Ala-ud-din ‘shed more innocent blood than ever any Pharaoh was guilty of,’ states Barani. But this comment is more an expression of Barani’s hyper-orthodox prejudice against the unorthodox sultan than an objective assessment. Though Ala-ud-din was indeed a sanguinary despot, that was not a unique trait in him, but a common characteristic of most Delhi Sultans. What distinguished Ala-ud-din was not his despotism or brutality, but his radical and futuristic political and economic reforms, which greatly enhanced the power and efficiency of the government, and even promoted the welfare of the people.
Ala-ud-din was a daringly original and in many respects a startlingly modern reformer. Though he was illiterate, many of his reforms showed excellent grasp of economic planning and administrative control. And on the whole his reforms and regulations, particularly his market regulations, were greatly beneficial to people. A Sufi sage would later ascribe philanthropic motives to Ala-ud-din’s market regulations, but that is a hyperbole. It is not that Ala-ud-din was indifferent to the welfare of the people—indeed, some of his statements specifically and strongly express his concern for the public weal—but the basic objective of all his policies and actions was to make the government more efficient and strong, and thus to consolidate and enhance royal power.
The sultan in the early years of his reign was beset by a number of political and socio-economic problems, and that convinced him that there was something very wrong with the polity of the Sultanate, and that sweeping reforms were imperative. He therefore decided to investigate, together with his advisors, the causes of the problems he faced, and to find efficient solutions for them—not just to solve the problems as they arose, but to prevent such problems from ever again arising. And then, having determined the causes of the problems faced by the state, he took a number of sagacious policy decisions, and executed them with relentless resolve, so that not only did peace and security as never before prevail in the empire, but also his subjects by and large lived a more prosperous, contended and secure life than at any other time in the history of the Delhi Sultanate. ‘During the whole period of Sultan Ala-ud-din’s reign, the situation of the county was very good and prosperous,’ concedes Barani. ‘Administration was carried on efficiently and successfully.’
In all his policies and actions Ala-ud-din was entirely open-minded and pragmatic, unrestrained by political conventions and precedents, as well as by religious prescripts. ‘Oh, doctor, thou art a learned man, but thou has had no experience,’ he once told a kazi who presumed to advise him on politics. ‘I am an unlettered man, but I have seen a great deal.’ Practicality was the sole guide of Ala-ud-din. And he was entirely unsentimental in this, and would not allow even his tribal or blood relationships sway his judgements in any way.
ALA-UD-DIN WAS UTTERLY ruthless in the pursuit of his goals, and had no qualms whatever in slaughtering thousands of people in cold blood if that was necessary to consolidate his power and achieve his goals. Thus when a conspiracy of New Muslims against him was discovered, he unhesitatingly ordered the total extermination of the tribe. ‘Twenty or thirty thousand New Muslims were killed, of whom probably only a few had any knowledge [of the intended revolt],’ reports Barani. ‘Their houses were plundered, and their wives and children turned out.’
Riots were fairly common in Delhi at this time, but Ala-ud-din put an end to them by dealing with the rioters with deliberate ferocity. ‘By the sultan’s command every rioter was most tenaciously pursued, and put to death,’ reports Barani. ‘Their heads were sawn in two and their bodies divided.’ From Ala-ud-din’s point of view, this was the right and proper thing to do, for it produced the desired result. ‘After these punishments, breaches of peace were never heard of in the city,’ concedes Barani.
Muslim religious leaders generally condemned many of the policies and actions of Ala-ud-din as irreligious and fiendish. But the sultan was unmoved by such excoriations. He, according to Barani, ‘held that matters of administration have nothing to do with religious laws.’ Even in his personal life Ala-ud-din was hardly religious. ‘The sultan,’ censures Barani, ‘said no prayers, did not attend the Friday prayer in the mosque . . . He was not careful at all about prayers and religious fasting.’
Once when a kazi expounded to him what was lawful and unlawful according to Islamic conventions, Ala-ud-din told him, ‘When troopers do not appear at the muster, I order three years pay to be taken from them. I place wine-drinkers and wine-sellers in pits of incarceration. If a man debauches another man’s wife, I cut off his organ, and the woman I cause to be killed. Rebels . . . I slay; their wives and children I reduce to beggary and ruin. Extortion I punish with torture . . . and I keep the extortionist in prison, in chains and fetters, until every jital is restored. Political criminals I confine and chastise. Wilt thou say that all this is unlawful?’
The kazi then rose from his seat, and moved to the place reserved for suppliants in the durbar hall, and there placed his forehead on the ground in submission and said, ‘My liege! Whether you send me, your wretched servant, to prison, or whether you order me to be cut in two, all these are unlawful, and finds no support in the sayings of the Prophet, or in the exposition of the learned.’
‘The sultan,’ records Barani, ‘heard all this and said nothing, but put on his slippers and went into his harem.’ The kazi too then went home. ‘The next day he took the last farewell of all his people, made a propitiatory offering, and performed his ablutions. Thus prepared for death, he proceeded to the court.’ But contrary to general expectation, Ala-ud-din called the kazi forward and honoured him with a ceremonial robe, and presented to him a large sum of money. Strong himself, Ala-ud-din appreciated strength and candour in others. And he said to the kazi: ‘Although I have not studied the Science or the Book, I am a Mussulman of a Mussulman stock. To prevent rebellion, in which thousands perish, I issue such orders as I consider to be for the good of the state and the benefit of the people . . . I do not know whether this is lawful or unlawful. Whatever I think to be for the good of the state, or suitable for the emergency, that I decree.’
Self-willed, Ala-ud-din always made up his own mind on all matters, but he also took care to hold detailed consultations with his top officers on all important issues, and to ponder over their views before deciding on what he should do. And he encouraged his courtiers to speak to him frankly. ‘Rest assured that I will not harm you,’ he once told a kazi. ‘Only reply with truth and sincerity to whatever question I may put to you.’
Ala-ud-din was ruthless, but not thoughtless. And he applied himself unswervingly to the implementation of his policies—he was as meticulous in the execution of his plans, as he was in their conception. Because of all this, most of his reforms were successful, even though many of them were daringly innovative and way ahead of the times.
ONE OF THE immediate concerns of Ala-ud-din on his accession was to secure the integrity of the empire by effectively dealing with the perennial problem of insurgency plaguing the Sultanate, caused by his ambitious close relatives and top nobles aspiring to usurp the throne, and by provincial governors seeking to establish independent kingdoms. There was also the recurrent problem of subordinate Hindu rajas and chieftains seeking to regain their independence.
There were four successive insurrections in the early part of Ala-ud-din’s reign, one of which very nearly led to his overthrow and assassination. These crises prompted Ala-ud-din to ponder over what he needed to do to prevent the recurrence of rebellions and to ensure that his government ran smoothly.
Ala-ud-din then, as usual, held extensive discussions with his councillors— ‘for several nights and days,’ according to Barani—to decide on how to deal with the problem of insurgency. He then concluded that there were four basic causes for insurrections: 1/ The sultan’s neglect of public affairs, and his inattention to the activities of his subjects. 2/ Convivial wine parties held by nobles, which were occasions for loose talk and the hatching of conspiracies. 3/ ‘The intimacy, affection, alliances, and intercourse of maliks (military commanders) and amirs (noblemen) with each other, so that if anything happens to one of them a hundred others get mixed up in it.’ 4/ ‘Money, which engenders evil and strife, and brings forth pride and disloyalty. If men had no money, they would attend to their own business, and would never think of riots and revolts, [and would not be able to win the support] of low and turbulent people.’
After thus deciding on the nature of the problems that the state faced, Ala-ud-din set about devising solutions to them. And these solutions, like much else that he did, were audaciously original and yet eminently practical, though also quite harsh. His first measure was to deprive the people of the material means and the leisure to hatch rebellions, by yoking them to the drudgery of earning their livelihood and preventing them from accumulating wealth. The sultan, reports Barani, ‘ordered that wherever there was a village held by proprietary right, in free gift, or as a religious endowment, it should . . . be brought back under the exchequer. People were pressed and amerced, money was exacted from them on every kind of pretence. Many were left without any money, till at length it came to pass that excepting maliks and amirs, officials, Multanis (moneylender-traders) and bankers, no one possessed even a trifle of cash. So vigorous was the confiscation that, beyond a few thousand tankas, all the pensions, grants of land and endowments in the country were appropriated [by the state]. The people were all then so absorbed in obtaining the means of living that the name of rebellion was never mentioned.’
Ala-ud-din’s second measure was to set up an elaborate intelligence network, to gather information on all that was going on in the empire, which he considered to be the absolute prerequisite for running an efficient government. This intelligence gathering was done with such thoroughness that, according to Barani, ‘no one could stir without the sultan’s knowledge, and whatever happened in the houses of nobles, great men, and officials was communicated to the sultan by his reporters. Nor were the reports neglected, for explanations . . . [on the matter reported] were demanded [from the nobles]. The system of reporting went to such a length that nobles dared not speak aloud even in the largest palaces, and if they had anything to say, they communicated it by signs. In their own houses, night and day, dread of the reports of spies made them tremble. No word or action which could provoke censure or punishment was allowed to transpire. The transactions in the bazaars, the buying and selling, and the bargains made, were all reported to the sultan by spies.’
‘THIRDLY, HE PROHIBITED wine-drinking and wine-selling, as also the use of intoxicating drugs. Dicing also was forbidden . . . Vintners and gamblers and beer-sellers were turned out of the city,’ reports Barani. The sultan, according to his courtier poet Amir Khusrav, considered wine as ‘the mother of all wickedness,’ and he himself now entirely gave up drinking wine and holding wine parties. All the china and glass vessels in the royal banqueting room were smashed, and jars and casks of wine in the royal cellars were emptied on the road—so much wine was poured into the streets that pools and puddles formed there as in the rainy season, reports Barani.
To enforce prohibition, Ala-ud-din ordered that ‘taverns should be set on fire, and that drummers should go around proclaiming vigorously that whoever drinks will be punished severely,’ reports Isami. All prohibition violators who were caught were imprisoned. And when jails became filled up with prisoners, which they soon did, a number of them were, according to Barani, confined in ‘pits for the incarceration of offenders dug outside the Badaun gate [of Delhi], which is a great thoroughfare.’ Many died in these pits, and many ‘were taken out half-dead.’
But nothing could prevent the habitual imbibers from finding some way to circumvent the prohibition rules and gratify their craving. Clandestine distilling and consumption of liquor now became common, and many travelled to the suburbs of Delhi to enjoy their drinks in peace and at leisure. A good amount of liquor was also smuggled into Delhi ‘by hundreds of tricks and devices, and by all sorts of collusion.’ These widespread violations of prohibition rules eventually constrained Ala-ud-din to modify the rules and permit private distillation and drinking of liquor, provided that liquor was not sold or consumed publicly, and that ‘drinking parties were not held.’ Prohibition was the only measure of Ala-ud-din that did not quite succeed.
Ala-ud-din also banned prostitution, as a companion measure to prohibition. The prostitutes then had to ‘sit in their houses, patching up their skirts with the greatest repentance and rubbing their hands together,’ states the Khusrav. ‘All the roots of sin and avarice have been cut off.’
The last of Ala-ud-din’s socio-political regulations was to virtually forbid the holding of convivial parties by nobles, by ordering that ‘noblemen and great men should not visit each other’s houses, or give feasts, or hold meetings,’ reports Barani. Marriage alliances between noble families were now required to be formed only with the consent of the sultan. Inevitably, ‘feasting and hospitality fell quite into disuse’ in Delhi.
ALONG WITH THESE socio-political regulations, Ala-ud-din also introduced certain administrative reforms, which were essential for the effective implementation of his policies and for the smooth functioning of the government. He paid special attention to the lower rungs of bureaucracy, particularly to those working in the districts, for these officers, Ala-ud-din knew, were the foundation stones of the state’s administrative superstructure, and any weakness in them would adversely affect the efficiency of the entire government. All through the history of the Delhi Sultanate, nearly all subordinate government officers were Hindus, and among them the conduct of the hereditary revenue collectors was a major concern for Ala-ud-din, for many of them were notoriously corrupt, lording over the peasants and gorging on the produce of their hard labour, and also cheating the government of its dues.
Ala-ud-din therefore sought to curb the powers of the traditional village officers by depriving them of their privileges and withdrawing the perquisites and concessions that they had traditionally enjoyed, thus in effect reducing them to the level of common peasants. ‘I have discovered that the khuts and muqaddams (village headmen) ride upon fine horses, wear fine clothes, shoot with Persian bows, make war upon each other, and go out hunting; but of the tribute, poll tax, house tax and pasture tax, they do not pay even one jital (coin),’ Ala-ud-din observed. ‘They levy separately the khut’s share from the villages, give parties and drink wine, and many of them pay no tax at all . . . Nor do they show any respect for my officers . . . I have therefore taken measures . . . so that at my command they are ready to creep into holes like mice.’ The suppression of the arbitrary powers of village chieftains and revenue collectors not only facilitated the efficient functioning of the government at the local level, but also benefited peasants, as it freed them from the oppressions and extortions of by chieftains.
Another important administrative measure of Ala-ud-din was to deal with the corruption of royal officials, which was endemic in the Delhi Sultanate. Government servants, the sultan noted, ‘were in the habit of taking bribes and committing embezzlements . . . They falsify accounts and defraud the state of revenue.’ Ala-ud-din dealt with this problem with a two-pronged measure. On the one hand, he kept strict surveillance over the work of government servants, and inflicted severe punishments on the corrupt, so that ‘it was no longer possible for anyone to take one tanka (coin) or any single thing from either a Hindu or Mussulman by way of bribe.’ At the same time the sultan increased the salaries of officials so that they would not have any survival compulsion to resort to corruption—‘I have directed that the salary of superintendents and other officials shall be fixed at such a rate as to allow them to live respectably,’ he announced.
ONE OF THE topmost concerns of Ala-ud-din throughout his reign was to maintain the strength and discipline of his army. That was essential for preserving the integrity of the empire against the persistent problems of provincial rebellions and Mongol raids. Besides, the booty that military campaigns brought was a major source of revenue for the Sultanate. In view of all this Ala-ud-din quite early in his reign decided, according to Barani, that the one indispensable requirement for the maintenance of the stability and security of the empire was to have a large standing army—‘and not only a large, but a choice army, well-armed, well-mounted, with archers, and all ready for immediate service.’
But the maintenance of such an army would involve enormous expenditure, which would empty the royal treasury in just a few years, Ala-ud-din realised. The only way that this could be managed was to substantially lower the salaries of officers and soldiers. And for this to be feasible, it was necessary to bring down the prices of provisions and other essential supplies, so that soldiers could maintain a good standard of living on a low salary. But how could the prices of provisions be brought down? ‘The sultan then consulted with his most experienced ministers as to the means of reducing the prices of provisions without resorting to severe and tyrannical punishments,’ reports Barani. ‘His councillors replied that the necessaries of life would never become cheap until the price of grain was fixed by regulations and tariffs.’
Heeding that advice, Ala-ud-din then issued a series of seven market regulations. First of all, he issued an order regulating the prices of grains, and this was so rigorously enforced that ‘this scale of prices was maintained as long as Ala-ud-din lived . . . whether the rains were abundant or scanty,’ states Barani in his detailed report about the price control measures of Ala-ud-din. Secondly, to ensure that traders complied with the regulated prices, the sultan appointed a senior officer, ‘a wise and practical man,’ as the controller of markets.
But prices could not be controlled through administrative measures alone, Ala-ud-din knew. He was well aware that the key means to control prices was to control supplies, and that the royal order fixing prices could be maintained only if it was backed by balancing supply and demand. Therefore, to regulate the supply of grain, he ordered, as his third measure of market control, that ‘all the khalisa villages (whose revenues were reserved for the royal treasury) in the Doab should pay their tribute in kind,’ and that those in some of the other nearby areas should pay half their tribute in grain. As a result of this order, grains from the districts arrived in Delhi in caravans, so ‘there never was a time when there were not two or three royal granaries full of grain in the city. When there was a deficiency of rain, or when for any reason the caravans [bringing grain] did not arrive, and grain became scarce in the markets, then the royal stores were opened and the corn was sold at the tariff price.’
To further regulate the supply of essential goods, Ala-ud-din ‘ordered that the names of all the merchants of the empire, whether Mussulmans or Hindus, should be registered in the book of the Diwan . . . Merchants were required to sign engagements whereby they were compelled to bring a certain quantity of wares to town and to sell them at the rates fixed by the sultan.’
Fourthly, Ala-ud-din placed grain dealers and transporters under the authority of the controller of markets. And to control them effectively, they, along with their families, were forced to settle in villages along the Yamuna near Delhi, and a supervisor was placed over them to ensure their proper conduct.
The fifth market control measure of Ala-ud-din was to prohibit regrating. ‘This was so rigidly enforced that no merchant, farmer or retailer, or anyone else could hold back secretly . . . [even a small amount of grain, or sell even a small amount of it] above the regulated price.’ Sixthly, ‘engagements were taken from provincial revenue officers and their assistants that they would ensure that the corn-carriers were supplied with corn by peasants on the field at a fixed [farm] price.’ The order also thoughtfully granted that, ‘to give the villagers a chance of profit, they were [to be] permitted to carry their corn into the market and sell it at the regulation [market] price.’
Lastly, the sultan maintained a hands-on control over the market by requiring three different sources—market superintendent, reporters and spies—to send to him daily reports on market rates and transactions. He also took care to ensure that the three sources served as checks on each other, in order to prevent any of them from falsifying their reports in any way.
‘ALL THE WISE men of the age were astonished at the evenness of the price [of grains] in the markets,’ comments Barani. Whether the season was favourable or unfavourable for cultivation, there was no scarcity of provisions in Delhi, and their prices remained unvarying. ‘This was indeed the wonder of the age, which no other monarch was able to achieve.’ Even luck favoured Ala-ud-din, for the monsoon was regular during most of his reign, and harvests were abundant.
Controlling the prices of food-grains was only the first step in Ala-uddin’s market control measures, which in their final formulation were very comprehensive, and covered virtually the entire gamut of market operations. The prices of ‘piece goods, garments, sugar, vegetables, fruits, animal oil, and lamp oil’ were all regulated by Ala-ud-din, notes Barani. The prices of maid servants and concubines, as well as of male slaves, were also fixed. ‘The price of a serving girl was fixed from five to twelve tankas, of a concubine at 20, 30, or 40 tankas. The price of a male slave was 100 or 200 tankas or less . . . Handsome lads fetched from 20 to 30 tankas; the price of slave labourers was 10 to 15 tankas, and of young domestic slaves 17 or 18 tankas . . . Great pains were taken to secure low prices for all things sold in the stalls in the markets, from caps to shoes, from combs to needles . . . Even in the case of articles of the most trifling value, the sultan took the greatest trouble to fix their prices and settle the profit of the vendors.’ In the case of luxury items, their purchase was permitted only with the written permission of the Diwan.
These price control measures were enforced with great rigour, with Ala-ud-din personally inquiring regularly into all aspects of market operations in every bazaar in Delhi. Violators of the price regulations were severely punished. Merchants then sought to circumvent the price regulations by using short weights—‘They sold their goods according to the stipulated rate, but they cheated the purchasers in the weight, especially ignorant people and children,’ reports Barani. Ala-ud-din investigated this matter by sending children to buy various things and take them to him, and he then had the items weighed. If any deficiency was found, ‘the inspector took from . . . [the particular] shop whatever was deficient, and afterwards cut from the shopkeeper’s haunches an equal weight of flesh, which was thrown down before his eyes. The certainty of this punishment kept the traders honest, and restrained them from giving short weight and resorting to other knavish tricks.’
‘From fear of the police, people both high and low, whether belonging to the market or not, became careful about their behaviour, obedient, and submissive, and subdued with fear and awe,’ continues Barani. ‘Nor did anyone dare to swerve a needle’s point from the letter of the law, to increase or diminish any of the royal standard prices, or to indulge in vain desires and excesses of any sort.’
These were all restrictive measures, which kept the market operations within the parameters prescribed by Ala-ud-din. But the sultan also initiated certain positive measures to stimulate the economy, such as advancing money from the royal treasury to traders for financing their business, and freeing cultivators from exploitation by village chieftains.
ALA-UD-DIN SUPPLEMENTED THESE market regulations with a number of revenue reforms, to augment the financial resources of the empire. He collected a variety of urban and rural taxes, and took particular care to systematise agricultural taxes, which were by far the main sources of revenue of the state. He classified farmlands into different categories, and assessed tax on them on the basis of the average yield per given measure of land in a given area. ‘Half [the produce] was required to be paid [as tax] without any diminution,’ states Barani. In addition to the tax on agricultural produce, peasants had to pay tax on milch cattle, as well as a general grazing tax.
All these revenue measures were rigorously enforced by the sultan. ‘People were brought to such a state of obedience that one revenue officer could string together by the neck twenty khuts, muqaddams and chaudharys (village headmen) and enforce payment by blows,’ notes Barani. ‘Blows, confinement in the stocks, imprisonment and chains, were all employed to enforce payment.’
Ala-ud-din preferred to collect taxes directly from cultivators rather than through village headmen. This was done to prevent tax collectors from cheating the government, or exploiting peasants, and to ensure, as Barani notes, that ‘the burden of the strong might not fall upon the weak, and there might be but one law for the payment of the revenue for both the strong and the weak.’ The tax pressure of Ala-ud-din was on the rich, not on the poor. Characteristically, he abolished the various concessions and privileges that village headmen had traditionally enjoyed, and collected from them the full tax due on their lands. He also prohibited them from levying on cultivators any cess of their own. This severity of Ala-ud-din with village headmen and traditional tax collectors was beneficial to common peasants, towards whom the sultan was generally protective.
Ala-ud-din was also strict in dealing with parasitic government tax officials, as he was in dealing with village headmen and traditional rural tax collectors. Royal officers who held land grants in lieu of pay were strictly forbidden to levy any additional cesses on their own. And ‘collectors, clerks, and other officers employed in revenue matters, who took bribes and acted dishonestly, were all dismissed,’ notes Barani. ‘There was no chance of a single tanka being taken dishonestly or as bribe from any Hindu or Mussulman. The revenue collectors and officers were so coerced and checked that for [cheating the government even] five hundred or a thousand tankas they were imprisoned and kept in chains for years . . . [Consequently] clerkship came to be considered . . . [a wretched profession], and no man would give his daughter to a clerk. Death was deemed preferable to revenue employment.’
THE MARKET AND revenue reforms of Ala-ud-din resulted in a substantial reduction in the prices of essential commodities. And this enabled the sultan, as he had planned, to regulate the salaries of soldiers, and to increase the size of his army. ‘At the present time the imperial army consists of 475,000 . . . warriors, whose names are recorded by the imperial muster-master, and whose pay and rations are entered in the regulations of the deputy-victualler,’ records Wassaf. There was also an increase in the number of war elephants in the Sultanate army at this time—according to Wassaf, there were as many as 400 elephants in the royal stables alone.
The army of Ala-ud-din was quite probably the largest, the best organised, and the best equipped army in the entire history of the Delhi Sultanate. The sultan took particular care to ensure that soldiers and their equipment met his quality specifications. ‘All the men were inspected by the muster-master. Those who were skilled in archery and the use of arms passed, and were paid the price of their horses. The horses were then branded,’ notes Barani. These soldiers were paid in cash, instead of with land assignments, as was usually done by the Delhi sultans. Ala-ud-din met the cash requirement for this by appropriating all the land near Delhi in the Doab as khalisa, royal estate, the revenue from which went directly into the royal treasury, rather than into provincial coffers.
And just as Ala-ud-din carefully monitored the recruitment of his soldiers, so also he kept a close watch on the operations of the army when it was in the field. ‘It was the practice of the sultan, when he sent an army on an expedition, to establish posts on the road,’ states Barani. ‘Relays of horses were stationed at every post, and at every half or quarter kos runners were posted, and officers and report writers were posted in every town or place where horses were stationed. Every day, or every two or three days, news used to come to the sultan reporting the progress of the army, and news about the health of the sovereign was carried back to the army. False news was thus prevented from being circulated in the city or in the army. This exchange of accurate information between the court and the army was of great public benefit.’
Another major concern of Ala-ud-din was the maintenance of law and order in the empire, for that was essential for the success of all his reforms. India was at this time infested with numerous wild bandit tribes, who disdained the authority of the state, and threatened to hamper the success of the socioeconomic reforms of the sultan. As in everything else, Ala-ud-din dealt with this problem decisively, so that, according to Barani, ‘dacoits and lawless men themselves turned into the guards of the roads. Not a single thread of travellers was ever reported to be lost. Peace and safety like this and to this extent were not found in any other period.’
ALA-UD-DIN IS SOMETIMES accused of unfair persecution of Hindus. Indeed, he was very severe in his treatment of them. But it was political expediency, not religious bigotry, that was the prime determinant of his policies and actions towards Hindus. He treated Hindus harshly not because of their religion, but because they, as a disaffected subject people, were a major source of disquiet in the kingdom.
Ala-ud-din believed that it was wealth that fomented disaffection and rebellion among Hindus, and he therefore decided that it was an imperative political necessity that they should be reduced to poverty. ‘I know that Hindus will never become submissive and obedient till they are reduced to poverty,’ he maintained. ‘I have therefore given orders that just sufficient shall be left to them from year to year, of corn, milk and curds, but that they shall not be allowed to accumulate wealth and property.’
Ala-ud-din’s measures to keep Hindus subservient were, according to Barani, so effective ‘that contumacy and rebellion, and riding on horses, carrying of weapons, wearing of fine clothes, and eating betel, entirely ceased among chaudharys (land owners) and other opulent men . . . It was in fact not possible for a Hindu to hold up his head, and in the houses of Hindus there was not a sign of gold and silver and articles of luxury . . . In consequence of their impoverished state, the wives of the landed proprietors and chief men even used to come to the houses of the Mussulmans and do [domestic] work there, and receive wages for it.’
There is no doubt considerable exaggeration in these reports of Barani; they quite probably reflect what the orthodox cleric would have liked to see, not the reality. This is equally true of an approbatory comment on the prevailing conditions of Hindus that Barani attributes to a kazi: ‘As soon as the revenue collector demands the sum due from him, [the Hindu] pays the same with meekness and humility, coupled with utmost respect, and free from reluctance, and he, should the collector chooses to spit into his mouth, opens the same without hesitation, so that the official may spit into it . . .’
ALA-UD-DIN WAS ONE of the most extraordinary rulers in Indian history, indeed in world history. He was a radical reformer, and was exceptionally successful in all that he did, though many of his reforms were several centuries ahead of his time.
This success of Ala-ud-din elicited admiration from even so adverse a critic as Barani—the sultan, he writes, was ‘brilliant . . . [in his] political and administrative measures . . . During his reign, either through his agency or the beneficent ruling of providence, there were several remarkable events and matters which had never been witnessed or heard of in any age or time, and probably will never again be seen.’ Barani then goes on to list ten major achievements of Ala-ud-din’s reign: 1/ Cheapness of all the necessities of life; 2/ invariable success in military campaigns; 3/ rout of the Mongols; 4/ maintenance of a large army at a small cost; 5/ political stability resulting from the suppression and prevention of rebellions; 6/ safety on roads in all directions; 7/ honest dealings of the bazaar people; 8/ erection and repair of mosques, minarets, and forts, and the excavation of tanks; 9/ the prevalence of ‘rectitude, truth, honesty, justice, and temperance in the hearts of Muslims in general during the last ten years of his reign’; and 10/ the flourishing of many learned and great men ‘without the patronage of the sultan.’ Ala-uddin, observes Ibn Battuta, ‘was one of the best of sultans, and people of India eulogise him highly.’
People by and large enjoyed peace and security, even prosperity, during the reign of Ala-ud-din. As a kazi once remarked, Ala-ud-din had driven criminals into ‘mice holes, and has taken cheating, lying and falsifying out of them . . . [And he] has managed the bazaar people as no king ever has done since the days of Adam.’ ‘None dared make any babble or noise,’ states Afif, a fourteenth century chronicler. ‘None dared to pick up [even] a fallen jewel from the street,’ claims Amir Khusrav.
Ala-ud-din was a compulsive workaholic, and he drove his officers as hard as he drove himself. Indeed, royal officers played a crucial role in the achievements of the sultan. As Barani states, ‘During the whole period of Sultan Ala-uddin’s reign, the situation of the county was very good and prosperous due to the bravery, mutual cooperation and farsightedness of officials and soldiers. Administration was carried on efficiently and successfully.’ A part of the credit for the success of Ala-ud-din’s reign should therefore go to his officers—but all the credit for laying down impeccable government regulations, finding talented officers, earning their loyalty, and getting the best out of them, should go to the sultan.
Another remarkable aspect of Ala-ud-din’s reign was that he, despite his authoritarianism and ruthlessness, also showed a genuine concern for the welfare of the common people, and sought to free them from exploitation by tax collectors and village headmen. And in his tax policy he sought to ensure that, as Barani states, ‘heavy burdens were not placed upon the poor.’ Further, in times of poor harvest, and when there was a general scarcity of provisions, Ala-ud-din made sure that ‘if in such a season any poor . . . person went to the market, and did not get assistance, the overseer [of the market] received punishment whenever the information reached the king’s ears.’
People on the whole led a better life under Ala-ud-din than under any other king of the Delhi Sultanate. ‘No more prosperous times than his had ever fallen to the lot of any Muhammadan sovereign,’ states Afif. Ala-ud-din was on the whole a beneficent ruler to his subjects.
But he was not a benign ruler. Rather, he was singularly brutal in extirpating all who stood in his path. Even in that sanguinary age, Ala-ud-din’s reign stood out for its excesses. All that can be said in extenuation of the sultan in this is that he could not have achieved much of what he did without such ruthlessness.