Moors and Mutineers
The Taxman Cometh
On 1 January 535, Belisarius was made Consul. The Vandal Kingdom had been destroyed, Roman rule had returned to Africa and the local populace were now free to practice their Catholic faith without fear of persecution. From the Roman point of view, all should have been well and in other circumstances our story would end here. But all was not well.
By and large the Moors had waited out the struggle between Belisarius and Gelimer without committing themselves. A number had been on the battlefield at Tricamarum in support of the Vandals, but they took no active part in the fighting. Later, some Moors gave sanctuary to Gelimer on Mount Papua, even helping him fight off the assault by Pharas’ Heruls. The majority, however, pledged their allegiance to Belisarius as soon as it was clear that he was in the ascendancy.
As soon as they heard that Belisarius was leaving, however, the Moors of Byzacena and Numidia took advantage of the vacuum and began to raid the outlying regions. Procopius gives a scathing verdict on their behaviour:
‘For there is among the Moors neither fear of God nor respect for men. For they care not either for oaths or for hostages, even though the hostages chance to be the children or brothers of their leaders. Nor is peace maintained among the Moors by any other means than by fear of the enemies opposing them.’
We have already seen how oaths of allegiance in this period of history were very personal, given to an individual and not to a nebulous concept such as a state or nation. Just as Geiseric did not feel bound by a treaty he had signed with Valentinian III once the Emperor had been murdered, neither did the Moors feel honour bound to uphold agreements made with Belisarius once the general took ship for Constantinople. The Romans assumed treaties were made with the Empire while the barbarian tribes gave oaths to individuals.
The defence of Roman Africa was entrusted to Solomon. Although Belisarius took some of his closest followers with him to Constantinople, he decided it best to leave the bulk of the Roman Army, including most of his bucellarii, behind with Solomon so that he had sufficient forces to deal with the Moors. The Emperor also sent further reinforcements under Theodorus, the Cappadocian, and Ildiger. Unhelpfully, Justinian also sent two tax officials, Tryphon and Eustratius, to assess the tax owing to the Empire by the native Roman Africans. This would have taken more than a little of the gloss off the Roman victory, as Procopius says that the taxmen were ‘neither moderate nor endurable’.
While Justinian’s tax inspectors were busily assessing the wealth that could be sucked out of North Africa, the Moors destroyed the outlying Roman garrisons in Byzacena and Numidia. Two detachments of Roman cavalry, commanded by Aigan the Hun and Rufinus the Thracian, came across a band of Moors in Byzacena who were plundering the farms and carrying off captives. They ambushed the raiders in a narrow pass and defeated them. However, a much larger Moorish army was close by. It was led by four chieftains, named by Procopius as Coutzinas, Esdilasas, Iourphouthes and Medisinissas. They attacked the small Roman force, trapping them in the pass. As long as the Romans and Huns could use their bows they were able to keep the Moors at bay, but when they ran out of arrows the Moors closed in for the kill and destroyed them. Aigan had commanded one of the contingents on the right wing at Tricamarum and Rufinus was Belisarius’ standard bearer. Aigan was killed in the fighting while Rufinus was captured and then beheaded by Medisinissas, who took the head back to show his wives. Procopius says that ‘it was a remarkable sight on account of the extraordinary size of the head and the abundance of hair.’
Camels, Mountains and Duels
The loss of two respected officers from Belisarius’ bucellarii shocked the Romans. Solomon immediately marched against the Moors with his army, finding them encamped at a place called Mammes on the borders of Mauretania. As the Roman Army approached, the Moors formed a circle of camels on a plain at the foothills of the mountains, just as Cabon had done when he took on the Vandals. Women, children and baggage took refuge in the middle of the circle while most of the fighting men, on foot and armed with light javelins, arrayed themselves around the perimeter. A body of mounted men remained outside the camel circle, hidden in the foothills, ready to sweep down at the right moment. Solomon concentrated his whole army against the part of the circle furthest from the mountains, possibly aware of the Moorish cavalry who were stationed there.
After the traditional pre-battle speeches, in which each commander urged his men to fight bravely and reminded them of previous victories, Solomon launched his attack. The Romans had to deal with the same problem that had plagued Thrasamund’s Vandals a few years earlier.
‘For their horses were offended by the noise made by the camels and by the sight of them, and reared up and threw off their riders and the most of them fled in complete disorder. And in the meantime the Moors were making sallies and hurling all the small spears which they had in their hands, thus causing the Roman Army to be filled with tumult, and they were hitting them with their missiles while they were unable either to defend themselves or to remain in position.’ (Procopius)
The Roman soldiers where, however, more flexible than the Vandals. Seeing that the horses would not close with the camels, Solomon ordered his men to dismount. Leading 500 of them, their shields covering them to ward off the Moorish javelins, Solomon attacked the camel circle and broke through. Once the gap was opened, the rest of the Roman Army poured through and the Moors fled, leaving their women and children to their fate.
Solomon fought a second battle against another army of Moors who, after ravaging Byzacena, had holed up in a mountain refuge. Their stronghold was a place called Mount Bourgaon by Procopius, which was presumably somewhere on the south western borders of modern Tunisia. Solomon deployed for battle, hoping that the Moors would come down from the mountain to attack him, but they did not oblige.
The eastern slope of the mountain was very steep, while the western side had a gentle slope. Naturally the Moors faced the Romans on the western slope, trusting that no attack could come from the east. Solomon took advantage of this, sending Theodorus, who led an elite guards unit of 1,000 men known as Excubitores, to climb the eastern slope in late afternoon. They reached the summit in the middle of the night, unobserved by the Moors. At dawn, Solomon attacked from the west, while Theodorus descended from the summit in the east, pinning the Moors between them.
Defeating the Moors must have seemed to Solomon like trying to hold back the tide. He had only one army and not a large one, while his enemies were an innumerable number of bands that ranged all along the frontiers. No sooner had one been put down than another popped up somewhere else. While Solomon was clearing out Byzacena, another Moorish chieftain, by the name of Iaudas, was ravaging Numidia, joined by the survivors of Solomon’s victories at Mammes and Mount Bourgaon.
Procopius describes a fascinating incident when a Roman officer by the name of Althias led seventy Huns to capture a spring near where Iaudas’ men were raiding. It was midsummer. The Moors had been in the saddle all day and there were no other water sources nearby. Although the Moors greatly outnumbered Althias’ Huns, when they reached the spring to find it in enemy hands they were worn out, thirsty and their horses were spent. Althias refused a deal to take a share of the Moors’ booty in exchange for access to the well. Instead he challenged Iaudas to single combat. Procopius relates:
‘It was agreed that if it so fell out that Althias was overcame, the Moors should drink. And the whole Moorish army was rejoiced, being in good hope, since Althias was lean and not tall of body, while Iaudas was the finest and most warlike of all the Moors. Now both of them were, as it happened, mounted. And Iaudas hurled his spear first, but as it was coming toward him Althias succeeded with amazing skill in catching it with his right hand, thus filling Iaudas and the enemy with consternation. And with his left hand he drew his bow instantly, for he was ambidextrous, and hit and killed the horse of Iaudas. And as he fell, the Moors brought another horse for their commander, upon which Iaudas leaped and straightway fled; and the Moorish army followed him in complete disorder. And Althias, by thus taking from them the captives and the whole of the booty, won a great name in consequence of this deed throughout all Libya.’
This incident gives us some insight into the nature of sixth century warfare, with its heroic ethos in which the prowess and deeds of the leaders were of utmost importance. It also shows us how much the ideal Roman soldier had changed from the steady legionary of old to a mounted warrior capable of using different weapons with amazing dexterity. Thus the deeds of a few skilled notable men, whether Vandal, Moor or Roman, could decide the outcome and bring victory or defeat to their followers.
The Moors were not a single nation. When Solomon marched against Iaudas with his full army, two other Moorish chieftains, Massonas and Ortaias, joined him as Iaudas had expanded his power at their expense. With his new Moorish allies Solomon marched to confront Iaudas, who, typically, had a mountain stronghold on Mount Aurasium. Solomon’s attempt to take the mountain failed because his enemies fell back rather than offering battle. As the Roman Army’s supplies began to dwindle, Solomon had to give up the fight. Leaving a force to bottle up the Moors in the Aurès Mountains, he returned to Carthage with the rest of his army with the intention of renewing the offensive in the spring of 536.
Mutiny
Solomon was clearly a very capable commander. He had shown great initiative and flexibility in dealing with the Moors, adapting his tactics to suit the situation. Without other problems to deal with, he probably would have eventually been successful. So far he had been dealt a pretty difficult hand, but he played the cards well and stayed in the game. By Easter 536, his hand was so bad that he could no longer win on skill alone.
The first problem was that many of the Roman soldiers in Africa had married Vandal widows or their daughters, assuming that they would take over the Vandal estates that had previously belonged to their husbands or fathers. With Justinian’s tax collectors at large, it was the Imperial treasury, not the veteran soldiers, who would gain the fruits of victory. A soldier married to a Vandal woman who previously owned the land, now became a tenant farmer and had to pay tax to the Imperial treasury. He would have seen the ships leaving for Constantinople, ladened with treasure he had fought to win. Adding insult to injury, neither he nor his comrades had been paid in months. Justinian went to the trouble of sending tax collectors but not to send any money to pay the soldiers who had fought for him.
Another old problem also raised its ugly head. Many of the Roman soldiers were of Germanic origin, and as such were Arians. This was certainly true of the Heruls in the army, but also many of the regular cavalry would have been recruited from other Arian German tribes. One of Justinian’s motivations for his war against the Vandals had been to restore orthodox Nicene Christianity, and he did this with a vengeance. In an attempt to stamp out the Arian faith, the Emperor decreed that no one would be allowed to be baptized as an Arian. By 536, many of the Roman soldiers who had taken Vandal wives now had children ready for baptism, and with Easter approaching they would not be allowed unless they renounced their faith.
Mutiny was brewing, bolstered by 400 Vandals who had been shipped earlier to Constantinople along with the other prisoners of war. En route they had managed to take over the ships carrying them and made them turn back to Africa.
‘They [the Vandals] came to land in Libya at a desert place, where they abandoned the ships, and, after equipping themselves, went up to Mount Aurasium and Mauretania. Elated by their accession, the soldiers who were planning the mutiny formed a still closer conspiracy among themselves. And there was much talk about this in the camp and oaths were already being taken. And when the rest were about to celebrate the Easter festival, the Arians, being vexed by their exclusion from the sacred rites, proposed to attack them [the loyalists] vigorously.’ (Procopius)
When an attempt to assassinate Solomon failed, many of the disgruntled soldiers took off to ravage the countryside around Carthage, while the loyalists and waverers gathered in the Hippodrome. Solomon sent Theodorus the Cappadocian to calm them, as he was popular with the troops. Rather than listening to him, the soldiers proclaimed him as their leader. Mutiny amongst Roman soldiers was nothing new. In previous centuries they would have lifted Theodorus on a shield and proclaimed him Emperor, in the way the British mutineers proclaimed Marcus, Gratian and Constantine earlier in our story (see Chapter 3). However, these mutineers did not have such grand plans. Indeed, it is not entirely clear what they wanted other than to get their pay, their share of the spoils and, for some of them, the right to practice their version of Christianity. When this was not forthcoming, their plan seemed to be to take over North Africa for themselves, as Odoacer’s men had done with Italy in 476.
Theodorus remained loyal. He helped Solomon, Procopius and a small number of notable loyalists to escape by sea while the mutineers rampaged through Carthage and then gathered on the plains of Bulla, where Gelimer had regrouped after his defeat at Ad Decimum. There, 8,000 mutineers proclaimed Stotzas as their leader and were joined by a large number of escaped slaves. The 400 Vandals who had escaped captivity also came to them, the Vandal numbers swelling to 1,000 as they were joined by others who had so far managed to avoid capture.
The Belisarius Effect
Unfortunately for the mutineers, Belisarius was close by in spring 536. He was in Sicily, about to embark on an even grander expedition to take back Italy from the Ostrogoths. When Solomon and Procopius joined him, telling him of the dire situation in Africa, Belisarius knew he had to act. He could not afford to divert the whole army gathering for the Gothic war to go to Africa, but neither could he afford to have a hostile Africa at his back.
Trusting to his fame with his former soldiers, Belisarius took ship to Carthage with Solomon and 100 picked bucellarii. Theodorus was still holding the city with a small number of loyal troops, while the mutineers ranged through the surrounding countryside and were encamped around the walls. As we have already seen, the reputation of individual leaders was more important than the number of troops they commanded. Belisarius’ reputation was second to none. As soon as word reached the mutineers that he had landed at Carthage they fled to Membresa (Mejaz al-Bab) on the Bagradas River, about 60km south west of Carthage. Belisarius followed hard on their heels with 2,000 loyalist troops.
Battle was joined the following day. In the traditional pre-battle speeches, Belisarius described the mutineers as ‘a throng of men united by no law, but brought together by motives of injustice.’ He reminded his soldiers that their good discipline and orderly array would more than make up for the enemy’s larger numbers. Stotzas reminded the mutineers of the injustices done to them, saying that it was better to die fighting for freedom than to live in servitude.
Belisarius had the wind to his back, and as the two armies drew up for battle the wind became so strong as to cause the mutineers’ arrows to fall short, giving extra range to those of the loyalists. Stotzas then moved out on one flank in an attempt to encircle Belisarius’ smaller army. Never one to surrender the initiative, Belisarius launched an immediate attack, hitting the mutineers while their ranks were in disorder from changing formation. Most of the mutineers fled immediately without waiting to engage in close combat. As a result they suffered few casualties, and most of those were Vandals, indicating that while the mutineers turned and ran without fighting, the Vandals at least made a stand.
Job apparently done, Belisarius departed to take up the campaign against the Ostrogoths. He could not delay, as word had come from Sicily that the troops there were also in a mutinous mood. The loyalist army in Africa pursued Stotzas to Gadiaufala (Ksar-Sbehi), two days’ journey from Carthage. It should have been an easy victory for them as many of the mutineers had melted away. Stotzas, however, infiltrated the enemy camp and reminded the loyal soldiers of the injustices done to them. His words are reported by Procopius, although he was not actually present:
‘Fellow-soldiers, you are not acting justly in taking the field against kinsmen and those who have been reared with you, and in raising arms against men who in vexation at your misfortunes and the wrongs you have suffered have decided to make war upon the Emperor and the Romans. Or do you not remember that you have been deprived of the pay which has been owing you for a long time back, and that you have been robbed of the enemy’s spoil, which the law of war has set as prizes for the dangers of battle? And that the others have claimed the right to live sumptuously all their lives upon the good things of victory, while you have followed as if their servants?’
Without the great Belisarius there to hold them together, the Imperial soldiers killed their commanders and joined in the mutiny.
The mutiny could easily have been prevented and, in its early stages, could probably still have been nipped in the bud if the Imperial authorities had bothered to pay the soldiers the money they were owed. In 536, Justinian did what he should have been done long before. He sent his nephew Germanus, to Africa with enough money to pay the soldiers all their wages – including back pay for the time that they had been in rebellion. On his arrival in Carthage, Germanus found that two-thirds of the army had gone over to the mutineers, but with money now forthcoming many began to trickle back.
Stotzas decided to march on Carthage and force a decisive engagement before he lost too many more troops to the Emperor’s now open pay chest. However, when Germanus’ increasing numbers of troops deployed to meet him, many of the mutineers broke ranks and fell back towards Numidia to protect their families and possessions. Germanus followed up, catching the mutineers at a place called Scalae Veteres.
Germanus deployed his infantry, commanded by Domicus, in the centre, along a line of wagons. He led the bucellarii that he had brought from Constantinople on the left wing, while the other cavalry – many of whom had recently been amongst the mutineers – were deployed in three divisions on the right. Procopius says that the mutineers formed up without order ‘in the manner of the barbarians’, with several thousand Moors hanging back to await the outcome before committing themselves, as usual. The surviving Vandals were also part of Stotzas’ army, but Procopius does not say where they deployed nor what they did in the battle. It is possible that they were arrayed with Stotzas and the Heruls, as later they remained with the leader of the mutineers when the battle was lost.
Stotzas attempted to open the battle by leading the Heruls – and possibly the Vandals—in a charge against Germanus on the left wing, but they refused to follow him against men who seemed determined to make a good fight of it. Therefore he switched his attack to the other wing, which was held by their old comrades who would be less inclined to fight quite so enthusiastically. This initial attack succeeded and the Imperial cavalry on the right broke.
‘And the mutineers took all their standards immediately, and pursued them as they fled at top speed, while some too charged upon the infantry, who had already begun to abandon their ranks. But at this juncture Germanus himself, drawing his sword and urging the whole of that part of the army to do the same, with great difficulty routed the mutineers opposed to him and advanced on the run against Stotzas.’ (Procopius)
At this point the battle dissolved into groups of mounted men from both sides mingling with each other and fighting a confused melée without order.
‘Neither side could be distinguished either by their own comrades or by their opponents. For all used one language and the same equipment of arms, and they differed neither in figure nor in dress nor in any other thing whatever.’ (Procopius)
Germanus’ horse was killed under him but he was saved at the last minute by his bucellarii, who formed a ring around him and gave him another horse. They pressed on with the fight and eventually gained the upper hand, managing to break into the enemy camp and begin looting it. At this point the Moors decided to join in, switching sides to chase down Stotzas’ men and get their share of the loot. Stotzas made a last ditch attempt to rally the Moors back over to his side, but when this failed he fled the field with no troops other than 100 surviving Vandals.
The End of the Vandals
The mutiny was over, and so too was the hope of the few remaining free Vandals to salvage something from their once great kingdom. Over the next four years there were further mutinies amongst the Roman troops and constant battles against the Moors. In 539, Solomon finally defeated Iaudas and garrisoned Mount Aurasium, then he began re-fortifying the African cities.
‘He ruled with moderation and guarded Libya securely, setting the army in order, and sending to Byzantium and to Belisarius whatever suspicious elements he found in it, and enrolling new soldiers to equal their number, and removing those of the Vandals who were left and especially all their women from the whole of Libya.’ (Procopius)
However, Solomon was killed in a skirmish with the Moors of Tripolitania in 543 and his nephew, Sergius, was appointed governor of Africa in his place. Procopius is scathing in his description of him:
‘This man [Sergius] became the chief cause of great ruin to the people of Libya, and all were dissatisfied with his rule – the officers because, being exceedingly stupid and young both in character and in years, he proved to be the greatest braggart of all men, and he insulted them for no just cause and disregarded them, always using the power of his wealth and the authority of his office to this end; and the soldiers disliked him because he was altogether unmanly and weak; and the Libyans, not only for these reasons, but also because he had shown himself strangely fond of the wives and the possessions of others.’
In the resulting unrest, Stotzas and the last remaining free Vandals came from the west to join up with Antalas, a Moorish chieftain who had overrun much of Byzacena and who was probably the same man who had defeated Hoamer’s Vandals in the late 520s. A number of disaffected Roman soldiers also fell in behind Stotzas’ standard. In 545, Justinian once again had to send reinforcements from Constantinople to deal with the chaos. He sent Areobindus with some Armenian soldiers to take over the campaign in Byzacena, leaving Sergius to deal with Numidia.
Areobindus sent a small army, commanded by yet another John, to engage Stotzas and Antalas at Sicca Venera (El Kef in modern Tunisia). He also summoned the other Roman forces to join him, but Sergius refused.
‘John with a small army was compelled to engage with an innumerable host of the enemy…. As soon as the fighting was about to come to close quarters, both [John and Stotzas] rode out from their armies and came against each other. And John drew his bow, and, as Stotzas was still advancing, made a successful shot and hit him in the right groin, and Stotzas, mortally wounded, fell there, not yet dead, but destined to survive this wound only a little time.’ (Procopius)
Once again we see the personal nature of sixth century warfare, with the leaders engaging in duels before the main action. In this instance Stozas, loss did result in the defeat of his army. Instead, his Vandal and Roman followers, together with Antalas’ Moors, rode out to avenge him. They swept aside the smaller Roman Army, killing John in the process.
Following this disaster, Justinian recalled Sergius and sent him to Italy to support Belisarius against the Ostrogoths, leaving Africa under Areobindus’ sole command. This did not last long. Gontharius, a Roman officer of Germanic origin, assassinated Areobindus in an attempt to seize Africa for himself. The remnants of Stotzas’ army joined his cause. Procopius says that these numbered 1,000 men: 500 Romans and eighty Huns, with the rest being Vandals.
Gontharius broke with Antalas. His troops, including the Vandals, defeated the Moorish chieftain near Hadrumentum (Sousse), supported by other Moors who had fallen out with Antalas. After this victory Gontharius held a banquet at Carthage. Artabanes, leader of the Armenian troops sent to Africa by Justinian to support Areobindus, was one of the principal guests. He had commanded the army which defeated Antalas, but he was Areobindus’ man. He had been looking for the right moment to avenge his patron’s assassination. He prepared his Armenian bodyguards and, when Gontharius was ‘thoroughly saturated with wine’, he had them strike. Gontharius was killed, ending yet another mutiny and ending forever the hopes of the last few remaining Vandals.
‘The Vandals fled to sanctuary. To these Artabanes gave pledges, and making them rise from there, sent them to Byzantium, and having thus recovered the city [Carthage] for the Emperor, he continued to guard it. And the murder of the tyrant [Gontharius] took place on the thirty-sixth day of the tyranny, in the nineteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Justinian [546].’ (Procopius)
So it was, 140 years after the Vandals crossed the Rhine, they finally disappeared from history.
The Vandal Legacy
The Vandals left virtually no archeological record: no great buildings, no new art, no writers, poets or philosophers. All we really have to remember them by is their name and its modern association with wanton destruction. They came from virtual obscurity, bursting onto the Roman world from the forests of central Germany to become the pre-eminent power in the Western Mediterranean. Their’s was a story of survival against all odds, a story of a people searching for an identity and a place in the civilized world. For a brief moment, under the inspired leadership of Geiseric, it looked as if they had achieved it. They held the most prosperous province of the West Roman Empire, controlled the sea and the Vandal royal family became linked in marriage to the Imperial house of Theodosius.
The descendants of Geiseric enjoyed the good life for several generations. As a small warrior aristocracy, however, they could never hope to control the vast swathes of territory they had conquered without finding some way to accommodate their more numerous Roman subjects and the many bands of Moors of the hinterland. In this regard they were far less successful than the Goths and Franks. The former made alliances with the Roman landed aristocracy and made attempts to meld the two cultures. The Franks benefited from never adopting Arian Christianity, and when they converted from paganism they followed the same orthodox beliefs as their Roman subjects.
For the Vandals, their Arian beliefs became an essential part of their identity. Their vigorous attempts to suppress the Catholic Church made integration with the Roman Africans nearly impossible. This ensured that they would never have the manpower to deal with the Moorish threats and forced the local inhabitants to look to Constantinople for their eventual salvation. Had the Vandals and Roman Africans been living in harmony, and if the Vandals had been content to be passive Arians, then maybe Justinian would not have attempted a reconquest. If he had attempted it under those circumstances, then it probably would have failed.
In their early days, the Vandals showed themselves to be incredibly resourceful and adaptable. Crossing the Rhine in midwinter was a huge gamble. The decision was probably forced on them as starvation threatened, but even though the Roman defences had been stripped to the bone the Vandals’ ability to survive and a winter campaign is testament to their fortitude. Beset by a multitude of enemies – Romans, Goths, Suevi and Moors – the Vandals managed to hang on. They fought when necessary, moved on when the situation became untenable. Despite many setbacks they managed to dust themselves off, pick themselves up again and emerge stronger than before. They trekked thousands of kilometres from Germany, through France and Spain, then along the coast of North Africa. Their original landlocked homeland was as far from the sea as is possible in Europe, and yet in a single generation they became the greatest naval power in the known world.
Once they found a recipe for success they kept to it, and if adaptability had been a hallmark of the early Vandals, their successors seemed to have become stuck in their ways. Once they had settled down in Africa with all the resources they needed to equip themselves as well accoutred mounted warriors, that was how they fought—at least on land. Up against the mobile Moors, who would skirmish at a distance, evade if charged and seek refuge in mountain hideaways or behind a circle of camels, the later Vandals did not adapt their tactics to suit the situation. When the Roman general Solomon faced Moors behind a line of camels, he dismounted his cavalry to attack on foot. Thrasamund’s Vandals did not do the same when they came up against Cabon’s men in a similar situation, even though many of their ancestors would have often fought dismounted. Despite defeats at the hands of both the Moors and East Romans, the later Vandals never changed their fighting methods.
Other than the incredible story of their rise from obscurity to world power, probably the greatest legacy of the Vandals was to hasten the end of the West Roman Empire. Geiseric’s capture of Carthage in 439 deprived Rome of her most prosperous province. It gave the Vandals control over the Western Mediterranean and the vital grain supply to Italy. With Goths, Huns, Franks, Burgundians, Saxons and Alamanni pouring over the frontiers; combined with internal strife, peasant uprisings and near perpetual war with the Persians to occupy the Eastern Empire, the West could not survive without Africa.
The little-known naval battle of Mercurium in 468 really deserves to be remembered as one of the most decisive battles of the western world. This catastrophic defeat of the huge Roman armada at the hands of the Vandals sealed Rome’s fate forever. If the Romans had been victorious, then there was every possibility that a rump of the Empire could have continued in the West in much the same way as it did in the East.
It may well have been the Huns, whose westward movements sparked off the Germanic migrations of the fifth century, that brought about the beginning of the end for the West Roman Empire. It may too have been Rome’s own internal weaknesses and her inability to find a way to replace an Emperor other than by a coup which made the Empire’s collapse inevitable. However, it was Geiseric’s Vandals who dealt the death blow in 468. Without Africa’s wealth and produce to prop up Italy and fund an army, the West Roman Empire was doomed.
Do the Vandals not deserve the reputation that their name now implies? Yes, they did loot Rome for fourteen days and yes, they did carry off most of her portable wealth. But the sack of Rome in 455 was done in accordance with an agreement with the Pope and it was not a wild orgy of rape, pillage and plunder. It is true that the Vandals did persecute Catholic Christians in Africa, but their persecutions were relatively mild compared to the church’s own actions against heretics in later years. Unfortunately, the Vandals did not have someone like Cassiodorus, Jordanes or Gregory of Tours, who told the stories of the Goths and Franks from their perspective. Our only glimpse into the world of the Vandals comes from their enemies, and it is little wonder that these accounts are less than favourable. Only Procopius gives us any detailed first-hand descriptions of the Vandals and these were when they were in decline. The churchmen who wrote of the Vandals in the fifth century left us only snippets and their writings were heavily biased by their animosity to the Vandal Arian faith.
For me, the story of the Vandals is one of great fortitude in the face of adversity. It is a story of the most incredible migration in history, where a whole people moved from the forests of Germany to the plains of North Africa and finally managed to find their place in the sun. It is also a story of great tragedy. The Vandals wanted acceptance in the same way as the Goths and Franks had been accepted, but they never achieved it. The Romans gave them no peace in Spain and then, once the Vandals had taken Africa, the Romans could no longer afford to do so.