Chapter Six

The Miraculous Year – Ramillies and the Conquest of Belgium, 1706

In late spring of 1706, things were stirring on either side of the Dyle river in the Spanish Netherlands. The Duke of Marlborough was anxious to get the French army to stand and fight, while his opponent, François de Neufville, Marshal Villeroi, was receiving instructions from Versailles to go and seek battle. Peter Drake, still serving in an émigré Irish regiment in the French service, wrote of the opening of the season for war:

We did not stir until the latter end of April, when we marched by the way of Brussels for Louvain, where the army was to assemble. We stayed some days to lay bridges over the Dyle, for the more convenient passing of the army and train, whilst the baggage marched through the town.

The Duke of Marlborough, with frustrating difficulty and delay, partially completed the concentration of his army near to Maastricht. A particular concern was that the dependable Danish cavalry were under instructions not to go on campaign until arrears of pay were settled, even though Queen Anne had written to her brother-in-law, King Frederick IV, on 13 April:

The Duke of Marlborough is projecting an important undertaking against the enemy, and the friendship which I have for you making me rely on your own, I hope that you will consent to allow Your Majesty’s troop[s] now under the said General’s command to march wherever he thinks for the good of the service. The great concern which I always had for your subjects in my pay, should convince you that you can well confide them to my care.

Marlborough told his friend, the lord Treasurer, Sidney Godolphin, on 15 May 1706:

When I left the Hague on Sunday [9 May] last I was assured that I should find the army in a condition to march. But as yet neither the artillery horses nor the bread wagons are come, so that we shall be obliged to stay for the English, which will join us on Wednesday [19 May], and then we shall advance towards Louvain. God knows I go with a heavy heart, for I have no prospect of doing any thing considerable, when the French would do what I am very confident they will not, when the marshal de Marsin should return [from the Moselle], as is reported, with thirty battalions and forty squadrons; for that would give them such a superiority as might tempt them to march out of their lines, which if they do, I will most certainly attack them, not doubting, with the blessing of God, to beat them, though the foreign troops I have seen are not so good as they were last year, but I hope the English are better.

Other concerns crowded in upon the Duke, in large degree a consequence of the imperfections of alliance warfare, and he wrote to Secretary of State, Robert Harley, in London on 17 May: ‘I find the King of Prussia is as obstinate as ever against his troops serving in Germany; or even letting them advance into these parts.’ However, the troops in English and Dutch pay were steadily gathering, even if Marlborough eventually had to pledge his own credit to secure the services of the Danish squadrons.

The Duke thought it unlikely that Villeroi would risk battle, but the Marshal now had orders from Versailles to do just that. Louis XIV wanted peace, and the best way to put pressure on his opponents to negotiate with him was to intimidate them, or so it seemed. All the French field commanders were expected to take the offensive this spring, and demonstrate to the whole world the vitality of France and the French war effort. The King had written ‘I can think of nothing which can better induce them [the Allies] to come to an agreement which has become necessary now than to let them see that I have sufficient forces to attack them everywhere.’ The rather pointed letters sent to Villeroi by both the King and Michel de Chamillart, the French War Minister, aggravated the Marshal, who seemed to feel that his own courage was being impugned. The Duc de St Simon wrote that:

Villeroi was wounded by these reiterated admonitions. He had the feeling that the King doubted his courage since he judged it necessary to spur him so hard. He resolved to put all at stake to satisfy him, and to prove that he did not deserve such hard suspicions.

It was also felt, both at Versailles and in the French army, that the inability of Marlborough to achieve very much in 1705, other than the Elixheim success, indicated that the victory at Blenheim in 1704 had been due to luck, rather than to the Duke’s skill. This, perhaps, led Villeroi to risks that otherwise he would not have thought of taking.

As Marlborough indicated in his letter of 15 May to Godolphin, he had information that Marshal Marsin would march from the Moselle valley to reinforce the French in Brabant. Should this take place, and some of Marsin’s cavalry certainly did join Villeroi in mid-May, his opponents might well feel powerful enough to take the field. The Duke was not very optimistic that this would be so, however, not yet aware of the urging coming from Versailles to the French commanders. Louis XIV, in fact, did caution Villeroi not to move until the reinforcements from the Moselle had joined him. In the French camp, Colonel Jean-Martin De La Colonie commented on the attitude of easy confidence that filled the French at this time:

The last campaign had been so favourable to France that she became convinced the wheel of fortune was turning in her favour, and that she should therefore take the opportunity to strike terror in the hearts of her enemies. To bring this about a battle in Flanders would be necessary; she had in reserve, should a reverse occur, a number of fortified towns which would be a means of defence for the frontier by checking the enemy’s advance and giving us time to replace our losses, and in case of success Holland and the German frontier lay open to us.

Rather against early expectations then, it was learned in the Allied camp on Wednesday 19 May that the 60,000-strong French army had left its camp near Louvain the previous day, and crossed the Dyle river, apparently heading for the Allied-held town of Leau, lost by Villeroi the previous year. The French then swung southwards, past Tirlemont, heading for the convenient watershed at Ramillies, where easy passage across dry ground could be found between the marshy Mehaigne and Gheete rivers. By this route he might turn the left flank of the Allied position on the borders of Brabant, and catch his opponent off-balance. Marlborough wrote to the Duke of Württemberg, commander of the absent twenty-one squadrons of Danish cavalry, on that same day: ‘Having just been advised that the enemy have passed the Dyle, I send this express to request your Highness to bring your cavalry forward by a double march.’

The Allied army, which would number 62,000 men when the Danish cavalry caught up, was put on the road, and moved to take possession of the very same watershed at Ramillies that Villeroi was heading for. The reason is plain; for this dry ground gave the only convenient route from east to west, or vice versa, in the region. Whichever army held the ground would be at an advantage when moving swiftly to the attack. On Thursday Marlborough wrote to Godolphin as the fateful campaign began to unfold:

The French knowing that it is not in our power, in less than three weeks, to have the Hanoverians or Hessians from the Rhine, they have taken the resolution of drawing as many of their troops out of the garrisons as is possible, and marched yesterday out of their lines, and are now camped at Tirlemont. The English join the army this day, and the Danes two days hence. We shall be 122 squadrons and 74 battalions … I hope for success, being resolved to venture; for as yet they have but twenty squadrons of the marshal de Marsin’s detachment [from the Moselle].

Marlborough delayed his army’s advance for a day at Corswaren, to enable the Danes to close up. Württemberg had responded to the Duke’s call like a loyal lieutenant, and his cavalry would join the Allied army in time to participate in the attack the following day. Meanwhile, Marlborough wrote from Borchloen to Robert Harley in London, telling of the urgent concentration of his army in face of the French moves: