Sturmgeschutz

Due to the lack of resources and limited production capacity in Germany, there were not enough assault guns available to be issued in battalion strength to each infantry division as was initially planned. Instead, all Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen (StuGAbt) were integrated at Heerestruppen (army troop) level, from where they were requested by infantry and tank units to assist at points of main effort. Thus the new weapon became the responsibility of and was controlled by the General der Artillerie.

However, there were many exceptions. With the establishment and expansion of the armed forces, the Waffen-SS units would have preference when Sturmgeschütz (if in small numbers) were issued. Other permanent subunits integrated for infantry support also received Sturmgeschütz in relative small numbers.

As Operation Barbarossa progressed an urgent requirement arose for an effective weapon to combat and defeat superior Soviet armour: the Sturmgeschütz would quickly prove to be absolutely suitable for this task.

Motivated by this development, the Organisationsabteilung (OrgAbt), seconded to the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH – High Command of the Army), again considered issuing Sturmgeschütz as a permanent subunit to various field units, more precisely the infantry divisions. However, despite of the high-flown plans of 1938 to 1940, Sturmgeschütz were now to be issued in company, rather than battalion strength.

Again the army was treated as a subordinate service. Hermann Göring, the chief of the Luftwaffe demanded that his Luftwaffe-Felddivisionen were to be the first to receive issues. But again, the number was small.

A new chapter in the history of the Sturmgeschütz service would be opened in 1943.

A Sturmgeschütz of III. Abt/PzRgt 2: The crew has attached lengths of track to the side of the hull as extra protection for this vulnerable area. A large wooden crate, fabricated in the field, is mounted on the rear of the engine deck. (Wilhelm)

Painted in a three-tone camouflage scheme, newly delivered Sturmgeschütz of III.Abt/PzRgt 2 (16.PzDiv) parked in a yard at their garrison before shipping-out to the Eastern Front. Note the Seitenschürzen (side skirts) are non-standard, the last plate appears to be another middle section. (Wilhelm)

German armies won a last series of battles in 1942. In North Africa, El Alamein was reached, and in southern Russia the Caucasus and Stalingrad.

However, the Allies continued to increase pressure on the German war machine. Although a failure, the amphibious assault by British-Canadian forces at Dieppe awakened the German military to the prospect of a second front in Europe.

While the situation at Leningrad in the north and also Moscow was relatively quiet, Hitler ordered his forces to advance south. His aim was to seize Stalingrad, the city bearing the name of his enemy, and understandably he wanted the oil; a strategic necessity. But he carelessly ignored the vastness of Russia. The initially successful offensive was split in two wedges; while the 6.Army advanced along the northern flank to finally reach Stalingrad, the southern forces spread out to take the Black Sea coast and finally advance to the Caucasus Mountains. If there were any critics, the speed of the advances silenced them. Hitler was so confident of achieving his targets that he would not listen to the Chief of Staff of the Army (Halder until September 1942, then Zeitzler). But was Hitler right; was he the military genius he truly believed he was?

History would show that by November 1942 German troops trying to take Stalingrad were overstretched and battle weary. A continuation of the attack on Stalingrad was fraught with danger, since neither replacement equipment nor fresh personnel could be sent. Nevertheless, 6.Army did succeed and occupied the most of the city. Despite being weakened and also battle weary, Soviet commanders combined all their offensive formations power and launched Operatsiya Uran (Operation Uranus). After some five days the Red Army had surrounded and trapped significant parts of 6.Army.

Three Sturmgeschütz of III.Abt/PzRgt 24 (24.PzDiv) during a short halt. The second StuG has lost the complete right-hand side set of Seitenschürzen (side skirts) making the vehicle vulnerable to attack by Soviet infantry armed with anti-tank rifles. (Münch)

On 31 January 1943, Feldmarschall Friedrich von Paulus was forced to surrender. The capitulation at Stalingrad had a disastrous effect on the German armed forces, despite all the fanatical propaganda spouted by Goebbels. A complete army, three Panzer divisions and 12 infantry divisions were lost.

The landing by US forces in North Africa on 7 November 1942 also came at a crucial moment. Rommel’s forces had all but exhausted their supplies and were under attack on two fronts, which forced Panzerarmee Afrika back to Tunisia where it held out until 12 May 1943.

In October 1942, the OrgAbt suggested forming Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen for 6, 7 and 10.PzDiv, using the men and equipment of StuGAbt 209. The term ‘Abteilung’, which normally described a battalion size unit, should be understood as a battery or company in the case of the above Panzer divisions. The reason for this decision remains unclear, and to the knowledge of the author was never realized.

The loss of 6.Army would change everything. In March/April 1943, the order was given to re-establish those divisions destroyed at Stalingrad. By 1 January 1943, temporary tables of organization had already been published which indicated as to how the ‘new’ 6.Army would be formed. These provisional plans provided for three rifle battalions and a Panzerjäger-Kompanie (PzJgKp) with nine self-propelled anti-tank guns for each infantry division, and one Panzer grenadier battalion and a PzJgKp with 12 self-propelled anti-tank guns for each tank division. As an option, the PzJgKp could be substituted by a Sturmgeschütz-Batterie (StuGBttr). Thus these documents prove, for the first-time, the integration of a StuGBttr in both infantry and Panzer divisions on a regular basis.

When compared to a fully-equipped 1942-style infantry/tank division the overall allotment appears weak. To the author’s knowledge, these suggestions were also never instigated. However, it was standard practice to merge battle-worn units as Kampfgruppen (battle groups). In order to restore their combat value, subunits were also reinforced by sparingly allotted equipment. The table may have served as an organizational help.

This Sturmgeschütz armed with the 7.5cm StuK 40 L/48 is from III.Abt/PzRgt 24. The vehicle carries the tactical number 1134, stencilled in plain black, which identifies it as being from 11th Schwadron (squadron) in the division. The style in which the Zimmerit coating has been applied indicates that the StuG was manufactured by Alkett. (Anderson)

Around March/April 1943, the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppe decreed that the three tank divisions (14, 16 and 24.PzDiv) lost at Stalingrad were to be re-established. Beside the standard I.Abt and II.Abt, all the divisions were authorized to form a III.Abt (Sturmgeschütz). Guderian, who had vehemently opposed the large-scale introduction of Sturmgeschütz from the beginning, had finally to accept out of sheer necessity. In 1943, German tank production was barely able to replace the heavy and continuous tank losses and at the same time satisfy the requirements for the establishment of new units. Only the manufacturers of the Sturmgeschütz would prove to be capable of significantly increasing production.

This preliminary table for the re-establishment of PzDiv and InfDiv destroyed in Stalingrad was published in early 1943. Upon availability, Sturmgeschütz were to be issued as a (better) alternative to towed antitank guns.

The commander (wearing a forage cap) and the loader (a field cap) of an unidentified Sturmgeschütz unit (possibly Waffen-SS). Both are wearing throat-type microphones and headphones, connected to the intercom system. The gunner’s periscope is visible, and as is the Scherenfernrohr (scissors-type periscope) in front of the commander. (Hoppe)

At around this time, a new organizational structure for the Panzertruppe was published, the ‘Panzerdivision mit PzRgt 43’, which served as a pattern for the three Panzer divisions. This proposed structure recommended a significant combat strength, intending to issue 96 PzKpfw V Panther tanks to the I.Abt, and 96 PzKpfw IV to the II.Abt and also 96 Sturmgeschütz to the III.Abt. However, since production of the new PzKpfw V Panther tank was beset by many problems, it was to be temporarily replaced by the PzKpfw IV until sufficient numbers became available.

The order to establish three Panzer-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen was given in March 1943 by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). The new-style units were to be issued in the following order:

Sturmgeschütz on the firing range during a unit’s establishment phase: The vehicle mounts a 7.5cm StuK 40 L/48 and has a Saukopf (pig’s head) gun mantlet indicating that it is a late series StuG. Note the gun barrel cleaning Rohrwischer (rod brush) leaning against the rear of the vehicle. (Anderson)

At the time respective new KStNs were not available, so the Panzer-Kompanien (Sturmgeschütz) were organized according to the available Panzertruppen structures:

Abteilungsstab (battalion staff) according KStN 1107 dated 1 April 1943. Stabskompanie (staff company) according KStN 1150b dated 25 January 1943

Four medium Panzerkompanie (22 StuG) according KStN 1175a dated 25 January 1943

One PzWerkstKp (workshop company, without 1.Zug [platoon]) according KStN 1187 dated 1 June 1942.

Establishment took place in France during the summer of 1943. At approximately the same time the KStNs for the PzStuGAbt in PzRgt were finally adapted, and at the same time the allotment of Sturmgeschütz was intended to be a provisional and temporary measure only. Subsequently, when new organizational structures were introduced in late 1943, neither the Infanteriedivision n A (neuer Art – new order) nor the 43.PzDiv would show any integral Sturmgeschütz subunits.

The mixed establishment of III.Abt/PzRgt 36 (14.PzDiv):The unit was sent to the Eastern Front in October 1943, and was equipped with 49 Panzer Ausf G IV (lang), 42 Sturmgeschütz, nine Panzerbefehlswagen (PzBefWg) command tanks and nine Flammpanzer III (flame-thrower tank). The Panzer IV tanks are fitted with Seitenschürzen (tank skirts). (Münch)

The Seitenschürzen (side skirts) were made up of two layers of armour; small inner plates (visible here) to protect the superstructure covered by larger plates to protect the vulnerable sides of the hull. The Sturmgeschütz carries the tactical number 421, which is repeated on the cupola. (Anderson)

On 3 June 1943, the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppe published an instructional leaflet, which again underlined Guderian’s principal reservations in regard to the Sturmgeschütz:

1)Some PzDiv will be temporarily issued with Sturmgeschütz as an interim solution.

a)Thicker frontal armour (beginning in April, new production PzKpfw IV will have the same level of protection).

a)The lack of commander’s cupola results in poor observation [from December 1942, all new StuG were fitted with a cupola].

4)The performances and characteristics of the Sturmgeschütz do not allow an independent deployment without support of Panzer or PzGren. Due to its advantages, the Sturmgeschütz can be considered a tank destroyer. Thus deployment of PzAbt with StuG within the PzRgt and the PzDiv is clearly determined.

a)The StuGAbt cannot fight independently like a PzAbt. Close cooperation with Panzer or PzGren is necessary. Thus StuG will be deployed in the last wave, closely connected with PzGren.

b)PzAbt equipped with PzKpfw III or PzKpfw IV with thin armour can be reinforced by StuG platoons or companies to accomplish limited missions. The Sturmgeschütz will then be deployed in the front lines.

c)When encountering enemy tanks, StuG units will advance allowing the other PzAbt to surround and subsequently totally destroy the enemy tanks.

d)StuG units deployed as tank destroyers will follow the open side of the PzRgt, so that they can guard the flanks and assist the PzAbt when engaging enemy tanks.

e)In case PzGren are deployed to create the requirements for the PzRgt’s mission, the StuG units can assist with their gunfire.

On the defensive, StuG units will be reserved ready to counterattack and supported by PzGren. The Sturmgeschütz will be used as tank destroyers.

During attacks with limited targets, Sturmgeschütz can assist when disengaging from the enemy.

Cleaning the bore of a gun barrel with a stiff Rohrwischer (rod brush) required a serious amount of muscle power. It was important to regularly clean the rifling as a build-up of residues could cause a barrel burst. (Anderson)

Panzer-Sturmgeschütz Company

Table of organization with 22 Sturmgeschütz, according to KStN 1158, 1 November 1943.

Having in mind the conceived limitations of assault guns, these guidelines appear appropriate. While the Sturmgeschütz were not intended for tank-versus-tank combat, occasionally this did happen if a commander made an error on the battlefront.

From March to October 1943, 14.PzDiv was positioned in France for refitting and training. The unit received its new Sturmgeschütz spasmodically, as noted in the following strength report dated 1 September 1943:

	*Sturmgeschütz*	PzKpfw III	PzKpfw IV	PzKpfw V
Authorized target	49	18	142	3
Combat ready	38	39	9	–
In workshop	6	7	3	–

The gap between the delivered StuGs and PzKpfw IVs provides a hint as to the situation at the manufacturers. The surplus PzKpfw III were in part, tanks authorized for the flame-thrower platoon and the Funklenk (Fkl) platoon. Possibly some were used as substitutes for the missing PzKpfw IV (the large authorized target would soon be reduced) and the PzKpfw V Panthers used as training vehicles. At that time, the commander referred to his unit as a Kampfgruppe (combat group) rather than a Panzer division.

A month later, 14.PzDiv had deployed to Russia and fighting at Krivoj Rog, in the northern region of the Crimean peninsula. At that time only III.Abt/36. PzDiv was available, and had a mixed establishment of two StuG companies and two PzKpfw IV companies. This fact proves that given standards were easily adapted by the unit’s leadership, who in fact were forced by reality. The commander Oberst Unrein reported 30 StuG out of 44, and 31 PzKpfw IV out of 49 as being operational. Panthers had not been issued at that time. In his report he noted PzGrenBtls 9.Kp, with their 15cm s IG 33 as missing and deplored the shortage of radio-equipped SdKfz 250.

A Sturmgeschütz of III.Abt/PzRgt 24 hidden under the branches of trees in a fruit orchard. In early summer 1943, the vehicles of this unit were fitted with smoke candle dischargers on the superstructure. The chassis number of the vehicle, 95210 is painted on the front plate. (Anderson)

On 7 December 1943, Unrein submitted an after-action report, principally affirming (or zealously copying) Guderians list of shortcomings:

After-action report on the commitment of Sturmgeschütz within the scope of a le Panzer-Abteilung [light tank battalion]

The first combat took place on 28 October 1943, and the action continued until 1 December 1943. The commitment of Sturmgeschütz took place as follows:

All four methods were practically tested over the six-week commitment, resulting in the following experiences.

The commitment of the StuG in the first wave had only the advantage of offering a smaller target. We noticed the following disadvantages: thanks to its turret, a tank commander can observe the direction of the assault, and is able to combat targets emerging from both sides. In contrast, the Sturmgeschütz must always turn head-on to the enemy. These turns delay combat of these targets and slow down the speed of the tank advance. This will be even more difficult during the mud season. The [StuG] driver has to brake repeatedly to point the barrel in the required direction. The rapid steering movements overstress the gearbox and especially the brakes. Very heavy soil led occasionally led to a thrown track. When breaking through enemy infantry positions containing anti-tank rifles, the lack of a close-defence machine gun with armour protection was crucial. The machine gun shield is not sufficient against anti-tank rifle fire from the front, and offers no protection against infantry fire from the side.

Sturmgeschütz proved to be more suited for use in the second wave or guarding the flanks. Any enemy counterattack can effectively be neutralized. However, if a menace from the flanks has to be encountered with a counterattack, the same weaknesses occurred as explained under item 1) …

Sturmgeschütz performed best when committed in close cooperation with Panzergrenadiere. StuGs will give the PzGren strong moral support, especially when engaging attacking enemy tanks. Supported by the PzGren, Sturmgeschütz can combat the enemy’s heavy weapons… the PzGren will guard the StuGs against enemy infantry and anti-tank rifles.

Sturmgeschütz performed well in defensive fighting. Committed as mobile anti-tank defence by using prepared positions, the enemy was effectively combated.

Survey of successes and lossesof the mixed le PzAbt from 28 October until 1 December 1943

In conclusion, it can be stated that in a mixed PzAbt, the PzKpfw IV proved to be superior to the Sturmgeschütz, especially during attack missions.

Despite their undoubted advantages, smoke candle dischargers on the Sturmgeschütz were soon removed, as they easily ignited after receiving a hit by small arms fire or shrapnel. (Anderson)

The mighty schwere Zugkraftwagen (s ZgKw – heavy tractor) 18t (SdKfz 9) was one of the most valuable vehicles in a Panzer unit. A Sturmgeschütz from III.Abt/PzRgt 36 is being used to attempt a recovery, but the narrow tracks on the assault gun had poor traction and there was the danger that it would also become bogged down. (Münch)

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G parked outside the shop of a ladies’ tailor in a small French town. The vehicle is fitted with a cast Saukopf (pig’s head) gun mantlet which indicates that was produced in 1944 by Alkett. Note that it is fitted with later type mounting brackets and rails for the Seitenschürzen (side skirts). (Hoppe)

Indeed this after-action report reveals nothing new, as StuGAbt fighting in the east had to deal with similar problems. The establishment of Begleitgrenadier-Batterien (escort grenadier batteries) was the logical answer to the threat imposed by Russian infantry equipped with large numbers of anti-tank rifles capable of penetrating the thin side armour on the StuG or Panzer IV.

StuG-Abteilungen in PzDiv and PzGrenDiv

The crew of a Sturmgeschütz from 90.PzGrenDiv has carefully concealed their vehicle on the edge of wood. In such a position gun traverse would been very limited and should it come under fire it would be almost to move out rapidly. (Anderson)

In theory, the three Panzer divisions with integrated PzStuGAbt were of significant combat value. However, the maximum allotment of 96 Panther, 96 PzKpfw IV and 96 StuG proved to be nothing but a pipe dream. Normally the II and III.Abt would have been merged. In the case of 14.PzDiv, its I.Abt with only ten PzKpfw V Panthers was attached to PzBrig 10 that was being established in France during summer, 1943. Thus 14.PzDiv lost its intended allotment of Panther tanks. Bearing in mind the actual allocation of StuG and PzKpfw IVs, the unit’s combat power decreased to 30 per cent of the initially authorized strength; 14.PzDiv would wait until August 1944 to receive Panthers.

At the start of World War II, the tank turned out to be a battle-deciding weapon. The successful operations during the invasion of France and the Balkans, and later in North Africa and Russia were decisively pushed forward by tanks.

Infantry divisions normally lacked this offensive potential. The temporary or permanent subordination of armoured elements was a solution. Fully aware of this problem, a number of German infantry divisions were issued with PzAbt by mid-1942, making best use of the limited resources. Among these units were PzAbt 103 (3.InfDiv), 116 (16.InfDiv), 129 (29.InfDiv) and 160 (60.InfDiv) and 190 (90.le Div).

These battalion-size tank detachments were organized according to the 1942 Panzer division standards. Each Abteilung had two leichte and a mittlere Panzerkompanie, or, according the actual delivery situation, three m PzKp. Indeed there were many exceptions from the rule.

A Sturmgeschütz of PzAbt 190 (90.PzGrenDiv): The Zimmerit coating has been applied in the checkerboard pattern as used by MIAG. A Balkenkreuz and the tactical number 223 have been stencilled on the Seitenschürzen. (Anderson)

When the new GenInsp d PzTrp Guderian enforced the reforming of the schnelle Truppen to the Panzertruppen in April 1943, he also ordered a new form of organization for selected infantry divisions, the PzGrenDiv. After reorganization these motorized units were put under his control. Some of the new PzGrenDiv still had a small number of tanks, but in future Sturmgeschütz were to be issued. Initially Guderian was allotted 100 assault guns a month. This is confirmed by a memorandum dated 26 August 1943, in which Guderian reported the following Sturmgeschütz deliveries for the Panzertruppe:

To defeat the Allied forces which had landed at Anzio on 22 January 1944, the Germans assembled a strong force to halt a breakout and advance into Italy. The Sturmpanzer is in service with StuPzAbt 216; the Panther is with PzRgt 4. The Sturmgeschütz is from either 3.PzGrenDiv, or PzAbt (Fkl) 301. None of these weapons proved to be effective in the difficult conditions encountered on the battlefront in southern Italy. (PeKo)

In September 1943 a new organizational structure was published, the 43.PzDiv As the successor to the motorized infantry division, the unit comprised two Grenadier-Regimenter, a formidable PzJgAbt with two PzJgKp (Sfl/SP) and a PzAufklAbt (tank reconnaissance battalion) and a Heeres-Flugzeugabwehrkanone-Artillerie-Abteilung (HFlaKArtAbt – army anti-aircraft battalion), and also other support services. To underline the offensive character of the new unit, a Sturmgeschütz detachment of 45 StuG was added, replacing the three tank companies. The decision to issue Sturmgeschütz in place of tanks followed the same requirements as those for 14, 16 and 24.PzDiv. This is confirmed by an entry in the war diary of the OrgAbt on 10 December 1943:

Since tank production is, at this time, not sufficient to equip all PzDiv with a PzKpfw IV Abt or a PzKpfw V Abt, and all PzGenDiv with a PzKpfw IV Abt, a provisional solution was introduced. For 25.PzGrenDiv, a PzAbt with 45 Sturmgeschütz has been established and will be incorporated as a PzAbt. All existing tanks will be diverted to a PzDiv in Heeresgruppe Mitte [Army Group Centre].

A train of goods wagons carrying German military equipment has been derailed by Italian partisan forces at Vincenza in the north of Italy. The Sturmgeschütz, possibly from PzAbt 190, is a late production vehicle and is fitted with a remote-controlled Rundumfeuer-Maschinengewehr (all-round fire machine gun). (PeKo)

Panzer-Sturmgeschütz Company

Table of organization with 14 Sturmgeschütz, according to KStN 1158, 1 November 1943.

However, the ‘provisional solution’ would continue for longer than anticipated.

For implementing in PzGrenDiv, the following organizational structures were published:

Abteilungsstab (battalion staff) according to KStN 1107 dated 1 April 1943 StbsKp (staff company) PzStuGAbt according to KStN 1157 dated 10 April 1943

Three PzStuGKp (14 StuG) according KStN 1159 dated 20 June 1943 One PzWerkstZug (workshop platoon) according KStN 1187 dated 1 June 1942

Organizational table for Panzer Division 43 (43.PzDiv).

The Sturmgeschütz Ausf G of III.Abt/PzRgt 36 (14.PzDiv) mounting 7.5cm StuK 40 L/48 with a Saukopf (pig’s head) mantlet. The vehicle has been camouflaged with whitewash paint and has the tactical number 1201 stencilled on the Seitenschürzen (side skirts). (Anderson)

In June 1943, orders had been given to establish ten PzGrenDiv by converting or renaming existing infantry divisions:

A number of Waffen-SS units had also been reorganized, and some were in the process of being reorganized to PzGrenDiv:

Due to the current situation (combat and insufficient production) these organizational changes could not be implemented immediately but did over an extended period. Lack of personnel and material restrictions created a desperate situation, and it took longer to convert all the units to 43.PzGrenDiv standards.

Many PzJgAbt in Italy, planned to be refitted to 43.PzGrenDiv, had to be equipped with Italian-built Semovente until replacement Sturmgeschütz were delivered from Germany. A German crew drives a 105mm Semovente M43 105/25 up a steep incline during training on the type. (BAMA)

A Sturmgeschütz and a column of Borgward B IV Ausf B Ladungträger (demolition charge carriers) from Panzer Versuchs-und Ersatzabteilung (PzVersAbt – experimental and replacement battalion) 300(Fkl): The StuG is possibly an experimental Leitpanzer (control tank), but the additional aerial for the radio-control equipment is not fitted. (Anderson)

A German soldier, from an unknown unit, stands beside an Italian-built Semovente da 105/25. In German service it was designated ‘Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 105/25 853 (i)’. The vehicle is finished in Italian-style camouflage, but has a prominent Balkenkreuz painted on the superstructure. (Regenberg)

The unit will be reformed according to ‘43.PzGrenDiv’ standard as soon as conditions allow.

PzAbt 190 has to be reformed as a PzAbt (Sturmgeschütz)… Until a regular supply of Sturmgeschütz is achieved, a mixed establishment with PzKpfw IV has to be accepted (existing PzKpfw IV will be deployed as Sturmgeschütz). However, within the single companies a common stock has to be ensured.

b)The PzJgAbt will be issued with Italian-supplied Sturmgeschütz [Semovente]. Respective orders for the training on these types will be given later.

Missing German and Italian Sturmgeschütz will be replaced by the office of the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen.

The above confirms the enormity of the problem faced by the Organisationsabteilung, the German army and finally the units in the field. Organizational changes could not be implemented within a feasible timescale, and short-term allotment of material was not guaranteed; units had to live with mixed establishments. In the case of 90.PzGrenDiv, the tank destroyer battalion had to be content with Italian-built Semovente (self-propelled) guns.

This practice led to a non-standardized establishment within the mother unit and the usage of PzKpfw IV, StuG III and Italian Semovente, caused serious problems with the supply of spare parts to the workshop units.

A new Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 105/25 ready for delivery to a German unit: the relatively light 16-ton vehicle was powered by a 192hp FIAT-SPA engine and had a top speed of 38kph. When the type entered Italian service in April 1942 the troops gave it the name Bassotto (Dachshund). (BAMA)

All PzGrenDiv were fully-independent units, but their combat strength existed merely on paper: 10.PzGrenDiv is a prime example. The division emerged from what had been the 10.InfDiv, and was reorganized at the same time it was re-equipped in the area of Heeresgruppe Mitte during April/May 1943. The division was deployed for Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel), and was involved in defensive action to halt Soviet counterattacks to Orjol/Brjanks. The unit was then sent to Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South), to participate in defence of the river Dniepr, followed by a slow retreat to Kirovograd. The division’s PzAbt 7, was authorized to have 45 Sturmgeschütz, but on 31 October reported that it had only three assault guns and all were in need of repair. Two weeks later, the Sturmgeschütz-Lage (a strength list prepared every 14 days by the GenStbdH) still reported only three Sturmgeschütz, but two were ready for combat and one was in need of repair. However, the list showed the authorized strength of 42.

Reinforcements finally reached the unit in late November, bringing it up to authorized strength.

After a series of battles fought between 30 November and 4 December, PzAbt 7 submitted an after-action report:

Attack with 3.Kp, attached to 3.PzDiv west of the Rollbahn [railway track] to Cherkassy in close cooperation with PzGren and PzAufklAbt. We crossed an anti-tank ditch and several trench systems. One PzBefWg [reconnaissance tank] was lost due to a direct hit after being ordered to scout towards Cherkassy.

Attack by the Abt attached to 72.InfDiv (without 3.Kp, which remains with 3.PzDiv) supported by 1.Kp and 2.Kp with a total of 24 StuG. The advance penetrated enemy positions near Dolgaja-Grab, Plisnezy-Grab on the northern boundaries of Kirilovka. After fighting against several anti-tank guns, a farm was taken. Our infantry is weakened (100 men with two light machine guns, young recruits and Romanian-Germans) and cannot be forced further. Due to ammunition shortage, the battalion is forced to retreat for 2km. a second advance cannot be launched due to nightfall. The failure of the attack was attributable to insufficient preparation, hasty issue of orders and very weak infantry support due to inexperienced troops.

3.Kp fought with 3.PzDiv to clear the southern boundaries of Cherkassy and the Rollbahn.

PzAbt 7 with 1.Kp and 2.Kp again attached to 3.PzDiv, reached positions 3km south of Kurgan-Grab… Due to mechanical failures during the previous day the Abt has been reduced to 13 Sturmgeschütz, and combined into one company under the command of Oberleutnant Schönherr. The company is attached to the regiment. At 11.00hrs the attack on Kirilovka begins, in close-support of the infantry southern parts of Kirikova are soon captured. However, our infantry is forced to retreat from the village by a Soviet counterattack supported by five T-34s accompanied by infantry. Schönherr then attacks and destroys three T-34s, before pulling back by 300m. After reforming, a further attack delights our infantry and the action ends with the successful capture of the complete village. The night hours are spent securing the village, eating, sleeping and collecting supplies.

Seven Sturmgeschütz under command of Leutnant Marré commenced an attack in a northerly direction, attacking and defeating enemy anti-tank guns, before crossing the main railway line. During the fight three T-34s were destroyed, and the line was cleared. They then continued to advance a further 2km, during which another two T-34s were destroyed.

Elements of PzAbt 7 are being pulled out of the front line and transported by rail to northern area of Kirovograd.

A Sturmgeschütz M43 concealed in an ambush position. In October 1943, it was ordered that 3.PzGrenDiv, 15.PzGrenDiv, 29.PzGrenDiv and 90.PzGrenDiv were to be the first units equipped with the ‘Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 75/46 and M43 mit 105/25’; others would follow. German crews operating the type considered it to be a very good combat vehicle. (Regenberg)

By the end of the deployment, PzAbt 7 had reported the destruction of 11 enemy tanks (ten T-34, one M4 Sherman) and 19 anti-tank guns for the total loss of one reconnaissance tank and six Sturmgeschütz. On 10 December 1943, the strength report stated that PzAbt 7 had 15 Sturmgeschütz operational and 21 in need of repair.

This report also shows that PzAbt 7 was deployed away from 10.PzGrenDiv, its parent unit, another problem that was widespread among many German units on all fronts: The reason was the ever-present shortage of armoured fighting vehicles – a problem that worsened as the war progressed.

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G in service with StuGBttr 247 attached to StuDiv Rhodos. A Maltese cross, the unit’s emblem, has been stencilled on the glacis plate, together with the tactical marking for an assault gun. (PeKo)

Two Kp and recce platoons with PzKpfw IV (lang) + four PzKpfw IV (lang).	=	49
Two Kp with StuG	=	44 StuG

Success	Tanks	Anti-tank guns	Artillery	Own losses
Panzer IV	136	117	20	20
StuG	75	59	34	16

14.PzDiv	Four (in total 44)
Fkl Kp 315	10
10.SS Division	34
11.SS Division	14

PzJgAusbAbt 3, 5, 9	15
One Fkl Kp (of July)	10 (subsequent delivery)
16.PzGrenDiv	14
10.PzGrenDiv	12
20.PzGrenDiv	12