TOP SECRET — By Hand of Officer Only
9th Dec. 42
To: Chief-of-Staff O.K.H.
Operations Branch O.K.H.
APPRECIATION OF SITUATION
1. Information about the Enemy. Enemy has committed further strong forces against this Army Group in last ten days. These consist primarily of the reserves expected in our appreciation of 28th Nov. but also include additional forces. Total formations identified by Army Group are:
86 rifle divisions
17 rifle brigades
54 tank brigades
14 motorized brigades
11 cavalry divisions,
i.e. 182 formations. In addition to these, we have identified thirteen independent tank regiments, tank battalions and anti-tank brigades.
Following is detailed break-down of enemy forces: (a) Surrounding Stalingrad fortress area:
Volga front. Sixty-Second Army (eight rifle divisions, three rifle brigades and one tank brigade up; two rifle, two tank and two motorized brigades in reserve).
Northern front. — Sixty-Sixth and Twenty-Fourth Armies (seventeen rifle divisions and one motorized brigade up; four rifle and four tank brigades in reserve).
Western front. Sixty-Fifth and Twenty-First Armies (ten rifle divisions, seven tank and two motorized brigades, five tank regiments and one anti-tank brigade up; four tank brigades in reserve).
Southern front. — Fifty-Seventh and Sixty-Fourth Armies (seven rifle divisions, six rifle, six tank and six motorized brigades and two tank regiments up; apparently two rifle divisions, two rifle, five tank and one motorized brigade and five motorized regiments in reserve).
(a) In the last ten days the enemy had attacked the northern, western and southern fronts in turn. His main pressure is undoubtedly directed against the western front, whereas he is relatively weak on the southern one.
(b) Soviet assault on Stalingrad is being covered to the south-west{35} on the Chir front by Fifth Tank Army (twelve rifle divisions, five cavalry divisions, two motorized cavalry divisions, four tank brigades, one tank regiment and two motorized brigades up; two rifle divisions, four tank brigades and one motorized brigade in reserve). Immediately to the north, facing the centre and left wing of the Hollidt Group, are three more rifle divisions.
Covering the assault in a southerly direction, east of the Don, is Fifty-First Army (four rifle and four cavalry divisions, one tank and one motorized brigade up; one tank and one rifle brigade in reserve). Reason for concentration of further motorized forces behind this front is still not clear.
(c) Reconnaissance during last few days has revealed unloading operations east of Stalingrad and troop movements across the Don to the south, past the eastern front of the Hollidt Group. While the Soviet covering front east of the Don has remained largely passive, probably because the concentration of motorized forces to the rear is not yet complete, the enemy has attacked across the Chir in strength on the Chir bridgehead and west of the Chir railway station. On account of the north-to-south movements in front of the Hollidt Group we must expect this attack to be extended further westwards.
(d) In the fighting to date the enemy has undoubtedly lost a considerable amount of his armour, but hitherto he has been able to fill the gaps by bringing up new tank regiments etc. The offensive capacity of his infantry remains low; the effect of his artillery has considerably increased, notably on the western front of Stalingrad.
2. Information About Own Troops.
(a) Sixth Army. So far the army has beaten off all enemy assaults, though at the cost of considerable losses. Special report is being submitted on its present fighting capacity. The following were the holdings of the main types of ammunition on 5th December 42, given in percentages of primary issues:{36}
5-cm. vehicle-drawn gun —59%
7.5-cm. vehicle-drawn gun —39.40%
8-cm. mortar—30.80%
Light infantry gun—28%
Heavy infantry gun.—25%
15-cm. mortar—25%
Light howitzer—34%
10-cm. cannon 19—21.60%
Heavy howitzer—36%
Present ration stocks, with bread cut to 200 gr., will last till about 14 Dec. for bread, 20 Dec. for midday meal and 19 Dec. for evening meal.
Despite exemplary efforts of the Luftwaffe, biggest airlift attained to date was 300 tons on 7th Dec. owing to bad weather. Of 188 aircraft used that day, two were shot down and nine failed to return. On all other days tonnage lifted varied between 25 tons (27th Nov.) and 150 tons (8th Dec.), at a daily minimum requirement of 400 tons.
(b) Fourth Pz. Army. Assembly of 57 Pz. Corps not materially completed until 10th Dec., instead of 3rd Dec. as hoped, owing to bogging-down of wheeled elements of 23 Pz. Div. 48 Pz. Corps (336 Inf. Div., 11 Pz. Div. and 3 Luftwaffe Fd. Div.) had initially to be thrown in on the Chir front to restore situation there. Battle still in progress.
(c) Rumanian Formations. Fourth Rumanian Army, lying north of 16 Mot. Inf. Div., at present standing fast. It cannot, however, be expected to withstand an attack of any strength from the north, particularly as it has been directed by Marshal Antonescu to avoid being cut off. In the case of Third Rumanian Army, apart from reasonably intact 1 Rum. Corps forming part of the Hollidt Group, the fighting power of the remnants of the Rumanian divisions committed forward amounts to no more than one or two battalions. No artillery worth mentioning any longer exists. Because of weapon shortage, reconstitution of formations in rear areas has produced no tangible results. It must also be faced that Rumanian formation staffs are not acting with necessary energy. They attribute their defeat to ‘force majeure’, in which they include the German Command. For the rest, entire front of Third Rum. Army is held by various types of emergency unit. In view of the absence of artillery and anti-tank guns there must be no illusions about ability of this front to hold out for any length of time should enemy attack it in strength, particularly with armoured forces. This motley collection of forces, which have nothing to hold them together from within, must shortly be relieved by proper combat units, since neither their composition nor their combat efficiency qualify them for a protracted spell at the front. Apart from this, those of them formed from specialist units from communications zones cannot be withheld from their proper functions without prejudicing the overall supply position.
3. Own Intentions.
Army Group intends, as already reported, to attack as early as possible with Fourth Pz. Army in order to make contact with Sixth Army. For the time being, however, soft state of ground precludes any advance by 57 Pz. Corps. Whether divisions of 48 Pz. Corps can be fully released on the Chir front by 11 Dec. is still uncertain. It will be necessary to bring 17 Pz. Div. into the attack, and orders have been given to this effect. As enemy must thus be expected shortly to extend his attacks on Chir front in general direction of Morosoyskaya, Hollidt Group must co-operate to relieve pressure on this front, either by attacking in general direction of Perelasovsky or by handing over one German division.
4. General Conclusions.
The weight of forces brought in by enemy against Don Army Group makes it clear that he sees his main point of effort here. He will carry on the struggle in this sector as long as possible by bringing over forces from other fronts.
Regardless of how Sixth Army’s own position may develop in the immediate future, therefore, it will still be necessary to maintain a steady flow of reinforcements to Don Army Group. Of decisive importance in this connexion is that everything be done to increase their rate of arrival. At the present rate we shall always lag behind the Russians. I further consider it essential that everything be done to restore the usefulness of the Rumanian Army, particularly as regards its will to fight and its confidence in the German Command.
As to whether Sixth Army should be taken out of the pocket once contact is re-established, I consider that the following factors must be carefully weighed:
(a) Should the army be left in the fortress area, it is entirely possible that the Russians will tie themselves down here and gradually fritter away their manpower in useless assaults. At the same time it must be faced that Sixth Army is having to live and fight under particularly unfavourable conditions in the fortress and that if the present ratio of strengths remains in force much longer, contact may well be lost again. At best it must be assumed that there will be no decisive change in the next few weeks.
(b) On the other hand, one must also allow for the possibility that the Russians will take the proper action and, while maintaining their encirclement of Stalingrad, launch strong attacks against Third and Fourth Rumanian Armies with Rostov as their target. If this happens our most vital forces will be operationally immobilised in the fortress area or tied down to keeping the link with it open, whereas the Russians will have freedom of action along the whole of the Army Group’s remaining front. To maintain this situation throughout the winter strikes me as inexpedient.
(c) The corollary of any decision to keep Sixth Army at Stalingrad must therefore be the decision to fight this battle through to a completely decisive ending. This will necessitate:
(i) providing Sixth Army with extra forces to maintain its defensive capacity, in the form of Luftwaffe field divisions which would be incorporated in its existing formations.
(ii) Initial reinforcement of the adjoining fronts of Third and Fourth Rumanian Armies by German forces, as these fronts cannot be guaranteed to hold with Rumanian remnants and ad hoc units.
(iii) launching a decisive offensive as soon as our own forces permit.
Whether the forces required can be made available and brought into action at short notice is not for me to judge.
v. MANSTEIN
Field-Marshal
Commanding Don Army Group