Despite the advances made in the liberal Western philosophical and educational tradition to counteract unethical, immoral and inhumane acts committed by the human species, these acts of inhumanity persist. It would be inapt to apportion blame only to Western thinking, which has its roots in Greek antiquity, as Plato and Aristotle, for instance, perpetually and justifiably pursued and advocated the human enactment of civility and friendship in their writings. Instead of revisiting liberal views on education and arguing for a reconsidered view of humanityCPöa possible and plausible contentionCPöthis article draws on African philosophical thought on education to disturb some of the doubts in potentially disrupting atrocities committed against the human race, especially on the African continent. By drawing on the philosophical ideas of Agamben, in particular the notions of actuality, potentiality and becoming, it is argued that an instance of African philosophy of education—ubuntu (human interdependence and humanness)CPöcan do much to trouble the escalating levels of inhumanity on the African continent.
The idea that an African philosophy of education is not capable of counteracting inhumane acts, such as genocide, torture, murder and the abuse of human beings, has been dealt with extensively in previous works (Waghid, 2014; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012). The main argument has been in defence of the moral concept of ubuntu (human interdependence and humanness), as being capable of thwarting and even eradicating inhumanity as the continent battles the remnants of what is commonly known as the Arab Spring (peopleCPÖs revolt against unjust state rule in several northern African countries) in the form of persistent acts of hostility against humanity. This article takes a renewed look at African philosophy of education, without discounting the positive effects of ubuntu to resist inhumanity. It argues that ubuntu has to be considered always as a communal practice in becoming in order for the continent to disturb the tide of inhumanity that has swept unabatedly across the continent, and more people suffer the fate of extinction, torture and excommunication from their lands. Through the radical philosophical lens of Giorgio AgambenCPÖs negation politics, I argue that ubuntu has a more enduring potentiality to counteract violence if looked at in relation to the notion of a community in becoming. In doing so, I simultaneously dispel the notion that Western (continental) thinking has no relation to African thought and practice. Instead, practising a philosophy of education, more specifically of an African kind, invariably draws on seemingly incommensurable traditions to trouble the ubiquitous presence of inhumanity.
Genocide on the African continent continues unabated. Whether in the form of atrocities committed by the Egyptian military rulers against protesting civilians, who insist in vain that the removal of democratically elected President Morsi be reversed; radical Egyptian Muslims desecrating churches and killing orthodox Coptic Christians; al-Shabab (the Youth) paramilitary forces massacring civilians in a Nairobi shopping mall; homophobic attacks against gays and lesbians by fundamentalist Muslims and Christians in Nigeria; Hutus raping and maiming women and children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Somali maritime piracy leading to assaults of members of shipping crews; and gunmen in South African township communities annihilating one another to gain more control over illegal drug traffickingCPöthe inhumanity perpetrated against people on the African continent remains endless and horrifying. All the mentioned atrocities against humanity persist, despite African communities’ apparent awareness that ubuntu should be actualised in their lived experiences, particularly in relations between individuals and others. Ubuntu (human interdependency) has been constitutive of African communal practices (and nowadays popularised through the media) for a very long time, to the extent that the practice has been linked to forms of communitarianism that should be actualised, such as having respect for elders, treating the destitute and helpless with care and cultivating sharing and trust amongst AfricaCPÖs peoples (Waghid, 2014, pp. 58–62). One cannot deny the need for ubuntu to manifest itself in the practices of people, considering the escalating levels of human indignity that have become endemic in certain parts of African society. There are those critics of ubuntu who use the inhumanity that prevails in certain parts of the continent as reason to take issue with the practice, and even to question whether Africa has the moral commitment to remedy its own continuing societal demise. There are others who go so far as stating that ubuntu contributes towards AfricaCPÖs moral malaise on account of its incipient potential to polarise communities along ethnically divisive understandings of ubuntu. Small wonder, then, that ethnic rivalries are so dominant and acrimonious in several parts of the African continent. I do not for a moment think that these criticisms are valid, as the ethical caring and compassionate mutuality associated with ubuntu make the practice an unlikely candidate for the discordant inhumanity some people suffer on the continent. For me, the answer lies perhaps in looking at ubuntu differently againCPöthis time through the paradigmatic lens of the radical political theory of Agamben. It is AgambenCPÖs views on actuality, potentiality and becoming that will be used to reconsider ubuntu as a moral imperative for Africa to become more attentive to the inhumanity that has permeated several parts of the continentCPöa situation that affects all Africans, as well as those intent on seeing humanity holding sway on the continent, and everywhere else for that matter.
As was mentioned earlier, ubuntu is a form of moral consciousness in terms of which communal Africans embark on caring, compassionate, hospitable and forgiving human engagements to ensure that human interdependency and humanity become actualisedCPöthat is, that they manifest in the practices of individuals and communities, including educational institutions (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012, pp. 13–15). At first glance, there seems to be very little wrong with arguing that acts of ubuntu should be actualised in communal practices so as to prevent human injustice. However, looking at the argument again, this might also be where the potential problem with ubuntu and its implementation lies. To assert that something is in actuality is to say that something has been exhausted in action and that there is no need for it to happen any longer, as its veracity is in the act itself. Simply put, having passed into actuality, ubuntu has no reason to happen again, as it is already with certainty in the practices of people. And perhaps this is the reason why people seem to be disinclined towards ubuntu, as it is erroneously assumed that the practice is already there in reality, yet interdependency and inhumanity are prevalent. Consequently, all enthusiasm for the practice is reduced when human indignity is observed, despite the apparent actuality of ubuntu in the lived experiences of some Africans. So, the question for me is not whether ubuntu is there (a matter of actualisation), but rather whether it ‘can’ be there. It is to such a discussion of whether something ‘can’ be there that I now turn.
Agamben (1999, p. 177) recounts the story of Anna Akhmatova, a gifted poet in the 1930s, who queued outside the prison of Leningrad with lots of other women trying to hear news of her son, who had been incarcerated as a political prisoner. On being asked by another woman whether she (Anna) ‘can speak of this (situation)’, Anna was reticent to respond until she said, ‘yes I can’CPöthat is, ‘I can … [which] does not refer to any certainty or specific capacity but is nevertheless absolutely demanding … the hardest and bitterest possible: the experience of potentiality’ (Agamben, 1999, p. 178). Although Anna could skilfully use language to tentatively describe the atrocities that happened to the prisoners, Agamben does not rule out the possibility that Anna might not actually be in a position also to describe the inhumane acts experienced by her son. In other words, for Agamben, the possibility that Anna can speak of atrocities is there, yet the possibility that she can also not speak of the atrocities is equally not there. That is, the potentiality that Anna can speak of atrocities and also not speak about them is always there. Drawing on AristotleCPÖs idea of potentiality, Agamben (1999, p. 179) characterises two kinds of potentiality: generic potentiality, for example, a child has the potential to know or she can potentially become someone, and existing potentiality, in the sense that someone suffers an ‘alteration’ or ‘becoming other’. So, whoever already possesses knowledge (who already knows) is not obliged to suffer an alteration, but those who do not already know can potentially come to knowCPöa matter of becoming another. In this way, potentiality is not annulled in actuality, but remains conserved and ‘saves itself in actuality’, which, according to Agamben, ‘survives actuality and in this way, gives itself to itself’ (1999, p. 184). To come back to the practice of ubuntu, those who claim to have actualised ubuntu have not given itself to itself because ubuntu was annulled in its actuality. If ubuntu has been actualised, there is no reason why it should become, as it is already in actuality. Put differently, its potentiality to contribute to human beings becoming altered others will simply not be possible. This perhaps explains why human inhumanity is still prevalent on the African continent, despite claims that ubuntu has passed into actuality. The fact that it is perceived to be in actuality makes its potentiality an impossibility.
My interest in potentiality as contributing towards an altered other or a becoming other brings into play how individuals engage in community, in this instance in communal ubuntu (interdependent) practices. Agamben (1993, p. 86) argues for a conception of community that does not presuppose commonality or identity as a condition for belonging: ‘Whatever singularities cannot form a societas because they do not possess any identity to vindicate nor any bond of belonging for which to seek recognition … the singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging (even in the form of a simple proposition)’. Agamben argues that a community of belonging is heralded in the event of Tiananmen Square, when thousands of Chinese students, workers and other protesters demonstrated against government corruption without clearly articulated demands taken on the basis of a ‘common interest deriving from a shared identity’ (Mills, 2008, p. 130). In the words of Agamben, ‘[w]hat was most striking about the demonstrations of the Chinese May was the relative absence of determinate contents in their demands (democracy and freedom are notions too generic and broadly defined to constitute the real object of a conflict, and the only concrete demand, the rehabilitation of Hu Yao-Bang, was immediately granted)’. Considering that the practice of ubuntu (human interdependence) has always been thought of as entailing communal practices, in which human beings share a common identityCPöethnicity, culture and languageCPöit follows that an Agamben perspective of ubuntu does not necessarily require humans to cobelong with reference to ethnic identity or ethnic difference. Communal ubuntu practices can still exist without appropriating a shared ethnic identity. In other words, Kenyan Kikuyus (the majority ethnic tribe) potentially can co-belong in community with minority ethnic groups, such as Merus or Kalenjins, without reference to their identitiesCPöthat is, they can cobelong and thus peacefully coexist under conditions of humaneness and interdependence (ubuntu), without laying claims to the ethnic purity and language that often drive them apart. An ubuntu community in becoming exists in ‘whatever being’, in which singularity is no longer sequestered in a common identity. At once, ‘I am because we are’ (the common phrase in African communities to depict ubuntu) can potentially be ‘I am because we can become [we are not yet]’. The political potency of such a view of ubuntu as a community in becoming can potentially disturb ethnic conflicts and clashes that often leave behind division, suspicion, destruction of the environment, loss of human life, homelessness, destitution, traumatisation, stigmatisation, stagnation of the education system, and hatred and anger amongst ethnic rivals (Nyakuri, 1997, p. 5). The fear ethnic rivals might have is that their culture, language and ethnicity will be sacrificed in the name of a common identity, often reflected in what the majority desires. In a way, an ubuntu community in becoming allows for a community of beings without identity. Such a community cobelongs without sharing a common identity, where the potentiality of inhumane treatment of the other remains in potentiality.
An ubuntu community in becoming is a ‘community without presuppositions and without subjects [where different human beings are brought] into communication without the incommunicable’ (Agamben, 1993, p. 65). When an ubuntu community in becoming is potentially brought into communication without the incommunicable, then the differences of language, of dialect, of ways of life, of character, of custom, and even the physical particularities of each, are brought into the open (Agamben, 1993, p. 63). This implies that such a community has nothing to hide and would not shame its individuals through arrogance and self-destruction. Such a community instigates its individuals to communicate that which might appear to be incommunicable. For example, the ongoing ethnic conflicts between rival tribes in several parts of AfricaCPöcommonly referred to as AfricaCPÖs forever warsCPöare a sufficient justification for individuals to communicate the incommunicable. Gentleman (2010) is correct when he attributes AfricaCPÖs bloodiest, most brutal ethnic wars that never seem to end to the combatants not having a common ideology or clear goals, or to the fact that they want to take over major cities:
TodayCPÖs rebels seem especially uninterested in winning converts, content instead to steal other peopleCPÖs children, stick Kalashnikovs or axes in their hands, and make them do the killing … What we are seeing is the decline of the classic African liberation movement and the proliferation of something elseCPösomething wilder, messier, more violent, and harder to wrap our heads around. If youCPÖd like to call this war, fine. But what is spreading across Africa like a viral pandemic is actually just opportunistic, heavily armed banditry … ICPÖve witnessed up closeCPöoften way too closeCPöhow combat has morphed from soldier vs. soldier (now a rarity in Africa) to soldier vs. civilian. Most of todayCPÖs African fighters are not rebels with a cause; theyCPÖre predators. ThatCPÖs why we see stunning atrocities like eastern CongoCPÖs rape epidemic, where armed groups in recent years have sexually assaulted hundreds of thousands of women, often so sadistically that the victims are left incontinent for life. What is the military or political objective of ramming an assault rifle inside a woman and pulling the trigger? Terror has become an end, not just a means.
What is clear from the above depiction of ethnic conflictCPöterrorCPöon the African continent is that the most obvious common interest that seems to perpetuate the ceaseless conflicts by mostly brainwashed child soldiers (boys and girls) ‘who ransack villages and pounder newborn babies to death in wooden mortars’ is crime and popular support (Gentleman, 2010). If the only proposed solution to the ‘forever wars’ is to capture with the prospect of prosecuting or killing the rebel leaders, then to my mind, there would not potentially be any end in sight for the violent conflicts, as violence only breeds violence, as Hannah Arendt (1969) reminds us.
It is here that I want to argue that ethnic conflict will remain in potentiality as long as an ubuntu community in belonging is not considered as a community that potentially can combat the violence under conditions of communication without the incommunicable. Ceaseless ethnic violence in the form of brutality, warfare, tyranny, rapes and murders can be considered as incommunicable acts of violence, especially when speech such as ‘ramming an assault rifle inside a woman and pulling the trigger’ is communicated. An ubuntu community in becoming potentially can engage warlords in communication without the incommunicable, because there is always the potentiality that ethnic conflict might be combated within its potentialities. What has emerged from the arguments in defence of an ubuntu community in becoming is that an instance of African philosophy of education—ubuntuCPöpotentially can undo the brutality and inhumanity associated with ethnic conflict and military coups on the African continent. Such a community in becoming potentially would offer more to combat the predatory style of warfare and conflict that has become endemic to African society. An ubuntu community in becoming seems to be AfricaCPÖs potential solution that can bring people from all spheres to cobelong as they set out to trouble the continentCPÖs conflicts that seem to remain in potentiality. Such a community would not predetermine who should be excluded, but rather consider each individual or group within its own singularity and potentiality worthy of engaging with, even if just on the basis of their being humans. Only through recognising that humans have the potentiality to communicate, without ending the communication on the basis of not using the incommunicable undignified, barbaric and brutal acts of violence to exclude perpetrators, the possibility is always there for the impotentiality of such heinous acts of savagery. This is not suggesting that perpetrators of brutal acts against humanity should not be reminded of their deeds. Rather, they should be (and potentially be prosecuted), but the heinous crimes should not be, a reason to prematurely exclude them from the act of communication, as this in itself potentially would not end the barbaric savagery. Put differently, people cannot show an unwillingness to communicate on the basis that the perpetrators of acts of brutality should be excluded. This is what an ubuntu community in becoming can do in both its potentiality and impotentiality. It is such a community that offers Africa hope to potentially bring its ethnic conflicts to an end, and if not, potentially so.
Now, considering that an ubuntu community in becoming is that community that has to advance African philosophy of education, it makes sense to integrate cultural understandings into reason-dependent practices in the educational curricula of Africans. This non-bifurcatory conception of education (culturally informed practices not being separated from reason-dependent action) has the potential to contribute towards the cultivation of AfricaCPÖs humanity, where an ubuntu community in becoming has a crucial role to play.
Agamben, G. (1993). The coming community. (M. Hardt, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis University Press.
Agamben, G. (1999). Potentialities: Collected essays in philosophy. (D. Heller-Roazen, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Arendt, H. (1969). On violence. London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press.
Gentleman, J. (2010). AfricaCPÖs forever wars: Why the continentCPÖs conflicts never end. Retrieved October 16, 2013, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas_forever_wars
Mills, C. (2008). The philosophy of Agamben. Stocksfield: Acumen.
Nyakuri, B. (1997, February). The impact of past and potential ethnic conflicts on KenyanCPÖs stability and development. Paper prepared for the USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Greater Horn of Africa, Nairobi: Department of History and Government, University of Nairobi.
Waghid, Y. (2014). African philosophy of education reconsidered: On being human. London: Routledge.
Waghid, Y., & Smeyers, P. (2012). Reconsidering Ubuntu: On the educational potential of a particular ethic of care. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 44(S2), 6–20.