Charles Joshua Horn
Elizabeth: See? Not stars. They’re doors.
Booker: Doors to…?
Elizabeth: To everywhere.
In the massive plot twist at the end of BioShock Infinite, the writers beautifully put forth a hypothesis that individuals might exist in more than one possible world. In philosophy, the idea that an individual can exist in more than one world is called transworld identity. An important rival to transworld identity theory is counterpart theory, the idea that individuals cannot exist in more than one possible world and are therefore “world bound.”
But before we begin our discussion of individuals in different possible worlds, we need to be clear about just how BioShock treats possible worlds and how philosophers treat possible worlds. In BioShock Infinite, possible worlds are accessed through different lighthouses. These lighthouses represent ways in which the universe could be different than it is. The “infinite” in BioShock Infinite refers to the plurality of ways that the universe (what philosophers refer to as “worlds”) could be. This modal theme permeates the game through the choices that the protagonist, Booker DeWitt, makes. In short, the idea expressed is that for every choice that someone makes, a new world is created wherein an alternative choice is made.
For philosophers who endorse a framework of possible worlds, there are two fundamentally different ways to think about them.1 The majority of philosophers who accept possible worlds are called actualists. According to these thinkers, there is an infinite set of ways that the world could be and only one of them (the world we live in) really exists in the most robust sense. Although it is contentious what makes the actual world actual, actualists generally agree that the other possible worlds are abstract.2 Possible worlds, one of which is the actual world, might be represented as states of affairs, sets of propositions, collections of possible essences, and so on. One way in which we could think of the actualist position is that there were an infinite number of possible worlds that could have come into existence, and for whatever reason, only one possibility was made actual.
The second major division among philosophers who accept a framework of possible worlds is represented by possibilists. The most popular theory of possibilism is called modal realism. Modal realism is the thesis according to which there is an infinite number of possible worlds that really exist in the most robust sense, relative to themselves. So whereas the actualist is only willing to concede that there is one actual world, the possibilist will grant that the actual world could vary depending on the perspective of the world.
The world of Columbia is one possible world. The world of Rapture is another possible world. Both the actualist and the possibilist agree on these claims. However, the possibilist makes an additional claim, which is that from the perspective of Columbia or Rapture, those worlds are the actual world and our world is merely a possible world.
Robert: Why do you ask what?
Rosalind: When the delicious question is when.
Robert: The only difference between past and present…
Rosalind: is semantics.
Robert: Lives, lived, will live.
Rosalind: Dies, died, will die.
Robert: If we could perceive time as it really was…
Rosalind: what reason would grammar professors have to get out of bed?
Robert: Like us all, Lady Comstock exists across time.
Rosalind: She is both alive and dead.
Robert: She perceives being both.
Rosalind: She finds this condition… disagreeable.
Although BioShock Infinite does a magnificent job at highlighting the plurality of worlds that might exist, it is unclear whether there is a coherent theory of transworld identity. That is, it is unclear whether or not one individual can be identical to another individual in a different world. But why should we care about transworld individuality at all? Traditionally, philosophers have cared about these issues because they help to explain other issues in metaphysics. Most important to the themes present in BioShock, transworld individuality has profound implications for differing notions of freedom. Other chapters in this volume sort out the issues of freedom in the BioShock universe, but it is important for the purposes of this chapter to show how vital a discussion of transworld individuality is for other areas of philosophy.
Using the framework of possible worlds, we can say that x is free to do y if and only if there is a possible world where x does y. For example, Booker was free to go to Columbia if there is at least one possible world where Booker goes to Columbia.3 Implicit in this example, though, is the question of whether the Booker who goes to Columbia is identical to the Booker who does not go to Columbia.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the question of transworld individuality was absolutely crucial, not only for issues of freedom, but, even more importantly, for moral responsibility. The theologian and philosopher Antoine Arnauld (1612–94) held that individuals must be identical in different possible worlds or else we could not be punished or rewarded for our free actions. Arnauld would claim, for example, that Booker’s actions at Wounded Knee were free because there is also a possible world where Booker does not commit those atrocities. Most importantly, those two Bookers are identical to each other even though they exist in different possible worlds. Further, since the action was free, Booker can be held responsible for those actions.
It would be very unfair, Arnauld would argue, to be held morally responsible for an action if one could not have done otherwise. Suppose that there is no possible world in which Booker exists where he does not commit the atrocities at Wounded Knee. That is, assume that it is necessary that Booker committed the atrocities at Wounded Knee. We would be hard pressed, Arnauld would think, to be able to explain how we can justify punishing Booker for something that he had to do.
The philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) had a famous correspondence with Arnauld about this very issue. Whereas Arnauld had endorsed transworld individuality, Leibniz could not. We can hold Booker responsible for his actions at Wounded Knee not because there is another possible world wherein he does not do those actions (strictly speaking, this is false for Leibniz), but because Booker’s decision was self-motivated; that is, it came from his own will.
Elizabeth: We swim in different oceans but land on the same shore.
The fundamental disagreement between Arnauld and Leibniz has to do with their respective views of essentialism. Although the thesis is nuanced (as we will see shortly), it is generally agreed that essentialism is the view according to which at least some of the properties that make up an individual are essential to him or her. The question, then, in this discussion is: “What properties are essential or necessary to an individual?” There are three basic answers to this question.
First, we could hold that no properties are essential to an individual. This position, sometimes referred to as anti-essentialism, means that there isn’t one property of Booker, for instance, that identifies him in different possible worlds. Booker could be Comstock, Elizabeth, Songbird, or even a lighthouse. Booker cannot be identified with the fact that he is male, organic, or even human. In short, Booker could lose all of his properties and still be Booker.
Second, we could hold that all properties are essential to an individual. This position, sometimes referred to as “superessentialism,” means that every property of Booker is necessary for his existence. If Booker were to lack even one property that defines his being, then it would not be Booker. So if Booker were a woman, then it would not be Booker. If Booker were not human, then it would not be Booker. Further, since our choices define who we are, every choice is necessary to Booker’s essence. If Booker did not go to Columbia, then it would not be Booker. If Booker did not commit the atrocities at Wounded Knee, then it would not be Booker.
Third, we could maintain an intermediate position, namely that some of the properties of an individual are essential to him or her. This position, sometimes referred to as moderate essentialism, entails that some properties are essential and some are not. Unfortunately, there is wide disagreement among philosophers about which kind of properties are essential. We might say, for example, that Booker’s hairstyle is not essential to his being, but his choices are. Or, we might say that Booker’s occupation is not essential to his being, but his beliefs are. The burden of moderate essentialists, though, is to explain why some properties are more important than others.
As we saw earlier, it is highly contested among philosophers (even those who are willing to accept the possible worlds lingo) whether individuals can exist in more than one world. Given our analysis of essentialism, we can start to piece together how certain views would entail other positions about modality. Since the anti-essentialist maintains that there are no properties of an individual that are necessary to him or her, it is easy to understand how individuals can exist differently in other possible worlds. Booker can be completely different in another world and still be Booker. Similarly, since a moderate essentialist maintains that some properties are not essential to the individual, the very same individual can exist in other possible worlds. However, a superessentialist believes that individuals are world-bound; that is, they only exist in their own world—not other possible worlds. This must follow because if every property is essential to the individual, then there would be no way to individuate one individual in one world from another individual in another world.4
Rosalind Lutece: When I was a girl, I dreamt of standing in a room, looking at a girl who was and was not myself, who stood looking at another girl who was and was not myself. My mother took this as a nightmare. I saw it as the beginning of a career in physics.
With a basic groundwork of possible worlds in place, we are now in a position to evaluate the BioShock games in terms of whether a coherent theory of transworld identity or counterpart theory is present. By way of reminder, transworld identity stipulates that an individual x can exist in world W1 and an individual y can exist in world W2 and that x is identical to y. By contrast, counterpart theory stipulates that x and y are not identical in this case, but can be counterparts of one another depending on the strictness of our similarity relation.
The earlier discussion regarding actualism and possibilism is important, because if we are going to talk about individuals existing in worlds, then we need to be clear about what kinds of things worlds are. Transworld identity is a much easier thesis to accept for a possibilist because modal realism holds that other possible worlds are concrete in just the way that the actual world is concrete. Things are much more complicated for an actualist with regard to transworld identity. After all, it is initially unclear how an individual in the actual world could be identical to an abstract entity. To address this problem, many actualists re-conceive what it means to exist in a possible world. Rather than think of other possible worlds as concrete entities, actualists tend to think of a possible world as a world that might have been actual, but was not.
Even though transworld identity is easier to accept for a possibilist, the standard account of modal realism denies that individuals can be identical across possible worlds. Instead, it endorses a version of counterpart theory. The reason for this is the logical law of identity. It is illogical to suppose that an individual in one world can have a certain set of properties that is different from the individual to whom they are identical in another possible world. For example, if we suppose that Booker in one world is identical with Comstock in another, and also that Booker and Comstock have different properties, then they cannot be identical. After all, if two things are identical, then they share all of their properties (according to the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals).
To address this problem, modal realists tend to accept a counterpart theory that is based on similarity, but not identity. In this sense, an individual can be a counterpart of another individual in a different possible world if the individuals are sufficiently similar in the appropriate way. So the question remains, what kind of modal theories does BioShock Infinite seem to accept?
Insofar as Columbia, Rapture, and an infinite number of other possible worlds are depicted as concrete places and not abstract entities, this seems to be evidence for a version of modal realism. Nevertheless, there are a few objections to what might otherwise seem like an obvious answer. Perhaps most significantly, modal realists tend to identify possible worlds as isolated in space and time. This means that it is metaphysically impossible to get to another possible world.5 Since one of the major story and gameplay mechanics in BioShock Infinite is that the player can manipulate tears in space and time through Elizabeth, we should be careful about attributing possibilism to the series. Nevertheless, possibilism is a much better fit for BioShock Infinite than actualism, and, as such, a counterpart theoretic model seems most fitting.
Elizabeth: They’re a million million worlds. All different and all similar. Constants and variables.
To demonstrate the counterpart theory, consider three pivotal figures in the BioShock universe: Booker DeWitt, Elizabeth Comstock, and the Lutece twins.
First, in one of the final revelations of the game, the player finds out that Booker DeWitt is a counterpart of Zachary Comstock, the Prophet and founder of Columbia. Comstock is the manifestation of Booker when he was baptized after the battle of Wounded Knee. The two characters are clear counterparts because they share a plurality of properties and are differentiated in the story merely by the choice to be baptized. The origins of their life up to the baptism are identical, their bodies are mostly identical, their relations to others are identical, and so forth.
Second, when Booker is tasked with delivering the young Anna DeWitt to Comstock to expunge his gambling debts, he changes his mind at the last moment and tries to keep her in his own world. In one of the most significant moments of the game, Anna’s finger becomes severed, part of it stays in Booker’s world, and the rest goes along with Anna into Comstock’s reality. As a result, Anna DeWitt exists in multiple realities. Again, we have a clear case of a counterpart. Like Booker and Comstock, Anna and Elizabeth share similar origins, bodies, relation to others, and so forth. Elizabeth Comstock, Anna DeWitt’s counterpart, is not the only character in BioShock Infinite to exist in different possible worlds, though.
Finally, and perhaps most obvious to the discussion of counterparts, we have the ubiquitous and mysterious Lutece twins. In the game, Rosalind was a quantum physicist with primary areas of research in other possible worlds. During her research, she was able to communicate with her “twin” in another possible reality—a counterpart named Robert. When the Luteces tried to help Elizabeth so that the prophecy foretelling the destruction of New York City would not occur, Comstock ordered Jeremiah Fink to sabotage the machine that the Luteces were using to create the tears in reality. Instead of the twins being killed, though, they gained the ability to exist in all possible worlds. This is an even clearer case of counterparts, because the existence of Robert Lutece comes directly from Rosalind.
In one of the most significant revelations in the game, Elizabeth leads Booker to a place that exists outside of space and time (at least in the traditional sense) and contains an infinite set of lighthouses—doors to other realities. One of these realities was the world from the previous BioShock entries, Rapture. Compellingly, philosophical issues of identity do not manifest from one game alone, but across different games. Not only does Booker have a counterpart in Comstock, he also has a counterpart in Jack, the protagonist from the first game. In what might be very easily overlooked, the original BioShock indicates that only Andrew Ryan can operate the bathyspheres. Because Jack is connected to Andrew Ryan, he can operate them too. But what happens when Elizabeth takes Booker to Rapture to escape Songbird? He operates the bathysphere just like Jack! The analogy works on a different level, too. Since Booker is a counterpart of Jack, it could also be the case that Comstock is a counterpart of Andrew Ryan, since both of them can technically operate the bathyspheres. Further, since the counterpart relation is based on a similarity relation that could change, it might be argued that there are other trans-game counterparts such as the Big Daddy and Songbird, Dr. Tenenbaum and Dr. Lutece, and also Fontaine and Daisy Fitzroy.
Elizabeth: There’s always a lighthouse, there’s always a man, there’s always a city…
Part of what makes BioShock great is that so much of each story is left to thoughtful players to piece together themselves. Much of what I have presented here is not explicit in the games, but nevertheless seems to follow from what we do know about their universe. BioShock Infinite is particularly exciting to both philosophy and the series because it brilliantly depicts a way in which prior games fit into the larger picture, while also laying a foundation for possible future stories to come. It should not be lost on the player and reader that there are seemingly an infinite number of stories, which manifest in different ways. Having said that, if we take Elizabeth at her word that there is always a lighthouse, a man, and a city, then BioShock is depicting something that philosophers have been grappling with for thousands of years; namely, the existence of God.
Philosophers traditionally conceive of God as a necessary being. Given our framework of possible worlds, this means that if God exists (as a necessary being), then he exists in all possible worlds. Put differently, if God exists, it is precisely his necessity that governs his existence in all possible worlds instead of only some possible worlds. But this is exactly the story that BioShock depicts; namely, the existence of necessary beings. The man, whether it is Jack or Booker, is a different manifestation of the same being. They are counterparts of one another. We might object here that the analogy isn’t perfect, because Jack or Booker does not exist in all possible worlds and so can’t fit the model of a necessary being. But then, what about the Lutece twins? The result of “dying” in their machine was that they were able to manifest in any reality whatsoever, not just Columbia. For all we know, it seems to be consistent with the reality of BioShock that they could appear in future representations of the city—not just Rapture or Columbia. In effect, they are necessary beings and satisfy at least one major component of the traditional conception of God.
Elizabeth: They’re doors to everywhere. All that’s left is the choosing.
In the metaphysics of modality, things become much more complicated than even the complex BioShock series depicts.6 In the games, possible worlds exist based only on the choices that individuals make within those worlds. The logical possibilities are more vast than can manifest through choices alone. After all, it is possible that there is a world with nobody making choices at all! We might also wonder about the veridicality of Elizabeth’s claim that there is always a lighthouse, a man, and a city. Is there really supposed to be a connection here to divinity? Or are the only worlds that we care about the ones that tell this basic story in different ways? Finally, even if we grant that there is a possible world for each new choice that people make in those worlds, why should we conclude that all possible Comstocks are destroyed once Booker allows Elizabeth to drown him at the end? By BioShock’s own logic, there should be a possible world where he does not allow Elizabeth to drown him, too.
Its far-reaching implications make BioShock such a worthy philosophical endeavor. The games connect issues in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and political theory to one strong story that manifests in a plurality of ways. Perhaps what is most exciting about BioShock is that even though an infinite number of possible stories are on the horizon, the series also asks the player to consider what we even mean when talking about what it means to be possible in the first place. In this way, BioShock at its best is akin to philosophy at its best. Both draw attention to certain presuppositions that we take for granted. Not everything is possible. But BioShock certainly makes us reconsider traditional answers associated with the question.7