INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL
1. A helpful discussion concerning the difficulties associated with classical taxonomies and recent alternative work in cladism can be found in Marc Ereshefsky, The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study of Biological Taxonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For a general overview of recent debates concerning species essentialism from an interdisciplinary perspective, see Robert A. Wilson, ed., Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays (Cambridge, Mass..: MIT Press, 1999).
2. Alain Badiou, Polemics, trans. Steve Corcoran (London: Verso, 2006), 106.
3. Although I do not touch on their work here, I should note that the thoroughgoing critique of anthropocentrism in the writings of Graham Harman and Ray Brassier accomplishes at an ontological level what I am trying to effect at the ethical and political levels. I hope to engage with their work more carefully elsewhere. See especially Graham Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), and Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming).
1. METAPHYSICAL ANTHROPOCENTRISM: HEIDEGGER
1. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).
2. Heidegger, Being and Time, 100.
3. Heidegger, Being and Time.
4. Heidegger, Being and Time, §§46–53.
5. Jacques Derrida, Aporias: Dying—Awaiting (One Another at) the Limits of Truth, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). Cf. also Gilles Deleuze’s remark, “it is the animal who knows how to die, who has a sense or premonition of death” (“Literature and Life,” trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, Critical Inquiry 23 [Winter 1997]: 226. For a strong critique of the anthropocentric prejudice concerning the supposedly unique human relation to death, see Allan Kellehear, A Social History of Dying (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11–15.
6. Heidegger, Being and Time, 30.
7. Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); cited henceforth in the text as FCM.
8. Various elements of such a reading, a reading that is more charitable than the one I offer here, can be found in William McNeill’s scholarly and remarkably insightful essay “Life Beyond the Organism: Animal Being in Heidegger’s Freiburg Lectures, 1929–30,” in Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 197–248. See also Frank Schalow, “Who Speaks for the Animals? Heidegger and the Question of Animal Welfare,” Environmental Ethics 22 (2000): 259–71, and Stuart Elden, “Heidegger’s Animals,” Continental Philosophy Review 39 (2006): 273–91.
9. The literature on this topic is enormous, but I would recommend in particular Iain Thomson’s fine article “Heidegger and the Politics of the University,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2003): 515–42.
10. I will not take up the question here of whether Heidegger offers a plausible reading of Nietzsche’s will to power, but I will say, without having the space to offer any sustained argument in support of my position, that I think Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on this issue is dripping with bad faith. It is only through considerable contortion and deliberate misreading of Nietzsche’s texts that one can turn his concept of will to power and his concomitant criticism of the hyperbolic naïveté of human chauvinism into subjectivism and neohumanism.
11. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 4, Nihilism, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 147.
12. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); cited henceforth in the text as P.
13. Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 42; emphasis added.
14. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), §374.
15. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §374.
16. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967), 12–14.
17. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 240–41.
18. On Kafka and becoming-animal, see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
19. Martin Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” trans. Thomas Sheehan, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 181.
20. Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” 181.
21. Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” 181.
22. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 245; henceforth cited in the text as LH.
23. Jacques Derrida, “The Ends of Man,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 128.
24. See, among several other places, FCM, 264.
25. Derrida, “The Ends of Man,” 128.
26. And we should bear in mind that this conception of responsibility can be read in terms of a responsibility to beings beyond man, for example, to animals and other so-called nonhuman entities, to all Others. Indeed, there is a sense in which Heideggerian responsibility might be understood as infinite in a manner that supplements and goes well beyond Levinas’s conception of infinite responsibility that I shall examine in the next chapter. For Levinas, responsibility is infinite insofar as it can never be fully assumed or accomplished—something that would render good conscience impossible. Yet responsibility remains finite within Levinas’s work insofar as it is limited to the human alone. Heidegger’s conception of responsibility could conceivably be brought to bear on this limitation in Levinas’s work. For more on such a project see John Llewelyn, The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighbourhood of Levinas, Heidegger, and Others (London: Macmillan, 1991).
2. FACING THE OTHER ANIMAL: LEVINAS
1. Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 177.
2. Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Seán Hand (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 152–53; cited henceforth in the text as DF.
3. Emmanuel Levinas, “The Paradox of Morality,” portions reprinted in Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought, ed. Matthew Calarco and Peter Atterton (New York: Continuum, 2004), 50.
4. For an extended discussion of Darwin and animal ethics, see James Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
5. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 2.
6. Dawkins’s discussion of “memes” and culture, which are sometimes thought to mark a break from nature, should not be read as a form of human exceptionalism in his work. Dawkins’s position on conscious foresight would be a better place in which to mark a rupture between human and animal in his writings, but even that distinction is not at all straightforward.
7. “I am not concerned here with the psychology of motives” (Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 4).
8. Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambrdige, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). Notice, however, that de Waal will not go so far as to endorse animal rights, despite the underlying logic of his position on biological continuism. See the “Conclusion” of Good Natured.
9. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Penn.: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 64–70, cited henceforth in the text as TI.
10. And the nonethicality of things has been questioned, effectively and forcefully, in Silvia Benso, The Face of Things: A Different Side of Ethics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).
11. Emmanuel Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?” trans. Peter Atterton, in Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adrian Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 10.
12. In sharp contrast to his later writings, in an early essay Levinas entertains the notion that existence as such can strike one as a miracle. See his “The Meaning of Religious Practice,” trans. Peter Atterton, Matthew Calarco, and Joelle Hansel, Modern Judaism 25 (2005): 285–89.
13. Levinas, “The Paradox of Morality,” 49.
14. Levinas, “The Paradox of Morality,” 49.
15. Levinas, “The Paradox of Morality,” 50.
16. See Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine, eds., Eco-phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).
17. Kenneth E. Goodpaster, “On Being Morally Considerable,” Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 308–25.
18. See Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
19. Thomas Birch, “Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration,” Environmental Ethics 15 (1993): 313–32, cited henceforth in the text as MC. A significant secondary debate has grown up around this essay. In this regard, see especially Anthony Weston, “Universal Consideration as an Originary Practice,” Environmental Ethics 20 (1998): 279–89; Jim Cheney, “Universal Consideration: An Epistemological Map of the Terrain,” Environmental Ethics 20 (1998): 265–77; and Tim Hayward, “Universal Consideration as a Deontological Principle: A Critique of Birch,” Environmental Ethics 18 (1996): 55–64.
3. JAMMING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL MACHINE: AGAMBEN
1. Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 53.
2. Aristotle, The Politics, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1253a 8–18.
3. Gorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 1993).
4. Émile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1971).
5. Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 19.
6. Agamben, Infancy and History, 51–52.
7. The scientific literature on this topic is enormous. One helpful entry point into the literature is Frans B. M. de Waal and Peter L. Tyack, eds., Animal Social Complexity: Intelligence, Culture, and Individualized Societies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
8. See Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
9. Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 92. See also Agamben, The Coming Community, 92, for a similar argument about human exceptionalism in politics couched in the terms of the notion of the irreparable.
10. A number of animal species do have an interest in mirrors, and many have even passed the so-called mirror test developed by Gordon G. Gallup Jr. See Clive D. L. Wynne, Animal Cognition: The Mental Lives of Animals (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
11. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 104–11.
12. Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York : Zone Books, 1999).
13. Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), cited henceforth in the text as O.
14. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 11.
15. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 10.
16. This question is a variation on a point made by Slavoj Žižek in his dialogue with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau. See Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000), 326.
17. Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow …: A Dialogue, trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), 65.
18. Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1968), §12B.
4. THE PASSION OF THE ANIMAL: DERRIDA
1. Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” trans. David Wills, Critical Inquiry 28 (Winter 2002): 369–418; quotation at 402; cited henceforth in the text as AIA.
2. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri C. Spivak (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press), 244–45.
3. Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans. John P. Leavey Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 26.
4. See Derrida’s discussion of Benjamin in AIA, 388 ff. Beatrice Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: Of Stones, Animals, Human Beings, and Angels (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), provides a fuller discussion of the place of animals and nature in Benjamin’s work.
5. Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 142–43.
6. Jacques Derrida, “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand,” trans. John P. Leavey Jr., in Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 161–96.
7. Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. G. Bennington and R. Bowlby (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989), chapter 6.
8. See AIA.
9. Jacques Derrida, Aporias: Dying—Awaiting (One Another at) the Limits of Truth, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
10. For one example among many, see Jacques Derrida, “‘Eating Well,’ Or the Calculation of the Subject,” in Who Comes After the Subject? ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Conor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991), 116.
11. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’” Cardozo Law Review 11 nos. 5–6 (1990): 952–53, and “Violence Against Animals,” in Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow? trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). 62–76.
12. Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 69; see also Derrida’s discussion of Baudelaire’s “Les bons chiens” in Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 143–44.
13. One final point worth mentioning along these lines is the importance Derrida accords the question of the animal in developing future work in the humanities. On this point, see “The Future of the Profession, or the University Without Condition,” in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 50–51.
14. Heidegger, of course, mentions these matters in the context of a contentious comparison between the mechanized food industry and concentration camps—a comparison that, as we shall see, Derrida also makes—but he does not follow it up with the kind of careful historical and ethicopolitical analysis that Derrida provides.
15. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art, and Politics, trans. Chris Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 34.
16. For an extended discussion of Isaac Singer, see Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust (New York: Lantern, 2003).
17. Boria Sax surveys the merits and demerits of various positions on this issue in Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the Holocaust (New York: Continuum, 2000).
18. Derrida, “Violence Against Animals”; cited henceforth in the text as VA.
19. Gary Francione’s most detailed discussion of his incremental abolitionist position can be found in Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996).
20. Bentham’s thinking on animals was considerably more complicated than his more famous textual pronouncements would lead readers to believe. For a fuller discussion, see Gary Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), chapter 6.
21. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 283 n. 6.
22. See Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
23. These themes are broached in Cora Diamond’s remarkable essay “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy,” Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas, nos. 1, 2 (June 2003): 1–26.
24. One of Derrida’s most fecund analyses of the event, invention, and an entire chain of related “venir” words can be found in his “Psyche: Inventions of the Other,” trans. Catherine Porter, in Reading de Man Reading, ed. Lindsay Waters and Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 25–65. Concerning the classical concept of invention, Derrida notes in this essay (first delivered in 1984) that it has always excluded the animal: “no one has ever authorized himself to say of the animal that it invents, even if, as it sometimes said, its production and manipulation of instruments resemble human invention” (44). The classical concept of invention, and its reinforcement of the supposedly unique human capacity for techne, thus allows us another opportunity to grasp the inner connections between anthropocentrism and metaphysical humanism: “This techno-epistemo-anthropocentric dimension inscribes the value of invention in the set of structures that binds differentially the technical order and metaphysical humanism.” Derrida goes on to suggest that if we are going to reinvent invention in terms of the advent of the tout autre, “it will have to be done through questions and deconstructive performances bearing upon the traditional and dominant value of invention, upon its very status, and upon the enigmatic history that links, within a system of conventions, a metaphysics to technoscience and to humanism” (44).
25. For Derrida’s brief discussion of these cat figures, see AIA, 376.
26. The passage I am referring to is §352 in Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
27. John Berger’s well-known essay “Why Look at Animals?” (in his About Looking [New York: Pantheon, 1980)] would have us believe that the possibility of encountering the look of another animal is for us today a near-impossibility. The look that used to occur between the human and the animal, he tells us, “has been extinguished…. This historic loss, to which zoos are a monument, is now irredeemable for the culture of capitalism” (27). This might lead us to think that Derrida’s encounter with the gaze of a household cat is not a genuine encounter with the Other animal, but only with the all-too-familiar animal that has “been co-opted into the family” (13). Is Derrida’s cat just another example of a family pet, one of Deleuze and Guattari’s “Oedipalized animals”? (For their tripartite schema of animal kinds, see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987], 240–41, and the discussion offered in chapter 1 of the present volume.) Perhaps not, for this animal, although seemingly familiar, ultimately shatters any attempt on Derrida’s part to conceptualize it. Although such an encounter with a domesticated animal would complicate his thesis about the disappearance of animals, even Berger admits that a domesticated animal can “surprise” the human (“Why Look at Animals?” 3). Deleuze and Guattari make the same admission with respect to so-called domestic animals. In view of their distinction among Oedipal, State, and pack animals, Deleuze and Guattari write: “Cannot any animal be treated in all three ways? There is always the possibility that a given animal, a louse, a cheetah or an elephant, will be treated as a pet, my little beast. And at the other extreme, it is also possible for any animal to be treated in the mode of pack or swarm…. Even the cat, even the dog:” (A Thousand Plateaus, 241).
28. Steve Baker, The Postmodern Animal (London: Reaktion, 2000), 185.
29. In the afterword to his Limited Inc. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1988), Derrida addresses the issue of reference in the following terms: “What I call ‘text’ implies all the structures called ‘real,’ ‘economic,’ ‘historical,’ socio-institutional, in short: all possible referents. Another way of recalling that ‘there is nothing outside the text.’ That does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book, as people have claimed, or have been naïve enough to believe and to have accused me of believing. But it does mean that every referent, all reality has the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this ‘real’ except in an interpretive experience” (148).
30. Compare Derrida’s early essay on the role of madness, philosophy, and reason in Foucault’s Madness and Civilization: “Cogito and the History of Madness,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978).
31. Tom Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights,” in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, ed. Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1989). For the full defense of Regan’s position, see his The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
32. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 78.
33. Recall Derrida’s remark: “I do not believe in the miracle of legislation” (VA, 65).
34. Derrida, “Force of Law,” 951.
35. See especially Carol Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (New York: Continuum, 1990), and Neither Man Nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals (New York: Continuum, 1994).
36. David Nibert, Animal Rights/Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).
37. Derrida, “Force of Law,” 953.
38. Derrida, “‘Eating Well,’” 114.
39. Derrida, “‘Eating Well,’” 114. There is, of course, the question of Adolf Hitler’s purported vegetarianism, which Derrida briefly addresses in a footnote to “‘Eating Well’” (119 n. 14). Presently, in the United States, there is at least one exception to this rule: Congressman Dennis Kucinich, who is reported to be a strict vegan and presented himself as a Democratic candidate for the presidency in 2004 and 2008. There is also the example of Dr. Janez Drnovsek, president of Slovenia, who has spoken openly and at length about his vegetarianism.
40. Derrida, “Force of Law,” 953.
41. David Wood, “Comment ne pas manger—Deconstruction and Humanism,” in Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 33.
42. Derrida, “‘Eating Well,’” 114–15.
43. Derrida, “‘Eating Well,’” 114.
44. I have no desire to attack any particular authors for egregious misreadings, although several examples could be given. Rather I will refer the reader to what I take to be one of the more reliable and interesting readings of Derrida’s remarks on animals: Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
45. Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997), chapters 1 and 8.
46. Derrida gives readings of all of these figures in L’animal que donc je suis (Paris: Éitions Galilée 2006). The chapter on Lacan in this book has been translated into English as “And Say the Animal Responded?” trans. David Wills, in Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, ed. Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 121–46.
47. Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper, 1976), 16; translation modified.
48. Derrida, “Geschlecht II,” 173.
49. Jacques Derrida, “On Reading Heidegger: An Outline of Remarks to the Essex Colloquium,” Research in Phenomenology 17 (1987): 183.
50. Elisabeth de Fontenay, Le silence des bêtes: La philosophie a l’epreuve de l’animalite (Paris: Fayard, 1998). A short essay from Fontenay on animals entitled “Like Potatoes: The Silence of Animals” can be found in Christina Howells, ed., French Women Philosophers: A Contemporary Reader (London: Routledge, 2004), 156–68.
51. Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, vol. 3, Sovereignty, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1991).
52. Derrida, afterword to Limited Inc., 123.
53. I am using “concept” in a Deleuzean sense; I am aware that Derrida has registered his unease with the concept “concept” in numerous places and that he would object to this language.
54. Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York; Routledge, 1991), 151–52