Sturmgeschutz

The tank destroyer detachments of the Heereseinheiten (army, infantry and tank divisions) were vital parts of their mother units, especially for the infantry which lacked any armour. Evolved during the 1930s, their main armament was the 3.7cm Panzerabwehrkanone (PaK), which was designed to combat tanks fitted with up to 30mm armour. The gun was light, easy to move and had similar ballistic performance to anti-tank guns then in service with the armies of other nations.

During the invasion of France it became apparent that the 3.7cm PaK was not powerful enough to defeat the majority of French tank types. Deliveries of the more powerful 5cm PaK 38 had begun, albeit at a slow pace, in early summer 1940 and only a few reached front-line troops.

From the launch of Operation Barbarossa, all divisional Panzerjäger-Abteilungen (PzJgAbt – tank hunter battalions) came under extreme pressure as the Red Army deployed increasing numbers of T-34 and KV tanks, and all available weapons had to be used to stop this threat. Unfortunately the new 5cm PaK 38 could not defeat the latest Soviet armour, and the 3.7cm PaK could only be used to attack light tanks. On 27 March 1942, Armeeoberkommando 2 (AOK 2) summarized the situation on the Eastern Front and submitted a report to Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South):

1) The earlier provision of anti-tank weapons to the army was, regarding calibre, not sufficient to effectively destroy all types of enemy tank found in Russia. During the winter fighting, it proved necessary to move artillery or 8.8cm Flugzeugabwehrkanone (FlaK guns) forward to assist the tank destroyer companies. Newly-designed ammunition allowed troops to combat against enemy tanks with some chance of success. However, the overall situation requires an increase in the calibre of our tank destroyer weapons. As a consequence, this development resulted in an increase in the number of different gun types, many of different calibre. Furthermore, guns from the artillery, 8.8cm FlaK and Sturmgeschütz also had to be used.

The assorted problems caused by this great variety of weapons, i.e. training, the different equipment, organization of the tank destroyer units on the battlefield and the ammunition supply are obvious. However, these points shall not be explained here in detail. For example, according to the order from OrgAbt to increase our anti-tank capabilities, a Panzerjäger-Kompanie can have up to three different guns in its inventory.

2) The above-mentioned weapons, which are at present available in many variations, are the most effective against tanks. It would be wise to give them back into the hands of the specialists, the artillery. The previously available self-propelled guns delivered to the tank destroyer units are the result of attempts to regain a sufficient mobility. However a better-suited weapon is already available in the shape of the Sturmgeschütz, which has proven to be highly effective in the Ostfeldzug [eastern campaign]. After the failure of all other defensive weapons, with respect to their inadequate calibre (anti-tank guns in the infantry) or because of poor mobility (le FH and FlaK guns), the Sturmgeschütz was often the last armour-defeating weapon combining sufficient calibre and mobility.

The Sturmgeschütz of 14.LwFeldDiv were used for field exercises in Norway until being withdrawn. An exercise Schiedsrichter (arbitrator), recognizable by the white band around his field cap, is on the engine deck. (Kocsis)

These few concise lines repeat and summarize the situation in the German infantry divisions on the Eastern Front after late 1941. With the knowledge that their own towed anti-tank guns were totally inadequate for defeating current Soviet armour, conventional artillery and anti-aircraft artillery weapons had to be used; especially light and heavy field guns. Any pieces withdrawn and moved forward left serious gaps in the artillery defences, and there was the logistical problem of moving large quantities of ammunition.

During the period November 1942 to March 1943, Sturmgeschütz were delivered to units painted to suit the deployment. This interesting photograph shows an early production Ausf G from PzJgAbt 1021 (L) finished in Dunkelgrau (dark grey). Although the vehicle has a standard superstructure, it is fitted with track guards from the first production batch. (Anderson)

Military planners decided to expedite the development of more effective 7.5cm guns. By early 1942, four different designs for 7.5cm and 7.62cm had been completed with little thought given to a more complicated ammunition supply. Another problem that was underestimated was the inability of German industry to deliver sufficient numbers of tractor units to tow these heavier guns. A logical solution was to mount a number of these new guns on obsolete light tank chassis, resulting in Selbstfahrlafetten (Sfl – self-propelled guns).

The unknown writer of the summary came to the conclusion that these self-propelled guns would not be the last word on the subject. He pointed out that the Sturmgeschütz would continue to fulfill all requirements and had the advantage of already being available. The report continues:

3) The question is as to whether the Sturmgeschütz design should be improved:-

a)Mount an 8.8cm gun in place of the 7.5cm: This question can be answered after the designers have checked if this is at all feasible.

b)Continue to utilize the standard gun mounting or change to a rotating turret: Importantly it should be noted that the extraordinary accuracy of the Sturmgeschütz is mainly due to the excellent gun mounting. Also it must be confirmed that a turret-mounted gun will have the same performance before progressing. The principle weakness with the Sturmgeschütz – the lack of 360° traverse – has been noted.

4) We suggest that each division be provided with a Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung within the framework of current organizational structures. Thus the division will receive a potent tank destroyer and also an effective infantry escort weapon. It is obvious that an upgrading from 7.5cm to 8.8cm gun will result in a higher kill rate, and needs no further explanation. With assignment of an integral Sturmgeschütz element, the [infantry] division will be independent from Heerestruppen [army troops]. The previous Heerestruppen-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen will then be solely available for the creation of points of main efforts. Furthermore, Herrestruppen-StuGAbt can substitute the Heeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilungen [tank destroyer battalion at army troop level].

A Sturmgeschütz from PzJgAbt 1014 (L) finished in light tropical camouflage which has been ‘modified’ with patches of a darker colour applied by brush. The name ‘Erika’ has been painted on the side pannier. The frontal plate had been reinforced to 80mm by bolting on an extra 30mm of armour. (Anderson)

The demands noted in item 3, are understandable as Panzerschock (tank shock) was still prevalent in troops on the front line. At that time all Sturmgeschütz mounted the short-barrel 7.5cm KwK L/24 gun, but the more potent 7.5cm KwK/StuK 40 was entering production and StuGs mounting the weapon would soon be available to front-line units. However, the existent StuG design would not allow installation of a heavy weapon such as the 8.8cm gun.

A Sturmgeschütz from a LwFeldDiv. The unit used single letters (here the letter ‘D’) to identify their vehicles using the old-style German ‘Fraktur’ script. Note the name ‘Ruth’ stencilled on the pannier and that this Ausf F/8 has an extra 30mm of armour welded on. At right a soldier wears a Fallschim-Schützenbluse, (paratrooper combat blouse) also known as a Knochensack (sack of bones). (Historyfacts)

However, the suggestion of re-designing the StuG as a turreted tank is most interesting. The gun mounting in the StuG was fitted with a periscopic Zielfernrohr 1a (ZF – sighting telescope) gunsight which proved to be superior to the Turmzielfernrohr 5f (TZF – turret sighting telescope) used in the Panzer IV, and this advantage was considered more important than a traversable turret.

The request for a StuGAbt for every division had already been proposed during the creation of the Sturmartillerie. By 1942, the priorities had changed, combat against enemy tanks was considered to be more important than the originally proposed infantry support role. Also it must be remembered that production in Germany’s heavy industries was stretched to capacity, and this demand could never be realized. The summary continues:

5) The sensitivity of the Sturmgeschütz to attack on the flank made it necessary to deploy 2cm FlaK 38 guns. It should be considered to provide two anti-aircraft batteries for every StuGAbt (each with three StuGBttr). The 2cm Flak will be used as a light support weapon, and also it will provide the division with the urgently needed anti-tank protection.

Item 5 highlights one of the main disadvantages of the Sturmgeschütz design; the lack of a close-defence weapon which caused assault gun crews to rely on close cooperation with the escorting infantry. These troops specially trained to eliminate enemy anti-tank teams and also locate targets for a StuG commander: vision from inside a StuG was dangerously restricted (as in any fully-enclosed armoured vehicle). In reality, many superior officers in the infantry were often unable or just unwilling to assist the commander of a StuG. In 1944, this development was taken into account by adding an integral GrenBeglBttr (escort grenadier batteries), and in some cases PzBeglBttr (escort tank batteries) equipped with the PzKpfw II mounting a 2cm gun.

The crew in this photograph of a Sturmgeschütz Ausf F/8 confirms that the men of Luftwaffe Felddivisionen were not always supplied with Sonderbekleidung for Panzer (special tank uniform); two are wearing overalls and two are in standard field uniform. A Luftwaffe eagle is clearly visible on the jacket of the seated soldiers. It was common practice for crews to reinforce the thin armour of the side panniers by adding spare track sections, in this case wider Winterketten (winter tracks). (von Aufsess)

6) We herewith suggest the tank destroyer detachment of the [infantry] division be organized as follows:

a)The Infanterie-Panzerjäger-Kompanie in its previous form with 7.5cm PaK 40.

b)A StuGAbt with three StuGBttr and two FlaKBttr (2cm Sfl), placed under the command of the divisional artillery leader.

7) Ultimately, this solution will result in an amalgamation of the Panzerjägerwaffe (tank destroyer army) in the Sturmartillerie. It will also lead to a simplification of leadership and organization. The solution will still be known as the Sturmartillerie, since it complies with the nature of the weapon, and its deployment.

Again this is not surprising. Towards the end of 1942, the General der Sturmartillerie feared that his force would no longer be autonomous. His counterpart Guderian, who should effectively reorganize the Schnelle Truppen (rapid forces) into the Panzertruppen, demanded that all armoured formations would come under his control. However, he only achieved parts of his demand.

A further report submitted by AOK 2, dated September 1942, is more interesting as it underlines the increased importance of the Sturmgeschütz for anti-tank defence:

The report emphasizes that the enemy suffered heavy tank losses due to our new anti-tank weapons. This fact led to him changing how he deployed his tanks. During an attack, the majority of his tanks will be held back behind his infantry, supporting it similar way to our assault guns but from longer ranges. When we counterattack, his tanks will be quickly dug-in for shelter and establish a most effective, actively led defence.

With this method, the enemy weakens his offensive power on behalf of saving his equipment. He sacrifices his infantry to a considerable extent, and slows down the speed of his advance. On the other hand we cannot effectively follow his tanks as our heavy PaK rely on motorized traction. Thus our counterattacks are impeded to a very high degree. This development makes the replacement of all army and divisional tank destroyer battalions by StuGAbt more important and urgent. As all other after-action reports have shown, Sturmgeschütz are the most effective, most mobile and best-protected anti-tank weapon.

After-action reports from a number of PzJgAbt have confirmed the superiority of Sturmgeschütz to towed or self-propelled anti-tank guns. In February 1943, PzJgAbt 41 of 6.PzDiv submitted its combat experiences in a report:

The following experience report is based on the offensive and defensive battles fought by six Panzer divisions in the Don/Donets area over the period of 1 December 1943 to 9 February 1943.

The combat of [enemy] tanks against [our] tank destroyers was of a special character… Referring to the tactical commitment, the majority of enemy tanks were impervious to the armour-piercing weapons of the PzJgAbt. Unfortunately the greater penetration power of our defensive weapons could not be brought into effect. The Soviet tanks [T-34 and KV-1] have the following advantages:

c)Mobile deployment in the artillery role from ranges where our armour-piercing weapons could not be effective.

In general destructive only against advancing enemy tanks, but not against tanks used as under (c)

This self-propelled gun must be regarded as not ideal, but a sufficiently suitable interim solution.

e)The comparison of losses and performance figures for a PzJgAbt with a StuGAbt – in combat at the same time and area – shows a measurable improvement:

The quality of the Russian tanks and how they are tactically deployed requires the creation of superior ways to combat them. Today as always, we need ‘Panzerjäger’. The Sturmgeschütz is the ideal solution as it ensures maximum results at low effort.

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf F/8 from a Luftwaffe unit loaded on Sonderanhänger 116 (SdAnh – special-purpose trailer) for recovery. This Ausf F/8 is fitted with an eight-hole type drive sprocket as used on early PzKpfw III tanks, and also external Filzbalgfilter (air filters) mounted on the engine air vents both of which suggest that it is in service with a Ausbildungs und Ersatzabteilung (training and replacement unit). (Anderson)

A group of officers of the PzDiv Hermann Göring gather around a Sturmgeschütz Ausf F/8. The side panniers and frontal areas have been covered with spare track links to improve protection; standard practice for many crews of early StuGs. The narrow ravine gives a good impression of the difficult combat conditions experienced in southern Italy. (Anderson)

Kolberg 1945: This most unusual Sturmgeschütz thought to be from a Luftwaffe unit, possibly 12.LwFeldDiv. The vehicle is based on a PzKpfw III hull, but is fitted with Sturmgeschütz Ausf G superstructure without the commander’s cupola. The vehicle is fitted with Seitenschürzen (side skirts) and has a protective cover mounted over the driver’s visor. A thick coating of concrete has been applied to the superstructure for added protection. (Netrebenko)

The crew of this Sturmgeschütz Ausf F/8 have carefully whitewashed their vehicle; only black Balkenkreuze and its thin outline is visible. It has welded-on armour at the front and the crew has placed track links on the front and sides to improve protection. Note the wire mesh cage fitted over the gunner’s periscope was used only on this particular production batch. (Anderson)

In late 1942, the first infantry units were issued with Sturmgeschütz, but for reasons unknown the newly established Luftwaffe-Feldeinheiten (air force field units) were given preferential treatment.

Generalfeldmarschall Göring had been planning the establishment of Luftwaffe-Feldeinheiten (field units) since 1941. In 1942, at a time when the armed forces first experienced a problem in finding sufficient replacements for the many personnel lost during fighting in the Russian winter, Göring managed to receive wide approval for his plan. His argument was eased by the fact that a large number of well-trained troops were available in Luftwaffe regiments stationed in France.

Similar to the establishment of SS units, Göring would also put great emphasis on better treatment of his men. Possibly this was the reason his units received Sturmgeschütz from when they were formed. Meanwhile, the depleted army infantry divisions had to continue fighting with the equipment they had available, before finally receiving StuGs.

A short entry in the war diary of Organisationsabteilung (OrgAbt – organizational department) dated 25 August 1942 confirms a conflict of interest:

The Luftwaffe demands that the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht changes the previous ratio of Zugkraftwagen [ZgKw – tractors] allotted to its benefit. Such a demand does not comply with the actual situation, and was sharply rejected by the OKW.

The ambitious plans initiated by Göring saw the establishment of 20 Luftwaffe-Feldbrigaden (infantry brigades) and the first eight units were formed in October 1942. Despite their size, these units were referred to as divisions.

The establishment did not happen without some problems, as noted in the diary of the OrgAbt on 26 October 1942:

The order for the establishment of Luftwaffe-Feldbrigaden decisively impairs the current state of material planning. The effect is greatest in the supply of soft-skinned vehicles. Faced with a difficult situation, OrgAbt applied for the number of cross-country vehicles to be reduced by 50 per cent. This request was accepted. Likewise only 33 per cent of the required ZgKw can be supplied and 66 per cent will be substituted by agricultural tractors and trucks.

This comment confirms that Germany’s armaments and heavy industries were unable to satisfy the demands of the military. The Luftwaffe units were all destined to fight on the Eastern Front where heavy Zugkraftwagen were essential, but an agricultural tractor would be useless and not even a poor substitute.

A battle-worn Sturmgeschütz from PzDiv Hermann Göring in service with forces sent to defend Sicily in 1943. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz from PzDiv Hermann Göring crashes through a shallow stone wall for the benefit of a propaganda photographer. Such action would not be possible if the StuG had been fitted with Seitenschürzen (side skirts) as they would have easily ripped off. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf F/8 from PzDiv Hermann Göring passes some German infantrymen concealed in the shadow of a large cactus plant. The vehicle has been fitted with a shield for the machine gun by the workshop company. (Münch)

Despite our determined concerns expressed during the formation of the first ten Luftwaffe field divisions, the establishment of a further ten field divisions has been ordered. The requirement for 6,000 soft-skinned vehicles will result in the postponement of re-equipping four to five Panzer divisions.

At the same time as the note was written, some 16 Panzer divisions in the east were in urgent need of being re-equipped.

The first eight Luftwaffe-Felddivisionen (LwFeldDiv) were in fact not more than reinforced infantry regiments, formed with four infantry battalions, a PzJgAbt, a schwere Artillerie-Abteilung (s ArtAbt – heavy artillery battalion) and support elements. From the very beginning, a Sturmgeschütz detachment was an integral element of the s ArtAbt.

On 21 November 1942, Göring as Reichminister der Luftfahrt (Secretary of Aviation) and Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Supreme Commander of the Air Force), ordered the establishment of further Luftwaffe field units:

a)A leichte Artillerie-Abteilung [light artillery battalion] with three batteries each with four 7.5cm Feldkanone 243(h) or three batteries each with four 7.65cm Feldkanone(t)

c)Two batteries each with four horse-drawn 15cm Feldhaubitz 414(f),and one StuG battery with four Sturmgeschütz.

Once again the parlous state of Germany’s industry revealed. Even the artillery battalions of the Göring ‘elite’ units had to rely on captured light and heavy artillery pieces of either Dutch (h), Czechoslovak (t) or French (f) origin. Even by the end of 1942, the heavy artillery battalion was horse drawn. However, one should remember that the actual organization of the Luftwaffe field units was dependent on what equipment was available which resulted in many variations.

The small StuG detachment was initially attached to the heavy artillery battalion, but later assault guns were also issued to the tank destroyer detachments; proof of a change in priorities. These Luftwaffe StuG batteries were authorized to have only four assault guns each, possibly this was due to the delivery situation. Despite of this reduced allotment, workshop and supply elements were identically equipped as that for an independent StuGBttr equipped with six or ten Sturmgeschütz, similar to that noted in KStN 446a. The Organisationsabteilung would repeatedly regret this oversupply.

One of the few available documents describing the commitment of Luftwaffe field divisions was submitted by AOK 18 on 2 April 1943. The reason for this report is unknown as it was compiled by a Sonderbeauftragter für Panzerabwehr (special envoy for anti-tank defences). However, details taken from it allow an interesting view on the efficiency of German weapons, and possibly the basic tactics employed.

Sturmgeschütz Battery for Luftwaffe Feld-Divisionen

Table of organization with four Sturmgeschütz, KStN unknown.

A rare view into the loader’s hatch of a Sturmgeschütz Ausf G from PzDiv Hermann Göring; the empty bracket was for a Maschinenpistole (MP) 40 machine gun. Note the thin armour plate used for the roof of the fighting compartment; this could be penetrated by a hit from infantry mortar shell. (Anderson)

18.Army was part of the force surrounding the city of Leningrad in the northern sector of the Eastern Front. Among the forces having tanks or Sturmgeschütz were s PzAbt 502, StuGAbt 226, and 1, 10, 12 and 13.LwFeldDiv.

During these commitments, s PzAbt 502 had a maximum of six PzKpfw VI Tigers and 15 PzKpfw III tanks combat ready. StuGAbt 226 had 41 Sturmgeschütz, including recently allocated vehicles. The four LwFeldDiv had 20 StuG in total, again including recently allocated vehicles.

In terms of anti-tank defences; the remaining field units were equipped with 253 medium PaK (5cm PaK 38) and 383 heavy PaK (7.5cm PaK 97/38, 7.62cm PaK (r) and 7.5cm PaK 40) the heavy being towed and self-propelled (SP).

	s PzAbt 502	StuGAbt 226	Luftwaffe Sturmgeschütz	Towed and SP anti-tank guns (other units)
Enemy tanks destroyed	160	210	17	482
Personnel losses	49	87	32	?
Own losses (total)	9 Tiger 13 PzKpfw III	13	5	?

The Luftwaffe infantry units (presumably) used their small Sturmgeschütz detachments for long-range tank defence and local counterattacks. On 14 April 1943, 13 Luftwaffe field divisions were in combat, and those fighting with 18.Army reported their availability:

	1.LwFeldDiv	10.LwFeldDiv	12.LwFeldDiv	13.LwFeldDiv
Combat ready	4	2	4	–
In need of repair	–	1	–	1
In supply	–	1	–	3

Initially StuG units were issued with SdKfz 252 armoured ammunition carriers. When production of this highly-specialized vehicle ended 1941, a simpler variant was built on the chassis of the SdKfz 250 light armoured halftrack. The SdKfz 250/6 (Ausf A) carred 70 rounds of 7.5cm StuK L/24 ammunition had the Ausf B variant carried 60 rounds 7.5cm StuK 40 L/48 (Ausf B) ammunition. The Sonderanhänger (SdAnh) 32 trailers were originally design to carry the much shorter L/24 round, but it was modified to carry 56 L/48 rounds. (Anderson)

A thoroughly camouflaged Sturmgeschütz parked in the main street of a town in Italy while being re-armed from an SdKfz 250/6 Munitionswagen (ammunition carrier). Note the bag filled with Stielhandgranate (stick grenades) on the rear of the vehicle. (Anderson)

The Sturmartillerie unit, StuGAbt 226, reported on 14 April 1943 that it had 13 Sturmgeschütz combat ready and a further 15 awaiting repair. At that time the battalion had implemented KStN 446a, which authorized 10 StuG in a battery, giving a total of 31 in a battalion, including a StuG for the commander..

If the unit could keep its batteries operational, then StuGAbt 226 would be a formidable combat force which could be deployed for attack missions in close support of the infantry or establish a strong tank defence.

On 25 September 1943, long after the failed offensive at Kursk, the number of StuG in LwFeldDiv detachments would not exceed four.

At the end of 1943 it was decided that all surviving LwFeldDiv were to be transferred to the army, but they would retain their original organization. This was accepted and 14 weakened Luftwaffe units passed to the army.

At this time of organizational chaos most LwFeldDiv relinquished their Sturmgeschütz batteries; their surplus equipment was used to establish new Heerestruppe StuGAbt, or passed to other units as replacements.

Hermann Göring promoted the establishment of Luftwaffe field units early. By 1935, police units served as a cadre for what was to become the Regiment Hermann Göring.

The regiment served during the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. During the invasion of Poland, most forces remained in Germany to guard Göring and his entourage. Later Regiment Hermann Göring participated in the Western campaign. During the initial phase of the invasion of the Soviet Union it served in close cooperation with 11.PzDiv.

By mid-1942 the unit was expanded to a brigade. During this process, it was decided to further enlarge it to a division. In September 1942, orders were given to establish the Division Hermann Göring with Panzer and Sturmgeschütz to the same extent as the Panzerdivisions in the West.

At roughly the same time OrgAbt announced it would establish StuG-Abteilungen for 6., 7. and 10.PzDiv using the material of StuGAbt 209. Here usage of the term Abteilung is misleading, as the units intended for the PzDiv were to have the size of a company battery, with a maximum of 11 assault guns, and should be part of the PzJgAbt. However, these plans were not continued in 1942. Instead, Hermann Göring (HG) division should receive two Panzer-Abteilungen, and an entire StuGAbt in its artillery regiment.

When, by the end of 1942, the situation in North Africa came to a crisis, parts of the Division Hermann Göring were sent to Tunisia. By May 1943, the unit had capitulated to the Allied forces.

A Sturmgeschütz had racks installed to carry 54 rounds of 7.5cm GrPatr ammunition. However, StuG crews were known to increase the ‘official’ amount by removing the racks. Often they packed up to 90 rounds into the interior, with the crew virtually sitting on shells. (Anderson)

Organizational structure for the Hermann Göring Division in October 1942.

The remaining remnants were now ordered for re-establishment as a Panzerdivision, now forming the PzDiv Hermann Göring (HG). By June it was transferred to Sicily to defend the island against the anticipated landing.

Compared with the older division, PzDiv HG showed a much stronger material equipment. The Panzerregiment now consisted of two Panzer-Abteilungen with four mittlere Kompanien each, summing up to 176 tanks. The Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung “HG” was now part of the PzRgt, as its III. Abteilung. This accoutrement complied with the early new 43.PzDiv organizational standard (with PzRgt 43). This standard was not adopted for other units – PzDiv “HG” was much stronger than any other Panzerdivision, which were organized according the normal 43.PzDiv standard, lacking the StuG-Abteilung.

PzDiv HG’s III.Abteilung (10., 11., 12. Batterie of PzRgt HG) was organized according the KStN 446a dated 1 November 1942. Each battery had ten Sturmgeschütz, of which three were Sturmhaubitzen.

Organizational structure for Fallschirmjäger-Panzerdivision (Paratroop tank division) Hermann Göring 1943 to 1944.

The commitment of Sturmgeschütz in the southern theatre of war (Sicily and Italy) was not without problems. The 11. (StuG)/PzRgt HG submitted an after-action report by October 1943 when in defensive positions near Caivano and Cardito near Naples::

After strong enemy infantry and tank forces broke through our positions near Cardito at 16:00hrs, I met the leader of the PzAufklAbt [reconnaissance battalion], Hauptmann Lübke. He gave the order to launch a counterattack with my available Sturmgeschütz. I manned two assault guns, whose crew had been relieved after being wounded, with the crew of a Sturmhaubitze whose vehicle had a jammed gun breach. I decided to lead the counterattack with my own and the other two Sturmgeschütz, and called for infantry support. Lübke told me to grab any man I could find. With 30 men I started the attack by slowly moving forward, with both sides guarded. We moved into positions at the southern boundary of Caivano. The enemy opened a heavy mortar bombardment. After 10mins, Lübke ordered a withdrawal to centre of the village. I retreated for some 200m. A short time later, Lübke joined us and ordered us to proceed with the counterattack. Approaching an S-shaped bend in the road at the southern edge of Caivano, our view ahead was completely blocked by a high stone wall. I informed Lübke that any further advance was impossible, since our line of fire was totally obstructed. I stopped 10m before the second curve and ordered the infantry forward to scout the road. They reported that several Sherman tanks were stationary on the road. Lübke gave orders to immediately cross a field in a right-hand direction and open fire on the enemy tanks. I argued that this position was very unfavourable. Lübke replied, “Move up, there is no alternative, it’s either you or the Shermans.” I drove to the ordered position, but due to the muddy ground my vehicle moved very slowly. It took some 5mins to move into position. Although their engines of the enemy tanks were not running, their guns tracked our advance exactly and aimed at us. Despite this I fired my first round. A second later, I received the first hit and our engine stalled. I tried to fire a smoke candle, but received a second hit which struck the left slope above the driver’s visor. The impact lifted off the roof plate over my gunner and hit and damaged the cupola, then slowly fell into the fighting compartment and struck my hand. I instantly ordered the crew to abandon leave the Sturmgeschütz, but I was catapulted out by the shockwave of a third hit. When I regained consciousness, some 40m from my vehicle, I became aware of two infantrymen dressing my wounds. A short time later a second Sturmgeschütz moved up, but also received a direct hit. As I was still able to move, I climbed onto the assault gun and returned.

This Sturmgeschütz Ausf G has been built using the hull of a PzKpfw III; one of a number of expedients employed to keep a constant supply of this valuable battlefield asset. The original 50mm hull armour has been reinforced by welding on extra 30mm armour plate. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf F/8 from PzDiv Hermann Göring has its tactical number ‘34’ stencilled on the gun’s armoured sleeve and has been retrofitted with a machine-gun shield. The Ausf F/8 is followed by a Sturmhaubitze (assault howitzer) armed with a 10.5cm light field howitzer; proof that they were also issued to units other than Sturmartillerie (assault artillery). (Anderson)

The after action report sent by the Batterieführer was instantly commented on by the StuGAbt commander:

Attached to this letter is an after action report of 11.(StuG)7.PzRgt HG describing the total loss of a Sturmhaubitze, the temporary failure of a further Sturmgeschütz and the considerable loss of life.

All losses were caused by the absolutely wrong commitment of the Sturmgeschütz, ordered by Hauptmann Lübke.

It is absolutely impossible to commit Sturmgeschütze in such a combat situations – especially in darkness – without determined infantry support. A StuG cannot defend itself at night. At 16.45hrs, the order was given to move into an absolutely inappropriate position to combat the enemy tanks. The leader of 11.Bttr rejected the order due to the onset of darkness, but this was overruled and he continued the deployment.

The battalion considers that by ignoring the legitimate objections of a battery leader, we regard the actions of this officer, who lacked experience and any knowledge of the tactical commitment of Sturmgeschütz, as intolerable. With his exclamation “you or the Shermans”, the loss of men and equipment was recklessly accepted. If the Sturmgeschütz had been deployed correctly, we could have inflicted serious damage on the enemy without any loss of personnel.

The Abteilung hereby issues a reprimand Hauptmann Lübke for his poor judgement.

After-action report, 7 October 1943.

The low silhouette of the Sturmgeschütz made it simple to conceal by using camouflage, perfect for an ambush missions. However, high walls and tall hedgerows were a constant obstacle in Italy, and in dense scrub close cooperation with the infantry was indispensable. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf F/8 from 11.LwFeldDiv moves up on a dusty road during the assault on Greece in May 1943. The vehicle appears to have been delivered in tropical camouflage, certainly suitable for the conditions. For better ventilation, the large maintenance hatch over the gunner has been opened, and the wire mesh protective cover for the periscope is visible. Note the tactical marking ‘A’ stencilled on the gun mantlet. (Anderson)

This short report again proves that in the difficult Italian terrain tanks, and especially Sturmgeschütz were certainly not the best possible tools. Their commitment was severely limited by their design and their poor observation means. Steep ascents and descents overrated the performance of engines, brakes and the steering mechanism, leading to many technical losses. Especially in built up areas with narrow roads, walls and debris, the turretless Sturmgeschütz were dangerously handicapped. This problem, however, was known after Stalingrad at the latest. Here infantry would have to do the dirty job.

The reaction of the Abteilung’s leader to protect his subordinate is comradely, but hardly expedient. A better understanding, target-oriented training of the different subunits and subsequently improved cooperation is one of the pillars of success of any armed conflict.

The battery was attached to Abteilung Rossmann and deployed near Cardito. Two StuG commanded by Wachtmeister (Wm) Boerner were positioned as a forward observation post at the junction of Cardito-Afragola-Casavia road. The platoon of Stabswachtmeister (StWm) Schulze-Oswald was positioned with two StuG at the southern entrance to Cardito. Platoon Wallhäuser, with two StuG, secured the area 2km southeast of Cardito. At 17:45hrs it was reported that enemy tanks were advancing from Afragola. At around 18:00hrs, Oberleutnant Jekosch and Leutnant Roebig took a Beikrad (Beiwagenkrad – motorcycle with sidecar) to get in contact with the Platoon Boerner, which had become trapped. In the following action, Leutnant Boerner was fatally shot in the head; Jekosch and the driver were wounded. This alarmed the commander of Platoon Boerner who then decided to forcibly break-out to Cardito. During the fight two Sherman tanks were destroyed. Schulze-Oswald, in the following the StuG, destroyed the Sherman tank which had fired on the battery commander’s Beikrad. After Jekosch had been wounded, Schulze-Oswald assumed command of the assault guns positioned at the southern exit of Cardito.

From 19:00 to 23:30hrs we heard the distinctive sound of tank tracks, and estimated that 25 to 30 enemy tanks were advancing.

The two reconnaissance patrols sent out by Schulze-Oswald and Lübke failed to find the enemy. Two further patrols led by Schulze-Oswald also failed. Possibly the patrols did not advance far enough.

Success: Three enemy tanks (Sherman) destroyed. Two trucks with mounted infantry destroyed, and the following infantry was repulsed by machine-gun fire. Losses: Leutnant Roebig; dead: Oberleutnant Jekosch and Gefrieter Rabitsch; wounded. No material losses.

The same Ausf F/8 carrying a group of infantry during a field exercise. The vehicle is fitted with two 2m rod aerials, indicating that Sturmgeschütz ‘A’ was possibly a command vehicle. (Anderson)

This Sturmgeschütz Ausf G photographed during a field exercise carrying a Schiedsrichter (arbitrator), identifiable by the white band around his Schiffchen (forage cap). (Anderson)

(Note: The ranks Wachtmeister and Stabswachtmeister were by tradition only used by the artillery and cavalry, therefore also by the Sturmartillerie. Division Hermann Göring, as part of the Luftwaffe would normally use the same rank designations as the army. This remains a mystery.)

The 7.5cm StuK 40 main gun in the Sturmgeschütz proved to be superior to the 75mm Gun M1 used in early versions of the Sherman tank. However, combat tactics were much more important than just firepower and armour. An attacking tank was always at a disadvantage, especially when advancing against well-camouflaged enemy armour.

In December 1943, PzDiv Hermann Göring was in defensive positions to the north of Naples, before slowly retreating as superior Allied forces continued to advance.

Enemy has advanced in unknown strength and is attacking Height 670, some 2.5km east of Presenzano. Our reconnaissance squads were taken by surprise by the assaults. Oberleutnant Schröder is in the area with his Stabskompanie.

Oberleutnant Bellinger has launched a counterattack into the flanks of the Americans with Chefgeschütz (commander’s StuG), he has one infantry man as a dispatch rider. No combat possible from the road, so the StuG retreated to the cover of a hillside. Opened fire with a hollow-charge round and destroyed an enemy anti-tank rifle [Bazooka] position.

Successes: Enemy almost annihilated. Some areas of the hillside caught fire. One enemy officer and 12 troopers taken as prisoner, also two US anti-tank rifles [Bazooka] with ammunition, a machine gun with mounting, several rifles and other material were captured. Due to the burning scrub, other material and a number of seriously injured enemy soldiers could not be recovered.

Late in the afternoon the enemy had attacked from the southeast, hitting the right flank of the staff company. The tank destroyer platoon was taken by surprise and had to abandon two guns plus tractors. Two Sturmgeschütz were moved into positions on the road and prevented the enemy from advancing with well-directed fire. Despite this, our front-line positions had to be re-taken. To recover the abandoned anti-tank guns, an advance commenced at 20:00hrs, supported by the grenadiers, and one gun was recovered. A short time later a second attack, led by Bellinger, was launched. Under supporting fire from the Sturmgeschütz, the second anti-tank gun and tractor was recovered undamaged.

In the early afternoon, the enemy tried to infiltrate our lines to the left the Rome-Naples road, which ran along the foot of the mountains. These assaults were repelled by two Sturmgeschütz led by Bellinger by making use of the gun and the machine gun. The enemy was forced to retreat after suffering heavy losses. Later in the afternoon, the enemy launched three further attacks but all were repulsed.

The marking for Sturmgeschütz, a unit badge and a single identifier letter have been stencilled on the glacis plate, but the identity of the unit is unknown. The letter ‘A’ possibly indicates that it is from a small unit with only four to ten StuG; perhaps it is from a Luftwaffe field unit. (Anderson)

The assault gun crews of PzRgt Hermann Göring had shown, despite the terrain in Italy, their ability to successfully combat a superior enemy attacking with large numbers of well-equipped infantry. The clear advantage of a mobile anti-tank defence over a towed anti-tank gun is evidenced by the fact that the Germans had to abandon two guns. However, the situation favoured German forces as the attacking US force was not supported by tanks and also little or no air cover was provided by Allied air forces.

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G, photographed with 8.8cm-armed Nashorn tank destroyers, during the winter of 1943/44 on the Eastern Front. The vehicle carries the number ‘III’, in Roman-style numerals, on the rear of the hull and also the commander’s cupola. The vehicle is fitted with Sternantenne (star antenna) indicating that it is a command vehicle. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz from PzJgAbt 1011 (L) (11.LwFeldDiv) during the occupation of Greece; The 80mm frontal armour could resist fire from most enemy tank and anti-tank guns until 1944. However, it remained vulnerable to attack from the side and rear until the end of the war. (Anderson)

In October 1943 the 3.PzGrenDiv was reformed according to PzGrenDiv 43 standard, when it was planned to provide the unit with a PzStuGAbt equipped with 42 Sturmgeschütz. However, these were in short supply forcing the unit to use Italian-built Semovente (self-propelled) guns. Their situation changed in 1944 when they were supplied with a full complement of StuG. (Anderson)

Number of anti-tank guns:	18
Total losses:	10
Personnel losses:	86
Score:	45 enemy tanks

Number of StuG:	21
Total losses:	1
Personnel losses:	19
Score:	114 enemy tanks