The system of government in the Zulu country is so bad that any improvement was hopeless – we should, if necessary, be justified in deposing Cetshwayo.
Sir Henry Bulwer (The Zulu War)
The annexation of the Transvaal
Since the Boers first crossed the Drakensberg Mountains in 1836, their settlements had continued to spread progressively towards the heart of Zululand, itself protected by a natural boundary, the Tugela River. This temporarily deterred further encroachment by the Boers. By the mid-1870s Boer settlers had again begun surreptitiously moving into Zululand, and these incursions were opposed with increasing vigour. One such area of heightened tension was an unofficial extension of the Boers' Transvaal into Zulu territory between the Buffalo and Blood rivers immediately north of Rorke's Drift, named after James Rorke, born in 1821 and the son of an Irish settler. He later married, settled near Durban and in 1849 moved near to the Buffalo River, where he purchased a remote farm. Rorke lived in harmony with the local Zulus and even began trading with them. Over the years, the trading post became known to the Zulus as KwaJimi (Kwameaning ‘of’, as in KwaJimi, KwaZulu etc.). Rorke died in 1874, and a Swedish missionary, Otto Witt, purchased the farm. Witt named the low rocky hill behind the solitary house Oskarsberg after his Swedish king.
It was evident to the British, Boers and Zulus alike that the relationship between Boers and Zulus was seriously deteriorating and that decisive action needed to be taken with increasing urgency if peace was to be preserved. The Zulu king Cetshwayo had traditionally regarded the encroaching Boers as his enemy and treated them with great suspicion, whereas he regarded the British as his true friends.
At the same time, the British became aware of potentially massive riches from newly discovered diamond and gold fields. Notwithstanding that these two new sources of wealth were situated in areas not directly under British control (diamonds in the virtually uninhabited Griqualand West and gold in the Boer Transvaal), Britain nevertheless resolved the territorial problem in typically high-handed colonial fashion. To gain the diamond fields, the British administrators simply redrew the border and adjusted their maps to bring the diamond fields of Kimberley under direct British control. The newly discovered gold fields in the Transvaal were not so easy to obtain, being under the control of the regional Boer administration. The British solved the problem by simply annexing the Transvaal . They did this with considerable subterfuge.
During April 1877 a serious confrontation between the Zulus and Boers began to develop as a result of trekkers moving onto land unanimously recognised to be Zulu territory. Cetshwayo decided to resolve the problem by massing his army, amounting to over thirty thousand warriors, at strategic crossing points along the Transvaal border. Before Cetshwayo could give the order for a full-scale Zulu attack, two events occurred simultaneously, either by coincidence or as a result of astute British diplomatic design. Firstly, the Secretary for Native Affairs, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, ordered Cetshwayo to withdraw his army. Cetshwayo reluctantly complied but sent a strong letter warning Shepstone that he had intended driving the Boers ‘beyond the Vaal River’. (1) Secondly, on the very same day, 12 April 1877, Shepstone actually attended a secret meeting with the Boers, with the sole intention of persuading them to surrender the Transvaal to British authority. He gave them two reasons to do so: firstly, that the Transvaal government was actually bankrupt; it had debts of £156,883 against a Treasury balance of £1. Secondly, he played on the Boers' belief that the Zulus were about to attack. The Zulus believe to this day that Shepstone encouraged Cetshwayo to mass his army on the Transvaal border in order to coerce the Boers into submission.
An agreement was quickly reached by which Shepstone then and there annexed the Transvaal to the Crown. The secretary to the mission, Melmoth Osbourne, read the declaration to the assembled Boers. Appearing to suffer a bout of chronic anxiety in the middle of the declaration, he began to tremble and his voice failed. Shepstone's twenty-year-old clerk, H. Rider Haggard, later to win fame as the author of King Solomon's Mines and other tales of African adventure, had to continue reading the script.
The turning point in the history of the relationship between the British and the Zulu kingdom was the annexation of the Transvaal. Previously, the British had largely supported Zulu claims against their own rivals, the Boers; but as soon as they had assumed control of the Boer republic, they repudiated their support for the Zulus and demanded that King Cetshwayo should abandon his claim to the ‘disputed territory’. His reluctance to do so was interpreted by the British as unwarranted aggression. Cetshwayo had initially welcomed the British annexation of the Transvaal, as he believed it would protect Zululand from further Boer attention. Cetshwayo had even told Shepstone, ‘I am glad to know the Transvaal is English ground; perhaps now there may be rest’. (2)
By annexing the Transvaal Britain had inadvertently assumed responsibility for the perpetual Boer-Zulu strife. Boer citizens, previously viewed as ‘foreigners’, became de facto British subjects who promptly demanded that the British must resolve their territorial disputes with the Zulus. Britain immediately faced the choice of conflict with either Boers or Zulus; they allied themselves with the Boers. The British High Commissioner to South Africa, Sir Henry Bartle Frere, soon became convinced that the independence of the Zulu kingdom posed a threat to his policies. By breaking up the Zulu kingdom, Frere hoped not only to intimidate potential future opponents but also to demonstrate British strength.
Matters came to a head during early 1878, when a number of Boer and displaced native settlers joined those already illicitly farming a particularly sensitive Zulu area, which was generally becoming known as the‘disputed territory’, directly to the north of Rorke's Drift.
In the British tradition of apparent compromise, Frere deferred the problem by reluctantly constituting an independent Boundary Commission; this was at the persistent request of the Governor of Natal, Sir Henry Bulwer, a longstanding friend of the Zulu people. The Commission was instructed to adjudicate on title to the disputed territory. Cetshwayo was consulted and he agreed to abide by the Commission's decision on condition he could nominate three senior chiefs, indunas, to participate in its deliberations. The Commission's principal members were three highly respected officials: Michael Gallwey, a barrister who had become the Attorney General of Natal in 1857 at the age of thirty-one, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Durnford RE, who had served in South Africa for many years and knew the area and the Zulus thoroughly, and John Shepstone, brother and deputy of the Secretary for Native Affairs. The Boers sent Piet Uys, a farmer who had lost relatives to Dingane's impis, together with Adrian Rudolph, the Boer Landdrost (3) of Utrecht and Henrique Shepstone who served on his father's staff in Pretoria.
The Commission sat for nearly five weeks, during which time they considered voluminous verbal and written representations. Gallwey utilised all his legal training to evaluate the material impartially, a task made especially difficult because several unsigned Boer documents proved to be outrageously fraudulent and to contain many worthless claims put forward as evidence. In fact, the picture became a confused tangle of spurious claims and counter-claims. Boundaries defined on paper simply could not be traced on the ground. There were many contradictions not only in the documents but also in the testimony of witnesses. Gallwey concentrated the Commission's attention on two main issues: who owned the land prior to the dispute, and whether land under dispute had been properly purchased or ceded.
No boundary line had ever been agreed between the Zulus and Boers, and for many years the local Zulu chiefs had repeatedly implored the British Governor in Natal for advice and help in dealing with incidents involving aggressive, land-hungry Boers. It had long been Boer policy, if policy it may be called, to force the Zulus gradually to retreat further and further from their rich pasturelands. Hitherto, little notice had been taken of their petitions. The Boundary Commissioners concluded that:
No cession of territory was ever made by the Zulu people, and that even had such a cession been made by either Panda or Cetywayo [sic] it would have been null and void, unless confirmed by the voice of the nation according to the custom of the Zulus. (4)
The right given to the Boers was, the Commissioners maintained, simply a grazing right, and any such right was conferred only in respect of land within the Utrecht district, west of the Blood River. The Commissioners held that the Boers never acquired, and the Zulus never lost, dominion over the disputed territory, that it was still properly a portion of Zululand and, furthermore, the developing Boer settlement at Utrecht must also be surrendered. The Boundary Commission eventually delivered their unexpected verdict in July 1878 to an astonished Sir Bartle Frere, who determinedly sought to coerce the Commissioners to amend their findings, without success.
On 4 June Durnford wrote home that the report of the Commission was nearly ready ‘and will please no one except perhaps Cetewayo [sic]’. Durnford drafted the report, which was completed on 20 June 1878. The Commissioners were not permitted to divulge the result to anybody until the High Commissioner had decided to make it public. However, Durnford could not resist hinting to his family at the satisfactory conclusion the Commission had reached. He wrote on 24 June 1878, ‘I think our views will be maintained – at least I hope so. You see we have gone in for fair play’
On 28 July an incident occurred which Frere used to agitate widespread anti-Zulu sentiment. Two sons of Sihayo, a local but important chief, crossed the river border to restrain two of their father's absconding wives on suspicion of their adultery. The terrified women were duly apprehended and marched back across the border at Rorke's Drift, only to be clubbed to death in accordance with established Zulu custom. Throughout Natal the incident received officially orchestrated publicity out of all proportion to the event, in order to further inflame public antagonism against Cetshwayo. Shepstone had initiated this policy of subversion in a report to Lord Carnarvon dated 11 December 1877 in which he wrote, ‘The sooner the root of the evil, which I consider the Zulu power and military organisation, is dealt with, the easier our task will be’. Even the pro-Zulu Bulwer was forced to agree that the danger of collision with the Zulus was growing and he wrote to Frere that,‘the system of government in the Zulu country is so bad that any improvement was hopeless – we should, if necessary, be justified in deposing Cetshwayo’.
Rebuffed by Durnford and the Boundary Commission, Frere knew that publication of the Commission's findings could unleash powerful forces against Britain. Native nations would believe their campaign against encroaching European settlement was vindicated, and the furious Boers faced the prospect of surrendering their land and farms in Zululand. Frere knew the Boers could well retaliate against Britain by resorting to military action against British-controlled Natal – which, in turn, might provoke additional antagonism from a number of the Boers' European allies, especially Holland and Germany. This possible complication would be most inconvenient, as Britain was also becoming seriously engaged in war in Afghanistan, and relations with Russia were consequently deteriorating.
To Frere, the invasion of Zululand remained the single option; after all, British victory was a certainty. A Zulu defeat would facilitate British progress to the north, and Confederation could then proceed. It would also placate the Boers, and such a display of British military force would certainly impress any African leader who might have contemplated making a stand against British expansion. Invasion would also overturn the Zulu king by eradicating his military potential and unshackle a valuable source of labour for British and Boer commercial activities. Frere ordered his General Commanding British Forces in South Africa, Sir Frederic Thesiger (shortly to become Lord Chelmsford), to proceed to Natal and secretly prepare his forces for an immediate and brief war against the Zulus. For the previous ten years Chelmsford had been concerned with administration, as Adjutant General in India. A pedantic figure, he would have well understood the theory of British army tactics underlying every military operation undertaken anywhere in the Empire. These tactics involved meticulous planning, rather like contemplating a game of chess, but nevertheless stuck to rigid rules and used equipment totally unsuitable outside of Europe. This attitude would inevitably lead Chelmsford's invading army to defeat. His army would wear red jackets in temperatures of 35°C, use tactics better suited to the previous century and ignore intelligence reports of his enemy's intentions and movements. This gave King Cetshwayo and his commanders the advantage of perfect knowledge of British positions in Zululand's difficult terrain, provide them with easy and accurate intelligence of British action and inaction, and enable Zulu subterfuge and decoys to mislead Chelmsford.
While they were blissfully ignorant of such implications, there were important personal considerations for both Frere and Chelmsford: success for Frere would embellish his already glittering career, and for Chelmsford an early defeat of the Zulu army would be popular and ensure him a heroic return to England. Meanwhile, Frere pondered the Boundary Commission's findings and decided that inactivity was the best, albeit temporary, solution.
Frere gained more time by forwarding the report to Hicks Beach, the new Colonial Secretary in London (who had succeeded Lord Carnarvon). He also requested additional Imperial troops, ostensibly to protect Natal and the Boer families still within the disputed area. Frere knew full well that Hicks Beach's official reply would take several months to reach him, by which time the Zulus would be defeated.
On 9 October an incident occurred which precipitated action by Frere. A local chief, Mbelini, led his warriors through the Pongola Valley in the area under dispute, attacking immigrant Boers and natives and stealing their cattle. Frere was already in the process of devising an ultimatum that he and his advisers knew would be impossible for Cetshwayo to accept. It would also negate the Boundary Commission's report and justify war against the Zulus. The raid by Mbelini formed the basis of the first item in the draft ultimatum.
The Ultimatum
On 11 December 1878 Zulu representatives were summoned to the site of an enormous shady fig tree on the Natal bank of the Tugela River to learn the result of the Boundary Commission's deliberations. Today, the stump of the tree, a national monument, languishes underneath a motorway bridge. John Shepstone represented the British officials, while Cetshwayo sent three of his senior indunas together with eleven chieftains and their retainers to report back the findings.
John Shepstone was an insensitive choice for several reasons. He was the brother and deputy of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Sir Theophilus Shepstone. He was actually working for the Boers at the time of the Commission, and whilst it could be argued that he could therefore represent the Boers, he caused confusion among the Zulus by announcing the findings on behalf of the British. He was also infamous among the Zulus for having once led a party that tracked down, shot and wounded a wanted Zulu, Chief Matyana. Matyana escaped and John Shepstone lost both his captive and his reputation.
Writing was unknown to the Zulus, who were nevertheless accomplished at memorising even lengthy speeches; this probably accounts for the number of senior Zulu representatives who would have to corroborate each other's account when they reported back to Cetshwayo. At the first meeting, the findings of the Boundary Commission were announced, though couched in heavily veiled terms designed to cause the Zulus confusion. Mr Fynney, Border Agent, carefully translated these to the Zulu deputies. The meeting adjourned for a roast beef lunch and reassembled in the afternoon, when the ultimatum was read and translated, sentence by sentence, again by Mr Fynney, and was listened to by the deputies with the utmost attention but with increasing indications of concern and apprehension. The astonished Zulus then anxiously set off to report the terms of the ultimatum to their king; Cetshwayo had a reputation for executing messengers who bore bad news, and therefore, understandably, his emissaries tarried. A white resident, John Dunn, duly learned of the ultimatum and sent his own messenger to Cetshwayo with advance warning.
The main requirements of the ultimatum were two-fold:
1. Conditions to be fully met within twenty days
a. The surrender to the British of the Swazi Chief, Mbelini (for cattle raiding).
b. The surrender of Chief Sihayo's two sons (for crossing the river border into Natal, abducting and then murdering two of Sihayo's adulterous wives) plus a fine of 500 cattle.
c. A fine of 100 cattle for having molested two British surveyors, Deighton and Smith, at a border crossing.
2. Conditions to be fully met within thirty days
a. A number of prominent Zulus were to be surrendered for trial (no names were specified).
b. Summary executions were forbidden.
c. The Zulu army was to disband.
d. The Zulu military system was to be abandoned.
e. Every Zulu was to be free to marry.
f. Missionaries were to be re-admitted to Zululand without let or hindrance.
g. A British resident official was to oversee Zulu affairs.
h. Any dispute involving a European was to be dealt with under British jurisdiction.
In the meantime, the British invasion force was already advancing on three fronts towards the border of Zululand in total confidence that Cetshwayo could not comply with the British ultimatum. Hicks Beach's reply finally reached Frere and it was, as Frere anticipated, an indication that the British government was indifferent to southern Africa. It contained little more than a request that caution must be exercised. The reply read:
Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to comply with a request for reinforcement of troops. All the information that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of affairs in Zululand appears to justify a confident hope that by the exercise of prudence and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetshwayo. (5)
Frere interpreted Hicks Beach's reply as implying authority to initiate a local war; once this had started, he was fully aware that the British government would be powerless to stop him. It took at least ten weeks for a message to travel to London and back; his exploitation of the delay, on the grounds of the tension and urgency he had created, was blatant.
At Frere's request, Colonel Henry Evelyn WoodVC, commanding British forces in the north of Natal, sought a meeting with the Transvaal Boers with the express intention of gaining their support in the forthcoming war. The Boers had previously informed Wood that, in the event of war with the Zulus, 800 mounted Boers would volunteer to fight under Wood's command. Arriving for the meeting, Wood learned that few volunteers would actually come forward. One Boer leader pointed out that the British were too few to invade Zululand, to which Wood replied:
Where we soldiers are ordered to go, we go. If you remain behind, and we are victorious – as please God we shall be – you will regret not having helped towards the securing of the quiet enjoyment of your property. If we fail for want of your help, the Zulus will overrun your farms. (6)
Three days later the Boers discovered that the Boundary Commission had already found against them. Realising the deception, the Boers became even more antagonistic and accordingly withheld their support – with the exception of isolated individuals, most notably Piet Uys, whose father and brother had been killed by the Zulus. The British now prepared for war against the Zulus, their former allies.
British preparations for war
The 1st Battalion, 24th (Warwickshire) Regiment had been stationed in the Cape since January 1875. The 2nd Battalion, with 24 officers and 849 other ranks, arrived in South Africa on 28 February 1878 and shortly afterwards commenced their duties at King William's Town. Both battalions were then engaged in quelling small pockets of rebellion throughout the Cape area. Their final military operation took place on the plateau west of Buffalo Poort, which they attacked on 8 May. Meanwhile, news of a Boer insurrection at Kimberley reached Natal; Colonel Richard Glyn was ordered to take the 1/24th to quell the dissent, and he did so by marching his men the 650 miles to Kimberley, only to discover a Boer change of heart. Glyn promptly marched his men back to the Cape; one positive aspect of the long march was the toughening of the regiment in preparation for the arduous campaign looming in Natal.
Both battalions then regrouped at Ibeka before returning to King William's Town. Officially orchestrated rumours were beginning to spread throughout Natal that King Cetshwayo was threatening to invade, so the 2nd Battalion was directed to Pietermaritzburg where they assembled on 6 August. The 1st Battalion was not long in following the 2nd; it had been back at King William's Town about a month when C and D Companies, under Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine, were also ordered to Pietermaritzburg.
During the recent operations against the Galekas and other native tribes, neither battalion had sustained significant casualties. Only two officers, Captains Frederick Carrington and Frederick Godwin-Austen, were wounded, one man was killed and a few wounded – though the losses from disease were higher: eighteen men of the 1st Battalion and twenty-one of the 2nd. On the other hand, the work certainly had been strenuous, and both battalions had earned much praise for their cheerfulness in facing hardships and discomforts and for their good conduct and discipline in the field. General Thesiger (later Lord Chelmsford) spoke in the highest terms of both battalions, emphasising how well the younger soldiers, of whom the 2nd Battalion was in large measure composed, had come through this severe ordeal of hard work in the face of difficult conditions.
Their achievement was of no slight importance. It was well to have destroyed the menace of the unsubdued native tribes on the eastern frontier and thus to be free from serious anxieties in that quarter before a far greater danger had to be tackled. The award of the CB to Colonel Glyn and Lieutenant Colonel Degacher, of the CMG to Captain Paton, and of Brevet Majorities to Captains Upcher and Carrington was not only a recognition of their good work but of the services of the 24th. Sir Arthur Cunynghame, in congratulating the Colonel, described it as‘your excellent regiment’.
Chelmsford's main fighting force was to consist of two battalions of the 24th and the 90th and a single battalion of the 3rd, 4th, 13th and 99th regiments, with a battalion of the 80th held in reserve at Luneburg – a total of nearly 9,000 professional British soldiers. To this force were added irregular units based on the quasi-military Natal police, together with frontier guards and local defence groups with grand names such as the Natal Hussars, Royal Native Carbineers and Royal Durban Rangers.
Logistics and supplies
Despite the disasters of the Crimean War, caused in part by insufficient supplies, there was still no established system of transport within the British army of 1879. Lord Chelmsford's invasion force included an estimated total of 16,000 fighting men (including native auxiliaries), 985 waggons and 60 mule carts, over 10,000 oxen, 870 horses and 450 mules. The force carried enough ammunition to eliminate the Zulu population of 200,000 many times over. The overall task of the invasion was relatively simple when compared with the job of supplying this force with food and water for men and animals. There were extensive stockpiles of tins of bully beef, 200lb bags of locally grown corn and wooden crates of tough army biscuits. Sufficient tentage consisting of Bell tents (named after their inventor, not the bell shape) had to be transported, one for every twelve men, together with mobile bakeries, engineering equipment, ammunition and medical supplies. The list of supplies was virtually endless and included much other valuable equipment (soon to fall into Zulu hands), including items such as axes, blankets, kettles, lanterns, shovels, tools, lifting jacks, stretchers, ropes and waterproof sheets. The stores also had to include such incidentals as sufficient supplies of grease for the mens' boots, and spare flannel shirts. Chelmsford's staff calculated that the total weight of these stores would amount to nearly two thousand tons.
The task fell to the existing Commissary, General Strickland, with a staff of less than twenty officers and men, to commence the organisation of supplies for the whole invasion force. Following the first of a number of scathing observations by Major John Crealock of Chelmsford's staff, that the commissariat and storage system had utterly broken down, these officers were soon supplemented by regular commissariat officers sent from the UK, including Lieutenant Horace Smith-Dorrien, who was later to escape from Isandlwana. Due to their inexperience, these commissariat officers were very vulnerable to a variety of fraudulent deals, and the British suffered considerable financial losses. Horses and cattle were sold to the military at highly inflated prices and, in some cases, were not even delivered. The most successful fraud, perhaps just a sharp business practice, was the widespread practice of wily civilian contractors purchasing, at knockdown prices, Zulu cattle seized by the British troops during skirmishes; these were then immediately resold to the army caterers as fresh meat at twenty times the price.
Having assembled sufficient stores, the establishment of an effective transport system was the next problem. All assembled stores had to be scaled down according to the size and purpose of the unit. The scale of transport was also meticulously prepared down to company level so that, remarkably, each company was mobile yet totally self sufficient. This was a huge logistical undertaking. The total number of waggons per infantry battalion amounted to seventeen, including one HQ waggon; a battery of artillery was allocated ten waggons and a squadron of mounted infantry had four. The overall responsibility for transport fell on the appointed Transport Officer, one per invading column, assisted by a sub-conductor for every ten waggons.
It is likely that the marching soldier was more concerned with the availability of his daily rations and the bottled beer acquired from travelling salesmen. His official daily entitlement was a minimum of 1lb of fresh meat, 1½ lb of fresh bread or its equivalent in biscuits, plus fresh vegetables and fruit or lime juice and sugar in lieu. Rum was available, but only if authorised by the accompanying medical officer. The soldiers' uniforms were well worn by the time of the invasion, and the only replacements readily available were shirts and steel-shod boots. Even so, a soldier was required to appear before a Board of three officers in order to obtain a replacement pair of boots. Soldiers knew how to care for their boots by keeping them well greased; they also combated fungal foot infections by regularly washing out their boots with urine.
Chelmsford quickly realised that the invasion force would be slow-moving and therefore vulnerable to attack by the fast-moving Zulus. He knew only too well that victory depended on the Zulus attacking prepared positions where they would face awesome firepower. He accordingly gave priority to the implementation of regulations relating to ammunition. Each artillery battery of two guns carried 68 rounds, together with 12 rockets, and additional reserves were to be readily available in accompanying carts and waggons. Rifle ammunition was calculated at 270 rounds per soldier, 70 in the possession of each man and 200 rounds in clearly identifiable ammunition waggons. All column commanders had received written instructions that ‘a commanding officer would incur a heavy responsibility should required supplies fail to arrive in time, through any want of foresight and arrangement on his part’. (7)
By the time of the invasion, Chelmsford had succeeded in an almost impossible task. He had assembled sufficient supplies and transport to sustain his campaign. Unusually for the period, he had also carefully informed his officers of the nature of the campaign and of the strengths of the enemy.
British firepower
In 1879 the Martini-Henry rifle was the backbone of British infantry firepower, the product of a fiercely fought Prize Competition between the rifle manufacturers of Europe, first held in 1867. Amongst the short list of competitors were a M. Frederich Chevalier de Martini of Frauenfeld, Switzerland and Mr Alexander Henry of Edinburgh. After lengthy trials in which none of the competing weapons was truly outstanding, the prize of £600 was awarded to Mr Henry. The competition, from the point of view of finding an acceptable breech-loading rifle for the British army, was officially regarded as a failure. Because of the rigid conditions imposed by the Prize Committee, many promising designs were not considered. It was decided to continue the trials but to standardise the calibre and size of the bullets.
During the subsequent trials it emerged that Henry's barrel and Martini's action were superior to all others, and it was decided that they should combine into one rifle. From this hybrid was born one of the most enduring of British arms.
After several modifications, the Martini-Henry Mark II, as carried in the Zulu War, had the following specifications: it was 4′ 1½″ in length and weighed 9lbs. It fired a black-powder, 0.45 calibre, centre-fire Boxer cartridge in a flat trajectory, which gave it considerable stopping power.(8)
The weapon's accuracy can be attributed to Henry's rifled seven-groove polygon barrel, while Martini's distinctive enclosed all-steel breech gave it robustness and protection. The hammerless action was simple compared with the complexities of muzzle loading. The breechblock was hinged at the rear and opened when the lever behind the trigger guard was lowered. An ejector would throw out the expended round and a fresh cartridge was laid on top of the grooved block, thumbed into the chamber and the lever raised. This action also automatically cocked the weapon, and a tearshaped indicator on the right showed that the gun was cocked. The rifle was sighted up to a theoretical 1,000 yards, but the average sighting for volley firing was 600 yards; in calm conditions on a rifle range, a well-trained infantryman was capable of firing twelve rounds per minute; most soldiers could manage to fire five rounds. Soldiers knew that the barrel would become unbearably hot with use, so they bound their weapons with individually made leather protectors – as can be seen in Plate 13 of Lieutenant Lloyd's On Active Service (Chapman & Hall, 1890). As with all rifles of this period, the stock and fore-end were fashioned from European walnut. The rifle was soon followed by carbine equivalents for the Cavalry and Artillery. (9)
The 1853-pattern equi-angular bayonet with three hollow ground faces had long been the standard issue. With so many already in service, it was decided to have them bushed to fit the Martini-Henry. In 1876 the specially designed socket bayonet, which looked similar to its predecessor, was 4½″ longer at 21½″. Fitted to the end of a Martini-Henry, it gave its handler an imposing reach and was most effective against native foes. Another bayonet designed especially for the Martini-Henry by Lord Elcho was known as the Pattern Sword Bayonet. This was also carried in the Zulu War and eventually took the place of the socket bayonet.
The Martini-Henry was subjected to more trials during 1873 when it was issued to the 4th and 46th Regiments and the 60th Rifles. Some of their findings found echoes in 1879: ‘Barrels heat with quick firing … may prove a serious drawback to rapidity of fire. A barrel cannot be touched after five or six rounds on some occasions. A leather shield attached to the fore-end may be found a necessary addition’. (10) The Inspector-General of Musketry wrote in his report:
I can only account for the inferior shooting of the 4th and 46th Regiments with the Martini-Henry rifle by the fact of the recoil being so great; the men in most instances fire with less confidence, and consequently at a great disadvantage; the shortness of the stock also frequently causes a smart blow on the cheek, particularly at the short distances and this naturally increases the chances of bad shooting. (11)
Although some modifications and improvements were made, the barrels still grew hot with rapid fire and the kick remained fearsome. This was less to do with the weapon itself but rather with the black-powder propellant. After a few rounds the barrel became fouled with residue, which reduced the bore slightly. This was enough, however, to produce greater backward force when fired, causing the gun to kick fiercely. Bruised shoulders and cheeks, torn firing fingers and bloody noses were often the result, and much of the poor marksmanship observed during the Zulu War was certainly attributable to flinching by young recruits at the moment of firing.
The overheating of the barrel was caused by the same source, and only frequent cleaning could reduce the problem. The suggestion of leather shields, which had been recommended at the trials, was shelved for later consideration. Soldiers subsequently followed the Boer example of stitching wet rawhide around the fore-end and allowing it to dry and shrink to form some protection.
The Boxer cartridges caused additional problems. As the barrels heated, so the cartridges were prone to ‘cook’ and prematurely discharge the rounds. The thin rolled brass became soft and stuck to the chamber, while the ejectors tore off the iron rim. The soldier then had to remove the empty case with a knife or try to knock it out with the cleaning rod. The cartridge was also found wanting in other respects. If carried for any length of time in an ammunition pouch, rounds became deformed, causing the bullets to loosen and to shed black powder. They were also prone to dampness.
Colonel Buller VC wrote a memo after the Zulu War in which he was heavily critical of the Boxer cartridge compared with the Snider:
My men carried their service ammunition in bandolier belts. This did very well for the Sniders, but the Martini-Henry ammunition is more delicate. It becomes unserviceable far more rapidly than the Snider
i. By becoming bent in the front of the swell.
ii. By getting bruised more easily.
iii. The bullet is far more apt to drop out.
iv. It is far more liable to get damp. This I consider very important. I found that Snider cartridges hardly ever became unserviceable from this cause, but a good shower of rain would spoil at least one-third of the ammunition (Martini-Henry) exposed to it. I could not account for this to my satisfaction, though I made many experiments. The result was always the same; Snider remained good, Martini-Henry carried in the same bandolier became damp. (12)
Major General Newdigate also wrote to the War Office: ‘Numerous complaints were made about the ball-bags; the weight of the cartridges makes the bags open, and when the men double the cartridges fall out’. (13) Shoulder-to-shoulder firing created its own perils; a volley would produce thick acrid smoke that stung the eyes and parched the throat. A pause was required to allow the smoke to disperse before another volley could be fired. Lieutenant Edward Wilkinson of the 3rd Battalion, 60th Rifles wrote:
We followed suit, firing volleys by sections in order to prevent the smoke obscuring the enemy, and we had repeatedly to cease fire to allow the smoke to clear off, as some young aspirants out of hand paid little attention to section firing. One lesson we learnt in our fight was, that with the Martini-Henry, men must fire by word of command either by individuals, or at most, by sections: independent firing means in firing in twenty seconds, firing at nothing; and only helped our daring opponents to get close up under cover of our smoke. Officers had to be everywhere, and to expose themselves to regulate the fire within bounds, and I feel sure that for the future, only volleys by sections will be fired. (14)
Private George Mossop (at the battle of Hlobane) also alluded to the problem in his celebrated book Running the Gauntlet. He wrote about the matter following the battle at Kambula:
The camp to be defended was large, we had lost a lot of men on Hlobane mountain the previous day. We were armed with Martini-Henry rifles charged with black powder, and each shot belched out a cloud of smoke; it became so dense that we were almost choked by it – and simply fired blindly into it. There was one continuous roar from cannon, rifles and the voices of men on both sides shouting. The smoke blotted out all view. It made every man feel that all he could do was to shoot immediately in front of him – and not concern himself with what was taking place elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the Martini-Henry was a real man-stopper. The soft lead slug flattened on impact, causing massive tissue damage. Even if not hit in a vital organ, the victim would almost certainly die of trauma. There is evidence, however, that the Zulus were sometimes able to lessen the impact. This is supported in various letters about the Zulu War that mention the Zulus bravely advancing under sustained volley fire. At Gingindlovu, the British volleys commenced when the Zulus reached the 800-yard markers, yet the Zulus were still able to get to within a few yards of the British lines. There are several reasons for this, including the facts that the Zulus were in vast numbers and many soldiers fired inaccurately or too high. However, Captain Edmund Wyatt-Edgell of the 17th Lancers noted that after the battle there were few Zulu bodies further than 300 yards from the British line. ‘At 300 yards a thin boundary of black bodies and white shields might be traced; at 200 yards and 100 yards from our lines their walls of dead were more thick.’ (15)
When advancing on the scattered companies of the 24th at Isandlwana, many Zulus held their shields at an angle in order to deflect the bullets. This tactic certainly appears to have had some success at ranges beyond 300 yards and may well have accounted for the Zulu warriors' belief that their ritual indoctrination of immunity against British rifle fire was, indeed, effective.
Rifles and ammunition taken by the Zulus after their victory at Isandlwana were subsequently used against the British, and if the Zulus had mastered the use of the rifle's leaf sight there would have been many more British casualties. By the end of the war, during which time the Martini-Henry had been subjected to sustained heavy rain, mud, dust and rough handling, it had emerged as a solid and reliable arm. It was acknowledged, however, that there were now superior weapons in service with other armies. During the Zulu War, the average cost to the government of each Martini-Henry rifle, including bayonet and cleaning kit, was £14 1s 8d.
Artillery at Isandlwana
The Royal Artillery, under the command of Major Stuart Smith RA, had two 7-pound rifled muzzle-loading guns at Isandlwana. These were originally designed for mountain warfare and were considered to be ideal weapons for Zululand. They were towed by three horses and were highly manoeuvrable, although prone to overturning on rocky ground. These guns could fire their explosive shells to a maximum range of 3,000 yards, whereas the shrapnel rounds or case-shot were used at close range.
The Royal Artillery was also equipped with Congreve rockets, whose efficacy was dubious. The rockets could not be accurately aimed and, theoretically, their main purpose was to alarm native troops by the screaming sound created by the rockets in flight.
British strategy and tactics in Zululand
Once Sir Bartle Frere had committed Lord Chelmsford to an offensive campaign against Zululand, five independent columns were prepared and assembled ready for the invasion on 11 January 1879. Chelmsford then reduced this number to three: Colonel Charles Pearson's Coastal Column (1st) consisting of 1,800 Europeans and 2,000 natives; Colonel Richard Glyn's Central Column (3rd) with 1,600 Europeans and 2,500 natives; and the Northern Column (4th) commanded by Colonel Evelyn Wood VC, with 1,700 Europeans and 300 natives. The remaining two columns were given other tasks: Colonel Anthony Durnford's column (2nd) was to act as a rearguard on the Natal border to prevent a Zulu incursion and had a theoretical strength of 3,000 natives. In reality, its effective strength amounted to 500, of which half were the elite and very loyal (to Durnford) Natal Native Horse and a small Rocket Battery commanded by Major Francis Russell RA. The remaining 5th column, with 1,400 Europeans and 400 natives under Colonel Hugh Rowlands VC, was to police the north near Luneburg and maintain a defensive watch on the malcontent and increasingly rebellious Transvaal Boers. Lord Chelmsford's strategy of invading Zululand with three independent columns was devised to discourage the Zulus from outflanking any one column or, more seriously, retaliating against a defenceless Natal before he could inflict defeat on the main Zulu force. The British invasion was to be spearheaded by the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment; both battalions were enthusiastic at the prospect of leading operations against the Zulus. (16)
Chelmsford's invasion date in early January 1879 was chosen deliberately, as the spring rains were late, thus delaying the Zulu harvest, and on advice from his staff he presumed the Zulus would be unpreparedf or a lengthy campaign during the intensive harvest period. From January until early April the rivers forming the Natal boundary with Zululand were expected to be in full flood and would thus provide a natural defence against a retaliatory Zulu counter-attack on a defenceless Natal. Chelmsford also relied on natural grazing for the invasion force's numerous oxen and horses, which precluded invading during the later grassless, dry season.
Due to the rocky terrain of Zululand and the ponderous progress of ox-drawn supply waggons, the British invasion force would be very slow-moving. Ordinarily, such serious transport deficiencies would have been a serious handicap, but Chelmsford turned this slow progress to his tactical advantage. A measured advance towards the Zulu capital of Ulundi permitted both adequate reconnaissance of uncharted Zululand and progressive destruction of Zulu crops and villages as his invasion force advanced, actions which were deliberately calculated to provoke the Zulus into attacking his prepared troops or entrenched positions.
British use of intelligence
For the senior British officers invading Zululand, the main point of military intelligence was to learn the Zulus' intentions and predict their tactics. Henry Curling (see The Curling Letters of the Zulu War, Greaves & Best, Pen & Sword Books, 2004) wrote that the advance into Zululand was handicapped by a lack of accurate maps. Chelmsford was, technically, invading Zululand blindly and so had to rely on local information for his intelligence. Much of this intelligence came from local officials, men such as John Robson and Henry Fynn, both local magistrates, who were familiar with the countryside and Zulu ways.
As late as 6 January, Robson's string of agents was reporting regular patrols of well-armed Zulus along the Buffalo River who appeared to be eager for a fight. Right up to the time of the British making camp at Isandlwana, daily reports were reaching Chelmsford that indicated massive concentrations of Zulu warriors between Ulundi and Isandlwana. Having already made up his mind, however, the supremely confident Chelmsford did not want to be bothered with the facts – he treated the reports with indifference and ignored them. The same mindset would afflict Colonel Pulleine, to whom the defence of Isandlwana would fall on 22 January.
Lord Chelmsford confidently anticipated the swift and total defeat of the Zulu army. His officers and their troops were all experienced in African native warfare, and their main fear was that the Zulus would not fight. Chelmsford knew the Zulus had lived peacefully for the previous twenty-three years though they were highly disciplined as a nation. He had nevertheless been very strongly warned by a number of Boer leaders experienced in Zulu affairs that he faced a powerful and tactically astute adversary. Within days of the invasion, the very first skirmish at Sihayo's homestead met with only a token resistance by its Zulu occupants, as most of Sihayo's warriors were already attending King Cetshwayo. This insignificant victory clearly strengthened Chelmsford's haughty and overconfident attitude.
The standard battle tactic employed by the British in South Africa was good reconnaissance followed by ruthless skirmishing. In rough country, both the infantry and mounted troops would advance to meet the enemy, the infantry breaking up any established groups by volley fire and the mounted troops harassing them in flight. In the unlikely event that the Zulus appeared in any number, the British were trained to form a square or entrench their position, thus drawing the Zulus into the range of their overwhelming firepower. Well-aimed rifle volleys from calm and experienced troops supported by rockets, artillery and, later in the campaign, Gatling guns, would, in Chelmsford's view, ensure the invincibility of the invasion force. Once a Zulu attack on such a well-defended position faltered, the cavalry would leave the protection of the entrenched position to harass and then rout the attackers.
Immediately prior to the invasion, Lord Chelmsford issued a circular to his officers pointing out certain notable Zulu characteristics. He wrote that the Zulus were ‘masters of the ambuscade and other ruses’, and that ‘in going through bush, remember that natives will often lie down to let you pass and then rise to fire on you’. Perhaps the wisest section related to ambushes: ‘A common ruse with the natives is to hide a large force in the bush and then show a few solitary individuals to invite an attack. When the troops enter the bush in pursuit of the latter the hidden men rise and attack them’. (17) It was this fundamental advice that the British would frequently and spectacularly ignore – to their cost.
Faced with the inevitable British invasion of Zululand, King Cetshwayo's overall strategy was either to trap or inflict a decisive preliminary defeat on the British invaders. At the time of the British invasion, Cetshwayo's army was well trained but totally inexperienced in actual warfare. Knowing the British possessed overwhelming firepower, Cetshwayo decided against the traditional Zulu mass frontal attack, preferring the use of siege tactics. He reasoned that, once trapped or starved into submission, the invaders would be forced to withdraw to Natal rather than face a humiliating defeat on the battlefield. He accordingly instructed his commanders to bypass the invading columns and isolate them from their supply lines.
The Zulu king was also a shrewd diplomat. Cetshwayo knew that once the British invasion force was trapped he could seriously embarrass Britain internationally and even force her invading army commanders to sue for peace. Unfortunately for Cetshwayo, his field commanders were autonomous and were either unable or unwilling to follow the King's orders. After the Zulu success at Isandlwana, Natal was utterly helpless to defend itself; the British invasion force was in part defeated and partly surrounded, yet Cetshwayo did not capitalise on his victory. Had he ordered his army into Natal, the consequences for the population of Natal and the subsequent history of southern Africa would have been difficult to imagine.
Zulu tactics
The Zulus historically favoured a dawn attack but were prepared to fight at any time. Prior to an attack, the Zulus would be indoctrinated by sangomas (witchdoctors), and the use of cannabis and other narcotics as stimulants was widespread. Senior Zulus, usually from a remote vantage point, always controlled military operations, although one of their number would be ready for dispatch into the battle to rally or take command if an assault faltered, as was to happen at Isandlwana.
Zulu tactics were based on the encircling movement of massed ranks of warriors, the ‘horns of the buffalo’ or impondo zankhomo (see Fig. 2, p. 23). At Isandlwana, the encircling horns consisted of the younger fitter men, with the body or chest made up of the more seasoned warriors who would bear the brunt of a frontal attack. The tactic was most successful when the two horns completed the encirclement of the enemy, and relied in part on the main body remaining out of sight until the horns met; the main body would then close in to slaughter the surrounded enemy. Features of the attack were speed and precision. Popular myth records the Zulus moving into the attack in mass formation. However, the reality was an attack in open skirmishing lines, although at Isandlwana these lines of warriors were more than half a mile deep. Certainly, from a distance, such a large force carrying shields would have appeared very densely packed. The force would advance at a steady jogging pace and complete the final attack at a run. Once amongst the enemy, their short stabbing assegai was most effective. Although the Zulus rarely used firearms with any effect, by 1878 they already possessed an estimated 20,000 serviceable firearms and 500 modern breech-loading rifles. (18) A sizeable reserve of warriors was always kept behind the main body to bolster any weakness which developed during an attack, and on several occasions the reserves were kept out of sight of the action to mislead the enemy as to their strength and to ensure the reserve remained calm until required. Such a tactic would succeed brilliantly against the British at Isandlwana.
By the end of September 1878 Cetshwayo was fully aware that events were rapidly moving beyond his control, and from his royal homestead on the rolling Mahlabatini Plain, the site of modern day Ulundi, he mobilised the Zulu army to assemble before him. He also ordered animal hunts to be held along the border with Natal, and the hunters were instructed to ensure that Shepstone's spies observed them. By the time the ultimatum reached Cetshwayo, most of the amabutho were already gathered and the ritual preparations for war began. Notwithstanding soothing reassurances from Shepstone, Cetshwayo was not to be caught off balance and shrewdly decided to wait and watch. He sent a number of senior emissaries to implore British restraint, but on presentation of their credentials they were arrested and imprisoned.
Even when the British threatened Cetshwayo with an impossible ultimatum and massed troops along the border with Zululand, Cetshwayo still withheld the order for his army to attack, in the hope that his final request to delay the implementation of the ultimatum would be accepted. Anticipating rejection, he finally gave his indunas their orders for a specific attack on Chelmsford's central column, though with certain restrictions – they must not attack any fortified or static position. There exists a post-war account by Mehlokazulu, Chief Sihayo's son and heir, a respected subchief in his own right, who was present at Ulundi when King Cetshwayo gave his chiefs their orders to attack the British invaders. Mehlokazulu's second interrogation report reads:
He [referring to Cetshwayo] then gave Tsingwayo orders to use his own discretion and attack the English wherever he thought proper [indicating clearly that Ntsingwayo was at liberty to attack as and when he thought fit] and if he beat them he was to cross the Buffalo River and advance on Pietermaritzburg, devastating the whole country and to return with the spoil. (19)
This report is supported by the account of a post-war discussion between Mr J. Gibson, a magistrate in Zululand, and King Cetshwayo's brother, Chief Undabuko, confirming there was no suggestion that to cross the border would have contravened the King's orders. According to Undabuko:
seeing that portion of the army which had not been engaged cross the border, [he] called to members of his own regiment, the Mbonambi, to join them but they declined on the ground that it was necessary to return to the field of battle to attend to their wounded. (20)
During the lull in fighting at Isandlwana, Muziwento recounted that his men were exhorted to fight by the call of their commander:
Never did the king give you the command ‘Lie down upon the ground’. His next words were: ‘Go, and toss them to Maritzburg’. (21)
Cetshwayo knew exactly where the British were massing their forces and correctly gauged their objective. Chelmsford's tactic of using three columns to approach and surround Ulundi was a direct copy, probably unwittingly, of the Zulu impondo zankhomo tactic. Cetshwayo would certainly have noticed the irony, and his understanding of the intricacies of the technique is perhaps one reason why the Zulu army was able to inflict such a stunning defeat on the British at Isandlwana. Because Chelmsford was accompanying the centre column, Cetshwayo correctly singled it out as being the most dangerous force.
On 17 January the Zulu army formed up to undergo ritual purification against evil influences during the coming conflict. That same day they began leaving their base on the Mahlabatini Plain to face the invaders, and the trail they left in the grass was to remain visible for many months. Their destination was a gorge just five miles from a huge, dominating rock outcrop known locally as Isandlwana. As the British soldiers of the 24th approached Isandlwana they immediately compared its lion-like crest to their regimental badge.
The time for peaceful negotiation had passed; both sides were ready for war. The Zulu nation had been at peace for twenty-three years, and no British settler or traveller had ever been harmed by them.