Robert McCabe, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller
This book set out to examine the role of small navies within European security and was motivated by a desire to respond to the relative lack of discourse and debate on this topic. It sought to explore the idea of small navies within this context and also to look at examples of what small navies do in practice. Different contributors have defined small navies in slightly different ways, but all adhere broadly to the notion that these are navies with limited means and limited ambitions. It is apparent, however, that this does not mean that they are of limited importance. These are not navies of no account.1
As this book makes clear, small navies, which represent the majority of European navies, have important roles to play in support of national and international policy. These include deterrence and self-defence, protection of resources and maintenance of good order within the EEZ, interdiction of drugs, arms or illegal migrants and support for national foreign policy and diplomacy. They also include contributions to EU or NATO collective defence, where sometimes the symbolic element can be as important as the physical contribution, although the latter should not be overlooked when even limited contributions can be the difference between success and failure. Moreover, small navies can play a key part in support of multi-national efforts to protect the maritime commons, and to participate in capacity and capability building exercises designed to help other small navies and maritime security sectors. Large navies need the support of their smaller counterparts to police and protect an environment that covers two-thirds of the planet, and also to meet more traditional challenges, a point that has been emphasised strongly in recent US pronouncements.2
It is apparent that small navies do not all follow the same path, in terms of roles, missions or force structure, as their larger counterparts. It would be surprising if they did. Intelligent planning for navies, big or small, must reject the notion that there is a particular model that must be adopted. Rational defence policy does not adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach but adapts to circumstances and reflects available resources, local conditions and likely tasks. The foregoing chapters identify areas of commonality between some of the navies studied, and also areas of difference. Some focus on alliance roles, others place a greater emphasis on national responsibilities, most try to balance the two. Many of these navies are now deeply concerned about the re-emergence of an apparent threat from Russia and are concerned about the exploitation of hybrid approaches that may challenge them below the response threshold of their friends and allies.
Others remain geographically remote from the immediate threat and have focused more on constabulary duties within the EEZ and on contributions towards multinational maritime security missions. Indeed, almost all of the navies discussed in this book have placed some degree of emphasis on the latter. The ability to contribute to such missions offers them a way to act as good global citizens, to contribute to NATO or EU goals and also, importantly, to demonstrate their relevance to a public that does not generally understand the need for a navy. They also allow those navies to make a meaningful contribution to security at and from the sea, promoting and protecting national security, the security of Europe and the stability of a globalised world that depends upon the safe and free use of the seas.
The Russian Navy, not a small navy by the broad metrics adopted here, figures prominently in a number of chapters as the most dangerous potential adversary. That navy may still be a shadow of its Soviet ancestor, but Russian joint forces have the potential to pose a range of serious challenges to sea control in both the Baltic and the Black Sea and have conducted successful conventional, hybrid and ‘grey-zone’ operations against their neighbours in the latter. Naval assets have also provided a key tool of Russian power projection and diplomacy in the Mediterranean, where the dubious military value of the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetzov should not disguise the diplomatic significance of its deployments to Syria. Sea-launched cruise missile strikes may provide a more practical example of the growing reach inland of the Russian Navy. When considered in terms of traditional maritime strategy and its largest potential enemy, the Russian Navy is rather ‘small’. The strategies that it might adopt in any confrontation with the West will surely reflect this. The focus on anti-access/area-denial in the Baltic could be represented as a strategy of the weak, the natural successor to the defensive approach of the old Soviet New School.3
The lessons from Georgia and Ukraine, and the opinions expressed by many authors here, suggest something more dangerous, where hybrid approaches seek to exploit conventional and unconventional means to generate leverage. Geography and politics dictate that small navies will be in the forefront of any response. Given the nature of the threat, one suspects that policy makers should read Kautilya’s ‘Arthashastra’, for its insight into the ruthless exploitation of all tools of statecraft, in addition to consulting the classics of naval strategy.4
This book is based on the idea that it is not necessary to believe that ‘small navies’ represent a distinct sub-group within maritime strategy, with shared characteristics (other than mere size) that differentiate them from larger navies, to recognise that they are still worthy of study. The reason for this enquiry is the simple reality than most navies are small, that despite this (or maybe even because of it) they fulfil a variety of interesting and important roles and that it is not possible to understand naval strategy, maritime security or indeed European security as a whole, unless you also understand the roles played by small navies. In many respects this book has only touched the surface of the topic. If it encourages others to dig a little deeper, and to address these topics in more detail, it will have served a useful purpose.
1 Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, Ian Speller (eds.), Small Navies. Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014) p. 1.
2 For example, see Dept of the Navy, CS21. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, (March 2015).
3 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century, 4th edn (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018) pp. 94–5. Also see Ian Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2018) p. 66.
4 See Roger Boesche, The First Political Realist. Kautilya and His Arthashastra, (Lanham, Ma: Lexingtom Books, 2002).