1945 to 1949
During the final months of the German occupation, there was much jockeying for position between the rival groups of andartes. As the Germans gradually withdrew towards the west, eastern Crete was largely under ELAS control, but the early enthusiasm for ELAS rapidly disappeared. By February 1945, many members and most leaders had abandoned the organisation, and ELAS ceased to have any significant influence in the east. Meanwhile, in January 1945, ELAS forces had taken up positions around Rethymnon and blockaded entry into the city, but after three days and twenty-seven deaths they were dispersed by EOK andartes. In Iraklion, the end of the month brought more clashes, in which six ELAS fighters and two British soldiers were killed. Further skirmishes in the Chania area led to hostages being seized on both sides, leading to fears of an all-out civil war. A meeting between the leaders of the main groups led to the release of all hostages and a treaty guaranteeing freedom of movement between the Chania and Rethymnon prefectures. To enforce this, a joint ELAS/EOK garrison was set up at Klima on a pass between the two areas. In March, the ELAS commander ordered his guerrillas to disband in all liberated areas, except for the regiment in Chania, which would remain fully armed until the German surrender. EOK also disbanded in 1945, although former members retained their anti-communist politics. Tensions continued and there was some fighting, but party politics was forgotten in the midst of celebrations of the end of the war in May.
However, in 1946, various factors led to a resumption of civil war in Greece. Although the tragedy of events in Crete should not be underestimated, the fighting there never reached the scale and intensity of that on the mainland. There were many reasons for this, some positive and some negative. In the first place, the Cretans’ legendary independence of mind meant that they tended to reject any centralist doctrine, whether monarchist or fascist, and whether imposed by the Russian communist party or even the central government in Athens. Indeed, in the referendum of September 1946, Crete voted by 70% for a republic, in contrast to the national vote of 70% in favour of restoring the monarchy. On a more practical level, the numbers involved in the rival groupings were much smaller in Crete, since many of the most active young resistance fighters on both sides had been drafted to fight in the civil war on the mainland.
In many respects, the communists of Crete differed from their comrades on the mainland. ELAS groups in Greece, perhaps justifiably, felt betrayed by the British, who had sided with the monarchists. In Crete, the ELAS andartes had less cause for bitterness, and on the whole had got on quite well with the British agents. Similarly, EOK guerrillas had fought bravely alongside the communists, and there was no way they could be accused of collaboration, as was the case with some nationalist groups on the mainland. The result of the referendum also showed that Crete was no hotbed of monarchists. It has been argued that sometimes allegiance to one or the other side was more related to long-standing vendettas than to politics, such as in the case of an entire family joining ELAS because their ancient enemies had joined EOK.
Nevertheless, the civil war in Crete did exist and needs to be described, at least in outline.1 On 28th October 1946, the anniversary of the outbreak of war between Italy and Greece, the Democratic Army was formed from the remnants of the ELAS andartes. However, apart from a few murders, usually driven by personal motives, fighting did not really start until April 1947, a whole year after the civil war on the mainland began. The first serious action of the war was a successful raid on Maleme airfield, in which members of the Democratic Army seized weapons and all the military equipment they could find. For the next few months, there were several skirmishes between former ELAS guerrillas and government troops, usually instigated by attacks on gendarmerie posts. “Civilian” hostages were frequently taken, but were in most cases released unharmed, and at this stage of the war even captured gendarmes were often released after being stripped of their outer clothes and boots. Those who were executed were usually known collaborators. In the east, a resurgent rebel group, aided by fifty-five deserters from the military base at Aghios Nikolaos, actually held the town of Ierapetra for a few hours, but withdrew after seizing all the supplies they could carry. There was a quick response from the gendarmes, the military and some nationalist bands, and the guerrillas were forced to split into small groups. These were gradually destroyed, and after the leader of the eastern rebels was killed the few survivors fled west to link up with the stronger guerrilla groups there.
It can be argued that the civil war in Crete should be more accurately described as a rebellion. It was less of a war between two rival groups seeking power than an insurrection against the generally accepted government, although the latter did receive support from armed former EOK nationalists. The military governor of the Chania prefecture, Pavlos Gyparis, was determined to defeat the communist rebels completely, and created a battalion of gendarmes specifically for that purpose. The guerrillas continued to attack gendarmerie posts and carry out raids on the villages of nationalist supporters. Nevertheless, continued harrying by Gyparis, coupled with revenge killings and attacks by nationalists, forced the guerrillas to split up into smaller groups and scatter. One of the guerrilla leaders was killed in June 1947, and when another was killed in battle in September, they decided to change their strategy.
The plan was for the Democratic Army to set up base on the Omalos plateau, from which they would continue to make raids but would avoid open battles. If attacked, instead of fighting it out, they would retreat higher up into the mountains, or into the Samaria Gorge. Meanwhile, government forces increased their patrols and continued to arrest communist sympathisers in the villages. An amnesty was offered by the Greek government, and a large number of the guerrillas and people who had helped them surrendered. Those who gave themselves up were released after signing a declaration of future good behaviour. Morale was now very low, and the size of the Democratic Army was shrinking daily. The remaining guerrillas were forced to go on the offensive to get food and money, but raids on farms and shepherds led to a decline in support for the communists and an increase in the number of informers. Continued individual murders of gendarmes and nationalists made it easy for Gyparis to find volunteers for small defence units in the villages.
As the deadline for the end of the amnesty approached, Gyparis published open letters in the newspapers, appealing to senior members of the guerrilla army to give themselves up. None were successful. On a more personal level, he also encouraged relatives of the guerrillas to send them letters urging them to surrender. Among these were a widowed mother who threatened to disown her son, a father who urged his son to surrender or be expelled from the family, and – most poignantly – a young woman who told her fiancé she would break off the engagement if he did not give himself up. Given the way Cretans feel about family, a few of these appeals may have been successful (although, in the latter case, the man refused and later married someone else). In one tragic case, a father persuaded his younger son to surrender, but when he and the boy’s godfather tried the same thing with his elder son, Christos, the son murdered both men as “traitors”. The case became front-page news and even shocked many of Christos’ communist friends.
Although a recruitment campaign by the KKE brought membership of the Democratic Army back up to about 300, this put even more pressure on food supplies, and early 1948 saw increased raids on villages and theft of sheep and goats. This in turn lost the guerrillas more support, even among those villagers and shepherds who had previously helped them, leading to further desertions. After the attempted assassination of Sophokles Venizelos, a government minister and the son of Eleftherios, the military command was passed to Lieutenant Colonel George Vardoulakis, who reinforced the gendarmerie and declared all-out war on the Democratic Army. After a few skirmishes and a steady flow of surrenders, most of the hard-pressed remaining guerrillas established camp in Samaria Gorge. Vardoulakis used 1,000 men to block all the six known paths through the mountains and keep the guerrillas bottled up. The communists retreated to higher ground in the area of Prinias, where a fierce battle took place and about seventeen guerrillas were killed. There are no reports of any prisoners. About ninety guerrillas escaped by using an unmarked route known only to local shepherds, climbing over precipitous and extremely dangerous mountains. The route was difficult enough by day, but the escapees had to climb by night. Nevertheless, only one person fell. A further twenty escaped by hiding among the rocks to the north-east for a few days until it was safe to move.
The defeat in the Samaria Gorge marked the end of the Democratic Army, and, in effect, the civil war in Crete was over. From this time, the remaining guerrillas were fugitives, only moving at night and with little support in the villages. Increasingly desperate and isolated groups carried out a few raids on villages and attacks on buses, mainly for food and weapons. They also took to assassinating those who had previously surrendered and given information to the authorities, although they did no harm to those who had kept quiet. The final “action” took place in November 1949, when two gendarmes at a guard post on the outskirts of Chania were murdered in a night attack. As for the government forces, Vardoulakis began the grisly practice of exhibiting the dead bodies or heads of important guerrilla leaders killed in battle. This was mainly to prove that these (often well known) andartes really were dead, but also to create an element of terror among the remaining supporters. The hunt continued for the remaining few, and by April 1956 there were only eight still at liberty. Six of these escaped to Italy and then to exile in Tashkent, but two remained in hiding.
The extraordinary story of George Tzobanakis and Spiro Blazakis has become something of a legend. This pair continued to hide in remote caves, mainly in the Apokoronas area where they had grown up, living on wild vegetables and what they were given by a few loyal comrades in the villages. They were at risk of death many times from the dangerous locations of the caves, but apart from occasional illnesses they seemed to have stayed in excellent health, considering their living conditions. Both of them suffered from boredom, and Tzobanakis certainly suffered from bouts of depression. In 1964, an amnesty was granted to most of the remaining communists in prison, but not to the two fugitives, because not all of their crimes were considered to be political. For example, in November 1949 they killed a hunter who had spotted them, but since the civil war had officially ended that summer this was not classed as a political crime.
Under the Greek military dictatorship (which lasted from 1967 to 1974), they were twice offered amnesty, but they refused – partly because they believed that it would be a betrayal of their communist principles, and partly because they distrusted the military junta. They had good reason for this, as all the communists amnestied in 1964 had been rounded up by the junta in 1967 and returned to prison. By this time, Tzobanakis and Blazakis had become almost heroic figures, nicknamed the Eagles of Crete. Finally, with the fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy under the government of Konstantinos Karamanlis, all political prisoners were released, and the KKE was legalised. At first, the government refused to grant an amnesty to the two fugitives, for the same reason as in 1964, but after a favourable interview published in the Guardian newspaper gained some international sympathy for the pair, an offer of unconditional amnesty was made in February 1975. After twenty-six years in hiding, Tzobanakis and Blazakis now felt able to return to society.