US infrastructure.
• Prioritise their most capable surface units and amphibious capabilities, which are both sparse and critical capabilities, in order to establish, strengthen and sustain layered A2/AD close to their own vital strategic objectives.
Russia’s concept for strategic deterrence is universal and includes coercive means to minimise threats against Russian interests in peace, crisis and war. In shaping their security environment, Russia will employ every available tool to promote strategic aims through utilising means such as economic operations.41 However, the only part of the Russian economy offering itself for power politics is energy warfare: through incentives and extortion, they can pressure other states into compliance in using energy supply as a weapon – a tactic often-times employed by Russia to obtain strategic objectives.
In 2013, the EU imported some 30 per cent of its natural gas from Russia.42 Replacing Russian gas fully is only possible if one both increases production in Norway and Algeria and supplements by liquid natural gas delivered by shipping. That would increase cost, but simultaneously render energy warfare a rather inefficient tool – and one which in addition could backfire.43 It is therefore likely that Russia will show restraint and only use such a tool if it is overwhelmingly likely to be effective.
It would be wholly another matter if Russia could control Norwegian gas export as well, as closing off both Norwegian and Russian gas would leave Europe dark and cold. Thus, Norwegian gas production is of vital interest for not only the EU and Norway, but also for Russia, rendering in sum Russian use of military power against Norway plausible regardless of the absence of both a bilateral or regional conflict.
In any conflict between Russia and NATO/US, Russian strategic submarines constitute the key arbitrator for Russia. Nuclear deterrence capabilities – and especially their strategic submarines – ensure continuous maintenance of Russia’s ability to prevent unwanted escalation while securing its ability to deescalate and enforce an abrupt end to warfighting when and if needed. Consequently, Russia is likely to take preventive action to secure their strategic submarines and associated infrastructure before a conflict renders offensive action against these key Russian assets likely. They will implement their so-called Bastion defence whenever they view an armed conflict with NATO as likely or if it has already erupted.
Furthermore, both the Bastion defence scenario and the energy scenario could happen in circumstances when NATO’s most capable rapid response forces are preoccupied or when NATO, or some NATO members, are unwilling to risk escalation and full-scale conflict given the high intensity warfighting reinforcing northern waters would demand. Thus, a rapid and ample response and support from NATO is not a given, Norway must to a large degree therefore be able to handle such situations by itself – unsupported and against potentially overwhelming odds.44
Beyond the above listed geographic and geostrategic factors, one must also consider the operational and technological approaches Russia employs in its strategic concepts. While this chapter does not leave room for an extensive exploration of such operational concepts, one ought nevertheless to consider that Russia would likely hold initial escalation dominance in every conflict involving Norway, determining what means they employ, when and where. In any war with limited strategic aims, which a war between nuclear powers mostly likely would be, the establishment of a fait accompli takes precedence.
To attack efficiently first has always been important in naval warfare, but as Norwegian resources and units today are very limited and impossible to replace in the short-term, a coup de grace has become even more achievable. Furthermore, it is utterly inconceivable that Norway could attack first effectively and efficiently unless warfighting has already erupted. Therefore, Norway suffers a double strategic challenge in the possibility of being subjected to a grey-zone warfare approach gradually reducing its will and ability to implement defensive measures while simultaneously needing to counter a full-scale and comprehensive strategic surprise attack in all domains.
Russian A2/AD capabilities and concepts, key to their defensive approach for securing their Bastion, cause three further major challenges for Norway. First, Norwegian forces must be able to survive and fight within a Russian denial area, which in open waters is only possible for submarines and other hidden measures such as naval mines. While such means are effective in the long-term, in lacking tactical mobility and thus being relatively easy to outmanoeuvre for an opponent determining time and space, they solely depend, against a single operation, on being in the right place at the right time. Norway must therefore necessarily utilise her geography, namely the littorals, as a force multiplier. Only by supplementing RNoN’s submarines with highly mobile units capable of hiding amongst islets and in fjords while simultaneously possessing the ability to deliver long-range precision attacks into open waters, may Norway in a cost-efficient manner sustain sea denial and contest opposing efforts of establishing sea control for a substantial amount of time.
Second, a Russian push to extend its A2/AD zone would require access to Norwegian territory, which is only possible through maritime power projection into its littorals. If Russian A2/AD capabilities are already in place in theatre having already achieved a fait accompli, they will turn Norway’s geographic advantages against any opposing force: it is therefore key to eliminate them before they get a foothold. Third, due to the combination of long-range precision strikes, few and vulnerable LLOCs, a likely unfavourable air situation and Russian open-water sea denial capabilities, Norway must maintain sea control in its inshore fairways if it is to have mobility, including army mobility, and logistic support. If they cannot protect these waters, they cannot receive landbound reinforcements, move them or their own forces, nor secure or resupply them or the civilian populace at an acceptable risk.
To defend Norway at sea and from the sea therefore requires very specific and specialised forces, but also forces that complement each other. In sum, then, Norway cannot fulfil its strategic role in the north without the capacity to conduct open water and inshore sea denial. Similarly, the Norwegian armed forces can neither respond to attacks nor sustain its own forces while protecting the population without the capacity to ensure sea control in Norway’s inshore waters. Finally, Norway cannot receive, stage and utilise allied reinforcements without securing their access to Norwegian waters while assuring their sustainment and mobility after they have arrived.
As Norway’s economy is one of the most open and internationally orientated economies in the world, Norwegian maritime interests are far from limited to the territorial defence of Norway. Maritime industries – namely oil and gas, shipping and financing, classing and insurance, yards and equipment, fisheries and aqua farming – collectively contribute to 31 per cent of Norway’s national outcome.45 Furthermore, ships or subsea pipelines carry 80–90 per cent of Norwegian export and import. Such numbers by themselves illustrate that the Norwegian economy is not only predominantly maritime-oriented, but also heavily dependent on a stable world order with set regulations for the conduct of business. Any major changes in the conduct of international trade and business could cause catastrophic economic and societal consequences for Norway.
Hence, international law and order, and the maintenance of a world order akin to the existing, is crucial for Norway, which is why Norway’s efforts in promoting, improving and securing international law and the existing world order by all available means are considerable and long-standing. Although the Norwegian armed forces are insignificant compared to major powers, Norway is involved in conflicts all around the world in order to promote its interests, mostly as part of coalitions or by other, non-military, means. Such involvement comes in many forms, yet sea power is and remains one of the most tangible and cost-efficient tools Norway has in its toolbox.
Simultaneously, Norway as a small although wealthy state with far-flung interest cannot afford in any foreseeable situation to build and maintain naval forces capable of effectively shielding, protecting or sustaining its maritime interests by itself beyond Norwegian waters. Norway is therefore dependent on allied support or of being part of a broad international coalition with the same objectives in support of the existing world order. To that end, the Norwegian government is acutely aware that its alliance membership demands contribution, and that it cannot base allied support on goodwill and common interest alone – certainly not if Norway’s opinions and interests are to influence allied proceedings.
Therefore, as previously outlined, the Norwegian Navy is prescribed with many tasks and missions in a national context to perform purely national assignments to which tailor-made forces are the most effective and efficient. On the one hand, such forces have characteristics and capacities that do not necessarily match the requirements of international or overseas operations. On the other hand, if Norway develops its defence structure towards international requirements it will end up with a navy that is poorly suited at worst and ineffective at best for its own existential defence.
The Norwegian Navy’s strategic roles, and hence force composition and operational capabilities, are a precarious multifaceted balancing act and an enduring dilemma in Norwegian defence planning and strategic thinking. This dilemma and balancing act between Norwegian capabilities to influence developments globally, maintain its sovereign rights and fulfil its defensive requirements, is not new. It has been a consistent dilemma since the Napoleonic Wars, although with significant variances in threats and others’ geostrategic interest in Norwegian territory, water and air space.
As Norwegian territory, air space and waters are vital to project power towards Russia’s SSBNs as their military centre of gravity – and likewise for Russia to project military power against NATO – Norway’s grand-strategic ambitions might very well be undermined or impossible to realise. If Norway’s allies cannot operate in northern waters, it could cause strategic defeat for Norway even if it maintains physical control over its territory. The defence of Norway is therefore neither an isolated affair nor is Norway only an importer of security: the Norwegian ability to influence the maritime theatre in support of allied requirements could be vital to ensure strategic objectives even if Norway itself is not the target for strategic offensives itself.
Given that Norway is a maritime nation through and through both geographically and economically, Norway’s strategy must consider the sea as a substantial factor in any armed conflict. Simultaneously, the strategic interests of others do in fact determine the kind of war Norway would have to fight and thus also the operations its armed forces would have to conduct. As demonstrated, Norway’s geostrategic position and interests indeed renders Corbett’s view on the relationship between land and sea power either irrelevant or even turns it inside-out in some instances.
As a small nation, Norway’s military-strategic aims are limited and distinct, allowing tailor-made naval forces. Such forces cannot be good at everything nor can they effectively and efficiently challenge a superior sea power symmetrically: they can, however, hinder a greater power from accomplishing its goals through focusing on specific tasks and objectives. Such tailor-made forces could provide Norway with significant ability to secure its own national survival and support its allies’ overall strategic aims while increasing the relevance of her partnership to the Atlantic powers of the US and the EU.
Therefore, the Norwegian Navy has been structured and thus evolved quite differently from most other navies in Europe in still maintaining a large fleet comparable with most other states, yet also a navy specialised for national requirements.
Nevertheless, Norway’s main political-strategic objective of preventing war remains the single most important factor determining RNoN’s strategic role, achieved through a careful balance between deterrence and reassurance. As per the required balancing act, the armed forces of Norway must be prepared and able to fight alone for days and weeks. Thus, Norway must not only maintain a military force capable of countering offensives in all domains alone, a complimentary force, but also a force carefully tailored to counter and survive attacks from Russian capabilities while utilising Norway’s geography to its benefit and robbing the opponent of the same opportunity. Simultaneously, such a Norwegian armed force cannot freely choose effectors and capabilities: if Norway establishes capabilities allowing it to deter through conventional punishment, Norway would more likely allure Russia into a preventive attack rather than prevent it. Hence, Norway depends on the development and maintenance of armed forces not necessarily logical prima facie considering purely military-strategic calculations and threats, yet which offer stout defensive power and resilience while reassuring Russia that Norway has neither offensive intensions in general nor aims to facilitate a NATO strategic surprise attack on Russia in the future.
1 Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1911: 2004): 13.
2 The model is based on Tommy Jeppsson and Inge Tjøstheim, Militärstrategiskt tänkande i ett småstatsperspektiv: En nordisk syn på militärstrategins roll (Krigsvetenskapliga institutionen, Försvarshögskolan, 2005).
3 John B. Hattendorf, ‘What is a Maritime Strategy?’, Soundings October 2013, no. 1 (2013): 5.
4 Paraphrase of Milan Vego, ‘Naval Classical Thinkers and the Operational Art’, NWC 1005 (2009): 16.
5 Berndt Brehmer in: Tom Kristiansen and John Andreas Olsen, eds., War Studies: Perspectives from the Baltic and Nordic War Colleges, Oslo Files on Security and Defence (Oslo: Institut for forsvarsstudier, 2007): 35.
6 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2nd edn 2004): 28–29.
7 John B. Hattendorf in: Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen, eds., Navies in Northern Waters, 1721–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 151–152 and James R. Holmes, ‘Small Navy, Strong Navy’, The Diplomat (2012).
8 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): xii.
9 Arthur F. Lykke Jr, ‘Defining military strategy’, Military Review 77, no. 1 (1997): 183.
10 Paraphrase of: Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy: 13.
11 Roger W. Barnett, ‘Strategic Culture and Its Relationship to Naval Strategy’, Naval War College Review Winter 2007 (2007): 32.
12 Michael Howard, ‘The forgotten dimensions of strategy’, Foreign Affairs 57 (1979): 975–986; Colin S. Gray, Modern strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 23–44. The list is not exhaustive.
13 Pharaphrase of: Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001): 1–19.
14 See Johan Jørgen Holst, Kenneth Hunt and Anders C. Sjaastad, Deterrence and defense in the North, Norwegian foreign policy studies (printed version) (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985); 8 for a thorough explanation of this balancing act. Also see: Hanne H Bragstad, ‘Avskrekking og beroligelse i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk overfor Russland’ (Master thesis, Norwegian Defence College, 2016).
15 Forsvarsdepartementet, ‘Prop. 151 S (2015–2016): Kampkraft og bærekraft: Langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren’, ed. Det kongelige Forsvarsdepartement (Oslo: Regjeringen, 2016).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Forsvarssjefen, ‘Et forsvar i endring: Forsvarssjefens fagmilitære råd’, ed. Forsvarsstaben (Oslo: Forsvarsstaben, 2016).
19 Ibid., 22–23.
20 Rolf Tamnes, ‘Et lite land i stormaktspolitikken’, International Politics 72, no. 3 (2015).
21 There are also many other reasons, often very different reasons, for why a potential opponent chose to abstain from use of force. Therefore, objectification of deterrence effect is impossible. See for an example: Roald Gjelsten, ‘Rammer for avskrekking’, Norsk tidsskrift for sjøvesen 117, no. 4 (2002).
22 Robert C. Rubel, ‘Getting a Grip on Tailored Deterrence: The World of Conflict Management’, Orbis 56, no. 4 (2012): 678.
23 Based on: ibid., see also: Carl von Clausewitz et al., On War (Princeton University Press, 1989), book 1, ch. 1.
24 Rubel, ‘Getting a Grip on Tailored Deterrence’: 684.
25 John Stone, ‘Conventional Deterrence and the Challenge of Credibility’, Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 1 (2012): 109.
26 Partly a paraphrase of: Dmitry Adamsky, ‘From Moscow with coercion: Russian deterrence theory and strategic culture’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (2018): 53–54.
27 For a brief but excellent explanation of the New Look reforms, see: Ina Holst-Pedersen Kvam, ‘“Strategic Deterrence” in the North. Implications of Russian Maritime Defence Planning and Seapower to Norwegian Maritime Strategy’ (Master thesis, Universitetet i Bergen, 2018): 45–47.
28 David C. Pugh, ‘Guns in the Cupboard’, in Årbok for Forsvarshistorisk forsknings-senter, Forsvarets høgskole, 1983–84, ed. Rolf Tamnes (Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 1984): 99–100.
29 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival 58, no. 4 (2016): 17–19.
30 Märta Carlsson, Johan Norberg and Fredrik Westerlund, ‘Military Capability of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2013’, Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2013 (2013): 65.
31 See Franklin D. Kramer and Hans Binnendijk, ‘Meeting the Russian conventional challenge: Effective deterrence by promt reinforcement’, (Atlantic Council: Scowcroft center for strategy and security, 2018): 4 and Timothy L. Thomas, Thinking Like A Russian Officer: Basic Factors And Contemporary Thinking On The Nature of War (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2016): 2.
32 Mark Schneider and Congressman Curt Weldon, The nuclear forces and doctrine of the Russian federation (Fairfax, Virginia: National Institut Press, 2006); Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’: 12 and Katarzyna Zysk, ‘Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy’, The RUSI Journal (2018).
33 Paraphrase of: Adamsky, ‘From Moscow with coercion’: 37–38 and Robert Peters, Justin Anderson, and Harrison Menke, ‘Deterrence in the 21st Century: Integrating Nuclear and Conventional Force’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (2018).
34 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the next century (New York: Touchstone, 1991), 67–77.
35 See for an example: Corbin Williamson, ‘Factors Affecting the Feasibility of a Warsaw Pact Invasion of Western Europe’ (Undergraduate Research Fellows Thesis, Texas A&M University, 2008): 62–63 and Christopher A Ford and David A Rosenberg, ‘The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan’s Maritime Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (2005): 385.
36 This concept did not emerge until about 1975, i.e. when Russian ICBMs got sufficient range to target the US mainland from Soviet local waters. (Jan S Breemer, ‘The Soviet navy’s SSBN bastions: Evidence, inference, and alternative scenarios’, The RUSI Journal 130, no. 1 (1985): 19.)
37 See for an example the security expert commitiee report: Forsvarsdepartementet, ‘Et felles løft: Ekspertgruppen for forsvaret av Norge’, (Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015), Richard Cantrill and Eystein Lockwood Meyer, ‘The JEF as a Force Multiplier: The Example of Joint Amphibious Response in the Nordic–Baltic Theatre’, in Rob Johnson and Janne Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit (London: Springer, 2019): 253–254 and John Andreas Olsen, ed. NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence (London: Routledge, 2017): 4, and 23–24.
38 Vladimir Kuzin and Sergei Chernyavskii, ‘Russian Reactions to Reagan’s “Maritime Strategy”’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (2005).
39 See Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, 2nd edn (Hampshire: MacMillan Press, 1989): 211. Although this conclusion is 30 years old, there is no change in circumstances that ought to lead to a different conclusion.
40 See Roger N. McDermott and Tor Bukkvoll, ‘Russia in the Precision-Strike Regime: Military Theory, Procurement and Operational Impact,’ in FFI Rapport (Kjeller: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, 2017) for a thorough and up-to-date summarisation of their capabilities and intended use.
41 Douglas Mastriano (ed.), Project 1721: A U.S. Army War College Assessment on Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe and Recommendations on How to Leverage Landpower to Maintain the Peace (Pennsylvania: US Army War College Press, 2017): 14–15.
42 CIEP, ‘Russian gas imports to Europe and security of supply – factsheet’, Clingendael International Energy Programme, www.clingendaelenergy.com/files.cfm?event=files.download&ui=9C1DEEC1–5254–00CF-FD03186604989704.
43 Mastriano, Project 1721: 15.
44 Already in 1983 Sir Michael Howard questioned whether NATO was able to deter and respond to a rapid conventional offensive. (Michael Howard, ‘Reassurance and deterrence: western defense in the 1980s’, Foreign Affairs 61, no. 2 (1982): 128.) Today the situation is far worse as the strategic objectives we would fight over is far less existential for most of Europe and as NATO’s rim is less capable of withstanding or delaying a Russian attack.
45 ‘Annual national accounts, 2016’ (Statistics Norway, 2016).