Early on the 20th Colonel Durnford marched to Rorke's Drift, crossing the river by means of the Pont, and establishing himself in a camp about half a mile from the river. Here we remained during the 21st; Captn. George Shepstone rode to Sandhlana [sic] Camp & returned same day. Lieut. Smith-Dorrien rode also to the Camp, & returned with a dispatch on the morning of the 22nd Instant. Colonel Durnford was on the road to the Dutch Farms on the Biggarsberg for the purpose of commandeering the Dutchmen's wagons when the dispatch reached him. I was with Colonel Durnford & he remarked to me “Just what I thought, we are to proceed at once to Sandlwana [sic] … There is an Impi about 8 miles from the Camp, which the Colonel moves out to attack at daybreak.”
Colonel Durnford returned to Rorke's Drift Camp at once, and marched for Sandlwana at about 7.30 or 8 a.m. My orders were to see all the wagons inspanned, start them all off, and hand them over to Conductor McCarthy & then join Colonel Durnford. I complied with these instructions, and arrived at the Sandlwana Camp, with Colonel Durnford, about 10 or 10.30 a.m. Having made all the necessary arrangements for his Column Col. Durnford took over the command from Colonel Pulleine 1/24th Regt. [When Colonel Durnford reached the camp, he received from Colonel Pulleine all the information he could give, when Colonel Pulleine said, “I'm sorry you have come, as you are senior to me, and will of course take command.” Colonel Durnford replied, “I'm not going to interfere with you. I'm not going to remain in camp,” or words to that effect. Colonel Pulleine gave over to Colonel Durnford, a verbal state of the troops in camp at the time, and stated the orders he had received, viz., to defend the camp; these words were repeated two or three times in the conversation.]
The news was that a number of Zulus had been seen since an early hour on the top of the adjacent hills, and that an attack had been expected; and in consequence the following disposition of the troops had been made. The Natives of Lonsdale's Contingent were on outpost duty on the hills to the left of the Camp, the guns were in position on the left of the Camp, The Infantry were turned out and formed in Column in the open space in front of the General's tent. The Waggons &c were inspanned. Constant reports came in from the Scouts on the hills to the left, but never anything from the men on the top of the Sandlwana hill that I heard. (1) Some of the reports were: “The Enemy are in force behind the hills on the left” – “The Enemy are in three Columns” – “The Columns are separating, one moving to the left rear & one towards the General”–“The Enemy are retiring in every direction.” [The bearer of this was not dressed in any uniform]
Upon this latter report Colonel Durnford said he would go out and prevent the one column from joining the Impi, which was supposed at that time to be engaged with the troops under the General. Colonel Durnford on hearing that one Column of the Enemy was moving towards the left rear, had reinforced the Baggage Guard (which at that time consisted of one Company, Native Contingent) with one troop of mounted Natives; and I understand that Captain George Shepstone was sent back with this part.(2)
[Durnford having decided to take out a force to attack the Zulus who were reported to be retiring in every direction said to Pulleine (3) “I will take out some of my own men if you will let me have a couple of Companies of Infantry to support them.” Pulleine replied “I think I can hardly do that. My orders are to defend the Camp and we couldn't spare the men.”. Colonel Durnford said, “Very well; perhaps I had better not take them. I will go with my own men.”]. Lt. Col. Durnford [said] that the Zulus were retiring and urged in favour of taking the men so that after a while Lt. Col. Pulleine said “Oh very well of course if you order them I'll give you them.” Lt. Col. Durnford said “That's all right.”
Lt. Col. Pulleine consulted with his Officers and in a few minutes, Lieut. Melville [sic] came up and said “Colonel I really don't think Col. Pulleine would be doing right to send any men out of Camp when his orders are to ‘defend the Camp.’ “ Lt. Col. Durnford replied –” Very well it doesn't much matter we won't take them.” His manner was persuasive not peremptory. There were no high words passed. Moreover the manner of the officers to one another was perfectly genial, and the conversation took place over some lunch which Lieut. Col. Pulleine was taking with Lieut. Col. Durnford. Colonel Durnford now sent two troops on the hills to the left under Captain Barton N.N.C. and took with him to the front the remaining two troops, and Russell's Rocket Battery with a Company of the N.N.C. under Captain Nourse as Escort to the Battery. (4) On leaving the camp [he] said to Lt. Col. Pulleine “If you see us in difficulties you must send and support us.” (5)
Going at a canter the Rocket Battery & Escort were soon left behind. Having proceeded between 5 and 6 miles, a mounted man came down from the hills on the left, and reported that there was an immense “Impi” behind the hills to our left, and he had scarcely made the report when the Zulus appeared in force in front of us & to our left. They were in skirmishing order but 10 or 12 deep, with supports close behind. They opened fire at us at about 800 yards & advanced very rapidly. We retired some little way, taking up a position in a “Donga” or water course, of which there are several across the plain in front of Sandlwana.
We retired steadily in skirmishing order, keeping up a steady fire for about 2 miles, when we came upon the remains of the Rocket Battery, which had been cut off & broken up. There was a hand to hand engagement going on with those that remained.
The left wing while returning was wheeled up to the right & drove the Zulus back who were not in very large numbers just there at that time. It appears that Captain Russell whilst following up with the Battery, perceived some of the Enemy on his left, he fired three Rockets with some effect; this was followed by a volley from the Zulus, the Native Contingent retired, the mules were frightened & disorder was caused. The Enemy seeing this ran down the hill and attacked the Battery. Captain Russell was killed. As the mounted men retired towards them, the Zulus ran back to their Cover. The retreat was continued until we arrived at a “Donga” about half a mile in front of the Camp. Here a few mounted men, Carbineers, Natal Mounted Police &c –reinforced our right. A stand was made here, but we were eventually driven in, & the Camp was taken from the left. It appears that the mounted men on the left became engaged on the hills about the same time as we were engaged on the flat, and I was informed that they held the Zulus back; but my opinion is that the right of the Enemy were only engaging the troops, and did not intend to advance until their left had worked round; and I believe that Captn. Shepstone (who after the arrival of the baggage, took the troop of mounted natives he had used as escort on the hills to the left) (6) rode down to the Camp & asked in the name of Colonel Durnford for assistance.
This Colonel Pulleine gave him by detaching two Companies of the 24th a little to the left front. These together with the mounted men & Lonsdale's Contingent, fell back into the Camp, & in spite of the Artillery fire and the steady musketry of the Infantry, who were in good position amongst the Stones & Boulders to the left & left centre of the Camp, and who stood their ground most gallantly the Enemy steadily advanced. (7) A general move was made towards the mountain to take up a last position, but it was too late. The Zulus were too quick & fleet of foot; they caught up the men on foot before they could reach the new position, completely overpowering them by numbers & assegaing right and left.
Notes
(1) Cf. Lieutenant Higginson's account.
(2) Cochrane is wrong about Shepstone, who rode out with the two troops mentioned below as being under Captain Barton.
(3) Cochrane is trying to be as precise as possible in this supplementary statement, giving the two officers their formal rank, instead of the informal ‘colonel’. He is (incidentally) incorrect in Durnford's case, as that officer had been promoted to brevet colonel in the previous month, although it seems that this was not known in South Africa.
(4) According to the report of Lieutenant Davies, who commanded one of the two troops accompanying Durnford, Durnford with Russell and Nourse left the camp half an hour after Barton.
(5) Cf. the following passage attributable to Cochrane: ‘According to the testimony of a special-service officer who was present, and afterwards escaped from the camp, Col. Pulleine went into his tent and brought out his written orders, to which Col. Durnford demurred, so far as to say, “Well, my idea is, that wherever Zulus appear, we ought to attack. I will go alone, but remember, if I get into difficulties I shall rely on you to support me.”’. The ‘special-service officer’ is almost certainly Cochrane.
(6) Shepstone. He picked up Vause's baggage escort on returning to camp to ask for reinforcements.
(7) Up to this time there had been no communication with the camp force, which was about 1000 yards to the left rear, holding the rising ground. Lieutenant Cochrane, observing the Zulus massing at a kraal to the left front, pointed it out to Colonel Durnford, and asked if he should send an orderly to call the attention of the artillery to it. The Colonel said, ‘No, they may not attend to him; you had better go yourself.’ Cochrane at once rode back to the camp force, but could not find his chief again. One gun was in fact moved in the desired direction, and after firing some shells returned to its previous position.