8 Conclusion

Even in the modern era, the Sturmgeschutz assault gun; its subsequent technical development and tactical deployment (from 1940 onwards) continues to hold a certain fascination for military enthusiasts and historians.

The soldiers of the new Sturmartillerie considered themselves as members of an elite force, possibly comparable the British SAS or to the infamous Waffen-SS. This feeling of superiority led to a formidable esprit de corps which the German propaganda machine exploited in a vast number of newspaper and film reports.

After the end of World War II, this spirit continued as veterans of the Sturmartillerie kept in contact by forming Alte Kameraden (old comrades) associations which met on a regular basis. Over the years, the author has been able to speak to many of these veterans and heard their tales, many interesting and some moving experiences. However, he did have to learn that as more years passed, the veterans began to spend more time glorifying their role in the war and extolling the power of their assault gun.

The author has made an effort not to be over-awed by this and concentrate on assimilating the facts. This was not always easy as even an inquisitive author can be affected by emotions. However, every single piece of information gathered had, whenever possible, to be cross-checked against information found in archives. In some cases documentation just did not exist.

Nevertheless, the achievements of the Sturmartillerie equipped with Sturmgeschütz, especially on the Ostfront (Eastern Front), were numerous and formidable. (See Sturmartillerie: Spearhead of the Infantry. Osprey: 2016.)

Sturmgeschütz vs Panzer

Perhaps Guderian’s concept of armoured warfare and the type of tank required to break through enemy lines was forward-looking, but it was not revolutionary. However, in 1940 when German forces launched their Blitzkrieg (lightning war) attack through northern Europe, French and British forces collapsed in the face of concentrated tank assaults.

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G passing a column of infantry supported by horse-drawn transport. Note the square plate which has been welded on the front plate to cover a hole left by a shell. (Anderson)

The commander of a Sturmgeschütz in the cupola: First introduced on the Ausf G, this item fitted with seven vision blocks was a great improvement and allowed all-round vision of the battlefield. (NARA)

The Sturmartillerie units attached to infantry divisions to provide fire support were of equal importance during the invasion. Whenever and wherever Sturmgeschütz were available, they would play a vital part in every German advance, in company with tanks of the Panzerwaffe, from 1940 to 1942.

After German forces were routed from Moscow in December 1941, the strategic situation began a slow change. From 1942, there was a urgent requirement to develop weapons powerful enough to defeat the ever-increasing numbers of Soviet tanks. A simple solution was to deploy the Sturmgeschütz in the anti-tank role. In the coming years, the type was improved and when up-gunned with the 7.5cm StuK 40 L/43 it became an effective tank destroyer and much feared by attacking tank forces.

The parlous economic situation in the Third Reich seriously delayed the building of new production facilities to meet the requirements of the Panzerwaffe. The subsequent shortfall in tank numbers forced military planners to increase Sturmgeschütz production.

A Sturmgeschütz concealed behind a heap of straw in the yard of a farm in Russia. The vehicle is fitted with late-type Ostketten (east tracks) and a Bosch headlamp, an item usually fitted on German tanks, mounted on the left track guard. (Anderson)

The Sturmgeschütz was conceived to support the infantry by directly attacking the enemy in their positions. Combat against an enemy tank was to be avoided, but if it did occur (at close range) the Sturmgeschütz was often the victor.

However, in a counterattack against enemy tanks, the StuG was very vulnerable to any attack on the flanks. Also being turretless the vehicle could not be quickly manoeuvred to gain line-of-sight on enemy armour, advancing from the side, or a well-hidden anti-tank gun. The lack of a close-defence weapon (machine gun) was a grave error.

This tactical disadvantage called for certain measures to be taken. Soon specialist infantry support platoons were provided to guard the Sturmgeschütz serving with other forces – Sturmartillerie, Panzertruppe and Infantry.

However, deployment of the Sturmgeschütz remained difficult. It was important for the commander of the unit to be as tactically aware as his StuG commanders, and be aware of the type’s limitations under certain battlefield conditions. A number of after action reports in this book will have enlightened the reader.

Development of the Sturmgeschütz (in the context of this book the StuG III, and later the StuG IV), and with it the Panzer IV began in the mid-1930s, but by 1941/42 both were outdated by the modern T-34 and KV tanks; also to a certain degree by the US-built M4 Sherman. In this critical situation, both the Panzer IV and the Sturmgeschütz proved to be in need of updating. The short-barrelled 7.5cm KwK L/24 gun mounted in the StuG was replaced by the more powerful 7.5cm StuK 40 L/48, and frontal armour was increased to 80mm.

In early 1944, 11.PzDiv was positioned in France to be re-equipped and undertake training exercises. While there it received a Sturmgeschütz company to strengthen PzJgAbt 61, its tank destroyer battalion. (Anderson)

Now the problems with the structure of the German armaments industry became apparent. It proved to be impossible to produce sufficient numbers of the planned successor to the Panzer IV; the PzKpfw V Panther medium tank. And while the development of a ‘neues Sturmgeschütz’ (new assault gun) would eventually lead to the leichte Panzerjäger (le PzJg) IV and the Panzer IV/70 armed with the 7.5cm KwK 42 L/70, they would also, due to many diverse reasons, never be produced in sufficient numbers.

Hungary 1945: Men of PzJgAbt 1052 in front of a late production Sturmgeschütz III mounting Rundumfeuer-Machinengewehr (all-round fire machine gun). The tactical number 124 has been stencilled in black on the Seitenschürzen (side skirts). (von Aufsess)

Subsequently it proved to be indispensable to keep both the Sturmgeschütz III and the PzKpfw IV in production until end of the war.

It is important to remember that towards the end of the war Sturmgeschütz units in the east, whether under the command of the Sturmartillerie or attached to subunits in the infantry divisions, were still achieving a great number of victories over Soviet forces: The number of enemy tanks they destroyed is astonishing.

Although there is the danger of careless simplification, it seems that the German units were able to overcome their numerical inferiority on the Eastern Front by utilizing much better tactical skills.

Fighting against Allied troops, this advantage was nullified. After-action reports made in Normandy and in Italy show that the lack of a turret was a major problem. In the narrow tracks through the Italian mountains and the hedgerows of Normandy, it would be almost impossible for the gunner in a Sturmgeschütz to align his gunsight on a target.

The Sturmgeschütz, a low-profile, turretless assault gun was a true German invention and was possibly the most significant armoured fighting vehicle of World War II; particularly in the vastness of Russia. The Sturmgeschütz will remain an iconic weapon, thanks to the incredible number of tank kills, and the combat history of StuG units contains incredible stories of success and many defeats.

The Soviets were impressed by the Sturmgeschütz, and used the concept to design their own assault guns (SU-122, SU-85, SU-100 and ISU 122 and ISU 152). The concept continued after the war, as the Soviets developed the heavily-armed mobile weapons such as the SU-122/54.

In the 1960s two turretless types entered service; the Swedish Army, developed the Stridsvagn 103 (S-Tank) and the 90mm Kanonenjagdpanzer (tank destroyer gun) for the Bundeswehr of West Germany Possibly the last ‘ancestors’ of the Sturmgeschütz.

The main battle tank in the armies of today is a multi-functional and more versatile weapon.

It was common practice for the crew of a StuG to burrow-out a hole under their vehicle as a shelter from enemy artillery fire. On the rear of the vehicle the tactical marking ‘G’ is just visible; the Balkenkreuz has a non-standard black outline. (Anderson)

The Seitenschürzen (side skirts) were never intended to give protection against fire from a heavy weapon. This late production Sturmgeschütz has received a direct hit which has penetrated the skirts before punching a hole in the side armour of the hull. (Getty)

April 1944: A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G of PzDiv Hermann Göring has been positioned on a bridge near Monte Cassino in preparation for an attack by advancing Allied forces. The unit deployed its Stug, with much success, against enemy troops attacking the Benedictine monastery and the surrounding area. (Getty)

The commander of a Sturmgeschütz Ausf C or D from Liebstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) observes a target in preparation for providing support fire. Note the Scherenfernrohr (scissor telescope) fitted in his position. (NARA)

Two Sturmgeschütz Ausf F/8 of PzDiv Hermann Göring pass along a street in an unknown Italian city during the retreat to the north after Allied forces were victorious at Monte Cassino on 25 May 1944. (Anderson)