CHAPTER EIGHT

The Niagara Front Ablaze

 

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ACCORDING TO NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, “GEN WILKINSON SEEMS TO HAVE exposed his life with great prodigality,” during the fight at Lacolle Mills in March1814. That claim was an exaggeration, but what was not was the pitiful performance of the latest American advance into Canada.

In late January 1814, James Wilkinson was ordered by the US Secretary of War, John Armstrong, to remove his diseased and frostbitten army from their encampment at French Mills to Plattsburg, New York. A month later, the Major-General made his last military effort by attacking an isolated enemy position five miles beyond the Canadian border at a road crossing over the Lacolle River. The object of the attack was a large stone mill garrisoned by 180 British regulars, militia, and marines serving as an outpost on the direct route from Lake Champlain to Montreal. Against this vulnerable target, Wilkinson sent 4,000 men and 11 artillery pieces. On March 30, after over two hours shooting up the place—without making any impression on the defenses and losing 254 casualties to the British 61—the Americans trudged back through the snow to Plattsburg. On April 11, his military reputation ruined by the fiasco at Lacolle, Wilkinson was relieved of his military responsibilities. It was the start of a long overdue reorganization of the American army high command.

In what was Armstrong's most valuable service during the war, the Secretary appointed three new Major-Generals, all excellent choices. The first, George Izard, raised in South Carolina, entered the United States Army in 1794 as a Lieutenant of engineers. He was the only American general in the War of 1812 who had a formal military education, having enrolled in the French Ecole du Genie in 1795. A Captain eight years later, he left the service as the US Army shrunk under President Jefferson. In 1812, he rejoined the army as a Colonel, and made Brigadier-General in 1813. He performed well during Hampton's advance to Montreal in late 1813, and in January next year was promoted to Major-General, becoming at the age of 38 the most senior US army commander along the Canadian frontier.

Jacob Brown was the second Major-General named. Although having no military training before the war, he was a man of action and had shown a combativeness that was both effective and inspiring. Made Brigadier in 1813, he distinguished himself in Wilkinson's Montreal Campaign.

Andrew Jackson, a transplanted South Carolinian to Tennessee, born March 15, 1767, was the third appointee. He had fought as a boy during the American Revolutionary War, and prior to the War of 1812 was a lawyer, United States Congressman and US Senator, a state Supreme Court justice, and militia Major-General. During the summer of 1813, he cobbled together a militia force and conducted successful campaigns against the Creek Indians for which he was made a Brigadier-General in the US Army in 1814. On May 1, he was named Major-General in the Regular Army as a replacement for William H. Harrison, who had resigned from that service due to simmering differences with the Secretary of War.

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Major-General Andrew Jackson — future President of the United States—first distinguished himself fighting Creek Indians during the War of 1812. Portrait by Thomas Sully.

In addition to the new Major-Generals, Armstrong appointed seven additional Brigadier- Generals during 1814: Alexander Macomb, Thomas Adams Smith, Daniel Bissell, Edmund Pendleton Gaines, Winfield Scott, Eleazar Wheelock Ripley, and Thomas Parker. The first six had distinguished themselves during the early stages of the war. Parker served as a staff officer during the conflict.

Prior to the command shake-up in the American Army initiated by Armstrong, Sir George Prevost made changes in the British military leadership responsible for the defense of Canada. In December 1813, Gordon Drummond was made civil and military administrator of Upper Canada, while Generals de Rottenburg, Vincent and Proctor were assigned to command troops in Upper Canada, Kingston, and York, respectively, and Sheaffe returned to England.

Lieutenant-General Drummond was born in Quebec on September 27, 1772. Joining the British Army in 1789, he attained his lieutenant-general's rank in 1811. His combat experience included action in Egypt, Holland and the West Indies. A dynamic leader, persistence, aggressiveness and determination were all hallmarks of his soldierly qualities. Seconding Drummond was Phineas Riall, an officer in the British Army since 1794. Made a Major-General in 1812, he was posted to Canada as military governor of the Montreal District. A 38-year-old Irishman, his previous combat experience was limited to campaigning in the West Indies. Brave, and bold, bordering on rash, in December1813 he conducted punitive raids on the American side of the Niagara River, defeating large contingents of opposing militia, and burning Buffalo and Black Rock, New York in retaliation for Yankee depredations on Canadian soil. When Drummond assumed control of Upper Canada, Riall was put in charge of the Niagara frontier.

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Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario, as viewed from Fort George. A strategically important target for the Americans.

As in the previous year, Armstrong made the centerpiece of campaigning in 1814 in the East the capture of Kingston—the key to British naval control of Lake Ontario, as well as the chokepoint for men and material moving from Lower to Upper Canada. Toward that end, he issued two orders to Jacob Brown, who had been placed in charge of the Niagara Front. The first, concocted as a ruse to mislead the British, directed Brown to recover Fort Niagara and Fort George; the second, and the one Armstrong really wanted Brown to execute, ordered the capture of Kingston. Unintended, Brown fell for Armstrong's ruse, thinking he really had been ordered to take the forts. When it was pointed out to him by one of his subordinates what Armstrong really wanted him to do, Brown requested assistance from Commodore Chauncey for an army and navy descent on that town. However, the latter refused, claiming, mistakenly, that his squadron was inferior to Yeo's, thus making it impossible, in the Commodore's view, for the American flotilla to leave Sackets Harbor.

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Chauncey's attitude was an example of the failure of US military leaders to integrate land and water forces in a combined enterprise designed to achieve a decisive goal. The near loss of his base at Sackets Harbor in 1813 resulted in the naval commander's focus being first to safeguard his operational base, second to defeat his opponent in a waterborne engagement, thus relegating cooperation with the army in seizing Kingston, or cutting the St. Lawrence River supply line, to last place in his strategic calculations. What Chauncey settled for was a naval arms race that suited his opponent, since avoidance of battle gave the strategic victory to the British on Lake Ontario. Further, Chauncey was reluctant to escort supply and troop transport craft with war vessels. This would reduce the number of ships available for fleet actions, which he insisted he wanted but in fact avoided. Neither did Chauncey want to stray far from his base since this could invite enemy attacks.

As the naval arms race on Lake Ontario accelerated in 1814, it took on a life of its own. In April, the 62-gun frigate USS Superior was completed, giving the US a rough parity with the British, who had that month launched two new frigates of their own. The 42-gun USS Mohawk was launched in June, giving Chauncey the edge over his rival until HMS St. Lawrence—a 102-gun ship-of-the-line—was put in the water in September. But the increased tonnage and number of cannon on the ships never brought about the decisive battle that Chauncey claimed he desired, and Yeo refused to engage in. Its most important impact was to preclude American land and water cooperation, immeasurably aiding the British in their defense of Canada.

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“If you left the [Sackets] Harbor with a competent force for its defense,” wrote John Armstrong to General Jacob Brown on March 20, 1814, “go on and prosper. Good consequences are sometimes the result of mistakes.” Thus the Secretary of War, realizing his ploy to outwit the British had instead confused his own subordinate, left the choice of the objective for the 1814 campaign in the east in Brown's hands. As a result, Brown started to prepare a plan that entailed the US Lake Erie squadron moving his force to the south shore of the Niagara Peninsula. From there he would go north across Grand River, take Burlington Heights, and then clear the rest of the peninsula by capturing Forts Erie, George and Niagara. Complicating the plan was the Madison administration's insistence on retaking Mackinac Island, thus depriving Brown of 1,000 men, and support from the Lake Erie squadron to transport his troops and supplies.

While Brown spent time at Sackets Harbor strengthening its defenses, American troops on the Niagara frontier, under his principal subordinate, Winfield Scott, underwent extensive training near Buffalo, New York. Captain Rufus McIntire, 3rd US Artillery Regiment, who had served under Scott during the Chrysler's Farm campaign, felt confident in Scott's ability as a trainer and combat leader and wrote, “If it be possible to meet the enemy I know Scott will manage to meet him if he can do it on anything like equal ground.” Drill, discipline and motivation were the essence of Scott's training regime, and that focus would make his regulars equal to their British counterpart.

In early May, Armstrong gave his approval to the latter's proposed offensive, but on June 9 he ordered the scheme suspended until Chauncey gained command of Lake Ontario. In the meantime, Armstrong suggested to Brown that he use his force to clear the Niagara River all the way to Fort George. Thinking along these same lines, Brown wrote to Gaines of his predicament, acknowledging, “I do not know that I am to be supported by the Fleet of either Lake but I intend to enter the Enemy's Country about the first of July.” Brown and Armstrong knew that without Chauncey's help, an American advance beyond Burlington Heights was unlikely. As it was, the Yankee Commodore chose to stick close to his base at Sackets Harbor and gave no aid to the army in the forthcoming campaign. Consequently, the General decided to cross the Niagara directly in the face of the enemy in a replay of Smyth's attack in 1812. His force, designated the Left Division, consisted of 5,358 regulars and about 600 Native American allies. An additional 1,500 soldiers under Gaines garrisoned Sackets Harbor.

“The views of His Majesty's Government respecting the mode of conducting the War with America,” wrote Sir George Prevost early in 1814, “do not justify my exposing too much on one stake.” However, he always left open the door for what he called “daring enterprises with disproportionate means” that even if unsuccessful would not endanger Lower Canada. While the Americans struggled to formulate a coherent campaign plan for 1814, the British, adhering to Prevost's defensive philosophy, watched and waited.

Prevost's passive strategy was not an easy one for Gordon Drummond to accept, while he formulated a defensive plan to thwart the coming American operation. It consisted of spreading his forces thin along the Niagara River with small troop concentrations at Forts Niagara, George and Erie, and Burlington Heights. Although courting defeat in detail if the enemy struck swiftly and in force, it would give the British time to react to their opponent's moves, as well as allowing them to slow done the Americans at key points. Drummond took the risk based on his belief that his opponent was going to focus on the recapture of Fort Niagara, and his contempt for American martial abilities based on their past performance in the east.

To implement his program, in March Drummond ordered Riall to use his 2,700 men on the Niagara Peninsula to maintain a thin screen of forces along the 30-mile-long Niagara River, while concentrating his main strength at Forts Niagara and George. He directed his subordinate to place defense forces on the Chippawa River, the largest water course on the peninsula, and Fort Erie to create a defensive shield, but one from which Riall could make “a rapid movement from Chippawa to support the Detachments on the Right [west and south], and to oppose any descent made from above [south of] Chippawa [River].” In other words, if opportunity arose, Riall was encouraged to seize the initiative by attacking the enemy. While Riall headed the Right Division, Drummond led the Left Division of four regular regiments that defended Kingston and eastward to the border with Lower Canada.

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Port of Buffalo on Lake Erie. American troops on the Niagara frontier underwent extensive training near here.

Around 2:00am on Sunday, July 3, General Brown launched his invasion of the Niagara Peninsula. His 1st Brigade under Winfield Scott, with part of Ripley's 2nd Brigade, landed on the Canadian shore above Fort Erie, while the rest of the 2nd Brigade hit the beach below the fort. Brown's intention was to encircle the enemy position and then pound it into submission with his artillery. As the American small boats neared shore, they were fired upon by a British picket from the 100th Foot Regiment. The fire was both accurate and “galling.” To inspire his men, Scott jumped into the water to lead them ashore but almost drowned in the surf.

Except for Scott's mishap, the landing of the 1st and part of the 2nd Brigades went well, and when Brown crossed over at dawn those units were preparing to move against the fort. The landing below the post, however, was delayed by a lack of boats and fog, and not completed until 6:00am. Brown ordered Major Thomas Jesup's 25th US Infantry Regiment to close on the fort and prevent the garrison from escaping. As Jesup's men approached it, they were hit by artillery fire, which wounded four of their number. As one member of the unit recalled, they expected that the regiment would have to “carry it [the fort] by storm as it was supposed to be well manned and fortified.” But early that afternoon, as American 18-pounders were being wheeled into position before the post, its commander, Major Thomas Buck, surrendered the garrison's 137 men and three guns.

By 8:00am, Riall, at Fort George, got word of the American crossing. He ordered five companies of the 1st Foot Regiment, a squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons, and Captain James Mackonochie's eight-gun battery to follow him to Chippawa. The 2nd Lincoln Militia Regiment and the 300 Grand River Indian allies, under their leader, John Norton, were also told to move there. Riall's third regular unit, the 8th Foot Regiment, on its way from York, was directed to hurry its march to Chippawa. Meanwhile, word of the American incursion was sent to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Pearson in charge of the Chippawa position, as well as commander of Riall's British light troops and Indians.

The British base at Chippawa was a strong one. The Chippawa River, which split the village in two, was a “dull muddy river running through flat, swampy country” 250 feet wide, spanned by a narrow wooden bridge running into the Niagara River. The bridge was shielded on the north bank by a line of entrenchments and a redoubt, making a frontal attack on it problematical. The position could not be outflanked to the east due to the Niagara River, and was difficult to turn from the west over the marshy and obstructed terrain in that direction.

Not knowing that Fort Erie had surrendered, Riall wished to attack the Americans while they were besieging the fort, but elected to wait until his 8th Foot was up. On July 4, Brown ordered Scott to march north from Fort Erie with his brigade, some artillery, and Captain Samuel Harris' squadron of the 2nd Light Dragoons to the Chippawa River. Brown followed Scott with the rest of the Left Division that afternoon.

Four miles from Fort Erie, at Frenchman's Creek, Scott ran into Pearson's composite battalion of regular light troops, dragoons and two artillery pieces. As Scott prepared to force a crossing, the British pulled out after discharging a few musket and artillery rounds at the invaders. For the next 14 hot, dusty miles, creek after creek, Pearson delayed the bluecoat advance until they came up to Street's Creek, the last stream before the Chippawa. Hoping to capture the British guns, a company from the 9th US Infantry Regiment crossed the stream to the west and prepared to take the enemy pieces, but they were charged by the British dragoons. Seeing the danger, the infantry ran for the shelter of a nearby farmhouse and were able to beat off the mounted attack. Later in the day, Pearson, now joined by Norton's Indians, crossed to the north bank of the Chippawa River. At dusk, after approaching Chippawa, and realizing he could not take the bridge, Scott went into camp south of Street's Creek. At midnight, Brown, Ripley's brigade, and the division's artillery and trains joined Scott after a 15-mile rain-soaked march.

The contest next day would be fought on flat ground called the “plain,” a convex arc two miles long between the Chippawa River and Street's Creek. The terrain closest to the Niagara was meadowland covered in waist-high grass partitioned by fences. Three- quarters of a mile from the Niagara lay a dense, cluttered forest. Projecting from the wood, a tongue of timber 400 yards long, stretching to within a quarter of a mile west of the Niagara, formed a natural defile in the middle of this normally open area. During most of the morning of July 5, British snipers harassed the Americans near their camp from the woodland, and according to Captain Benjamin Ropes, 21st US Infantry Regiment, who was posted on guard in the area, “we had considerable Skirmishing [in] the forenoon.”

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American gray-clad troops advance at the battle of Chippawa on July 5, 1814. At first, the British thought they were militia who would be easily routed, only realising their mistake too late. Painting by H. Charles McBarron.

Reports from his militia and Indians engaged with the American sentries convinced Riall that he was facing only 2,000 Americans and that the remainder of Brown's army was besieging Fort Erie. That assumption, as well as the arrival of his entire command, about 1,400 regulars, 200 militia, 300 Indians, and his artillery at Chippawa, determined him to attack.

With the strip of woodland blocking his view of British preparations at Chippawa, Brown had no idea of an impending enemy assault. He therefore rode south to bring up New York Militia Brigadier-General Peter Buell Porter's 1,000-man mixed Pennsylvania militia and the Seneca Indian 3rd Brigade, which had crossed the Niagara the night before and was marching to the American bivouac below Street's Creek.

Porter, 41-years-old, was an attorney and War Hawk in the US House of Representatives from 1809 to 1813. A Brigadier-General in the New York militia, early in the war he was critical of the senior officers of the US Army. Untrained in military matters prior to the conflict, he became a brave and competent practitioner of that art during the Niagara Campaign of 1814.

On orders, at 3:00pm, Porter gathered 500 of his militia and 56 regulars, as he wrote later, to “drive off the hostile Indians who had been firing at our pickets” from the wood surrounding the American camp. Forming a skirmish line three quarters of a mile long, preceded by Indian scouts, Porter's men entered the woods just south of the American encampment. Immediately, the opposing Indian auxiliaries made contact and fierce combat between them commenced, with the British-allied Natives being pushed back. Suddenly Porter's Indians came rushing toward the rear after they had come up against a solid line of Redcoats. They had blundered into Riall's attack.

At 3:00pm, Riall had ordered his men to the south bank of the Chippawa, his main force remaining in column while Pearson's light troops—2nd Lincoln Militia and 200 of Norton's Indians—anchored his right. The clash with Porter's command in the woods soon followed. A series of American musket volleys decimated the Canadian militia and Grand River Indians, but the disciplined fire of Pearson's regular light companies drove the Americans through the woods back to their camp.

Earlier, Riall's main force had marched down the road adjacent to the Niagara River and deployed on the northern edge of the plain: the 100th Foot on the left, then the 1st Foot, with the 8th behind the 1st, the 19th Light Dragoons on the road to the rear of the 100th, with artillery detachments on each wing. Riall was confident of the battle's outcome, supposedly saying that his opponents were “a set of cowardly untrained men who will not stand the bayonet.”

Detecting this enemy move, Brown who was in the plain, ordered up Scott's 1,300 men, uniformed in gray, not the standard blue US Army uniform, to meet the enemy coming down the river highway. As Scott's troops crossed Street's Creek, they came under British artillery fire but managed to form a battle line—from right to left, Captain Nathan Towson's three 12-pounders on the river road, then the combined 9th/22 US Infantry, Ropes' company of the 21st Infantry, and finally the 11th US Infantry Regiment. Viewing this well executed maneuver under fire, Riall realized he was not facing gray-clad militia and exclaimed, “Damn, these are regulars.” Private George Ferguson of the 100th, also saw the American line forming flawlessly and decided that the Americans facing them were “unquestionably well disciplined troops.” A short artillery duel then ensued, until Riall ordered an attack on the American line.

At 4:30pm, the British 1st and 100th went straight at the enemy, while the 8th was moving up some distance behind and to their right while keeping an eye on the US 25th Regiment moving to the British right. The British movement masked their supporting artillery and relieved the waiting Americans of the punishing fire it had been delivering. As the three battalions moved forward, a growing gap developed between the 1st, 100th and the 8th Foot. Scott saw this and ordered the US 11th Infantry on his left to throw forward its left flank companies to fire on the exposed British right. This caused severe losses to the British. When these two battalions came within 100 yards of the American line, Scott ordered the Americans to commence firing. The Redcoats halted under the withering enemy musket and artillery fire, and began exchanging musket volleys with their opponents.

It was 4:00pm when Brown ordered the 2nd Brigade's 21st Infantry to move from camp, enter the woods and strike the British right. Unfortunately, the regiment never got into the fight due to the difficulties crossing Street's Creek and moving through the woods. Meanwhile, the 25th US moved to its left and engaged the British light troops who were harassing the American left flank from the edge of the woods. According to Captain George Howard, the 25th came “within grinning distance,” when its Colonel ordered, “Halt, ready, fire three rounds and charge.” The enemy fled, with the Americans following until they gained the right flank of the 8th Foot, which was preparing to face the onrushing 25th. Its independent brawl with the US 25th prevented it from aiding the 1st and 100th Foot in their fight with Scott's main line.

As the two Redcoat battalions and the Americans blazed away at each other, the British battalion leaders, Lieutenant-Colonels George Hay and John Gordon, of the 100th and 1st Foot, respectively, attempted without success to get their men to charge their opponents. Hay later wrote, “Despite my best efforts I could not get them to advance.” Both battalion leaders were soon felled by enemy bullets. Meanwhile, additional American artillery came into play as newly arrived guns were inserted between the 11th and 9/22 Regiments. With losses mounting, his men barely holding their positions, and no possibility of a decisive bayonet charge by them to clear the enemy from the field, Riall ordered a retreat. The 1st and 100th Foot retraced their path northward, then formed into column on the river road—covered by the 8th Foot and the 19th Light Dragoons—and proceeded to cross to the north bank of the Chippawa. Norton's Indians in the woods followed suit.

Scott and Porter followed the British to the south bank of the Chippawa. It was 6:30pm when Brown deemed the hour too late to attempt to storm the British position across the river. “Cousin Jonathan” had defeated “John Bull” after a bloody three and a half hour struggle. The cost paid was 58 dead, 241 wounded, and 19 missing, including Indians, on the American side; 148 killed, 321 wounded, and 46 missing for the British. The Americans estimated British Native losses at 87.

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On July 8, Riall decamped from Chippawa after Brown gained a position to flank him from the west. On July 23, the British moved to Twenty Mile Creek after leaving strong garrisons in Forts George and Niagara, while the Americans, unable to reduce either place due to the absence of a siege train, which Chauncey's fleet would not transport to the peninsula, headed back to Chippawa, where Street's Creek was being used as an entry point for supplies from Buffalo. During these days of maneuver, the British maintained contact with their enemy to learn his intentions.

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US troops on the march to Buffalo, New York State, with their camp followers. American version of a Thomas Rowlandson caricature of British troops and their women.

By mid-morning on Monday, July 25, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Pearson's roving light troops had discovered the whereabouts of Jacob Brown's army. The Americans were camped on both sides of the Chippawa River: the 2nd and 3rd Brigades along the Niagara; the 1st Brigade on the south side of the river. Pearson posted his command—the Glengarry Light Infantry Regiment, Canadian infantry and cavalry militia, elements of the 19th Light Dragoons, three artillery pieces, and Norton's Indians—in total 1,200 men—around the junction of the Portage Road and Lundy's Lane, two and a half miles north of Chippawa. In the meantime, Drummond, who that day came from York to meet Riall, decided to concentrate all his forces at Lundy's Lane. He surmised it would be the perfect site from which to protect Forts George and Niagara, counter an American thrust at Burlington Heights, or attack Brown at Chippawa. Orders went out to Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Morrison and his 800 regulars, plus Indians and an artillery detachment, nearby, to move to Lundy's Lane, arriving there at 6:00pm. The brigade of Colonel Hercules Scott, at Twelve Mile Creek, containing 1,500 regulars and 250 militia infantry, was also directed to head for Lundy's Lane.

As Drummond gathered his forces north of the American camp, Jacob Brown received disturbing reports. The first was of a British column moving from Fort Niagara down the American side of the Niagara River threatening Brown's main supply center at Schlosser. This was the case, but the British turned back before reaching that place. The second report stated that there was an enemy force above Chippawa. Brown ordered Winfield Scott's command to march north toward Queenston to investigate. This, Brown hoped, would abort any enemy move on Schlosser. Scott's 1,100 infantry, 70 dragoons and Towson's artillery marched at 5:00pm.

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Virginian Brigadier-General Winfield Scott had natural leadership abilities. Drill, discipline, and motivation were the essence of Scott's training regime for his American soldiers.

Around 7:00pm the head of Scott's column, marching on the Portage Road, spotted the British arrayed in battle formation on a low, flat hill. The hill was a sandy ridge running east to west for a mile, and was a half-mile wide. Fifty feet above the surrounding area, it sloped gradually to the south and west, but more steeply to the north and east. Lundy's Lane, a sunken, tree and fence-lined road, ran across its entire length. On its eastern margin was the Portage Road; on its western edge, a track ran south to Skinner's Farm a mile away. The height commanded a cleared area of farmland crossed by fences that extended to a chestnut wood 750 yards further south. East of the Portage Road, as well as to the north and west of the hill, were scattered fields and woods. The slopes of the ridge were clear of trees. About 250 yards west of Portage Road was a log meeting house and cemetery that crowned the hill. To the south east and be low the graveyard, on the slope stood an orchard and a family residence referred to in battle accounts as the “white house.” Along the orchard, 300 yards in front of the hill, was a track connecting Portage Road with the path to Skinner's Farm.

Drummond placed his command thus: Captain James Maclachlan's five artillery pieces, and the Royal Marine Congreve Rocket detachment at the cemetery; to the rear of the artillery and in the center of the line was the regular infantry of the 89th Foot; to their right were three companies of the 1st Foot; holding the left flank on the Portage Road stood the Light Company of the 41st; light troops of the 8th Foot and some Incorporated Militia held the wooded extreme left between the Portage Road and the Niagara River Gorge; on the west flank were stationed the dark green uniformed Glengarry Light Infantry, elements of the four Lincoln and one York militia regiments, and Norton's 500 Indians; and at the junction of the Portage Road and Lundy's Lane the blue-clad troop of the 19th Light Dragoons. The British line of 1,600 men resembled a concave curve with the hill at its center and its ends advanced.

Upon seeing the British position, Winfield Scott first considered retreating but then decided to take the bolder course of standing fast, giving the impression “upon the enemy that the whole American reserve was at hand and would soon assault his flanks.” Scott then ordered his regiments to form line to the left of the Portage Road: the 9th on the left, the 11th in the center, and the 22nd on the right. Towson's three cannon went into battery on the road. As the brigade moved to deploy into line, the British artillery started to play among the Americans. According to 11th US Regiment drummer Jarvis Hanks, the enemy fire, “rattled around me” cutting “the branches of trees … splintered the [fence] rails.” The cannonade caused parts of the 22nd and 11th Regiments to panic and break for the rear. Most of these men were quickly rallied and returned to the ranks.

Once formed, the American infantry started firing at the only targets they could see—the enemy guns on the hill, and the British 1st Foot on the US left. The rest of Drummond's force was positioned on the reverse slope of the ridge out of American view. While the Yankee muskets were too far away for their fire to be effective, the British artillery was not. Relentlessly firing at the stationary enemy infantry, the British gunners did good execuvtion at a range of 600 yards. According to Lieutenant Samuel Brady, 22nd US Regiment, “We were completely cut up, more than half the officers and men being wounded.” Towson's three pieces could not counter the opposing artillery, since his guns, although within range, could not be elevated enough to hit the British cannon.

Brigadier-General Scott leads his men forward at the battle of Chippawa.

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After 45 minutes of this punishing artillery fire—of which a British officer later wrote that American “Dread seemed to forbid his advance, and Shame to retrain his flight”—Scott ordered his 1st Brigade to attack. It moved only 100 yards before stopping, presenting its left flank to the Glengarries, militia and Indians posted on the British right. The British moved to assail the American flank while some of the 1st Foot moved to the front of the hill to support this attack. Responding to the danger, the left-most companies of the US 11th wheeled back to face the Canadians. Both sides then exchanged fire, but as dusk approached neither made a move to advance.

If Drummond had made a “bold and gallant forward movement at once with his whole force and the bayonet,” according to General Ripley's later reflections, it would have settled “in fifteen minutes” the fate of the 1st Brigade. This was the opinion of the remaining officers of the rapidly disintegrating unit. Drummond failed to advance because he felt that he was facing Brown's entire Left Division, a force he knew to be twice the number of his own.

Drummond was also distracted by the twilight attack made on his left by Major Thomas S. Jesup's 25th US Infantry, which had traveled north and then veered east, crashing into that British flank. The Americans drove the Canadian militia and British regulars west of the Portage Road and forced Drummond to face part of the 89th Foot to the east along with the rallied militia and 8th Foot contingent of his left wing. During Jesup's advance, the 25th captured a number of prisoners including General Riall, who had been wounded in the arm. But the Major, hearing that Scott's force had been beaten, retired south down the Portage Road. As he marched, he was met by reinforcements Jacob Brown had sent.

At 7:30pm, Brown at Chippawa heard cannon fire and assumed Scott was heavily engaged. Ripley's men, with Brown at their head, moved to Scott's assistance, while Porter's unit was put on alert. At the same time, the brigade of Colonel Hercules Scott was rushing to reinforce Drummond at Lundy's Lane. As this new force approached the battlefield at 9:00pm, after a 20-mile forced march, Drummond pulled the troops of both his right and center back to their original locations.

Brown reached the battlefield at 9:00pm and directed Ripley to march through the chestnut woods where “the enemy fire was very heavy,” according to Ripley's aide, Captain William McDonald, and “fell about us in great quantities.” Ripley's Brigade formed east of the Portage Road to the Skinner tract with the 23rd Regiment on the right, the 21st in the center, where it was ordered to assault the hill, while the 1st Regiment made a demonstration on the American left. When directed by Brown to move against the height, the commander of the 21st, Colonel James Miller replied, “I'll try, Sir!” But at that moment Lieutenant Colonel Roger C. Nicholas exceeded his orders and attacked the hill with his 1st US Regiment, and he was met by a hail of British cannon fire and forced to retreat to the base of the slope.

Nicholas's effort allowed Miller's regiment to move up the southeast side of the hill without encountering the British artillery fire directed at the 1st US. At 100 feet from the enemy cannon, the Americans let loose a volley that cut down many of the British gunners. A bayonet charge followed, which delivered the British ordnance into American hands. Drummond, who was close to the scene, ordered the 89th behind the British artillery line to recover the captured guns. The regiment entered the cemetery and exchanged musket fire with the Americans at 40 yards distance. The American did not budge, but after 20 minutes of intense musketry, the 89th pulled back. Sergeant Cummins of the 8th Foot mistakenly reasoned that the Yankees did not crumble under the British fire because they were “well fortified with whiskey [which] made them stand longer than ever they did.” During this firefight, Drummond helped steady the 89th Foot until he was hit by a musket ball that entered his right ear and lodged in his neck. After two further failed attempts to charge and save their cannon, the British defenders retreated down the north slope of the ridge, leaving their guns in Miller's possession.

Over on the American right, the 23rd Regiment had gone up the Portage Road to assault the enemy gun position from the west. After encountering an ambush, which threw the unit into disarray, it finally ascended the hill.

Miller's charge at the battle of Lundy's Lane, July 25, 1814. Much of the fighting took place at night.

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At 9:30pm, the 1st and 23rd US Regiments joined Miller's 21st on the formerly British-occupied eminence. Porter's 3rd Brigade, only 300 in number, arrived and was placed on the left—west of the 1st Regiment—angling down the slope. There its line was extended south by the 19th US Infantry from Scott's brigade. The rest of 2nd Brigade was aligned along Lundy's Lane, supported by three artillery companies. Meanwhile, Drummond had reformed his army a few hundred yards north of his original position, his force stretching from the Portage Road to west of the Skinner tract.

At 11:30pm the British initiated a final counterattack against their old position. At this time, Winfield Scott made his last attack of the day from the middle of the American line on Lundy's Lane, but was forced back, retiring to the west and out of the battle.

Soon after, Jacob Brown, near the position of the 1st US, was struck by a musket ball in the right thigh, then he was hit in his left side, but did not leave the field. Nearing Porter's men, the British 103rd, parts of the 1st, the Incorporated Militia, and 41st Regiments, advanced and traded volleys with 3rd Brigade. Porter charged his foe, and with the help of the 1st US Regiment, pushed the Redcoats back. On the American far right, after the British closed to within effective musket range, a 30-minute duel commenced with the US 25th, which Jesup, having sustained four wounds in the fight, remembered as a “contest now more obstinate than in any of the previous attacks of the enemy … but our fire was so well directed and so destructive that the enemy was again compelled to retire.”

In the center of the British line, the attack of the 89th Battalion on the right, the 8th in the middle, and elements of the 1st Battalion on the left, was directed at the captured British guns, and according to General Ripley this last effort “compelled the whole line [of the US 1st and 25th Regiments] to recoil, and it was with unexampled difficulty that it was rallied.” A fierce struggle took place among the artillery pieces, only resolved when first the British flank units pulled back, followed by their center forces, leaving the cannon and the hill crest to the American Left Division.

The Battle of Lundy's Lane, after five hours of heavy fighting, was over—and the Americans had held their own. Brown, before leaving the field to tend to his wounds, ordered Ripley to withdraw the badly mauled division back to Chippawa where it arrived on the 26th. Without enough horses, Ripley did not attempt to haul away the captured British guns. Instead, they were recovered by Drummond next day when he reoccupied his hilltop position. He not only reclaimed all but one of his lost artillery pieces, but two American cannon as well! Brown ordered Ripley on July 26 to go back to Lundy's Lane and bring off the captured guns, but as the latter made his way to the battlefield with 1,500 men, he was informed that a superior number of British were waiting for him there and he immediately returned to Chippawa. The bloodiest battle of the war cost Brown 173 dead, 571 wounded and 117 missing; Drummond suffered 84 killed, 559 wounded, 235 missing or captured.

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Having suffered severe casualties, his men exhausted, and fearful of an enemy attack, Ripley, commanding the Left Division while Brown was recuperating from his wounds, decided to retreat to Fort Erie. The incapacitated General Brown let his subordinate carry out this withdrawal. At 11:00pm on the 26th, the Left Division limped into the fort. On August 2, moving from Queenston, Drummond arrived six miles from Fort Erie. Even before the British neared his position, Ripley had begged Brown to allow him to move the division across the Niagara to the American side. Brown scornfully rejected Ripley's proposal. Ripley then set to work, strengthening the post's defenses by adding to the original small stone structure a series of earthworks connecting it with Lake Erie, and extending it 800 yards south to Snake Hill, a sand mound made into a formidable artillery battery. The place was then surrounded by a wide ditch and dense abatis. Beyond the fort, the area was cleared up to 400 yards, allowing the installation's 18 heavy guns a clear field of fire. This was supplemented on the fort's north side by the guns at Black Rock, New York, as well as three US Navy Schooners anchored in the lake.

To breach the American position, Drummond prepared a battery sporting five heavy guns sited near the lake north of the fort. His bombardment began on August 13 and continued through the next day. But the British cannon, 1,100 yards from the fort, were 400 yards too far away to injure the defenses. One British observer stated that not “one shot in ten reached the rampart at all,” and the ones which did reach the stone building, “rebounded from its sides as innocuous as tennis balls.”

On the 15th, Drummond planned to storm the fort. His plan called for Indians to make a feint to draw off some of the garrison between Snake Hill and the stone fort. A little later, a southern column of 1,500 from the De Watteville and 8th Regiments would assault Snake Hill. After that point was taken, from the north 300 men of the 104th Regiment would hit the stone fort itself, while another force to its left, composed of 700 men from the 103rd Regiment, took the entrenchments running from the fort to the lake. A small reserve was to follow and clean out any resistance remaining.

Advancing in the dark, the attackers were repulsed at all points. Some managed to gain a small entry into the stone fort but could not penetrate the defenses further, and were decimated by an explosion in the stone bastion from ammunition stored on a lower floor. The effort cost the British 2,500-man storming force 57 dead, 309 wounded, and 905 missing. The defenders lost 62 soldiers.

The siege continued but the British were hampered by the appearance of the American lake fleet, which blockaded the mouth of the Niagara, cutting off food and weapons to the British besiegers. Two more batteries were constructed nearer the fort by early September, and 1,200 new troops arrived to bolster Drummond's force, but on the 16th he decided to lift the siege.

Next day, as the Redcoats started to dismantle their siege lines, the Americans, under orders from Brown, sallied out from the fort. The plan called for Porter to move from Snake Hill and take the British in the flank. Soon after, James Miller would attack directly from the American center. The initial Yankee attack, made in the rain, quickly captured two of the enemy batteries. Counterattacked by the now alerted Canadians and regulars, Miller and Porter's forces could not reach the last enemy artillery position. Ripley led a reserve force to their rescue but got lost and was wounded. The attackers retreated back to the fort after losing 79 dead, 216 wounded (including Porter) and 216 missing; Drummond lost 115 killed, 183 injured and 316 missing.

After decamping from Fort Erie, Drummond moved to the Chippawa River, arriving there on September 24. He was followed by the Americans, under General Izard who, outranking Brown, was put in charge of the Niagara sector in mid-October. Unable to goad Drummond into a fight, Izard returned the Left Division to the United States on October 24. Marking a finale to Jacob Brown's offensive, on November 5 Izard removed all American troops from Canada, blew up the fortified works at Fort Erie, and ended the Niagara Campaign of 1814—the hardest fought operation of the war.

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Elite British Riflemen. Figure standing is from the 60th Regiment—originally the Royal American Regiment recruited to defend the American colonies in the mid-18th century—an extra battalion was raised for the War of 1812. Figure kneeling is from the 95th Rifles that fought at New Orleans.