CHRONOLOGY

1975	Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum leads members of his Satmar Hasidic sect from the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn to the town of Monroe in Upstate New York, designating their community Kiryas Joel, or Village of Joel. The Satmar teach their children in separate schools (Torah study in private yeshivas for the boys and special private academies for the girls to prepare them to become mothers and homemakers in the community), but there is no provision for children with special needs.
1976	New York enacts legislation requiring that children with disabilities receive appropriate schooling at public expense. The Monroe-Woodbury Central School District sends public school teachers into Kiryas Joel to provide special education services.
1977	The community of Kiryas Joel reaches a population of 525, sufficient to declare itself a village under New York law, and does so. A legal entity, the Village of Kiryas Joel, is formed.
1985	The US Supreme Court decides Aguilar v. Felton, striking down a program that used federal funds to pay the salaries of teachers providing special education services to children in parochial schools. With this decision, the Monroe-Woodbury school district has no choice but to stop serving the special needs children of Kiryas Joel in a village school and place them in the area’s public schools. The situation troubles Satmar parents, who do not want their children exposed to the outside world.
1986	The Village of Kiryas Joel sues the Monroe-Woodbury bus drivers’ union to force it to provide male bus drivers to transport boys to their private yeshivas (religious law forbids Satmar from riding with female drivers). When the union wins the suit, boys begin walking to school rather than ride in buses driven by women.
1988	The state’s highest court, the New York Court of Appeals, holds that Monroe-Woodbury school district cannot be compelled to teach the village’s disabled children at a site separate from other public schools.
1989	Governor Mario Cuomo signs a law creating the Kiryas Joel Village School District, making the Satmar enclave the only village in the state with the power and authority to operate its own public school system.
1990	Steven Benardo, head of the special education program for some thirty thousand students in the Bronx, is hired to set up and run the new school in Kiryas Joel—and opens the school in three months.
	Al Hawk and Louis Grumet of the New York State School Boards Association file suit challenging the law.
1992	State supreme court justice Lawrence E. Kahn in Albany rules that the law creating the Kiryas Joel school district is unconstitutional. Kahn calls the legislation “an attempt to camouflage, with secular garments, a religious community as a public school district.”
	Kahn’s ruling is affirmed by the appellate division of the state supreme court, but the midlevel appellate court splits 4–1. The majority expresses concern that the Kiryas Joel district is “likely to be perceived by adherents of the Satmar Hasidim as an endorsement, and by nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious rights.” Justice Howard A. Levine of Schenectady dissents, arguing that the district’s establishment had a valid secular purpose, “to protect the children from the psychological and emotional trauma caused by exposure to integrated classes.”
1993	The state court of appeals, in a 4–2 decision yielding four separate opinions, upholds Kahn and rules that the establishment of the Kiryas Joel school district amounts to an impermissible endorsement of religion. The main opinion, written by Judge George Bundy Smith, declares the school district in violation of the First Amendment.
	By deciding the case solely on the federal Constitution, the state court leaves the issue on the doorstep of the US Supreme Court. Justice Clarence Thomas issues a temporary stay to keep the district open while the case is litigated.
1994	Lawyers Jay Worona of the New York State School Boards Association, Nat Lewin for Kiryas Joel, Lawrence Reich for the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, and Assistant Attorney General Julie Mereson for the state argue before the Supreme Court. Worona, assisted by attorney Pilar Sokol, contends that Kiryas Joel is unconstitutional. The others argue in favor of the special school district.
	The Supreme Court, by a 6–3 vote, upholds the original decision by Kahn and shoots down Kiryas Joel. The court declines an opportunity to tinker with the Lemon test, its standard for determining when a governmental action violates the constitutionally mandated separation of church and state.
	The New York State Legislature enacts and Governor Cuomo signs a new law establishing a school district for Kiryas Joel. This time, the law doesn’t specify that it is designed just to benefit the religious enclave of Kiryas Joel—although it’s self-evident, since no other community could meet the criteria.
	State supreme court justice Joseph Harris in Albany issues a procedural opinion allowing the school district to remain open and predicting that this time around, Kiryas Joel would prevail.
1995	Justice Kahn, reviewing the second legislative attempt to create a special school district for Kiryas Joel, finds that the legislature now got it right.
1997	The New York Court of Appeals says Kahn got it wrong and concludes the second law is an unconstitutional sham.
	In Agostini v. Felton, the US Supreme Court overrules Aguilar v. Felton and decides that public school teachers can instruct at religious schools as long as the material is secular and does not result in “excessive entanglement” between government and religion.
	Governor George Pataki and the legislature enact yet another law establishing a school district for Kiryas Joel, this one capable of applying to only one other municipality in the state.
1998	Albany-based state supreme court justice Joseph Teresi finds the third effort to create a special school district for Kiryas Joel unconstitutional.
	The appellate division of the state supreme court affirms Teresi.
1999	The New York Court of Appeals, in a 4–3 decision, concludes that the third law is as much an unconstitutional sham as the first two.
	A fourth bill is passed allowing Kiryas Joel to create a school district. Since this one applies to any municipality with between ten thousand and twenty-five thousand residents contained within a larger school district, the law is not effectively challenged. The Kiryas Joel school district has operated under this framework ever since.

Supreme Court Religion/Education Establishment Clause Jurisprudence

1908	Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 US 50. The case dealt with Indian funds held in trust by Congress and used to pay a Catholic Indian mission to provide schools. The court decided that this did not constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause.
1930	Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 US 370. At issue was whether Louisiana could provide textbooks to all students, including those in parochial schools. The court held for the first time that indirect aid could be provided to religious schools based on a “child benefit” theory.
1947	Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1. In this key decision, a 5–4 Supreme Court held for the first time that the Establishment Clause is one of the liberties secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—meaning that all government activity, be it at the federal, state, or local level, must conform to the constrictions of the Establishment Clause. It was a case in which a New Jersey school district authorized reimbursing parents for the cost of bus transportation to and from school.
1948	McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 US 203. The State of Illinois provided religious instruction in public schools but allowed children who were not interested to be reassigned to classes where religion was not taught. By an 8–1 margin, the justices held that the religious instruction nonetheless violated the First Amendment.
1952	Zorach v. Clauson, 343 US 306. Question: Did a New York State program permitting students enrolled in out-of-school religious education programs, while nonparticipants remained in school under the state’s mandatory education requirements, violate the Establishment Clause? Answer: No, because the program was offered off school grounds.
1962	Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421. This dealt with a nondenominational prayer composed by the New York Board of Regents to be recited every morning in public schools. It read, “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country.” The court ruled the practice unconstitutional.
1963	Abington School District v. Schemmp, 374 US 203. A Pennsylvania statute required the reading of ten verses from the Bible in public schools; Maryland permitted a daily recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in schools. The court found them both unconstitutional.
1968	Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US 236. A New York law permitted public schools to loan textbooks to all students, free of charge, in public or parochial schools. The court upheld the practice, finding that it benefited families with children in parochial schools, and not the schools themselves.
	Flast v. Cohen, 392 US 83. This decision established that taxpayers have a right to bring a federal court action challenging an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause. Here, Congress had appropriated money to assist private and public schools, including parochial schools. Chief Justice Earl Warren said in the majority opinion, “Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.” In a concurrence, Justice Potter Stewart added, “Every taxpayer can claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a religious institution.”
1970	Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 US 664. Can New York State exempt religious institutions from taxation without violating the Establishment Clause? Yes, because the exemption was offered to nonreligious institutions as well, and taxing religious institutions would unconstitutionally entangle the state in religion.
1971	Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602. In this watershed case, a dispute involving state aid to help parochial schools pay their teachers, the court enacted a three-part litmus test for Establishment Clause analysis: (1) the law must have a secular purpose, (2) the law may neither advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) the law must not excessively entangle religion and government.
	Tilton v. Richardson, 403 US 672. In the first application of the Lemon test, the court generally upheld a federal program providing public funds for the construction of facilities in religious institutions of higher learning. The court said the arrangement had not excessively entangled church and state since the buildings were not used for religious purposes.
1972	Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US 205. The court held that Amish children could be exempt from compulsory school attendance after eighth grade.
	Essex v. Wolman, 409 US 808. Based on the Lemon test, the court said that an Ohio statute providing grants to reimburse parents for parochial school tuition was unconstitutional.
1973	Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 US 472; Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 US 756; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 US 825. In this trio of cases, the court struck down state laws providing direct aid to parochial schools and/or tuition reimbursements and tax breaks for parents of parochial school children.
1976	Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 US 736. “We are asked once again to police the constitutional boundary between church and state,” began the opinion by Justice Harry Blackmun. Here, the court upheld a Maryland law providing grants to private, religious-affiliated colleges to be used for nonsectarian purposes.
1977	New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 US 125. After the 1973 Levitt decision, which said the state couldn’t give direct aid to parochial schools, the New York State Legislature passed a law allowing parochial schools to be reimbursed for expenses incurred before Levitt was decided. The court disallowed it.
1980	Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 US 646. At issue was the constitutionality of a New York statute appropriating public funds to reimburse religious-related and secular nonpublic schools for conducting state-mandated testing. The court said the initiative was constitutional under the Lemon test, because it had a secular purpose, its primary effect did not advance religion, and it did not entangle the state with organized religion.
	Stone v. Graham, 449 US 39. The court struck down a Kentucky law requiring the placement of the Ten Commandments in all public school classrooms. It was unimpressed with a disclaimer at the bottom of the display contending that the commandments had a secular purpose and were the basis for the nation’s legal tradition.
1983	Mueller v. Allen, 463 US 388. The court upheld a Minnesota statute providing a tax deduction for tuition, textbooks, and transportation for children to attend public, private, or sectarian schools. It said that as long as the benefit to religious schools was indirect, parents of students in religious schools could not be denied a benefit offered to parents in other schools.
1985	School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 US 373. A Michigan program provided funding for special education programs in nonpublic schools, allowing for public school special education teachers to be sent to religious schools. The court found the program violated the Lemon test in that it advanced religion.
	Aguilar v. Felton, 473 US 402. Initially, and based on the Grand Rapids case, the court struck down a program in which federal funds were used to pay the salaries of teachers providing special education services to children in parochial schools. But it overruled itself twelve years later in Agostini v. Felton (see next page).
1990	Board of Education of the West Side Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 US 226. In this case, students at a public high school wanted to form an extracurricular religious club to meet on school grounds, a privilege afforded to other groups. The court held that the Federal Equal Access Act prohibits schools from denying student groups the use of the premises based on the religious nature of the meetings.
1992	Lee v. Weisman, 505 US 577. In this Rhode Island case, principals were granted permission to invite members of the clergy to give invocations at middle and high school graduations. Since the principal selected the clergy and controlled the content of the prayer, the court said it was unconstitutional.
1993	Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 US 384. Here, a religious group wanted to show a religious film at a public school when the school was not being used, a privilege offered to other organizations. The court said it was wrong for the school to deny the request to present a religious film, because the school board had created an “open forum” for the community and could not discriminate based on religion.
1994	Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 US 687. The court ruled unconstitutional the creation of a separate religious school district to receive state and federal financial assistance to educate children with disabilities in the village of Kiryas Joel.
1997	Agostini v. Felton, 521 US 203. The court overruled its 1985 decision in Aguilar v. Felton and held that public school teachers could instruct at religious schools as long as the material was secular and did not result in “excessive entanglement” between government and religion.
2000	Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 US 290. The court shot down as unconstitutional a school district’s policy allowing student-led prayer at football games.
	Mitchell v. Helms, 530 US 793. By a 6–3 margin, the court upheld a program that provided for the loan of equipment and resources to religious schools under the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981.
2002	Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639. In this landmark ruling, the 5–4 court upheld a Cleveland voucher program providing publicly funded scholarships to low-income and inner-city families so their children could attend private schools, including those operated by religious entities.
2004	Locke v. Davey, 540 US 712. The court held that the state of Washington did not violate the Constitution by denying state funding to college students pursuing a degree in theology.