In recent years there has been a growth of interest in revaluating the metrics and heuristics used to classify navies. Discourse has centred on re-examining and updating established methods of comparison that date from the Cold War, notably including Eric Grove’s nine-fold typology.1 Writers have questioned the methods employed to rank navies and to establish hierarchies of efficacy and competence. To simplify a complex debate, traditional appraisals suggest that there are large and small navies, and navies in between, but most importantly that navies can be grouped by metrics relating to size and role, and that such groupings provide utility in their construction. Indeed, that logic is suggested by the title of this book, choosing to focus on a group described as ‘small navies’. Much has changed since the two superpower navies and their allies dominated the naval scene. Some navies have advanced, others have declined, and entirely new navies have emerged. The debate has also moved on, with greater recognition now that there may be different ways in which to judge the efficacy and capability of a navy. Paradigm diffusion models are not appropriate. The utility of existing forms of categorisation has been questioned, not least by some of the contributors to this book. Some have argued that it has in fact always been the case that the differences between navies have been principally those of scale not kind.2 Others have engaged with the notion that the creation of hierarchies of this type inherently influences the perception of navies by creating implicit assumptions about the nature of naval capabilities.3
This paper explores the development of three distinct small European navies since the end of the last century. In doing so it will shed light on the range and variety of their activities and highlight areas of comparison and contrast. This is a useful activity in itself, demonstrating that smaller navies can make an important contribution to national and international security and that maritime power is not the sole preserve of larger navies. The chapter also seeks to contribute to the debate by considering the extent to which it is useful to think about small navies as being members of a common group. How much utility does the term ‘small navy’ have, particularly when the conception of naval affairs has expanded beyond appraisals of power projection and kinetic capabilities, where small is seen as an inferior state of being? When a ‘small’ navy is compared to a larger one, differences of scale emerge most prominently. However, it may be the case that such comparisons are possible because large navies possess such a breadth of capabilities that there is always a direct comparison that can be drawn between some element of their tasking and that of a given ‘small’ navy. On the other hand, it may not always be as easy to compare one small navy to another as they may not fulfil similar roles. Counter-intuitively, small navies may actually share more in common with larger navies than with each other. What does this say about the categorisation of scale if the kinds of differences thought previously to exist primarily between groups, or more recently to be of scale, are in fact manifested within the established groupings?
This chapter will examine three self-described ‘small’ navies, the Irish Naval Service (INS), the Maltese Maritime Squadron and the Croatian Navy. The first two serve as examples of constabulary navies on the fringes of Europe while the third is an example of a defensive flotilla situated inside Europe’s boundaries. Two are based in the Mediterranean while the INS has been engaged in two consecutive humanitarian and maritime security operations in the region since 2015. Two of the examples are states that emerged from the British Commonwealth in the last century while Croatia emerged from the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the wider collapse of the Soviet Union. The chapter will examine what their recent developments in areas such as policy, assets and operations illustrate about the utility of categorising these navies as comparable based on relative size.
The Maltese Maritime Squadron is an example of a Mediterranean small navy that operates right on the forefront of migration issues. Since 2004 it has operated as a distinct unit within the Armed Forces of Malta, with sole responsibility for maritime affairs. Prior to this it had operated as a specialist unit under the overall command of the land-based forces, operating a small flotilla of mixed inshore vessels made up of donated German, Italian and US vessels. Traditionally, its tasking has been in relation to general patrol duties typical of constabulary navies with a growing interest in the migration issue given its location on the border of mainland Europe.
In terms of recent policy development, there have been few examples of traditional ‘top down’ policy directives. Two exceptions to this trend are the 1996 White Paper on the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces Strategy Paper 2016–2026. The first of these, while a textbook example of a Defence White Paper in terms of process and publication, was primarily focused towards increasing professionalisation across the armed forces in areas such as oversight of promotions and ensuring independent technical oversight. The only notable maritime component was a commitment to modernising the elements of the headquarters that dealt with Search and Rescue operations. While envisioned as a ten-year development plan, it was succeeded after 20 years by the subsequent strategy plan. While this placed a large emphasis on development in physical terms, it also represented the most definitive outline of the Maltese conception of defence policy. While it contained standard reference to traditional defence responsibilities, it also emphasised the role of the Armed Forces in intelligence gathering. Furthermore, it recognised the importance of participation in international actions for Malta. However, the drafting process of this strategy paper was far less public than its predecessor, it was not promulgated beyond a briefing compiled by the Maritime Squadron’s command.4
However, despite the lack of major policy announcements, in the intervening period it is possible to observe the development of an organic ‘bottom up’ approach to policy building within the Maritime Squadron. This can be evidenced by sources from in-house operational policy to a series of annual reports to the Prime Minister’s office (and the ministry of home affairs and security post-2013). These highlight a drive towards the involvement of the Maritime Squadron in engaging internationally with regional and international partners such as the US, the UK, and particularly supra-national bodies such as NATO (through its partnership for peace initiative) and the EU (through the various FRONTEX-led operations and especially through EUNAVFOR MED ATALANTA and later SOPHIA) to provide both capacity-building opportunities for itself, and to also strengthen the region’s security. This was largely in response to Malta’s key strategic position with regards to sea-based migration, particularly after its accession to the EU in 2004.
Another notable policy trend was a commitment to Maltese involvement in regional security operations. The hope was that, by maintaining involvement in these matters, Maltese interests would be considered in their planning and execution.5 This policy was particularly pursued in relation to EU-led operations in the region where Maltese officers were sent to the headquarters of operations such as ATALANTA and were notably involved in the early planning stages of EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA. Another notable policy direction that emerges from these papers is a commitment to building regional partnerships, particularly between the EU members and their North African neighbours. Much of this work was carried out under the 5 + 5 initiative that grew out of Operation CANALE, a longstanding capacity-building exercise between Malta and Italy, but which grew to include partners such as Libya, Spain, Tunisia and Morocco.6 Malta also engaged frequently in capacity building with Libya over the period both before and after the civil war and the collapse of the Gaddafi regime.7 These efforts were again designed to promote regional cooperation to help stem the tide of illegal migration. In summary, Malta’s policy development in this period was characterised by being driven by emergent daily operational taskings and has been translated upwards from there.
In terms of fixed assets at the turn of the century, the Maritime Squadron base at Hay Wharf had seen no investment projects since the 1980s.8 However, since then it has received a relatively unprecedented number of upgrades. The most prominent of these include the construction of a new headquarters bloc in 2013, alongside increased hangar facilities, and the establishment of a subsidiary base on the Island of Gozo in 2015.9 These upgrades began mainly in response to the need for the expansion of the Squadron due to EU accession, with early examples including the extension of the jetty at Hay Wharf base in 2004. Funding allocation for these projects followed a similar ‘bottom up’ approach to policy, as the Maritime Squadron pursued a strategy of establishing development goals and matching those to (mainly EU) funding opportunities as they became available.10
In terms of the fleet during the same period it too was initially updated in a ‘renewal project’ in 2002, to meet EU expectations.11 The project saw a series of new vessels purchased to replace ageing West German and USCG-donated vessels. This began with the purchase of two USCG-designed Protector class vessels between 2002–2004, followed by the commissioning of the current flagship the Italian Diociotti class P-61 in 2005. Once again this was partly internationally financed in recognition of Malta’s increasing border control duties.12 Likewise, with the creation of the EU’s external borders fund, Malta was able to purchase four Austral class vessels in 2010 and additional RHIBS in 2010.13 In addition, Malta has received recent donations from their US allies in the form of two Defender class vessels in 2013 and night vision sensors.14 Throughout all of this procurement, the Squadron has prioritised assets relating directly to rapid response and increasingly long-range patrol capabilities in relation to border security. In terms of future development, the recent acquisition of the former INS vessel, the LÉ Aoife in 2015, has been considered as a trial run of operating a larger OPV while Malta considers the purchase of a similar-sized vessel in the future.15 Once again, it is clear that the driving force behind procurement is Malta’s specific regional security concerns.
Personnel development in recent years was similarly driven by the requirements of Malta’s growing international commitments.16 With the development of the Squadron as a full unit came the rapid expansion of the service from an establishment of 130 to 400 persons. This growth took place largely between 2002 and 2010. With regards to managing the increased training burden, enlisted personnel were trained in conjunction with the Maltese College of Art, Science and Technology (MCAST). Though not as integrated an effort as other navies have constructed, this provided a supplemental pathway to training skilled trades people. Officer training has been traditionally carried out in conjunction with traditional international allies such as the US, the UK, Italy and Germany, with cadets being sent to various naval colleges as the establishment of a national training programme would be too costly. It would seem that, given the tradition of vessel donations to the Squadron, it would be efficient to train relevant personnel within donor states frameworks. In this period there was an expansion of this trend, with cadets attending a wider variety of naval colleges such as those run by the Irish Defence Forces.17 Additionally, international assets such as the US-led International Military Education and Training programme have been leveraged to provide greater access to such institutions, and to assist with the potential challenges faced with integrating such diverse educational backgrounds within the Maritime Squadron.18 Other notable departures in the period include the formation of Rapid Deployment Teams to conduct high-risk interdiction operations. Such operations were considered increasingly likely in the period both at home and abroad. While there has been significant relative growth within the Squadron, the typical issues of retention remain. The pull of the private sector for highly-trained technical personnel remains high and the surge of recruitment has set up a ‘timebomb’ of retirement for the Squadron in the coming decade. These concerns are somewhat exacerbated by the lack of ‘depth’ of personnel that is common among small navies, where there is often a worryingly small pool of specialists to draw from.
Operationally, the Maritime Squadron has seen little change in terms of its tasks at home. Migration has been a daily concern for the Squadron for over two decades; however, the scale and frequency has increased drastically.19 One notable change to the type of operations engaged in was that a lucrative smuggling route has emerged, in the wake of the Libyan Civil War. With the collapse of the state, oil purchased at drastically lower prices in North Africa has been increasingly smuggled into Europe via the sea routes.20 Meanwhile, international operations have become more prominent as they represent a means of achieving disproportional effect in relation to the security goals of Malta. This has taken the form of capacity-building exercises as well as more direct engagement in security operations with various regional partners.
Two of the most prominent engagements have been with the EU’s counter-piracy operation ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden and the EUNAVFORMED operation SOPHIA. The former was in part motivated by Malta’s status as the sixth largest flag state in the world as this necessitated an effort to demonstrate it was taking seriously its duties to safeguard its registered vessels.21 The operation highlights typical solutions to issues of scale sought by smaller navies as it consisted of a series of Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs). These were deployed on Dutch vessels in the region tasked with protecting shipping.22 Additionally, they were also utilised as security details aboard World Food Program vessels.23 These deployments demonstrate the issues of depth face by small navies. In this case, the VPDs had to be composed of Maritime Squadron elements supplemented by ‘marinised’ personnel from the land-based C ‘special duties’ Company of the 1st Regiment of the Malta Land Forces.24 This was in part due to the necessity of maintaining a required minimum standing at home in order to ensure daily tasking needs were met by the Squadron.
With EUNAVFORMED Operation SOPHIA, the maritime squadron saw engagement from its planning stages, with senior officers deployed to HQ.25 Building on smaller-scale joint operations with partners such as Italy and Spain in the previous decade, Sophia sought to go beyond dealing with the effects of migration towards actively engaging in mapping and disrupting the models of people smuggling that had emerged in the region. However, even as the operation moved beyond the initial phase and increasing efforts were placed into active SAR operations, there were no defined parameters for disrupting the smuggling operations infrastructures, as these were situated in Libyan territory. For Malta, the operation was envisioned as another in a series of opportunities to not only contribute meaningfully to their common European security goals but also to leverage the capacities of their allies to alleviate the drastically increased burden on the Maritime Squadron.26 Given the trends of increased migration in terms of frequency (post-2011 the yearly ‘regeneration period’ the Squadron enjoyed in winter months for refit and training had evaporated) and density (increased numbers of ships with increasing numbers of migrants), the necessity for engagement with international partners was only exacerbated.27
In summary, the Maltese Maritime Squadron’s development has been significantly driven by regional factors, chiefly the security concerns arising from its position on the fringes of Europe. This is particularly clear given its tendency to derive policy from emergent practice.
Unlike the Maltese example, Irish defence policy has seen relatively consistent growth in the significance of the naval element over the last two decades. Traditionally, the Naval Service had been an afterthought in Irish defence development. The fleet was most often comprised of a handful of patrol vessels long past their operational lifespan, in an ill-defined operational environment beyond ‘fisheries duties’ and ‘state defence’. Investment was sporadic and generally only in the direst of circumstance, most notably in the 1970s when the requirements of entry to the European Economic Community were placed on a service lacking sea-going patrol vessels, prompting the first major investment since the end of the Second World War.28 However, from the middle of the 1990s, there has been a clear trend towards increased interest in the maritime affairs of the state, particularly the Naval Service’s roles. This growth began somewhat slowly with the state’s first ever White Paper on defence in 2000, making reference to the role of the Naval Service purely in terms of fisheries duties.29 However, 15 years later, the second White Paper on defence presented a broader scope for the Naval Service. This, while primarily a development plan, highlighted the role of the Naval Service in a variety of roles: from smuggling interdiction to public-private development. It is also notable that the second White Paper was the product of a more transparent development process. This included the drafting of a traditional green paper and a wider engagement with submissions from interested parties. While this is a more ‘top down’ approach than the Maltese example, there was during this period a series of organic developments within the Naval Service itself. These predominantly related to increasing professionalisation and the formalisation of established practices.30
In addition, there were examples of innovation particularly in terms of personnel development. However, the primary focus was to establish a formal recognition of the taskings and relationships between the service as the ‘principal maritime agency of the state’ and its various partners. Examples included the establishment of formal Service Level Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding between the Naval Service and its partners and clients, such as the Coast Guard and the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources. These agreements related to taskings such as search and rescue, the provision of medical services and safeguarding offshore resources.31
There was also a trend towards an increasingly international outlook in Irish maritime policy. For the Naval Service there was an increased interest in leveraging international allies to develop suitable frameworks to meet its goals. At a defence policy level this is present in the increased emphasis placed on topics such as the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy and NATOs ‘Partnership for Peace’ within the second White Paper. In practical terms, this translated into increased integration of Irish maritime assets in international cooperative endeavours such as joining the Maritime Analysis and Coordination Centre-Narcotics in 2007 and operationally in the deployment of Irish vessels in the Mediterranean.
The Naval Service has also looked abroad for examples of how to conceptualise policy. Given the small scale of the fleet and the myriad tasks it could face on any given patrol assignment, the adoption of concepts such as Operational Swing, a term previously employed by the Royal Navy, referring to the need to hone adaptability across assets fixed or human, is unsurprising. This is additionally relevant given the difficult maritime environment the service operates within.32 While the Naval Service has been stable in terms of topics such as state defence, it is interesting to note that an increased engagement with partners and an expansion of state interest in the maritime domain seems to be creating an expanded concept of mission for the Naval Service. Given the recent instability with its closest neighbour and the uncertain consequences of their impending exit from the EU, it is likely this increased attention will continue.33
The trends of formalisation and professionalisation were also present in recent asset development. With regards to the fleet, with the first White Paper the government committed to an established disposition of no less than an eight-ship flotilla. This was the first commitment to any particular standing.34 To this end, the Naval Service recently completed the expanded purchase of the Samuel Beckett class of offshore patrol vessels. Initially envisioned a decade earlier as a two-vessel replacement for the ageing Emer class, the programme was so successful that it subsequently expanded into four vessels as of 2018.35 It is particularly notable that this was not only the first expanded procurement project in the Naval Services history, but was also able to achieve this during a period of significant financial strain in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent years of austerity. The vessels were designed with operational flexibility and the harsh conditions of the Atlantic in mind. Influences from previous vessels such as the Eithne were present, such as the large, open and modular aft deck.
There was also a plan in the second White Paper to replace the ageing flag ship (Eithne) with a new ‘Multi Role Vessel’ with potential for functions such as company-sized transport, increased medical facilities and landing craft functionality.36 Additionally, it seems that international partners have been engaged, with delegations sent to services such as the New Zealand Navy to inspect similar vessels for suitability.37 However, the tender has yet to be formally announced by government, leaving the future of the project uncertain.38 In terms of onshore assets and soft assets, the largest departure for the Naval Service has been the development of the National Maritime College Ireland (NMCI). This came in 2006 and saw the completion of the NMCI building, located adjacent to the naval base at Haulbowline, as part of the first Public Private Partnership involving a third level institution in the state.39 This project, developed alongside the Cork Institute of Technology, was part of attempts to formalise the accreditation of qualifications achieved by Naval Service personnel under the national framework.40 It is notable that the Naval Service has placed a significant value on the provision of in-house or at least nationalised training as opposed to more significantly leveraging their international partners.
When it comes to operational developments, the Naval Service’s trend towards formalisation in recent years can be witnessed again. The implementation of the various agreements created a form of operational legitimacy for traditional operations such as fisheries patrols, smuggling interdiction etc. Alongside these developments, the service embraced its now formal identity as a ‘Constabulary Navy’ set out by the White Paper. The Naval Service chose to highlight this as an indication that its national defence focus should be upon the surveillance and patrol of territorial waters and economic zones. This allowed the framing of daily patrol activities, regardless of mission tasking, as contributory to national defence readiness.41 These activities were dovetailed with parallel efforts to create a unified ‘recognised maritime picture’ and folded into general intelligence and monitoring.42 This increased international outlook within the service can be most prominently demonstrated with the recent landmark international deployments.
The first deployment, operation PONTUS, began in 2015. In response to the growing humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean, a commitment was made that Irish naval assets would become involved in the SAR efforts. To this end, the Irish government agreed a bilateral ‘note verbale’ with the Italian government.43 This would allow Irish naval assets to operate from Italian waters, thereby satisfying the conditions of both UNCLOS and the national legal restrictions on Defence Forces personnel engaging in border enforcement operations.44
Operation PONTUS was conducted as a series of three-month deployments of single vessels. It was run alongside the ongoing EUNAVFORMED Operation SOPHIA. This would create challenges with regards to information sharing between the Naval Service and SOPHIA elements in the operational space.45 From a Naval Service perspective, Operation PONTUS was an opportunity to engage internationally in a meaningful way towards national interests, in conjunction with its partners. It was also envisioned that it would be a suitable tasking for a service that operated flexible craft with crews suited towards operational swing and high-tempo daily operations.46 Following a series of deployments, the proof of Operation PONTUS’s success came with the subsequent political decision to join EUNAVFORMED in July 2017.47
Throughout recent operational development for the Naval Service, it appears that they have successfully managed a transition from a period of formalisation into one of growth. Specifically, it must be noted that a significant factor of their ability to do so has been the flexibility they have developed in response to their expanded operational framework.
The current Croatian Navy was established in 1991 during the break-up of Yugoslavia. The first dedicated attempts at formalising policy came after the cessation of hostilities and the creation of the state in 1995. After this came the question of how the new Navy would adapt the remnants of the Soviet Era Yugoslav fleet to the emergent peacetime needs of the Croatian state. The fleet itself was comprised of 36 vessels seized during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. These vessels represented a quarter of the former fleet and were focused on coastal defence, with a handful of missile boats supported by a larger number of small patrol vessels.48 During the fighting in the early 1990s, the Navy mostly engaged in inshore activities including transport duties and repelling their former sister vessels that had been seized by other forces in the conflict.49 For the remainder of the decade, they were practically engaged in developing the relevant operational and administrative practices that could not be addressed in wartime.50
From a policy perspective, development came in the form of a series of ‘Strategic Defence Reviews’ (SDR) and an ongoing development plan. With Croatia’s entry into NATO’s PFP and membership access program between 2000 and 2002, the influence of international partners would quickly become apparent. A decade after beginning formalisation attempts, the 2005 SDR was published to address the strategic context of Croatia with a structured development plan.51 Following this came the Croatian Armed Forces Long Term Development Plan 2006–2015. The plan was mainly focused on land assets with the navy scheduled to receive a small number of new patrol vessels, and an operational reduction of personnel.52 It also contained a direction to establish a coastguard, leaving the peacetime tasking of the Navy to include protection of the state interests at sea beyond national defence, developing capabilities for combined operations at home or abroad with established PSOs and general maintenance of good order in territorial waters.53
With NATO accession in 2009, the 2013 SDR and Long Term Development Plan 2015–2024 reasserted the priority for greater integration among Croatian forces. Interoperability with NATO counterparts was particularly emphasised.54 The navy was to ensure capability for engaging surface targets, mine and counter-mine operations, command and control in complex environments and networking.55 However, it is notable prioritisation of new vessels was given to the coastguard.56 While the need for clear defence policy was recognised early in the Croatian Navy’s existence, it was nearly a decade before the first significant policies emerged. Notably, these were heavily influenced by a desire for integration, and indeed active participation in international security alliances. Finally, it must not be overlooked that these modernisation plans were set against the backdrop of declining defence budgets, with spending falling to 1.3 per cent of GDP by 2015.57
With regards to the development of assets in this period, two decades of budgetary restrictions have had a significant impact on the Croatian Navy. These restrictions have resulted in little change in the flotilla since the formation of the state. Many of the vessels still date from the period when the Yugoslavian navy operated them.
The core of the flotilla are the missile boats, with the two Kralj class vessels being the largest. The Kralj Petar Krešimir IV was captured while still in production in 1991, while the Kralj Dmitar Zvonimir was commissioned in 2002. They are operating alongside the last of the vessels they were meant to replace. The Končar class Šibenik is another seized vessel that has been modernised several times to try to extend its lifespan. Additionally, there are the two Helsinki class vessels, the Vukovar and the Dubrovnik. These were purchased for a token price, as part of an offset deal relating to a purchase of vehicles from the Finnish in 2008.58 These vessels were similar in capability to their existing counterparts. In addition to missile boats, the Croatian Navy also operated a small detachment of four Mirna-class patrol boats. Nearing four decades old, they were slated to finally be retired and replaced with new inshore patrol vessels under the control of the coastguard.59 There is also a limited mine-hunting component to the Croatian Navy. The Korčula class minesweeper is the sole vessel currently in operation, however Croatia was expected to take delivery of two Kulmbach class minesweepers from Germany in 2017.60 These vessels were set to be decommissioned but were instead donated. Finally, the flotilla is supported by a small fleet of landing craft and support vessels, including diving support launches and a cargo vessel. Overall, there seems to have been reluctance through much of the period to expand the flotilla outside of life-extending upgrades.
However, since 2015, the navy has embarked upon a new plan for the modernisation of the fleet. It envisioned that by 2020 there would be complete overhauls of the radar and information systems, particularly to allow integration with NATO systems, a refurbishment of existing missile systems, the launch of the new patrol boats and the acquisition of the new mine-hunting vessels.61 Furthermore, there were plans to purchase an OPV second hand by 2024, to bolster the reach of the navy. As of December 2018, the first new patrol vessel has been received with a potential option for up to four more.62 From a fleet perspective, Croatia appears to have taken the first step on a major renewal.
In terms of international maritime operations, since 2009 Croatia has contributed actively towards Operation ATALANTA. Like Malta, Croatia has contributed VPDs assigned to protect World Food Organisation shipments.63 Over the last decade it has successfully deployed several of these teams to ATALANTA and has received numerous commendations for their efforts.64 It seems that, similar to the other examples of small navies in this period, Croatia has managed to achieve a notable contribution to a large international maritime partnership despite its relative lack of fixed assets. Outside of ATALANTA there has been some recent involvement of the Croatian Navy in other international operations. Following participation in a series of NATO-led drills such as Trident Juncture in 2015, the Croatian Navy announced its participation in the NATO-led Operation Sea Guardian in June 2018. The Croatian contribution consisted of a 30-day deployment of a patrol vessel in the Adriatic region, as part of the larger operation designed to increase the scope of the recognised maritime picture across the central Mediterranean. The operation also provides shared situational information to other security operations in the area such as Operation SOPHIA.65 Once again this suggests that common national security concerns are prompting increased international involvement for these navies.
Upon review, it is clear that there are significant differences in the character of the three examples across their contemporary policy and composition. The greatest area of similarity is that all of the examples have demonstrated a recent commitment to increased engagement in European security issues. It is clear that all three face a set of constraints common to ‘small navies,’ such as shortages in personnel, limited fleets and a lack of access to the kinds of economies of scale that larger navies enjoy when it comes to asset procurement. Adaptability has therefore become a vital common virtue. However, while this can offset these issues, it is important to be wary that qualities such as the INS’s ‘can do’ attitude does not become ‘make do’, as adaptability has its practical limitations. Furthermore, it seems that the largest factor driving the development of these navies is their ‘daily’ tasking, rather than any long-term plan or vision. All three examples illustrate that development is driven by these varied tasks; whether it be the economic patrol duties of the INS or the border security duties of the Maltese Maritime Squadron. This has also remained true for Croatia, a navy that is undergoing a shift from one traditional primary tasking of national defence, inherited from the former Yugoslav navy, towards a more flexible set of responsibilities, in conjunction with a recently prioritised coastguard. Additionally, given Croatia’s recent international efforts towards a common goal of contributing to increased maritime security, it is likely they will exhibit more similarities in their handling of maritime security operations going forward. It must also be noted that, while for Malta the issue of good order at sea in the southern Mediterranean is inherently of national interest, the conditions and context of the operations undertaken by the other examples currently represent a departure to their ‘daily tasking’ in the Atlantic and the Adriatic.
It is interesting to note that small navies are somewhat by definition the most limited in their resources, therefore the natural prioritisations of each state may lead to a more substantial set of differences between small navies, who must choose which roles to fill and which to leave to others. This is in contrast to their larger counterparts who attempt to cover more roles, often with constrained resources, and in that respect may share many problems common to their smaller counterparts. Thus, the INS may find that in some respects it has less in common with the Croatian Navy than it does with elements of the US, British or French navies. Finally, it is worth noting that, among two of the examples, the Irish and the Maltese, there has been a distinct trend towards a more postmodern conception of maritime strategy. In both cases, an emphasis has been placed on broadening the engagement of the organisation to highlight areas of utility beyond traditional duties. This is clearly evident for the INS in its formalisation of its services to the state and other bodies and its partnership with educational bodies. Meanwhile, Malta has engaged in some similar behaviours such as its relationship with MCAST. Indeed, both organisations have demonstrated an increased interest, and this is true of Croatia as well, in engaging in international operations, even if simply in an advisory role to ensure that they can represent the states’ broader political interests in the domain of maritime security.
1 Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press, 1990) pp. 26–21.
2 Geoffrey Till, ‘Are Small Navies Different’ in Small Navies Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace, ed. Mulqueen et al. (London: Ashgate, 2014), 31.
3 Basil Germond, ‘Small Navies in Perspective: Deconstructing the Hierarchy of Naval Forces’ in Small Navies, ed. Mulqueen et al., 49.
4 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Valleta, 22 June 2018.
5 Ibid.
6 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Valleta, 30 August 2018.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Valleta, 22 June 2018.
10 Ibid.
11 Times of Malta (Valetta, Malta), 11 April 2004.
12 Malta Independant (Valetta, Malta), 5 November 2005.
13 Captain Etienne Scicluna, ‘Border Control, the Way Ahead’ On Parade, October 2012.
14 Armed Forces Malta. Press Release PR2797. Valetta, Malta: Armed Forces of Malta, 2012. www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Pages/2012/December/21/pr2797.aspx.
15 RTÉ, ‘Active Discussions’ over LÉ Aoife Transfer to Malta’ 21 February 2015. www.rte.ie/news/2015/0221/681854-le-aoife/.
16 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Valleta, 22 June 2018.
17 Ibid.
18 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Valleta, 30 August 2018.
19 Government of Malta, Annual Report of Government Departments 2008. Valetta: Gov. of Malta, 2008.
20 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Valleta, 30 August 2018.
21 Ibid.
22 EUNAVFOR, ‘Maltese Boarding Team Maintain their Skills Aboard E.U. Naval Force Warship HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën’, accessed 20 January 2019. http://eunavfor.eu/maltese-boarding-team-maintain-their-skills-aboard-eu-naval-force-warship-hnlms-de-zeven-provincien/.
23 EUNAVFOR, ‘Malta’s First EU NAVFOR Operational Mission Protects World Food Programme (WFP) Ship Mustafa-H’, accessed 20 January 2019. http://eunavfor.eu/maltas-first-eu-navfor-operational-mission-protects-world-food-programme-wfp-ship-mustafa-h/.
24 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wallace Camilleri. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Valleta, 6 October 2018.
25 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Valleta, 22 June 2018.
26 Ibid.
27 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Valleta, 30 August 2018.
28 Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola. ‘The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922–1977’ (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2009), 144.
29 Department of Defence Ireland, White Paper on Defence. Dublin, Ireland: Dept. of Def., 2000, 45.
30 Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Dublin, 22 October 2017.
31 Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces Annual Report 2015. Dublin, Ireland: D.F.I., 2015, 28.
32 Department of Defence Ireland, White Paper on Defence. Dublin, Ireland: Dept. of Def., 2015, 39.
33 Dara Doyle, ‘Irish “Warship” Seizes Northern Irish Trawlers, DUP Says’, Bloomberg, 28 February 2019. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019–02–28/irish-warship-seizes-northern-irish-trawlers-dup-says.
34 Department of Defence Ireland, White Paper on Defence. Dublin, Ireland: Dept. of Def., 2000, 46.
35 Department of Defence, The White Paper on Defence: Review of Implementation. Dublin: Dept. of Def., 2005, 30.
36 Irish Examiner (Dublin, Ireland), 12 October 2017.
37 Ibid.
38 Minister for Defence (Kehoe, P.), ‘Written Answers, Naval Services Vessels’, Dáil Éireann Debate Vol. 972 No. 8, 3 October 2018.
39 National Maritime College of Ireland, ‘Minister Mary Hanafin opens National Maritime College of Ireland in Ringaskiddy, Co. Cork’, accessed 6 January 2019. www.nmci.ie/index.cfm/page/newsarchive/id/6.
40 Irish Examiner (Dublin, Ireland), 18 June 2010.
41 Irish Naval Service, Strategy Statement (Dublin: D.F.I., 2003), 7.
42 Commodore Hugh Tully. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Cork, 10 April 2017, 6.
43 Commodore Hugh Tully. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Cork, 10 April 2017, 2.
44 Cdr. Pat Burke, ‘Troubled waters’. In Defence Forces Review 2016, edited by Col. D Dignam Prof. E. O’Halpin, Dr. I. Speller (Kildare, DFI, 2016).
45 Irish Times (Dublin, Ireland), 10 July 2017.
46 Commodore Hugh Tully. Interview by Ciarán Lowe. Formal interview. Cork, 10 April 2017, 2.
47 Irish Times (Dublin, Ireland), 13 July 2017.
48 Mary Reljanović, ‘Croatian Navy in Defence of the Adriatic’, Hrvatski-Vojnik, December 2013.
49 Ibid.
50 GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Croatia-Navy-Modernization’, accessed 8 January 2019. www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/hr-navy-modernization.htm.
51 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, Strategic Defence Review 2005. Zagreb: M.O.D., 2005. www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/livrobranco/arquivos/pdf/Croacia%202005.pdf.
52 Nathan M. Polak, Ryan C. Henderson, Nathan Garret. ‘NATO membership for Albania and Croatia: military modernization, geo-strategic opportunities and force projection’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22, no. 4 (2009): 502–14, 504.
53 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, Strategic Defence Review 2005. Zagreb: M.O.D. 2005. www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/livrobranco/arquivos/pdf/Croacia%202005.pdf.
54 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. The Croatian Armed Forces Long Term Development Plan 2015–2024. Zagreb: M.O.D., 2015. www.morh.hr/images/stories/morh_2015/pdf/dpr/ltdp_en_2015.pdf, 32.
55 Ibid., 71.
56 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, Strategic Defence Review 2013. Zagreb: M.O.D., 2013. www.morh.hr/images/stories/morh_2014/pdf/strategic_defence_review_2013.pdf, 25.
57 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘(2015) Chapter Two: Comparative defence statistics’, The Military Balance 115 (2015):21–28. Accessed 28 January 2019. www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2015.996348, 24.
58 Igor Tabek, ‘2 Finnish Helsinki Class FACs to Croatia’ Defense Industry Daily, 17 May 2008). www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2-Finnish-Helsinki-Class-FACs-to-Croatia-05017/.
59 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, ‘“Brodosplit” lays the keel for in- shore patrol vessels’ Zagreb: M.O.D., 2015. www.morh.hr/en/news/press-releases/12102-%E2%80%9Cbrodosplit%E2%80%9C-lays-the-keel-for-in-shore-patrol-vessels.html.
60 Denis Krnic, ‘Split shipyard offers best deal for five ships for the navy’. Slobod na Dalmacija (Split, 2014), 8 May 2014. www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/dalmacija/split/clanak/id/234155/splitski-skver-dao-najbolju-ponudu-za-pet-brodova-hrm-a.
61 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. the Croatian Armed Forces long term development plan 2015–2024. Zagreb: M.O.D., 2015. www.morh.hr/images/stories/morh_2015/pdf/dpr/ltdp_en_2015.pdf, 72–73.
62 Naval Today, ‘Croatia takes delivery of first locally-built inshore patrol vessel “Omiš”’. Naval Today, 7 December 2018. https://navaltoday.com/2018/12/07/croatia-takes-delivery-of-first-locally-built-inshore-patrol-vessel-omis/.
63 EUNAVFOR Somalia, ‘Croatia takes Over E.U. Naval Force World Food Programme Vessel Protection Duties from Serbia’, accessed 21 January 2019. http://eunavfor.eu/croatia-takes-over-eu-naval-force-world-food-programme-vessel-protection-duties-from-serbia/.
64 EUNAVFOR Somalia, ‘Croatian maritime protection team awarded E.U. Operation Atalanta Medal for keeping W.F.P. vessel MSM Douro safe from pirates off coast of Somalia’, accessed 23 January 2019. http://eunavfor.eu/croatian-maritime-protection-team-awarded-eu-operation-atalanta-medal-for-keeping-wfp-vessel-msm-douro-safe-from-pirates-off-coast-of-somalia/.
65 Naval Today, ‘Croatian Navy to Deploy Ship to NATO Mission for First Time Ever’. Naval Today, 28 June 2018. https://navaltoday.com/2018/06/28/croatian-navy-to-deploy-ship-to-nato-mission-for-first-time-ever/.