CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS (JUNE 20, 2013)
You were just in Lebanon. The dangers of a wider war in the Middle East seem to be increasing. The United States is now going to openly arm the so-called rebels in opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. What did you learn on your trip?
Lebanon is quite interesting. People have somehow developed psychological defenses, so that they go on living extremely placid lives, as if they’re not about to be consumed by a conflagration. But they are. Lebanon is a small country of four million people, and it has taken in more than half a million Syrian refugees. That’s apart from the Palestinian refugees and Iraqi refugees already there. The country is under constant threat from Israel, which is quietly pointing out that it may decide to destroy all the missiles in Lebanon—Israel claims Lebanon has sixty thousand missiles scattered all over the country. What the Israelis say is, We learned the lesson of the last invasion. We’re not going to fight on the ground. The resistance is too strong.
The last Israeli invasion of Lebanon was in 2006.
Yes. This time, they say, We’ll just get it done in two days. That can only mean bomb the country into rubble. But people act as if none of this is happening. Life goes on. Pleasant events, discussions.
On Syria, I’m really not convinced that our administration intended to arm the rebels in any serious way. If the United States and Israel wanted to support the rebels, there are very simple ways of doing it that don’t involve sending arms. Simply have Israel mobilize forces on the Golan Heights—which is actually Syrian territory, though the U.S. government and the press call it part of Israel—forty miles from Damascus. In one day, you could march in. It’s in artillery range.
Assad would be compelled to send forces to the south, as happened in the past when Israel mobilized forces. It would happen now. That would relieve pressure from the attacks on the rebels without sending one pistol across the border. Have you heard a word about it? It’s not even discussed. It’s not even an option. It’s not that they can’t figure it out. They can figure it out more easily than I can. But I think that means that they just don’t want the Assad regime to collapse.
The United States and Israel are pretty happy, watching Arabs slaughter each other. It’s deepening the Shiite-Sunni divide, which is tearing the region apart and is one of the worst consequences of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a major crime. Let the Arabs kill each other and undermine each other. Meanwhile, we’re around to pick up the spoils. And the Assad regime has been more or less in line with our interests. It cooperates in intelligence and has kept the border with Israel quiet. Maybe the U.S. and Israel don’t love the situation, but I don’t think they love the alternative either, which would probably be a jihadi-dominated government.
Incidentally, I did spend some time with Syrian democracy activists. Really wonderful people, impressive people, and very frustrated by the fact that they get almost no support from the West, including the Western Left, which doesn’t support them the way it supported others in the region.
Why is that?
There are many reasons. One is that I think the activists are somewhat deluded about the situation in Syria. A lot of people on the left here think that the rebels are just trying to overthrow a legitimate government, maybe not the greatest government in the world but a legitimate government. Why should we support them? It’s like the contras attacking the Sandinistas or something. That’s a widespread attitude. You can argue about whether it’s right or wrong, but it’s certainly not without some elements of justification. But the rebels are not the same as the democracy activists I met. The activists think they are, but that’s not the case.
It certainly started with them being the same. In the first couple of months of the uprising in Syria, it was a very impressive, honorable, popular movement, calling for reforms. It should have received support then, but it didn’t. And soon it turned into a military confrontation. Once that happens, a certain dynamic begins to develop: the harshest and most brutal elements come to the fore. They’re the fighters. They know how to kill, they’re good at it. They come to the fore, and you get increasing brutalization.
In the Vietnam War, for example, the National Liberation Front were not saints but they were, in my view, the most hopeful and progressive element. Pretty soon, they were marginalized and ended up with essentially no power. In fact, I wrote an article pointing out what seemed to be obvious at the time, that the war would end either with the total destruction of Indochina or else with the survival of only the most brutal elements, who would dominate all of Indochina.1 Which is pretty much what happened.
But that’s what you can expect from a military conflict. And I think we see it emerging in Syria, which is part of the reason for the lack of support from the Left. It’s maybe not a justification, but it’s a reason. The young Syrian democracy activists—the ones I met, at least—are in favor of the United States sending arms to the rebels. They say that will partially equalize the military imbalance and drive Assad to negotiations, which will then enable them to take over. But I think that’s an illusion. First of all, it’s not going to equalize the military imbalance. As soon as you send some arms to the rebels, more arms—and more advanced arms—will come to the regime from Iran and Russia. In fact, that’s just what happened a couple of days after I was there. There was an announcement that Iran had sent four thousand Revolutionary Guards and troops to support Assad.2 So I think sending arms to the rebels would raise the level of conflict, with the same imbalance.
The only faint hope that I can see—and it’s pretty faint—is something like a Geneva negotiation, in which an agreement might be made between Russia and the United States to allow a transitional government in which the Assad regime participates and maintains some degree of authority, with the hope that the Assadists would be impelled to abandon political control and move toward some other system. The probability of this is really not high. But if there is a better alternative, I don’t see it. And as far as I know, virtually every informed commentator sympathetic to the goals of the democracy activists says something like this, whether it’s Patrick Cockburn, Robert Fisk, Jonathan Steele, Charles Glass, or others. I just don’t see any other possibility. But it’s not going anywhere, because, for one thing, the rebels say they would not take part in such a conference.
What about Israel? Viewed in the long term, the occupation seems self-destructive. And even former prime minister Ehud Olmert and former Shin Bet leaders have basically acknowledged this. So why does Israel persist?
I would question the word “acknowledged.” The way they’re presenting the situation, Olmert and the others, is that we either accept a two-state settlement or else there will be one state with the so-called demographic problem—too many Palestinians in a Jewish state. Either we will have to move to intolerable apartheid, they say, or else we will disappear. Those are the alternatives they offer.
The trouble is, those aren’t the alternatives. It’s a delusion. And I’m sure they know it. The alternatives are either a two-state solution along the lines of the international consensus—or Israel and the United States continue doing exactly what they’re doing right now.
And you can see that very clearly. The policy is explicit. It’s being implemented before our eyes. First, separate Gaza from the West Bank. That’s in violation of the Oslo Agreements, but who cares? It’s a crucial step, because it means any autonomous government in the West Bank, however limited, will be cut off from the outside world. Gaza stays under a state of harsh siege, and as for the West Bank, Israel takes over the Jordan Valley—which is, in fact, what it’s doing. Step by step, every couple of days, kick out another village, drill some more wells, and so on. Do it quietly, so the goyim don’t notice—or at least pretend not to notice.
And then Israel will take over maybe 40 percent of the region that’s left: the areas inside the so-called Separation Wall, which is actually an annexation wall; Greater Jerusalem, a hugely expanded area around Jerusalem proper; a couple of corridors extending through the occupied territories—one to the east of Greater Jerusalem through Ma’ale Adumim, which virtually bisects the West Bank, and one to the north that takes in the city of Ariel and cuts off most of the rest of the West Bank. Meanwhile, move the Palestinians out, but slowly, a village at a time, without fanfare or international publicity.
When all of this is integrated into Israel, there’s not going to be any “demographic problem.” There will be very few Arabs in the areas that Israel will ultimately integrate. No civil rights struggle, no anti-apartheid struggle. And the Palestinians will be left with a couple of small cantons that can supervise newspaper deliveries in the morning or maybe collect some taxes.
This has been going on for a hundred years. Quietly “create facts on the ground” without talking about it—that’s been the traditional method of Zionist colonization. The Palestinians who remain are completely hemmed in. They don’t even have access to Jordan, which is a U.S. client state.
There are some exceptions. In postcolonial systems, privileged elites have to be given a little piece of the action. If you go to the poorest, most repressed Third World countries, there’s a privileged elite living in amazing luxury. That’s what’s happening in Ramallah, which is kind of like Paris and London. The Palestinian elite have a nice life there. So let that continue. That will kind of pacify them. And the rest of the population, let them rot.
That’s the policy that’s being carried out. That’s the alternative to a two-state settlement. There is no one-state alternative. It’s not an option.
Whatever Olmert may say, he’s smart enough to know that Israel is not going to allow one state to emerge, for exactly the reasons he says. They don’t have to, because they can continue the current policy. So, I hate to say it, but those who think they’re helping the Palestinians by calling for one state are in practice supporting the continuation of the current policies, which may lead to some form of Palestinian autonomy, but of an utterly fragmented, meaningless kind.
Those are the alternatives—and that’s what you have to face if you want to live in this world, not some world of abstractions in philosophy seminars.
Why does the U.S. government persist in its support of Israeli policies?
The primary reasons have been geostrategic. But Israel also has close links with U.S. military and intelligence. An illustration comes via WikiLeaks, which exposed a diplomatic cable listing sites of uniquely high significance to the United States. One was near Haifa: Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, manufacturer of drones and other high-tech military equipment. It’s so closely linked to the U.S. military industry that it shifted its headquarters to Washington to be closer to the money.3
Israel has also been called upon to perform secondary services for the United States. For example, enabling Ronald Reagan to evade congressional restrictions to pursue his terrorist wars in Central America.4 And it’s highly valued by U.S. investors. Intel has established a major plant there for a new generation of chips. Warren Buffett recently said, after purchasing a major Israeli company, that “Israel is the leading, largest and most promising investment hub outside the United States.”5
Apart from numerous such advantages, there are significant cultural factors. Elite Christian Zionism, based on biblical mythology, goes back long before Jewish Zionism. And particularly since 1948, it has been joined by the Zionist extremism of the vast evangelical movement, by now a substantial part of the Republican Party’s base.
We should also not overlook another reason. The three countries that are most supportive of Israel are the United States, Australia, and Canada—all settler-colonial societies that virtually exterminated their indigenous populations. What Israel is doing seems quite consistent with their own national images.
Then there are the significant lobbies that support Israel: the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the military industry, evangelicals, and others. In contrast, Palestinians lack all of these. They have neither wealth, nor power, nor support among the powerful, so they have no rights, by normal principles of statecraft.
Finally, one should not forget the dependency in the relationship, and its significance. When the United States puts its foot down, Israel must obey. That has happened repeatedly, from Reagan to George W. Bush.
What will it take to change U.S. policy?
The primary mechanism is the usual one: popular organization and activism. That can have an effect. There is also some concern in the military and intelligence about Israeli policies and their impact on U.S. interests. So far that concern has been mostly squashed, but it could become a factor. If the Arab oil producers or Europe were to pursue an independent course, that could also have an effect.
You were in Turkey in January. In late May 2013, street protests erupted, ostensibly over the building of a commercial mall at Gezi Park, near Taksim Square. Incidentally, part of the park was an Armenian cemetery that was seized by the government in 1939.6 The mall project triggered deep-rooted resentments against the regime of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. What do you see happening there?
I was in Istanbul to deliver the Hrant Dink Memorial Lecture. Hrant Dink, the Turkish-Armenian journalist, was assassinated, everyone assumes by the state, and there was a big backlash that led to a serious increase in concern about the Armenian massacre and its denial.7 By now there is a pretty substantial popular movement interested in understanding and doing something about the Armenian genocide. And there was a huge demonstration in support of Hrant Dink and what he stood for, which the police didn’t try to stop.
Taksim Square was already simmering at the time, and confrontation seemed imminent. The square is the last green, open area in Istanbul. The rest of the city has been hit by a wrecking ball of commercialization, gentrification, and authoritarian control that has essentially wiped out the commons. It’s destroying an ancient treasure of ethnic neighborhoods and historical monuments, taking away public space in the interest of the rich.
Gezi Park is part of Taksim Square. When the bulldozers came in, there was resistance. People occupied the square, protesting against having the last piece of the commons destroyed. Erdoğan’s reaction was like Hosni Mubarak’s in Egypt or Bashar al-Assad’s in Syria: send in the riot police and smash them to pieces. It was very violent.
Then Erdoğan kind of backed off a little, and for about a day it seemed as if a negotiated settlement was coming. Even the terms of it were announced: the government would wait for the outcome of a court case about the legitimacy of the demolition. If the court ruled that it was legal to proceed, there would then be a referendum in Istanbul.8 That looked like a possible settlement. But within hours, Erdoğan sent the police in to smash everything up and drive the demonstrators out.9
Now there’s a real split in Turkey between a conservative Islamic element, largely rural, and a secular, liberal, progressive element, which wants a more democratic and open society. The Erdoğan government has been becoming more repressive. Turkey has jailed more journalists than any other country.10 You also see increasing Islamization, which many people don’t like.
What happens in Turkey is of enormous significance. Turkey’s importance in the region is substantial. And my own view is that there is a broader meaning to these developments. The human species at the moment is destroying its own commons. Nobody owns the atmosphere, for example. It’s our common possession. The environment is a common possession—and we’re destroying it.
It’s a striking fact that the ones trying to defend the commons are mostly indigenous populations. They’re in the forefront: the First Nations in Canada trying to block the tar sands, indigenous people in Bolivia and Ecuador, aboriginals in Australia, Adivasis in India, campesinos in southern Colombia. They’re trying to protect the commons, protect the future for all of us. The richest and most powerful countries, like the United States and Canada, are happily destroying the commons.
What you see in Taksim Square is a microcosm of this. It’s the same wrecking ball, just on a massive scale.
And the same thing is happening all over the world. Wherever you go, there’s a battle under way between neoliberal depredation and the effort to protect future generations from this wrecking ball. The outcome is going to determine what happens to the species.
You say that if you look at the current political situation in the world, cynicism is justified but should not lead to passivity.
If cynicism leads to passivity, we walk off the cliff. That’s what it means. The choices are stark: either you give up and help ensure that the worst happens or you become engaged and maybe you will make things better.
I don’t know if you actually believe in reincarnation, but you have mentioned that if you could live in another era, you would like to be in Edinburgh during the Enlightenment. Why?
The Scottish Enlightenment was a period of unusual intellectual freedom, independence, thoughtfulness, reflection. It happened to be in Edinburgh mostly, and included thinkers such as David Hume, Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, others.
I wouldn’t romanticize it too much. Hume is one of my favorite philosophers, but he wrote some essays that are pretty awful—like his essay on national character, which is very racist but rather favorable to Armenians. He says in their national character, Jews are known for “fraud” and Armenians for “probity.”11 Oh, I see why you brought up this question. You wanted me to say that.
So what about reincarnation?
I hope it isn’t true. If there is reincarnation, what we should hope for is to be reincarnated either as bacteria or as beetles, because they’re the ones who are likely to survive what we’re creating in the world.
You end almost all of your talks with a few words about how people must organize and change never comes easily. But you don’t go beyond that. When you give lectures, you talk for more than an hour, and then right at the end there’s a coda of a few minutes, in which you say: “You can change things. Thank you.” And it’s over. People are sometimes left aghast.
Yes. “Tell us how to do it.” Nobody can tell you how to do it. Nobody has ever been able to tell you. Saul Alinsky can give you some tricks for organizing a community, but that’s not very much. Nothing you couldn’t figure out for yourself in five minutes if you set yourself to it.
Furthermore, nobody from the outside can tell you what to do, because you’re the one who knows the circumstances in which you live. You know what the options are. You know what can be done. You know who you are, what you’re willing to undertake, how much commitment and engagement you’re prepared to devote. Nobody can devote 100 percent of their time to political activism. So you’re the one who has to decide. There’s just no way out of that dilemma. You can’t expect to find some savior coming from the outside and telling you, “Here’s what you ought to do.” That was true at every point in the past, and it’s still true.
You travel so much, and when you’re at home, you work incessantly. Do you reflect on your remarkable journey and the roads taken or not taken?
Not much. If I’m asked, I can think of things I should have done that I didn’t do, but you go on. It’s the normal way of life.
Do you ever feel like simply retiring and leaving all these political headaches to others to worry about?
It’s going to happen pretty soon, whether I choose to or not.