1. THE PEOPLE AND VLADIMIR PUTIN
1. Natalya is not her real name. Throughout this book, we present quotes and insights from interviews conducted with ordinary Russian citizens in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yaroslavl in early 2018. To protect the interviewees, we have given them pseudonyms. To help ensure that these interviews were open and honest, the interviews were conducted on our behalf and using our questions by native Russian sociologists, as many Russians might feel uncomfortable talking about their political views with an American and a Scot.
2. Freedom House. (2018, January 16). “Democracy in Crisis: Freedom House Releases Freedom in the World 2018.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://freedomhouse.org/article/democracy-crisis-freedom-house-releases-freedom-world-2018
2. THE KREMLIN UNDER FIRE
1. In his official campaign biography for the 2000 presidential election, the now famously athletic Putin blames beer for his flabby appearance in shirtless photographs taken during the Dresden days. See Kolesnikov, A., Gevorkyan, N. P., and Timakova, N. (2000). Ot pervogo litsa. Razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym. Vagrius. Retrieved from https://www.litmir.me/bd/?b=132894&p=1
2. “Мы здесь власть!”
3. Navalny was an anti-corruption blogger turned protest leader, Udaltsov was a radical left-wing politician and Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister turned oppositionist. Radio Svoboda. (2012, May 7). “‘Marsh millionov’. Naval’nyy, Nemtsov, Udal’tsov zaderzhany.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.svoboda.org/a/24571375.html; TV Rain. (2012, May 7). “‘Marsh millionov’. Informatsionnyy vypusk, final’naya chast.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://tvrain.ru/lite/teleshow/experiment/marsh_millionov_informatsionnyy_vypusk_finalnaya_chast-246014/
4. Ekho Moskvy. (2012, May 7). “Sotni chelovek zaderzhany, desyatki postradali v khode vcherashnikh aktsiy protesta i stolknoveniy s politsiey v Moskve.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://echo.msk.ru/news/885899-echo.html; Lenta.ru. (2012, May 7). “Na pyatachke: Grazhdane i omonovtsy vpervye poprobovali drug druga na prochnost’.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://lenta.ru/articles/2012/05/07/shestoyemaya/
5. Vikalyuk, A. (2013, June 4). “Biznesmen Kozlov vyshel iz kolonii ‘svobodnym chelovekom’.” RIA Novosti. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://ria.ru/incidents/20130604/941164092.html
6. BBC News. (2012, March 6). “Obvinyaemye v ‘pank-molebne’ v KhKhS arestovany do 24 aprelya.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2012/03/120306_pussy_riot_arrest.shtml
7. Bocharova, S., Zheleznova, M., Kornya, A., and Glikin, M. (2013, May 30). “Ekspertov privlekli k delu YuKOSa.” Vedomosti. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2013/05/30/delo_yukosa_mozhet_pojti_na_tretij_srok; Chelishcheva, V. (2013, May 29). “Mest’ otvyazavsheysya pushki.” Novaya Gazeta. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2013/05/29/54911-mest-otvyazavsheysya-pushki
8. RBK. (2012, August 17). “Uchastnits Pussy Riot prigovorili k dvum godam kolonii.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from http://top.rbc.ru/society/17/08/2012/665147.shtml; RBK. (2012, October 10). “Delo Pussy Riot: E.Samutsevich otpustili, ee podrug otpravyat v koloniyu.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from http://top.rbc.ru/society/10/10/2012/673669.shtml
9. On November 9, 2012, Maksim Luzianin was the first to be sentenced, receiving four and a half years in prison. On April 23, 2013, Konstantin Lebedev was sentenced to two and a half years. On October 8, 2013, Mikhail Kosenko was given an indefinite sentence in a psychiatric hospital. On February 24, 2014, Andrei Barabanov, Iaroslav Belousov, Denis Lutskevich, Aleksei Polikhovich, Stepan Zimin, Sergei Krivov and Artem Savelov were sentenced to terms of two and a half to four years, while Aleksandra Dukhanina was given a suspended sentence. On August 18 of the same year, Aleksei Gaskarov, Il’ia Gushchin and Aleksandr Margolin were given prison terms of two and a half to three and a half years, while Elena Kokhtareva received a suspended sentence, and on October 10 Dmitrii Ishevskii was sentenced to three years and two months in prison. The final sentence, of two and a half years, was handed down to Ivan Nepomniashchikh on December 22, 2015, after he had spent almost a year under house arrest. See Gazeta.ru. (2012, November 9). “Sud vynes pervyy prigovor po ‘bolotnomu delu’: Maksim Luzyanin poluchil 4,5 goda lisheniya svobody.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2012/11/09/n_2609281.shtml; Shainyan, K. (2013, April 25). “Opyat’ dvoyka: oglashen prigovor Lebedevu.” Radio Svoboda. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.svoboda.org/a/24968001.html; Kommersant. (2014, February 24). “Semero figurantov ‘bolotnogo dela’ budut sidet’.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2415425; Newsru. (2014, August 18). “Chetyre figuranta ‘bolotnogo dela’ prigovoreny k nakazaniyu ot uslovnogo do 3,5 let kolonii.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.newsru.com/russia/18aug2014/4bolot.html; Ishevskiy, D. (2014, December 1). Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://grani-ru-org.appspot.com/people/2203/; Dzhanpoladova, N. (2015, December 22). “Chekisty vzyalis’ za pravnuka.” Radio Svoboda. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.svoboda.org/a/27443336.html
10. Interfax. (2012, October 11). “Udal’tsov rasskazal pro poisk deneg.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.interfax.ru/russia/270303
11. Dzhanpoladova, N. (2013, June 21). “Udal’tsov i Razvozzhaev nachinayut znakomit’sya s delom.” Radio Svoboda. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.svoboda.org/a/25024150.html
12. BBC News. (2014, July 24). “Udal’tsov i Razvozzhaev prigovoreny k 4,5 godam kolonii.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/07/140724_udaltsov_sentence_verdict.shtml
13. Lenta.ru. (2014, March 12). “Konstantin Lebedev rasskazal o rossiyskom ‘mikromaydane’.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/12/lebedev/
14. RT na russkom. (2012). “Putin v Luzhnikakh: Vystuplenie na mitinge 23 fevralya.” Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWUxcGCfdiI
15. Не будоражить народ.
16. Skovoroda, E. (2012, October 22). “Gaz bez antidota.” The New Times. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.webcitation.org/6DfA3H4CN
17. Sokolov, M. (2008, December 16). “Boris Nemtsov ob itogakh s”ezda vserossiyskogo dvizheniya ‘Solidarnost” .” Radio Svoboda. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.svoboda.org/a/477229.html
18. Author interview with Gleb Pavlovsky, 27 October 2016. Moscow.
19. Hillygus, D. S., and Shields, T. G. (2016). The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns. Princeton University Press.
20. Matveeva, G. (2012). “Pank-moleben ‘Bogoroditsa, Putina progoni’ Pussy Riot v Khrame.” Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GCasuaAczKY. The original video was taken down as supposedly violating YouTube’s policy on “hate speech.” An alternative posted later can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHxBKK6fw_4, retrieved November 16, 2018.
21. RBK. (2012, October 10). “Delo Pussy Riot: E.Samutsevich otpustili, ee podrug otpravyat v koloniyu.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from http://top.rbc.ru/society/10/10/2012/673669.shtml
22. Mel’nikov, A. (2012, February 27). “Proshcheniia ne budet.” Nezavisimaia Gazeta.
23. Samokhina, S., and Korchenkova, N. (2013, June 11). “Gosduma prinyala zakon ob oskorblenii chuvstv veruyushchikh.” Kommersant. Retrieved from https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2209841
24. Legoyda, V. (2013, May 14). “Materialy SMI: ‘Kart-blansh. Chuvstva veruyushchikh i neveruyushchikh, ili pochemu ne stoit khodit’ so svoim ustavom v chuzhoy monastyr’.” Interfax. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=51159
25. Svetova, Z. (2012, June 11). “Umalili dukhovnuiu osnovu gosudarstva.” The New Times.
26. Vedomosti. (2013, April 11). “Ot redaktsii: Pochti bez chuvstv.”
27. Davydov, I. (2015, August 24). “Ia znaiu apostolov antikhrista po imenam.” The New Times.
28. Gazeta.ru. (2012, February 8). “Avtor skandal’nogo zakona o geyakh predlagaet formirovat’ otryady politsii nravov iz kazakov.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2012/02/08/n_2196741.shtml; Interfax. (2013, September 23). “10 samyh izvestnyh iniciativ deputata Milonova.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.interfax.ru/russia/330435
29. ITAR-TASS. (2012, February 29). “V Peterburge prinyat zakon o shtrafakh za propagandu pedofilii i gomoseksualizma.” Retrieved November 22, 2018, from https://tass.ru/obschestvo/573556
30. Petrovskaya, I. (2012, April 7). “‘Serdtsa geev nado szhigat’ i zakapyvat’ v zemlyu’. Chadolyubivyy televedushchiy predlozhil retsept dlya spaseniya detey.” Novaya Gazeta. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/04/07/49123-171-serdtsa-geev-nado-szhigat-i-zakapyvat-v-zemlyu-187-chadolyubivyy-televeduschiy-predlozhil-retsept-dlya-spaseniya-detey
31. Rabochy put’. (2013, June 6). “Smolensk: V krestovyy pokhod za semeynye tsennosti!” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from http://www.rabochy-put.ru/society/43259-smolensk-v-krestovyjj-pokhod-za-semejjnye-cennosti.html
32. Grani.ru. (2013, May 11). “V Volgograde soversheno zverskoe ubiystvo na pochve gomofobii.” Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://graniru.org/Society/Neuro/m.214558.html
33. Eysmont, M. (2013, May 20). “Mariya Eysmont: Gei i my.” Vedomosti. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2013/05/20/solidarnost_s_geyami
34. Ivashkina, D. (2014, January 7). “Ivan Okhlobystin poprosil vernut’ stat’yu za ‘muzhelozhestvo’.” Komsomol’skaya Pravda. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.kp.ru/online/news/1627527/
35. Kondakov, A. (2017). “Prestupleniya na pochve nenavisti protiv LGBT v Rossii. Tsentr nezavisimykh sotsiologicheskikh issledovaniy.” CISR.ru. Retrieved from http://cisr.ru/publications/hate-crime-against-lgbt-in-russia/
36. The sample included Russian citizens living in cities of 1 million or more inhabitants, with at least some university education, at least a middle-level income and between the ages of 16 and 65. As we hoped, the sample over-represented those who opposed the Kremlin: 48.2 percent of respondents somewhat or fully approved of Putin’s activities as president, and only 39.3 percent reported voting for him in the 2012 election.
37. Respondents who reported voting for Putin were about 12 percentage points more likely to fully support the religious sentiment law and 20 percentage points more likely to fully support the anti-LGBT law than respondents who reported voting for an opposition candidate. It is notable that opponents of the religious sentiment law were much more numerous (nearly 70 percent of the opposition) than opponents of the anti-LBGT law (only about 30 percent of supporters of the political opposition—and the majority of these expressed lukewarm opposition).
38. Respondents who rarely or never watched TV news were some 25 percentage points more likely than regular TV watchers to fully oppose the LGBT law, and some 40 percentage points more likely to oppose the religious sentiment law.
39. Boytsova, M. (2013, June 14). “Deputat pod krovat’yu.” Rosbalt. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2013/06/14/1140900.html
40. Golitsyna, A. (2012, July 9). “Gosduma odobrila fil’tratsiyu runeta.” Vedomosti. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2012/07/09/proshel_bez_filtra
41. Newsru. (2014, March 13). “Roskomnadzor zablokiroval dostup k portalam ‘Grani.ru’, ‘Kasparov.ru’, ‘Ezhednevnomu zhurnalu’ i ZhZh Naval’nogo.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.newsru.com/russia/13mar2014/block.html
42. Krasnikov, E., and Naberezhnov, G. (2014, April 21). “Pavel Durov uvolen s posta gendirektora ‘VKontakte’.” RBK. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://top.rbc.ru/economics/21/04/2014/919473.shtml
43. RBK. (2013, December 9). “S.Mironyuk – kollektivu RIA ‘Novosti’: S nami postupili nespravedlivo.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://top.rbc.ru/society/09/12/2013/893728.shtml; Lenta.ru. (2013, December 19). “Putin ob”yasnil naznachenie Kiseleva glavoy ‘Rossii segodnya’.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://lenta.ru/news/2013/12/19/patriotic/
44. Andreeva, N. (2012, February 12). “Rassredotochilsya. Soratniki novogo zamglavy administratsii prezidenta Volodina zanimayut krupnye posty.” Novaya Gazeta. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/02/12/48190-rassredotochilsya-soratniki-novogo-zamglavy-administratsii-prezidenta-volodina-zanimayut-krupnye-posty
45. Meduza. (2014, December 26). “‘Shaltay-Boltay’ ulichil Kristinu Potupchik v maskirovke pod byvshego press-sekretarya Naval’nogo.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://meduza.io/news/2014/12/26/shaltay-boltay-ulichil-kristinu-potupchik-v-maskirovke-pod-byvshego-press-sekretarya-navalnogo
46. The term translates literally to “defenders” but could also be translated as “conservators.”
47. Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking Politics. Cambridge University Press; Goffman, E. (1986). Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Northeastern University Press.
48. Polletta, F., and Jasper, J. M. (2001). “Collective Identity and Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology, 27(1), 283–305. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.283
49. Some 97 percent of her reports mention Putin; 96 percent of the reports talked about war; 98 percent mention the opposition; 96.5 percent mention Navalny; 52 percent mention Nemtsov; 27 percent mention Mikhail Khodorkovsky; 86 percent mention Ukraine; 60 percent mention Europe; 57 percent mention the United States; 56 percent mention Crimea; 54 percent mention sanctions; 33 percent mention Donbas; and 31 percent mention Novorossia.
50. Amos, H. (2014, December 15). “Russian Ruble Crashes to World’s Worst-Performing Currency.” The Moscow Times. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-ruble-crashes-to-worlds-worst-performing-currency-42275
1. Kchetverg.ru. (2014, April 23). “Zhitel’ Lesnogo pomogal ‘otvoevyvat” Krym. Eksklyuzivnoe interv’yu opolchentsa.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://www.kchetverg.ru/2014/04/23/zhitel-lesnogo-pomogal-otvoevyvat-krym-eksklyuzivnoe-intervyu-opolchenca/
2. Lenta.ru. (2014, February 20). “Medvedev poprosil Yanukovicha ne byt’ tryapkoy.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://lenta.ru/news/2014/02/20/medvedev/
3. Euronews. (2014, February 20). “Dozens killed in Kyiv as Ukraine ‘truce’ shattered.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.euronews.com/2014/02/20/ukraine-death-toll-rises-as-protesters-retake-maida
4. BBC News. (2014, February 26). “V Simferopole proizoshli stolknoveniya pered Radoy.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2014/02/140226_ukraine_crimea_tensions
5. Bigmir.net. (2014, February 28). “Zakhvat Rady Kryma i novyy Kabmin. Khronika 27 fevralya.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/796985-Zahvat-Rady-Kryma-i-novyj-Kabmin--Hronika-27-fevralja; NTV. (2014, February 27). “Vooruzhennye lyudi zakhvatili zdaniya parlamenta i pravitel’stva Kryma.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/848321/?fb
6. NTV. (2014, February 28). “Vooruzhennye lyudi v voennoy forme zablokirovali aeroport Simferopolya.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/848838/?fb
7. Blokpost Sevastopol’. (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.blokpostsevastopol.ru/
8. Nightwolves. (2014, March 31). “Khirurg: ‘My gotovilis’ k zatyazhnoy voyne s banderovtsami, gotovilis’ k osade’.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://www.nightwolves.ru/rm/news/1639/
9. Author interview with Roland Oliphant, 6 October 2017.
10. Varlamov, I. (2014, March 4). “Situatsiya v Krymu, chast’ 1 – Varlamov.ru.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://varlamov.ru/1017094.html
11. ZN.ua. (2014, March 4). “Putin zayavil, chto v Krymu deystvuyut ne rossiyskie voyska, a mestnye sily samooborony.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://zn.ua/POLITICS/putin-zayavil-chto-v-krymu-deystvuyut-ne-rossiyskie-voyska-a-mestnye-sily-samooborony-140331_.html
12. Shevchenko, V. (2014, March 11). “‘Little green men’ or ‘Russian invaders’?” BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154
13. Oliphant, R. (2014, March 16). “Crimeans Vote Peacefully in Referendum, But Have Little Choice.” The Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10701676/Crimeans-vote-peacefully-in-referendum-but-have-little-choice.html
14. BBC News. (2005, April 25). “Putin deplores collapse of USSR.” Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm; Putin, V. (2007, February 10). Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034
15. Rodina’s key figures were, however, coopted by the Kremlin itself. Dmitrii Rogozin was appointed ambassador to the EU and NATO, before being made deputy prime minister in charge of the military–industrial complex. Sergei Glaz’ev spent a number of years in the political wilderness but was made an economic adviser to Putin after his reelection in 2012, pushing a dirigiste agenda.
16. Other nationalist leaders arrested at the time included Dmitrii Rumiantsev, Sergei Korotkikh and Nikita Tikhonov.
17. Verkhovskiy, A. (2015, December). “Natsional-radikaly ot prezidenstva Medvedeva do voyny v Donbasse.” Kontrapunkt. Retrieved October 26, 2018, from http://www.counter-point.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/verkhovsky_counterpoint2.pdf
18. Prokopenko, P., Davidyak, S., and Shtykaleva, V. (2013, October 17). “Politsiya i sotrudniki FMS provodyat v Moskve reydy po vyyavleniyu nezakonnykh migrantov.” TVC. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://www.tvc.ru/news/show/id/19253
19. The one exception was the Communist Party candidate Ivan Mel’nikov.
20. Polit.ru. (2013, August 24). “Naval’nyy zapretit v stolitse lezginku i razreshit gey-parady.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://polit.ru/news/2013/08/24/navalny/
21. Putin, V. (2014, March 18). “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603
22. Some of it was being heard by professional historians for the first time, too, and Putin has been accused of taking liberties with the historical record.
23. In July 2013, Ukraine was mentioned in some 35 percent of posts, up from only 3 percent in June.
24. Mentions of Ukraine grew from 44 percent of posts in November 2013 to 67 percent in January 2014. Attention to Europe and the US also spiked in early 2014, to peaks of 62 percent and 39 percent, respectively. It was Ukraine, however, that was the key focus of attention.
25. At the same time that attention to Ukraine spiked, so did discussion of gays (37 percent of posts), ‘liberal values’ (18 percent of posts) and fascism (41 percent of posts).
26. Kchetverg.ru. (2014, April 23). “Zhitel’ Lesnogo pomogal ‘otvoevyvat” Krym. Eksklyuzivnoe interv’yu opolchentsa.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://www.kchetverg.ru/2014/04/23/zhitel-lesnogo-pomogal-otvoevyvat-krym-eksklyuzivnoe-intervyu-opolchenca/
27. May, Yu. (2014, April 10). “Turchinov poobeshchal ne arestovyvat’ zakhvatchikov SBU v Luganske.” Vesti. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://vesti-ukr.com/donbass/46797-turchinov-poobewal-ne-arestovyvat-zahvatchikov-sbu-v-luganske
28. Fakty. (2014, April 18). “Rossiyskie spetsnazovtsy rasstrelivali nas iz avtomatov prakticheski v upor.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://fakty.ua/180361-rossijskie-specnazovcy-rasstrelivali-nas-iz-avtomatov-kalashnikova-prakticheski-v-upor; Vesti. (2014, April 13). “V Slavyanske nachalas’ Antiterroristicheskaya operatsiya.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://vesti-ukr.com/donbass/47186-v-slavjanske-nachalas-antiterroristicheskaja-operacija
29. “‘Vezhlivye lyudi’ v Luganske boyatsya fotokamer i ne znayut, chego khotyat.” (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://blognews/307982-vezhlivye-lyudi-v-luganske-boyatsya-fotokamer-i-ne-znayut-chego-hotyat.html
30. TASS. (2014, April 16). “Zdanie Donetskogo gorsoveta zakhvatili aktivisty khar’kovskoy organizatsii ‘Oplot’.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1125050
31. Novikova, G. (2014, April 17). “Vezhlivye lyudi prishli v Donetskiy aeroport.” Komsomol’skaya Pravda v Ukraine. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://kp.ua/politics/448909-vezhlyvye-luidy-pryshly-v-donetskyi-aeroport
32. Balinskiy, V., Vesilyk, Yu., Gerasimova, T., Dibrov, S., Zaporozhets, V., Ivashkina, V., . . . Shtekel’, L. (2014, June 26). “Khronologiya sobytiy v Odesse 2 maya 2014-go goda (chast’ 1).” Taimer. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://timer-odessa.net/statji/hronologiya_sobitiy_v_odesse_2_maya_214_go_goda_chast_1_219.html
33. Radio Svoboda. (2014, April 17). “Putin: v Krymu deystvovali rossiyskie voennye.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.svoboda.org/a/25352506.html
34. Putin, V. (2015, December 17). “Bol’shaya press-konferentsiya Vladimira Putina.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971; Khomami, N., and Walker, S. (2015, December 17). “Vladimir Putin Press Conference: ‘Russian military personnel were in Ukraine’—as it happened.” The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/dec/17/vladimir-putins-annual-press-conference-live
35. Kireev, Yu. (2014, June 4). “Komanduyushchiy Soprotivleniem Donetskoy narodnoy respubliki Igor’ Strelkov.” Moskovskii Komsomolets. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.mk.ru/editions/daily/2014/06/04/komanduyushhiy-soprotivleniem-doneckoy-narodnoy-respubliki-igor-strelkov.html; Vinogradov, D. (2014, June 5). “Boevye zaslugi: kto nauchil voevat’ Igorya Strelkova.” SVPressa. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://svpressa.ru/society/article/89194/
36. Ponomarev, A. (2014, May 14). “Mylovary, emememshchiki, pevtsy. Kto vozglavil opolchentsev yugo-vostoka Ukrainy?” Slon.ru. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://slon.ru/world/kto_vse_eti_dyudi_spisok_novykh_upravlentsev_ukrainy-1097871.xhtml
37. Glavred. (2014, May 17). “Stsenarii dlya Kryma i Donbassa gotovila odna komanda – ‘prem’er’ separatistov.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://glavred.info/politics/279802-scenarii-dlya-kryma-i-donbassa-gotovila-odna-komanda-premer-separatistov.html
38. RIA Novosti. (2014, May 16). “‘Vezhlivye lyudi’ kak novyy obraz Rossiyskoy armii.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140516/1007988002.html
39. Pravda. “Boroday: Na Donbasse povoevali ot 30 do 50 tysyach rossiyan.” (2015, August 27). Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/08/27/7079232/
40. Walker, S., and Grytsenko, O. (2015, January 21). “Ukraine Forces Admit Loss of Donetsk Airport to Rebels.” The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/21/russia-ukraine-war-fighting-east
41. Petrovskaya, I. (2014, July 17). “TV, ledenyashchee dushu.” Novaya Gazeta. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2014/07/17/60385-tv-ledenyaschee-dushu; Ponomarev, A. (2014, July 14). “Zhurnalisty ne nashli podtverzhdenie syuzhetu ‘Pervogo kanala’ o raspyatom v Slavyanske rebenke.” Slon.ru. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://slon.ru/fast/russia/zhurnalisty-ne-nashli-podtverzhdeniya-syuzhetu-pervogo-kanala-o-raspyatom-v-slavyanske-rebenke-1126851.xhtml
42. Pervyy kanal. (2014, December 21). “Zhurnalisty Pervogo otvechayut na obvineniya vo lzhi v svyazi s syuzhetom pro ubiystvo rebenka v Slavyanske.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-12-21/31502-zhurnalisty_pervogo_otvechayut_na_obvineniya_vo_lzhi_v_svyazi_s_syuzhetom_pro_ubiystvo_rebenka_v_slavyanske
43. Bigmir.net. (2014, November 27). “Chetvert’ rossiyan uvereny, chto v Ukraine est’ voyska RF – opros.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/861538-Chetvert-rossiyan-yvereni-chto-v-Ykraine-est-voiska-RF--opros
44. 5.ua. (2015, May 20). “Tsar’ov ofitsiyno viznav krakh ‘proektu Novorosiya’.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.5.ua/ato-na-shodi/tsarov-ofitsiino-vyznav-krakh-proektu-novorosiia-81024.html
45. To try to gauge the effect that the Ukraine crisis was having on the coherence of the nationalist community, we ran a linguistic analysis of all of the posts across the sixteen community pages in our dataset and measured the mathematical divergence in terms of the words used. This divergence can range from 0 (no divergence, i.e., everyone writing about the same thing using the same words) to 1 (total divergence, with no overlap in vocabulary whatsoever). When we first “meet” our groups in December 2011, the level of divergence is high (0.79). It remains relatively high (fluctuating from 0.44 to 0.76) until about May 2013, the same time that the nationalists begin worrying in earnest about the prospect of Ukraine’s association agreement with the EU. After that, the online nationalist discussion becomes more and more homogenous, falling to a divergence of 0.26 in August 2013, and to a divergence of below 0.1 by June 2014. It remains at that remarkably low level until May 2015, when Tsarev drops his bomb and divergence spikes to 0.51. Divergence falls again, but then begins an inexorable upward climb.
46. Regnum. (2016, April 6). “MGB DNR provodit ‘zachistku’ vysshego rukovodstva Donetska.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2112967.html; Segodnya. (2016, April 20). “Rukovoditeley ‘DNR’ i ‘LNR’ zhdet zachistka – Gritsak.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/rukovoditeley-dnr-i-lnr-zhdet-zachistka-gricak-709425.html; Snegirev, D. (2015, January 3). “Chistki u separatistov: kto i pochemu ‘ubiraet’ glavarey boevikov?” Gordon. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://gordonua.com/day_question/pochemu-ubili-betmena.html
47. Vashchenko, V. (2017, July 5). “Organizator ‘Russkikh marshey’ zaderzhan FSB.” Gazeta.ru. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2017/07/05/10774934.shtml; Meduza. (2017, September 23). “Lider ‘Khristianskogo gosudarstva’ Aleksandr Kalinin arestovan.” Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://meduza.io/news/2017/09/23/lider-hristianskogo-gosudarstva-aleksandr-kalinin-arestovan
48. Eysmont, M. (2015, March 5). “Sindrom opolchentsa.” Snob. Retrieved October 11, 2018, from https://snob.ru/selected/entry/89001. Reproduced with permission of the International Media Project “Snob” (snob.ru).
49. “Grebtsov Igor Aleksandrovich.” (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2018, from http://gruz200.net/?n=38941
4. THE GATHERER OF LANDS
1. When Yanukovych fled to Russia, Ukrainian citizens opened his palatial presidential compound to the public, exposing the preposterous luxury in which the president of a relatively poor country lived. For some pictures taken onsite see: The Telegraph. “In Pictures: Inside the Palace Yanukovych Didn’t Want Ukraine to See.” (2014, February 27). Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10656023/In-pictures-Inside-the-palace-Yanukovych-didnt-want-Ukraine-to-see.html
2. Hutchings, S., and Szostek, J. (2016). “Dominant Narratives in Russian Political and Media Discourse During the Ukraine Crisis.” In Pikulicka-Wilczewska, A., and Sakwa, R. (2016). “Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives.” E-International Relations. Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR.pdf; Teper, Y. (2015). “Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of Crimea: National or Imperial?” Post-Soviet Affairs, 32(4), 378–396; Hansen, F. S. (2014). “Framing Yourself into a Corner: Russia, Crimea, and the Minimal Action Space.” European Security, 24(1), 141–158.
3. Medvedev, S. (2014). “Russkiy resentiment.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://www.strana-oz.ru/2014/6/russkiy-resentiment
4. Borodina, A. (2014, July 3). “Televizor Olimpiady i Ukrainy: rekordy propagandy.” Forbes. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-opinion/konkurentsiya/261539-televizor-olimpiady-i-ukrainy-rekordy-propagandy
5. Sobolev, S. (2014, November 20). “TNS zafiksirovala istoricheskiy rekord interesa k telenovostyam.” RBK. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://top.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/20/11/2014/546dff7bcbb20f48e98df5fa
6. Cottiero, C., Kucharski, K., Olimpieva, E., and Orttung, R. W. (2015). “War of Words: The Impact of Russian State Television on the Russian Internet.” Nationalities Papers, 43(4), 533–555.
7. Rogov, K. (2015). “‘Krymskiy sindrom’: mekhanizmy avtoritarnoy mobilizatsii.” Kontrapunkt. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://www.counter-point.org/%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B4%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BC/
8. Verkhovskiy, A. (2015, December). “Natsional-radikaly ot prezidenstva Medvedeva do voyny v Donbasse.” Kontrapunkt. Retrieved October 26, 2018; from http://www.counter-point.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/verkhovsky_counterpoint2.pdf
9. Solnick, S. L. (1998). Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions. Harvard University Press.
10. See for example: Groenendyk, E. (2011). “Current Emotion Research in Political Science: How Emotions Help Democracy Overcome its Collective Action Problem.” Emotion Review, 3(4), 455–463; Neuman, W. R., Marcus, G. E., Crigler, A. N., and MacKuen, M. (eds). (2007). The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior. University of Chicago Press; Mercer, J. (2010). Reputation and International Politics. Cornell University Press; Petersen, R. D. (2002). Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press; Pearlman, W. (2013). “Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings.” Perspectives on Politics, 11(2), 387–409.
11. Jasper, J. M. (2011). “Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research.” Annual Review of Sociology, 37, 285–303; Conover, P. J., and Feldman, S. (1986). “Emotional Reactions to the Economy: I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take it anymore.” American Journal of Political Science, 30(1), 50–78.
12. See Zajonc, R. B. (1980). “Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences.” American Psychologist, 35(2), 151.
13. Cassino, D., and Lodge, M. (2007). “The Primacy of Affect in Political Evaluations.” In Neuman, Marcus, Crigler, and MacKuen, (eds). (2007). The Affect Effect. University of Chicago Press. 101–123.
14. Lodge, M., McGraw, K. M., and Stroh, P. (1989). “An Impression-driven Model of Candidate Evaluation.” American Political Science Review, 83(2), 399–419; McGraw, K. M., Lodge, M., and Stroh, P. (1990). “On-line Processing in Candidate Evaluation: The Effects of Issue Order, Issue Importance, and Sophistication.” Political Behavior, 12(1), 41–58.
15. See Ibid. This is what political scientists and psychologists call the “online processing model.”
16. Zajonc (1980). “Feeling and Thinking.”
17. MacKuen, M., Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., and Keele, L. (2007). “The Third Way: The Theory of Affective Intelligence and American Democracy.” In Neuman, Marcus, Crigler, and MacKuen, (eds). (2007). The Affect Effect. University of Chicago Press. 124–151.
18. There is some very careful political science research demonstrating this. See for example Young, L. E. (2016). “The Psychology of Repression and Dissent in Autocracy.” Columbia University. https://doi.org/10.7916/D86110HB
19. Rubenstein, J. (2016). The Last Days of Stalin. Yale University Press. Chapter 4.
20. Alexievich, S. (2016). Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets. Random House Publishing Group.
21. Arendt, H. (1973). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Preface to the Third Edition. Cited in Baehr, P. (2007). “The ‘Masses’ in Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Totalitarianism.” The Good Society, 16(2), 12–18.
22. Arendt (1973). The Origins of Totalitarianism. 353. Cited in Canovan, M. (1994). Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought. Cambridge University Press. 55.
23. Canovan. (1994). Hannah Arendt. 56. Arendt’s account, of course, is more theoretical than empirical. Though she does rely heavily on eyewitnesses and first-person accounts, often collected at the Nuremberg Trials, much of her account is at odds with empirical work conducted since on voting patterns and support for the Nazis. Rather than appealing to an undifferentiated mass, support for the NSDAP was in fact highly structured with clear variation across social classes, religion and regions, though patterns of support did vary over time. See: Childers, T. (1976). “The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote.” Journal of Contemporary History, 11 (4), 17–42.
24. For details, see: Greene, S. A., and Robertson, G. B. (2018). “The Co-Construction of Authoritarianism: Emotional Engagement and Politics in Russia after Crimea.” Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3289134
25. Volkov, D., and Goncharov, S. (2014). “Rossiiskii media-landshaft: Televidenie, pressa, internet.” Levada-Center.
26. In each round 43 percent said Russian ethnicity was a very important part of their personal identity. Orthodox Christianity was very important to 25 percent before Crimea and 27 percent after—proportions that are statistically indistinguishable given the survey margin of error.
27. Formally in sociology this field is known as interaction ritual theory. See Collins, R. (2004). Interaction Ritual Chains. Princeton University Press.
28. A good modern translation is Durkheim, É., and Swain, J. W. (2008). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology. Scholar’s Choice.
29. Durkheim, É. (1965). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Free Press. 213.
30. Wiltermuth, S. S., and Heath, C. (2009). “Synchrony and Cooperation.” Psychological Science, 20(1), 1–5.
31. Bonilla, Y., and Rosa, J. (2015). “# Ferguson: Digital Protest, Hashtag Ethnography, and the Racial Politics of Social Media in the United States.” American Ethnologist, 42(1), 4–17; see also González-Bailón, S., Borge-Holthoefer, J., and Moreno, Y. (2013). “Broadcasters and Hidden Influentials in Online Protest Diffusion.” American Behavioral Scientist, 57(7), 943–965.
32. Ipsos MORI Political Monitor. (n.d.). Untitled. Retrieved from https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/migrations/en-uk/files/Assets/Docs/Polls/margaret-thatcher-poll-rating-trends.pdf
33. Gallup Inc. (n.d.). Presidential Approval Ratings—George W. Bush. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-George-Bush.aspx
34. Levada-Tsentr. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://www.levada.ru/
35. Tharoor, I. (2014, March 19). “It’s Not Just Putin: Russia’s Obsession With Crimea Is Centuries-Old.” Time. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://time.com/29651/putin-crimea-russia-annexation/
36. Tharoor, I. (2014, December 4). “Why Putin says Crimea is Russia’s ‘Temple Mount’.” The Washington Post. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/04/why-putin-says-crimea-is-russias-temple-mount/
37. Hermanowicz, J. C., and Morgan, H. P. (1999). “Ritualizing the Routine: Collective Identity Affirmation.” Sociological Forum, 14(2), 197–214.
38. See Madsen, D., and Snow, P. G. (1991). The Charismatic Bond: Political Behavior in Time of Crisis. Harvard University Press. Chapter 1.
5. PUTIN’S GREENGROCERS
1. Havel Václav. (2018). “The Power of the Powerless.” East European Politics and Societies, 32(2), 353–408.
2. Mandler, P. (2013). Return from the Natives: How Margaret Mead Won the Second World War and Lost the Cold War. Yale University Press. xii.
3. Ibid. 45–46; Mead, M., and Métraux, R. (eds). (2000). The Study of Culture at a Distance (Vol. 1). Berghahn Books.
4. Mead, M., Gorer, G., and Rickman, J. (2001). Russian Culture (Vol. 3). Berghahn Books. 138.
5. Mandler. (2013). Return from the Natives. Chapter 4.
6. Ibid. 232.
7. Mead, Gorer, and Rickman. (2001). Russian Culture. 144.
8. Ibid. 148.
9. Christal, R. E. (1992). “Author’s Note on ‘Recurrent Personality Factors Based on Trait Ratings’.” Journal of Personality, 60(2), 221–224.
10. The terms used in the original Tupes and Christal were Culture, Dependability, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Emotional Stability, though each of the contemporary terms was included in their description of the traits. See Tupes, E. C., and Christal, R. E. (1961). “‘Recurrent Personality Factors Based on Trait Ratings’, Technical Report ASD-TR-61-97.” Personnel Laboratory, Aeronautical Systems Division (AFSC).
11. Goldberg, L. R. (1981). “Language and Individual Differences: The Search for Universals in Personality Lexicons.” Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 2(1), 141–165.
12. Bouchard, T. J. (1994). “Genes, Environment, and Personality.” Science-AAAS-Weekly Paper Edition, 264(5166), 1700–1701.
13. DeYoung, C. G. (2010). “Personality Neuroscience and the Biology of Traits.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(12), 1165–1180.
14. Friedman, H. S., Tucker, J. S., Tomlinson-Keasey, C., Schwartz, J. E., Wingard, D. L., and Criqui, M. H. (1993). “Does Childhood Personality Predict Longevity?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(1), 176–185. Cited in Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., and Goldberg, L. R. (2007). “The Power of Personality: The Comparative Validity of Personality Traits, Socioeconomic Status, and Cognitive Ability for Predicting Important Life Outcomes.” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2(4), 313–345.
15. Weiss, A., and Costa Jr, P. T. (2005). “Domain and Facet Personality Predictors of All-cause Mortality Among Medicare Patients Aged 65 to 100.” Psychosomatic Medicine, 67(5), 724–733. Cited in Roberts et al. (2007). “The Power of Personality.”
16. Bogg, T., and Roberts, B. W. (2004). “Conscientiousness and Health-related Behaviors: A Meta-analysis of the Leading Behavioral Contributors to Mortality.” Psychological Bulletin, 130(6), 887; Hampson, S. E., Andrews, J. A., Barckley, M., Lichtenstein, E., and Lee, M. E. (2000). “Conscientiousness, Perceived Risk, and Risk-reduction Behaviors: A Preliminary Study.” Health Psychology, 19(5), 496. Cited in Ozer, D. J., and Benet-Martinez, V. (2006). “Personality and the Prediction of Consequential Outcomes.” Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 401–421.
17. Caspi, A., Roberts, B. W., Pervin, L. A., and John, O. P. (1990). “Personality Continuity and Change Across the Life Course.” In Pervin, L. A. (1990). Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research. Vol. 2. Guilford Publications. 300–326; McCrae, R. R., and Costa, P. T. (1984). Emerging Lives, Enduring Dispositions: Personality in Adulthood. Little, Brown and Company; Roberts, B. W., and Mroczek, D. (2008). “Personality Trait Change in Adulthood.” Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17(1), 31–35.
18. Danner, D. D., Snowdon, D. A., and Friesen, W. V. (2001). “Positive Emotions in Early Life and Longevity: Findings from the Nun Study.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80(5), 804. Cited in Roberts et al. (2007). “The Power of Personality.”
19. Roberts et al. (2007). “The Power of Personality.” 322.
20. Scollon, C. N., and Diener, E. (2006). “Love, Work, and Changes in Extraversion and Neuroticism Over Time.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(6), 1152–1165.
21. Roberts et al. (2007). “The Power of Personality.”
22. Robins, R. W., Caspi, A., and Moffitt, T. E. (2002). “It’s Not Just Who You’re With, It’s Who You Are: Personality and Relationship Experiences Across Multiple Relationships.” Journal of Personality, 70(6), 925–964. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.05028. Cited in Roberts et al. (2007). “The Power of Personality.”
23. Ozer and Benet-Martinez. (2006). “Personality and the Prediction of Consequential Outcomes.”
24. For a seminal article on the importance of framing see Druckman, J. N. (2004). “Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects.” American Political Science Review, 98(4), 671–686. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404041413
25. See Iyengar, S., and Hahn, K. S. (2009). “Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use.” Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.x and Hopkins, D. J., and Ladd, J. M. (2014). “The Consequences of Broader Media Choice: Evidence from the Expansion of Fox News.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 9(1), 115–135. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00012099
26. For more technical details of the survey and how we measured personality traits and other items see Greene, S., and Robertson, G. (2017). “Agreeable Authoritarians: Personality and Politics in Contemporary Russia.” Comparative Political Studies, 50(13), 1802–1834. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016688005
27. https://www.levada.ru/
28. 31 percent of educated urbanites thought that minority protections were important for society, while 38 percent said minority protections didn’t matter.
29. While 42 percent of our survey takers supported the legislation, fully 51 percent opposed it.
30. Only 10 percent said their Russian nationality was not that important to them, and 46 percent said it was a very important part of their identity. Being a citizen of the Russian state was very important to the self-conception of 40 percent, and was not that important only to 10 percent.
31. Attitudes to other foreign countries were much more moderate. Only 7 percent considered China to be an enemy of Russia (though 35 percent thought it a rival); a mere 4 percent thought Germany an enemy and only 16 percent considered it a rival.
32. Since we were running an online survey and people taking online surveys—as we all know—have short attention spans, we measured personality traits using an extremely short list of ten questions. The personality test we used is called the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) and was pioneered by Gosling, Rentfrow and Swan. See Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., and Swann, W. B. (2003). “A Very Brief Measure of the Big-Five Personality Domains.” Journal of Research in Personality, 37(6), 504–528. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1. Though it is short, research suggests that the TIPI performs as well as longer, more sophisticated instruments and it has been extensively used in political science applications where a host of other issues in addition to personality data are examined. To the extent that using such a short personality inventory is a problem from a scientific perspective, it ought to underestimate the size of the personality effects. See Carney, D. R., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., and Potter, J. (2008). “The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind.” Political Psychology, 29(6), 807–840. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00668.x and Credé, M., Harms, P., Niehorster, S., and Gaye-Valentine, A. (2012). “An Evaluation of the Consequences of Using Short Measures of the Big Five Personality Traits.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(4), 874–888. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027403. The questions are set up so that agreeing to the description means opposite things in each case, reducing errors in the case of people who just like to agree or disagree with everything.
33. Here we define a high score as being one standard deviation above the mean and a low score as being one standard deviation below the mean.
34. Ormel, J., Riese, H., and Rosmalen, J. G. M. (2012). “Interpreting Neuroticism Scores Across the Adult Life Course: Immutable or Experience-Dependent Set Points of Negative Affect?” Clinical Psychology Review, 32(1), 71–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2011.10.004
35. For more details on the peripheral nature of agreeableness to politics in the existing research see Greene and Robertson. (2017). “Agreeable Authoritarians.”
36. Meduza. (2018, March 15). “Ideal’naya Rossiya glazami chitateley ‘Meduzy’. V odnoy kartinke.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://meduza.io/short/2018/03/15/idealnaya-rossiya-glazami-chitateley-meduzy-v-odnoy-kartinke
37. For more details see Hale, H. E. (2005). Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State. Cambridge University Press; Hanson, S. E. (2010). Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia. Cambridge University Press; and Gel’man, V. (2015). Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes. University of Pittsburgh Press.
38. Dubin B. V. (2011). Rossiya nulevykh: politicheskaya kul’tura — istoricheskaya pamyat’ — povsednevnaya zhizn’. Rosspen. Retrieved from http://ru.b-ok.org/book/2381358/10d9b2
39. Mickiewicz, E. P. (2014). No Illusions: The Voices of Russia’s Future Leaders. Oxford University Press. 88–89.
40. Mondak, J. J. (2010). Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior. Cambridge University Press. 58.
41. Kieras, J. E., Tobin, R. M., Graziano, W. G., and Rothbart, M. K. (2005). “You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Effortful Control and Children’s Responses to Undesirable Gifts.” Psychological Science, 16(5), 391–396. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01546.x
42. Graziano, W. G., Bruce, J., Sheese, B. E., and Tobin, R. M. (2007). “Attraction, Personality, and Prejudice: Liking None of the People Most of the Time.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(4), 565–582. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.4.565
6. RUSSIA AT WAR
1. Novaya Gazeta. (2014, March 15). “V Moskve zavershilsya ‘Marsh mira’ (KhRONIKA).” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2014/03/15/97994-v-moskve-zavershilsya-171-marsh-mira-187-hronika
2. Rustamova, F., and Volkova, D. (2014, September 11). “Meriya Moskvy soglasovala oppozitsionnyy ‘Marsh mira’.” RBK. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://top.rbc.ru/politics/11/09/2014/948321.shtml
3. Rustamova, F. (2014, September 11). “‘Marsh mira’ v Moskve proydet pod lozungami v podderzhku Ukrainy.” RBK. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://top.rbc.ru/politics/11/09/2014/948493.shtml
4. Kataev, D. (2014, September 20). “Boris Nemtsov o predstoyashchem ‘Marshe mira’: soglasovali bystro – meriya otlichno znaet, chto eto pervaya aktsiya za mnogo-mnogo mesyatsev.” TV Rain. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/here_and_now/boris_nemtsov_o_predstojaschem_marshe_mira_soglasovali_bystro_merija_otlichno_znaet_chto_eto_pervaja_aktsija_za_mnogo_mnogo_mesjatsev-375588/
5. BBC News. (2014, September 21). “Desyatki tysyach lyudey proshli po Moskve ‘Marshem mira’.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/09/140921_moscow_peace_demo.shtml
6. Kanashevich, S., and Rustamova, F. (2014, September 21). “V Moskve proydet ‘Marsh mira’ protiv voyny na Ukraine.” RBK. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://top.rbc.ru/politics/21/09/2014/950310.shtml
7. Nemtsov, B., Larina, K., and Dymarskiy, V. (2015, February 27). “Vesennee vozrozhdenie: vernetsya li oppozitsiya v politicheskoe pole?” Ekho Moskvy. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://echo.msk.ru/programs/year2015/1500184-echo/
8. The New Times. (2015, March 1). “Boris Nemtsov.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/95244
9. http://vesna.today/
10. Among the highlights have been: a July 2012 law authorizing Roskomnadzor to censor internet sites; a July 2012 law requiring NGOs engaging in “political activity” and receiving foreign funding to declare themselves publicly as “foreign agents”; June 2013 laws criminalizing “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” and “offending the feelings of religious believers”; a June 2014 law requiring all Russians holding dual citizenship or foreign residence permits to register; and a May 2015 law mandating a list of “undesirable organizations,” work on behalf of whom in Russia would be a criminal offense.
11. Greene, S. A. (2014). “Beyond Bolotnaia: Bridging Old and New in Russia’s Election Protest Movement.” Problems of Post-Communism, 60(2), 40–52. https://doi.org/10.2753/PPC1075-8216600204
12. Some of the older, “legacy” organizations included:
• Golos, whose name translates to “Voice” or “Vote,” Russia’s largest and oldest election-monitoring organization;
• Memorial, one of Russia’s oldest and largest human-rights organizations, with a particular focus on chronicling Soviet-era political repressions and human-rights violations;
• Imprisoned Rus, a movement created by journalist Olga Romanova and other volunteers to defend the rights of wrongly accused and imprisoned citizens, including Romanova’s own husband, Alexei Kozlov;
• Parnas, the People’s Freedom Party, chaired (until his death) by Nemtsov, alongside former prime minister Mikhail Kasianov, Vladimir Milov and Vladimir Ryzhkov.
Among the newer groups were:
• We were on Bolotnaya and will come again, a group modeled after the Zucotti Park movement that launched Occupy Wall Street, the largest online movement organization created during the 2011–12 protest wave;
• The League of Voters, one of two Bolotnaya-era organizations created to focus specifically on the (then) upcoming March 2012 presidential elections;
• White Ribbon of Protest, a broad online movement, whose name refers to the white ribbons that came to symbolize the Bolotnaya-era movement;
• Citizen Observer, the second of the two organizations created to focus on the March 2012 presidential elections, with a particular emphasis on mobilizing and coordinating independent election observation volunteers.
13. Activity fell from some 1,100 interactions per day in March 2012 (the month of Putin’s re-re-election) to fewer than 100 in December 2013.
14. Activity in the opposition network spiked to more than 5,300 interactions a day in early March 2014, frequently peaking above 600 interactions a day through the summer, and remaining above 200 through September, before declining again as time wore on—again, showing the “abeyance” pattern we would expect from a protest movement.
15. The number of individual users in our network grew from about 20,000 to more than 35,000 over the course of March 2014, and climbed to nearly 45,000 by the summer of 2015.
16. Participation grew still further into the fall, and some 8,200 individuals were active in the network during the September 21, 2014, Peace March, which brought 50,000 people out onto the streets of Moscow and around half as many in St. Petersburg.
17. In our (admittedly limited) dataset, 98.8 percent of those recruited in July 2014 were new, and 75.7 percent of those active in September of that year were also brand new to the broader movement.
18. Mineeva, Y. (2015, August 18). “Na severe Moskvy zhiteli blokirovali vyrubku Parka Druzhby.” Novaya Gazeta. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/08/18/114353-na-severe-moskvy-zhiteli-blokirovali-vyrubku-parka-druzhby
19. For details on the evolution of the movement, as well as current updates, see the protesters’ two Facebook pages: https://www.facebook.com/groups/OboronaLevobereg and https://www.facebook.com/parkdrug
20. Mishina, V. (2016, May 19). “Po ‘Druzhbe’ so sluzhby.” Kommersant, 4. Retrieved 28 October, 2018, from http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2990190
21. https://www.facebook.com/ZAPARK1/
22. https://www.facebook.com/events/1685759934987983/
23. Antonova, E., Galaktionova, A., and Makutina, M. (2015, November 19). “Bunt dal’noboyshchikov: vtoruyu volnu protesta podderzhali v 24 regionakh.” RBK. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://www.rbc.ru/politics/19/11/2015/564dd7a09a79471bb0b58dcd
24. Azar, I. (2015, February 21). “Rasserzhennye patrioty: ‘Antimaydan’ proshel marshem po Moskve.” Meduza. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://meduza.io/feature/2015/02/21/rasserzhennye-patrioty
25. Greene. (2014). “Beyond Bolotnaia.”
26. Meleshenko, A. (2017, May 15). “Bolee 35 tysyach moskvichey prinyali uchastie v mitingakh v podderzhku renovatsii.” Rossiiskaya Gazeta. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://rg.ru/2017/05/15/reg-cfo/bolee-35-tysiach-moskvichej-priniali-uchastie-v-mitingah-v-podderzhku-renovacii.html
27. Mos.ru. (2017, June 17). “Podvedeny itogi golosovaniya po proektu renovatsii v ‘Aktivnom grazhdanine’ i tsentrakh gosuslug.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://www.mos.ru/news/item/25633073/
28. Naval’nyy, A. (2016a). “Mer i ego taynye kvartiry v Mayami.” Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8GvCG0t7Fo
29. Chayka. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://chaika.navalny.com/
30. Naval’nyy, A. (2016b). “Sobaki vitse-prem’era Shuvalova letayut na chastnom samolete.” Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tx8ZqZtjyT4
31. Dimon.navalny. “On vam ne Dimon. Taynaya imperiya Dmitriya Medvedeva.” (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://dimon.navalny.com/#intro
32. Reilhac, G., Soldatkin, V., and Solovyov, D. (2017, October 17). “Russian Opposition Leader’s Fraud Conviction Arbitrary, Europe’s Top Rights Court Says.” Reuters. Retrieved from https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-navalny-echr/russian-opposition-leaders-fraud-conviction-arbitrary-europes-top-rights-court-says-idUKKBN1CM1EY
33. https://2018.navalny.com/news/
34. Meduza. (2017, March 26). “Mitingi v rossiyskikh regionakh. Video: Aktsii protesta proshli v desyatkakh gorodov po vsey strane.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://meduza.io/feature/2017/03/26/mitingi-v-rossiyskih-regionah-video
35. Meduza. (2017, March 26). “V Moskve zaderzhany bolee 900 chelovek.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://meduza.io/news/2017/03/26/v-moskve-zaderzhany-bolee-500-chelovek; Lyaskin, N. (2017, March 26). “Glava moskovskogo otdeleniya Partii progressa popal v bol’nitsu posle zaderzhaniya.” Meduza. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://meduza.io/news/2017/03/26/glava-moskovskogo-otdeleniya-partii-progressa-popal-v-bolnitsu-posle-zaderzhaniya
36. OVDinfo. Delo 26 marta. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://ovdinfo.org/story/delo-26-marta
37. cf Robertson, G. B. (2011). The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia. Cambridge University Press.
38. In 2017, the network was averaging 62,529 communicative interactions (i.e., posts and comments, but not likes, of which there were many times the number) per month, compared to 4,255 interactions per month in 2012–15.
39. At least 9 percent of its online participants had been in Bolotnaya-era groups like the League of Voters or Citizen Observer in 2012–15, 5.7 percent had been in the anti-war movement, and another 2.6 percent had been connected with Team Navalny during that time. Given the nature of the data and the fact that it will not capture all participants, these numbers probably actually underestimate the degree of overlap.
40. Navalny’s network recruited only 18.9 percent of its participants from earlier protest waves (in proportions similar to those for the anti-demolition movement).
41. Some 10.7 percent of anti-demolition members were active in the Navalny network, and some 3.5 percent of Navalny activists were also present in the anti-demolition groups.
42. Some 38 percent of those who engaged with Khodorkovsky’s #Nadoel rallies in April on Twitter had previously engaged with Navalny’s “Dimon” protest in March, as did 11 percent of the anti-demolition protesters and 21 percent of the Russia Day protesters in June. Whether those who engaged on Twitter actually came out into the street is another question, which we cannot answer.
43. The measure in question is what network analysts call “weighted degree.”
44. The measure in question is what network analysts call “average path length.”
45. These are what network analysts call the “clustering coefficient,” or the gravity that each individual exerts on those around them, as well as a “triadic census” characterizing the links between all individuals, and the relative size of the largest “component” of the network.
46. On Facebook the Navalny and anti-demolition communities “clustered” around the same vocabularies with an 87 percent and 86 percent probability, respectively. We found similar results for the truckers’ protests.
47. Meduza. (2017, April 28). “Vokrug shum: Naval’nogo prodolzhayut oblivat’ zelenkoy.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://meduza.io/shapito/2017/04/28/vokrug-shum-navalnogo-prodolzhayut-oblivat-zelenkoy
48. Meduza. (2017, March 18). “‘To est’ patriotov v vashem klasse net?’: Direktor shkoly iz Bryanskoy oblasti beseduet s uchenikami o Naval’nom, Putine i geopolitike. Rasshifrovka.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://meduza.io/feature/2017/03/18/to-est-patriotov-v-vashem-klasse-net
49. Meduza. (2015, February 21). “Politsiya otsenila chislennost’ aktsii ‘Antimaydana’ v 35 tysyach chelovek.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://meduza.io/news/2015/02/21/politsiya-otsenila-chislennost-aktsii-antimaydana-v-35-tysyach-chelovek
50. Varlamov, I. (2015, February 21). “Antimaydan v Moskve.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://varlamov.ru/1281822.html
51. Lenta.ru. (2015, August 14). “Enteo s pravoslavnymi aktivistami razgromili vystavku v ‘Manezhe’.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://lenta.ru/news/2015/08/14/enteomanege/
52. Interfax. “‘Antimaydan’ sobralsya prepyatstvovat’ provedeniyu v Moskve aktsii Naval’nogo.” (2017, March 22). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://www.interfax.ru/moscow/554749; Berg, E. (2017, May 2). “Aktivisty dvizheniya SERB — predpolagaemye napadavshie na Alekseya Naval’nogo. Kto oni takie?” Meduza. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://meduza.io/feature/2017/05/02/aktivisty-dvizheniya-serb-predpolagaemye-napadavshie-na-alekseya-navalnogo-kto-oni-takie
53. RIA Novosti. “Bozh’ya volya” raskololas’ iz-za druzhby Enteo s uchastnitsey Pussy Riot.” (2017, October 3). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://ria.ru/religion/20171003/1506117881.html; Abrikosovo, T. (2017, October 3). “V ‘Bozh’ey vole’ zayavili, chto Enteo izgnan za svyatotatstvo.” Life.ru. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://life.ru/t/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8/1048791/v_bozhiei_volie_zaiavili_chto_entieo_izghnan_za_sviatotatstvo
54. VK.com. Wall posts. (2017, June 9). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://vk.com/wall-55284725_470527
55. Naval’nyy, A. (2017, June 11). “Mitingi 12 iyunya: ob”yasnyayu na utochkakh.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://navalny.com/p/5425/
7. RUSSIA’S PUTIN
1. Gereykhanova, A. (2017, January 9). “Pered Oktyabr’skoy revolyutsiey Nikolay II nabiraet podpischikov.” URA. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://ura.news/articles/1036269937
2. Anderson, J. (2006). “The Chekist Takeover of the Russian State.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19(2), 237–288. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600500483699; The Economist. (2007, August 23). “The Making of a Neo-KGB State.” Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/briefing/2007/08/23/the-making-of-a-neo-kgb-state; Bandow, D. (2014, December 26). “Lubyanka Runs the New Russia, Much Like the Old Soviet Union.” The Huffington Post. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/lubyanka-runs-the-new-rus_b_6383554.html
3. Gerber, T. P. (2014). “Beyond Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Public Opinion.” The Washington Quarterly, 37(3), 113–134. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.978439
4. Ostrovsky, A. (2016). The Invention of Russia: The Rise of Putin and the Age of Fake News. Penguin; Gehlbach, S., and Sonin, K. (2014). “Government Control of the Media.” Journal of Public Economics, 118, 163–171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.004
5. Gudkov, L. (2018, April 27). “Lev Gudkov, ‘Levada-tsentr’: ‘Propaganda chrezvychayno effektivna’.” RTVi. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://rtvi.com/broadcast/lev-gudkov-levada-tsentr-propaganda-chrezvychayno-effektivna-/
6. Shteyngart, G. (2015, February 18). “Out of My Mouth Comes Unimpeachable Manly Truth.” The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/magazine/out-of-my-mouth-comes-unimpeachable-manly-truth.html
7. Authors’ email correspondence with Gary Shteyngart, 15 October 2018.
8. There is interesting research on media consumption in the United States that shows precisely this effect. For a survey see Prior, M. (2013). “Media and Political Polarization.” Annual Review of Political Science, 16(1), 101–127. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135242
9. Robertson, G. (2017). “Political Orientation, Information and Perceptions of Election Fraud: Evidence from Russia.” British Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 589–608. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000356
10. Geddes, B., and Zaller, J. (1989). “Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science, 33(2), 319–347. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111150
11. Robertson. (2017). “Political Orientation, Information and Perceptions of Election Fraud.”
12. Parents can choose to have their children take Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism or Buddhism, or “Fundamentals of Religious Culture and Secular Ethics.”
13. Greene, S., and Robertson, G. (2017). “Agreeable Authoritarians: Personality and Politics in Contemporary Russia.” Comparative Political Studies, 50(13), 1802–1834. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016688005
14. Arendt, H. (1973). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 353. Cited in Canovan, M. (1994). Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought. Cambridge University Press. 55.
15. In the interview cited above, Gudkov estimates this group to constitute a mere 3 or 4 percent of the population.
16. https://meduza.io/; https://republic.ru/
17. Naval’nyy, A. (n.d.). “On vam ne Dimon.” Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g&t=909s
18. See by contrast, The New Yorker. (2018). “David Remnick Interviews Masha Gessen about Putin, Russia, and Trump.” Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3J98qByki7o
19. Radio Svoboda. (2018, June 5). “Opros FOM: povyshenie pensionnogo vozrasta odobryayut 9% rossiyan.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://www.svoboda.org/a/29272009.html
20. Levada.ru. (2018, September 27). “Chislo zhelayushchikh protestovat’ protiv pensionnoy reformy rezko snizilos’.” Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://www.levada.ru/2018/09/27/chislo-zhelayushhih-protestovat-protiv-pensionnoj-reformy-rezko-snizilos/
21. Kuran, T. (1991). “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.” World Politics, 44(1), 7–48. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010422
22. Beissinger, M. R. (2002). Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge University Press.
23. Yurchak, A. (2013). Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation. Princeton University Press.