Seeds of Suicide
The Ecological and Human Costs of the Globalization of Agriculture
This study takes stock of the impact of a decade of trade liberalization on the lives and livelihood of farmers. Across India farmers are taking the desperate step of ending their lives because of new pressures building up on them as a result of globalization and the corporate takeover of seed supply, leading to the spread of capital-intensive agriculture and the propagation of nonsustainable agriculture practices. The lure of huge profits linked with clever advertising strategies evolved by the seed and chemical industries and easy credit for the purchase of costly inputs is forcing farmers into a chemical treadmill and a debt trap. The reality of globalization is different from the corporate propaganda and from the promises of trade liberalization and agriculture offered by the World Bank, the WTO, and experts and economists sitting in our various ministries. The impacts of trade liberalization and globalization have been felt in each and every state of India, with the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Punjab bearing the maximum burden in terms of the high social and ecological costs. Farmers are paying for globalization by being forced to sacrifice their lives and livelihoods. In what follows we present scenarios from these states on the status of farmers’ suicides; since December 1997, when such suicides first reached epidemic proportions, the Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Ecology has been monitoring these incidents and analyzing their causes.
The epidemic of farmers’ suicide is a barometer of the stress Indian agriculture and Indian farmers have been put under by the globalization of agriculture. Growing indebtedness and increasing crop failure are the main reasons farmers have committed suicide across the length and breath of rural India. These are also the inevitable outcomes of the corporate model of industrial agriculture being introduced in India through globalization. Agriculture driven by multinational corporations is capital intensive and creates heavy debt for the purchase of costly inputs such as seeds and agrochemicals. It is also ecologically vulnerable since it is based on monocultures of introduced varieties and on nonsustainable practices of chemically intensive farming.
The high social and ecological costs of the globalization of nonsustainable agriculture are not restricted to the cotton-growing areas of the states under consideration here; they have been experienced in all regions where commercially grown and chemically farmed crops are raised. While the benefits of globalization go to the seed and chemical corporations through expanding markets, the cost and risks are exclusively borne by the small farmers and landless peasants.
The two most significant ways through which the risks of crop failures have been increased by globalization are the introduction of ecologically vulnerable hybrid seeds and the increased dependence on agrochemical input such as pesticides, necessary with pest-prone hybrids.
The privatization of the seed sector under trade liberalization has led to a shift in cropping patterns from polyculture to monoculture and a shift from open-pollinated varieties to hybrids. In the district of Warangal in Andhra Pradesh, this shift has been very rapid, converting Warangal from a mixed-farming system based on millets, pulses, and oilseeds to a monoculture of hybrid cotton.
The problem of pests is a problem created by the erosion of diversity in crops and cropping patterns and the introduction of commercial hybrid seeds. The most sustainable solution for pest control is rejuvenating biodiversity in agriculture. Nonsustainable pest control strategies offer chemical or genetic fixes while reducing diversity, which is the biggest insurance against pest damage.
As the cotton disaster described below shows, the globalization of agriculture is threatening both the environment and the survival of farmers. Biodiversity is being destroyed, the use of agrochemicals is increasing, ecological vulnerability is increasing, and farmer debts are skyrocketing, leading to suicides in extreme cases.
The Andhra Pradesh Scenario of Farmers’ Suicides
From Mixed Farming to Monocultures: The Lure of “White Gold”
More than sixteen thousand farmers have committed suicide in Andhra Pradesh alone from 1995 to 1997.1 Taking into consideration the large number of suicides during 1998 and 1999, it is possible that by early 2001 the number will reach twenty thousand.
Cotton cultivation has been taken up in areas that were not traditionally used for cotton growing. One such region is Warangal district in Andhra Pradesh, which has switched from predominantly food crops to cotton, which is a relatively new crop brought in under trade liberalization. The area given over to cotton in this region grew over threefold within a decade. In Warangal, over three decades (between the 1960s and the 1980s), the total acreage devoted to cotton was negligible. According to the available data, in 1986–1987 the total area under cotton cultivation was 32,792 hectares (or 81,980 acres), which increased to 100,646 hectares (or 251,615 acres) in 1996–1997, nearly three times as much. The cotton cultivation has basically replaced the jawar crop. The area under jawar in 1986–1987 was 77,884 hectares, which went down to 27,306 hectares in 1996–1997. The acreage under the traditional paddy has also shrunk. The land under bajra (millet) has been drastically reduced in the last ten years, from 11,289 hectares in 1986–1987 to just 400 hectares in 1996–1997.
The acreage under cotton increased because the farmers in Warangal were getting a good return on cotton. But in the 1997–1998 season there was heavy damage to the cotton crop. There were several reasons for the crop failure, but the most important were bad weather and a severe pest attack. There was drought in June–July, the main sowing season for cotton. Because of the drought only 15 percent paddy could be planted. In October–November the rain came during the cotton boll-bursting season. The untimely rain also affected the paddy because it was in the maturity period. The cloudy weather, untimely rain, and lack of winter in November–December led to the emergence of pests.
In 1997 the pests first emerged in the chili fields, and the weather helped them to multiply. The pests attacked all the crops in the fields—chili, cotton, red gram, and so on—the yield was thus heavily reduced.
G. Mahendar of Mulkaligud village in Warangal district bought Excel cottonseed last year after being lured by the company’s advertising propaganda. The company dealers took two jeep loads of farmers to the trial fields of Excel cotton every day and informed them that the variety yielded eighteen quintals per acre. Farmers in Mulkaligud and neighboring villages planted thirty-five thousand acres of land with the variety. The crop did not perform well; the plant shed the bolls it developed.
The farmers complained to the dealer in their area and demanded compensation. Many company officials visited the farmers’ households and conducted elaborate surveys. However, so far no compensation has been paid to the farmers. Instead the dealer threatened to close the shop in their area and open a new shop elsewhere.
Since several sprays of chemicals had already been made by that time, they had no effect on the pests. The more the chemicals failed, the more they were used. The panic created by the pests led to heavy dosages of pesticides sprayed at frequent intervals in the cotton fields.
Analysis of the cotton failure has been focused on the excessive use of pesticides or of spurious pesticides. However, pesticide use is intimately linked to hybrid seeds. Pesticides become necessary when crop varieties and cropping patterns are vulnerable to pest attacks. Hybrid seeds offer a promise of higher yields, but they also have higher risks of crop failure since they are more prone to pest and disease attack, as illustrated by the Andhra Pradesh experience. Monocultures further increase the vulnerability to pest attacks since the same crop of the same variety planted over large areas year after year encourages pest buildups.
Privatization and the Spread of Monocultures
No native variety of cotton is found in Warangal—all varieties of cottonseeds used in Warangal are hybrid seeds sold by private companies providing high-yielding varieties. It takes at least six to seven years of trials and verifications under the supervision of government authorities for any company to launch certified seeds. However, to avoid such delays in the introduction of seeds to the market, seed companies sell them as “truthful” seeds: seeds sold on the basis of farmers having confidence in the company’s claims about them. There is no regulation to prevent the sale of “truthful” seeds.
In the 1970s cotton cultivation in Warangal was dependent upon the varieties developed by the public sector seed supply. During that time the most popular variety was Hybrid-4, a short staple cotton variety. Besides Hybrid-4 (H-4), the other varieties used during the 1970s and 1980s were MCU-5 (developed by Coimbatore Research Station); L. K. varieties (which were resistant to white fly and jassids); Varalakshmi (developed by Cotton Research Station, Nandyal); and JKHY-1 (an HYV developed by Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vidhyalaya, MP), among others. All these varieties were government varieties that were cultivated in the Telengana region.
However, during the 1980s a handful of private companies participated in cotton research and evolved a number of hybrid cotton varieties. These included Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company, Jalna (Mahyco); Mahindra Seeds Company, Jalna; and Nath Seeds Company, Aurangabad. These companies captured the entire market for cottonseed production and distribution.
The most popular variety of cotton in Warangal, based on yields during 1995–1997, was RCH-2, a long-duration “truthful” hybrid variety produced by Rasi Seeds Company and marketed by J. K. Company, Secundrabad. Other varieties of cottonseeds grown by farmers and the acreage under each variety in Warangal during 1996–1997 are shown in table 9.2. In Adilabad the most popular variety during this period was the short-duration L. K. variety. The MCU varieties were popular in Khammam district. The choice of variety for a particular region depends upon its soil condition, water availability, and the inclination of farmers. As a result of aggressive marketing by private companies, the farmers made their first mistake, according to Dr. L. Jalpathi Rao, a senior agronomist in the Warangal Agriculture Research Centre, by abandoning the short-duration variety of cotton suitable for the low rainfall and shallow soil of Telengana. They planted RCH-2, a long-duration variety, suitable to areas with assured irrigation. The drought condition in the beginning and the erratic power supply compounded the problem of poor irrigation.
In 1994–1995 the total area under cotton cultivation in Warangal was 69,286 hectares, which increased to 100,646 hectares in 1996–1997. Commensurate with the increase in acreage was the increase in cotton arrival in the Warangal cotton market. In 1994–1995 the total arrival of cotton was 676,993 quintals, which increased to 13,38,330 quintals in 1996–1997. The increase in cotton production led to a decline in prices. In 1994–1995, the average price per quintal of cotton was Rs. 1,809, which went down to Rs. 1,618 in 1996–1997 (see table 9.3). However, there was no decline in the input cost per acre; instead the input cost in cotton has been increasing every year, says Dr. Jalpathi Rao.
In Warangal district the cotton crop basically replaced the crop rotation based on jawar (rabi) and green gram (kharif). Now these two crops have almost become obsolete. The acreage under the green gram–jawar sequence has shown a drastic decline in the last decade. In 1987–1988 the area under the green gram and jawar sequence was 143,500 hectares, which declined to 31,952 hectares in 1997–1998. Besides jawar and green gram, cotton has also replaced other oilseeds, especially sesame, groundnut, and castor. Today cotton is grown in 20–23 percent of the total cultivable area in Warangal. The total agricultural land of Warangal is around 4.5 lakh hectares, according to Dr. Jalpathi Rao.
In 1997–1998 the total area under kharif cotton was 99,150 hectares. Eighty percent of cotton farmers used RCH-2 (Research Cotton Hybrid-2); other varieties used by farmers were Somnath and Shaktinath of Nath Seeds, MECH-1, 12, and 13 of Mahyco Seeds, and Sunjiv of Indo-American Seeds. RCH-2 has been the most vulnerable to pest attack due to the compact planting or bushy planting of this variety. This variety grows horizontally and has a closed canopy, which protects pests because sunrays don’t reach beneath the canopy.
In one acre, 450 grams of seeds (of any cotton variety) are sown. The cost is between Rs. 250 and Rs. 350 per 450-gram packet. However, when the farmer finds that not all seeds have germinated, he sows more, so about 500–600 grams of seeds are used in one acre. Since RCH-2 was very popular, farmers had to book this variety in advance; those who did not had to buy it on the black market at higher prices. However, the cotton failed due to severe pest attacks. The frequent sprays and spurious quality of pesticides used made them even more ineffective. Most farmers had to spend between Rs. 12,000 and Rs. 15,000 an acre on pesticides.
B. Ramanamma belongs to Gangapur village in Jadcherla in Mehboobnagar district of Andhra Pradesh. She and her husband cultivated twenty acres of leased land. Taken in by the marketing hype of seed companies, they replaced paddy with cotton. This proved beneficial at the beginning, but the crop demanded intensive irrigation, for which they took a loan of Rs. 50,000. The subsequent crops failed. Burdened with loans and accumulating interest, Ramanamma’s husband committed suicide by consuming pesticide. Ramanamma and her son are today working as construction workers in order to survive.
The heavy investment in agrochemicals could not be recovered because the yield was much below the expected level; it did not even cover the input cost. Small farmers who had taken money and material on credit were driven into debt and then to suicide.
The agricultural season of 1998–1999 in the state of Andhra Pradesh echoed the experience of the preceding years. Facing incessant rains followed by drought, working hard for the whole year and not getting a reasonable price for their produce, unable to pay back loans from private moneylenders, farmers succumbed to suicide. Within Andhra Pradesh, more than 80 percent of total farmers’ suicides occurred in the Telengana region of the state alone, with Warangal district sharing 40 percent of total deaths.
Farmers, lured by advertisements for cottonseeds, cultivated their lands with new varieties of cotton, including Navratan Ajith, Parry White Gold, and Bioseed. Mindful of the losses incurred during the past cotton crop, farmers have cultivated cotton with the utmost care. In spite of that, the adulterated seeds have destroyed thousands of acres of cotton crop in Parakala, Regonda, Atmakuru, Geisukonda, Sangyam, and Dharmasagar mandals of the district.
In Warangal district during 1998–1999, the extent of area cultivated by Navratan Ajith, Parry White Gold, Bioseed, and other varieties of cotton was around thirty thousand acres, which was spread across two hundred villages in twenty-seven mandals. It is believed that about six seed companies were successful in introducing these varieties in the villages through their field distributors.
Interestingly, the seed companies select their seed distributors from the village itself. These distributors are well-off farmers who operate large farms and influence decision making in their village. The films the seed companies show to farmers have been found to greatly influence their decision making about what type of seed to buy. Many farmers report that the boll size and the opened boll appeared very good in the films—however, they often could not get a single boll in their fields, and whatever bolls formed were shed by the plant without opening.
In the village Ulligedda Damera in the Atmakuru mandal of Warangal district, the whole village had planted a total extent of 150 acres with the Navratan Ajith variety of cotton in 1998–1999. Madarappu Ramesh, who had cultivated Navratan Ajith, invested a total of Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 11,000 per acre on his cotton crop. Nearly 70 percent of this investment was spent on chemicals and fertilizers. In the same village another farmer, Gudur Rajaiah, had cultivated three acres of land with the Navratan Ajith variety; he also incurred the same cost of cultivation for the cotton crop. His situation was worse than Ramesh’s as he had a debt of Rs. 90,000 from the arthies, or private moneylenders, at an interest rate of 36 to 48 percent. These farmers and others came to know about this variety of seed from video films showed to them in their village. And almost all the farmers were in debt either to arthies shops or to landowners.
In another village, Pallarigudda in the Sangyam mandal of Warangal district, almost all the farmers had cultivated their fields with Parry White Gold (PWG). The standing crop was very robust but without any bolls on the plants. About 150 villagers had initiated complaints in the district consumer redressal forum at Warangal against the failure of PWG, demanding appropriate compensation from the company. Government officials visited the fields of farmers whose cotton crops had failed. The villagers also requested that government officials clear their spiraling debts.
Lack of Support for Agricultural Workers
In addition to the seed failure, in many mandals yellow-insect cotton pests had destroyed the entire standing crops in 1998–1999. Farmers reported that the agriculture department of the state had shown total negligence in disseminating the advice of scientists, which had resulted in the havoc caused by the pests. Moreover, farmers persuaded by the suggestions of pesticide sellers had bought at high cost inferior chemicals that could not reduce the pests’ attack on the cotton crop. Also, the rate for cotton per quintal was not more than Rs. 1,500, which was not commensurate with the investment made on the crop.
Kottula Yakayya of Samudrala village in Station Ghanpur Mandal committed suicide in 1999. His family owns four acres of land. On two acres chilies were sown, and on two acres cotton was grown. Last year he borrowed a sum of Rs. 25,000 for cultivating cotton. With interest it totaled Rs. 60,000. Moneylenders started pestering him for payment of the interest. Not getting a proper price for his cotton in the market and unable to know how to clear the heavy debt, the farmer committed suicide by consuming insecticide.
Pacchikeyala Kameshwara Rao of Akinepalli village of Mangapeta Mandal, unable to bear his financial problems, committed suicide the same year. Insects intensely attacked his cotton crop, and the use of many insecticides could not stop their spread. His crop was completely destroyed. Receiving no advice from scientists and agricultural officers, he became despondent and consumed poison in the form of insecticides.
Lack of scientific advice from agricultural departments led to many more suicides, including those of Indala Ayilayya, Malotu Danja, Tallapalli Lakshamayya, and Pentala Odelu.
Despairing over their investment losses and their inability to feed their families, farmers are committing suicide by consuming pesticide mixed in curd rice. The number of suicides reported during November and December 1998 was about fifteen. Of these suicides, most were of farmers forty and older. They left behind families who have no one to look after them. The story of two such farmers is given in the box above.
Discussions with seed and pesticide merchants at Warangal revealed that the seed companies provide a very high margin on their products and also they do not demand immediate cash payment from the seed and pesticide merchants. About 80 percent of these transactions are on a credit basis of forty-five to sixty days. The merchants pay the seed companies through postdated checks. In turn, the merchants sell the product on credit to the farmers, who are lured by the “helping hand” extended by these merchants. Since the farmers need not pay in cash, they can easily become trapped in increasing debt. Further, the same merchants who sell the seeds also sell the chemicals and fertilizers required for the crops. Getting everything on credit from one source makes the farmer vulnerable to every suggestion given by the merchant. In this way the farmer sinks into a marsh of indebtedness.
Seed and chemical companies operational in Warangal include Shaw Wallace, ICI, Rallis India, Monsanto, Saral India, Novratis, Nocil, and Bayer. The liberalization of the seed sector is an epidemic leading to suicides and high debt for the purchase of seeds, agrochemicals, and pesticides.
Growing Seed Scarcity
Globalization and privatization of the seed sector have eroded the seed supply of farmers and the public sector. Although the entry of private seed companies is justified on grounds of increasing farmers’ options and choices, by making farmers look down on their own varieties as inferior and by eroding the capacity of the public sector, globalization has in effect created a seed famine.
There is a great mismatch in the number of seeds demanded by farmers and the seeds supplied. With this widening gap between demand and supply, the plight of farmers is getting worse. The demand for seeds of all crops has nearly doubled within six years. Public sector agricultural departments, state seed development departments, and oil-fed supply around 20 percent of the total requirement of seeds in Andhra Pradesh. Taking advantage of the deficit supply of seeds, private sector seed companies are providing spurious seeds.
Unavailability of seeds is also creating conditions of distress, causing farmers to resort to suicide. For instance, in the Rayalseema region of Andhra Pradesh, 50 lakh acres of groundnuts are cultivated. It is known to farmers that the groundnut crop in the kharif season can withstand ten to fifteen days without rain, a peculiarity utilized by the Anantpur and Kurnool regions, which cultivate this crop. Anantpur district requires 14 lakh quintals of groundnut seeds, but the government supplies only 1.12 lakh quintals. If farmers agitate for more, the government could provide a further 68,000 quintals, but even that would total only a meager 12 percent of the requirement. Thus, publicsector seed companies are unable to meet the demand, and the situation worsens every year. Taking advantage of these conditions and also the government’s privatization spree, private seed companies are trying to reap benefits through selling unreliable seeds.
When seeds are unavailable, farmers either leave their lands fallow or are forced to change to other crops. Or worse: Gogoti Bali Reddy from Kuntalapalli village in Nallamada mandal in Ananthpur district succumbed to suicide due to having no seeds to sow.
In the agricultural season of 1999–2000, five lakh acres of rich fertile land were left fallow without any crop. The scenario is the same everywhere. In the ghat region (basically tribals), farmers were not able to raise their paddy nurseries due to lack of paddy seeds. Similarly, the subsidy available on seeds has been removed. During the cropping season of 2000–2001, the Department of Agriculture unearthed a racket operating in the distribution and sale of spurious banni cottonseeds. The farmers have so far planted fifty thousand acres of land with banni seed in the districts of Guntur and Prakasham.
Another aspect of seed scarcity is the precipitous rise of seed prices. Cottonseeds are now sold at double the price of the period of easy availability. This appears to be a deliberate strategy to create a market for the genetically engineered Bt cotton, which will be relatively higher priced.
Seeds, Pesticides, and Debt: The Intimate Nexus of Corporate Feudalism
In Warangal, land is easily available on lease because of the heavy migration of people from the villages to the city. Farmers with small landholdings often take land on lease to grow cotton, paying Rs. 1,800–3,000 per acre as an annual rent. Rajmalla Reddy of Atmakur mandal, for example, has forty acres of land, thirty-five of which he gives on lease every year for Rs. 1,800 per annum for each acre. Lands that have irrigation facilities fetch up to Rs. 3,000 per annum, said Mr. Reddy. Attracted by the prospect of getting rich overnight, peasants who lease land spend thousands of rupees on the pesticides and fertilizers necessary for conventional cotton cultivation. Besides contributing their own resources, middle and small farmers borrow money, paying high interest rates, from arthies, who also provide them with seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides on credit. These private moneylenders take on the role of “pest-management advisors,” extend credits to farmers, sell spurious pesticides made by fly-by-night companies, charge higher than prevailing prices, and recommend the application of excessive doses of these pesticides.
The rise of moneylenders is a part of an emerging phenomenon of corporate feudalism. Withdrawal of low-interest credit has been a key element of the World Bank–led economic reforms. As cooperatives and rural banks close down, and public sector banks are privatized, rural credit dries up and farmers are pushed into borrowing from moneylenders. The failure of the private sector in Indian banking was what had ushered in the nationalization of banks in 1966. The prenationalization period had witnessed the growth of a banking system which, driven by profits, could not cater to the development needs of the nation. Credit was virtually inaccessible to the large masses of the rural and poor population. Lending policies were turned to the advantage of industrialists, with banks being under the control of industrial chairmen. Banking came to be controlled by a few communities, making it a family profession. The nationalization of banks was followed by a sharp increase in the number of bank branches. Consequently, employment shot up. Further, banking policies were tuned more to cater to the development needs of the nation, as priority-sector lending took precedence over profit-driven lending. In protecting the poor from the clutches of unscrupulous moneylenders, the nationalization of banks had succeeded in building up the productive base of regions and areas that would have otherwise remained neglected, through a number of projects and programs targeted particularly at women and other weaker sections of society.
The opening up of the banking sector to competition from private domestic and foreign banks has been accompanied by a reversal in these positive trends. For instance, there has been a fall in the proportion of credit received by the household sector, which had earlier received a relatively larger share of bank credit. Further, the incremental expansion during the postreform period for the household sector has not only been the smallest but is also smaller than expansion in favor of corporate enterprises. Similarly, the financial assistance sanctioned by the all-India financial institutions suggests that while disbursements of development financial institutions (DFIs) generally assisting large-scale industries expanded by 197 percent between 1990–1991 and 1994–1995, those of DFIs assisting small-scale and medium industries have risen by 62 percent only.2
Foreign banks are concentrated in metropolitan areas and completely absent in rural areas, while private banks are mostly concentrated in semiurban areas. In the event of the nationalized banks giving way to private participants, it wouldn’t be long before the rural areas are isolated from the financial scene. These trends are suggestive of a return to the prenationalization era, a demonstrated failure.
The private moneylenders are mostly pesticide dealers or shop owners. In Warangal there are thirteen thousand pesticide shops that distribute pesticides produced by ninety-three companies registered in Andhra Pradesh and also by about two hundred contraband units based in Maharashtra.3 In each village there are five to eight shops. The shop owners and dealers get their supply of the stock from the pesticide companies on credit. So there exists a chain of credit system, and the shop owners are only the mediators. In reality, the farmers indirectly get the credit from the company itself. The interest rate varies from 36 to 60 percent per annum. Since the chemicals are easily available on credit, farmers have no hesitation in using it often, usually once a week, and at a high intensity. There is no government agency to finance the farmers, and bank loans are negligible. This has forced farmers to approach the private moneylenders.
The cotton farmers in Warangal spend about Rs. 1,500 on preparing their fields (especially on labor costs). The sowing period is June to July. In fields that are rain fed, sowing is delayed till it rains. One week to ten days after sowing the cottonseeds, farmers do the first spray of pesticides. This is done without ascertaining the existence of pests in their field. The first spray is considered crucial; it is believed that without it the crop will fail. However, the state government’s Agriculture Department and the Agricultural Research Station, Warangal, have suggested to farmers the integrated pest management (IPM) strategy to control the pests through growing “trap crops” (such as a castor, marigold, and pheromone trap) in the field to see whether pests are actually present.
But farmers brainwashed into the miracle seeds/miracle spray culture do not pay heed to these suggestions, and within ten days of sowing, they start spraying their cotton fields with pesticides. Initially they use lower concentrations of chemicals. The chemicals that are used in the initial stage of spraying are Monocrotophos 36% EC, Dimethoate 30%, Oxydemeton-methyl, and so on. Mixing two chemicals is very common. In the first spray, only 250 milliliters is used in one acre of land. But from the second spray onward, 50 milliliters are added each time, and at one stage farmers end up using one liter of chemicals per acre. In one season, besides expenditure on fertilizers, labor, and seeds, cotton farmers spend Rs. 8,000 to 10,000 on pesticides alone. Pesticide is a major input in cotton. Once a week 300 to 500 milliliters of pesticide are sprayed per acre, and in one season (June–March) twenty-five to thirty-five sprays of pesticide are normal practice in Warangal. Among all the Indian states, the maximum use of pesticides is in Andhra Pradesh. A major portion of this is used in cotton and chili cultivation. Cotton is quite susceptible to a range of pests and diseases. In the 1980s, pesticide consumption in Warangal was less than Rs. 10 crores. But as the hybrid cotton cultivation picked up its momentum in 1985–1986, pesticide use also increased. In 1997–1998 the approximate sale of pesticides in Warangal district alone is Rs. 200 crores,4 which is the highest in Andhra Pradesh, and almost 80 percent of this is used in cotton.
The pest problem is not new in the Telengana region; the farmers of this area have been facing this problem for the last three years. But in 1997–1998 the problem was very severe and the pests attacked almost all standing crops in the fields. There was a heavy loss of crops. However, the most affected crop was cotton. Cotton farmers were hardest hit because input cost in cotton was higher and the yield was not as expected. Earlier, cotton farmers used to get ten to twelve quintals of yield in one acre spread over four to five pickings. But in 1997–1998 they could hardly get four to five quintals. Some of the farmers could not get even that. The temptation of heavy returns on cotton had attracted small farmers, who had even leased land for growing cotton. Bandi Kalavathi, wife of Somaiah of Venkatapur village, had no land of her own but she had taken five acres of land on lease and in four of these she had planted only cotton. She had taken on Rs. 35,000 of debt from private parties. Bandi Kalavathi is one of the farmers who committed suicide due to the crop failure.
Andhra Groundnut Crop Failure Drives Farmers to Suicide Hyderabad, September 24.
Close on the heels of suicides by Mehboobnagar cotton farmers during April–May this year, death has once again begun to take a heavy toll in the fields of Anantaput district, bordering Karnataka. As many as seven farmers and two girls have committed suicide in the districts during the last four days due to pest attack that almost wiped out the entire groundnut crop in 3 lakh acres.
—Hindustan Times (New Delhi), September 25, 2000
In the cotton cropping season in 1997–1998, not a day passed after mid-December 1997 without at least one farmer ending his or her life as a consequence of the failure of the cotton, chili, red gram, and other crops in Warangal, Karimnager, Medak, Rangareddi, and Mahabubnagar districts in the Telengana region and Kurnoor in the Rayalaseema region.
Incidentally, this was not the first time that such suicides had taken place in Andhra Pradesh. In 1987 in the Guntur and Prakasham areas, the cotton farmers faced a similar predicament, as did tobacco farmers in other areas in subsequent years. Farmers were encouraged to shift from their traditional self-sufficient cropping (of paddy and vegetables) to more remunerative cash crops. But unlike the case with their traditional food crops, total reliance on cash crops entailed a gamble, since fluctuations in the market price affected their earnings. Moreover, their cultivation involved huge expenditure on inputs like fertilizers and pesticides.
For the pesticides industry, the pests are a blessing in disguise, sustaining profit margins over the years regardless of the extent of crop damage. The more the pest incidence, the more lethal the pesticide cocktail. Consequently, the insects became resistant to all kinds of pesticides. Today controversial synthetic pyrethroids are also available. The pyrethroids are more expensive and are known to have a knockdown effect on birds and other animals. They are also believed to be carcinogenic. No sooner did the pesticides trade push in the pyrethroids than the insects developed immunity against these fourth-generation pesticides. There are twenty-eight known natural enemies of pests in the cotton fields. Nature has provided enough protection for cotton through the abundance of benign insects, parasites, and predators available in the field: spiders, ladybird beetles, crysopa, wasps, rats, frogs, snakes, birds, and others. But the tragedy is that these parasites and predators are the first to be killed when pesticides are sprayed. With their natural enemies gone, pests are stronger than ever in the crop field. In Warangal the indiscriminate use of pesticides has reduced the bird population. When pesticides disturb nature’s equilibrium, many of the little-known and previously insignificant pests of cotton, like white fly and Spodoptera, emerge as major pests.
There are more than fifty chemicals used in agriculture, and more than ninety companies are selling their products in Warangal district. There are several companies that are selling spurious and low-quality chemicals to which pests have developed resistance. As a result, farmers use higher concentrations and more expensive pesticides. Mixing two to three chemicals in order to combat pests has become a normal practice.
Besides pesticides, the cotton farmers also use fertilizers. In one season, about 150 kilograms of fertilizers, which cost about Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 2,000, are used in one acre. Every cotton farmer uses DAP and urea. Besides urea, they either use 17-17-17, 28-28-0, 14-35-14, 16-20-0-15, ammonia, DAP, and so on.
The two pests that attacked the cotton crop in 1997–1998 in Warangal were Heliothis and Spodoptera. Before these pests attacked cotton, the sucking and chewing pest white fly had attacked groundnut and chilies. In October–November, Spodoptera attacked the cotton crop. Though this is not a major pest for cotton, it heavily attacked cotton as well as groundnut, chilies, pulses, and others. The Spodoptera eats everything that is green—leaf, buds, flowers, and capsules. It is a voracious eater and moves in groups, attacking one field after another. Heliothis, on the other hand, eats only cotton capsules and buds. From morning to evening it remains under the soil and comes up in the evening for eating. That is the reason pesticide sprays don’t affect it. In 1997–1998 farmers had to use poison baits to kill this pest.
Consequences of Overburdening Debts: Distress Sale of Kidneys
The ever-growing interest rates and the accumulating debts in Rentachintala mandal of Andhra Pradesh has led to the distress sale of kidneys by many farmers. The farmers are caught in a lose-lose situation; there is no way out of debt and no escape from humiliation at the hands of arthies and moneylenders/pawnbrokers.
A. P. Farmers Sell Kidneys to Avoid Penury Guntur, May 15.
Rentachintala, once again the hottest place in Andhra Pradesh, is back in the news, for an altogether different reason. At least 26 persons, all in their prime age, have sold their kidneys for pecuniary gains.
Pushed into the clutches of penury, the handful of small time farmers found an easy way out from their debt trap at the cost of their kidneys. The gravity of the situation can be gauged from the fact that at least 100 persons underwent fitness tests.
A “seller” Mr. Polli Reddy said he had no other option. “We owe thousands of rupees to the money lenders. They gave us loans to raise crops, mostly cotton and chillies. We could not reap a good crop in the 1st two years. The growing interest was draining our pockets.”
—Hindu (New Delhi), May 16, 2000
The farmers here switched to cultivating chili, as usual driven by the lucrative returns. The investment during initial years was relatively low, as they were using native seeds, which are known for requiring less chemical intake. However, with the monoculture of chili cultivation spreading the damage, disease attacks increased, and every year the standing crops were affected. The loans the farmers subsequently took out after failed crops each year were used to sustain themselves, with whatever amount was left over put toward the next cropping season. Farmers went to pawnbrokers to get money to buy the necessary chemicals and sprays. The pawnbroker is a major actor who always comes out ahead in dealing with farmers. He “supports” farmers by providing loans at very exorbitant interest rates and also sells them chemicals from his shop. Individual loans may be small, but they accumulate over years and the farmers find themselves in heavy debt.
Once farmers are deep in debt there is no alternative available but to sell their land, agriculture implements, or homes. Recently, some farmers in Rentachintala and surrounding areas like Gurazala have sold their kidneys in order to clear their outstanding debts with the pawnbrokers. Farmers from Rentachintala mandal who sold their kidneys are:
Bobba Venkat Reddy got deeper and deeper into debt as spurious seeds and chemicals ruined his crops year after year. Continually harassed by moneylenders, he heard of a broker who was helping farmers get money by selling their kidneys. This was a better option than suicide, and he took advantage of it. However, the surgery has left him weak and unable to work his farm. Because of the media coverage, moneylenders have refused to loan any more money to him and farmers like him.
1. Durgyampudi Chinna Venkat Reddy
2. Dirsinals Narsi Reddy
3. Bobba Venkat Reddy
4. Siddhavarpu Poli Reddy
5. Peramlacchi Reddy
6. Kancharla Krishna
7. Narmala Krishna
8. Golle Ramaswami
9. Thai Narsaiah
Since the sale of farmers’ kidneys came to light, the life of these farmers has become even worse. There is no support either from the government or from the village itself. These farmers are looked on as untouchables, and no one is coming forward to extend support to the deprived families.
The Karnataka Scenario of Farmers’ Suicides
Crop Failures
In the 1999 cropping season, farmers at Harobanavalli village in Shimoga taluka reported that the 1001 paddy variety, which is very popular in the region, failed to perform in the second cropping season. Around ten farmers reported that the paddy variety 1001 supplied by Rallis Company in this village failed.
In 1999, Gaddilingappa cultivated four acres of land with the C-71 variety of jowar supplied by Cargill. The company assured 20–25 quintals of yield. However, he got only 1 to 1.5 quintals. All the farmers who had taken up the seed variety went to the agricultural commissioner and senior officials in the agricultural department. An inquiry by the commissioner revealed that the seeds were meant for the kharif season, not the rabi. Farmers picketed Cargill at Bellary, after which Rs. 380 per acre was given as compensation. Farmers also demanded that twenty-eight tons of seed the company still had be destroyed.
The cost of the seeds is steadily increasing over the years. The problem with the 1001 variety was that despite regular applications of fertilizers and other chemicals, there was drastic reduction of yield. The farmers had been using the company seeds for a long time and therefore depended on the market for the seeds. Some of the farmers reported that the company cautioned the farmers for not using 1001 variety for a second time on their fields. They are apprehending this as a possible reason for the failure of the crop.
The case with the horticultural crop of chilies is also not good. This crop, though, has little to do with companies supplying seed, as seeds saved by farmers are mostly used. The farmers largely depend upon two major regions for supply of the seeds—one is in Karnataka itself called Baidagi, and the other is Guntur (Andhra Pradesh).
In the Bellary region, out of the thirty-five thousand acres of chilies planted during 1999–2000, around twenty-six thousand acres of the crop suffered total destruction. This amounts to nearly 70 percent of the area planted. Per-acre investment for the chili crops is between Rs. 16,000 and Rs. 20,000, of which the majority is on chemical sprays. The returns from the output were around Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 4,000 per acre. The failure of the crop was attributed to excessive rainfall and a subsequent attack of viral disease. This amounted to huge losses for the farmers, who have taken out loans from commercial banks at the rate of 30 percent per annum.
The number of suicides related to chili crop failure during 1999–2000 as reported by government agencies was around eight individuals; the figure reported by one concerned nongovernment group was nineteen individuals.
Another problem chili farmers face is storage facilities for their harvest. The government cold-storage facilities are becoming costlier, and farmers are not getting good prices despite holding the stock for longer periods. This is only adding to their costs, and the interests on their loans keep accumulating.
Seed Supply: Public versus Private Companies’ Participation
All the agencies that are involved in seed production cater to the needs of farmers. These agencies need to provide quality seeds to these farmers by providing either certified seeds or labeled seeds. To sell certified seeds, agencies need to obtain a certificate from the state certification agency. They can also sell labeled seeds on their own. An analysis of all agencies providing various types of seeds shows that only public sector agencies pursue certification of seeds; those in the private sector operate without any proper certification.
In the kharif of 2000, an analysis of seed producers that have gone through seed certification in the state shows that more than 80 percent are public sector agencies, of which major players are Karnataka State Seeds Corporation and National Seeds Corporation of the State. Private sector participation in seed distribution in the state is around 12.28 percent of the total seed distributed. Interestingly, a detailed analysis of the sixty-five operational private seed companies that are registered with the state seed certification agency found that 88 percent of the companies are involved in the supply of cottonseeds, followed by maize, paddy, and bajra.
The Maharastra Scenario of Farmers’ Suicides
Farmers in Yavatmal district in Vidhrabha have faced problems of cotton failure in the last few years despite favorable climatic conditions and uninterrupted supply of inputs. The yields have drastically decreased from a quintal to a few kilograms per acre over these years.
The crisis is very severe, and farmers are struggling for survival in the wake of the failure not only of cotton but also of other important crop seeds such as toor (pulses) and others. Till 1992, the majority of farmers were cultivating a basic normal hybrid (AHH 468) of cotton, which was fairly consistent and provided normal yield. The problem in this region started after 1992, when a new variety of cotton (CAHH 468) was introduced to the farmers in the region. The farmers noticed that the new hybrid, which has not been certified by the government, failed to perform well in spite of all the care taken by them. As reported by the farmers, the yield registered was almost negligible in subsequent years. These seeds were supplied to farmers by some seed companies they have trusted for years, including Nath, Aurangabad, Ajith, Jalna, and Sanjay. The government seed-selling outlets are supplying substandard seeds to the farmers. Some farmers have brought this to the notice of the authorities of these seed companies. For instance, karadi (Bhima) seeds (marketed by Mahabeej, Akola), which have been duly certified by the certifying agency, were found to be substandard.
In Maharashtra, the people were growing millets, but agriculture departments working as extension workers for seed corporations advised them to stop growing millets and to start growing soya. Because they would get more money. They went in for soya. The farmers when growing millets were getting foliage that helped them to keep cattle, which produced dung to make the compost, which in turn, went back to the farmers’ fields. Now when soya came to the market, the soya oil went to some factory, the soya cake was exported to USA for feeding pigs; the cattle had nothing to eat, the soil had no dung. It started to lose its fertility. The cycle started to work in the wrong way. The need of the hour is to look into the soil aspect of the farms. The concept of soil aeration is of utmost importance. Soil aeration is not taken into account by the western education. We forget about the air. The earthworm is one such type of organism that helps in soil aeration. GM crops endanger the soil component and the concept of living soil will vanish in the course of time if such crops are allowed. The need of the integrated approach to organic farming where the whole cycle of life is again rejuvenated.
—Dr. Sultan Ismail, leading earthworm ecologist
82 Maharashtra Farmers Committed Suicide This Year
As many as 82 farmers from Vidarbha and Marathwada regions of Maharashtra had committed suicide during the year after being overburdened by debts, The Revenue Minister, Mr. Narayan Rane told the Maharashtra Legislative Council today. The State Government had given financial assistance to 25 farmers.
—Hindu (New Delhi), July 21, 1998
The Punjab Scenario of Farmers’ Suicides
Punjab—the highest contributor of grain to the national pool—enjoys the notorious distinction of having the highest rate of farmers’ suicides among all the states. They started in 1990, but in 1997–1998 the problem became very severe, and today it has reached alarming proportions. Despite some government agency reports to the contrary, the alarming rise in rural suicides has become an acknowledged fact.
Initially the Punjab government was not ready to acknowledge that the suicides were occurring. But when the media reported the suicides, then the government formed committees to look into the matter. But unfortunately, these committees failed to pinpoint unremunerative agriculture, increased cost of production, and large-scale indebtedness as major reasons for the misery of farmers and instead concluded that the suicides are taking place due to family problems, intoxication, and other social reasons.
The study Suicides in Rural Punjab conducted by the Institute for Development and Communication, Chandigarh, in 1998, confirmed that there has been a distinct increase in the number of suicides in Punjab since 1998. In 1992–1993, suicides in Punjab increased by 51.97 percent; in 1993–1994 there was an increase of 14 percent; in 1994–1995 the increase was 57 percent. It notes with concern that suicide rates, that is, the number of suicides per lakh population, has been steadily increasing from 0.57 in 1988 to 2.06 in 1997 in Punjab.5 It has been also observed that the percentage share of cultivator-farmers’ suicides among total suicides in Punjab in 1991–1997 was 23 percent. In Sangrur district the percentage share of cultivator-farmers among total suicides was 50 percent. The suicide rate of cultivator-farmers in 1993 was 1.98, which increased to 4.49 by 1997. The study clearly admits that the rate of suicides of cultivator-farmers has been on the rise in Punjab since 1993. However, the chief minister of Punjab downplays this alarming situation. Replying to a question regarding these suicides during the June–July Assembly Session in 1998 (question number 1,087), he said, “During 1996, 1997 and 1998 there were only 8 suicides of farmers and agricultural labourers in Punjab. One in Tarn-Taran in Amritsar district in 1996 was a result of family dispute. The three in Sangrur were due to crop damage and indebtedness. Three in Bhatinda were because of crop damage and indebtedness and one in Jalandhar due to crop damage by hailstorm.”
The state of Punjab covers an area of 50,33,000 hectares, constituting about 1.57 percent of the total geographical area of the country.
There are seventeen districts: Amritsar, Bhatinda, Faridkot, Ferozepur, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jalandhar, Kapurthala, Ludhiana, Sangrur, Ropar, Mansa, Fatehgarh Sahib, Nawa Shahr, Moga and Muktsar, which have further been divided into 138 blocks comprising 12,795 villages.
The population of the state as per the 1991 census is 20.28 million. Out of this, 14,288,744 is the rural population, while the urban population is 59,93,225.
The state has been divided into three agroclimatic zones: the sub mountainous zone, central alluvial zone, and southern dry zone. The climate of the state is semihumid to semiarid.
Of the total geographical area of 50.33 lakh hectares, the net sown area in 1997–1998 was 42.04 lakh hectares, constituting approximately 84 percent of the total, as against the national average of 42 percent.
The gross cropped area is 78.33 lakh hectares, and the cropping intensity is 186 percent. The net irrigated area in Punjab was 40.21 lakh hectares in 1997–1998, and 96 percent of the gross cropped area is under irrigation. In 1997–1998 the average fertilizer consumption works out to be 167 kilograms per hectare in Punjab, compared to the national average of 73 kilograms per hectare.
The number of small and marginal farmers having up to 5 acres of land is about 499,510, 45 percent of the total landholding in Punjab. The average size of small and marginal farmers’ landholdings is only .99 hectares.
Crop Failures Lead Punjab Farmers to Suicide Chandigarh, April 20.
About 80 cases of suicides by farmers and agricultural labourers reported from five villages of Sangrur district in the last four or five years could only be the “tip of the iceberg” as death stalks the rural areas of the Lehra and Andana blocks in the otherwise prosperous district of Punjab.
According to a former sarpanch, Mr. Jarnail Singh, and a jathedar, Mr. Mastan Singh, about 33 persons had been driven to suicide in Balaran village, while the figure was zero in the official records since 1994.
—Hindu (New Delhi), April 21, 1998
Fifteen years back, Paramjit Singh of Punjab cultivated chilies. Over the years, the cost of chemicals increased, and the yield declined considerably. Local moneylenders forced Paramjit Singh to sign blank papers in return for giving him loans and took over his land. When he could not repay his loans, they dragged him off the land. This was more than he could bear, and he committed suicide.
Sangrur and Bhatinda districts reported the most suicides, with suicide rates of 12.08 percent and 6.24 percent respectively. It is also noticed that the share of noncultivators’ suicides in these two districts is very high compared with other districts: 13.24 percent and 11.35 percent respectively. The districts of Mansa, Amritsar, Ferozpur, Gurdaspur, Faridkot, and Muktsar had moderate levels of suicide proneness in 1991–1997. All these districts comprise the cotton belt of Punjab.
Some analysts acknowledge the suicide phenomenon in Punjab but characterize it as a result of militancy. Countering this, Mr. Inderjeet Singh Jaijee, convenor of the Movement against State Repression, said, “If this were the case one would expect to find suicides limited to Punjab and that too to certain areas of Punjab such as the border districts. This is not the case. Lehra and Andana Blocks in Sangrur district have been identified as suicide prone area[s] and yet this part of Punjab was less affected by militancy. Likewise Haryana did not suffer the turmoil and disruption of militancy, yet debt related suicides are being reported from that state too.”
The increased number of farmer suicides in Punjab can be understood in the context of growing distress in the agriculture of the state. The factors contributing to this state of affairs in agriculture are the decline in farmers’ income from the farm, the increased cost of production, crop failures and crop losses, the monoculture of wheat-paddy cultivation, rising unemployment in the rural areas, and so on. According to an estimate of the Department of Economics and Sociology, Punjab Agriculture University, Ludhiana, “The annual surplus of small size farm is about Rs. 9,500 during 1993–84.” It further estimates that “the best managed five hectares farm with standard field crop rotation, can earn barely an income equivalent to the average per capita income in Punjab.” However, in 1999–2000 this could have declined further due to the increased cost of the production of principal crops in the state.
Green Revolution Is Not More Green
The prevalence of suicide among farmers in Punjab exposes the flaws in the much-vaunted Green Revolution. Today the village agricultural economy of Punjab is in crisis, and the living conditions of the farming community and farm laborers are in bad shape.
Mr. Prakash Singh Badal, the present chief minister of Punjab, has said, “Agriculture for most has become a pain in the neck. It is not profitable at all except for those who own ten acres or more…. What is in the hands of the state? Everything has been centralised. Prices of all inputs are controlled and fixed either by the industry or Union Government. The price of farmers’ produce—wheat and paddy and most of the other produce—are fixed by the Centre.”6
The farmers of Punjab are voracious users of inputs in their bid to enhance the productivity of agricultural crops. For example, Punjab consumes 10 percent of the fertilizers, 11 percent of the pesticides, and 55 percent of the herbicides used in the entire country. The same is true for other agricultural inputs like irrigation and use of farm machinery.
In Punjab the growth of agriculture is mainly confined to two crops, rice and wheat, and has reached its saturation point. The data of Punjab indicate that the productivity of rice was 4.89 percent from 1965–1966 to 1985–1986, and it declined to 0.58 percent from 1985–1986 to 1996–1997. The productivity of wheat has also declined from 2.79 to 2.14, and sugarcane declined from 3.40 to 0.28 in the corresponding period. The productivity of cotton increased to 1.63 from 1965–1966 to 1985–1986, but the total production of cotton in the state declined from 19.25 lakh bales in 1996–1997 to 9.41 lakh bales in 1997–1998 due to the pest attack and crop failures. However, in the 1980s, the Punjab Agriculture University, Ludhiana, made it abundantly clear that farmers with holdings of fewer than fourteen acres were fighting a losing battle for survival.
Essential factors such as soil health and water resources are being overstrained, and there are serious buildups of pests, diseases, and weeds. Pest has emerged as a very serious menace in Punjab due to monocultures. There is also no scope for further expansion of the area under cultivation or increase in the cropping intensity (which is at present at a very high level of 186 percent). The water resources of the state are being overex-ploited through the adoption of high-water-requiring cropping sequences and the use of high-yielding varieties.
Increased Cost of Production
The increase in the prices of inputs and labor has pushed the cost of production up during the last three decades (six times for wheat, seven times for cotton, and ten times for paddy). The increased cost of production has led to increased indebtedness among farmers in Punjab. Today 90 percent of farmers in Punjab are in the trap of debt.
To get an idea of the soaring cost of cultivation in Punjab, it is desirable to study the trends of the three major crops of the state: paddy, wheat, and cotton. The per-hectare cost of the cultivation of paddy in Punjab has increased by five times in a span of eighteen years, from Rs. 3,419.33 in 1978–1979 to Rs. 17,966.85 in 1996–1997. The cost of production per quintal of paddy has increased from Rs. 68.71 in 1978–1979 to Rs. 334.81 in 1996–1997 (see table 9.8).
However, despite the fivefold increase in the cost of the cultivation of paddy, there is no corresponding increase in its yield. The yield increased by just 2.17 quintals per hectare from 1978–1979 to 1996–1997. However, during this period there was a very significant increase in the use of fertilizer, insecticides, and machine labor in the paddy crop in Punjab and a very drastic decline in the use of animal labor. This also indicates that Punjab farmers have almost ceased doing any manual work on their farms, leaving it to either migrant laborers or machinery.
Fertilizer use in paddy increased from 163.85 kilograms in 1978–1979 to 195.49 kilograms per hectare in 1996–1997. During the same period, the total amount of insecticide, in terms of value, also increased, from Rs. 56.77 to Rs. 825.04, while the machine labor cost increased from Rs. 90.93 to Rs. 956.80. Unfortunately, the heavy use of machine labor had its impact on the animal labor on the farm, which declined from 21.89 pair hours in 1978–1979 to 1.99 pair hours in 1996–1997.7
The wheat crop has also shown a similar increasing trend in cost of production. There is a sixfold increase in the per-hectare cost of cultivation of wheat in Punjab, from Rs. 2,722.36 in 1978–1979 to Rs. 17,333.89 in 1997–1998. During the same period, the cost of production per quintal of wheat has also increased, from Rs. 108.57 to Rs. 411.97 (see table 9.9).
In wheat, the yield has increased from 22.61 quintals in 1978–1979 to 35.78 quintals per hectare in 1997–1998. In comparison to this, during the same period, fertilizer use also increased from 125.69 kilograms per hectare to 224.87 kilograms per hectare, the cost of insecticide per hectare increased from Rs. 0.95 to Rs. 428.83, and the cost of machine labor per hectare increased from Rs. 283.03 to Rs. 1,692.07. Due to the heavy use of machine labor, the animal labor declined from 45.44 pair hours in 1979–1980 to 2.47 pair hours in 1997–1998.8
Cotton is not untouched, either. There is a sharp increase in the cost of cultivation of cotton. In 1975–1976 the cost of cultivation was Rs. 2,154 per hectare, which increased to Rs. 19,497 per hectare in 1996–1997, a more than eightfold increase. Obviously, the cost of production per quintal has also increased in this period, from Rs. 225.95 to Rs. 1,703.04 (see table 9.10).
In cotton also there is no significant increase in yield in Punjab despite heavy use of fertilizers and pesticides. In 1975–1976 the yield of cotton was 9.11 quintals per hectare, which increased to only 10.93 quintals in 1996–1997. In comparison to the yield, the cost of insecticide use increased from Rs. 51.99 to Rs. 2,401.49, and the fertilizer cost increased from Rs. 189.83 to Rs. 776.11 per hectare during the same period.9 In 1999–2000 the total consumption of pesticides in Bhatinda alone was about 941,671 liters. Out of this, 90 percent was used only on cotton.
Cotton is a major crop in the southwestern districts of Punjab such as Bhatinda, Faridkot, Mansa, Moga, Muktsar, and Sangrur, which accounted for 13 to 20 percent of the national cotton production. But in the last few years there was a sharp decline in cotton production. The major constraints in the cotton crop include the inadequate availability of certified cottonseed, waterlogging in some pockets of the cotton area, and bad weather conditions during the cotton season. In Punjab about 80–85 percent of the area under this crop is covered by American cotton (Hirsutum) and the remaining area is under desi (Arboraum) (see table 9.12). Among the prominent varieties of American cotton are LHH-144, Fateh, F-1378, LH-1556, F-1054, F-846, and LH-900, and the desi cotton varieties are LDH-II, LD-491, LD-327, and LD-230.
In the last few years there has been a drastic increase in the population of sucking pests and aphids, jasids and bollworm, particularly American bollworm. The farmers are following a dangerous trend of spraying a cocktail of pesticides in hopes that one or another chemical in the mixture will control the pest.
One significant change occurring in the last couple of years in the cotton cultivation in Punjab is the increase in the area of hybrid cotton. It has increased from 10,200 hectares in 1998–1999 to 76,800 hectares in 2000–2001. This is a disturbing trend that will further escalate cultivation costs for farmers and will promote a very intensive use of pesticides as we have witnessed in Andhra Pradesh.
However, hybrid seeds by their very nature are high-risk seeds under high-input conditions affordable only by rich farmers. They may give good yields, but for resource-poor farmers, they translate into high risks and high debts. Also, hybrid seeds are highly pest prone and therefore need frequent pesticide applications. Pesticides create new pest problems as well as environmental and health hazards. Pesticides fail to control pest whether or not they are spurious. With the increase in the area of hybrid cotton, pest attacks will further increase and will create more problems for Punjab farmers.
Due to the pesticide treadmill, farmers borrow money on credit to buy pesticides. In 1999–2000 also, as the bollworm attacked cotton plants, farmers started taking out more loans to buy pesticides and insecticides to save their crops. Although Agriculture Department authorities maintain that there was only a mild attack of bollworm in the cotton belt, cotton growers of about twenty villages in the Talwandi Sabo block of Bhatinda pointed out that the attack was alarming. Sikander Singh of Bhai Bakhtaur village says, “Sundi (bollworm) has badly hit the crop. If the bollworm were not killed at this stage, it would kill the cotton growers.” He was not able to repay last year’s loan for buying pesticides and insecticides for spraying on the cotton crop, and this year he had to take out another loan for the same purpose.10 Another farmer, Mr. Resham Singh, said that for the past six years he had been growing cotton and suffering losses. Every year he had been taking out loans to meet his agricultural and social needs, and now he was neck deep in debt.
Cotton farmers point out that bollworm has become resistant to insecticide and pesticides. If the government fails to take any action and the farmers fail to adopt alternative methods of pest control and integrated management of pests, Punjab might again witness a spurt in the numbers of farmers’ suicides.
For the economic survival of small and marginal peasants, it is imperative to shift away from the pesticide treadmill that is pushing farmers into debt and suicide. The farmers are being forced into intensive industrial agriculture that is leading to the loss of their money, their land, and their lives.
Extensive Crop Failure
Besides the pest attack, another menace faced by farmers in Punjab is extensive crop failure and seed failure. Many analysts have attributed farmers’ suicides in Punjab to crop failure and seed failure. Professor Gopal Iyer has acknowledged this fact in his report on suicides in Punjab. He says that “Punjab has also experienced substantial crop loss in cotton consistently during 90’s and there was a major crop loss during 1998 Kharif. This fact has been adequately acknowledged by the Punjab Government in its report submitted to the Central Government for compensation to Punjab farmers due to crop loss for Kharif in 1998. The untimely rain in the third week of September and again from October 15 to 18, 1998 caused extensive damage to standing and harvested crops in Punjab.”11
Farmers have also suffered huge losses because of seed failures. In the 1999–2000 cotton season, too, several instances of crop failure have been noticed. In the Jagaram Tirath village of Talwandi Sabo block, district Bhatinda, the Kohinoor variety of hybrid cotton is performing very poorly. Most farmers who have sown this variety are not happy with this, and they are now mentally prepared to face a total failure of this crop. Some realized this in the beginning and replanted the same field. Mr. Gurcharan Singh (son of Mehr Singh) and Mr. Gurdeep Singh Sarpanch had to plant again when their Kohinoor seeds did not germinate well.
Similarly, Mr. Mahinder Singh, son of Mangal Singh of Jagram Tirth village, also sowed Kohinoor hybrid cotton in seven acres. It is an early variety, as claimed by the company, but very few plants had given flower before mid-August, after 120 days of planting. The farmers said that by this time the bolls should have been ready. When the villagers went to the dealer to complain, he said that the bolls would come and that the same variety was doing well in Rajasthan, knowing full well that no farmers would go there to investigate. According to farmers, in more than twenty villages of Moud Mandi, Talwandi Sabo, Rama Mandi, and Mansa Mandi about 50 percent of farmers had planted Kohinoor cotton, but in all these villages it showed signs of failure, as reported by farmers of Jagram Tirth village.
The loss of their crop is a curse for indebted farmers, and in extreme cases they commit suicide.
Cropping Pattern: Trends toward Monoculturism
In Punjab, the cropping pattern shows a trend toward monoculture. Farmers are abandoning the cultivation of diverse crops, for example, pulses, bajra, jowar, and oilseeds and getting trapped into the paddy-wheat combination. This is one of the major reasons for farmers’ declining productivity and income. They are now dependent on the market for their day-to-day requirement of pulses, oilseeds, and vegetables. Though Punjab is known for being the “food basket of the country and the granary of India,” it is not bringing prosperity to its own farmers. The paddy-wheat combination in Punjab is wiping out agricultural diversity.
The area under rice has increased from 227,000 hectares in 1960–1961 to 2,519,000 hectares in 1998–1999, an elevenfold increase. The area under wheat increased from 1,400,000 hectares in 1960–1961 to 3,338,000 hectares in 1998–1999, while the area under cotton increased from 446,000 hectares in 1960–1961 to 724,000 hectares in 1997–1998 but declined to 475,000 hectares in 1999–2000 due to crops failures in the last few years. But in 1999–2000 the area under cotton again increased, to 550,000 hectares in Punjab.12
However, the area under pulses in Punjab has decreased drastically, from 903,000 hectares in 1960–1961 to 78,000 hectares in 1998–1999, more than a tenfold decrease. In the same period gram went down from 838,000 hectares in 1960–1961 to 132,000 hectares in 1998–1999, which is more than a sixtyfold decline. The area under maize went down from 327,000 hectares to 154,000 hectares in the same period. Area under oilseeds has also decreased, from 185,000 hectares to 158,000 hectares. Area under millets and coarse grains has also declined. In the case of bajra and jowar, the decline is very sharp, from 123,000 hectares to only 4,000 hectares and 17,000 hectares to nil, respectively, during the period from 1960–1961 to 1998–1999.
It is true that Punjab, comprising only 1.57 percent of the geographical area of the country, produced 19.3 percent of wheat, 9.6 percent of rice, and 8.4 percent of cotton of India’s total produce during the year 1997–1998, and it contributes 40–50 percent of rice and 50–70 percent of wheat to the central pool. However, the increase in the area of wheat and rice has shifted the whole cropping pattern of Punjab from diversity to monoculture, and quite obviously the shift to monoculture would register an increase of monoculture output but a drastic decline in the output of the diverse crops.
The production of pulses has decreased from 709,000 tons in 1960–1961 to 50,000 tons in 1998–1999. Similarly, the production of oilseeds, millets, and maize has also decreased in Punjab due to the spread of monocultures of wheat and rice. This shift has left farmers with no option except to hope that they would get better yield next year. With that hope they are getting trapped on the treadmill of fertilizers and pesticides and keep sinking further into the swamp of debt and humiliation.
Their profit from agriculture has declined while their household expenditures have been increasing. Gone are the glory days of the 1980s and early 1990s, when their income had increased substantially due to the introduction of HYVs, good returns from cotton, and government-supported subsidized inputs to encourage the Green Revolution. Today the Green Revolution is no longer green. Neither are the HYVs performing a miracle of instant increase in yield; cotton has been failing in the last few years, and the government has been withdrawing the crutches of subsidy. Now to feed their farms with chemical fertilizers and pesticides and to feed themselves and their families, farmers are succumbing to the control of private moneylenders, tractor agencies, and seed, fertilizer, and pesticide dealers. Their burden of debt is increasing every year.
Reckless Mechanization of Agriculture
Though agriculture in Punjab is undergoing a severe crisis, there is no sign of a decline in the sale of farm machinery. The farmers of the state have been suffering due to the high cost of input-intensive agriculture. Table 9.15 on the increase in agricultural implements in Punjab from 1995 to 1999 validates this. In Mansa district alone, which is a very backward district of Punjab and a suicide-prone area, too, the total number of tractors of all brands sold every year is around twelve hundred, according to Mr. Kishor Chand, manager of Amar Tractor Agency.
Agricultural experts of Punjab blame tractors for the indebtedness of farmers. The tractor has become a status symbol for many farmers. At present, there are about four lakh tractors in Punjab. Even farmers with five to six acres of land buy tractors in this state. This has given rise to a secondhand market of tractors, and once a week, the tractor mela (market) is held in more than fifteen different places in Punjab. But this only highlights the bad state of affairs in Punjab, as farmers are selling their tractors to pay their debt or meet social obligations. Farmers buy a new tractor on loan and within a month resell it in the market at Rs. 50,000–60,000 less than the price they paid. This phenomenon is very prevalent among distressed farmers in Punjab. The reason for such resale, as acknowledged by some of the farmers, is to repay loans borrowed from local arthies.
Increased Farmers’ Suicides
Suicides in Punjab have reached alarming proportions in recent years, especially in the southern districts, also the main cotton zone of this state. As reported by Dr. Gopal Iyer and Dr. Mehar Singh Manick of the Department of Sociology, Punjab University, the reason for farmers’ suicides in Punjab is mainly high indebtedness. “Indebtedness among the farmers and farm labourers in Punjab has reached epidemic proportions. Landless agricultural labourers, small and marginal farmers are more vulnerable than large farmers. Large farmers are able to sell portions of their holdings to pay off debts, which acts as a buffer. The major thrust of the small and semi-medium farmers is to borrow primarily for agriculture and marriage purposes. The lending agencies not only pressurise the farmers to clear the outstanding loans but also humiliate them. They experience loss of prestige and are forced to commit suicide.”13 High indebtedness is followed by constant pressure from lending agencies to repay the loan, an important factor influencing farmers to commit suicide. Another important factor is family members’ resistance to selling land to clear the debts, culminating in the suicide of one or more family members. In the Chek Ali Sher village in Mansa, three members of one family—a father and two sons—committed suicide when a moneylender claimed his title over their land.
Crop Failure and Mounting Debts Drive Punjab Farmer to Suicide Bhatinda, Oct. 2.
Reeling under heavy debts and disappointed over the decay of his crop, Mohinder Singh (30), a farmer of Nat Bagher village, about 35 km from here, allegedly ended his life consuming pesticide. He has left behind a 27-year-old wife and three children.
Mohinder’s uncle told the Indian Express that he (Mohinder) owed Rs. 2 lakh to a commission agent and money lenders. He has taken nine acres of land on contract at the rate of Rs. 7,000 per acre.
His cotton crop on seven acres was destroyed by American bollworm and other pests. Another farmer, Jarnail Singh said that about 90% farmers of the village were under debt owing to the bad crops for the past five years.
—Indian Express (New Delhi), October 3, 1998
Two More Farmers Commit Suicide in Punjab
In yet another case of debt and crop failure deaths, two farmers of Bir Khurd village in this district allegedly committed suicide by consuming pesticides. Bikkar Singh (39) and Baldev Singh (42) ended their lives on October 19 and October 16, respectively. Both of them were deep in debt.
—Indian Express (New Delhi), October 25, 1998
In fact, this culture of committing suicide to escape indebtedness and the social stigma of being financially broke started in Punjab a few years ago. Small and marginal farmers are opting for commercial crops such as hybrid cotton on a large scale and making huge investments in anticipation of a good return. To meet heavy investment demands, farmers take out private loans at a very high interest rate, 2 percent to 3.5 percent per month. This has given rise to several other social problems among cultivators’ families in Punjab. According to psychiatrists in Punjab, the debt trap has led to an increase in the consumption of intoxicants as well as matrimonial and family disputes. Most farmers are very “status conscious.”
Most Punjab farmers have insufficient income to maintain themselves as the expenses of the community rise. Many farmers who have lost their land, ashamed to work as laborers in their own village, migrate to cities in search of such jobs. In the cities they compete with migrant laborers, who are preferred by landlords because they are cheaper and better behaved than local laborers. Moreover, subsidiary occupations of the farming community such as animal husbandry, poultry keeping, beekeeping, and fisheries are also running at a loss. In most cases these businesses were started on loans that the entrepreneurs now find difficult to repay. In addition, landholdings are fragmenting into smaller and smaller parcels because of rising population and the disintegration of the family.
Education has been totally neglected in Punjab villages. There are schools in which as many as three hundred children share a single teacher. The literacy rate is lowest in the Mansa–Sangrur districts, where suicide has been a large-scale problem in the last few years. The arthies take advantage of the farmers’ illiteracy; even after a farmer’s debt has been totally discharged, they normally do not delete the farmer’s name from their registers. There is a saying in Punjab, according to Subah Singh of Jagaram Tirth village, Talwandi Sabo, Bhatinda: “If a farmer takes a loan from a commission agent, it will never be over till his death.” The situation is further exacerbated by the floods every year in this region.
Due to increased rural indebtedness in certain villages, all lands are encumbered. The farmers want to sell the land, but there are no buyers. The land price has come down drastically.
Credit Facilities to Farmers
Farmers in Punjab are borrowing from various credit sources/agencies. The main agencies that are financing the credit needs of farmers in the state are cooperative credit institutions like primary agricultural credit societies and primary land development banks, commercial banks, and regional rural banks and also the informal sector credit agencies like commission agents (arthies) and moneylenders.
Borrowing for financing the current farm expenses is on a shortterm basis, normally for a crop season, and these loans are repaid (fully or partly) through the sale proceeds at the end of the season. Fresh loans are taken out to finance the working capital requirement of the next cropping season: a never-ending vicious cycle. The credit advanced to the farmers of Punjab increased six times between 1990–1991 and 1998–1999 (see table 9.16).
A formal credit agency lends money to farmers by registering their land as security in its name. Similarly, banks provide loans against the security of land. Once the loan is forwarded to the farmer, these agencies ensure that the farmer does not apply for a loan from any other bank by putting their stamp on the papers.
Over the years, banks and other financial lending agencies have changed their methods of recovering their losses from loans to farmers. Once the stipulated date of repayment is passed, representatives from the banks go through the village announcing the auction of the land on a loudspeaker. This method of auction, according to farmers, is being done to humiliate them as well as to terrify other farmers so that they make their payments on time. The three acres of land of Mr. Roshan Singh of Bhai Bhakhtuar village of Maud block of Bhatinda was auctioned in this way by the bank.
All farmers, irrespective of their own investment through loans, take out the meager loan of Rs. 2,000 provided by the bank. According to a study conducted by Dr. Shergill of Punjab University, the total debt on the farmers of the Punjab state is about Rs. 5,700 crore.14 This debt is about 70 percent of the net domestic product originating in the state in a year. In other words, three-fourths of one year’s total agricultural income of the state has to be paid if the total amount of debt is to be liquidated. However, to freeze the annual recurring interest charged on the total debt, about 13.2 percent of the total farmland area of the state will have to be mortgaged by the farmers. Seventy percent of the farmers are unable to repay their loans. The Punjab scenario is distressing—farmers must sell their land, tractors, and cattle at throwaway prices to meet their debt commitment. The cash expenditure of the farmers has been steadily growing, which has resulted in a continual decline in the net surplus generated from the production of their crops.
Loans through government agencies in the 1980s and early 1990s used to be waived by the government. But now it is a different scenario because the loans are being taken mostly from private moneylenders. According to Mr. Rudlu Singh, a farmer member of the BKU Ekta, Mansa, there are about twenty-four thousand commission agents in Punjab who charge compound interest for loan money, which is doubled in a short period of three years, three months, and nineteen days.
The arthies copy the formal credit institutions and register the land of the borrowers in their name as a security. When a farmer borrows a big amount from the arthies, he registers his land for the same value. If the borrower fails to repay the loan, he loses his land. But sometimes arthies give the land to the owner to cultivate as a tenant and not as owner. Due to social stigma and shame, the victim farmer never tells others in the village that he has become landless. About Rs. 8,000 crores of arthies’ money is floating in the market in Punjab. These arthies pay no income tax on this amount. There is a total of 12,560 villages in the state of Punjab, and on average two arthies operate in each village and control the village’s finance and economy, according to the BKU Ekta.
If the arthies fail to get their money back from farmers, they take away tractors, trolleys, and grains and sometimes occupy the house and lands of the defaulters. Mr. Mange Ram of Mansa Mandi took away the tractor and Rs. 82,000 from a farmer, Mr. Mahinder Singh, son of Mr. Arjun Singh, of Burj Tilam village in Mansa district for not repaying a debt of Rs. 3 lakhs to him. To pay the money the farmer had to sell his land. A farmer in the village Jattan Khurd in Mansa district had taken a loan of Rs. 65,000 and could not repay due to successive crop failures. The commission agent took away thirty-five to forty quintals wheat, the annual ration, lying in his house as well as his tractor with trolley. Even with the intervention of the BKU Ekta, the farmer got back only his wheat.
There are several farmers in Bhai Bhakhtawar village in Maud Tehsilin Bhatinda district whose land has been seized by arthies. Among others are Jagseer Singh (son of Jaggar Singh), Bant Ram Vpeywala, and Nichatar Singh. According to Dr. H. S. Shergill, “In 1997 farmers borrowed a whopping Rs. 3119 crore. Sixty one percent came from traditional commission agents. Here interest rates are between 24 to 30 percent. Cooperative could manage just 34 percent; the rest—a meager 4 percent—came from commercial banks.”15 This situation is particularly detrimental to small farmers as interest rates are determined by the size of the holding—the smaller the holding, the higher the interest. Such exploitation by the commission agents and the burden of debt are forcing several farmers in Punjab to commit suicide, and nobody in the government seems to be paying any attention. Unfortunately, these suicides are rarely reported to the police. The discrepancy between the actual figure (collected by activists and farmer unions) and the official figure is explained by the fact that many suicides go unreported; official figures are invariably lower than the real ones. There seem to be unanimous agreement among villagers in rural Punjab not to report these deaths to the police as suicides. The villagers justify this by stating it will avoid “desecration of the dead body during postmortem examination and associated harassment by the police.”
The most common method adopted by farmers for suicide is drinking pesticides and agricultural fumigants, which are available in abundance. Hanging, drowning, self–immolation, and throwing oneself in front of an oncoming train are also resorted to by some farmers.
About 150 cases of suicide by farmers and agricultural laborers have been reported in the last four to five years from the Lehra and Andana blocks of Sangrur district. In a single village, Dhindsa of the Lehra block, in the last five years more than fifteen farmers have committed suicide due to crop failure and increased debt.
In 1999–2000 suicides by farmers continued in Punjab due to acute indebtedness, exploitation of commission agents, and crop failures. Mr. Tirth Anok Singh of Jagaranm village was in debt for Rs. 1 lakh, which he borrowed from an arthi. He also bought a tractor (Mahindra 256 DI) against his lands and was in debt for Rs. 2.5 lakhs to the State Bank of Patiala. But one month after the purchase of the tractor the arthi took it away. Mr. Singh left his house the day his tractor was seized and never returned. His son Mr. Pretem Singh said that his father might have committed suicide. The arthi sold the tractor for more than Rs. 2 lakhs but kept all the money; nothing was given back to Mr. Singh’s family after deducting the loan money. Neither was any paper given to the victim’s family after the sale of the tractor. The family continued paying interest to the bank; otherwise they would lose the land, because farmers’ lands are registered in the name of the loaner bank. In April 2000, Mr. Sadhu Singh, aged forty years, of Dhindsa village, Mwonak Tehsil of Sangrur, committed suicide. In 1998 he took out a loan of around Rs. 35,000 from a commission agent. In two successive years his crop failed. He had also taken land on lease against his wife’s jewelry. After his death, the owner of the land kept the jewelry and gave the land to the commission agent. In August 2000 two landless laborers, Mr. Surju, son of Chand, and Mr. Sukhdev, son of Preetam, of Dudian village under Mwonak Tehsil of Sangrur district committed suicide because they were not able to repay their debts.
Conclusion
India has once before been colonized through cotton. From being the biggest producer of cotton and cotton textiles, India was converted into the biggest market for textile produced by the British industry.
Today cotton colonization is not restricted to cotton textiles but goes deeper, into the colonization of cottonseeds. From being the country of origin and the center of diversity, India is being rapidly reduced to dependence on imported cottonseeds.
Freedom from the first cotton colonization was based on liberation through the spinning wheel. Gandhi’s use of the charkha and the promotion of khadi were both forms of resistance to the British monopoly on cloth and reminders that it was in our hands to make our own cloth again.
Freedom from the second cotton colonization needs to be based on liberation through the seed. Indigenous seeds are still available in large parts of India. Organic cotton is promising to become a major route to prosperity for farmers in marginal and rain-fed areas. The freedom of the seeds and the freedom of organic farming are simultaneously a resistance against the monopolies of corporations like Monsanto and a regeneration of agriculture that will bring fertility to the soils and prosperity to the farmers. The seeds of suicide need to be replaced by seeds of prosperity. And those seeds should be in the hands of our farmers, not in the control of corporations.
Notes
1. Observer, June 8, 1999.
2. Sudhir Shetty, Alternative Economic Survey (1996).
3. Chakrabarti Asish, “Pesticides, Moneylenders Play Havoc with Andhra Farmers,” Farm Digest, February 1998.
4. Ibid.
5. Suicides in Rural Punjab (Chandigarh: Institute for Development and Communication, 1998).
6. Tribune, May 15, 1998.
7. Cost of Cultivation of Principal Crops in India, 1991, 1996 and February 2000 (New Delhi: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, 1991).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Tribune, August 17, 2000.
11. Gopal Iyer and Mehar Singh Manick, Indebtedness, Impoverishment and Suicides in Rural Punjab (Delhi: Indian Publishers, 2000).
12. Agricultural Statistics of Punjab on the Eve of New Millennium (Punjab: Statistician Department of Agriculture, 2000).
13. Iyer and Manick, Indebtedness, Impoverishment and Suicides in Rural Punjab.
14. H. S. Shergill, Rural Suicides and Indebtedness in Punjab (Chandigarh: Institute for Development and Communication, 1998).
15. Ibid.