BOOK IX

[1] τῷ δὲ μετὰ τούτους ἔτει διαφορᾶς γενομένης τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν περὶ τῶν ἀποδειχθησομένων ὑπάτων: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠξίουν ἀμφοτέρους ἐκ τῶν ἀριστοκρατικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν προαγαγεῖν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῷ κεχαρισμένων: γνωσιμαχήσαντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος τέλος συνέπεισαν ἀλλήλους ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστης μερίδος ὕπατον αἱρεθῆναι: καὶ ἀποδείκνυται Καίσων μὲν Φάβιος τὸ δεύτερον ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς, ὁ τὸν Κάσσιον ἐπὶ τῇ τυραννίδι κρίνας, Σπόριος δὲ Φούριος ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτικῶν, ἐπὶ τῆς ἑβδομηκοστῆς καὶ πέμπτης ὀλυμπιάδος ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι [p. 272] Καλλιάδου, καθ᾽ ὃν χρόνον ἐστράτευσε Ξέρξης ἐπὶ

[1.1] The following year, a dispute having arisen between the populace and the senate concerning the men who were to be elected consuls, the senators demanding that both men promoted to that magistracy should be of the aristocratic party and the populace demanding that they be chosen from among such as were agreeable to them, after an obstinate struggle they finally convinced each other that a consul should be chosen from each party. Thus Caeso Fabius, who had accused Cassius of aiming at a tyranny, was elected consul, for the second time, on the part of the senate, and Spurius Furius on the part of the populace, in the seventy-fifth Olympiad, Calliades being archon at Athens, at the time when Xerxes made his expedition against Greece.

[2] τὴν Ἑλλάδα. ἄρτι δὲ παρειληφότων αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν Λατίνων τε πρέσβεις ἧκον ἐπὶ τὴν βουλὴν δεόμενοι πέμψαι σφίσι τὸν ἕτερον τῶν ὑπάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως, ὃς οὐκ ἐάσει προσωτέρω χωρεῖν τὴν Αἰκανῶν καταφρόνησιν, καὶ Τυρρηνία πᾶσα ἠγγέλλετο κεκινημένη καὶ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ χωρήσουσα εἰς πόλεμον. συνήχθη γὰρ εἰς κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὸ ἔθνος, καὶ πολλὰ Οὐιεντανῶν δεηθέντων συνάρασθαι σφίσι τοῦ κατὰ Ῥωμαίων μαίων πολέμου, τέλος ἐξήνεγκεν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς βουλομένοις Τυρρηνῶν μετέχειν τῆς στρατείας: καὶ ἐγένετο χεὶρ ἀξιόμαχος ἡ τοῖς Οὐιεντανοῖς ἑκουσίως τοῦ πολέμου συναραμένη. ταῦτα μαθοῦσι τοῖς ἐν τέλει Ῥωμαίων ἔδοξε στρατιάς τε καταγράφειν καὶ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἀμφοτέρους ἐξιέναι, τὸν μὲν Αἰκανοῖς τε πολεμήσοντα καὶ Λατίνοις τιμωρὸν ἐσόμενον, τὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ

[2] They had no sooner taken office than ambassadors of the Latins came to the senate asking them to send to them one of the consuls with an army to put a check to the insolence of the Aequians, and at the same time word was brought that all Tyrrhenia was aroused and would soon go to war. For that nation had been convened in a general assembly and at the urgent solicitation of the Veientes for aid in their war against the Romans had passed a decree that any of the Tyrrhenians who so desired might take part in the campaign; and it was a sufficiently strong body of men that voluntarily aided the Veientes in the war. Upon learning of this the authorities in Rome resolved to raise armies and also that both consuls should take the field, one to make war on the Aequians and to aid the Latins, and the other to march with his forces against Tyrrhenia.

[3] Τυρρηνίας ἄξοντα τὰς δυνάμεις. ἀντέπραττε δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα Σπόριος Ἰκίλιος τῶν δημάρχων εἷς: καὶ συνάγων εἰς ἐκκλησίαν τὸν δῆμον ὁσημέραι τὰς περὶ τῆς κληρουχίας ὑποσχέσεις ἀπῄτει παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ οὐδὲν ἔφη συγχωρήσειν οὔτε τῶν ἐπὶ πόλεμον οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς ψηφιζομένων ἐπιτελεσθῆναι, ἐὰν μὴ τοὺς δέκα ἄνδρας ἀποδείξωσι πρότερον ὁριστὰς τῆς δημοσίας χώρας, καὶ διέλωσι τὴν γῆν, ὡς [p. 273]

[3] All this was opposed by Spurius Icilius, one of the tribunes, who, assembling the populace every day, demanded of the senate the performance of its promises relating to the allotment of land and said that he would allow none of their decrees, whether they concerned military or civil affairs, to take effect unless they should first appoint the decemvir so fix the boundaries of the public land and divide it among the people as they had promised.

[4] ὑπέσχοντο τῷ δήμῳ. ἀπορουμένῃ δὲ τῇ βουλῇ καὶ ἀμηχανούσῃ, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, Ἄππιος Κλαύδιος ὑποτίθεται σκοπεῖν, ὅπως διαστήσεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δημάρχων πρὸς αὐτόν, διδάσκων, ὅτι τὸν κωλύοντα καὶ ἐμποδὼν γινόμενον τοῖς δόγμασι τῆς βουλῆς ἱερὸν ὄντα καὶ νόμῳ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντα ταύτην ἄλλως οὐκ ἔστι παῦσαι τῆς δυναστείας, ἐὰν μή τις ἕτερος τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης τιμῆς καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐχόντων τἀναντία πράττῃ καί, οἷς ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἐμποδὼν γένηται,

[4] When the senate was at a loss and did not know what to do, Appius Claudius suggested that they should consider how the other tribunes might be brought to dissent from Icilius, pointing out that there is no other method of putting an end to the power of a tribune who opposes and obstructs the decrees of the senate, since his person is sacred and this authority of his legal, than for another of the men of equal rank and possessing the same power to oppose him and to order to be done what the other tries to obstruct.

[5] ταῦτα κωλύῃ. συνεβούλευέ τε τοῖς αὖθις παραληψομένοις τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπάτοις τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ σκοπεῖν, ὅπως ἕξουσί τινας ἀεὶ τῶν δημάρχων οἰκείους σφίσι καὶ φίλους: μίαν εἶναι λέγων τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀρχείου κατάλυσιν, ἐὰν στασιάζωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄνδρες.

[5] And he advised all succeeding consuls to do this and to consider how they might always have some of the tribunes well disposed and friendly to them, saying that only method of destroying the power of the college was to sow dissension among its members.

[1] ταύτην εἰσηγησαμένου τὴν γνώμην Ἀππίου δόξαντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς παραινεῖν οἵ τε ὕπατοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ δυνατώτατοι, πολλῇ θεραπείᾳ διεπράξαντο τοὺς τέτταρας ἐκ τῶν δημάρχων οἰκείους τῇ βουλῇ

[2.1] When Appius had expressed this opinion, both the consuls and the more influential of the others, believing his advice to be sound, courted the other four tribunes so effectually as to make them well disposed toward the senate.

[2] γενέσθαι. οἱ δὲ τέως μὲν λόγῳ μεταπείθειν τὸν Ἰκίλιον ἐπεχείρουν ἀποστῆναι τῶν περὶ τῆς κληρουχίας πολιτευμάτων, ἕως οἱ πόλεμοι λάβωσι τέλος: ὡς δ᾽ ἠναντιοῦτο καὶ διώμνυτο λόγον τε τὸν αὐθαδέστερον εἰπεῖν ἐτόλμησε τοῦ δήμου παρόντος, ὅτι μᾶλλον ἂν βούλοιτο Τυρρηνοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολεμίους κρατήσαντας [p. 274] τῆς πόλεως ἐπιδεῖν, ἢ τοὺς κατέχοντας τὴν χώραν τὴν δημοσίαν ἀφεῖναι, δόξαντες ἀφορμὴν εἰληφέναι καλὴν πρὸς αὐθάδειαν τοσαύτην τοῦ τἀναντία λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν, οὐδὲ τοῦ δήμου τὸν λόγον ἡδέως δεξαμένου, κωλύειν αὐτὸν ἔφησαν, καὶ φανερῶς ἔπραττον, ὅσα τῇ βουλῇ τε καὶ τοῖς ὑπάτοις δοκοίη:

[2] These for a time endeavoured by argument to persuade Icilius to desist from his course with respect to the allotment of land till the wars should come to an end. But when he kept opposing them and swore that he would continue to do so, and had the assurance to make a rather insolent remark in the presence of the populace to the effect that he had rather see the Tyrrhenians and their other enemies masters of the city than leave unpunished those who were occupying public land, they thought they had got an excellent opportunity for opposing so great insolence both by their words and by their acts, and since even the populace showed displeasure at his remark, they said they interposed their veto; and they openly pursued such measures as were agreeable to both the senate and the consuls. Thus Icilius being deserted by his colleagues, no longer had any authority.

[3] μονωθεὶς δ᾽ Ἰκίλιος οὐδενὸς ἔτι κύριος ἦν. μετὰ τοῦθ᾽ ἡ στρατιὰ κατεγράφετο καί, ὅσων ἔδει τῷ πολέμῳ πάντα ὑπηρετεῖτο, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἁπάσῃ προθυμίᾳ: καὶ διὰ τάχους οἱ ὕπατοι διακληρωσάμενοι τὰ στρατεύματα ἐξῄεσαν, Σπόριος μὲν Φούριος ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰκανῶν πόλεις, Καίσων δὲ Φάβιος ἐπὶ Τυρρηνούς.

[3] After this the army was raised and everything that was necessary for the war was supplied, partly from public and partly from private sources, with all possible alacrity; and the consuls, having drawn lots for the armies, set out in haste, Spurius Furius marching against the cities of the Aequians and Caeso Fabius against the Tyrrhenians.

[4] Σπορίῳ μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα κατὰ νοῦν ἐχώρησεν οὐχ ὑπομεινάντων εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν τῶν πολεμίων, καὶ πολλὰ ἐκ τῆς στρατείας ἐξεγένετο χρήματά τε καὶ σώματα λαβεῖν. ἐπῆλθε γὰρ ὀλίγου δεῖν πᾶσαν ὅσην οἱ πολέμιοι χώραν κατεῖχον, ἄγων καὶ φέρων, καὶ τὰ λάφυρα τοῖς στρατιώταις ἅπαντα ἐχαρίσατο.

[4] In the case of Spurius everything succeeded according to his wish, the enemy not daring to come to an engagement, so that in this expedition he had the opportunity of taking much booty in both money and slaves. For he overran almost all the territory that the enemy possessed, carrying and driving off everything, and he gave all the spoils to the soldiers.

[5] δοκῶν δὲ καὶ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον εἶναι φιλόδημος, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς στρατηγίας ἐθεράπευσε τὸ πλῆθος. καί, ἐπειδὴ παρῆλθεν ὁ χρόνος τῆς στρατείας, ἄγων τὴν δύναμιν ὁλόκληρόν τε καὶ ἀπαθῆ χρήμασιν εὔπορον κατέστησε τὴν πατρίδα.

[5] Though he had been regarded even before this time as a friend of the people, he gained the favour of the multitude still more by his conduct in this command; and when the season for military operations was over, he brought his army home intact and unscathed, and made the fatherland rich with the money he had taken.

[1] Καίσων δὲ Φάβιος ὁ ἕτερος τῶν ὑπάτων, οὐδενὸς [p. 275] χεῖρον στρατηγήσας, ἀφῃρέθη τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἔπαινον παρ᾽ οὐδὲν ἁμάρτημα ἴδιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τὸ δημοτικὸν οὐκ εἶχε κεχαρισμένον αὐτῷ, ἐξ οὗ τὸν ὕπατον Κάσσιον ἐπὶ τῇ τυραννίδι προσαγγείλας ἀπέκτεινεν.

[3.1] Caeso Fabius, the other consul, though as a general his performance was second to none, was nevertheless deprived of the praise that his achievements deserved, not through any fault of his own, but because he did not enjoy the goodwill of the plebeians from the time when he had denounced and put to death the consul Cassius for aiming at a tyranny.

[2] οὔτε γὰρ ὅσα δέοι σὺν τάχει στρατηγῷ κελεύσαντι τοὺς ὑπηκόους πειθαρχεῖν, οὔθ᾽ ὅσα τῷ προθύμῳ καὶ πρέποντι χρησαμένους βίᾳ κατασχεῖν, οὔθ᾽ ὅσα λάθρα τῶν ἀντιπολεμίων χωρία εἰς πλεονεξίαν εὔθετα σφετερίσασθαι, οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο πράττειν οὐδὲν ἕτοιμοι ἦσαν, ἐξ οὗ τιμήν τινα ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ δόξαν ἀγαθὴν ἐξοίσεσθαι ἔμελλε. καὶ τἆλλα μὲν αὐτῶν, ὅσα ὑβρίζοντες τὸν ἡγεμόνα διετέλουν, ἐκείνῳ θ᾽ ἧττον λυπηρὰ ἦν καὶ τῇ πόλει βλάβης οὐ μεγάλης ἄξια, ὃ δὲ τελευτῶντες ἐξειργάσαντο κίνδυνον οὐ μικρὸν ἤνεγκε καὶ πολλὴν αἰσχύνην ἀμφοῖν.

[2] For they never showed any alacrity either in those matters in which men under authority ought to yield a prompt obedience to the orders of their general, or when they should through eagerness and a sense of duty seize positions by force, or when it was necessary to occupy advantageous positions without the knowledge of the enemy, or in anything else from which the general would derive any honour and good repute. Most of their conduct, to be sure, by which they were continually insulting their general was neither very troublesome to him nor the occasion of any great harm to the commonwealth; but their final action brought no small danger and great disgrace to both.

[3] γενομένης γὰρ παρατάξεως ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῶν λόφων, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἦσαν ἐστρατοπεδευκότες ἀμφότεροι, πάσῃ τῇ παρ᾽ ἑκατέρων δυνάμει, πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἀποδειξάμενοι καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀναγκάσαντες ἄρξαι φυγῆς, οὔτ᾽ ἠκολούθησαν ἀπιοῦσι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πολλὰ ἐπικελεύοντος οὔτε παραμείναντες ἐκπολιορκῆσαι τὸν χάρακα ἠθέλησαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάσαντες ἀτελὲς ἔργον καλὸν ἀπῄεσαν εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν στρατοπεδείαν.

[3] For when the two armies had arrayed themselves in battle order in the space between the hills on which their camps were placed, using all the forces on either side, and the Romans had performed many gallant deeds and forced the enemy to begin flight, they neither pursued them as they retreated, notwithstanding the repeated exhortations of the general, nor were they willing to remain and think the enemy’s camp by siege; on the contrary, they left a glorious action unfinished and returned to their own camp.

[4] ἐπιχειρησάντων δ᾽ αὐτοκράτορα τὸν ὕπατον ἀναγορεῦσαί τινων μέγα [p. 276] ἐμβοήσαντες ἀθρόοι κακιζούσῃ τῇ φωνῇ τὸν ἡγεμόνα ἐλοιδόρουν, ὡς πολλοὺς σφῶν καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀπολωλεκότα δἰ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ στρατηγεῖν: καὶ ἄλλῃ πολλῇ βλασφημίᾳ καὶ ἀγανακτήσει χρησάμενοι λύειν τὸν χάρακα καὶ ἀπάγειν σφᾶς εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἠξίουν, ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοὺς ἐσομένους, ἐὰν ἐπίωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι, δευτέραν ὑπομεῖναι μάχην.

[4] And when some of the soldiers attempted to salute the consul as imperator, all the rest joined in a loud outcry, reproaching and taunting their commander with the loss of many of their brave comrades through his want of ability to command; and after many other insulting and indignant remarks they demanded that he break camp and lead them back to Rome, pretending that they would be unable, if the enemy attacked them, to sustain a second battle.

[5] καὶ οὔτε μεταδιδάσκοντος ἐπείθοντο τοῦ ἡγεμόνος, οὔτ᾽ ὀλοφυρομένου καὶ ἱκετεύοντος ἔπασχόν τι πρὸς τὰς δεήσεις, οὔτ᾽ ἀπειλὰς καὶ ἀνατάσεις, ὁπότε καὶ ταύταις χρήσαιτο, δι᾽ εὐλαβείας ἐλάμβανον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἅπαντα τραχυνόμενοι ταῦτα διέμενον. τοσαύτη δ᾽ ἀναρχία καὶ καταφρόνησις τοῦ ἡγεμόνος πᾶσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν παρέστη, ὥστε περὶ μέσας νύκτας ἐξαναστάντες τάς τε σκηνὰς ἔλυον καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἀνελάμβανον καὶ τοὺς τραυματίας ἐβάσταζον οὐδενὸς κελεύσαντος.

[5] And they neither gave heed when their commander endeavoured to show them the error of their course, nor were moved by his entreaties when he turned to lamentations and supplications, nor were they alarmed by the violence of his threats when he made use of these too; but they continued exasperated in the face of all these appeals. Indeed, some of them were possessed with such a spirit of disobedience and such contempt for their general that they rose up about midnight and without orders from anyone proceeded to strike their tents, take up their arms, and carry off their wounded.

[1] ταῦθ᾽ ὁ στρατηγὸς μαθὼν ἠναγκάσθη πᾶσι δοῦναι τὸ παράγγελμα τῆς ἐξόδου δείσας τὴν ἀναρχίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ θράσος. οἱ δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐκ φυγῆς ἀνασωζόμενοι τάχει πολλῷ συνάπτουσι τῇ πόλει περὶ τὸν ὄρθρον. καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν τειχῶν ἀγνοήσαντες, ὅτι φίλιον ἦν στράτευμα, ὅπλα τ᾽ ἐνεδύοντο καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀνεκάλουν, ἥ τ᾽ ἄλλη πόλις, ὡς ἐπὶ συμφορᾷ μεγάλῃ, ταραχῆς ἐγεγόνει μεστὴ καὶ θορύβου: καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἀνέῳξαν αὐτοῖς τὰς πύλας οἱ φύλακες, ἢ λαμπράν τε ἡμέραν γενέσθαι καὶ γνωσθῆναι τὸ οἰκεῖον στράτευμα. [p. 277]

[4.1] When the general was informed of this, he was forced to give the command for all to depart, so great was his fear of their disobedience and audacity. And the soldiers retired with as great precipitation as if they were saving themselves from a rout, and reached the city about daybreak. The guards upon the walls, not knowing that it was an army of friends, began to arm themselves and call out to one another, while all the rest of the city was full of confusion and turmoil, as if some great disaster had occurred; and the guards did not open the gates to them till it was broad day and they could distinguish their own army.

[2] ὥστε πρὸς τῇ αἰσχύνῃ, ἣν ἐκ τοῦ καταλιπεῖν τὸν χάρακα ἠνέγκαντο, καὶ κίνδυνον οὐ τὸν ἐλάχιστον αὐτοὺς ἀναρρῖψαι, σκότους ἀπιόντας διὰ τῆς πολεμίας ἀτάκτως. εἴ γ᾽ οὖν τοῦτο καταμαθόντες οἱ πολέμιοι ἐκ παντὸς ἀπιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς ἠκολούθησαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυσεν ἅπασαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν στρατιάν. τῆς δ᾽ ἀλόγου ταύτης ἀπάρσεως ἢ φυγῆς τὸ πρὸς τὸν ἡγεμόνα ἐκ τοῦ δήμου μῖσος, ὥσπερ ἔφην, αἴτιον ἦν, καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῆς ἐκείνου τιμῆς, ἵνα μὴ θριάμβου καταγωγῇ

[2] Thus, in addition to the ignominy they incurred in deserting their camp, they also exposed themselves to great danger in returning in the dark through the enemy’s country, without observing any order. Certainly, if the Tyrrhenians had learned of it and had followed close on their heels as they departed, nothing could have prevented the army from being utterly destroyed. The motive of this unaccountable withdrawal or flight was, as I have said, the hatred of the populace against the general and the begrudging of any honour to him, lest he should be granted a triumph and so acquire the greatest glory.

[3] κοσμηθεὶς ἐπιφανέστατος γένηται. τῇ δ᾽ ἑξῆς ἡμέρᾳ μαθόντες οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ τὴν ἄπαρσιν τῶν Ῥωμαίων νεκρούς τ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐσκύλευσαν καὶ τραυματίας ἀράμενοι ἀπήνεγκαν τάς τε καταλειφθείσας ἐν τῷ χάρακι παρασκευάς — πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἦσαν ὡς εἰς χρόνιον παρεσκευασμέναι πόλεμον — διεφόρησαν, καὶ ὡς δὴ κρατοῦντες τῆς χώρας τῶν πολεμίων τὴν ἐγγυτάτω λεηλατήσαντες ἀπῆγον τὴν στρατιάν.

[3] The next day the Tyrrhenians, having learned of the withdrawal of the Romans, stripped their dead, took up and carried off their wounded, and plundered all the stores they had left in their camp, which were very abundant as having been prepared for a long war; then, like conquerors, they laid waste the adjacent territory of the enemy, after which they returned home with their army.

[1] οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους ἀποδειχθέντες ὕπατοι, Γνάϊος Μάλλιος καὶ Μάρκος Φάβιος τὸ δεύτερον ἄρχειν αἱρεθείς, ψήφισμα τῆς βουλῆς ποιησαμένης στρατὸν ἐξάγειν ἐπὶ τὴν Οὐιεντανῶν πόλιν, ὅσον ἂν πλεῖστον δυνηθῶσι, προὔθηκαν ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ τὸν κατάλογον ἔμελλον ποιήσεσθαι τῆς στρατιᾶς. γινομένου δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐμποδὼν ἐπὶ κωλύσει τῆς καταγραφῆς ἑνὸς τῶν δημάρχων, Τεβερίου Ποντοφικίου καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς κληρουχίας ψήφισμα ἀνακαλουμένου, θεραπεύσαντες τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτοῦ [p. 278] τινας, ὥσπερ ἐποίησαν οἱ πρὸ αὐτῶν ὕπατοι, διέστησαν τὸ ἀρχεῖον: καὶ μετὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραττον ἐπὶ πολλῆς ἐξουσίας τὰ δόξαντα τῇ βουλῇ.

[5.1] The succeeding consuls, Gnaeus Manlius and Marcus Fabius (the latter chosen for the second time), in pursuance of a decree of the senate ordering them to march against the Veientes with as large an army as they could raise, appointed a day for levying the troops. When Tiberius Pontificius, one of the tribunes, opposed them by forbidding the levy and called upon them to carry out the decree relating to the allotment of land, they courted some of his colleagues, as their predecessors had done, and thus divided the college of tribunes, after which they proceeded to carry out the will of the senate with full liberty.

[2] γενομένης δὲ τῆς καταγραφῆς ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐξῄεσαν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, δύο μὲν ἑκάτερος ἄγων Ῥωμαίων τάγματα τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς καταγραφέντων τῆς πόλεως, οὐκ ἐλάττω δὲ ταύτης χεῖρα τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποίκων τε καὶ ὑπηκόων ἀποσταλεῖσαν. ἀφίκετο δ᾽ αὐτοῖς παρὰ τοῦ Λατίνων τε καὶ Ἑρνίκων ἔθνους διπλάσιον τοῦ κληθέντος ἐπικουρικόν. οὐ μὴν ἐχρήσαντό γε παντί: πολλὴν δὲ χάριν αὐτοῖς εἰδέναι φήσαντες τῆς προθυμίας ἀπέλυσαν τῆς ἀποσταλείσης δυνάμεως τὴν ἡμίσειαν.

[2] The levy being completed in a few days, the consuls took the field against the enemy, each of them having with him two legions of Romans raised in the city itself a force no less numerous sent by their colonies and subjects. Indeed, there came to them from the Latin and the Hernican nations double the number of auxiliaries they had called for; they did not, however, make use of this entire force, by stating that they were very grateful for their zeal, they dismissed one half of the army that had been sent.

[3] ἔταξαν δὲ καὶ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τρίτον ἐκ δυεῖν ταγμάτων τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ στρατόν, φύλακα τῆς χώρας ἐσόμενον, εἴ τις ἑτέρα δύναμις πολεμίων ἐκ τοῦ ἀδοκήτου φανείη: τοὺς δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν κατάλογον, οἷς ἔτι δύναμις ἦν ὅπλων χρήσεως, ἐν τῇ πόλει κατέλιπον ἄκρας τε καὶ τείχη φυλάξοντας.

[3] They also drew up before the city a third army, consisting of two legions of the younger men, to serve as a garrison for the country in case any other hostile force should unexpectedly make its appearance; the men who were above the military age but still had strength sufficient to bear arms they left in the city to guard the citadels and the walls.

[4] ἀγαγόντες δὲ πλησίον τῆς Οὐιεντανῶν πόλεως τὰς δυνάμεις κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἐπὶ λόφοις δυσὶν οὐ μακρὰν ἀφεστηκόσιν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν πολεμίων δύναμις ἐξεστρατευμένη πρὸ τῆς πόλεως πολλή τε καὶ ἀγαθή. συνεληλύθεσαν γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάσης Τυρρηνίας οἱ δυνατώτατοι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν πενέστας ἐπαγόμενοι, καὶ ἐγένετο τοῦ Ῥωμαικοῦ στρατοῦ

[4] When the consuls had led their forces close to the city of Veii, they encamped on two hills not far apart. The enemy’s army, which was both large and valiant, had also taken the field and lay encamped before the city. For the most influential men from all Tyrrhenia had joined them with their dependents, with the result that the Tyrrhenians’ army was not a little larger than that of the Romans.

[5] μεῖζον τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν οὐκ ὀλίγῳ. τοῖς δ᾽ ὑπάτοις τό τε πλῆθος ὁρῶσι τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῶν ὅπλων πολὺ δέος ἐνέπεσε, μή ποτ᾽ οὐχ ἱκανοὶ [p. 279] γένωνται στασιαζούσῃ δυνάμει τῇ σφετέρᾳ πρὸς ὁμονοοῦσαν τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἀντιταξάμενοι ὑπερβαλέσθαι: ἐδόκει τ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὀχυρωσαμένοις τὰ στρατόπεδα τρίβειν τὸν πόλεμον ἐκδεχομένοις, εἴ τινα δώσει πλεονεξίας ἀφορμὴν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῶν πολεμίων θράσος ἀλογίστῳ καταφρονήσει ἐπαρθέν. ἀκροβολισμοὶ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο συνεχεῖς ἐγίνοντο καὶ ψιλῶν συμπλοκαὶ βραχεῖαι, μέγα δ᾽ ἢ λαμπρὸν ἔργον οὐδέν.

[5] When the consuls saw the numbers of the enemy and the lustre of their arms, great fear came upon them lest, with their own forces rent by faction, they might not be able to prevail when arrayed against the harmonious forces of the enemy; and they determined to fortify their camps and to prolong the war in the hope that the boldness of the enemy, encouraged by an ill-advised contempt for them, might afford them some opportunity of acting with advantage. After this there were continual skirmishes and brief clashes of the light-armed troops, but no important or signal action.

[1] οἱ δὲ Τυρρηνοὶ ἀχθόμενοι τῇ τριβῇ τοῦ πολέμου δειλίαν τ᾽ ὠνείδιζον τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐξῄεσαν εἰς μάχην, καὶ ὡς παρακεχωρηκότων αὐτῶν σφίσι τῆς ὑπαίθρου μέγα ἐφρόνουν. καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπήρθησαν εἰς ὑπεροψίαν τοῦ ἀντιπάλου στρατοῦ καὶ καταφρόνησιν τῶν ὑπάτων δόξαντες καὶ τὸ θεῖον αὑτοῖς συμμαχεῖν.

[6.1] The Tyrrhenians, being irked by the prolongation of the war, taunted the Romans with cowardice because they would not come out for battle, and believing that their foes had abandoned the field to them, they were greatly elated. They were still further inspired with scorn for the Roman army and contempt for the consuls when they thought that even the gods were fighting on their side.

[2] τοῦ γὰρ ἑτέρου τῶν ὑπάτων Γναΐου Μαλλίου κεραυνὸς εἰς τὸ στρατήγιον ἐμπεσὼν τήν τε σκηνὴν διέσπασε καὶ τὴν ἑστίαν ἀνέτρεψε καὶ τῶν πολεμιστηρίων ὅπλων τὰ μὲν ἐσπίλωσε, τὰ δὲ περιέκαυσε, τὰ δ᾽ εἰς τέλος ἠφάνισεν: ἀπέκτεινε δὲ καὶ τὸν λαμπρότατον αὐτοῦ τῶν ἵππων, ᾧ παρὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐχρῆτο, καὶ τῶν θεραπόντων τινάς.

[2] For a thunderbolt, falling upon the headquarters of Gnaeus Manlius, one of the consuls, tore the tent in pieces, overturned the hearth, and tarnished some of the weapons of war, while scorching or completely destroying others. It killed also the finest of his horses, the one he used in battle, and some of his servants.

[3] λεγόντων δὲ τῶν μάντεων τοῦ τε χάρακος ἅλωσιν προσημαίνειν τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν ἀπώλειαν, ἀναστήσας τὴν δύναμιν ὁ Μάλλιος ἀπῆγε περὶ μέσας νύκτας ἐπὶ τὸν ἕτερον χάρακα καὶ μετὰ τοῦ συνάρχοντος κατεστρατοπέδευσε.

[3] And when the augurs declared that the gods were foretelling the capture of the camp and the death of the most important persons in it, Manlius roused his forces about midnight and led them to the other camp, where he took up quarters with his colleague.

[4] μαθόντες οὖν οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ τὴν ἀπανάστασιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καί, δι᾽ ἃς αἰτίας ἐγένετο, [p. 280] παρά τινων αἰχμαλώτων ἀκούσαντες ἐπήρθησάν τε ταῖς γνώμαις ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς πολεμοῦντος τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τοῦ δαιμονίου, καὶ πολλὴν εἶχον ἐλπίδα κρατήσειν αὐτῶν: οἵ τε μάντεις ἀκριβέστερον τῶν ἄλλοθί που δοκοῦντες ἐξητακέναι τὰ μετάρσια, πόθεν τε αἱ τῶν κεραυνῶν γίνονται βολαὶ καὶ τίνες αὐτοὺς ὑποδέχονται μετὰ τὰς πληγὰς ἀπιόντας τόποι, θεῶν τε οἷς ἕκαστοι ἀποδίδονται καὶ τίνων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν μηνυταί, χωρεῖν ὁμόσε τοῖς πολεμίοις παρῄνουν διαιρούμενοι τὸ γενόμενον τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις σημεῖον κατὰ τάδε.

[4] The Tyrrhenians, learning of the general’s departure and hearing from some of the prisoners the reasons for his action, grew still more elated in mind, since it seemed that the gods were making war upon the Romans; and they entertained great hopes of conquering them. For their augurs, who are reputed to have investigated with greater accuracy than those anywhere else the signs that appear in the sky, determining where the thunderbolts come from, what quarters receive them when they depart after striking, to which of the gods each kind of bolt is assigned, and what good or evil it portends, advised them to engage the enemy, interpreting the omen which had appeared to the Romans on this wise:

[5] ἐπειδὴ τὸ βέλος εἰς ὑπάτου σκηνὴν κατέσκηψεν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ στρατήγιον ἐνῆν, καὶ πᾶσαν αὐτὴν ἄχρι τῆς ἑστίας ἠφάνισεν, ὅλῃ προσημαίνειν τὸ δαιμόνιον τῇ στρατιᾷ τοῦ χάρακος ἔκλειψιν βίᾳ κρατηθέντος καὶ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ὄλεθρον.

[5] Since the bolt had fallen upon the consul’s tent, which was the army’s headquarters, and had utterly destroyed it even to its hearth, the gods were foretelling to the whole army the wiping out of their camp after it should be taken by storm, and the death of the principal persons in it.

[6] εἰ μὲν οὖν, ἔφασαν, ἔμειναν ἐν ᾧ κατέσκηψε χωρίῳ τὸ βέλος οἱ κατέχοντες αὐτό, καὶ μὴ μετηνέγκαντο τὰ σημεῖα ὡς τοὺς ἑτέρους, μιᾶς τε παρεμβολῆς ἁλώσει καὶ ἑνὸς ὀλέθρῳ στρατοῦ τὸ νεμεσῶν αὐτοῖς δαιμόνιον ἀπεπλήρωσεν ἂν τὸν χόλον: ἐπειδὴ δὲ σοφώτεροι τῶν θεῶν εἶναι ζητοῦντες εἰς τὸν ἕτερον χάρακα μετεστρατοπεδεύσαντο, καταλιπόντες ἔρημον τὸν τόπον, ὡς οὐ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῦ θεοῦ προδηλοῦντος τὰς συμφοράς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τόποις, κοινὸς ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ δαίμονος ἥξει χόλος, τοῖς τ᾽ ἀπαναστᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ὑποδεξαμένοις.

[6] “If, now,” they said, “the occupants of the place where the bolt fell had remained there instead of removing their standards to the other army, the divinity who was wroth with them would have satisfied his anger with the capture of a single camp and the destruction of a single army; but since they endeavoured to be wiser than the gods and changed their quarters to the other camp, leaving the place deserted, as if the god has signified that the calamities should fall, not upon the men, but upon the places, the divine wrath will come upon all of them alike, both upon those who departed and upon those who received them.

[7] καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἁλῶναι σφῶν τὸν ἕτερον χάρακα βίᾳ θείας ἐπιθεσπιζούσης ἀνάγκης οὐ περιέμειναν τὸ χρεών, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ [p. 281] παρέδοσαν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἐκεῖνος ὁ χάραξ ὁ τὸν ἐκλειφθέντα ὑποδεξάμενος ἀντὶ τοῦ καταλειφθέντος ἁλώσεται βίᾳ κρατηθείς.

[7] And since, when destiny had foretold that one camp should be taken by storm, they did not wait for their fate, but of their own accord handed their camp over to the enemy, the camp which received the deserted camp shall be taken by storm instead of the one that was abandoned.”

[1] ταῦτα παρὰ τῶν μάντεων οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ ἀκούσαντες μέρει τινὶ τῆς ἑαυτῶν στρατιᾶς τὴν ἐρημωθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων καταλαμβάνονται στρατοπεδείαν ὡς ἐπιτείχισμα ποιησόμενοι τῆς ἑτέρας: ἦν δὲ πάνυ ἐχυρὸν τὸ χωρίον καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Ῥώμης ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἰοῦσι κωλύσεως ἐν καλῷ κείμενον. πραγματευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ τἆλλα, ἐξ ὧν πλεονεκτήσειν τοὺς πολεμίους ἔμελλον, ἐξῆγον εἰς τὸ πεδίον τὰς δυνάμεις.

[7.1] The Tyrrhenians, hearing this from their augurs, sent a part of their army to take possession of the camp deserted by the Romans, with the intention of making it a fort to serve against the other camp. For the place was a very strong one and was conveniently situated for intercepting any who might come from Rome to the enemy’s camp. After they had also made the other dispositions calculated to give them an advantage over the enemy, they led out their forces into the plain.

[2] μενόντων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐφ᾽ ἡσυχίας προσιππεύοντες ἐξ αὐτῶν οἱ τολμηρότατοι καὶ πλησίον τοῦ χάρακος ἱστάμενοι, γυναῖκάς τ᾽ ἀπεκάλουν ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αὐτῶν τοῖς δειλοτάτοις τῶν ζώων ἐοικέναι λέγοντες ἐκάκιζον, καὶ δυεῖν θάτερον ἠξίουν: εἰ μὲν ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς περὶ τὰ πολέμια ἀρετῆς, καταβάντας εἰς τὸ πεδίον μιᾷ τὸν ἀγῶνα κρῖναι μάχῃ, εἰ δ᾽ ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι κακοί, παραδόντας τὰ ὅπλα τοῖς κρείττοσι καὶ δίκας ὑποσχόντας, ὧν ἔδρασαν, μηδενὸς ἔτι τῶν μεγάλων ἑαυτοὺς ἀξιοῦν.

[2] Then, when the Romans remained quiet, the boldest of the Tyrrhenians rode up and, halting near the camp, called them all women and taunted their leaders, likening them to the most cowardly of animals; and they challenged them to do one of two things — either to descend into the plain, if they laid claim to any warlike valour, and decide the contest by a single battle, or, if they owned themselves to be cowards, to deliver up their arms to those who were their betters, and after paying the penalty for their deeds, never again to hold themselves worthy of greatness.

[3] τοῦτ᾽ ἐποίουν ὁσημέραι καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἐπέραινον, ἀποτειχίζειν αὐτοὺς ἔγνωσαν ὡς λιμῷ προσαναγκάσοντες παραστῆναι. οἱ δ᾽ ὕπατοι περιεώρων τὰ γινόμενα μέχρι πολλοῦ, δι᾽ ἀνανδρίαν μὲν ἢ μαλακίαν οὐδεμίαν — ἀμφότεροι γὰρ εὔψυχοί τε καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἦσαν — τὸ δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐθελόκακόν [p. 282] τε καὶ ἀπρόθυμον, διαμένον ἐν τοῖς δημοτικοῖς, ἐξ οὗ περὶ τῆς κληρουχίας διεστασίασαν, ὑφορώμενοι: ἔτι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔναυλα καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ἦν, ἃ τῷ παρελθόντι ἐνιαυτῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔγκοτον τῆς πρὸς τὸν ὕπατον τιμῆς αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια τῆς πόλεως εἰργάσαντο, παραχωρήσαντες τῆς νίκης τοῖς ἡττηθεῖσι καὶ φυγῆς ὄνειδος οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὑπομείναντες, ἵνα μὴ καταγάγῃ τὸν ἐπινίκιον θρίαμβον ὁ ἀνήρ.

[3] This they did every day, and when it had no effect, they resolved to block them off by a wall with the purpose of starving them into surrender. The consuls permitted this to go on for a considerable time, not through any cowardice or weakness — for they were both men of spirit and fond of war — but because they feared the soldiers’ wilful shirking of duty and their apathy, which had persisted among the plebeians ever since the sedition over the allotment of land. For they still had ringing in their ears and fresh before their eyes the shameful behaviour, unworthy of the commonwealth, which the soldiers, because of their begrudging the honour that would come to the consul, had been guilty of the year before, when they had yielded up the victory to the vanquished and endured the false reproach of flight in order that their general might not celebrated the triumph awarded for victory.

[1] βουλόμενοι δὴ τὸ στασιάζον ἐκ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐξελεῖν εἰς τέλος καὶ καταστῆσαι πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁμόνοιαν ἅπαν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ εἰς ἓν τοῦτο πᾶσαν εἰσφερόμενοι βουλήν τε καὶ πρόνοιαν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κολάσει μέρους τινὸς σωφρονέστερον ἀποδοῦναι τὸ λοιπὸν ἦν, πολὺ καὶ αὔθαδες ὑπάρχον καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχον, οὔτε πειθοῖ προσαγαγέσθαι λόγων τοὺς οὐδὲ πεισθῆναι βουλομένους, δύο ταύτας ὑπέλαβον ἔσεσθαι τῶν στασιαζόντων αἰτίας τῆς διαλλαγῆς, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιεικεστέρας μετειληφόσι φύσεως — ἐνῆν γάρ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἐν τῷ πολλῷ — τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνειδισμοῖς τῶν πολεμίων αἰσχύνην, τοῖς δὲ δυσαγώγοις ἐπὶ τὸ καλόν,

[8.1] Desiring, therefore, to banish sedition from the army once and for all and to restore the whole rank and file to their original harmony, and devoting to this single end all their counsel and all their thought, since it was not in their power by punishing some of them to reform the rest, who were numerous, bold, and had arms in their hands, or to attempt by the persuasion of words to win over those who did not even wish to be persuaded, they assumed that the following two motives would bring about the reconciliation of the seditious: first, for those of a more reasonable disposition (for there was an admixture of these also among the mass of the troops), the shame of being taunted by the enemy, and second, for those who were not easily led to adopt the honourable course, the thing of which all human nature stands in dread — necessity.

[2] ἣν ἅπασα δέδοικεν ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἀνάγκην. ἵνα δὴ ταῦτα γένοιτο ἀμφότερα, ἐφῆκαν τοῖς πολεμίοις λόγῳ τ᾽ αἰσχύνειν κακίζοντας σφῶν ὡς ἄνανδρον τὴν ἡσυχίαν, καὶ ἔργοις ὑπεροψίας τε καὶ καταφρονήσεως πολλῆς γινομένοις ἀναγκάζειν ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι τοὺς ἑκουσίως [p. 283] εἶναι μὴ βουλομένους. γινομένων γὰρ τούτων πολλὰς ἐλπίδας εἶχον ἥξειν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατήγιον ἅπαντας ἀγανακτοῦντας καὶ καταβοῶντας καὶ κελεύοντας ἡγεῖσθαι σφῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους: ὅπερ καὶ συνέβη.

[2] In order, however, to accomplish both these results, they allowed the enemy not only to shame them by words, but also by repeated deeds of scorn and contempt to compel those to show themselves brave men who were not disposed to be so of their own accord. For if these insults should be continued, they had great hopes that all the soldiers would come to headquarters, giving vent to their indignation, reproaching the consuls, and demanding that they lead them against the enemy; and that is just what happened.

[3] ὡς γὰρ ἤρξαντο τὰς ἐξόδους τοῦ χάρακος ἀποταφρεύειν τε καὶ ἀποσταυροῦν οἱ πολέμιοι, δυσανασχετήσαντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἐπὶ τῷ ἔργῳ, τέως μὲν κατ᾽ ὀλίγους, ἔπειτ᾽ ἀθρόοι συντρέχοντες ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς τῶν ὑπάτων ἐκεκράγεσάν τε καὶ προδοσίαν αὐτοῖς ἐνεκάλουν, καὶ εἰ μή τις ἡγήσεται σφίσι τῆς ἐξόδου, δίχα ἐκείνων αὐτοὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἔλεγον ἐξελεύσεσθαι.

[3] For when the enemy began to block the outlets of the camp with ditches and kinds, the Romans, growing indignant at their action, ran to the tents of the consuls, first in small numbers and then in a body, and crying out, accused them of treachery, and declared that if no one would lead them in a sortie, they themselves would take their arms and without their generals sally out against the enemy.

[4] ὡς δ᾽ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἐγίνετο τοῦτο, παρεῖναι τὸν χρόνον, ὃν περιέμενον, οἱ στρατηγοὶ νομίσαντες ἐκέλευον τοῖς ὑπηρέταις συγκαλεῖν τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἐκκλησίαν: καὶ προελθὼν Φάβιος τοιάδε εἶπε:

[4] This being the general cry, the consuls thought the opportunity for which they had been waiting had now come, and they ordered the lictors to call the troops to an assembly. Then Fabius, coming forward, spoke as follows:

[1] βραδεῖα μὲν ἡ ἀγανάκτησις ὑμῶν γίνεται περὶ ὧν ὑβρίζεσθε ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ἄνδρες στρατιῶταί τε καὶ ἡγεμόνες: καὶ τὸ βουλόμενον ἑκάστου χωρεῖν ὁμόσε τοῖς ἐναντίοις πολὺ τοῦ δέοντος ὕστερον φαινόμενον ἄωρόν ἐστι. παλαίτερον γὰρ ἔτι τοῦθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἔδει πράττειν, ὅτε πρῶτον αὐτοὺς εἴδετε καταβαίνοντας ἐκ τῶν ἐρυμάτων καὶ μάχης ἄρχειν βουλομένους. τότε γὰρ δήπου καλὸς ὁ περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἦν ἀγὼν καὶ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων φρονήματος ἄξιος. νῦν δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖος ἤδη γίνεται, καὶ οὐδ᾽, ἂν τὸ κράτιστον λάβῃ

[9.1] “Long delayed is your indignation at the insults you are receiving from the enemy, soldiers and officers, and the eagerness which you one and all have to come to grips with your opponents, by showing itself much too late, is untimely. For you should have done this still earlier, when you first saw them come down from their entrenchments and eager to begin battle. Then, no doubt, the contest for the supremacy would have been glorious and worthy of the Roman spirit; as things are, it is already becoming a matter of necessity, and however successful its outcome may be, it will not be equally glorious.

[2] τέλος, ὁμοίως καλός. εὖ δὲ καὶ νῦν ποιεῖτε ὅμως ἐπανορθώσασθαι τὴν βραδυτῆτα βουλόμενοι καὶ τὰ [p. 284] παραλειφθέντα ἀναλαβεῖν, καὶ πολλὴ χάρις ὑμῖν τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ κράτιστα ὁρμῆς, εἴ γ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀρετῆς γίνεται: κρεῖττον γάρ ἐστιν ὀψὲ ἄρξασθαι τὰ δέοντα πράττειν ἢ μηδέποτε: εἴτ᾽ οὖν ἅπαντες ὁμοίους ἔχετε περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων λογισμούς, καὶ ἡ προθυμία τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ὁρμῆς ἅπαντας ἡ αὐτὴ κατείληφε.

[2] Yet even now you do well in desiring to atone for your slowness and to retrieve what you have lost by neglect, and great thanks are due to you for your eagerness to follow the best course, whether this springs from valour — for it is better to begin late to do one’s duty than never — or whether indeed you have all come to the same logical conclusions as to what is example, and the same eagerness for rushing into battle has seized all of you.

[3] νῦν δὲ φοβούμεθα, μὴ τὰ περὶ τῆς κληρουχίας προσκρούσματα τῶν δημοτικῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τέλει μεγάλης αἴτια τῷ κοινῷ γένηται βλάβης: ὑποψία τε ἡμᾶς κατείληφεν, ὡς ἡ περὶ τῆς ἐξόδου καταβοὴ καὶ ἀγανάκτησις οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς προαιρέσεως παρὰ πάντων γίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ὡς τιμωρησόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους προθυμεῖσθε

[3] But as it is, we are afraid that the grievances of the plebeians against the authorities over the allotment of land may be the cause of great mischief to the commonwealth. And the suspicion has come to us that this clamour and indignation about a sortie do not spring from the same motive with all of you, but that while some desire to go out of the camp in order to take revenge on the enemy, others do so in order to run away.

[4] τοῦ χάρακος ἐξελθεῖν, οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἀποδρασόμενοι. ἐξ ὧν δὲ παρέστηκεν ἡμῖν ταῦθ᾽ ὑποπτεύειν, οὐ μαντεῖαί εἰσιν οὐδὲ στοχασμοί, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργα ἐμφανῆ καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα παλαιά, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι ἐνιαυτῷ γενόμενα, ὡς ἅπαντες ἴστε, ὅτ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους τούτους πολλῆς καὶ ἀγαθῆς ἐξελθούσης στρατιᾶς, καὶ τῆς πρώτης μάχης τὸ κράτιστον ἡμῖν λαβούσης τέλος, δυνηθέντος ἂν τοῦ τότ᾽ ἄγοντος ὑμᾶς ὑπάτου Καίσωνος, ἀδελφοῦ δ᾽ ἐμοῦ τουδὶ καὶ τὸν χάρακα τῶν πολεμίων ἐξελεῖν καὶ νίκην τῇ πατρίδι καταγαγεῖν λαμπροτάτην, φθονήσαντες αὐτῷ δόξης τινές, ὅτι δημοτικὸς οὐκ ἦν, οὐδὲ τὰ κεχαρισμένα τοῖς πένησι διετέλει πολιτευόμενος, τῇ πρώτῃ νυκτὶ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἀνασπάσαντες τὰς σκηνὰς ἄνευ παραγγέλματος ἀπέδρασαν [p. 285] ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος, οὔτε τὸν κίνδυνον ἐνθυμηθέντες τὸν καταληψόμενον αὐτοὺς ἀτάκτως καὶ χωρὶς ἡγεμόνος ἀπιόντας ἐκ πολεμίας γῆς καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐν νυκτί, οὔτε τὴν αἰσχύνη, ὅση καθέξειν αὐτοὺς ἔμελλεν, ὑπολογισάμενοι, ὅτι παρεχώρουν τοῖς πολεμίοις τῆς ἡγεμονίας, τὸ γοῦν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς μέρος, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ οἱ

[4] As for the reasons which have induced us to entertain these suspicions, they are neither divinations nor conjectures, but overt deeds, and deeds, too, that happened, not long ago, but only last year, as you all know. For when a large and excellent army had taken the field against this very enemy and the first battle had had the most successful outcome for us, so that your commander at the time, the consul Caeso, my brother here, could not only have taken the enemy’s camp, but also have brought back a most glorious victory for the fatherland, some of the soldiers, begrudging him the glorious because he was not a friend of the people and did not constantly pursue such a course as was pleasing to the poor, struck their tents the first night after the battle and without orders ran away from the camp, neither taking thought for the danger they would incur in retreating from a hostile country in disorderly fashion and without a general, and that too in the night, nor taking into account all the disgrace that was sure to come upon them for yielding the supremacy to the enemy, as far at least as in them lay, and yielding it, moreover, as victors to the vanquished.

[5] νικήσαντες τοῖς κεκρατημένοις. τούτους δὴ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρρωδοῦντες, ὦ ταξίαρχοί τε καὶ λοχαγοὶ καὶ στρατιῶται, τοὺς οὔτ᾽ ἄρχειν δυναμένους οὔτ᾽ ἄρχεσθαι βουλομένους πολλοὺς καὶ αὐθάδεις ὄντας καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντας ἐν χερσίν, οὔτε πρότερον ἐβουλόμεθα μάχην συνάπτειν οὔτε νῦν ἔτι θαρσοῦμεν ἐπὶ τοιούτοις συμμάχοις τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγίστων ἀγῶνα ἄρασθαι, μὴ κωλύματα καὶ βλάβαι γένωνται τοῖς ἅπαντα τὰ καθ᾽

[5] Being afraid, therefore, tribunes, centurions, and soldiers, of these men who are neither able to command nor willing to obey, who are numerous and bold and have their weapons in their hands, we have been unwilling hitherto to join battle and dare not even now, with such men to support us, engage in a life-and-death struggle, lest they prove hindrances and detriments to those who are displaying all the alacrity in their power.

[6] ἑαυτοὺς πρόθυμα παρεχομένοις. εἰ μέντοι κἀκείνων ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τὰ κρείττω τὸν νοῦν ἄγει νυνὶ καὶ καταβαλόντες τὸ στασιάζον, ὑφ᾽ οὗ νῦν πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα βλάπτεται τὸ κοινόν, ἤ γε δὴ εἰς τοὺς τῆς εἰρήνης ἀναβαλόμενοι καιρούς, ἐπανορθώσασθαι βούλονται τὰ παρελθόντα ὀνείδη τῇ νῦν ἀρετῇ, μηδὲν ἔτι τὸ κωλῦσον ἔστω χωρεῖν ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, τὰς ἀγαθὰς προβαλλομένους ἐλπίδας.

[6] If, however, Heaven is turning the minds of even these men to better ways at the present time, and if, laying aside their seditious spirit, from which the commonwealth is suffering very great harm, or at least postponing it till times of peace, they wish to redeem their pas disgraces by their present valour, let there be no further hindrance to your advancing against the foe, setting before your eyes the fair hopes of victory.

[7] ἔχομεν δὲ πολλὰς μὲν καὶ ἄλλας ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸ νικᾶν, μεγίστας δὲ καὶ κυριωτάτας, ἃς τὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνόητον ἡμῖν παρέχει, οἵ γε πλήθει στρατιᾶς μακρῷ προὔχοντες ἡμῶν καὶ τούτῳ [p. 286] μόνῳ δυνηθέντες ἂν πρὸς τὰς ἡμετέρας τόλμας τε καὶ ἐμπειρίας ἀντέχειν ἀπεστερήκασι τῆς μόνης ὠφελείας ἑαυτοὺς ἀπαναλώσαντες τὸ πλεῖον τῆς δυνάμεως μέρος εἰς τὰς τῶν φρουρίων φυλακάς.

[7] “We have many resources for winning, but greatest and most decisive are those afforded us by the folly of the enemy. For though they far exceed us in the size of their army, and for that reason alone might have withstood our courage and experience, they have deprived themselves of their only advantage by using up the greater part of their forces in garrisoning the forts.

[8] ἔπειτα δέον αὐτοὺς σὺν εὐλαβείᾳ καὶ λογισμῷ σώφρονι πράττειν ἕκαστα, ἐνθυμουμένους, πρὸς οἵους ἄνδρας καὶ πολὺ ἀλκιμωτέρους αὐτῶν ὁ κίνδυνος ἔσται, θρασέως καὶ ἀπερισκέπτως ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα χωροῦσιν, ὡς ἄμαχοί τινες καὶ ὡς ἡμῶν καταπεπληγότων αὐτούς. αἱ γοῦν ἀποταφρεύσεις καὶ αἱ μέχρι τοῦ χάρακος ἡμῶν καθιππεύσεις καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν λόγοις τε καὶ ἔργοις ὑβρίσματα τοῦτο δύναται.

[8] In the next place, when they ought to act with caution and sober reason in everything they do, bearing in mind against what kind of men, actually far superior to them in valour, the hazard will be, they enter the struggle recklessly and incautiously, as if forsooth they were some invincible warriors and as if we stood in terror of them. At any rate, their digging of ditches round our camp, their riding up to our entrenchments, and their many insults both in word and actions indicate this.

[9] ταῦτά τε δὴ ἐνθυμούμενοι καὶ τῶν προτέρων ἀγώνων μεμνημένοι πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς αὐτοὺς ἐνικᾶτε, χωρεῖτε μετὰ προθυμίας καὶ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν ἀγῶνα: καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὑμῶν ἕκαστος χωρίῳ ταχθῇ, τοῦθ᾽ ὑπολαβέτω καὶ οἶκον εἶναι καὶ κλῆρον καὶ πατρίδα: καὶ ὅ τε σώζων τὸν παραστάτην ἑαυτῷ πράττειν τὴν σωτηρίαν ὑπολαβέτω, καὶ ὁ ἐγκαταλιπὼν τὸν πέλας ἑαυτὸν ἡγείσθω τοῖς πολεμίοις προδιδόναι. μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐκεῖνο μεμνῆσθαι προσῆκεν, ὅτι μενόντων μὲν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μαχομένων ὀλίγον τὸ ἀπολλύμενόν ἐστιν, ἐγκλινάντων δὲ καὶ φευγόντων κομιδῇ βραχὺ σωζόμενον.

[9] Bearing these thoughts in mind, then, and remembering the many glorious battles of the past in which you have overcome them, enter with alacrity into this contest also. And let every one of you look upon the spot in which he shall be posted as his house, his lot of land, and his country. Let him who saves the man beside him feel that he is effecting his own safety, and let him who forsakes his comrade feel that he is delivering himself up to the enemy. But, above all, you should remember this, that when men stand their ground and fight their losses are small, but when they give way and flee very few are saved.”

[1] ἔτι δ᾽ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος τὰ εἰς τὸ γενναῖον ἐπαγωγὰ [p. 287] καὶ πολλὰ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων ἐκχέοντος δάκρυα, λοχαγῶν τε καὶ ταξιάρχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στρατιωτῶν ἕκαστον, ᾧ συνῄδει τι λαμπρὸν ἔργον ἐν μάχαις ἀποδειξαμένῳ, κατ᾽ ὄνομα ἀνακαλοῦντος, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα τοῖς ἀριστεύσασι κατὰ τὴν μάχην φιλάνθρωπα δώσειν ὑπισχνουμένου πρὸς τὸ τῶν πράξεων μέγεθος, τιμάς τε καὶ πλούτους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας βοηθείας, ἀναβοήσεις ἐξ ἁπάντων ἐγίνοντο θαρρεῖν τε παρακελευομένων καὶ ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀξιούντων.

[10.1] While he was yet uttering these encouragements to bravery and accompanying his words with many tears, calling by name each one of the centurions, tribunes, and common soldiers whom he knew to have performed some gallant action in battle, and promising to those who should distinguish themselves in this engagement many great rewards in proportion to the magnitude of their deeds, such as honours, riches, and all the other advantages, shouts arose from all of them as they bade him be of good cheer and demanded that he lead them to battle.

[2] ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐπαύσατο, προέρχεταί τις ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, Μάρκος Φλαβολήιος ὄνομα, ἀνὴρ δημοτικὸς μὲν καὶ αὐτουργός, οὐ μὴν τῶν ἀπερριμμένων τις, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπαινουμένων δἰ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὰ πολέμια ἄλκιμος, καὶ δι᾽ ἄμφω ταῦτα ἑνὸς τῶν ταγμάτων τῇ λαμπροτάτῃ ἀρχῇ κεκοσμημένος, ᾗ τὰς ἑξήκοντα ἑκατονταρχίας ἕπεσθαί τε καὶ τὸ κελευόμενον ὑπηρετεῖν κελεύει ὁ νόμος. τούτους Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῇ πατρίῳ γλώττῃ πριμοπίλους καλοῦσιν.

[2] As soon as he had done speaking, there came forward from the throng a man named Marcus Flavoleius, a plebeian and a small farmer, though not one of the rabble but one celebrated for his merits and valiant in war and on both these accounts honoured with the most conspicuous command in one of the legions — a command which the sixty centuries are enjoined by the law to follow and obey. These officers the Romans call in their own tongue primipili.

[3] οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ — ἦν δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγας τε καὶ καλὸς ἰδεῖν — στάς, ὅθεν ἅπασιν ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι φανερός, Ἐπεὶ τοῦτ᾽, ἔφησεν, ὦ ὕπατοι, δεδοίκατε, μὴ τὰ ἔργα ἡμῶν οὐχ ὅμοια γένηται τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ πρῶτος ὑμῖν ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ τὸ βέβαιον τῆς ὑποσχέσεως ἐκ τῆς μεγίστης πίστεως παρέξομαι: καὶ ὑμεῖς δ᾽, ὦ πολῖται τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κοινωνοὶ τύχης, ὅσοι [p. 288] διεγνώκατε εἰς ἴσον καταστῆσαι τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λόγοις,

[3] This man, who, besides his other recommendations, was tall and fair to look upon, taking his stand where he would be in full view of all, said: “Since this is what you fear, consuls, that our actions will not agree with our words, I will be the first to give you in my own name the greatest pledge I can give. And you too, fellow citizens and sharers of the same fortune, as many of you as are resolved to make your actions match your words, will make no mistake in following my example.”

[4] οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοιτε ταὐτὸ ποιοῦντες ἐμοί. ταῦτ᾽ εἰπὼν καὶ τὸ ξίφος ἀνατείνας ὤμοσε τὸν ἐπιχώριόν τε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ κράτιστον ὅρκον, τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἑαυτοῦ πίστιν, νικήσας τοὺς πολεμίους ἥξειν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἄλλως δ᾽ οὔ. τοῦτον ὀμόσαντος τοῦ Φλαβοληίου τὸν ὅρκον πολὺς ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔπαινος ἐγένετο: καὶ αὐτίκα οἵ τε ὕπατοι ἀμφότεροι ταὐτὸν ἔδρων καὶ οἱ τὰς ἐλάττους ἔχοντες στρατηγίας χιλίαρχοί τε καὶ λοχαγοί, τελευτῶσα

[4] Having said this, he held up his sword and took the oath traditional among the Romans and regarded by them as the mightiest of all, swearing by his own good faith that he would return to Rome victorious over the enemy, or not at all. After Flavoleius had taken this oath there was great applause from all; and immediately both the consuls did the same, as did also the subordinate officers, both tars and centurions, and last of all the rank and file.

[5] δ᾽ ἡ πληθύς. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐγένετο, πολλὴ μὲν εὐθυμία πᾶσιν ἐνέπεσε, πολλὴ δὲ φιλότης ἀλλήλων, θάρσος τ᾽ αὖ καὶ μένος: καὶ ἀπελθόντες ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οἱ μὲν ἵπποις χαλινοὺς ἐνέβαλλον, οἱ δὲ ξίφη καὶ λόγχας ἔθηγον, οἱ δὲ τὰ σκεπαστήρια τῶν ὅπλων ἐξέματτον: καὶ ὀλίγου πᾶσα ἦν ἕτοιμος εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἡ στρατιά.

[5] When this had been done, great cheerfulness came upon them all and great affection for one another and also confidence and ardour. And going from the assembly, some bridled their horses, others sharpened their swords and spears, and still others cleaned their defensive arms; and in a short time the whole army was ready for the combat.

[6] οἱ δ᾽ ὕπατοι τοὺς θεοὺς εὐχαῖς τε καὶ θυσίαις καὶ λιταῖς ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τῆς ἐξόδου σφίσι γενέσθαι ἡγεμόνας, ἐξῆγον ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος ἐν τάξει καὶ κόσμῳ τὸν στρατόν. καὶ οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ κατιόντας αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐρυμάτων ἰδόντες ἐθαύμασάν τε καὶ ἀντεπεξῄεσαν ἁπάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει.

[6] The consuls, after invoking the gods by vows, sacrifices, and prayers to be their guides as they marched out, led the army out of the camp in regular order and formation. The Tyrrhenians, seeing them come down from their entrenchments, were surprised and marched out with their whole force to meet them.

[1] ὡς δ᾽ εἰς τὸ πεδίον ἀμφότεροι κατέστησαν, καὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν ἐσήμηναν αἱ σάλπιγγες, ἔθεον ἀλαλάξαντες ὁμόσε: καὶ συμπεσόντες ἀλλήλοις ἱππεῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ [p. 289] πεζοὶ πεζοῖς ἐμάχοντο, καὶ πολὺς ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἐγίνετο φόνος. οἱ μὲν οὖν τὸ δεξιὸν ἔχοντες τῶν Ῥωμαίων κέρας, οὗ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν εἶχεν ὁ ἕτερος τῶν ὑπάτων Μάλλιος, ἐξέωσαν τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς μέρος, καὶ καταβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ἐμάχοντο πεζοί. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ εὐωνύμῳ κέρατι ταχθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ τῶν πολεμίων ἐκυκλοῦντο.

[11.1] When both armies had come into the plain and the trumpets had sounded the charge, they raised their war-cries and ran to close quarters; and engaging, horse with horse and foot with foot, they fought there, and great was the slaughter on both sides. The troops on the right wing of the Romans, commanded by Manlius, one of the consuls, repulsed the part of the enemy that stood opposite to them, and quitting their horses, fought on foot. But those on the left wing were being surrounded by the enemy’s right wing,

[2] ἦν γὰρ ἡ Τυρρηνῶν φάλαγξ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὑπερπετής τε καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγῳ μείζων τῆς ἑτέρας. παρερρήγνυτο δὴ ταύτῃ τὸ Ῥωμαικὸν στράτευμα καὶ πολλὰς πληγὰς ἐλάμβανεν. ἡγεῖτο δὲ τούτου κέρως Κόιντος Φάβιος, πρεσβευτὴς καὶ ἀντιστράτηγος ὤν, ὁ δὶς ὑπατεύσας: καὶ μέχρι πολλοῦ ἀντεῖχε τραύματα λαμβάνων παντοδαπά, ἔπειτα λόγχῃ βληθεὶς εἰς τὰ στέρνα μέχρι τῶν σπλάγχνων ἐλθούσης τῆς αἰχμῆς ἔξαιμος γενόμενος πίπτει.

[2] since the Tyrrhenians’ line at this point outflanked that of the Romans and was considerably deeper. Thus the Roman army was being broken in this sector and was receiving many blows. This wing was commanded by Quintus Fabius, who was a legate and proconsul and had been twice consul. He maintained the fight for a long time, receiving wounds of all kinds till, being struck in the breast by a spear, the point of which pierced his bowels, he fell through loss of blood.

[3] ὡς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἤκουσεν ὁ ἕτερος τῶν ὑπάτων, Μάρκος Φάβιος — ἦν δὲ κατὰ μέσην τὴν φάλαγγα τεταγμένος — τοὺς κρατίστους τῶν λόχων ἀναλαβὼν καὶ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν ἀδελφῶν Καίσωνα Φάβιον ἀνακαλεσάμενος, παρήλαυνεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φάλαγγα καὶ μέχρι πολλοῦ προελθών, ἐπειδὴ παρήλλαξεν τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν πολεμίων κέρας, ἤλαυνεν ἐπὶ τοὺς κυκλουμένους. ἐμπεσὼν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς φόνον τε τοῖς ἐν χερσὶ ποιεῖ πολὺν καὶ φυγὴν τῶν πρόσω, τόν τ᾽ ἀδελφὸν ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καταλαβὼν αἴρεται.

[3] When Marcus Fabius, the other consul, who commanded in the centre, was informed of this, he took with him the best of the centuries, and summoning Caeso Fabius, his other brother, he passed beyond his own line, and advancing a long way, till he had got beyond the enemy’s right wing, he turned upon those who were encircling his men, and charging them, caused great slaughter among all whom he encountered, and also put to flight those who were at a distance; and finding his brother still breathing, he took him up.

[4] ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὗν οὐ πολὺν ἔτι χρόνον ἐπιβιοὺς ἀποθνήσκει: τοῖς δὲ τιμωροῦσιν αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἔτι πλείων παρέστη καὶ μείζων [p. 290] πρὸς τὸ ἀντίπαλον: καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς προνοούμενοι σὺν ὀλίγοις εἰς μέσους ἐμπεσόντες τοὺς μάλιστα συνεστηκότας τῶν πολεμίων, σωροὺς ἐξεπλήρουν νεκρῶν. κατὰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἔκαμεν ἡ

[4] The man lived only a short time after that; but his death filled his avengers with still more and greater anger against the foe and, heedless now of their own lives, they rushed with a few followers into the densest ranks of the enemy and made large heaps of their dead bodies.

[5] Τυρρηνῶν φάλαγξ, καὶ οἱ πρότερον ὠσάμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπὸ τῶν κεκρατημένων ἀνεκόπησαν. οἱ δὲ τὸ εὐώνυμον ἔχοντες κέρας κάμνοντες ἤδη καὶ φυγῆς ἄρχοντες, ἔνθα ὁ Μάλλιος ἦν ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς καθ᾽ ἑαυτούς. παλτῷ γάρ τις βαλὼν τὸν Μάλλιον διὰ τοῦ γόνατος ἄχρι τῆς ἰγνύας διήρεισε τὴν λόγχην: καὶ τὸν μὲν οἱ πέριξ ἄραντες ἐπὶ τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἀπεκόμιζον, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι τὸν ἡγεμόνα τῶν Ῥωμαίων τεθνηκέναι δόξαντες ἐπερρώσθησαν, καὶ παραβοηθησάντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ἑτέρων ἐνέκειντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἡγεμόνα.

[5] In this part of their line, therefore, the Tyrrhenians were hard pressed, and those who earlier had forced their enemies to give ground were now repulsed by those they had conquered; but those on the left wing, where Manlius was, though they were already in distress and beginning to flee, put their opponents to flight. For when Manlius had been struck in the knee with a javelin by an opponent who thrust the point through to the hamstrings, and those about him took him up and were carrying him back to the camp, the enemy, believing the Roman commander to be dead, took heart and, the rest coming to their assistance, pressed hard upon the Romans who now had no commander.

[6] ἠναγκάσθησαν δὲ πάλιν οἱ Φάβιοι καταλιπόντες τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας τῷ δεξιῷ βοηθεῖν: καὶ οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ προσιόντας αὐτοὺς στίφει καρτερῷ μαθόντες τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον διώξεως ἀποτρέπονται, πυκνώσαντες δὲ τοὺς λόχους ἐμάχοντο ἐν τάξει, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν σφετέρων ἀπέβαλον, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀπέκτειναν.

[6] This obliged the Fabii to quit their left wing once more and rush to the relief of the right; and the Tyrrhenians, learning that they were approaching in a strong body, gave over further pursuit, and closing their ranks, fought in good order, losing a large number of their own men, but also killing many of the Romans.

[1] ἐν ᾧ δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἐγίνετο, οἱ τὸν χάρακα τὸν ἐκλειφθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ Μαλλίου καταλαβόμενοι Τυρρηνοὶ συνθήματος ἀρθέντος ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγίου σὺν τάχει πολλῷ καὶ προθυμίᾳ μεγάλῃ χωροῦντες ἐπὶ τὸν ἕτερον ἠπείγοντο τῶν Ῥωμαίων χάρακα, ὡς οὐκ ἀξιοχρέῳ δυνάμει [p. 291] φυλαττόμενον. καὶ ἦν ἡ δόξα αὐτῶν ἀληθής. ἔξω γὰρ τῶν τριαρίων καὶ ὀλίγων ἄλλων τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ τὸ λοιπὸν πλῆθος ἐμπόρων τε καὶ θεραπόντων καὶ χειροτεχνῶν ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ: γίνεταί τε πολλῶν εἰς ὀλίγον συνελασθέντων χωρίον: περὶ γὰρ. ταῖς πύλαις ὁ ἀγὼν ἦν: ὀξεῖα καὶ χαλεπὴ μάχη, καὶ νεκροὶ παρ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων πολλοί.

[12.1] In the meantime the Tyrrhenians who had possessed themselves of the camp abandoned by Manlius, as soon as the signal for battle was given at headquarters, ran with great haste and alacrity to the other camp of the Romans, suspecting that it was not guarded by a sufficient force. And their belief was correct. For, apart from the triarii and a few younger troops, the rest of the crowd then in the camp consisted of merchants, servants and artificers; and with many crowded into a small space — for the struggle was for the gates of the camp — a sharp and severe engagement followed, and there were many dead on both sides.

[2] ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ὅ τε Μάλλιος ὕπατος ἐκβοηθῶν ἅμα τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὁ ἵππος ἔπεσε συγκατενεχθεὶς καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἀναστῆναι ὑπὸ πλήθους τραυμάτων, ἀποθνήσκει καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ἄλλοι νέοι. μετὰ δὲ τὸ πάθος τοῦτ᾽ εὐθὺς ὁ χάραξ ἡλίσκετο, καὶ τέλος εἶχε τοῖς Τυρρηνοῖς τὰ

[2] During this action the consul Manlius was coming out with the cavalry to the relief of his men, when his horse fell; and he, falling with him and being unable to rise because of his many wounds, died there, and likewise many brave young men at his side. After this disaster the camp was soon taken, and the Tyrrhenians’ prophecies had their fulfilment.

[3] μαντεύματα εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐταμιεύσαντο τὴν παροῦσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ διὰ φυλακῆς ἔσχον τὸν χάρακα, τάς τ᾽ ἀποσκευὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων κατέσχον καὶ αὐτοὺς αἰσχρῶς ἀπελθεῖν ἠνάγκασαν: νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἁρπαγὴν τῶν ἀπολειφθέντων τραπόμενοι καὶ ἀναψύχοντες τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ πλείους καλὴν ἄγραν ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν ἀφῃρέθησαν. ὡς γὰρ ἀπηγγέλθη θατέρῳ τῶν ὑπάτων ἡ τοῦ χάρακος ἅλωσις, ἠπείγετο σὺν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἱππέων τε καὶ πεζῶν.

[3] Now if they had husbanded the good fortune that was then theirs and had kept the camp under guard, they would have got possession of the Romans’ baggage and forced them to a shameful retreat; but as it was, by turning to plundering what had been left behind and from then on refreshing themselves, as most of them did, they allowed a fine booty to escape out of their hands. For as soon as word of the taking of the camp reached the other consul, he hastened thither with the flower of both horse and foot.

[4] καὶ οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ μαθόντες αὐτὸν ἐπιόντα περιεστεφάνωσαν τὸν χάρακα, μάχη τ᾽ αὐτῶν γίνεται καρτερὰ τῶν μὲν ἀνασώσασθαι βουλομένων τὰ σφέτερα, τῶν δέ, μὴ πασσυδὶ διαφθαρῶσιν ἁλόντος τοῦ χάρακος, δεδοικότων. χρόνου δὲ γινομένου πλείονος καὶ τῶν Τυρρηνῶν πολλὰ πλεονεκτούντων — ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐξ [p. 292] ὑπερδεξίων τε χωρίων καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δι᾽ ἡμέρας ὅλης κεκμηκότας ἡ μάχη — Τῖτος Σίκκιος ὁ πρεσβευτὴς καὶ ἀντιστράτηγος, κοινωσάμενος τῷ ὑπάτῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ διάνοιαν τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν ἐκέλευε σημαίνειν, καὶ

[4] The Tyrrhenians, informed of this approach, formed a circle round the camp and a sharp battle occurred between them, as the Romans endeavoured to recover what was theirs and the enemy feared being annihilated if their camp should be taken. When considerable time passed and the Tyrrhenians had many advantages, since they fought from higher ground and against men spent with fighting the whole day,

[5] καθ᾽ ἓν ἅπαντας γενομένους μιᾷ προσβάλλειν πλευρᾷ τοῦ χάρακος, καθ᾽ ὃ μάλιστα τὸ χωρίον ἦν ἐπιμαχώτατον: τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς πύλας εἴασε μέρη κατά τινα εἰκότα λογισμόν, ὃς οὐκ ἐψεύσατο αὐτόν, ὅτι σωθήσεσθαι μὲν ἐλπίσαντες οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ μεθήσονται τοῦ χάρακος, ἐν ἀπογνώσει δὲ τούτου γενόμενοι κυκλώσεώς τε πάντοθεν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων γενομένης καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ὑπαρχούσης ἐξόδου ἀναγκαῖον ἕξουσι τὸ εὔτολμον.

[5] Titus Siccius, the legate and proconsul, after communicating his plan to the consul, ordered that a retreat should be sounded and that all the men should assemble in a single body and assault one side of the camp where it was most easy of attack. He left free from attack the parts next the gates, reasoning plausibly — and in this he was not deceived — that if the Tyrrhenians saw any hope of saving themselves, they would abandon the camp, whereas, if they despaired of this, finding themselves surrounded on all sides and no way of escape left, necessity would make them brave.

[6] γενομένης δὲ καθ᾽ ἓν χωρίον τῆς προσβολῆς οὐκέτι πρὸς ἀλκὴν οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ ἐτράποντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνοίξαντες τὰς πύλας ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἀνεσώζοντο χάρακα.

[6] And when the attack was directed against one point only, the Tyrrhenians no longer resisted, but opening the gates, made their way back in safety to their own camp.

[1] ὁ δ᾽ ὕπατος ἐπειδὴ τὸ δεινὸν ἀπεώσατο, παρεβοήθει πάλιν τοῖς ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ. αὕτη μεγίστη λέγεται τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς γενέσθαι Ῥωμαίοις μάχη, πλήθει τ᾽ ἀνθρώπων καὶ μήκει χρόνου καὶ τῷ ἀγχιστρόφῳ τῆς τύχης. αὐτῶν μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ῥωμαίων ἡ κρατίστη τε καὶ ἐπίλεκτος ἀκμὴ δισμυρίων μάλιστα πεζῶν ἐγένετο, καὶ τῶν συντεταγμένων τοῖς τέτταρσι τάγμασιν ἱππέων ὁμοῦ τι χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων, ἀποίκων δὲ καὶ συμμάχων ἑτέρα τοσαύτη.

[13.1] The consul, after he had averted the danger, returned once more to the assistance of those who were in the plain. This battle is said to have been greater than any the Romans had previously fought as regards not only the numbers of the combatants, but also the time it lasted and its sudden turns of fortune. For of the Romans themselves from the city the flower and choice of their youth consisted of about 20,000 foot and some 1200 horse attached to the four legions, while from their colonies and allies there was another force equally large.

[2] χρόνος δ᾽ ἐμηκύνθη τοῦ ἀγῶνος ὀλίγῳ πρότερον τῆς μεσημβρίας [p. 293] ἀρξάμενος μέχρι δύσεως ἡλίου. τὰ δὲ τῆς τύχης μέχρι πολλοῦ τῇδε καὶ τῇδε νίκαις τε καὶ ἥτταις ταλαντευόμενα διέμεινεν: ὑπάτου δὲ θάνατος ἐγένετο καὶ πρεσβευτοῦ δὶς ὑπατεύσαντος καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ ταξιάρχων καὶ λοχαγῶν, ὅσων οὐδέπω πρότερον. τὸ μέντοι κράτος τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἐδόκει περὶ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους γεγονέναι κατ᾽ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δὲ τῇ ἐπιούσῃ νυκτὶ καταλιπόντες τὸν χάρακα οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ ἀνέζευξαν.

[2] As for the duration of the battle, it began a little before noon and lasted till sunset. Its fortunes continued for a long time shifting to and fro with alternating victories and defeats. A consul was slain, as well as a legate who had himself been twice consul, and many other commanders, tribunes and centurions — more indeed than in any previous battle. But the victory in the struggle seemed to rest with the Romans, for this one reason alone, that the Tyrrhenians left their camp the following night and withdrew.

[3] τῇ δ᾽ ἑξῆς ἡμέρᾳ πρὸς ἁρπαγὰς τῆς ἐκλειφθείσης ὑπὸ τῶν Τυρρηνῶν παρεμβολῆς οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τραπόμενοι καὶ ταφὰς ποιησάμενοι τῶν σφετέρων νεκρῶν ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸν ἑαυτῶν χάρακα. ἐκεῖ δ᾽ ἐκκλησίαν ποιησάμενοι τοῖς ἀγωνισαμένοις λαμπρῶς τὰς ἀριστείους ἀπέδοσαν τιμάς, πρώτῳ μὲν Καίσωνι Φαβίῳ τῷ τοῦ ὑπάτου ἀδελφῷ μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἔργα ἀποδειξαμένῳ, δευτέρῳ δὲ τῷ Σικκίῳ, τῷ διαπραξαμένῳ τὸν χάρακα ἀνασώσασθαι, τρίτῳ δὲ Μάρκῳ Φλαβοληίῳ τῷ ἡγεμόνι τοῦ τάγματος, τοῦ θ᾽ ὅρκου χάριν καὶ τῆς παρὰ τὰ

[3] The next day the Romans turned to plundering the camp which had been abandoned by the Tyrrhenians, and having buried the dead, returned to their own camp. There, having called an assembly of the soldiers, they distributed the rewards of valour to those who had distinguished themselves in the battle, as follows: first, to Caeso Fabius, the consul’s brother, who had performed great and remarkable exploits; next, to Siccius, who had brought about the recovery of their camp; and third, to Marcus Flavoleius, the commander of the legion, on account of both the oath he had taken and the prowess he had shown in the midst of danger.

[4] δεινὰ ῥώμης. διαπραξάμενοι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ μείναντες ἡμέρας ὀλίγας ἐπὶ τοῦ χάρακος, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἀντεπεξῄει τῶν πολεμίων μαχησόμενος, ἀπῄεσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. πάντων δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ὡς ἐπὶ μεγίστῳ ἀγῶνι κάλλιστον τέλος εἰληφότι, τὴν ἐπινίκιον τιμὴν τοῦ θριάμβου τῷ περιόντι ὑπάτῳ προσθεῖναι βουλομένων, ἠρνήσατο τὴν χάριν αὐτῶν ὁ ὕπατος, οὔτε ὅσιον εἶναι [p. 294] λέγων οὔτε θεμιτὸν ἐπ᾽ ἀδελφοῦ θανάτῳ καὶ συνάρχοντος ἀποβολῇ πομπεύειν καὶ στεφανηφορεῖν: ἀποθεὶς δὲ τὰς σημαίας καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀπολύσας ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα τὴν ὑπατείαν ἀπωμόσατο, δυεῖν ἔτι μηνῶν εἰς τὸν ἐνιαύσιον χρόνον λειπομένων, ἀδύνατος, ὢν τὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔτι πράττειν. ἐταλαιπώρει γὰρ ὑπὸ τραύματος ἐξαισίου καὶ ἦν κλινοπετής.

[4] After attending to these things they remained a few days in the camp; then, when none of the enemy came out to fight against them, they returned home. Though all in the city wished to honour the surviving consul with the victor’s reward of a triumph because of a most glorious outcome to a very great battle, the consul declined the favour they offered, saying that it was neither right nor lawful for him to ride in procession and wear a crown of laurel after the death of his brother and the loss of his colleague. But after putting away the standards and dismissing the soldiers to their homes he resigned the consulship when two months still remained to complete his year’s term, since he was no longer capable of performing the duties of the office. For he was still suffering from a horrible wound and obliged to keep his bed.

[1] ἑλομένης δὲ τῆς βουλῆς μεσοβασιλεῖς τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου μεσοβασιλέως συγκαλέσαντος εἰς τὸ πεδίον τοὺς λόχους, ἀποδείκνυται Καίσων Φάβιος ὁ τὰ ἀριστεῖα λαβὼν ἐκ τῆς μάχης, ἀδελφὸς δὲ τοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀποθεμένου, τὸ τρίτον ὕπατος καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ Τῖτος Οὐεργίνιος. οὗτοι διαλαχόντες τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξῄεσαν εἰς τὴν ὕπαιθρον:

[14.1] The senate chose interreges to preside at the election of magistrates, and the second interrex having assembled the centuries in the Field, Caeso Fabius, the one who had been awarded the prize for valour in the battle, and brother to the man who had abdicated his magistracy, was chosen consul for the third time, and with him Titus Verginius. These, having drawn lots for the armies, took the field, Fabius to war against the Aequians, who were plundering the fields of the Latins, and Verginius against the Veientes.

[2] Φάβιος μὲν Αἰκανοῖς πολεμήσων προνομεύουσι τοὺς Λατίνων ἀγρούς, Οὐεργίνιος δὲ Οὐιεντανοῖς. Αἰκανοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπειδὴ στρατὸν ἐλευσόμενον ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἔγνωσαν, ἀναστάντες ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας διὰ τάχους ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὰς ἑαυτῶν πόλεις: καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα λεηλατουμένης τῆς σφετέρας γῆς ἠνείχοντο, ὥστε πολλῶν κρατῆσαι χρημάτων τὸν ὕπατον καὶ σωμάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης λείας ἐξ ἐφόδου. Οὐιεντανοὶ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἐντὸς τείχους μένοντες, ἐπειδὴ καιρὸν ἔχειν ἔδοξαν ἐπιτήδειον, ἐπέθεντο τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐσκεδασμένοις ἀνὰ τὰ πεδία καὶ πρὸς ἁρπαγὴν τετραμμένοις τῆς λείας.

[2] The Aequians, when they learned that an army was going to come against them, hastily evacuated the enemy’s country and returned to their own cities; and after that they permitted their own territory to be ravaged, so the consul possessed himself at the first blow of large amounts of money, many slaves, and much booty of other sorts. As for the Veientes, they at first remained within their walls; but as soon as they thought they had a favourable opportunity, they fell upon the enemy as they were dispersed over the plains and occupied in seizing booty.

[3] ἔχοντες δὲ πολλὴν καὶ συντεταγμένην δύναμιν ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς αὐτούς, [p. 295] καὶ τήν τε λείαν ἀφαιροῦνται, καὶ τοὺς ὁμόσε χωροῦντας, οὓς μὲν ἀποκτείνουσιν, οὓς δ᾽ εἰς φυγὴν τρέπουσι: καὶ εἰ μὴ Τῖτος Σίκκιος πρεσβευτὴς τότ᾽ ὢν στίφει συντεταγμένῳ πεζῶν τε καὶ ἱππέων παραβοηθήσας ἐπέσχεν αὐτούς, οὐδὲν ἂν τὸ κωλῦσον ἦν ἅπασαν ἀπολέσθαι τὴν στρατιάν. ἐκείνου δ᾽ ἐμποδὼν γενομένου συνελθεῖν ἔφθασαν οἱ λοιποὶ οἱ καθ᾽ ἕνα διεσκεδασμένοι: πάντες δ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῷ γενόμενοι λόφον τινὰ καταλαμβάνονται περὶ δείλην ὀψίαν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν νύκτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔμειναν.

[3] And attacking them with a large army in good order, they not only took away their booty, but also killed or put to flight all who engaged them. Indeed, if Titus Siccius, who was legate at the time, had not come to their relief with a body of foot and horse in good order and held the foe in check, nothing could have prevented the army from being utterly destroyed. But when he got in the enemy’s way, the rest of the troops, who had been scattered one here and one there, succeeded in getting together before it was too late; and being now all united, they occupied a hill late in the afternoon and remained there the following night.

[4] ἐπαρθέντες δὲ Οὐιεντανοὶ τῷ κατορθώματι πλησίον τοῦ λόφου τίθενται τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐκάλουν ὡς κατακεκλεικότες τοὺς Ῥωμαίους εἰς χωρίον, ἔνθα οὐδὲν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔμελλον ἕξειν, καὶ προσαναγκάσοντες οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν παραδοῦναι σφίσι τὰ ὅπλα. γίνεταί τ᾽ αὐτῶν συχνοῦ ἐλθόντος ὄχλου δύο στρατεύματα περὶ τὰς ἐπιμάχους λαγόνας τοῦ λόφου, πολλά τ᾽ ἄλλα φρούρια βραχύτερα κατὰ τοὺς ἧττον ἐπικαίρους τόπους: καὶ πάντα ἦν μεστὰ

[4] The Veientes, elated by their success, encamped near the hill and sent for their forces in the city, imagining that they had shut up the Romans in a place where they could not get any provisions, and that they would soon force them to deliver up their arms to them. And when a multitude of their men had arrived, there were now two armies posted on the two sides of the hill that could be assailed, as well as many smaller detachments to guard the less vulnerable positions; and every place was full of armed men.

[5] ὅπλων. ὁ δ᾽ ἕτερος τῶν ὑπάτων Φάβιος γραμμάτων παρὰ τοῦ συνάρχοντος ἀφικομένων ἐπιγνούς, ὅτι ἐν ἐσχάτοις εἰσὶν οἱ κατακλεισθέντες ἐν τῷ λόφῳ, καὶ κινδυνεύσουσιν, εἰ μή τις αὐτοῖς βοηθήσει, λιμῷ ἁλῶναι, ἀναστήσας τὸν στρατὸν ἦγεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Οὐιεντανοὺς σὺν τάχει: καὶ εἰ μιᾷ βραδύτερον ἡμέρᾳ διήνυσε τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὤνησεν, ἀλλὰ διεφθαρμένην τὴν ἐκεῖ [p. 296] στρατιὰν κατέλαβε. πιεζόμενοι γὰρ τῇ σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων οἱ κατέχοντες τὸν λόφον ἐξῆλθον ὡς τὸν εὐπρεπέστατον αἱρησόμενοι τῶν θανάτων, καὶ συμβαλόντες τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐμάχοντο κεκμηκότες οἱ πλείους τὰ σώματα λιμῷ τε καὶ δίψῃ καὶ ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ τῇ

[5] The other consul, Fabius, learning from a letter that came from his colleague that the troops shut up on the hill were in the direst straits and would be in danger of being reduced by famine unless someone came to their relief, broke camp and marched in haste against the Veientes. Indeed, if he had been one day later in completing his march, he would have been of no help, but would have found the army there destroyed. For the men holding the hill, distressed by the lack of provisions, had sallied out, ready to choose the most honourable death; and having engaged the enemy, they were then fighting, though the bodies of most of them were weakened by hunger, thirst, want of sleep, and every other hardship.

[6] ἄλλῃ κακώσει. μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ τοῦ Φαβίου στράτευμα προσιὸν ὤφθη πολύ τε καὶ συντεταγμένον, θάρσος μὲν ἔφερε τοῖς σφετέροις, δέος δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις: καὶ οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ οὐκέτι ἀξιόμαχοι εἶναι νομίσαντες πρὸς ἀγαθήν τε καὶ ἀκμῆτα δύναμιν εἰς ἀγῶνα χωρεῖν, ᾤχοντο ἐκλιπόντες τοὺς χάρακας. ὡς δ᾽ εἰς ταὐτὸ συνῆλθον αἱ τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις ἀμφότεραι, στρατόπεδόν τε ποιοῦνται μέγα πλησίον τῆς πόλεως ἐν ἐχυρῷ, καὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας αὐτόθι διατρίψαντες καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην τῶν Οὐιεντανῶν χώραν λεηλατήσαντες ἀπῆγον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου τὴν στρατιάν.

[6] But after a short time, when the army of Fabius, which was very large and drawn up in order of battle, was seen approaching, it brought confidence to their own men and fear to the enemy; and the Tyrrhenians, believing themselves no longer to be strong enough to engaged in battle with a valiant and fresh army, abandoned their camps and withdrew. When the two armies of the Romans had come together, they made a large camp in a strong position near the city; then, after remaining there many days and plundering the best part of the territory of the Veientes, the generals led the army home.

[7] ὡς δ᾽ ἔγνωσαν οἱ Οὐιεντανοὶ τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀφειμένας ἀπὸ τῶν σημαιῶν, τὴν εὔζωνον ἀναλαβόντες νεότητα, ἥν τ᾽ αὐτοὶ συντεταγμένην εἶχον καὶ τὴν παρὰ τῶν πλησιοχώρων παροῦσαν, ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰ προσκείμενα τῇ σφετέρᾳ χώρᾳ πεδία, καὶ διαρπάζουσι καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὄντα μεστά. κατέβησαν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐρυμάτων οἱ γεωργοὶ χιλοῦ τε τῶν βοσκημάτων ἕνεκα καὶ ἐργασίας τῶν ἀγρῶν πιστεύοντες τῇ σφετέρᾳ στρατιᾷ προκαθημένῃ καὶ οὐ φθάσαντες ἀπελθούσης ἀνασκευάσασθαι πάλιν, οὐκ ἐλπίσαντες τοσαῦτα [p. 297] κεκακωμένους τοὺς Οὐιεντανοὺς ταχεῖαν οὕτως ἀντεπιχείρησιν κατὰ τοῦ ἀντιπάλου ποιήσεσθαι.

[7] When the Veientes heard that the forces of the Romans had been discharged from the standards, taking the light-armed youth, not only their own which they had already assembled, but also that of their neighbours which was then present, they made an incursion into the plains bordering upon their own territory, which were full of corn, cattle and men, and plundered them. For the husbandmen had come down from the strongholds to get feed for their cattle and to till their lands, relying upon the protection of their army, which then lay encamped between them and the enemy; and after this army had retired, they had made no hasten to move back, as they did not expect the Veientes, after having suffered so many defeats, to make a return attack so promptly against the foes.

[8] αὕτη χρόνου μὲν μήκει βραχεῖα ἐγένετο ἡ τῶν Οὐιεντανῶν εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων γῆν ἐμβολή, πλήθει δὲ χώρας, ἣν ἐπῆλθον, ἐν τοῖς πάνυ μεγάλη, καὶ ἀχθηδόνα σὺν αἰσχύνῃ Ῥωμαίοις ἀήθη παρέσχεν ἄχρι Τιβέριός τε ποταμοῦ καὶ ὄρους Ἰανίκλου στάδια τῆς Ῥώμης οὐδ᾽ εἴκοσιν ἀφεστῶτος ἀφικομένη. ἡ κωλύσουσα γὰρ δύναμις ἐπὶ πλεῖον χωρεῖν τὰ πολέμια οὐκ ἦν ὑπὸ σημαίαις. ἔφθασε γοῦν τὸ τῶν Οὐιεντανῶν στράτευμα πρὶν ἢ συνελθεῖν τε καὶ λοχισθῆναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀπελθόν.

[8] This irruption of the Veientes into the Romans’ country, though brief in point of the time it lasted, was very serious with respect to the amount of territory they overran; and it caused the Romans unusual vexation, mingled with shame, since it extended as far as the river Tiber and Mount Janiculum, which is not twenty stades from Rome. For there was no force then under the standards to stop the enemy’s further progress; at any rate, the army of the Veientes had gone before the Romans could assemble and be assigned to centuries.

[1] συναχθείσης δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο τῆς βουλῆς ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπάτων καὶ σκέψεως γενομένης, τίνα χρὴ πολεμεῖν τοῖς Οὐιεντανοῖς τρόπον, ἡ νικῶσα ἦν γνώμη, στράτευμα συνεστηκὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁρίοις, ὃ διὰ φυλακῆς ἕξει τὴν χώραν θυραυλοῦν καὶ αἰεὶ μένον ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις. ἐλύπει δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἥ τ᾽ εἰς τοὺς φρουροὺς δαπάνη πολλὴ σφόδρα ἐσομένη, τοῦ τε κοινοῦ ταμιείου διὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς στρατείας ἐξαναλωμένου καὶ τῶν ἰδίων βίων ἀπειρηκότων ταῖς εἰσφοραῖς: καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν ἀποσταλησομένων φρουρῶν καταγραφὴ τίνα τρόπον ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἑκουσίων γέ τινων προκειμένων [p. 298] ἁπάντων, καὶ μὴ ἐκ διαδοχῆς, ἀλλὰ συνεχῶς ταλαιπωρεῖν ὑποστησομένων.

[15.1] When the senate was later called together by the consuls and had deliberated in what manner the war should be carried on against the Veientes, the opinion which prevailed was to maintain a standing army upon the frontiers, which should keep guard over the Roman territory, camp ing in the open and always remaining under arms. But the expense of maintaining the garrisons, which would be very great, grieved them, since the public treasury was exhausted as a result of the continual campaigns, and their private fortunes had prove unequal to the burden of the war-taxes. And they were grieved still more by the problem of enlisting the garrisons which were to be sent out, how that could be accomplished, there being little probability that a few men would, willingly at least, serve as a bulwark in defence of all and submit to hardships, not in successive shifts, but continuously.

[2] ἀδημονούσης δ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις συγκαλέσαντες οἱ δύο Φάβιοι τοὺς μετέχοντας τοῦ σφετέρου γένους καὶ βουλευσάμενοι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑπέσχοντο τῇ βουλῇ τοῦτο τὸ κινδύνευμα αὐτοὶ περὶ πάντων ἑκόντες ὑπομενεῖν, πελάτας τε τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἐπαγόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ τέλεσι τοῖς ἰδίοις, ὅσον ἂν χρόνον ὁ πόλεμος διαμένῃ, στρατευόμενοι.

[2] While the senate was troubled on both these accounts, the two Fabii assembled all the members of their clan, and having consulted with them, promised the senate that they themselves would voluntarily undertake this risk in defence of all the citizens, taking along with them their clients and friends, and would at their own expense continue in arms as long as the war should last.

[3] ἀγασθέντων δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἁπάντων τοῦ γενναίου τῆς προθυμίας καὶ τὸ νικᾶν παρ᾽ ἓν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τιθεμένων, κλεινοὶ καὶ περιβόητοι καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ὄντες ἐξῄεσαν ἀναλαβόντες τὰ ὅπλα σὺν εὐχαῖς καὶ θυσίαις. ἡγεῖτο δ᾽ αὐτῶν Μάρκος Φάβιος ὁ τῷ παρελθόντι ὑπατεύσας ἔτει καὶ νικήσας τοὺς Τυρρηνοὺς τῇ μάχῃ, τετρακισχιλίους μάλιστα ἐπαγόμενος, ὧν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον πελατῶν τε καὶ ἑταίρων ἦν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Φαβίων γένους ἓξ καὶ τριακόσιοι ἄνδρες. εἵπετο δ᾽ αὐτοῖς μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺ καὶ ἡ Ῥωμαίων δύναμις, ἧς ἡγεῖτο Καίσων Φάβιος ὁ ἕτερος τῶν ὑπάτων.

[3] All admired them for their noble devotion and placed their hopes of victory in this single undertaking; and while they were being acclaimed and their names were on the lips of all, they took their arms and marched forth, accompanied by vows and sacrifices. Their leader was Marcus Fabius, the man who had been consul the preceding year and had conquered the Tyrrhenians in the late battle; those he took with him were about four thousand in number, the greater part of them being clients and friends, while of the Fabian clan there were three hundred and six men. They were followed a little later by the Roman army under the command of Caeso Fabius, one of the consuls.

[4] γενόμενοι δὲ ποταμοῦ Κρεμέρας πλησίον, ὃς οὐ μακρὰν ἀπέχει τῆς Οὐιεντανῶν πόλεως, ὑπὲρ ὄχθου τινὸς ἀποτόμου καὶ περιρρῶγος ἐπετείχιζον αὐτοῖς φρούριον ἱκανὸν φυλάττεσθαι τοσαύτῃ στρατιᾷ τάφρους τ᾽ ὀρυξάμενοι περὶ αὐτὸ διπλᾶς καὶ πύργους ἐγείραντες πυκνούς: καὶ ὠνομάσθη τὸ φρούριον ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ Κρεμέρα. οἷα δὲ πολυχειρίας τ᾽ ἐργαζομένης καὶ ὑπάτου συλλαμβάνοντος,

[4] When they came near the river Cremera, which is not far from the city of the Veientes, they built upon a steep and craggy hill a fortress to command their territory, as large as could be garrisoned by an army of such size, surrounding it with a double ditch and erecting frequent towers; and the fortress was named Cremera, after the river. Since many hands were employed at this work and consul himself assisted them, it was completed sooner than might have been expected.

[5] θᾶττον ἢ κατὰ δόξαν ἐτελέσθη τὸ ἔργον. καὶ μετὰ [p. 299] τοῦτ᾽ ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν δύναμιν παρήλασεν ἐπὶ θάτερα τὰ μέρη τῆς Οὐιεντανῶν χώρας τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην ἐστραμμένα Τυρρηνίαν, ἔνθα ἦν τοῖς Οὐιεντανοῖς τὰ βοσκήματα, οὐδέποτε στρατὸν ἥξειν Ῥωμαίων ἐκεῖ προσδεχομένοις. περιβαλόμενος δὲ πολλὴν λείαν ἀπῆγεν ἐπὶ τὸ νεόκτιστον φρούριον, χαίρων ἐπὶ τῇ ἄγρᾳ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, τῆς τ᾽ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ τῶν πολεμίων τιμωρίας ἕνεκα, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς φρουροῖς τοῦ χωρίου πολλὴν ἔμελλε παρέξειν εὐπορίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτ᾽ εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ἀνήνεγκεν, οὔτε τοῖς στρατευομένοις ἰδιώταις ἀπένειμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρόβατα καὶ ὑποζύγια καὶ ζεύγη βοεικὰ καὶ σίδηρον καὶ τἆλλα, ὅσα εἰς γεωργίαν ἐπιτήδεια ἦν, τοῖς περιπόλοις τῆς χώρας ἐχαρίσατο.

[5] After that the consul marched out with the army and went past the city to the other side of the territory of the Veientes, the side facing toward the rest of Tyrrhenia, where the Veientes kept their herds, not expecting that a Roman army would ever come there; and having possessed himself of much booty, he returned home to the newly erected fortress. This quarry afforded him great satisfaction for two reasons — first, because he had so promptly retaliated upon the enemy, and again, because it would furnish abundant supplies to the garrison of the stronghold. For he neither turned over any part of the spoils to the treasury nor distributed any to the soldiers, but presented all the cattle, the beasts of burden, the yokes of oxen, the iron, and the other implements of husbandry to the patrols of the country.

[6] ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἀπῆγεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου τὴν στρατιάν. τοῖς δὲ Οὐιεντανοῖς μετὰ τὸν ἐπιτειχισμὸν τοῦ χωρίου κακῶς πάνυ τὰ πράγματ᾽ εἶχεν, οὔτε τὴν γῆν ἔτι δυναμένοις ἀσφαλῶς γεωργεῖν οὔτε τὰς ἔξωθεν εἰσαγομένας ἀγορὰς δέχεσθαι.

[6] After accomplishing this he led the army home. The Veientes found themselves in very dire straits after the erection of the frontier stronghold, since they could no longer either till their land in safety or receive the provisions that were imported from abroad.

[7] νείμαντες γὰρ εἰς τέτταρα μέρη τὴν στρατιὰν οἱ Φάβιοι, τῷ μὲν ἑνὶ διεφύλαττον τὸ χωρίον, τοῖς δὲ τρισὶ τὴν χώραν τῶν πολεμίων ἄγοντές τε καὶ φέροντες ἀεὶ διετέλουν: καὶ πολλάκις τῶν Οὐιεντανῶν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεμένων χειρὶ οὐκ ὀλίγῃ καὶ εἰς χωρία ἐνέδραις κατεχόμενα ὑπαγομένων, περιῆσαν ἀμφοτέρως καὶ πολλοὺς νεκροὺς ποιήσαντες ἀσφαλῶς ἀπῄεσαν εἰς τὸ χωρίον. ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁμόσε χωρεῖν [p. 300] αὐτοῖς ἔτι οἱ πολέμιοι ἐτόλμων, ἀλλὰ τειχήρεις μένοντες τὰ πολλὰ καὶ κλέπτοντες τὰς ἐξόδους διετέλουν, καὶ ὁ μὲν χειμὼν ἐκεῖνος οὕτως ἐτελεύτα.

[7] For the Fabii had divided their army into four bodies, with one of which they guarded the stronghold, while with the other three they continually pillaged the enemy’s country; and often, when the Veientes openly attacked them with a considerable force or endeavoured to entice them into places beset with ambuscades, the Fabii had the advantage in both situations, and after killing many of them, would retire safely to their stronghold. Consequently the enemy no longer dared to engage them, but remained shut up within their walls for the most part, and only ventured out by stealth. Thus ended that winter.

[1] τῷ δὲ κατόπιν ἔτει Λευκίου τ᾽ Αἰμιλίου καὶ Γαίου Σερουιλίου τὴν ὑπατείαν παρειληφότων ἀπηγγέλη Ῥωμαίοις, ὅτι Οὐολοῦσκοι καὶ Αἰκανοὶ συνθήκας πεποίηνται στρατιὰς κατ᾽ αὐτῶν ἅμα ἐξάγειν, καὶ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ εἰς τὴν χώραν ἐμβαλοῦσι: καὶ ἦν ἀληθῆ τὰ λεγόμενα. θᾶττον γοῦν ἢ προσεδόκα τις ἀμφότεροι τὰς δυνάμεις ἔχοντες ἐδῄουν τὴν κατὰ σφᾶς ἕκαστοι χώραν, ὡς οὐχ ἱκανῶν ἐσομένων Ῥωμαίων τῷ τε Τυρρηνικῷ πολέμῳ ἀντέχειν καὶ σφᾶς ἐπιόντας δέχεσθαι.

[16.1] The next year, when Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Servilius had assumed the consulship, the Romans were informed that the Volscians and the Aequians had entered into an agreement to lead out armies against them at the same time, and that they would soon make an irruption into their territory. And this information was true. At all events, sooner than anyone was expecting, both nations with their armies were ravaging the parts of the Roman territory that adjoined their own, in the belief that the Romans would not be able to cope with the Tyrrhenian war and at the same time to withstand their own attack.

[2] καὶ ἕτεροι αὖθις ἥκοντες ἐκπεπολεμῶσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς Τυρρηνίαν ἀπήγγελλον ὅλην καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι Οὐιεντανοῖς κοινὴν ἀποστέλλειν συμμαχίαν. κατέφυγον γὰρ ὡς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατοι ὄντες ἐξελεῖν δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν τὸ φρούριον Οὐιεντανοί, συγγενείας τε ὑπομιμνῄσκοντες καὶ φιλίας καὶ ὅσους μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἤραντο πολέμους διεξιόντες: ἀντὶ πάντων δὲ τούτων ἀξιοῦντες συνάρασθαι σφίσι τοῦ κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πολέμου, ὡς σφῶν τε προκαθημένων Τυρρηνίας ὅλης καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀνακωχευόντων τὸν ἀπὸ Ῥώμης ῥέοντα κατὰ πάντων τῶν ὁμοεθνῶν. καὶ οἱ Τυρρηνοὶ πεισθέντες ὑπέσχοντο πέμψειν αὐτοῖς [p. 301]

[2] And again other messengers came reporting that all Tyrrhenia had become hostile to them and was prepared to send joint reinforcements to the Veientes. For the latter, finding themselves unable to destroy the fortress by themselves alone, had turned to them for help, reminding them of their kinship and friendship, and enumerating the many wars they had waged in common. In view of all this, they asked them to assist them in their war against the Romans, since they were now serving as a bulwark for all Tyrrhenia and stemming the torrent of war which was rushing from Rome upon all the peoples of their race. The Tyrrhenians were persuaded, and promised to send them as large a force of auxiliaries as they asked for.

[3] ὅσην ἠξίουν σημμαχίαν. ταῦθ᾽ ἡ βουλὴ μαθοῦσα ἐψηφίσατο τρισσὰς ἐκπέμψειν στρατιάς, καὶ γενομένων ἐν τάχει τῶν καταλόγων Λεύκιος μὲν Αἰμίλιος ἐπὶ Τυρρηνοὺς ἐπέμφθη: συνήρατο δ᾽ αὐτῷ τῆς ἐξόδου Καίσων Φάβιος, ὁ νεωστὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀποθέμενος, δεηθεὶς τῆς βουλῆς ἐπιτρέψαι αὐτῷ τοῖς ἐν Κρεμέρᾳ συγγενέσιν, οὓς ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ φρουρήσοντας τὸ χωρίον ἐξήγαγε, συνεῖναί τε καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀγώνων μετέχειν: καὶ ἐξῆλθε σὺν τοῖς ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐξουσίᾳ κοσμηθεὶς ἀνθυπάτῳ.

[3] The senate, being informed of this, resolved to send three armies into the field; and the levies were speedily raised. Lucius Aemilius was sent against the Tyrrhenians; and taking part in the expedition with him was Caeso Fabius, the man who had recently resigned the consulship, having now asked leave of the senate to join his kinsmen on the Cremera whom his brother had led out to garrison that place, and to take part in the same contests as they; and invested with the proconsular power, he set out with his followers.

[4] Γάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος ὁ ἕτερος τῶν ὑπάτων ἐπὶ Οὐολούσκους ἐστράτευσε: Σερούιος δὲ Φούριος ἀνθύπατος ἐπὶ τὸ Αἰκανῶν ἔθνος. ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ αὐτῶν δύο μὲν τάγματα Ῥωμαίων εἵπετο, Λατίνων δὲ καὶ Ἑρνίκων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων οὐκ ἐλάττω τῆς Ῥωμαικῆς δυνάμεως. τῷ μὲν οὖν ἀνθυπάτῳ Σερουίῳ κατὰ νοῦν ὁ πόλεμος ἐχώρησε καὶ σὺν τάχει. μιᾷ γὰρ ἐτρέψατο τοὺς Αἰκανοὺς μάχῃ καὶ ταύτῃ δίχα πόνου, τῇ πρώτῃ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐκπλήξας ἐφόδῳ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδῄου τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καταπεφευγότων εἰς τὰ ἐρύματα.

[4] Gaius Servilius, the other consul, marched against the Volscians, and Servius Furius, the proconsul, against the Aequians. Each of them was at the head of two legions of Romans and an equally strong force of Latins, Hernicans and the other allies. In the case of the proconsul Servius the war went according to his wish and was soon over. For in a single battle he routed the Aequians, and that without any trouble, having terrified the enemy at the first onset; and thereafter he laid waste their country, as the people had taken refuge in their forts.

[5] Σερουιλίῳ δὲ θατέρῳ τῶν ὑπάτων ὑπὸ σπουδῆς τε καὶ αὐθαδείας ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα χωρήσαντι πολὺ τὸ παρὰ γνώμην ἀπήντησε, καρτερῶς πάνυ τῶν Οὐολούσκων ἀντιταξαμένων, ὥστ᾽ ἠναγκάσθη πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἀπολέσας μηκέτι χωρεῖν ὁμόσε τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ χάρακι ὑπομένων ἀκροβολισμοῖς καὶ ψιλῶν [p. 302]

[5] But Servilius, one of the consuls, having rushed into battle in a precipitate and headstrong fashion, found himself greatly disappointed in his expectations, with the result that after losing many brave men he was forced to give up engaging in pitched battles with them any longer, but remaining in his camp, to carry through the war by means of skirmishes and engagements of the light-armed troops.

[6] συμπλοκαῖς διαφέρειν ἔγνω τὸν πόλεμον. Λεύκιος δ᾽ Αἰμίλιος, ὁ πεμφθεὶς ἐπὶ Τυρρηνούς, εὑρὼν ἐξεστρατευμένους πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς Οὐιεντανοὺς καὶ σὺν αὐτοῖς πολὺ τὸ παρὰ τῶν ὁμοεθνῶν ἐπικουρικόν, οὐδὲν ἔτι μελλήσας ἔργου εἴχετο: ἡμέραν δ᾽, ἀφ᾽ ἧς τὸν χάρακα ἔθετο, διαλιπὼν ἐξῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς μάχην, θρασέως πάνυ τῶν Οὐιεντανῶν ὁμόσε χωρούντων. ἰσορρόπου δὲ τοῦ ἀγῶνος γινομένου τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἀναλαβὼν ἐνσείει τοῖς πολεμίοις κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, καί, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο διεσάλευσεν, ἐπὶ θάτερον ἐχώρει, ὅπου μὲν ἱππάσιμον εἴη χωρίον ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων μαχόμενος, ὅπου δ᾽ ἄνιππον ἀποκαταβαίνων τε καὶ πεζὸς ἀγωνιζόμενος. πονούντων δὲ τῶν κεράτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδ᾽ οἱ κατὰ μέσον ἔτι ἀντεῖχον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξεώσθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν πεζῶν, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο πάντες ἔφυγον ἐπὶ τὸν χάρακα.

[6] Lucius Aemilius, who had been sent against the Tyrrhenians, finding that the Veientes had taken the field before their city together with a large number of auxiliaries of the same race, set to work without further delay; and letting only a single day pass after making camp, he led out his forces to battle, in which the Veientes joined with great confidence. When the contest continued doubtful, he took the horse and charged the right wing of the enemy; then, after throwing that into confusion, he proceeded to the other wing, fighting on horseback where the ground would permit, and where it would not, dismounting and fighting on foot. When both of the enemy’s wings were in distress, those in the centre could no longer hold out either, but were thrust back by the Roman foot; and after that they all fled to their camp.

[7] ὁ δ᾽ Αἰμίλιος ἠκολούθει τοῖς φεύγουσι συντεταγμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἔχων καὶ πολλοὺς διέφθειρε. γενόμενος δὲ πλησίον τοῦ χάρακος καὶ προσβαλὼν ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἐκείνην τε παρέμεινε τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν νύκτα, τῇ δ᾽ ἑξῆς ἡμέρᾳ κόπῳ τε καὶ τραύμασι τῶν πολεμίων καὶ ἀγρυπνίᾳ ἀπειρηκότων ἐγκρατὴς γίνεται τοῦ χάρακος. οἱ δὲ Τυρρηνοί, ὡς εἶδον ἐπιβαίνοντας ἤδη τοὺς Ῥωμαίους τοῖς περισταυρώμασιν, ἐκλιπόντες τὸ στρατόπεδον ἔφευγον, οἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δ᾽ εἰς τὰ πλησίον ὄρη.

[7] Aemilius followed them in their flight with his army in good order and killed many of them. When he came near their camp, he attacked it with relays of fresh troops, remaining there all that day and the following night; and the next day, when the enemy were spent with weariness, wounds and want of sleep, he made himself master of the camp. The Tyrrhenians, when they saw the Romans already mounting the palisades, left their camp and fled, some to the city and some to the neighbouring hills.

[8] ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν τῷ χάρακι τῶν πολεμίων ἔμεινεν ὁ ὕπατος, [p. 303] τῇ δ᾽ ἑξῆς ἡμέρᾳ στεφανώσας τοὺς ἀριστεύσαντας ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ταῖς ἐκπρεπεστάταις δωρεαῖς, πάντα τὰ ἐγκαταληφθέντα ἐν τῷ χάρακι ὑποζύγιά τε καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ σκηνὰς πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν γεμούσας τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐχαρίσατο. καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν πολλῇ εὐπορίᾳ τὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στράτευμα ὡς ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς ἑτέρας πώποτε μάχης. ἁβροδίαιτον γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολυτελὲς τὸ τῶν Τυρρηνῶν ἔθνος ἦν οἴκοι τε καὶ ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου, περιαγόμενον ἔξω τῶν ἀναγκαίων πλούτου τε καὶ τέχνης ἔργα παντοῖα πρὸς ἡδονὰς μεμηχανημένα καὶ τρυφάς.

[8] That day the consul remained in the enemy’s camp; and on the next day he rewarded with the most magnificent presents those who had distinguished themselves in the battle, and gave to the soldiers all the beasts of burden and slaves that had been left behind in the camp, together with the tents, which were full of many valuables. And the Roman army found itself in greater opulence than after any former battle. For the Tyrrhenians were a people of dainty and expensive tastes, both at home and in the field carrying about with them, besides the necessities, costly and artistic articles of all kinds designed for pleasure and luxury.

[1] ταῖς δ᾽ ἑξῆς ἡμέραις ἀπειρηκότες ἤδη τοῖς κακοῖς οἱ Οὐιεντανοὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν ἱκετηρίας φέροντας ἀπέστειλαν ὡς τὸν ὕπατον ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰρήνης διαλεξομένους. καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες ὀλοφυρόμενοί τε καὶ ἀντιβολοῦντες καὶ τἆλλ᾽, ὅσα ἐπαγωγὰ ἦν εἰς ἔλεον, μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων διεξιόντες πείθουσι τὸν ὕπατον ἐπιτρέψαι σφίσι τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς εἰς Ῥώμην ἀποστεῖλαι τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν διαλεξομένους, ἕως δ᾽ ἂν οἱ πρέσβεις ἀφίκωνται φέροντες τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, μηδὲν αὐτῶν κακουργεῖν τὴν χώραν. ἵνα δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐγγένηται ταῦτα πράττειν, σῖτόν τε ὡμολόγησαν τῇ Ῥωμαίων στρατιᾷ διμήνου παρέξειν, καὶ χρήματα εἰς ὀψωνιασμὸν [p. 304]

[17.1] In the course of the following days the Veientes, yielding at last to their misfortunes, sent their oldest citizens to the consul with the tokens of suppliants to treat for peace. These men, resorting to lamentations and entreaties and with many tears rehearsing every argument calculated to arouse compassion, endeavoured to persuade the consul to let them send ambassadors to Rome to treat with the senate for a termination of the war, and until the ambassadors should return with the senate’s answer, to do no injury to their country. In order to obtain these concessions, they promised to supply the Roman army with corn for two months and with money for their pay for six months, as the victor commanded.

[2] ἓξ μηνῶν, ὡς ὁ κρατῶν ἔταξε. καὶ ὁ μὲν ὕπατος λαβὼν τὰ κομισθέντα καὶ διαδοὺς τῇ στρατιᾷ ποιεῖται τὰς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀνοχάς. ἡ δὲ βουλὴ τῆς πρεσβείας ἀκούσασα καὶ τὰ τοῦ ὑπάτου γράμματ᾽ ἀναλεξαμένη πολλὴν ποιουμένου παράκλησιν καὶ παραινοῦντος ὡς τάχιστα καταθέσθαι τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Τυρρηνοὺς πόλεμον, δόγμα ἐξήνεγκε διδόναι τὴν εἰρήνην, ὡς ᾐτοῦντο οἱ πολέμιοι: ἐφ᾽ οἷς δὲ δικαίοις αὕτη γενήσεται, τὸν ὕπατον καταστήσασθαι Λεύκιον Αἰμίλιον, ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ

[2] And the consul, after receiving what they brought and distributing it among his men, made the truce with them. The senate, having heard the ambassadors and received the letter of the consul, in which he earnestly recommended and urged putting an end to the war with the Tyrrhenians as soon as possible, passed a decree to grant peace as the enemy desired; as to the terms on which the peace should be made, they left them for the consul Lucius Aemilius to determine in such manner as he should think best.

[3] φανῇ κράτιστα ἕξειν. ταύτας λαβὼν τὰς ἀποκρίσεις ὁ ὕπατος σπένδεται πρὸς τοὺς Οὐιεντανούς, ἐπιεικεστέραν μᾶλλον ἢ συμφορωτέραν τοῖς κεκρατηκόσι ποιησάμενος εἰρήνην, οὔτε χώραν αὐτῶν ἀποτεμόμενος οὔτε χρημάτων ἄλλων ἐπιθεὶς ζημίαν, οὔτε ὁμήρων δόσει τὸ πιστὸν ἐν τοῖς συγκειμένοις βεβαιωσάμενος.

[3] The consul, having received this answer, concluded a peace with the Veientes that was more equitable than advantageous to the conquerors; for he neither took far from them any part of their territory, nor imposed on them any further fine of money, nor compelled them to give hostages as security for the performance of their agreement.

[4] τοῦτ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγαν ἤνεγκε φθόνον, καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς κατωρθωμένοις χάριτας αἴτιον ἐγένετο. ἐνέστησαν γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸν θρίαμβον αἰτουμένῳ τὴν αὐθάδειαν αἰτιώμενοι τῶν συνθηκῶν, ὅτι οὐ μετὰ κοινῆς γνώμης αὐτὰς ἔπραξεν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὕβριν ἢ πρὸς ὀργὴν λάβῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ Οὐολούσκους αὐτὸν ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν δύναμιν ἀπάγειν ἐπικουρίας τοῦ συνάρχοντος ἕνεκα, εἰ δύναιτο κατορθώσας τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον — ἦν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ πολὺ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον — ἀφανίσαι τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς προτέροις ἁμαρτήμασιν ὀργάς. ὁ δ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἀγανακτῶν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀτιμίᾳ πολλὴν ἐποιήσατο τῆς βουλῆς [p. 305] ἐν τῷ δήμῳ κατηγορίαν, ὡς ἀχθομένης ἐπὶ τῷ λελύσθαι τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Τυρρηνοὺς πόλεμον. ἔφη δὲ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ ὑπεροψίας τῶν πενήτων ποιεῖν, ἵνα μὴ τῶν ὑπερορίων ἀπαλλαγέντες πολέμων ἀπαιτῶσι τὰς περὶ τῆς κληρουχίας ὑποσχέσεις,

[4] This action brought upon him great odium and was the reason for his not receiving from the senate the rewards due for his success; for when he requested the customary triumph, they opposed it, censuring his arbitrary behaviour in the matter of the treaty, in that he had concluded it without their concurrence. But lest he should take this action as an insult and evidence of their anger, they ordered him to march with his army against the Volscians in order to bear aid to his colleague, on the chance that if he succeeded in the war there — for he was a man of great bravery — he might blot out the resentment for his former errors. But Aemilius, angry at this slight upon his honour, inveighed violently against the senate in the popular assembly, accusing them of being displeased that the war against the Tyrrhenians was ended, He declared that they were doing this with treacherous intent and through contempt of the poor, lest these, when freed from foreign wars, should demand the performance of the promises concerning the allotment of land with which they had been cajoled by them for so many years already.

[5] πολλοστὸν ἔτος ἤδη φενακιζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτῶν. ταῦτα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὅμοια εἰπὼν καὶ δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἀκράτου τῶν πατρικίων ὀνείδη κατασκεδάσας, τήν τε συστρατευσαμένην αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἀπέλυσε τῶν σημείων καὶ τὴν μετὰ Φουρίου τοῦ ἀνθυπάτου διατρίβουσαν ἐν Αἰκανοῖς μεταπεμψάμενος ἀφῆκεν ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα: ἐξ ὧν πολλὴν πάλιν ἐποίησεν ἐξουσίαν τοῖς δημάρχοις κατηγορεῖν τῶν βουλευτῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις καὶ διιστάναι τοὺς πένητας ἀπὸ τῶν εὐπόρων.

[5] After he had in his ungovernable resentment poured forth these and many similar reproaches against the patricians, he not only dismissed from the standards the army that had served under him, but also sent for the forces that were tarrying in the country of the Aequians under Furius the proconsul and dismissed them to their homes. Thereby he once more gave the tribunes a considerable warrant for accusing the senators in the meetings of the assembly and sowing dissension between the poor and the rich.

[1] μετὰ δὲ τούτους παραλαμβάνουσι τὴν ὑπατείαν Γάιος Ὁράτιος καὶ Τῖτος Μενήνιος ἐπὶ τῆς ἑβδομηκοστῆς καὶ ἕκτης ὀλυμπιάδος, ἣν ἐνίκα στάδιον Σκάμανδρος Μιτυληναῖος ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Φαίδωνος. τούτοις κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς μὲν ὁ πολιτικὸς θόρυβος ἐμποδὼν ἐγένετο πράττειν τὰ κοινὰ ἠρεθισμένου τοῦ δήμου καὶ οὐδὲν ἐῶντος ἕτερον ἐπιτελεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν, ἕως ἂν μερίσηται τὴν δημοσίαν γῆν, χρόνῳ δ᾽ ὕστερον εἶξε τὰ παρακινοῦντα καὶ ταραττόμενα τῇ ἀνάγκῃ συγχωρήσαντα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς στρατείας ἑκούσια ἦλθε.

[18.1] These consuls were succeeded by Gaius Horatius and Titus Menenius in the seventy-sixth Olympiad (the one at which Scamander of Mitylene won the foot-race), when Phaedo was archon at Athens. The new consuls were at first hindered from transacting the public business by the domestic disturbance, the populace being exasperated and not permitting any other public business to be carried on until they should divide up among themselves the public land; but after a time the seditious and turbulent elements yielded to necessity and came in voluntarily to be enlisted.

[2] Τυρρηνῶν γὰρ αἱ μὴ μετασχοῦσαι τῆς εἰρήνης ἕνδεκα πόλεις [p. 306] ἀγορὰν ποιησάμεναι κοινὴν κατηγόρουν τοῦ Οὐιεντανῶν ἔθνους, ὅτι τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον οὐ μετὰ κοινῆς γνώμης κατελύσαντο, καὶ δυεῖν θάτερον αὐτοὺς ἠξίουν πράττειν, ἢ λύειν τὰ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὁμολογηθέντα

[2] For the eleven cities of the Tyrrhenians which had had no part in the peace, holding a general assembly, inveighed against the Veientes for having put an end to the war with the Romans without the general consent of the nation, and demanded that they do one of two things — either break the compact they had made with the Romans, or join with the Romans in making war upon the rest of the Tyrrhenians.

[3] ἢ πολεμεῖν σφίσι μετ᾽ ἐκείνων. οἱ δὲ Οὐιεντανοὶ τῆς μὲν εἰρήνης τὴν ἀνάγκην ᾐτιῶντο, ὅπως δ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴν καταλύσαιντο εὐπρεπῶς εἰς κοινὸν ἐτίθεσαν σκοπεῖν. ἔπειτα ὑποτίθεταί τις αὐτοῖς ἔγκλημα ποιησαμένοις τὸν ἐπιτειχισμὸν τῆς Κρεμέρας καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀπανίστασθαι τοὺς φρουροὺς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς, λόγῳ μὲν πρῶτον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοὺς ἐκλιπεῖν τὸ χωρίον, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πείθωσι, πολιορκεῖν τὸ φρούριον, καὶ ταύτην ἀρχὴν ποιήσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.

[3] But the Veientes laid the blame for the peace upon necessity, and proposed that the assembly consider how they might break it with decency. Upon this someone suggested to them that they should make formal complaint of the erection of the frontier stronghold on the Cremera and of the failure of its garrison to withdraw from there, and then should first make an oral demand that they evacuate the place, and, if they refused, should lay siege to the fortress and make this action the beginning of the war.

[4] ταῦτα συνθέμενοι ἀπηλλάττοντο ἐκ τοῦ συλλόγου: καὶ μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺ Οὐιεντανοὶ μὲν ἀποστείλαντες πρεσβείαν ὡς τοὺς Φαβίους ἀπῄτουν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τὸ φρούριον, Τυρρηνία δὲ πᾶσα ἦν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις. ταῦτα Ῥωμαῖοι αἰσθόμενοι Φαβίων αὐτοῖς ἐπιστειλάντων ἔγνωσαν ἀμφοτέρους ἐκπορεύεσθαι τοὺς ὑπάτους ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον, τόν τ᾽ ἀπὸ Τυρρηνίας ἐπαγόμενον σφίσι καὶ τὸν ἔτι πρὸς Οὐολούσκους συνεστῶτα.