How small states use naval strategy
There can be little doubt that the Danish Navy is indeed small. Measured in tonnage, ship types and its ability to power project, the Danish Navy does not come within reach of Denmark’s closest European allies like Germany, the UK or France.1 That said, when labeling a navy ‘small’ the next question is naturally ‘how small’? Is it smaller than the Norwegian or Swedish navies or bigger? Both states have submarines, a capacity not found within the Danish Navy. On the other side, Sweden does not have any frigates at all, while the Danish Navy has the largest frigates in Scandinavia measured by tonnage.2 Another question could be, has the Danish Navy reduced or increased after the Cold War? The number of ships has reduced significant since 1989 but, on the other side, Danish warships have never been bigger, measured by size and armament.3 Today, the Danish Navy has the ability to project power more globally while, on the other side, it is almost unable to defend the Danish shores in the Baltic. This outlines the difficulty in comparing one navy with another.
Basil Germond has reviewed a number of proposals on how to categorise the size of a navy.4 The overall common nominator is power projection. The more a navy can maintain power projection abroad the higher the ranking. This can indeed be a solid way to measure the size of greater powers’ navies. However, smaller states tend to focus less on power but more on international institutions, cooperation, international law and diplomacy because power by itself cannot guarantee their security. This means there is a fundamental difference in the way smaller states use their defence forces compared to larger states. As Laurent Goetschel points out, smaller states’ security policy aims to minimise or compensate for their power deficits.5 Smaller states can decide to either follow a strategy of autonomy or influence, but because of their lack of power they cannot do both. If a state decides to maximise its influence, it can do so by following a cooperative strategy for example joining an alliance. This also means the risk for being dragged into conflicts the state does not want to participate in. As an alternative, a state can follow a strategy of autonomy or neutrality. This, however, might result in being abandoned by the greater powers in the system and therefore a higher risk for the small state to lose its present position.6 Translated into a Danish security strategy, Denmark might have followed a strategy of influence during the Cold War, because of its NATO membership, however in a balanced way. Denmark was a frontline state and therefore followed a strategy of influence with the aim of state survival and maintaining its position in the international system. At the same time, Denmark tried to balance its security policy by being a NATO ally on one side and recognising Soviet security interests on the other. Denmark therefore only participated in UN-sanctioned operations, mainly Gaza 1956–1967 and Cyprus 1964–1994.7 Denmark was a NATO ally with reservations and followed a balancing strategy to maintain a level of international political autonomy on one side and keep its position in the international system on the other.8
The change in European security after the Cold War gave Denmark the opportunity to rethink a new strategy of influence. A strategy aiming to improve its position in the international system without the need to address Soviet interests. A strategy focusing on the political ties with the US by participating in a number of US-led interventions and conflicts.9
This change of strategy had significant implications on the Danish Armed Forces, including the navy. It exemplifies how small states with limited resources try to increase their influence or position with a greater power. Such a change in Danish strategy did not come overnight, but slowly and incrementally over the decades after the Cold War; partly because building and commissioning completely new ship classes takes time, partly because a complete change in strategic thinking takes time to mature on the political level.
That said it is important to understand that Danish naval strategy after the Cold War has not only aimed at creating influence internationally. As Denmark does not have a coastguard, the Danish Navy also has a constabulary role in both the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic. Therefore, the Danish change towards a strategy of influence, and the implications for the Danish Navy, had to be balanced with the other tasks within the Danish Kingdom. While the threat and challenges decreased in the Baltic Sea, new and more complex security challenges arose in the Arctic.
This chapter will therefore argue that Danish naval strategy has changed directions multiple times since the Cold War. The 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s was characterised by a change towards a strategy of influence, peaking with Danish involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, in the beginning of the 2010s the increased international focus on the Arctic combined with Greenlandic aspirations for independence and later Russia’s new role in European security forced Danish politicians to implement a dual track naval strategy. A strategy with the aim on one side to maintain close ties to the US and on the other to be able to act more independently in the Arctic and corporate with other strategic partners in Europe.
To understand the changes in Danish naval strategy, this chapter will therefore look into five periods as follows:
• the 1980s: a naval strategy of balancing
• 1990–2001: the institutional decade
• 2001–2007: the strategy of influence
• 2007–2017: the beginning of a dual track strategy
• 2018: a dual strategy implemented.
The end of the Cold War was a strategic shock for the Danish Armed Forces. The navy consisted mainly of FAC, minelayers, coastal batteries and submarines, with the main purpose to withstand or delay any amphibious assault on the Danish eastern Baltic coastline and furthermore prevent the Soviet Baltic Fleet’s access to the North Sea.10 As late as 1988, a secret Defence Forces analysis pointed out that, regardless of the improved relations between the Soviet Union and the US, the biggest threat against Danish security came from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (WAPA).11 On a political level, the 1988–1989 white paper on the future of the Danish Defence expressed a concern that while the security climate in Europe had improved significantly this would also allow East European states to reform more independently, which then again could contribute to crises within WAPA countries with a spill over into NATO countries. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact was still seen as a credible adversary and the white paper therefore still focused on the sizes of the military forces between the two alliances.12 No one in the Defence Force nor the Danish political level foresaw the fundamental changes that were to begin by the end of 1989, ending a few years later with the dissolution of both WAPA and the Soviet Union.
The Defence agreement covering the period 1989–1991, negotiated in 1989, therefore reflected a traditional Cold War threat perception. Procurement was made, to buy new bottom sea mines, develop costal mobile missile batteries with Harpoon missiles, upgrade submarines and new close-in weapon systems for different surface ships.13
The 1989–1991 defence agreement specifically outlined the main purposes of the new patrol vessel of Flyvefisken-class; surveillance, mine laying, combat and mine sweeping.14 By the end of 1989, the navy’s main role was still to defend the Danish Straits and coastline in case of an attack from the east as a part of Article 5 in the NATO treaty. Denmark followed a balanced strategy of influence, avoiding any military involvement abroad. For the navy, this was best exemplified in 1986. Consideration was given to deployment of a corvette of the Niels Juel Class to the Arabian Gulf to protect Danish shipping during the Tanker War; however, the idea was abandoned by the Danish prime minister with the argument that the ships were not designed for such a mission.15 Despite this, in 1990 the same ship class was deployed to the Arabian Gulf as a part of Operation Desert Shield/Storm.16
As the Cold War ended, the Danish security focus changed rapidly. With German unification in 1990, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, Denmark’s role as one of NATO’s frontline states ended.17
The 1993–1994 Defence Agreement pointed out that any direct military threat against Denmark had disappeared and emphasised the importance of international institutions such as the UN, NATO and the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OCSCE) for crises support and management;18 points echoed again in the 1997–1998 Defence white paper.19 Danish strategy was changing from state survival to regional and global involvement in two directions. The first direction followed the strategy of regional influence in the Baltic Sea and the second direction as a strategy of influence mainly through international institutions such as the UN and OSCE.
The regional strategy of influence had new implications for the Danish Navy. The 1995–1999 Defence Agreement argued for the importance of the Baltic Sea Initiative. The Baltic Sea Initiative is a multilateral initiative to support the Baltic States and Poland in building and transform different national institutions, including their military forces.20
The navy became heavily involved in education of naval personnel in the three Baltic States; either by conducting training within each of the respective national navies or by educating future officers at the Danish Naval Academy. Furthermore, Denmark donated three ships to the Estonian Navy in 1994, 2000 and 2006.21 The Danish Navy’s involvement was a part of a Danish strategy to incorporate the Baltic States into the European security architecture. By doing so, Denmark could improve its own security by abandoning its role as a frontline state and hereby give Denmark the opportunity to continue its change towards a strategy of influence. As such, Danish involvement in Baltic security became a precondition for implementing the strategy of influence on a more global scale. The navy was used as an important part of this strategic ambition and was the military tool of the Danish political ambition to include the Baltic States into the European security architecture. This was fulfilled in 2004 when the three Baltic States became members of both NATO and the EU.
From a naval perspective, the first changes towards a strategy of global influence already came with the deployment of a corvette to the Arabian Gulf in 1990–1991 as a part of Operation Desert Shield/Storm.22
It was the first time in more than 150 years that the Danish Navy deployed a warship to participate in a conflict outside the territories of Denmark and its dependencies.23 While Denmark did participate in the Korean War, it was with a merchant ship redesigned as a hospital ship manned with a naval crew.24 Operation Desert Shield and the deployment of the corvette Olfert Fischer would later mark the strategic change for Denmark and the beginning of a new foreign policy; a policy aiming at global involvement in military conflicts, the strategy of influence.
Later in the 1990s, the civil wars in the Balkans broke out and the Danish Armed Forces got heavily involved, most notably in Tuzla, where Denmark deployed and used main battle tanks.25 In 1992, Operation Maritime Monitor, later Operation Sharp Guard, was mandated by the UN Security Council as a part of the weapon embargo of Yugoslavia. The Danish Navy participated in 1992 as a part of the initial deployment of Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (later SNMG 1), followed by seven three-month deployments in the period 1993–1996.26
Furthermore, in 1999 the Kosovo conflict broke out, which later led to the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia;27 a campaign the Danish Air Force participated in.28 At sea, NATO conducted Operation Allied Harvest to remove unused air ordinance dropped on the sea bottom.29 Denmark contributed with a MCM vessel and later with a flagship to MCM Group Northwest, NATO mine countermeasure task group, tasked to remove the dropped ordinance.30 Unlike the previous interventions in the Balkans, it was questionable if the Kosovo intervention was mandated by the UN Security Council.31 The Danish government argued the intervention was internationally legal and did not break any international laws.32 However, a report ordered a year later by the government clearly pointed out the intervention was outside international law. Just as important, the report did not change the political support for the intervention, in the Danish parliament.33 Influence and international partnership had become more important than international law.
The defence agreement covering the period 2000–2004 reflected clearly Denmark’s continued focus on expeditionary forces that could deploy with international institutions such as the UN, NATO and OSCE and, on a lesser degree, on territorial defence. The first large ships, the Absalon Class, had been ordered and new frigates were considered. A sea mine depot was closed together with the coastal forts. Two out of five submarines, two out of four large mine layers, together with the FAC of Willemoes-Class, were decommissioned. The remaining two mine layers were kept mainly as training ships for cadets.34 In the beginning of the 2000s, the navy started developing in two directions; one direction as a coastguard able to operate in the Baltic Sea or the North Atlantic and a second direction as an expeditionary navy able to deploy globally. Any territorial threat above coastguard ‘level’ was now considered irrelevant. As mentioned in the defence white paper from 1998, indirect threats towards Denmark had replaced direct threats.35
The 1990s set the ground for the future of Danish foreign policy. Danish policy makers discovered, especially with the involvement in the Balkan Wars, what a strategy of influence was able to achieve, namely to create Danish political influence abroad. Before 1990, Denmark could use its geostrategic importance as a bargaining chip because of Greenland and the Danish Straits. That bargaining chip more or less disappeared after the Cold War, so a strategic change was needed and, in the 1990s, Denmark discovered that military involvement in NATO/US conflicts could be a way forward. This set the stage for the following two decades of Danish military involvements.
The 9/11 2001 attack marked yet another significant change for the Danish Armed Forces. The following decade would by some scholars be characterised as, ‘The Middle Eastern Decade’ mainly because of the Danish participation in the interventions in both Afghanistan and Iraq.36
The Danish Navy had not yet received its new units and depended heavily on ships either built or at least planned during the last years of the Cold War. Therefore, while Danish foreign policy had changed towards a global involvement with an army heavily deployed around the world, the navy did not yet have the full potential to do the same. The Danish Navy therefore depended heavily on its ageing corvettes of the Niels Juel Class, to some extent its patrol boats of Flyvefisken Class and submarines.
As a reaction of the 9/11 attack, Operation Active Endeavour was initiated and Denmark decided to deploy a corvette to the Mediterranean, as a part of STANAVFORLANT.37 The following year Denmark deployed a submarine and in 2003 two-patrol boats, and participated in Operation Active Endeavour STROG escorting merchant ships through the Strait of Gibraltar.38 These deployments showed some limitations with the present Danish naval order of battle. The patrol boats and submarine were demanding logistically when it came to maintenance. However, from a political perspective the participation sent the right message, namely Danish support to the US, and fitted perfectly into the Danish strategy of influence.
Another consequence of the 9/11 attack was Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2003, a political debate broke out in the Danish parliament whether Denmark should support this Operation. Previous interventions had seen an overall political consensus in the parliament with the two major parties supporting them.39 With Operation Iraqi Freedom, this changed. The biggest opposition party did not want to support Danish participation and, even though the government had the simple majority in the parliament, they abandoned the initial idea of sending Special Forces. Instead, the government decided to deploy, still without the support of the opposition, a submarine and a corvette to the Arabian Gulf.40 It signaled Danish support for Operation Iraqi Freedom without the risk of losing Danish soldiers in the initial land campaign. The government did not want to send Danish troops into a conflict with the risk of casualties without the support from the opposition. Later, in 2003, the opposition agreed to support the deployment of land troops to Iraq as a part of a stabilisation operation in the country.41 At the same time, the Danish naval presence in the Arabian Gulf was withdrawn.
In 2004, a new defence agreement, for the period 2005–2009, was negotiated. The last pieces of the territorial defence disappeared, including the ability to mobilise the male population, which was abandoned. For the navy, the agreement emphasised the importance of participating in NATO standing naval forces and furthermore in continuing its coastguard duties in both the Baltic and North Atlantic.42
Also, Denmark decommissioned its last submarines and minelayers without replacement. Denmark decided instead to order three new frigates of the Ivar Huitfeldt Class and to investigate a possible replacement for the ageing Lynx maritime helicopter. It was decided to charter two merchant ships for strategic logistic support. The 2004 agreement underlined the change towards a smaller but more global Danish Navy.
The costs for the participation in the two conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq put a heavy burden on Danish Defence, as it used the majority of the agreed budget for international operations.43 Therefore, naval operations abroad were limited in the early 2000s. However, in 2006 the Lebanon War broke out between Israel and Hezbollah. After 34 days of fighting, the UN negotiated a ceasefire agreement between the fighting parties.44 The agreement resulted in a significant increase of the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the first naval operation in UN peacekeeping history.45 Denmark decided to deploy on a rotational basis three patrol boats of Flyvefisken Class and a corvette to the Lebanese coast in the period October 2006 to July 2008. With the army heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, the navy was the only alternative for Denmark to contribute to UNIFIL. Danish land forces were first sent to UNIFIL in 2009, two years after the Danish withdrawal from Iraq, further indicating that the navy was used as the only option in the previous years.46 This was the last time Denmark deployed its patrol boats and corvettes into international operations.
Overall, the period 2001–2007 had a significant influence on the Danish Armed Forces. When it came to deployment, Danish defence had its focus on the army and the navy therefore only played a minor role. This slowly started to change in the following years, with the withdrawal from Iraq, the rise of piracy in the Indian Ocean and the increased international attention in the Arctic due to climate change.
By 2007, Denmark had been involved in two simultaneous conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The navy had received its first large units of the Absalon Class and three new frigates were under construction. Furthermore, two large Arctic patrol crafts were underway or commissioned while a third came in 2016.47 In a sense, these new ships symbolised the two major areas the navy would focus on up to the present. First, global deployment with counter-piracy, then removal of chemical weapons from Syria and Libya and, later, deployment with a US Carrier Strike Group to the Arabian Gulf. Second, a regional deployment, with an increased maritime presence around Greenland and the Arctic Region.
The heavy involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan had given an element of political fatigue for any further military involvement abroad. Political considerations were given, if the costs of the strategy of influence had been too high. Decisions were made to withdraw first from Iraq and then later partly from Afghanistan, which stimulated a debate on the size and priorities of the defence budget. The political fatigue together with the budget cuts would have big implications on the navy in the following years.
During the beginning of the new millennium, Greenlandic politicians put increased pressure on the Danish government to give the island a higher level of autonomy. The pressure resulted in a new governance agreement between Greenland and Denmark in 2009,48 which allowed a far higher level of Greenlandic autonomy. It recognised Greenland’s right to readmit, with a few essential exceptions, all political areas from Copenhagen and furthermore underlined that the decision for independence alone rests in Greenland. One of the few areas that Greenland cannot readmit without full independence is foreign and security policy. Denmark continues to represent, in consultation with Greenland and the Faroe Islands, the Kingdom in matters of foreign and security policy. This is not done without criticism from both Faroe Islanders and Greenlandic politicians, often suggesting that Denmark lacks interests in international Arctic matters.49
In the beginning of the 2010s, there was a Greenlandic hope to become independent economically from Denmark, which could lay the base for full Greenlandic independence as the Arctic began to receive more international attention due to climate change combined with the increased international demands for natural resources.50
Suddenly, Denmark stood in a situation where it might lose its access and political influence in the Arctic region within the foreseeable future. The Danish government’s reaction was to initiate a working group, under the Ministry of Defence, followed by a white paper with recommendations on how the defence forces could increase its presence in and around Greenland.51 By increasing especially the navy’s and air force’s presence in the Arctic, Danish politicians hoped to signal the strategic importance of Greenland for Denmark and furthermore a willingness to enforce Greenlandic sovereignty. If Denmark had the responsibility for security and safety at sea, any incident ill-handled by the navy could add to further criticism of the Danish–Greenlandic relations. Denmark needed to focus more on those areas that could not be readmitted to Greenland unless they became independent. The white paper therefore listed a number of recommendations.
These recommendations included an intensified presence in the Arctic by occasionally deploying a frigate to the Faroe Islands, to release an additional Arctic patrol vessel into Greenlandic waters and finally increase air and satellite surveillance of Greenlandic territory and waters.52 Strategically, Greenlandic dreams of independence and overall increased international attention in the Arctic forced Denmark to revisit its strategy in the High North – not in the sense that the Danish Kingdom was threatened from an outside actor, but because it was threatened from the inside by Greenlandic aspirations for independence. Therefore, the navy’s increased focus on the Arctic was not only a result of climate change and an overall international attention, but also an initiative to keep the Kingdom together.
In June 2007, a Danish merchant vessel Danica White was hijacked by Somali pirates, drawing both public and political attention to maritime insecurity in the Indian Ocean. Until then piracy had not been on the Danish security agenda, but the hijacking completely changed this, because Danica White was owned by a Danish company with a Danish crew.53 Being the world’s sixth-largest shipping operator measured by tonnage, pressure from the domestic shipping industry increased on the Danish government to get involved in the counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.54
In 2007, for the first time ever, the newly formed Danish government put anti-piracy in its strategic white paper.55 Two months later, the Arctic patrol vessel HDMS Thetis deployed to the Indian Ocean to become a part of the escort mission protecting World Food programme ships transiting to and from Mogadishu with humanitarian aid.56 By August the same year, the newly built HDMS Absalon deployed to the Indian Ocean to join Task Force 150. This marked the Danish Navy’s involvement in maritime security in the Indian Ocean and, for the period from 2007 to 2017, the navy and air force conducted multiple deployments to the Indian Ocean, either with ships or maritime patrol aircraft.57
It was not only the Danish armed forces that contributed to maritime security in the Indian Ocean. On an institutional level, Denmark supported a number of initiatives. One such initiative was the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), formed as a reaction to UN Security Council resolution 1851.58 CGPCS consisted of five working groups and Denmark for a period chaired working group two on legal matters.59 Furthermore, Denmark initiated a number of regional maritime initiatives in East Africa, including a bilateral capacity-building project with the Kenyan Navy.60 With the deployment of Danish ships to the Indian Ocean, the Danish Navy supported these long-term initiatives. There might not be a direct influence, however, they were important for Denmark to show its concerns and involvement. If Denmark demanded a greater international involvement though institutions such as CGPCS, such demands would have less international weight if Denmark did not have ships operating in the Indian Ocean. As such, it is more difficult to ask other states to become involved if you are not doing it yourself. The Danish Navy’s deployment to the Indian Ocean was therefore not only about maritime security but also, on the strategic level, a way to demand more international attention. So, while the Danish military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq was a result of a strategy of influence towards the US, the Danish Navy’s involvement in maritime security in the Indian Ocean aimed at a strategy of influence, towards any state with maritime interests. By 2012, the international effort against piracy had paid off and, for the first time in years, there were a significant drop in piracy attacks.61 The operations had been so effective that NATO terminated its Operation Ocean Shield in 2016.62 The last Danish warship deployed in counter-piracy was withdrawn in 2015 and replaced with regular deployments of maritime patrol craft instead.63
Maritime security in the Indian Ocean was not the only international involvement the Danish Navy was tasked to do. In 2013, a new task came after a chemical gas attack in Syria. The attack had initiated an international crisis and the US considered how to respond. The US president was not able to mobilise the political support in congress for an intervention. Instead, an agreement was negotiated between the US and Russia to remove chemical weapons from Syria (RECSYR).64
A task group from Denmark, Norway and the UK was created under Danish Task Group. It is uncertain why Denmark got the leading role in RECSYR. A more obvious choice would have been a greater power or a coastal state in the Mediterranean. However, being given the opportunity, Denmark offered both a warship, HDMS Esbern Snare, and one of its leased merchant vessels to transport the chemicals. Both ships were already deployed and were re-directed towards the Syrian coast. A month later, the first chemical weapons were removed and, after half a year, RECSYR was completed.65 Three years later, Denmark was asked to conduct a similar, but far smaller, operation by removing chemical weapons from Libya (RECLIB).66
Participation in RECSYR and RECLIB were unique opportunities for Denmark to continue its strategy of influence. It is even possible that Denmark was asked to contribute to RECSYR because of its close ties with the US. The operation was fully supported by the international community and there was, at Danish political level, a high appetite to contribute, as even the far-left parties in parliament supported it.67 So, years of international military involvement had possibly positioned Denmark closer to the US and given Denmark a good position to contribute and lead RECSYR.68
As mentioned before, Danish politicians had slowly begun to reconsider the strategy of influence and its costs. The defence agreement 2010–2014 was cut short in 2013, with a new agreement for the period 2013–2017, implementing significant cuts of 15 per cent from 2014 onwards.69 The new 2013 defence agreement did not offer much to the Danish Navy, which at the time had received all its three new frigates. However, a single important decision came during the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, where Denmark offered a frigate to NATO’s ballistic missile defence (BMD).70
In 2016, as counter piracy operations stopped, a decision was made to integrate a Danish frigate into a US carrier battle group deployed to the Arabian Sea the following year. From a tactical level, it was important to get this opportunity as it gave the navy a possibility to improve their classical war fighting skills at sea; an area the navy had been neglecting while operating in the Indian Ocean during counter-piracy operations. On a strategic level, participation in a US carrier battle group was important to maintain close relations to the Americans. Previously the bargaining chip had been heavy involvement with land forces and, even though Denmark continued to have troops both in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was not anywhere near the scale and intensity that was seen during the mid- and late 2000s. Deploying a frigate with a US carrier battle group was a fairly cheap alternative compared with the billions of krones the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had cost.71
Overall, the 2007–2017 period was important to the navy. While Danish land operations were reduced abroad, the navy was increasingly used as a political tool, as it was receiving its new units. The new ships gave Denmark possibilities not seen before. The Danish Navy was now able to deploy and operate from the North Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and contribute to different kinds of naval operations with its closest allies. This transition came with a cost, namely abandoning naval operations in the Baltic above the level of coastguard duties.
In January 2018, a new defence budget was agreed in the Danish parliament, covering a six-year period from 2018 to 2023.72 It marked two new important security issues. First, Russia’s new role in European security architecture and second, the criticism Denmark had received for not spending 2 per cent of the GDP on defence.73
This type of criticism was not new, but Denmark had previously balanced it with its high involvement in US-led conflicts through the strategy of influence. With a new president in the White House, this strategy seems not to be as effective as before.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and war in east Ukraine had furthermore put Denmark in a strategic dilemma. As its land forces the last decades had changed into an expeditionary force able to deploy into asymmetric scenarios around the world, the need for symmetric war fighting capabilities was now present.
NATO and the US recalled the need for European states to focus on a European military strategy and dedicate military forces to NATO’s eastern flank as a part of the alliance’s deterrence profile. On that background, Denmark decided to deploy land forces to the Baltic States.74 On the other side, the Danish Navy continues its global operations in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. While a strategy of deterrence is required from NATO, Denmark still sees the political benefit of being involved globally. With the army mainly engaged in the Enhanced Force Presence in Estonia and partly in the Middle East, the navy has become the tool to maintain a strategy of influence through global involvement. This is seen with a Danish frigate deployed with a French carrier group in 2019.75 It exemplifies what can happen in the coming years. Denmark will probably divide its military strategy into two areas: a strategy of regional involvement with the main task for the army in the Baltic and part of the navy in the North Atlantic; and a strategy of influence mainly conducted by the navy deployed globally; using the air force as a multiplier in both strategies depending on the political priorities.
The historical tradition of naval strategy has focused on power projection. Classical thinkers such as Mahan and Corbett are perfect examples of this. Even the Jeune Ecole, advocating a strategy of the weak, focused on offensive operations through Guerre de Commence. Finally, Admiral Gorshkov argued that the strategic purpose of the navy is strike warfare and nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the historical cornerstone of naval strategy is about power projection of greater powers towards an adversary. It can therefore be difficult to translate these strategic ideas into smaller states’ naval strategy. However, this does not make naval strategy obsolete to smaller states, it just makes it different. In the Danish case, Denmark follows a strategy of balanced influence when it must and a strategy of influence when it can, because strategy of balanced influence is about independence and state survival. So, as the existential threat disappeared in the 1990s, Denmark decided to follow a strategy of influence, which had a significant impact on Danish naval planning. Denmark replaced within 15 years its submarines, FAC and minelayer with fewer but far larger units.
The strategy of influence was conducted by deploying land forces, to either the Balkans or the Middle East, with the navy playing a secondary role. Still, the same strategy showed the up- and downsides of small state navies. On the downside, small states cannot afford to have a navy that covers the whole spectrum of naval warfare. It has to prioritise. In the Danish case, it took more than ten years from the change of strategy to the first large units being commissioned. So, while naval ships can be quickly deployed to an area for a long period, compared to land forces, small states’ navies find it difficult to adapt quickly to strategic changes, because they are costly. That said, the Danish Navy has still been important for the Danish strategy of influence. Especially where the army did not have the resources or the political support to deploy. Also, Task Force 150 and RECSYR showed that small states navies can play important and unique roles in international politics.
In the Arctic, the Danish Navy continues to be the main player of the three services. For Danish politicians, it is important to show interests and concern for security in the Arctic and a naval presence, mainly in a role of a coastguard, contributes to a Danish strategy of keeping Greenland within the Kingdom.
Russia’s new role in Europe forces Denmark to consider which strategy to follow. Denmark is no longer a frontline state and is therefore not as concerned about its own survival as during the Cold War. Also, the expansion of NATO and the EU to the east has completely changed what would be a naval strategy in the Baltic in case of a conflict. While, during the Cold War, Denmark’s role was to prevent Russian access to the North Sea and the Danish coasts, today it would be to assure free access of NATO into the Baltic Sea in cooperation with other NATO Baltic Sea States.
Today, Denmark partly follows a regional strategy of deterrence. On the other side, in the last three decades, Denmark has benefited from the strategy of influence. With part of the army in the Baltic States, the main mission for the Danish Navy in the future will be to contribute to a strategy of influence. Denmark will try to follow what it should not be able to do. To follow a regional and global strategy at the same time by dividing the strategy between the army and navy. The Danish Navy will therefore continue to play an important role in Denmark’s attempt to create influence abroad by deploying globally with partners such as the US, the UK and France.
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3 Søren Nørby, ‘The Royal Danish Navy’. In Seaforth World Naval Review 2017, Conrad Waters (ed.), p. 82, Barnsley, Seaforth Publishing, 2016.
4 Basil Germond, Small Navies in Perspective: Deconstructing the Hierarchy of Naval Forces in Small Navies. Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace, Michael Mulqueen et al. (eds), pp. 33–50, Farnham: Ashgate, 2016.
5 Laurent Goetschel, The foreign and security policy interests of small states in today’s Europe, in Small states in and outside the European Union, Laurent Goetschel (ed.), p. 19, Boston, Springer-Verlag US, 1998.
6 Jean-Marc Rickii, ‘European small states’ military policies after the Cold War: From territorial to niche strategies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21:3(2008): pp. 309–310.
7 Danish Ministry of Defence, Veteranrapport app. 2, 2010, www.fmn.dk/temaer/veteraner/veteranpolitik/documents/bilag2veteranrapport.pdf, (accessed 15 October 2018).
8 Poul Villaume, Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og Den kolde Krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949–1961. Copenhagen: Eirene 1995.
9 Magnus Petersson and Håkon Lunde Saxi, Shifting Roles Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009, Journal of Strategic Studies 36:6 (2012): pp. 772–774.
10 Ministry of Defence, Søværnets Historie, 2016, www2.forsvaret.dk/viden-om/historie/sovarnets/Pages/Soevaernetshistorie2.aspx (accessed 11 December 2018).
11 Forsvarschefen, Truslen mod Danmark, 1988, https://fe-ddis.dk/SiteCollection Documents/FE/DenKoldeKrig/Truslen_Mod_Danmark_1988.pdf (accessed 12 October 2018).
12 Forsvarskommissionen af 1988, Forsvaret i 90’erne, 1989, https://fe-ddis.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/FE/DenKoldeKrig/Dele_af_Beretning_fra_Forsvarskommissionen_af_1988.pdf (accessed 12 October 2018).
13 Forsvarsministeriet, Aftale om Forsvarets Ordning 1989–1991, p. 3, 1989, www.marinehist.dk/orlogsbib/Forsvarsforlig/19890314-FForlig.pdf (accessed 15 November 2018).
14 Ibid, pp. 16–18.
15 NATO, What was the Warsaw Pact, no date, www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_138294.htm.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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26 Nørby, Fra Kold Krig til International Engagement, pp. 238–253.
27 Mark Bromley, United Nations Arms Embargoes Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour Case study: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1998–2001, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2017) p. 6, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/UNAE/SIPRI07UNAEFRY.pdf (accessed 12 December 2018).
28 John Andreas Olsen, European Air Power: Challenges and Opportunities, 2014, p. 157, Lincoln, Potomac Books, 2014.
29 GlobalSecurity, www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/allied-har0vest.htm (accessed 12 December 2018).
30 Gustav Lang and Erik Dreyer-Andersen, Maritime Operationer til støtte for operationerne i Kosovo, https://krigsvidenskab.dk/maritime-operationer-til-stoette-for-operationerne-i-kosovo (accessed 12 December 2018).
31 Frederik Harhoff et al., Folkeret, pp. 379–380, Hans Reitzels Forlag, Copenhagen, 2017.
32 Retsinformation, Folketingsbeslutning om dansk militært bidrag til en NATO-indsats på det vestlige Balkan, 1998, www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=91790.
33 Jens Ravn-Olesen, Kosovo et år og fem dage efter, Kristeligt Dagblad, 2000, www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/kirke-tro/kosovo-et-%C3%A5r-og-fem-dage-efter (accessed 17 December 2018).
34 Danish Ministry of Defence, Tidligere Forsvarsforlig, 2018, www.fmn.dk/videnom/Pages/Tidligereforsvarsforlig.aspx, (accessed 17 December 2018).
35 Forsvarskommissionen, Beretning fra Forsvarskommissionen af 1997, p. 20, 1998, www.fmn.dk/videnom/Documents/Forsvarskommissionen-af-1997-Hovedbind-beretning.pdf (accessed 15 November 2018).
36 Olesen Mikkel Runge and Johannes Nordby, The Middle Eastern Decade. Denmarks and Military intervention, in Edström et al., Different or Alike, Scandinavian Approaches to Military interventions, pp. 62–64, Santétus Acedemic Press, Stockholm, 2014.
37 Niels-Peter Mangor, Danske internationale flådeoperationer i det 21. århundrede, 2004, https://krigsvidenskab.dk/danske-internationale-flaadeoperationer-i-det-21-aarhundrede (accessed 17 December 2018).
38 Ibid.
39 Olesen and Nordby, ‘The Middle Eastern Decade’, in Edström and Gyllensporre, pp. 62–63.
40 Martin Kaae and Jesper Nissen, Vejen til Irak-Hvorfor Danmark går i krig?, p. 209, Gads Forlag, Copenhagen, 2008.
41 Olesen and Nordby, ‘The Middle Eastern Decade’, in Edström and Gyllensporre, p. 92.
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43 Danish Ministry of Defence, Udviklingen i forsvarsbudgettet I Danmark, www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Documents/Faktaark_2020_Forsvarsministeriet.pdf (accessed 17 December 2018).
44 Jim Clancy et al., U.N.: Cease-fire begins Monday, CNN, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20060819041624/www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/08/12/mideast.main/index.html (accessed 17 December 2018).
45 UNIFIL, UNIFIL Mission Profile, 2017, https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mission-profile (accessed 18 December 2018).
46 Danish Ministry of Defence, Tidligere danske indsatser: Libanon (UNIFIL), 2018, www.fmn.dk/videnom/Pages/IndsatseniLibanon.aspx (accessed 18 December 2018).
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49 Mikkel Runge Olesen, Lightning Rod. US, Greenlandic and Danish relations in the shadow of postcolonial reputations, in Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic, Kristian Søby Kristensen and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen (eds.), pp. 73–74, London, Routledge, 2017.
50 Martin Breum, Cold Rush, pp. 179–180, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2018.
51 Danish Ministry of Defence, Forsvarsministeriets fremtidige opgaveløsning i Arktis, 2016, www.fmn.dk/nyheder/documents/arktis-analyse/forsvarsministeriets-fremtidige-opgaveloesning-i-arktis.pdf (accessed 15 December 2018).
52 Ibid., pp. 188ff.
53 H. Folmer et al., Fakta om kapringen af Danica White, 2016, www.folmer.dk/news/news-in-danish/fakta-om-danica-white (accessed 12 December 2018).
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55 VK Regeringen III, Mulighedernes Samfund, 2007, pp. 64–65, www.stm.dk/multimedia/Mulighedernes_samfund__Regeringsgrundlag.pdf (accessed 19 December 2018).
56 Danish Defence, Piratbekæmpelse I Adenbugten, 2017, www2.forsvaret.dk/viden-om/udland/adenbugten/Pages/Adenbugten3.aspx, (accessed 15 November 2018).
57 Ibid.
58 US Department of State, Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2017, www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2017/266864.htm (Accessed 17 December 2018).
59 Ulrik Trolle Smed, Small States in the CGPCS: Denmark, Working Group 2, and the end of the debate on an international piracy court, Working Paper of the Lessons Learned Project of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), 2015, www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2015/03/Smed-Small-states-in-the-CGPCS-Denmark.pdf (accessed 10 December 2018).
60 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategy for the Danish measures against piracy and armed robbery at sea 2015–2018, 2015, www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Documents/Strategy-for-the-Danish-measures-against-piracy-and-armed-robbery-at-sea-2015–2018.pdf, pp. 18–19, (accessed 15 December 2018).
61 Michele Vespe et al., The declining impact of piracy on maritime transport in the Indian Ocean: Statistical analysis of 5-year vessel tracking data, Marine Policy 59, p. 11, 2015.
62 NATO, Counter-Piracy Operations (Achieved), 2016, www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/topics_48815.htm (accessed 2 December 2018).
63 Danish Defence, Piratbekæmpelse I Adenbugten, 2017, www2.forsvaret.dk/viden-om/udland/adenbugten/Pages/Adenbugten3.aspx, (accessed 15 November 2018).
64 Michael R. Gordon, U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms, New York Times, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/syria-talks.html (accessed 2 December 2018).
65 Danish Defence, Tidslinje RECSYR, www2.forsvaret.dk/viden-om/udland/fn/dkfn-missioner/recsyr/Pages/tidslinje-recsyr.aspx#2, (accessed 2 December 2018).
66 Danish Defence, Kemiske stoffer fjernet fra Libyen, 2016, www2.forsvaret.dk/nyheder/intops/Pages/KemiskestofferfjernetfraLibyen.aspx (accessed 2 December 2018).
67 Folketinget, B 29 Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om dansk bidrag til FN’s og OPCW’s mission i Syrien, 2013, www.ft.dk/samling/20131/beslutningsforslag/B29/36/afstemninger.htm (accessed 2 December 2018).
68 UN Security Council, Resolution 2118(2013), 2013, www.securitycouncilreport.org/wp-content/uploads/s_res_2118.pdf (accessed 12 December 2018).
69 Ministry of Defence, Aftale på Forsvarsområdet 2013–2017, 2012, www.fmn.dk/videnom/Documents/Aftale_paa_forsvarsomraadet_2013-2017a.pdf (accessed 5 December 2018).
70 Atlantic Council, NATO Summit Special Series: Denmark and Norway, 2016 www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-summit-special-series-denmark-and-norway (accessed 2 December 2018).
71 Berlingske, FAKTA: Danmark har postet milliarder I Afghanistan, 2016, www.berlingske.dk/politik/fakta-danmark-har-postet-milliarder-i-afghanistan (accessed 20 December 2018).
72 Ministry of Defence, Ny aftale for Forsvaret 2018–2023, 2018, www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Pages/ny-aftale-for-forsvaret-2018–2023.aspx, (accessed 19 December 2018).
73 Jacky Naegelen, ‘Denmark to up military spending, PM says after Trump call’, Reuters, 16 November 2016, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-denmark-security-idUKKBN13B2MI (accessed 15 December 2018).
74 Danish Defence, Enhanced Forward Presence, 2018, www2.forsvaret.dk/viden-om/udland/nato1/Pages/EnhancedForwardPresence.aspx (accessed 15 December 2018).
75 Soefart, Regeringen vil sende dansk fregat til fransk hangarskib, www.soefart.dk/article/view/617367/regeringen_vil_sende_dansk_fregat_til_fransk_hangarskib (accessed 15 December 2018).