Sturmgeschutz

A year after the catastrophic winter of 1941, the situation for the German army in the east, especially the infantry divisions, worsened. After the stalemate during the winter of 1942, the Soviets would achieve many great (if costly) successes beginning with victory at Stalingrad, the recapture of Velikiye-Luki and a short time later the recapture of Demyansk. Slowly but surely, and with growing confidence, the Red Army was able to increase its operational opportunities. German forces now faced ever increasing numbers of Soviet tanks and vast numbers of infantry were forced back on the defensive.

Although German anti-tank capability had been significantly improved with the introduction of the 7.5cm Panzerabwehrkanone (PaK) 40, there was still a problem. The weight of the 5cm PaK 38, already in service, made it very difficult for the crew to move, but the PaK 40 was even heavier. Any change of firing position relied on the use of a prime mover and since these vehicles were in short supply, the situation for PaK 40 crews became untenable. Infantry units in a PzAbt were issued with an increasing number of self-propelled guns, but there would never be enough.

If attacks by enemy tanks could not be repelled, the defensive front held by German infantry would be overrun and enemy infantry, following the tanks, would then occupy the positions, forcing a retreat. On many occasions his had a disastrous effect on the morale of the German troops and Panzershock (tank shock) returned.

When the situation on the Eastern Front was affected more and more by these breakthroughs, the question of anti-tank defence finally required an urgent solution. Reality would show that attack missions or an effective defence was only possible when a StuGAbt was available.

Quite logically, it was now discussed whether to provide the infantry divisions with integral assault gun units, similar to those elements attached to the Luftwaffe Feld Divisionen (LwFeldDiv – air force field divisions).

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G in France, 1944: The Zimmerit coating is of the pattern applied by Alkett and the vehicle has a standard-type stowage frame fitted around the engine deck. The Seitenschürzen (side skirts) are of a later improved type fitted with triangular-shape hooks. Note the Maschinengewehr (MG) 34 has been mounted on top of the gun shield, to allow fire against enemy aircraft. (Hoppe)

On 22 September 1943, PzJgAbt 31 (31.InfDiv) submitted an after-action report on the effectiveness of its anti-tank weapons. Reports like this were numerous, and all more or less underlined the need for better weapons in the infantry divisions.

1)The 7.5cm PaK 40 Sfl 38(t) (148hp Praga engine) performed extremely well and fully met the requirements, in contrast to the 7.62cm PaK 36(r) Sfl 38(t) (125hp Praga engine).

2)With regard to the critical equipment situation, any delivery of self-propelled anti-tank guns for the tank divisions is unnecessary. Instead, it is more sensible to issue these weapons to infantry division.

a)Anti-tank defence in tank divisions is guaranteed by the arrival of vehicles armed with 7.5cm KwK 40 L/48 gun. During the recent fighting, self-propelled guns were used by tank divisions mostly in the same manner as a tank. This is a task self-propelled guns cannot fulfill, therefore this commitment turned out to be very poor.

b)Since size and weight of the PaK mot Z (towed anti-tank guns) are significantly increasing, a rapid move into position and having time for camouflage is becoming more difficult.

3)The best solution for the question of new equipment for the tank-destroyer battalions would be to issue them exclusively with Sturmgeschütz. As long as this is not possible, we suggest provision of one company PaK (Sfl) (self-propelled anti-tank guns) and one company with assault guns.

b)A sole establishment of an PzJgAbt with PaK (Sfl) is not practical, since the infantry compares it with assault guns resulting in exaggerated expectations, which the PaK (Sfl) cannot fulfill.

c)A further advantage of a StuG company within the PzJgAbt is the fact that the commander (of the InfDiv) will always have direct access. This is in most cases is not feasible with a Heeres-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung, with batteries dispersed over two or three divisions. This split will lead to problems with supply lines for the battalion and workshop units in the rear.

This early production Sturmgeschütz Ausf G does not have a Zimmerit coating and is fitted with Nebelkerzen-Wurfgeräte (smoke candle dischargers). The chassis number 92991 stencilled on the front plate indicates that it was built in early 1943 by Alkett. (Münch)

This opinion was supported by many identical after-action reports. The commander of PzJgAbt 31 clearly recognized the advantages of allotted assault guns.

Having been almost annihilated at Stalingrad, what remained of 60.InfDiv was re-established at St Raphaël in the South of France, and subsequently renamed as PzGrenDiv Feldherrnhalle (FHH). The unit had a mixed PzAbt with two tank and two Sturmgeschütz companies. In December 1943, FHH was transferred to Heeresguppe Nord (Army Group North) at Narva, Estonia. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz of PzGrenDiv FHH in St Raphaël, November 1943. The gun mantlet is protected by a factory-made dustcover. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G: The crew shows the workings of their vehicle to Italian townsfolk. (Anderson)

In September 1943, the commander of 16.PzGrenDiv complained of declining morale in his infantry:

The Panzerschreck [tank shock] in our infantry is still alive, and it can be only overcome when:

a)The infantry positions a sufficient number of heavy anti-tank weapons directly in the Hauptkampflinie (HKL – main line of resistance)

b)If the infantrymen can be absolutely sure that enemy tanks which have broken through will definitely be destroyed.

The report continues that if these conditions are not met, the infantryman will not be able to withstand tank assaults as a direct result, and he demanded a sufficient allotment of heavy anti-tank guns. However this was not possible and due to the relative immobility of these towed anti-tank guns, even the powerful PaK 40 would have been of little value. At this time of mobile warfare, a fixed anti-tank position was always in danger which inevitably led to the loss of the weapon.

In his report, the commander explained that his PzJgAbt was not able to perform as Panzerjäger in the true sense of the word – the mission to actively hunt down enemy tanks. His report continues:

The Räder-PaK (towed anti-tank guns) can never be a Panzerjäger, since it cannot be used against enemy tanks that have broken through. This applies also to the 8.8cm PaK. The only weapon suitable to hunt and destroy tanks is the Sturmgeschütz. If the infantryman can be sure to have a sufficient number of Sturmgeschütz supporting him, or if he has had first-hand experienced as to how easily Sturmgeschütz can destroy broken through tanks, he will keep calm and will learn to keep low in his hole until the tank has passed-over him, knowing that the assault guns will keep his back and flanks safe.

Heeres-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen, which will be distributed over the combat sector of an entire corps, cannot fulfill this task. To give the infantryman the security he requests, the infantry division must have a battalion with at least two batteries. The PzJgAbt can be dropped.

A Sturmgeschütz of 2.SS-PzDiv Das Reich during the funeral ceremony for a comrade killed in action. The name SS-Unterscharführer Hoffmann, possibly the person killed, is painted on the side of the superstructure. (Anderson)

The statement of the commander of 16.PzGrenDiv is fully understandable. However, it is interesting to note the degree to which the officer (among many others) is fixated on the Sturmgeschütz. A tank such as the PzKpfw IV Ausf G to H armed with the 7.5cm KwK L/48 would have been equally effective. There were some examples where a small number of infantry divisions were issued with tank battalions. However, the troop demanded assault guns.

Finally, the OrgAbt took the decision to issue only one company/battery as a reinforcement to the divisional PzJgAbt.

The Sturmgeschütz carrying this coffin was built on the chassis of a PzKpfw III, identifiable by the horizontal exhaust silencer (muffler). (Anderson)

In January 1944, a table ‘StuGAbt in PzDiv and PzGrenDiv’ was published showing the actual unit strengths.

Firstly 12.Heeres (Army) and Waffen-SS PzGrenDiv were each issued with a Panzer-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung (45 StuG), with three more to be established. Furthermore, 11 Panzer divisions were available; six for the Waffen-SS, four for the army and one for the Luftwaffe with reported strengths varying from seven to 43. The Grossdeutschland unit was listed here as a Panzer division (still with a 1942-style Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung of 21 StuG), although it had officially been called a PzGrenDiv since June 1943. PzDiv Hermann Göring is also noted although officially being a Luftwaffe unit, it fought under the command of the army.

Some special units also received assault guns. These miscellaneous formations showed a very varying establishment.

Thought to be a vehicle from PzJgAbt 1095 from 3.GebDiv, this Sturmgeschütz has what appears to be an Ausf F chassis fitted with the superstructure of an Ausf G. The vehicle is fitted with late-type Ostketten (east tracks) and Seitenschürzen (side skirts). (Anderson)

Despite the ‘temporary’ character of the Sturmgeschütz allocations for the Panzer divisions, the practice would continue. In late summer 1944, more units would receive Sturmgeschütz or Panzerjäger, among them new Panzer brigades. Sturmgeschütz had to replace missing PzKpfw IV tanks, or Panzerjäger such as Panzer IV/70 (V) and Jagdpanther:

By late 1944, further PzJgAbt of PzDiv and PzGrenDiv had Sturmgeschütz in their inventory, although not officially authorized.

On 23 March 1944 during a Führervortrag, Guderian demanded clarification of reports relating to an alleged increase in the number of StuGAbt (under the command of the General der Artillerie) to 54. He reminded the military officers and civil officials attending the meeting of the recently agreed limitation of 45. Any further increase in the number of StuArt units, with all associated problems such as replacement equipment, would be impossible due limited production capacity.

Concealed at the side of a peasant’s cottage, the crew of a Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G from 5.SS-PzDiv Wiking (Viking) cover their vehicle with a heavy tarpaulin for protection against the Russian weather. (NARA)

In early 1944, SS-PzDiv Das Reich was engaged in combat near Cherkassy on the River Dniepr during the Battle of Korsun. A column of Sturmgeschütz from SS-StuGAbt 5 is shown; all are fitted with the early type of Winterketten (winter tracks) to improve traction. The crews of all the vehicles have used spare track links to protect the superstructure. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G built on a PzKpfw III hull, in service with an SS-Ersatz und Ausbildungsabteilung (replacement and training battalion) on the Debica training ground in Poland. The vehicle carries the name Montabon (a commune in the Loire, France) on the side of the superstructure. Note that some links of early-type Winterketten (winter track) have been randomly inserted in the standard 40cm tracks. (Schneider)

Guderian also said that he was fully aware that production was barely sufficient to satisfy the demands of the Sturmartillerie and his Panzerjäger. Furthermore, he had to accept that the ‘temporary’ substitution of tanks in the Panzer divisions by Sturmgeschütz would continue for longer than expected.

However, Guderian would continue to demand that the number supplied to the Sturmartillerie should be limited to 200 each month. Quite naturally, his argument did not impress the General der Artillerie: In June his department insisted on the agreed delivery of 375 Sturmgeschütz each month as the lowest number to guarantee expansion of all 45 battalions (at that time renamed to brigades) to the target of 45 assault guns each, and to replenish the number lost in action.

Guderian also complained of the poor situation in regard to recovery and maintenance; a lack of recovery vehicles, spare parts and a shortage of supply vehicles resulted in a decreased number of tanks and assault guns being available for front-line units. This was a misleading complaint as the overall number of tanks and assault guns/tank hunters being produced was slowly increasing.

In his report, Guderian cited from the problems of Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South):

At Uman some 300 tanks were captured by the enemy, Heeresgruppe Süd, as the responsible authority, reported:

The repair of the damaged tanks at Uman was impossible due to the lack of spare parts. With a sufficient supply, the repair of the majority of these tanks would easily have been possible. An evacuation of the immobilized tanks was not feasible because of the lack of heavy half-track tractors and an overall inadequate transport situation.

SS troops swearing an oath to the Führer during a commissioning ceremony: All the Sturmgeschütz are standard early-type Ausf G. (Anderson)

In the first half of 1944, Guderian attempted to accelerate the equipping of infantry divisions with assault guns. On 2 June 1944, he wrote to the Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Zeitzler:

Various reports submitted to me indicate that some erroneous conceptions exist about the employment and affiliation of the Panzerjäger-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen.

The decisive importance of the Panzerabwehr makes a fundamental re-arming of the PzJgAbt necessary. At my instigation, the rebuilding of the PzJgAbt was therefore initiated and the first goal was set for the re-arming of one company of each battalion with Sturmgeschütz and Panzerjäger.

The outfitting of the Panzerjäger units with this equipment does not mean a fundamental change, but at most an extension of their duties. This was already clearly defined in earlier reports.

The most important task of the Panzerjäger-Sturmgeschütz units is the destruction of enemy tanks, the most dangerous opponents of our infantry. They, therefore, are the prime support for the infantry, because the solution to anti-tank defence is that it is of prime importance to hold any position. If the Panzerjäger is not bound by this task, they then can be used in direct support of the infantry in attack and defence.

The Panzerjäger-Sturmgeschütz units have not taken over the tasks of the Sturmartillerie, but they only operate as Panzerjäger. Any use under other terms or unauthorized creation of other subordinated attachments (i.e. under the Artilleriekommando (Arko – artillery command) means an alteration to their original tasks and endangers the structure of the Panzerjägerwaffe. I therefore request to issue an order on the attached proposal to the Oberkommandos of the Heeresgruppen and the Armeen.

A mid-production Sturmgeschütz has an Alkett-applied Zimmerit coating, and is fitted with a cast Saukopf (pig’s head) mantlet and the cast deflector in front of the commander’s cupola. (Anderson)

Personnel of struggling infantry divisions were transferred to Truppenübungsplatz (military training ground) Mielau in central Poland to undergo conversion to the Sturmgeschütz. The pace was slow; an average of only ten battalions was established each month. In April 1944, Mielau reported having trained five StuGAbt (i.e. companies) and that a further ten units were selected. From lessons learned during the first conversions, Guderian insisted that only tank destroyer personnel were to be considered.

SS Hauptsturmbannführer Rennert of SS-StuGAbt 9 wears the standard communications equipment for a StuG commander; headphones and a throat-type microphone. He has turned the cupola so that the open hatch will provide some protection against fire from the front. (Schneider)

He also ordered that any soft-skinned vehicles that were in good condition were to taken back with the unit. This was unusual, as only personnel were transferred; equipment was left behind and distributed to other front-line units.

The disadvantages of Sturmgeschütz with tank units were known. In June 1944, PzAOK 3 reacted by publishing a note explaining their view for the tactical deployment of a StuGAbt:

A number of divisions of the tank army received a Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung within the frame of their divisional tank destroyer battalion; further divisions have transferred tank destroyer units to Mielau for being rearmed with the Sturmgeschütz. The purpose of this measure is to provide the division with a strong armoured punch for attacks and counterattacks. At the same time the StuGAbt represents a mobile reserve against any further enemy tanks. The divisional StuGAbt should not be deployed outside the frame of its mother unit. The grenadier elements in the division should be, according to the situation, trained to support the StuGAbt.

A Sturmgeschütz III from 5.SS-PzDiv Wiking hidden in the lea in a Russian farmhouse. Note the massive 80mm frontal armour plate. (NARA)

In early July 1943, SS-PzDiv Das Reich was positioned near Kharkov waiting to be replenished with new equipment. At around this time Seitenschürzen (side skirts) were being fitted to production Sturmgeschütz, and also began to be sent to front-line units to be fitted by workshop companies. The skirts of this vehicle have been modified by field engineers. (NARA)

The crew of a Sturmgeschütz prepares their vehicle for service. This was a mid-production vehicle manufactured by MIAG, identified by their style of applying Zimmerit. (Ullstein)

A photographer from a German intelligence/reconnaissance unit uses a camera, fitted with a high-performance telephoto lens, to take images of enemy positions and equipment. Ground-based and aerial reconnaissance was vital for positioning defensive forces or the planning of an assault. (Getty)

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G of 2.SS-PzDiv Das Reich moves past grenadiers in a trench during fighting around Kursk in 1943. Parts of the Seitenschürzen (side skirts) are missing, and the rear plate has been damaged by shell splinters. (NARA)

This note shows that the commander of PzAOK 3 did not understand the purpose of the new Panzerjäger-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung and is in clear contradiction to the earlier statement made by Guderian.

However, weapons like the Sturmgeschütz were a true enhancement to the arsenal of an infantry division, and would be used when and where they were needed, independent of the guidelines set by Guderian.

The note also highlights the shortcomings of a Sturmgeschütz and the dependency on the infantry to protect their flanks during a battle.

In previous years, Sturmgeschütz with the artillery were attached to either an infantry or a tank division. Coordination with these units was not always positive, the benefits of the Sturmgeschütz were overestimated, and the shortcomings ignored. In the worst case, occasionally StuGs were sent into action without infantry support in the vague hope that their armour and firepower would overcome all odds.

Seitenschürzen (side skirts) became standard equipment from early summer 1943. Although very effective against Soviet anti-tank rifle fire, their mounting brackets were extremely vulnerable to damage. Front-line units did their best to improve these items by adopting their own modifications. Here heavy bolts have been welded directly to the superstructure (NARA)

As a direct consequence, Sturmgeschütz units (artillery, deployed at army troop level) were issued with Begleitgrenadier (escort grenadier) units; purposely trained, specialist support units with the sole task of supporting the Sturmgeschütz in the attack or retreat. In case of the battalion size units for the Sturmartillerie, these were to be organically incorporated as the fourth battery in a StuG brigade.

For the much smaller Panzerjäger-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung (PzJgStuGAbt) in infantry divisions similar escort units could not be allotted. Aware of the shortcomings of the Sturmgeschütz and Jagdpanzer, the department of the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppe (GenInsdPzTrp) decreed the establishment of Grenadier-Begleitzüge (GrenBeglZg – escort grenadier platoons) as follows:

In October 1944, OKH/GenInsp d PzTrp decided that all infantry, grenadier, Volksgrenadier, Gebirgs and JägerDiv, which have already been issued with Jagdpanzer or Sturmgeschütz are instructed to establish Grenadier-Begleitzuge “auf dem Kommandowege” (using their own means).

The GrenBeglZg will be directly attached to the PzJgAbt and its sole mission is to escort the attack by the JgdPz or StuG. The GrenBeglZg must not be used to hold an area after the JgdPz or StuG have been withdrawn.

Only the best soldiers are recruited for the GrenBeglZg. After probation the members of the GrenBeglZg will get the note in their service papers: “To be used only in Grenadier-Begleitzug”.

To ensure high firepower and great mobility, all should be armed with the Sturmgewehr 44. This is a priority.

Axis forces (Italian, Romanian and later Hungarian) attached to Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South) did not have tanks able to fight modern Soviet types. Small numbers of Panzer IV and some Sturmgeschütz were supplied to Hungary as military aid. This Turan II has been destroyed by a direct hit on the turret. (Anderson)

While trying to pass a peasant’s hut, a Sturmgeschütz Ausf G has become bogged-down. The recovery crew has attached a schwere Zugkraftwagen (s ZgKw) 18t (SdKfz 9) in an attempt to haul the assault gun out of the deep mud. (Anderson)

In September 1944, the GendPzTrp decided to rename the StuGAbt within PzJgAbt to Panzerjäger-Kompanien (PzJgKp) but retained their numerical identification.

There are few after-action reports known of StuG-equipped PzJgAbt or companies. Two were published in the Nachgrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen (bulletin of the armoured troops) dated September 1944.

The amphibious VW Typ 166 Schwimmwagen was probably the most versatile and mobile German vehicle used in World War II. Powered by an air-cooled four-cylinder engine the type was used on all battlefronts. This vehicle belonged to PzJgAbt 1095. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G from SS-StuGAbt 1007 of SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgsdivision Prinz Eugen when the unit was in Yugoslavia during August 1944. This notorious unit mainly fought partisan forces and was feared for its brutality. Note the searchlight fitted on the superstructure. (Anderson)

The crew of a Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G from StuGAbt 1095, 3.GebDiv, begin to apply a coat of whitewash to their vehicle in preparation for winter operations. Behind the StuG is an SdKfz 10/5 half-track vehicle mounting a 20mm cannon used to provide heavy support fire; many after-action reports praised the effectiveness of the type. (Anderson)

During the course of the collapse of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre), 45.InfDiv with PzJgAbt 45 was annihilated. In July, re-establishment took place at Döllersheim, a military training area in Austria, where it was renamed as 45.VolksGrenDiv. The unit was then sent to Poland, where it was involved in heavy fighting south of Warsaw at the Warka bridgehead. The unit’s PzJgAbt included a Sturmgeschütz company, PzJgKp 1045. The commander of PzJgKp 1045 submitted this in August 1944:

After-action report from Panzerjäger-Kompanie 1045 equipped with Sturmgeschütz III:

The company was provided as a divisional reserve. In the afternoon, the enemy launched an attack after a preparatory heavy artillery bombardment. The assault by 30 tanks, mostly T-34/85 and KV-1 was supported by Schlachtflieger (strafing aircraft). Using elements of five to six divisions the enemy strove to enforce a breakthrough in this sector. The terrain was favourable to the enemy, small areas of scrub and woodland offered cover for his gun positions and assembly areas.

The company countered the enemy with nine Sturmgeschütz. During the first day of combat we destroyed:

The tanks were destroyed at a range of between 600 and 800m, one assault gun destroyed five tanks out of the column within 15 minutes. HE shells had an extraordinary success on soft targets. The provision of the Sturmgeschütz with Maschinengewehr (MG) and Maschinenpistole (MP) proved to be advantageous, and enabled the suppression of enemy close-combat [anti-tank] teams and infantry. It must be added that on the harvested fields the corn was stored in stooks. During a counteroffensive, the Russians fired incendiary shells and three Schützenpanzerwagen [SPW – armoured half-track vehicle], concealed on the field were set on fire..

Some 30 minutes after the beginning of the attack, the Russians began using our radio frequency in an attempt to discover the position reports from our Sturmgeschütz using the code name given to our company commander. The commander was forced to change the frequency three times during the battle.

Finally, it can be said that after his great losses, the opponent did not continue to accompany his infantry assaults with tanks, but positioned them in prepared positions.

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G from the Prinz Eugen division: The Maschinengewehr (MG) 34 has been mounted on the top of the gun shield to enable the gunner to engage enemy aircraft. Note the slot in the shield has been enlarged, possibly to improve gun elevation and side traverse; the latter was important for combat in forested terrain. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz of 3.SS-PzDiv Totenkopf (Death’s Head) moves through front-line positions during the Kursk campaign. All infantry trenches could be dangerous to the armour of both sides during the heat of battle. (Anderson)

Another report was submitted by PzJgKp 1253 of 253.InfDiv. This unit was also part of Heeresgruppe Mitte, which in summer 1944 was forced to make a defensive retreat to Kovel:

After-action report from Panzerjäger-Kompanie 1253 equipped with Sturmgeschütz IV.

Owing to the situation, the company was almost exclusively be deployed in platoon strength. This will be necessary time and again for a PzJgKp (StuG) of an infantry division. Therefore, training must be focused on a smaller-scale deployment in platoon strength.

Due to its hasty commitment and the following retreat, the company lacked any time to practice cooperation with the infantry. The situation did not allow any contact with the lower commanders (non-commissioned officers).

Assaults by our troops were hindered by the low combat strength of the infantry and the lack of cooperation on the battlefield.

Even the enemy’s tanks and anti-tank guns avoided any contact during our counterattacks. He put up a stiff resistance only if our infantry was not involved. The company was issued with Sturmgeschütz, which were not fitted either with a machine-gun and shield, or the new Rundumfeuer-Machinengewehr [all-round fire machine gun]. In some situations the enemy can only be fought by machine-gun fire, and the lack of a machine gun cannot be substituted by firing more HE shells.

The deplorable state of our motor vehicles has led to serious supply problems. The workshop unit was unable to operate, since it had only a few trucks to transport equipment.

Barely recognizable in the field, this Sturmgeschütz III Ausf F/8 has been fitted with Seitenschürzen (side skirts) to improve protection (and losses) against Soviet light antitank guns and anti-tank rifles. (NARA)

1)The deployment of a Sturmgeschütz-Kompanie in platoon strength can only be condoned by the situation, and must not become the rule… Only by utilizing the combined firepower and impact of the entire unit in close cooperation with the infantry can the desired result be achieved without a significant loss of men and equipment. The results achieved by StuGKp 1045 provide positive proof.

2)Camouflage consisting of flammable material must be attached in a way that it can be remove very quickly.

4)Sustaining the operational readiness of a StuGKp’s, all the time necessary to prepare for a mission has to be allowed

5)The lack of the self-defence machine gun is a great disadvantage, and the Generalinspekteur underlines his urgent call for this weapon to be installed in the Sturmgeschütz and Panzerjäger. Great emphasis must be attached to the training with this device.

The Allied landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944 brought the long-expected second front in Europe (Italy was an almost isolated theatre of war, since the French Alps formed a natural obstacle).

The Seitenschürzen (side skirts) on this Sturmgeschütz of 5.SS-PzDiv Wiking have been painted with an interesting camouflage scheme. Note T-34 track links were added at the superstructure sides. (NARA)

For German troops, the situation became challenging due to a lack of reinforcements and a shortage of heavy equipment. Any available forces had been sent to the Ostfront (Eastern Front) or Italy, but these were now under pressure from an advancing enemy. The units sent to halt the Allied landings soon reported very specific problems. A report by a staff officer dated 3 July 1944 reads:

1)The available experiences regarding the tank defence refer to combat against the Allied invasion force in the period of 6 June to 24 June. The fighting took place in the hedgerows of Normandy. The experiences made here cannot be applied to other theatres of war.

20)The hedgerows of Normandy are not suited for the deployment of tank units. The terrain is also not favourable for the usage of a single tank. The numerous tall hedges impede vision and hinder the weapon’s impact. Ridges and ravines make a speedy advance impossible.

19)Any major assault of enemy tanks took place, as anticipated, along paved roads or streets.

21)Combat operations: The character of this ‘bush war’ is neither the classic assault nor defence, but raiding operations.

25)Deployment: Panzerjäger and Sturmgeschütz: Both have tactically favourable characteristics, since they are trained for combat in small detachments or groups (half platoon). On the other hand, Sturmgeschütz are considerably at a disadvantage in combat in scrub-covered land due to their limited traverse and low-firing height. In ravines or gullies, they are defenceless against any attack on the flank.

Conclusion: Any advance by Panzerjäger, PaK (Sfl) and Sturmgeschütz in this area must be protected by a larger number of infantry than an advance by tanks.

A Sturmgeschütz from SS-PzDiv Wiking ploughs through thick mud in a Russian village. The vehicle is fitted with Winterketten (winter tracks) which supplied much-needed improved traction. (Anderson)

This report is not surprising, as the basic problems for the deployment of tanks in ‘Le Bocage’ (hedgerow country) are obvious and Sturmgeschütz were certainly not suited for this area. The suggestion to provide StuGs with better flank protection by simply reinforcing the escort infantry did not always work; there were many instances where Sturmgeschütz became separated from the escorting infantry after being attacked by artillery barrage or ground-attack aircraft.

A Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G of 9.SS-PzDiv Hohenstaufen positioned at the edge of a forest on the Belgian border with Germany as part of the force assembled to halt the US Army. The 7.5cm StuK 40 L/48 would take its toll among the M4 Sherman tanks. (Anderson)

A Leit-Sturmgeschütz (control tank) of PzAbt 302 (Fkl) in the ruins of Warsaw: The assault guns firing high-explosive (HE) ammunition proved effective against insurgents holding positions in buildings. However, there was the constant threat of enemy snipers firing down from the buildings. (Getty)

Platoon leader	(One officer)
Platoon command group	(One NCO, Four troopers, including a pioneer)
Three groups	(One group in each JgdPz platoon)
1 special purpose group	(One NCO, 14 troopers, including a pioneer)
1 reserve group	(One NCO, Two troopers)
Combat train	(A commander, Five troopers, Three riflemen, a pioneer)