Maritime security in a highly contested
environment
Ukraine has been, is and will be a maritime state.1
President Petro Poroshenko
Using the Ukrainian navy as a case study, this chapter explores two related challenges facing many small European navies and one unique Ukrainian challenge. First, this chapter examines the difficulty for small navies of trying to address, simultaneously, very traditional security challenges and those that might be termed ‘new’ maritime security threats. In this regard, the Ukrainian navy offers a fascinating example of the challenges of rebuilding a small navy in what is an increasingly contested maritime environment. On the one hand, the Black Sea, like the Baltic Sea, has become a securitised power projection space for the Russian Federation. On the other, Ukraine also faces ‘new’ maritime security threats such as pollution, drug and nuclear trafficking and illegal good smuggling. In common with other small navies, the Ukrainian navy must consider the assets, capabilities, training and educational requirements necessary to allow its maritime personnel to engage simultaneously in such roles as sea denial operations and national and international maritime security operations.
Second, this chapter also explores an enduring challenge facing many small European navies: how to balance commitments against resources in an age of austerity when there is considerable pressure on national budgets. One response to this problem is greater innovation and adaption: essentially changing the naval paradigm that is used to conceptualise solutions. In the Ukrainian context this has meant developing a new maritime strategy and adopting a ‘mosquito fleet’ concept to address the complex range of security challenges Kyiv faces in the maritime domain. These examples of Ukrainian innovation have also demonstrated some of the wider obstacles facing small navies in adapting their approaches to address maritime security challenges; not least in terms of the practical deliverability of the naval concept Ukraine has adopted. Ukraine, unlike the other small European navies discussed in this book, also faces a unique challenge; it is, in effect, rebuilding rather than simply modernising or transforming its navy to meet the diverse maritime challenges of the twenty-first century.
The illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 had a devastating effect on the Ukrainian navy. Ukraine lost the majority of its capital ships, its maritime bases and infrastructure and its most experienced maritime personnel.2 It lost access to a third of its Black Sea coastline, control of the Kerch Straits and access to the defence industries located in Crimea.3 After the seizure, the Ukrainian navy was described by many commentators as having been ‘decimated’ or ‘destroyed’.4 Andri Ryzenko, the former Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Navy, described the fleet as an ‘operational shadow of its former self’ in urgent need of rebuilding.5 To further compound these losses, the Ukrainian government, fighting a prolonged and, at times, highly attritional conflict in the east has focused on increasing the combat effectiveness of its land and air rather than its naval forces. As a result, the Ukrainian navy has been neglected and underfunded. Highlighting the growing imbalance between maritime security threats and naval capabilities, the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko recently stated that the maritime domain had become ‘the most vulnerable in Ukraine’s defensive arrangements.’6 In an attempt to address this imbalance, the Ukrainian government has published a new ‘Ukrainian Naval Strategy-2035’, which creates a vision for the regeneration of the Ukrainian navy with a view to increasing both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of maritime power while also bringing it up to NATO standards.
This chapter begins by examining the many maritime security threats facing Kyiv before then evaluating the extent to which the new naval strategy will allow Ukraine to develop an effective and efficient small navy able to address these challenges in its maritime domain. It will argue that, while Ukraine faces an increasingly contested maritime security domain awash with complex traditional challenges, newer maritime security challenges also remain important. It will also argue that, while Ukraine has made progress in developing the conceptual framework necessary to create a modern small navy, many challenges lie ahead in successfully implementing this plan. Some of these challenges include the need for sustained government investment in and prioritisation of the navy and ongoing problems with Ukraine’s shipbuilding industry.
Ukraine faces a complex mix of traditional and new maritime security challenges where, though the latter have become no less important, they have become much harder to address because of the former. Since the end of the Cold War, maritime security has generally been conceptualised in progressively broader terms.7 The more traditional maritime security agenda, focusing on issues such as conventional military threats, has been augmented and in some cases supplanted by a focus on an agenda comprising so called ‘new’ challenges.8 These include counter-terrorism, anti-piracy operations, counter-narcotics and a range of activities that contribute to security in a wider sense.9 This broader conception of maritime security has come under challenge in the Black Sea. The significant build-up of Russian military forces in Crimea as well as Moscow’s support for proxy forces in the ongoing conflict in the east of Ukraine, Russia’s introduction of a maritime blockade in the Sea of Azov and its attacks on the Ukrainian navy and seizure of its maritime assets and personnel and its use of hybrid warfare to undermine neighbours has led to an increasingly contested and miltiarised maritime environment dominated by traditional security concerns more reminiscent of the Cold War. As a result, traditional maritime security threats such as changes in the balance of power, naval confrontation and military conflict on the shores of the Black Sea have come to define the core elements of the maritime security agenda facing Ukraine. As will be discussed below, while new maritime security challenges threaten Ukraine’s blue economy and its security, its ability to address these challenges is, ultimately, hostage to the dynamics of more conventional maritime conflict. So, what are the more traditional maritime security challenges Ukraine faces in the Black Sea?
The first and perhaps most challenging maritime security issue facing Ukraine has been the significant increase in Russia’s strategic footprint given its heavy fortification of Crimea and its subsequent ability to project maritime power in the Black Sea and beyond. In the early months after annexation, Russia implemented a Crimean Defence Plan and moved quickly to enhance its military power on the peninsular. It developed a fully capable air defence system and deployed S-400, Bastion and Bal missiles, giving it the ability to establish an A2/AD covering almost all of the Black Sea.10 Russia also doubled the number of service personnel and increased its tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and helicopters.11 Under the last state armament programme 2011–2020, the Black Sea Fleet has improved multirole capabilities. It took delivery of two new missile ships, frigates and six conventional submarines which carry Kalibr cruise missiles.12 Estimates suggest that Russia spent US$750 million and has effectively ‘turned Crimea into a strong force projection beachhead in the region’.13 Russia has ambitious plans to further increase its maritime power in the Black Sea with the construction of new light tonnage vessels such as missile ships, which are heavily armed.14 Due to shipbuilding and financial constraints, Russia will look to refurbish and upgrade its legacy fleet and supplement these platforms with shorter-range more modern multipurpose ships equipped with long-range missiles able to augment coastal defense systems and naval aviation able to protect its interests in the Black Sea.15 Russia has also recently deployed new sophisticated and highly mobile long-range detection radars in Crimea.16 It has also significantly enhanced the training and effectiveness of its Black Sea Fleet personnel as a result of their deployment to the Mediterranean.17
As well as facing a threatening militarised maritime domain in the Black Sea, Ukraine has also seen an increase in conflict at sea and from the sea. In December 2015, Russia hijacked three offshore oil drilling rigs belonging to Ukraine located in its territorial waters and towed them back to Crimea. Russia has also seized eight maritime gas fields belonging to Ukraine in the Black Sea, extracting the largest quantity of gas from the Odeske gas field located near Ukraine’s port of Odessa.18 Direct conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the maritime domain has also increased.19 In early 2018, a Ukrainian coastguard ship involved in intelligence gathering near the coast of Crimea was directly confronted by two Russian combat patrol ships and a Russian SU24 bomber. The development by the pro-Russian separatists in the east of Ukraine of an alleged mosquito fleet in 2015 has also increased the possibility of attacks from the sea, in particular on Ukraine’s key ports in the sea of Azov, Mariupol and Berdyansk. A report by a Russian newspaper in 2015 claimed that an Azov flotilla with a maritime Spetsnaz element has been set up by the Donetsk People’s Republic.20 The development of a small, highly mobile fleet equipped with anti-tank guided missiles, automatic grenade launchers and machine guns able to carry out attacks on ports and conduct raids or sabotage missions is clearly a potential threat to Ukraine’s maritime security.21 While the Ukrainian navy has dismissed this as a threat, there is still justifiable concern that this flotilla was set up as a means of providing cover for a potential Russian amphibious assault on key Ukrainian ports and beaches in the Sea of Azov at some point in the future.22 Russia has used its forces and assets to protect the interests and fighting power of the separatists in the east. During the first year of the conflict in the Donbas, Russian forces surged across the border to provide military support for the Russian-backed separatists who were facing defeat in high intensity land battles in Iloviask and Debaltseve. Highlighting legitimate concerns that Russian forces could also be used in the maritime domain to influence events on land, the Ukrainian military has recently placed mines along the beaches and coastline off Mariupol. In July 2018, the Ukrainian President warned that a ‘military operation, an attack on Maripuol’ was possible.23 In an interview, Major-General Yuriy Sodol, Ukraine’s Naval Infantry Commander, highlighted the threat from Russia when he stated that, in providing Ukrainian marines with new and modernised models of arms and military equipment and training, Ukraine is ‘giving special attention to defending our coast from invasion from the sea’.24
Conflict at sea between Russia and Ukraine has also increased with the introduction of an economic blockade by Russia in the Sea of Azov. From mid-May 2018, the coastguard service of the Russian FSB (Federal Security Service) has been stopping merchant ships heading to and from the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. In light of growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine, Russia has also strengthened their contingent of warships and boats to the Sea of Azov, deploying vessels from the Caspian flotilla and large amphibious assault units.25 Ukraine’s maritime interests have been severely compromised by this blockade and the building of the Russian bridge across the Kerch Straits linking the Russian mainland to Crimea. As a result of the height restrictions under the bridge, the commercial port of Mariupol will be unable to use 40 per cent of its larger commercial vessels and the Berdyansk seaport also predicts that freight turnover will drop by 50 per cent.26 While the Russians have justified their maritime ‘inspections’ in light of concern about potential Ukrainian terrorist attacks on the new Kerch Straits bridge,27 the cost of the economic blockade on the Ukrainian economy has been enormous.28 In the first three months, Russian border guards stopped 148 ships for inspection, costing the shipping companies between 10,000 and 50,000 US dollars a day in lost revenue.29 Ukraine’s infrastructure minister, Volodymyr Omelyan, has estimated that Ukraine will lose billions in lost revenue if the blockade continues and the effect on the regional economy will be devastating.30 In November 2018, the attack on and seizure by the Russian coastguard of three Ukrainian naval ships and 24 sailors heading from Odessa to the port of Mariupol in the Sea of Azov has led to direct conflict at sea between Ukraine and its larger and more powerful neighbour.31 After months of growing tension in the Sea of Azov between Russia and Ukraine, on 23 November two Ukrainian naval patrol boats and a tug boat heading though the Kerch Straits to reinforce the Ukrainian navy were accused of violating Russia’s territorial waters and fired upon before being seized and taken to the Crimean port of Kerch.32 However, according to international law, as Crimea is under military occupation by Russia, the peninsula and its surrounding waters remain Ukrainian territory. In addition, the Sea of Azov is designated as ‘internal waters’ of both states under an agreement signed in 2003 signifying that this is clearly an illegal seizure. While Russia has temporarily re-opened the Kerch Straits, the potential threat of a future closure by Russia and the ongoing threat to Ukraine’s maritime economic interests remain high. Estimates suggest that Ukraine could lose up to 2 per cent of its gross domestic product as a result of a full blockade of the region.33 In light of the Russian threat to its maritime interests, Ukraine has stepped up security at critical infrastructure sites, including at nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, chemical factories and at ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.34
Ukraine also faces several important ‘new’ maritime security challenges, including drug trafficking and illicit good smuggling as well as chemical pollution and nuclear trafficking. The emergence of traditional maritime security threats already discussed has, however, made these newer maritime security issues much harder to address. The ability to resolve these challenges through cooperative measures is ultimately hostage to good or at least cordial relations among littoral states.35 Drug trafficking and illicit good smuggling remain a serious problem. Heroin is trafficked along a sub-branch of the Balkan route that goes from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the countries of the southern Caucasus (mainly Azerbaijan and Georgia) for shipment across the Black Sea to Ukraine and then by land, partly through the Republic of Moldova, to Romania for onward trafficking along the eastern branch of the Balkan route to Western Europe.36 Cocaine is shipped from South America in large quantities through the ports of the Black Sea including Ukraine.37 For Ukraine, the port of Odessa is recognised as an important transit hub for drugs through container shipping in seaports.38 The movement of illicit goods has also re-emerged as a serious concern after a barge full of millions of packs of cigarettes washed ashore in Odessa in November 2018.39 In addition, the area surrounding the Dniester River and the Danube Delta along Ukraine’s western border with Romania is a hub for small craft that are involved in illegal activity.40 In light of the these challenges Ukraine has recently established two port control units, one in the Odessa Sea port and the other at Borispol International airport, to undertake specialised profiling, targeting and examining of high-risk containers used to transport illicit goods.41
Chemical pollution at sea is also a considerable ‘newer’ maritime security challenge for Ukraine.42 Operational or illegal discharges of oil by maritime vessels are a very real concern, particularly along major shipping routes and Ukrainian ports. As a result of these discharges the worst surface oil pollution is concentrated along the main shipping routes in the Black Sea between Istanbul and Novorossiysk, Istanbul and Odessa, and Istanbul and Tuapse as ships discharge oil-containing waste several times along their routes.43 Illegal discharges of oil have also increased in the Black Sea and cause considerable harm to the sea ecosystem.44 Oil patches often covering tens of square kilometers can be regularly detected. Tensions in the region and strained relations among states are hampering Ukraine’s ability to address these maritime security challenges. While the Black Sea Convention, signed by all six littoral states in 1994, set up a regional cooperation framework to protect against pollution, this issue has effectively fallen off the political agenda and pollution monitoring has been seriously compromised. Ukrainian environmental authorities in Odessa are currently unable to monitor pollution around Crimea and talks among Black Sea littoral states have been suspended.45
In addition to environmental issues, the Black Sea is widely recognised as being at the centre of the world’s nuclear black market, and nuclear trafficking is a serious and growing maritime security threat. There have been over 630 nuclear-trafficking incidents recorded in the Black Sea between 1991 and 2012, and five of the seven more recent incidents have involved the unauthorised possession of highly enriched uranium.46 Highlighting the scale of the problem, in the first six months of 2016, there were three incidents involving the trafficking of radioactive materials in Georgia. In an April 2016 incident, Georgian officials arrested five men who had transported uranium isotopes for sale to the Black Sea coastal resort of Kobuleti, not far from the Turkish border.47 Several seizures of uranium and other radioactive material in other Black Sea ports also suggest that maritime routes have been used for nuclear smuggling. Small amounts of concealed nuclear or radioactive material are harder to detect aboard large cargo ships, particularly as these are less likely to be monitored for radioactivity and can be easily unloaded onto small boats. Indicating the scale of the maritime security problem, local authorities in the Georgian port of Batumi have intercepted eight nuclear-smuggling attempts since 1999 and there have been ten nuclear-trafficking incidents in and around the Ukrainian port of Odessa.48
Exacerbating this problem of nuclear trafficking is the presence of ungoverned spaces in the Black Sea region, which have increasingly become a source of and haven for nuclear smuggling. With the declaration of independence by Luhansk and Donetsk in the east of Ukraine in 2014, there are now five unresolved or ‘frozen’ conflicts in the wider Black Sea that provide ungoverned spaces. These include Nagorno Karabakh, the disputed enclave between Armenia and Azerbaijan; Transnistria in Moldova; Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia; and the Donbas in the east of Ukraine. Unresolved separatist conflicts have created a belt of internationally unrecognised, but de facto, states that operate in an environment of lawlessness and provide fertile ground and safe havens for organised crime and smuggling networks. Ungoverned spaces in the wider Black Sea are particularly attractive for nuclear smuggling as they often host industrial facilities and military bases containing nuclear material and have lenient penal codes and lax or corrupt law enforcement systems.49 Suggesting the scale of the problem posed by ungoverned spaces in 2014, the Ukrainian Security Services arrested nine people trying to smuggle nuclear material from Transnistria to eastern Ukraine. Raising further concern about nuclear smuggling from ungoverned spaces, Kyiv has now lost regulatory control over its nuclear sources and facilities in eastern Ukraine due to the ongoing conflict, including 65 entities that use ionizing radiation, including eight with very high-level radiation sources and one repository of radioactive waste near Donetsk chemical plant.50
In light of this mix of traditional and newer maritime security challenges and the urgent need to rebuild its very small navy, Ukraine published its first ever naval strategy in November 2018. The purpose of this strategy is to create a vison for the Ukrainian navy and to lay out its missions and values. While the mission of the Ukrainian navy is certainly ambitious, the strategy is inherently pragmatic, clearly stating that Ukraine will build up maritime roles and capabilities gradually. In the introduction, President Poroshenko makes it clear that regenerating Ukraine’s small navy is a long-term project. He states that, while the main task of the navy is to rebuild naval capabilities, this will ‘require new thinking, a certain amount of time and considerable resources’.51 In addition, while the mission of the Ukrainian navy is ambitious, there is a recognition that this rebuilding will need to take place over the next two decades in stages – the first from 2018–2025 the second 2025–2030 and the last stage from 2030–2035. The aim of the Ukrainian navy is ‘to deter aggression, protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine to ensure maritime safety, economic growth and international stability, in conjunction with the national forces of defense and strategy security patterns, at sea and from the sea’.52 To meet these objectives the Ukrainians have adopted a mosquito fleet concept.53 A mosquito force aims to deny command of the sea to adversaries with larger and more powerful navies.54 The idea behind a mosquito fleet is that small, fast and relatively cheap platforms, backed up by gunboats, mines and coastal defence ships, engage in a strategy of coastal defence with the aim of making it impossible for an enemy to approach one’s coastline.55 This concept is made clear in the new naval strategy in which the Ukrainians lay out what could best be described as a coastal defense theory using a mosquito fleet. Coastal defence theory adopted by the Ukrainians has much in common with the Soviet New School approach to maritime power that emerged in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s.56 This school advocated localised defence of the Soviet coastline, using mines, coastal artillery, torpedo boats and submarines, enhanced by close inter-service cooperation and good communication.57 Coastal defence theory was also used by the Norwegians during the Cold War to counter the Russian Fleet in the North Sea and its aim was to deter ‘large scale naval action through inflicting punishment rather than crudely attempting to defeat it’.58 Coastal defence theory tends to be of greater interest to smaller, weaker states and the effectiveness of this strategy has been demonstrated by Iran’s long-term naval strategy since the 1980s, which assumes warfare against larger more established navies, such as the US, and has been focused on asymmetrical tactics.59 Rather than develop a conventional navy, the Iranians have focused on coastal missile batteries, anti-ship missiles, FAC, naval mines, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and small submarines.60 While Ukraine has no plans to build submarines in the near future, its naval procurement plans contain platforms and capabilities very similar to the Iranians.
During stage one of rebuilding, Ukraine aims to develop sea, land and airborne anti-ship missiles, develop cruise missiles and in the next stage up to 2030 to also recreate its surface fleet. Over the next few years Ukraine will acquire Lan class fast attack missile boats that will deter intrusions in Ukraine’s EEZ and be used to protect its surface and under-sea maritime domain. The second stage of rebuilding the navy will necessitate procuring multi-purpose patrol and mine countermeasure platforms to engage in escort and protection and detect and neutralise mine threats. The first of these second stage tasks, escort and protection, will be performed by the two US Island-Class offshore patrol boats that Ukraine has just taken into service from the US. The last stage of rebuilding the navy will include the procurement of fast amphibious boat platforms capable of delivering marines and Special Forces into theatre.61 Ukraine’s new naval strategy also recognises the importance of developing the conceptual and moral elements of fighting power. In particular, this will involve developing appropriate doctrine and the adoption of NATO principles, standards and values, as well as looking at qualitative issues such as training and education and morale of maritime personnel.
Despite the adoption of a pragmatic, logical and comprehensive new naval strategy, Ukraine will face many challenges in implementing this plan and building an effective and efficient small navy. The first and most important challenge is resources. In the light of the ongoing conflict in the east, the government has made the difficult decision to prioritise defence spending on increasing the combat effectiveness of its land and air rather than naval forces.62 As a result of this prioritisation, while Ukraine’s defense budget has significantly increased year on year since the annexation of Crimea, the navy’s share of the overall budget has remained small.63 In 2018, Ukraine’s defence budget increased again by more than 24 per cent to UAH16.8 billion ($3.9 bn) with just over 20 per cent reserved for armaments and military equipment.64 Given the high capital costs of meeting the phase one requirements of the new naval strategy, a rearmament budget for all three services of $603 million is unlikely to be enough to meet these objectives.65 Further compounding these financial challenges is the issue of whether or not the government has in the limited armaments budget prioritised the purchase of the right sort of small attack craft during stage one of its regeneration. During the first stage of building its mosquito fleet, Ukraine is continuing to purchase a significant number of Gurza-M artillery cutters. While these boats have formed the backbone of the current Ukrainian navy, making up a third of its ships before the Russian seizure of two in the Kerch Straits, these cutters are slow and weather-limited and divert Ukraine’s limited resources away from the purchase of fast attack craft. The Gurza-M was designed in 2003 for the then Uzbek President Islam Karimov for guarding and controlling the Amudarya river and is ideal for riverine operations. However, despite the plan to procure 18 more of these boats, the Gurza-M cannot operate in high winds, has a maximum speed of only 25 knots and can be used only when the sea is not too rough.66 If Ukraine is to build an effective mosquito fleet it needs to prioritise the rapid addition of its Centaur FAC. The Ukrainian navy is currently waiting for the addition of two of these boats based on a concept design previously tested by the Swedish navy and later adopted by Russia for its project 03160 Raptor Class, eight of which are deployed with Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.67 The Centaur are fast and the warship of choice for navies seeking effective defence against more powerful adversaries at sea. However, due to a long logistic tail in procurement, the Ukrainians are likely to continue to procure ineffective Gurza-M cutters that cannot be used effectively to counter the growing Russian threat in the Sea of Azov. While the second stage of regenerating the Ukrainian navy looks more promising, in practise financial challenges are also likely to emerge with the construction and funding of these capital ships required to perform task two discussed earlier. In November 2017, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers adopted a decision to resume the funding of Ukraine’s multi-role corvettes-type warships of the 58250, ‘Vladimir the Great’ series.68 However, six months later, the head of the Ukrainian navy, Ihor Voronchenko, stated that this project had been postponed due to a lack of funds. According to Voronchenko, the government lacked the $51 million necessary to carry out construction of these warships. Highlighting his concerns that Ukraine’s shipbuilding industry had reached what he referred to as a ‘state of no return’, Voronchenko called for the immediate funding of this project to protect the shipbuilding industry.69
At the root of the problem of regenerating Ukraine’s small navy is the parlous state of the Ukrainian economy, which has necessitated hard choices and will continue to do so in the near future. The Ukrainian government is still fighting a financially costly war in the east and the Ukrainian economy has been slow to recover from the crisis. In a speech to the UN summit in New York in September 2015, the Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko, spelled out the high economic costs of the conflict. Poroshenko claimed that the conflict in the east was costing Ukraine $5 million a day. He also went on to point out that, due to the loss of its eastern territories, Ukraine had also lost about a fifth of its economic potential.70 The recovery of Ukraine’s industry has also been interrupted by the severance of trade ties with the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with estimates suggesting that this cost Ukraine up to 1.5 per cent of GDP growth in 2017.71 Although there have been some positive signs that Ukraine’s economy has begun to recover, with robust growth in manufacturing, services and construction, weaknesses remain in the agriculture and mining sectors and the difficultly of attracting foreign capital suggest that this recovery will be at best modest over the next year.72 The delay in the adoption of the law on privatisation and the establishment of an anti-corruption court, as well as the government’s reluctance to raise the price of gas, has led to the suspension of Ukraine’s cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and external financing from both the EU and the World Bank.73 Compounding these structural economic problems is the fact that Ukraine’s small rearmament budget is also likely to be negatively affected by the ongoing high rate of inflation in Ukraine, which in annual terms (November 2018 from November 2017) grew to 10 per cent from 9.5 per cent in October and 8.9 per cent in September 2018.74 Defence inflation is likely to remain a major problem in Ukraine over the next few years, forcing the government to make tough decisions about future force priorities.
As a result of weak domestic demand historically, a lack of government investment and corruption in the shipbuilding industry, Ukraine will also face a number of practical challenges in regenerating its fleet.75 In a sign of the extent of the problem, the National Anti-Corruption Agency of Ukraine has begun to investigate Ukraine’s state-run defence production enterprise, UkrOboronProm, a consortium of around 130 companies with 80,000 employees.76 UkrOboronProm’s main industries include aircraft construction and repair, the production of armoured vehicles, radio electronics and shipbuilding.77 The Ukrainian State Company UkrOboronProm was created by a Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in December 2010 by former President Yanukovych in an attempt to concentrate Presidential control over the financial flows of Ukraine’s defence industry. When President Poroshenko came to power, he largely retained the old structure, placing some of his own business associates into key positions, which triggered accusations that he was prolonging corruption and hampering the development of Ukraine’s defence sector.78 Recent serious allegations against UkrOboronProm have included large-scale fraud involving transfers to bank accounts of a family member of one of the Ukrainian state arms maker and exporter’s top managers, as well as re-selling Soviet-era armoured vehicles imported from Poland at artificially high prices.79
In addition to allegations of corruption, Ukraine’s shipbuilding industry has become increasingly politicised, which could also damage the regeneration of the Ukrainian navy. In April 2018, the Ukrainian President was accused of deliberately stalling the acceptance of the two US Island class patrol boats from the US as it would take business from his privately owned Kuznya Na Rubalskomy shipyard.80 According to an investigation by Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe, taking the US boats could cause cuts in the state defence procurement contract awarded to Poroshenko’s Kyiv based shipyard to produce Gurza-M class patrol boats for the Ukrainian navy.81 In a sign of ongoing problems in Ukraine’s shipbuilding industry, in October 2017 UkrOboronProm announced the suspension of all works at the Mykolaiv shipyard due to its accruing debts.82 The Mykolaiv facility produced and repaired both military and civilian platforms and had designed the Gurza M class patrol boat. Due to the recent closure of the Mykolaiv shipyard in 2018, Kuznya is the only enterprise in the country that now produces small military naval vessels and has also been awarded the contract for producing the Centaur fast attack boats. The loss of this significant shipyard severely limits the scope for competition within Ukraine’s domestic shipbuilding industry.
Ukraine’s shipbuilding industries also suffer from a lack of transparency. Highlighting the extent of the problem, allegations have surfaced of a secret contract between the state and Kuznya to sweeten the sale of this shipyard to another powerful Ukrainian oligarch.83 In an attempt to divest himself of almost 100 businesses before the next presidential election, President Poroshenko announced his plans to sell the Kuznya shipyard. A contract for engine repairs on Ukraine’s frigate was signed right before the sale of the shipyard was agreed between Prime Assets Capital, Poroshenko’s holding company, and Sergiy Tigipko, the owner of the TAS Group business empire and close ally of ex-Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych.84 As a result of this non-tendered contract, Tigipko gains a multimillion Hryvnia contract for the next two years. While some commentators have claimed that this contract was legitimate as Kuznya is the only company able to perform engine repairs on the Hetman Sahaydachniy frigate, the ongoing lack of transparency in tendering, as well as the loss of key shipbuilding facilities and their ownerships by Ukrainian oligarchs, could hamper Ukraine’s ability to competitively and effectively build the most appropriate new naval platforms domestically.
Ukraine has, however, made some notable progress in developing new weapons systems, which will go some way to increasing its maritime power in the short term. In December 2018, President Poroshenko announced the mass production of the new Neptune cruise missile, which in tests had destroyed a target at a distance of 280 km. The Neptune is a domestically produced subsonic weapon developed for the maritime environment, which can also be deployed against land targets. The secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, Oleksandr Turchinov, noted that the creation of this new cruise missile would significantly increase the effectiveness of Ukraine’s coastal defence.85 Further augmenting Ukraine’s limited maritime power, these new weapons will also be installed on Ukraine’s new fast attack cutters and its project 5820 corvettes, when they come into service.86 In addition to procuring new weapons systems, Ukraine has also sought to increase security cooperation with key neighbours in the Black Sea in order to address some of their common maritime security concerns. In a meeting in September 2018, the heads of the Ukrainian and Turkish navies discussed increasing military cooperation and also how to foster cooperation in the Black Sea region and increase naval diplomacy.87 In addition to increasing its maritime cooperation with Turkey, Ukraine’s small navy has also benefited enormously from increasing US engagement. Over the past decade, the US has provided over two billion US dollars to the Ukraine military in the form of non-lethal equipment and training via waived payments under the Foreign Military Financing Program.88 In 2015, they provided five Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) for operations in shallow littorals.89 More recently, US President Donald Trump approved the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine and this has led to further assistance on platform and combat systems, boat and ship acquisition, and industrial capacity assistance projects.90 In May 2018, Congress approved $250 m in military assistance to Ukraine for 2019 and Kurt Volker, US special envoy for Ukraine, stated that Washington was ready to further expand arms supplies to Ukraine in order to build up the country’s naval and air defence forces in the face of continuing Russian support for eastern separatists.91 In a clear sign of its ongoing commitment, Congress has recently authorised the US government to provide Ukraine with air defence and coastal defence radars, naval mine and countermine capabilities, and littoral-zone and coastal defence vessels.92
In conclusion, it is clear that despite developing a new naval strategy, an innovative fleet concept and having made progress in developing new weapons systems, the Ukrainian navy, in common with the other small navies discussed in this book, faces two challenges. Ukraine faces a complex mix of traditional and ‘new’ maritime security challenges similar to those faced by many small European navies, particularly those in the Baltic Sea. Russia’s militarisation of the Black Sea as well as Moscow’s ongoing harassment of the Ukrainian navy and its commercial ships has created an increasingly threatening and dangerous maritime domain where Ukraine is struggling to protect and advance its maritime interests. Ukraine, in common with other European navies, is also confronted by ‘new’ security challenges which, in many ways, have become much harder to address due to the absence of regional maritime security cooperation between littoral states. Strained and difficult relations between states in the Black Sea has ultimately hampered their ability to collectively cooperate and deal with important ‘new’ maritime security challenges such as pollution, drug and nuclear trafficking. In essence, a contested maritime environment in the Black Sea has pushed the newer maritime security threats off the Ukrainian agenda.
A second common challenge that both Ukraine and the other small European navies also face is how to engage in naval regeneration in an age of austerity where there are competing demands on an overstretched budget. Although the Ukrainian economy has shown some positive signs of recovery, it remains in a precarious state and this means that future governments will be forced to make hard choices about defence priorities. The Kerch Strait incident in November 2018 has created the necessary political impetus and public support to rebuild the Ukrainian navy. However, despite this political momentum, regenerating the Ukrainian navy is likely to be adversely affected by the high costs of capital ships and the politicisation of and corruption prevalent in Ukraine’s shipbuilding industry. Unlike the other European small navies discussed in this book, Ukraine also faces a unique challenge in addressing maritime security challenges. Kyiv is building rather than transforming its small navy and must generate maritime capabilities in a weak state context in which major economic challenges and an ongoing and brutal conflict in the east of the country ultimately interfere with the ability to establish and implement effective maritime policy and strategy.
1 Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine official website, 10 April 2015, www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2015/04/10/president-ukraine-was-is-and-will-be-a-maritime-state/4 August 2014.
2 Deborah Sanders, ‘Rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy’, US Naval War College Review, 70/4, 2017, 1–17; Tatiana Urbanskaya, ‘Deputy Chief of Ukraine’s Navy: terms of operation of all Ukrainian military vessels will have run out by 2018’, UNIAN News, 6 July 2015.
3 ‘Crimean losses and their consequences’, Defence Express website, Kiev, in Russian, 24 April 2016, as reported on BBC Monitoring, monitoring.bbc.co.uk/.
4 Dmitry Tymchuk, ‘Ukrainian military resistance ends in Crimea; Navy destroyed’, as published in Kyiv Post, 26 March 2014; also see Tim Ripley, ‘Ukrainian navy decimated by Russian move into Crimea’, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 March 2014.
5 Andri Ryzenko, ‘Conceptual Paper: “Model and Reformation of the Ukrainian Navy 2015–2020”’, Odessa, 25 May 2015 (copy given to author by Captain Ryzenko at US Navy Conference on Maritime Security in Naples in June 2016).
6 Ukrainian Navy: Naval Strategy 2035 Kyiv: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Odessa, Kyiv, November 2018.
7 Christian Bueger, ‘What Is Maritime Security?’ Marine Policy, no. 53 (2015): 159–64; Ian Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2014), 151.
8 C. Bueger and T. Edmunds, ‘Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for maritime Security Studies’, International Affairs, 93 (6). 1293–1311; Council of the EU, ‘EU Maritime Security Strategy’, 2014.
9 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Oceans and Laws of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/63/63 (New York: United Nations, 2008), paragraphs 54–108.
10 ‘On Alert, Crimea to get BUK missile systems’, Sputnik International, 27 February 2017; ‘Russia deploys more surface-to-air missiles in Crimean build-up’, Reuters, 13 January 2018.
11 Sergey Ishchenko, ‘Fortress Crimea. How Russia’s defensive arrangements on the peninsula look’, Svpressa.ru website, Moscow, in Russian, 18 March 2015 as reported on BBC Monitoring.
12 Dmitry Boltenkov, ‘It protects shores: Why Black Sea Fleet did not take part in halting Ukrainian act of provocation’, Izvestia, 27 November 2018 as reported on BBC Monitoring online.
13 Yuri Barash, ‘Armed and dangerous: Prospects for the development of groups of the Russian Armed Forces in Crimea’, Defense-Express website, Kiev, in Russian, 29 Mary 2014 as reported on BBC Monitoring online.
14 Dmitry Gorenburg, ‘Is the Russian Black Sea Fleet coming? Or is it here?’, War on the Rocks, 31 July 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/is-a-new-russian-black-sea-fleet-coming-or-is-it-here/.
15 Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue, ‘Russia’s New State Armament Programme, Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027’, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, May 2018.
16 ‘Timeline of Russian military build-up in Crimea’, BBC Monitoring Insight, 30 November 2018, as reported on BBC Monitoring.
17 ‘Black Sea Fleet missile frigates to join Russia’s Mediterranean task force’, TASS, Moscow, 25 August 2018, http://tass.com/defense/1018623.
18 Maksym Bugriy, ‘Russia’s Moves to Gain Dominance in the Black Sea’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13/32, 17 February 2016; ‘Ukraine says Russia looted two Crimean oil rigs’, Reuters, 16 December 2015.
19 ‘Russia’s Moves to Gain Dominance in the Black Sea’.
20 ‘Russian tabloid says Ukraine rebels set up “top secret” flotilla, Komsomolskaya Pravda website, Moscow, in Russian, 7 May 2015, as reported on BBC Monitoring.
21 ‘Givi leads DPR forces in practice assault on Mariupol’, Fort Russ News, 27 August 2016, www.fortruss.com/2016/08/photosvideo-givi-dpr-forces-practice.html; Alex Kokcharov, ‘Ukrainian separatists demonstrate amphibious assault capability’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 August 2016; ‘Donetsk separatists marine capability more likely to be use for raids on Mariupol ports than seizing territory’, Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, 24 August 2016.
22 Tetyana Katrychenko’s, ‘The Stolen Sea, what game Russia has conjured up in the Sea of Azov’, Fokus, 3 August 2018 as reported on BBC Monitoring, monitoring.bbc.co.uk/.
23 Marisha Shultz and Bruce Golding, ‘Ukrainian Presdient calls for marshal law as tentions with Russia rise’, New York Post, 29 November 2018.
24 ‘Ukraine’s marines rearmed, trained to repel attacks from the sea’, Narodna Armiya, 21 July 2018, as reported on BBC Monitoring, monitoring.bbc.co.uk/.
25 ‘Ukraine weekly views reason for Russia’s Azov Sea blockade’, Fokus, Kiev, 3 August 2018 as reported on BBC Monitoring, monitoring.bbc.co.uk/.
26 Veronika Melkozerova, ‘Ukraine loses control of Azov Sea to Russia’, Kyiv Post, 15 June 2018.
27 ‘Shantazh Kremlya: Priazovskie Porty v Obmen Na Dneprovskuju Vodu?’, (Blackmail of the Kremlin: Azov ports in exchange for Dnieper water?) Information Resistance, May 31, 2018, http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/shantazh-kremlya-priazovskie-porty-v-obmen-na-dneprovskuyu-vodu.
28 ‘Daily calls Azov Sea “new arena” for Russia-Ukraine confrontation’, Izvestia website Moscow, 19 July 2018 as reported on BBC Monitoring, monitoring.bbc.co.uk/.
29 ‘Ukraine weekly views reason for Russia’s Azov Sea blockade’.
30 ‘Explainer: Will Ukraine lose Sea of Azov to Russia?’, 20 July 2018, as reported on BBC Monitoring, monitoring.bbc.co.uk/.
31 Olga Rudenko, ‘Russia’s attack in Black Sea, as it happened (EXPLAINER)’, Kyiv Post, 26 November 2018.
32 ‘Captured Ukrainian sailors to face Russian court’, Kyiv Post, 26 November 2018.
33 ‘How much will economy suffer if Azov Sea is lost’, Kyiv Post, 30 November 2018.
34 ‘Citing Russia threat, Ukraine boosts security at ports, power plants’, Reuters, 1 December 2018.
35 Deborah Sanders, ‘Maritime security in the Black Sea: Out with the new, in with the old’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 28/2, 2017, 4–29.
36 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2018: ANALYSIS OF DRUG MARKETS Opiates, cocaine, cannabis, synthetic drugs, www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_3_DRUG_MARKETS.pdf.
37 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug addiction, ‘Romania Country Drug Report 2018’, www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries/drug-reports/2018/romania/drug-markets_en.
38 Andriy Karakuts, Valeriy Kravchenko, Mykola Zamikula, Oleksandra Davymuka, ‘Security Passport of Odesa Oblast: Regional Dimension’, Black Sea Security, 2/32 2018, 56–59.
39 ‘Smuggling probe launched as loose barge with millions of cigarette packs washes ashore near Odesa’, 21 November 2018, https://economics.unian.info/10347030-smuggling-probe-launched-as-loose-barge-with-millions-of-cigarette-packs-washes-ashore-near-odesa.html.
40 IHS Markit, ‘Ukraine – Navy,’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, 23 November 2017.
41 ‘UNODC and Ukraine sign Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen port control, facilitate trade’ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2018/January/unodc-and-ukraine-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-to-strengthen-port-control–facilitate-trade.html.
42 For an overview, see Fisheries Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (Strasbourg: European Parliament, 2012), www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2012/495833/IPOL-PECH_NT(2012)495833_EN.pdf.
43 A. Yu. Ivanov and A.A. Kucheiko, ‘Distribution of Oil Spills in Inland Seas Based on SAR Image Analysis: A Comparison between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea’, International Journal of Remote Sensing, no. 37 (2014): 2101–14.
44 Marina Mityagina and Olga Lavrova, ‘Satellite Surveys of Inner Seas: Oil Pollution in the Black and Caspian Seas,’ Remote Sensing 8, no. 10 (2016), www.mdpi.com/2072–4292/8/10/875.
45 Peter Schwartzstein, ‘The Black Sea Is Dying and War Might Push It Over the Edge’, Smithsonian.com, 11 May 2016, www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/black-sea-dying-and-war-might-push-it-over-edge-180959053/.
46 Lyudmila Zaitseva and Frederick Steinhausler, ‘Nuclear Trafficking Issues in the Black Sea Region’, EU Non-Proliferation Papers, 29, Brussels, 2014.
47 Maia Edilashvili, ‘Georgia: Nuclear Smuggling Cases Raises Concerns’, EURASIANET.org, 8 July 2016, www.eurasianet.org/node/79576.
48 Eliza Gheorghe, ‘After Crimea: Disarmament, Frozen Conflicts and Illicit Trafficking through Eastern Europe’ (Paper presented at the workshop A Stable Transition to a New Nuclear Order, Berlin, 15–16 December 2014).
49 Ibid.
50 ‘National Progress Report: Ukraine’ (Washington, DC: Nuclear Security Summit, 2016), www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/3/31/national-progress-report-ukraine.
51 ‘Ukrainian Navy: Naval Strategy 2035’.
52 Ibid.
53 Ihor Vetrov, ‘Ukraine creating mosquito fleet’ Segodnya, Kiev, in Russian, 31 May 2016, as reported in BBC Monitoring online.
54 Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare.
55 Ibid. p. 59.
56 Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare.
57 Ibid. p. 66.
58 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A guide for the Twenty-first Century, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2004, 66.
59 Ibid. p.63.
60 Parisa Hafezi, Jonathan Saul, Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, ‘How could Iran disrupt Gulf Oil flows?’, Reuters World News, 11 July 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-iran-explainer/how-could-iran-disrupt-gulf-oil-flows-idUSKBN1K12MH?il=0; Robert Beckhusen, ‘America’s Mighty A-10 Warthog vs. Iran’s ‘Swarm’ Boats: Who Wins?’ National Interest, 1 August 2018; Chase Winter, ‘Iran’s military power: What you need to know,’ DW, 6 August 2018, www.dw.com/en/irans-military-power-what-you-need-to-know/a-43756843.
61 ‘Ukrainian Navy looking to acquire 30 new warships by 2010’, Ukrainian Defence Review, 2 April-June 2018, 8–9, https://issuu.com/ukrainian_defense_review/docs/udr_02.
62 For details see The White Book 2015: The Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv.
63 ‘Military Budget for year 2016 is four times greater than in 2014’, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv, 27 February 2016; The Military Balance 2016, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2016, 204: Illia Ponomarenko, ‘Ukraine’s defense budget up by 28% in 2018’, Kyiv Post, 10 December 2017; ‘White Book 2014 The Armed Forces of Ukraine’, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2015; ‘Defense Ministry budget for 2016 to amount for $2.22 billion’, 12 January 2016, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. www.mil.gov.ua/content/files/whitebook/WB_2014_eng.pdf. Andri Ryzenko, ‘Conceptual Paper: ‘Model and Reformation of the Ukrainian Navy 2015–2020’, Odessa, 25 May 2015 (copy given to author by Captain Ryzenko at the US Navy Conference on Maritime Security in Naples in June 2016).
64 ‘Ukraine’s ministry of defence 2018 budget approved at $3.1bn’, Defence Express, 26 March 2018, https://defence-ua.com/index.php/en/news/4345-ukraine-s-ministry-of-defense-2018-budget-approved-at-3–1b.
65 ‘Ukraine’s defense budget up by 28% in 2018’.
66 Serhiy Hrabovskyy and Ior Losyev, ‘The Ukrainian Navy: What do we have?’, Den, 28 August 2018, as reported on BBC Monitoring.
67 ‘Centaur class fast assault craft promises new capabilities for the Ukrainian Navy’, Defense Express, Kyiv, 10 December 2018.
68 ‘Ukraine doubles funding for warship building’, Defence Express Website, Kyiv, 24 November 2017, as reported on BBC Monitoring.
69 ‘Ukrainian Navy Vice Admiral: Kyiv could not find funds for the planned construction of warships’, UAWire, 5 June 2018, https://uawire.org/ukraine-has-not-found-money-for-the-construction-of-warships.
70 ‘Poroshenko says conflict costing Ukraine $5 million a day’, RFE/RL, 28 September 2015.
71 Ksenia Obukhovska, ‘Ukraine economy 2018’, UNIAN News Agency, 2 January 2018.
72 ‘Economic growth of Ukraine depends on completing pending reforms quickly’, Press Release, The World Bank, 10 April 2018.
73 Neil Buckley, ‘Ukraine’s painful reforms start to bear fruit’, Financial Times, 12 September 2018.
74 ‘Inflation in Ukraine up to 10 per cent in annual terms’, Interfax-Ukraine, as cited in Kyiv Post, 10 December 2018.
75 Tomas Malmlof, ‘A case study of Russo-Ukrainian defense industrial cooperation: Russian Dilemmas’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 29:1, 1–22; also see Michael Carpenter, ‘Why no major western defence company with invest in Ukraine’, Atlantic Council, 4 January 2018.
76 Oleg Varfolomeyev, ‘Ukraine’s Defense Industry Slowly Moves Towards Adopting NATO Standards.’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15/114, 31 July 2018.
77 ‘Poroshenko sweeps out the traces of money theft of Ukraine’s defense budget’, Luxembourg Herald, 15 February 2018.
78 Askold Krushelnychy, ‘UkrOboronProm chief tout reform plans to tempt US investors’, Kyiv Post, 18 October 2018.
79 Askold Krushelnychy, ‘Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Agency alleges fraud in arms industry’, Foreign Affairs, 21 December 2017.
80 Illia Ponomarenko, ‘Following Outcry in media, Ukraine’s leadership vows to accept US naval aid’, Kyiv Post, 5 April 2018.
81 Valery Yoshishin, ‘American “Island” for the Ukrainian fleet: why boats still are not in Ukraine (investigation)’, in Ukrainian, RFE/RL Radio, 30 March 2018, www.radiosvoboda.org/a/schemes/29134047.html.
82 Nikolai Holmov, ‘Ukrainian government and UkrOboronProm deadlocked over debt and production problems at Mykolaiv shipyard’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15/2, 9 January 2018.
83 Natalia Datskevych, ‘Poroshenko’s shipyard signs secret contract with navy ahead of its sale to Tigipko’, Kyiv Post, 26 October 2018.
84 Linda Kinstler, ‘The Corrupt Shall Inherit Ukraine, In a country where even the anti-corruption prosecutors abuse their power, it’s hard to say who the good guys are’, Foreign Policy, 17 September 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/17/the-corrupt-shall-inherit-ukraine/.
85 Peter Dunai, ‘Ukraine’s Neptun missile conducts successful first launch’, AIN online, 28 August 2018, www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2018–08–28/ukraines-neptun-missile-conducts-successful-first-launch.
86 ‘Ukrainian cruise missile Neptun profiled’, Narodna Armiya, 12 April 2018 as reported on BBC Monitoring.
87 ‘Ukrainian, Turkish navy commanders discuss cooperation’, UNIAN News Agency, Kiev, 3 September 2018 as reported on BBC Monitoring.
88 https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/UKR?fiscal_year=2016&measure=Disbursements&implementing_agency_id=7
89 ‘CCD Contracts and Technical Briefs’, NAVSEA Combatant Craft Division, 18 August 2015, 30.
90 Reuters, ‘U.S. Military Chief Says Recommends Providing Ukraine With Lethal Defensive Aid’, 27 September 2017; also see Josh Rogin, ‘Trump administration approves lethal arms sales to Ukraine’, Washington Post, 20 December 2017 [Accessed at www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2017/12/20/trump-administration-approves-lethal-arms-sales-to-ukraine/?utm_term=.bbebf4190e62.]
91 Julian Borger, ‘US ready to boost arms supplies to Ukraine naval and air forces, envoy says’, Guardian, 1 September 2018.
92 Joe Gould, ‘US lawmakers urge Trump to arm Ukraine, break silence on Russian blockade’, Defense News, 26 November 2018, www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/11/26/us-lawmakers-urge-trump-to-arm-ukraine-break-silence-on-russian-blockade/.