Operations
1943
January 1943 – 8 Group is born, new TIs, ground markers & H2S operational
The year began much as it had ended, with a continuous stream of Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes leading increasingly larger formations of Lancasters. Essen was attacked seven more times during the month. The largest and last Oboe trial on 13/14 January involved 66 Lancasters and three Mosquitoes. The results were mixed during all the trials flown but it was clear that Oboe was here to stay for the remainder of the war. One interesting tactic of the German night-fighters on 13/14 January was the use of decoy flares to try and distract the bombers away from the sky-marking. It did not work on this occasion but it did show that the enemy was quite aware of the tactics being employed by Bomber Command.
The first big raid of the year did not take place until 14/15 January and, compared to operations over Germany, this was a ‘milk-run’ for the PFF. The target was the U-boat base at Lorient on the French coast. A total of 122 aircraft took part, including nine Wellingtons and six Halifaxes from 6 (RCAF) Group on their first bombing operation. The following night, another 157 aircraft approached Lorient to find it covered in 3-5/10th drifting cloud but, showing great discipline, the force did not attack until a decent break opened up. The bombing was much more accurate on this occasion with at least 800 buildings destroyed. The majority of the population had wisely already evacuated after the previous night’s attack resulting in just twelve civilians killed.
Berlin, on 16/17 January, was the first time that the PFF led a raid on this unpopular but important target. The German capital had not been attacked for fourteen months and expectations were high. The 201 Lancasters and Halifaxes involved in this raid made it the first all four-engined operation of the war. The raid did not start well and thick cloud almost all the way did not help navigation. The cloud cleared on approach to the city but it was still covered in haze. The PFF were using proper red TIs for the first time but were still unable to effectively mark the target. Beyond the range of Gee, navigation would eventually be improved when the range of Oboe could be extended. The following night, another 187 aircraft set out for Berlin in improved weather conditions but the PFF were once again unable to mark the centre of the city. It was a surprising tactic by Bomber Command to fly to the same target on consecutive nights and even more surprising that they would fly the same route. As a result, the German night-fighters were waiting and nineteen Lancasters and three Halifaxes were lost, equating to 11.8% of the force. No further attacks on Berlin would take place using target indicators until H2S became available.
A pair of Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes showed how aircraft fitted with the latest modern aids could inflict almost as much damage as a larger force. On 22/23 January, the Mosquitoes set out for Cologne to carry out the first Oboe attack on the city. These two machines managed to damage 55 houses, kill five people and injure another 22. While these are still small numbers, only two years previously, a force ten times the size was lucky to find Cologne let alone plant bombs accurately in the middle of it.
The PFF, up until now, was controlled via 3 Group because it was not a group in its own right. But, on 25 January, (backdated to 13 January), the status of the PFF was raised, to the independent 8 Group. This meant an increase in staff and all orders were received direct from Bomber Command rather than from 3 Group. Bennett was promoted to Air Commodore but the Air Staff still wanted to place an AVM above him. Harris stuck to his promise of keeping Bennett in charge, much to the annoyance of the Air Staff, who wanted to keep a tighter rein on him. Bennett’s first task was to rid 156 Squadron of its Wellingtons in favour of the Lancaster. A maintenance depot was then set up at Wyton, specifically for 8 Group’s Lancasters. A similar one was set up for the Mosquito at Upwood later in the war.
Düsseldorf, on 27/28 January, was another ground-breaking raid for 8 Group. It was 109 Squadron’s first chance to shine in front of a decent-sized force of 162 aircraft rather than the smaller experimental raids. It was also the first time that the Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes carried out ground-marking. These markers were now standard TIs which were designed to burst and cascade just a few feet above the ground rather than the less accurate parachuted sky-markers. On arrival over the target, three of the five Mosquitoes involved dropped red TIs, backed up by thirteen Lancasters, eleven of which dropped green TIs. Despite the target being covered by a thin 10/10th layer of low stratus cloud, the 157 bombers of the main force could still see the TIs glowing bright, and all bombed on them. All of those who bombed this night said they would not have attacked without the help of 8 Group.
Another milestone during this month was the first H2S attack of the war. It was 8 Group’s Stirlings and Halifaxes that were fitted with the device on a raid to Hamburg on 30/31 January. The force of 148 aircraft was also treated to some colourful and accurate marking en route and on the target. Red flares were dropped as route markers and, approximately 16 miles from the target, these changed to green. The H2S equipped aircraft ground-marked the centre of Hamburg with red TIs backed up by greens. A second wave of marking dropped further TIs which were red with green stars as a precaution in case the target was cloud covered. Despite the new equipment, the bombing by 130 aircraft was scattered and post-attack reconnaissance found very little new damage. It is thought that, despite 315 tons of bombs being dropped, the vast majority of them fell in the river Elbe and surrounding marshes. H2S would become more effective in the future.
It had been a remarkable month for the new 8 Group. It was maturing fast, gaining new aircraft and new techniques which it was rapidly honing. Receiving group status had also given the Pathfinders a new respect and, with its newly-promoted leader, it could only go from strength to strength.
February 1943 – Blind-bombing success and FIDO (Fog Investigation Dispersal Operation)
A busy month lay ahead for 8 Group as unseasonal good weather dominated February. It was, however, a cloudy night on 2/3 February when 161 aircraft set course for Cologne, led by a pair of Oboe Mosquitoes and 7 Squadron’s H2S-equipped Stirlings. Because of the cloud, markers were dropped by all of 8 Group’s aircraft but, like Hamburg before it, the results were not as expected. The city was certainly hit by a number of bombs but these were scattered and no significant industrial targets were hit. Five bombers failed to return. Most significant was 7 Squadron Stirling I R9264 being flown by Sqn Ldr W. A. Smith DFC MID. The bomber was shot down by a night-fighter of I.NJG/1 and crashed at Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht in Holland, killing Smith and four other aircrew; only the mid-upper and rear-gunners managed to escape the stricken aircraft. Despite being damaged, the Germans had gained themselves a good example of an H2S set. Quickly repaired by the German company Telefunken, it was tested, giving the enemy the information they needed to develop a system later known as ‘Naxos’ which, fitted in a nightfighter, could home in on any aircraft carrying H2S. This was quite a blow for Bomber Command which had waited so long for it to enter service, only for it to fall into enemy hands after just two operational sorties.
A larger force of 263 aircraft returned to Hamburg on 3/4 February but severe icing conditions outbound over the North Sea caused many to return home early. Once again, despite having the assistance of H2S, the PFF were unable to deliver accurate concentrated marking. Bombing was scattered again and the German night-fighters made it a miserable night for Bomber Command. Sixteen bombers were shot down. The PFF were lucky; only 35 Squadron Halifax II W7923 was written off after it crash landed at Graveley because of flak damage. There were several close calls with night-fighters, including one involving 156 Squadron Lancaster flown by Plt Off V. S. Moore. Whilst flying straight and level so his navigator could take an astro-fix and his wireless operator a loop bearing, the Lancaster was suddenly attacked from below. The aircraft was raked from nose to tail, wounding the bomb aimer in the foot but, luckily, no one else and the bomber seemed to keep on flying. The aircraft was still carrying its load of TIs and, as the Lancaster twisted and turned, the load was jettisoned. As the flares burned brightly, the night-fighter broke off its attack, probably thinking the Lancaster was on fire, leaving it to limp home back to Warboys. The starboard inner engine had been knocked out in the attack and, after extinguishing a fire, the bomber settled down for the flight home. Moore carried a good landing and the crew survived to fight another day.
The now deserted Lorient was revisited on 7/8 February by 323 bombers. The PFF plan worked perfectly, with illuminators being accurately dropped which enabled the visual markers to identify the aiming point and ground mark it. A poor decoy fire on the edge of the town did not detract the main force from delivering a devastating two wave attack on Lorient. A larger force of 466 aircraft returned to Lorient on 13/14 February, dropping over 1,000 tons of bombs on the already ruined town. While further damage was caused, it was not as accurate as the previous raid and, unlike the first, the PFF lost another Halifax from 35 Squadron. Lorient was attacked for a third time on 16/17 February. The U-boat pens still defiantly stood intact and operational while the rest of the town suffered another 377-strong bomber raid. Over the past three raids, 1,675 aircraft claimed to have bombed the target, dropping nearly 4,000 tons of bombs. It was clear that the pens could not be destroyed from the air but the surrounding communication lines were constantly attacked so as to disrupt supplies reaching the U-boats. Lorient was never captured from the Germans and it did not surrender until the very end of the Second World War despite being surrounded by an American garrison for months. Today, the pens still stand, without a single bomb scar to show for Bomber Command’s efforts.
The H2S blind-bombing device was having difficulty proving itself until the raid on Wilhelmshaven on 11/12 February. The PFF aircraft leading the operation were more prepared than at any other time to deal with whatever weather conditions faced them this night. A complicated brief for the PFF crews included the following: If the cloud over the target is less than 5/10th then the H2S will drop flares and try and identify the target visually (Newhaven); if 5/8ths cloud-cover then the PFF are to ground mark blindly using H2S (Parramatta); and finally, if faced with 8/10th or more, the PFF are to drop skymarkers (Wanganui) the least reliable of the three. The force of 177 aircraft set course for the north German port only to find the target completely covered in cloud. The PFF set to work dropping sky-markers, keeping the A/P marked for over fifteen minutes. Once again, this was performed with great accuracy and the town was hit very hard. One devastating explosion witnessed by the whole force was the naval ammunition dump at Mariensiel blowing up on the western side of the town. The glow from the explosion kept the sky lit for nearly ten minutes and was visible 60 miles away. This was a great success, not just for the PFF but it also represented the first blind-bombing success by the H2S radar.
Handley Page Halifax II Srs IA, HR928 TL–L of 35 Squadron with Sqn Ldr A. P. Cranswick at the controls. (via Author)
Wg Cdr T. G. ‘Hamish’ Mahaddie with ‘erks’ (ground crew) of ‘A’ Flight, 7 Squadron at Oakington. Later promoted to Group Captain, ‘Hamish’ joined the staff of PFF HQ and quickly became ‘a horse thief for the Pathfinders’, becoming particularly adept at finding the right kind of men and crews for 8 Group. (via Author)
The Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes of 109 Squadron were beginning to make their presence felt on 15/16 February. Six of them attacked the Krupps factory in Essen, Rheinhausen and the night-fighter airfield at St Trond. These small insurgency-type raids would continue to grow throughout the war and spread themselves over an increasingly diverse array of targets.
Back in November 1942, Bennett had eagerly agreed that a new fog-dispersal device should be tested at one of his airfields. Graveley was chosen to be the first operational airfield to test FIDO on 18 February. The system relied on steel pipes which ran either side of the runway. When fuel was pumped through these and ignited at intervals by burners, the fog would lift. In fact, Bennett flew the first aircraft, possibly an Oxford, landing with a cross wind between the lit burners. The device would go on to save many air crew who would otherwise have had to divert into a strange airfield or even bail out because of lack of fuel.
The next three major raids on German targets, with the exception of a failed attack on Bremen on 21/22 February, were against Wilhelmshaven. None of the three attacks were as successful as the one earlier in the month and, when things went wrong, all fingers were pointed at the Pathfinders. The first, on 18/19 February involved 195 bombers, 35 of them from the PFF. It was a clear night and the force was able to map read its way from the Frisian Islands the last 60 miles to the target. The PFF claimed good marking but despite the vast majority of the main force bombing on them, very little damage was caused. The following night, the same operation was repeated with 338 aircraft but once again, despite the PFF claiming accurate marking, almost all of the bombing fell to the north. After this raid, the most basic error appears to have been made. Unbeknown to 8 Group, they had been issued with out-of-date pre-war maps which did not show any of the recent town developments. The third raid took place on 24/25 February, but the 115 aircraft of 6 and 8 Groups appeared to have made little impact on Wilhelmshaven. Local reports described a ‘small raid’ with very little damage, the only consolation for Bomber Command was that all returned home safely. Wilhelmshaven was not attacked again until October 1944.
All five PFF squadrons took part in a raid on St Nazaire on the night of 28 February/1 March. St Nazaire, like Lorient, was a major U-boat base from which Allied shipping was being sunk at an alarming rate. Mosquitoes from 109 Squadron led the way, two of the four aircraft involved dropped greens on the A/P and this was backed up by the heavies dropping more flares. The A/P was continually marked for a record-breaking 34 minutes. The raid was a total success with widespread destruction tearing across the town. One airman described the carnage as a ‘bubbling mass of red fire’. Local reports state that over 60% of the town was destroyed but fortunately only 29 people were killed, apparently, the population was warned subversively that the raid was coming. Like Lorient, the main objective was the U-boat pens which stood up to the onslaught and continued to operate until late 1944. It, too, remained in German hands until the end of the war.
Both attacks on the U-boat pens were seen by Harris as a complete waste of Bomber Command resources. He was, of course, right and even without the benefit of hindsight it must have been clear to those involved in these operations that these were not the kind of targets they should be attacking in early 1943. Even when larger more penetrating weapons became available they were not wasted on U-boat pens. With H2S and Oboe now at his disposal, he quite rightly wanted to concentrate his resources on Germany as the Battle of the Ruhr approached.
March 1943 – The Battle of the Ruhr begins
The month began with a trip to Berlin on 1/2 March and, once again, the PFF led this raid in force. Some 302 aircraft took part, including H2S-equipped Halifaxes and Stirlings, plus sixteen Lancasters from 83 and 156 Squadrons who assisted with the marking. When the force was 100 miles north-west of Berlin, the first of many route-markers were dropped near Bahlenhüsch. These continued until warning flares were dropped 12 miles from the target bringing the main attacking force of 274 aircraft to bear. H2S was still more accurate on a coastal target and the mass of indistinguishable features that made up Berlin did not look clear on the operator’s screens. Despite this, the TIs were dropped near the centre of the city and backed-up but the main weight of the raid fell on the south-western side of the city. The bombing quickly spread to an area of 100 square miles and 22 acres’ worth of workshops and rail repair shops were destroyed in the Templehof area alone. This was a classic example of a heavy Bomber Command raid that was not particularly accurate but still caused a great deal of collateral damage. One ironic incident occurred when the Telefunken works, where the captured H2S set was being repaired, was hit by several bombs. If the captured set was damaged, it was irrelevant because a second set was gifted intact to the enemy when Sqn Ldr P. C. Elliott DFC and crew in their 35 Squadron Halifax II W7877 were shot down by a night-fighter near Goor in Holland. This was the only PFF aircraft lost on this operation.
The first of 47 sorties which would be known as the ‘Battle of the Ruhr’ began on 5 March. All but six of these operations were directed at targets in Germany which would continue until 24 July. This new phase of Bomber Command operation was referred to by Sir Arthur Harris as his ‘main offensive’ and would continue into the spring of 1944. Since taking charge in February 1942, Harris had nurtured and steadily brought his forces up to a strength from where they could consistently dispatch up to 600 bombs per operation. By the end of the Battle of the Ruhr, this had increased to 800 and the average bomb load dropped per night was well over 2,000 tons. Bomber Command also had the added advantage of 8 Group and, in particular, Oboe which could now consistently mark any target in the Ruhr with amazing accuracy, certainly compared to the operations being carried out in 1941 and early 1942.
The first target, chosen by Harris himself, was Essen on 5/6 March. He knew the fledgling 8 Group needed a boost and also had to prove that it was proficient to lead Bomber Command into battle. Up to this date, Essen had not been successfully bombed, but the 442 strong force, including 35 PFF aircraft, were determined to change that. The success of the raid depended on eight Oboe Mosquitoes but three of them had to return with technical problems. In fact, it looked like Essen was going to escape again because a further 53 aircraft, an unimpressive record for Bomber Command, also had to turn back with various mechanical problems. The remainder continued and, on arrival over the target, which was covered in traditional ground haze, the PFF began their plan. With Oboe working effectively in the remaining Mosquitoes, the PFF began a Musical Parramatta dropping red TIs while 22 heavies backed-up with reds. Yellow land markers were also dropped 15 miles from the target so that the main force could attack from a datum point to avoid a collision over the target. The centre of Essen was marked perfectly and the timing of the backers-up was excellent, all performed ‘blind’ thanks to Oboe. The main force followed in three waves, the first was all Halifax, the second Wellingtons and Stirlings and the final wave was all Lancasters. IBs were dropped in the first two waves while the Lancasters poured HE onto the intense fires below. The raid lasted for 40 minutes and 362 aircraft claimed to have bombed the target on the night that Bomber Command flew its 100,000th sortie of the war. The raid was an amazing success and post-attack reports recorded over 160 acres of damage. A total of fourteen aircraft were lost, including two Lancasters from 83 and 156 Squadron and their fourteen aircrew. It was almost fifteen aircraft lost, when another 83 Squadron Lancaster was nearly blown out of the sky as the 4,000 lb ‘cookie’ it had just dropped was hit by flak. The blast from the bomb sent the Lancaster vertically 500 ft, showering the machine with bomb fragments and shrapnel. A small fire was quickly extinguished and the bomb-aimer had the presence of mind to jettison the photo flashes in the bomb bay. On return to Wyton, the souvenir hunters spent the following day removing thousands of pieces of the cookie from the lucky Lancaster, including the bomb’s filler plug from the main plane and the arming pistol from an engine nacelle.
Targets beyond the range of Oboe were still proving difficult to bomb accurately; Nuremburg on 8/9 March was no exception. With no moon to help, the PFF had to rely on H2S and visual navigation to lead the total force of 335 aircraft to the target. Haze over Nuremburg added to the problems and the red TIs were scattered across the city. The backers-up had to select several options to drop their green TIs and the resulting bombing spread itself along a 10-mile route. Over half of the bombs dropped fell outside the city but those that did not caused considerable damage to several important industrial targets. Local reports state that over 600 buildings were destroyed and another 1,400 damaged, including the Siemens-Schukert electrical works and M.A.N. diesel engine factories.
Despite winds that were not properly forecast, the raid on Munich on 9/10 March was the most effective of the war so far. The use of good route-marking, starting as far away as Metz in France (250 miles west of the target) helped to bring the force of 264 aircraft on track for Munich. The final route-marker was once again dropped near the Ammer See and the remaining 23-mile run to target was flown on DR. The lead PFF aircraft marking was planted into the centre of the haze-covered city and the majority of the raid stretched across the western half of it. While little was made of the raid from the crews involved, the ferocity of intercepted German radio reports was interpreted as another success for Bomber Command.
The effectiveness and accuracy of the first three raids of the Battle of the Ruhr are worthy of note. While all three were successful in their own right, the use of Oboe for Essen and H2S plus visual methods for the further Nuremberg and Munich raids shows how human input lessened the accuracy. Add the factor that the Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes, up until now, were relatively unmolested by both flak and fighters while those bombers using H2S were an easy target.
Air Vice Marshal Don Bennett presiding over a meeting at Pathfinder HQ while it was still located at Wyton. Bennett was the RAF’s youngest Air Vice Marshal. (www.ww2images.com)
Bomber Command’s good run came to an end over Stuttgart on 11/12 March. The PFF had skilfully dropped IBs on Baden-Baden en route to act as a beacon so that the main force of 314 aircraft did not stray into the flak over Strasbourg and Karlsruhe. On arrival, the PFF claimed to have marked Stuttgart accurately but the main force lagged behind, giving the Germans their first opportunity of the war to use their own dummy TIs. This must have been successful as most of the bombing fell in open country and only civilian housing was hit. Night-fighters were also prevalent and eleven bombers failed to return, including 83 Squadron’s Lancaster I ED313 which was shot down near Sogny-en-l’Angle. The Lancaster was attacked three times by a fighter, having to drop down to 2,500 ft in an effort to escape. It was at this point that five of the crew managed to bail out, only the mid-upper and rear gunner, who may have already been killed in the fighter attack, did not escape.
A period of rest followed the Stuttgart raid and it was not until 22/23 March that the PFF were in action again. The target was St Nazaire and, despite 3 Group recalling its force of 63 Stirlings, the attack was successful. The remaining 283 aircraft, thanks to accurate PFF marking, delivered the heaviest raid of the war so far on the port. The port was attacked again on the 28/29, led by seven Oboe Mosquitoes. Again, the PFF marking was accurate and the vast majority of the 323 aircraft involved dropped their bombs in the port area.
It is quite possible that this period of relative inactivity was Harris’ method of preparing his forces for a lengthy period of operations. It was Bomber Command policy that no major operations were flown on three consecutive nights but, from 26/27 March, the rules were broken when the first of four attacks began. Duisburg was not a good start because despite being led by nine Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes, five were forced to return early with technical problems. A sixth, Mosquito IV DK318, flown by Flt Lt L. J. Ackland DFC, and his navigator, W/O1 F. S. Strouts DFC RCAF, was last heard from in the North Foreland area, becoming the first operational Oboe Mosquito loss. The remaining Mosquitoes were left to carry out a Musical Wanganui over the city but with so few markers, large gaps were left in the centre without any TIs at all. The result was widely spread bombing so very little damage was confirmed.
The St Nazaire raid made up the third consecutive PFF contributed raid and Berlin, on 29/30 March, became the fourth. Simultaneously, 149 Wellingtons were led by eight Oboe Mosquitoes to Bochum but badly-timed Musical Wanganui and gaps in the marking resulted in a disappointing raid. Only four buildings in Bochum were recorded as hit, all at the expense of twelve Wellingtons shot down, this equated to 8% of the force. The Berlin raid, made up of 329 aircraft, fared no better. Badly forecast winds combined with icing made the long trip to Berlin unnecessarily difficult. The PFF claimed good concentrated marking but it was positioned south of the city and, combined with the main force arriving late, most of the bombing landed in open country. Like Bochum, the losses were higher than average with 21 aircraft failing to return. An 83 Squadron Lancaster and its crew was the only loss for 8 Group.
April 1943 – More squadrons, more airfields
The month began with the formation of a new unit which would hopefully eradicate any further inaccurate weather forecasts. No.1409 (Meteorological) Flight flew its first operational sortie, known as a PAMPA (Photographic Reconnaissance and Meteorological Photography Aircraft) on 2 April and was the only flight made by a Bomber Command aircraft that day. The 1409 Flight was one of two which were formed from 521 Squadron based at Bircham Newton. The new flight was officially formed at Oakington on 1 April as a lodger unit alongside 7 Squadron; the airfield at this stage was still under 3 Group control. The first sortie, a weather reconnaissance flight over Brittany in preparation for another U-boat pen raid, was flown by Flt Lt P. Cunliffe-Lister and his navigator Sgt J. Boyle; the first of 1,364 sorties.
Despite unfavourable weather conditions, accurately forecast thanks to 1409 Flight, the Essen raid of 3/4 April went ahead. The PFF covered the operation by preparing a Parramatta and Wanganui attack but, on arrival over the target, Essen was found to be clear of cloud. The PFF still carried out both marking methods, confusing the main force of 348 aircraft. The bombing was still accurate and widespread, and damage was caused in the centre and western half of the city. Many crews described Essen’s defences as more hostile than usual but this could be due to the fact that no Wellingtons or Stirlings were involved in this raid. These lower flying bombers usually took most of the flak for the Lancasters (over 200 took part in this raid for the first time) and Halifaxes. As a result, twelve Halifaxes were shot down, two of them crashing in England and nine Lancasters also FTR (Failed to Return). It was 83 Squadron that took the brunt of 8 Group’s losses; three more Lancasters were lost, along with 21 aircrew, and 156 Squadron lost Lancaster I W4894 with another seven crew.
The weather dictated success or failure over Kiel on 4/5 April when 577 bombers took part in the largest ‘non-1000’ raid of the war so far. Dense cloud and strong winds left the PFF no choice but to use the Wanganui sky-marking technique, but parachute flares and such conditions do not mix. TIs were also dropped but these could not be seen through the cloud and an effective decoy fire also added to the problem. Resorting to a DR bomb run, very few bombs were reported to have fallen in the town while defending flak managed to knock down several of the twelve aircraft lost, two of them from 156 Squadron.
It was a similar story over Duisburg on 8/9 April when 392 bombers were dispatched. Thick cloud once again disrupted any chance of the PFF marking the target accurately. Even with nine Oboe Mosquitoes at the helm, the bombing was scattered and only 40 buildings were reported as destroyed. Losses were high again as the nicknamed ‘happy valley’ defences poured deadly flak into the sky. Twenty aircraft were lost, including 7 Squadron Stirling I R9199 and 156 Squadron Lancaster I ED622 which crashed near Cologne. The following night, a smaller force of 104 Lancasters led by five Mosquitoes returned to Duisburg. Covered in thick cloud again, nearly all of the main force bombed on the Mosquitoes’ sky-marking with only limited damaged being caused.
The situation did not improve during a raid on Frankfurt on 10/11 April. Solid cloud faced the PFF again and a large number of the main force claimed to have bombed on the glow of their TIs through the cloud. No one on this raid had any idea whether they were bombing on a TI, decoy fire or dummy fire and the raid was a failure. Twenty-one aircraft were lost, including three from 8 Group.
The training of Pathfinder crews and, in particular, the navigators was raised to a new level on 10 April, with the formation of the Pathfinder Force Navigation Training Unit (PFFNTU). Formed under the control of 8 Group, the PFFNTU was established at Gransden Lodge. As its title implies, the task of the unit was to train crews, selected from Main Force squadrons, for pathfinder duties. On 17 June 1943, the unit moved to Upwood, an air party being established at Warboys with effect from 11 June. Establishment at this time was four Stirlings, six Halifaxes and four Lancasters. With the Stirling being withdrawn from front-line operations later in the year, the establishment changed again to nine Lancasters and nine Halifaxes.
On 5 March 1944 the whole of the PFFNTU was moved to Warboys, by which time the Mosquito was introduced. Fourteen Mosquitoes were on establishment by December 1944, plus fourteen Lancasters and fifteen Oxfords. The PFFNTU was disbanded on 18 June 1945.
Harris was becoming restless with the lack of damage being caused in spite of large forces of bombers being dispatched. Bennett called for a change of tactic in an effort to tighten up attacks that were taking place within Oboe range. A modified version of the visual ground-marking technique Newhaven was developed where the PVM worked closely with the H2S-equipped aircraft. The H2S would drop blindly and then these were marked again with contrasting colours by the PVMs. It was over Stuttgart on 14/15 April that the PFF carried out its first official Newhaven attack with 462 aircraft taking part. The PFF claimed to have marked the centre of the city but, in fact, the first TIs landed on the north-north-east side and it was from here that the first bombing developed. With the target clear, the bombing started to ‘creepback’ in a north-easterly direction following the line of the attack. Attempts by the backers-up to re-mark the target either failed or marked further along, aggravating the creepback still further. Useful damage was still inflicted on the districts of the city, but the tendency for the bombing to creepback from the AP was never fully rectified by Bomber Command.
Another stepping stone was reached towards strengthening 8 Group on 15 April. Oakington was finally placed under 8 Group control and 7 Squadron which had been serving there as a lodger unit since 1941 was now part of the station’s strength. Two more airfields, Bourn and Gransden Lodge, were also placed under 8 Group in preparation for two more squadrons. The first, 97 Squadron, flying the Lancaster, was wrenched reluctantly from 5 Group, moving from Woodhall Spa to Bourn on 18 April. The second new 8 Group unit was selected from 6 (RCAF) Group. No. 405 (Vancouver) Squadron who were operating the Halifax moved from Leeming to Gransden Lodge on 19 April. Within days, both squadrons were in action. Bennett hoped that the increase in strength would give the group the ability to mark targets for longer and with a greater concentration.
RAF Oakington, north-west of Cambridge, the home of 7 Squadron from 1940 to 1945 and under 8 Group control from 1943 onwards. At least 20 Lancasters can be seen at their dispersals resting from the previous night’s operations. (via Author)
Two raids that involved the PFF took place on the night of 16/17 April. A complicated plan to attack the Skoda armaments works in Pilsen was the largest raid of the night. Because this was a difficult target to attack, the PFF, leading the total force of 327 aircraft, were only operating as guides and the main force was briefed to identify the target themselves once the town had been illuminated. Once the PFF dropped their initial guiding TIs, the vast majority of the main force bombed onto them rather than carrying out the brief. Even with the PFF illumination and a moonlit night, many of the main force mistook a large asylum in Dobrany, seven miles to the south-west, as the Skoda factory. Only six crews brought back bombing photographs that were within three miles of the target. To add to the misery, 36 aircraft were lost along with 250 aircrew, five of them from 8 Group. In contrast, an excellent Newhaven attack was being carried out by 271 bombers over Mannheim. Accurate marking saw 130 buildings destroyed and at least 3,000 damaged. Forty-one industrial buildings had their production completely halted or seriously reduced. Wellingtons and Stirlings as usual took the brunt of the losses on this raid but 8 Group all returned home. The night for Bomber Command as a whole was a disaster, with a total of 54 aircraft lost, making this the worst night of the war so far. The only consolation was that fourteen aircraft came down in the sea homeward bound and several aircrew were rescued.
Far beyond the range of Oboe, Stettin and Rostock, 600 and 500 miles from England respectively, were chosen as targets on 20/21 April. A total of 339 crews were briefed to fly as low and as long as possible over the sea, while eleven Mosquitoes of 2 Group made a diversionary attack on Berlin. Visibility was excellent as the force approached the target and the PFF began the third Newhaven of the month. Six PVM aircraft delivered their flares onto the A/P thanks to good illuminators. The backers-up maintained the marking throughout the raid which was delivered with equally devastating accuracy. Over 100 acres of the city centre were destroyed and thirteen industrial buildings, including the Pommersdorf-Milch chemical works, were totally wiped out. When a PRU flight was made the following day, 24 fires were still burning. The all-Stirling force taking part in the Rostock raid were nowhere near as successful. Their target was the Heinkel factory at Marienehe, north-west of the city centre, but on arrival, the target was completely obscured by a very effective smoke screen. The bombing was scattered and there were no reports that the factory was even hit let alone damaged. Twenty-one aircraft were lost on the Stettin raid, two of them from 8 Group. Eight Stirlings failed to return from Rostock, none of them from the PFF.
After being ‘poached’ from 5 Group in April 1943, 97 Squadron returned to Lincolnshire in April 1944 and remained there for the rest of the war. (via Author)
Having settled into their new homes, it was time for 97 and 405 Squadron to carry out their first operations with 8 Group. Their baptism of fire was a 561-strong raid to Duisburg which was occupying far too much of Bomber Command’s resources. The PFF claimed to have marked the centre of Germany’s largest inland port but a visit by the PRU the following day begged to differ. The PFF had in fact marked the north-eastern quarter of the city and the bombing by the main force appears to have fallen in this area and further afield. Some damage was caused, including 300 buildings destroyed, but it was not the attack that Harris or Bennett had hoped for. Two aircraft were lost from 8 Group out of the seventeen that failed to return. One of them was 405 Squadron Halifax II JB920, the first since joining 8 Group.
The last major raid of April 1943 was another trip to Essen on 30 April/1May. As cloud was expected, the PFF tactic was to sky-mark using just the Oboe Mosquitoes. Pessimistically written off as probably not working as well as groundmarking, the raid went remarkably well. Out of the force of 305 aircraft taking part, 238 claimed to have bombed Essen.
Dortmund was selected for the first time as a target on 4/5 May. A force of 596 aircraft, the largest ‘non-1000’ force so far, initially used green TIs to mark the target so as not to confuse the reds being simultaneously used on a minor PFF H2S training operation to Rheine, 50 miles to the north. The marking was accurate in Dortmund but the backers-up, dropping red flares, slightly undershot and the bombing began to creep back. Half of the force managed to bomb within three miles of the AP, despite the best efforts of a decoy fire, which did attract nearly 300 bombs. Damage was extensive with 1,218 buildings destroyed and over 2,100 damaged, including the Hoesch and Dortmunder Union steel factories. A total of 693 people were killed and over 1,000 injured giving a grim but new record for a Bomber Command attack. It was also a bleak night for the crews who did not know that the weather had taken a turn for the worse over England. The raid may have been a success but by the time the last bomber had landed, 42 aircraft had either been shot down, abandoned or crash landed, the majority because of poor weather over their home airfields.
Harris was determined that the fourth raid on Duisburg on 12/13 May would make up for the lack of success from the previous attacks. One thousand, five-hundred sorties had already been flown by Bomber Command on Duisburg since October 1940. A total of 572 bombers were detailed for the raid, loaded with 1,559 tons, a record amount for a single target. The attack went like clockwork, the Oboe marking using red TIs was accurately backed-up by greens and the bombing was concentrated. Severe damage was caused throughout the centre and port areas by 85% of the crews who claimed to have bombed within three miles of the A/P. Over 1,500 buildings were destroyed and thousands more were damaged, including four August von Thyseen steel factories. In the port area, the bonus prize of sinking 21 barges and thirteen other ships, weighing in at 18,921 tons, was gratefully received by Harris. Another six ships of 41,000 tons were also damaged. Escalating fires tore through Duisburg and returning crews could still see them as they crossed the Dutch coast for home. Duisburg was not attacked again during the Battle of the Ruhr. No. 8 Group lost another four bombers, including two from 156 Squadron. One of them was flown by Sqn Ldr L. Verdon-Roe DFC, the son of Sir Alliott VerdonRoe, the founder of the Avro aircraft company in 1910. The family had already lost a son serving with 102 Squadron in July 1941.
The increased effectiveness of the German night-fighter was in evidence when the majority of Bomber Command crews were stood down from operations for nine days during a full-moon period. Some operations did take place, the most significant being Operation Chastise by 617 Squadron on 16/17 May. Once again, 5 Group showed that they were the specialists when it came to precision bombing. The PFF were not inactive during the stand-down either, flying less glamorous and less dangerous Bullseyes which were simulated operational sorties for the benefit of OTU (Operational Training Unit) and HCU (Heavy Conversion Unit) courses.
Air Cdre Bennett and his staff also took the opportunity to move from Wyton into Castle Hill House, Huntingdon, on 15 May. With expanding staff since becoming a group, the Pathfinder Force HQ was controlled from this location until it disbanded on 15 December, 1945.
Operations began again on 23/24 May and Harris was determined to remind Germany that Bomber Command was still active. The largest non-1,000 bomber raid operation of the war so far, totalling 826 aircraft, was unleashed on Dortmund making it the biggest single attack of the Battle of the Ruhr. The PFF also achieved a record by managing to dispatch more than 100 aircraft for a single operation for the first time. In clear weather conditions, eight Mosquitoes accurately marked the centre of the city and the backers-up performed perfectly. The attack was carried out in two waves and the best 250 crews of all the groups involved were selected for the first one. They were instructed only to bomb on a TI and, if they did not see one, they should go round again until the next wave passed. The raid was a resounding success, with over 2,000 buildings destroyed, the concentrated bombing killing nearly 600 people and injuring 1,275. A large number of industrial buildings were also destroyed, including the Hoesch steelworks which ceased production. The attack was so successful that Bomber Command did not attack Dortmund for another year.
Essen, on 27/28 May, was saved by the weather despite a valiant attempt to sky-mark the target by the PFF. The force of 518 bombers caused only limited damage compared to previous attacks on this target with just 488 buildings destroyed. The bombing was so scattered that at least ten other Ruhr towns were struck by bombs. Four 8 Group aircraft were lost this night; three of them fell to night-fighters, including 109 Squadron Mosquito IV DZ432 which crashed at Bleskensgraaf. Flt Sgt C. K. Chrysler RCAF managed to bail out but his navigator Sgt R. H. Logan RCAF was killed. DZ432 was the first Oboe-equipped Mosquito to fall on enemy-occupied territory.
EF361 of 7 Squadron was one of two Stirlings that were brought down from the blast of a 77 Squadron Halifax, which exploded after being attacked by a night-fighter on the Dusseldorf raid on 25/26 May 1943. EF361 came down near Jülich, killing Plt Off J. F. E. G. Berthiaume and his six crew. (www.ww2images.com)
The most successful raid of the Battle of the Ruhr came on 29/30 May. The target was the long, narrow town of Wuppertal, in particular, the Barmen part of the town to the north-east. The actual target was only two miles long and less than a mile wide but the accuracy with which the PFF marked this narrow strip of land was superb. The raid was almost a disaster when Oboe equipment failed, leaving an uncomfortable gap between the reds being dropped and the backers-up dropping their green TIs. The crews of 83 and 156 Squadron, all H2S-equipped, acting as the backers-up, kept the A/P marked with an accuracy that had never been seen before and has rarely been surpassed since. Credit must also go to the first wave of the 719-strong force who planted their IBs directly around the markers, giving all who followed behind a good target to aim at. Large fires quickly developed within the narrow streets of the town and what was experienced by the people of Wuppertal was probably the first example of a firestorm. Over 1,000 acres, approximately 80% of the built-up area in Barmen, would be destroyed by fire. Industry was almost wiped out with five out six of the town’s big factories completely destroyed and an additional 71 damaged. Some 611 of the force came home with photographic proof that they had bombed the target but 33 more aircraft failed to return, the vast majority falling to night-fighters. It was the Me110s of NJG1 that claimed most if not all of the kills that night, pursuing many of the bombers out over the North Sea. All of 8 Group’s losses were from 35 Squadron and all were shot by night-fighters, the only consolation being that, out of the four crews lost, fourteen survived to become POWs. Many combats took place and, in reply, at least seven Me110s were shot down.
On the last day of May 1943, 2 Group flew its last sorties before it left Bomber Command to join the new 2nd Tactical Air Force (TAF). The following day, two of its Mosquito units, 105 and 139 (Jamaica) Squadron, along with their current base, Marham, were transferred to 8 Group. To bring 105 Squadron up to speed with regard to Oboe, a section of 109 Squadron was transferred to it, giving 8 Group two Mosquito squadrons with the same capability. The introduction of 139 Squadron was an excellent piece of foresight from Bennett. Initially used as a ‘supporting squadron’, the unit was used for early marking and was particularly effective at carrying out diversions, drawing away many night-fighters from the main attacks. However, what Bennett had instigated within this squadron were the building blocks to a much larger all-Mosquito force which would come into its own from early 1944.
Following another full-moon stand-down, Harris called for a maximum effort attack on 11/12 June. No. 8 Group were involved in two attacks, the first by far the largest, was a second attempt to bomb Düsseldorf. A total of 783 aircraft, including 202 Halifaxes, the most ever dispatched of this type in a single raid, took part in the attack. The attack started well with the thirteen Mosquitoes involved dropping their red TIs accurately on Oboe. However, a combination of late backing-up and one Mosquito accidentally dropping a load of TIs 14 miles north-east of the city, meant that the raid was not the success it could have been. A large proportion of the main force bombed on the stray TIs and the enemy’s decoys. But despite these distractions, a large amount of the bombing fell on Düsseldorf, destroying approximately 130 acres of the city and becoming the most effective attack on this target of the war. The partial success came at a cost for Bomber Command, losing 38 aircraft – only one of them from 8 Group.
The other attack taking place this night was an all-8 Group operation involving 29 Lancasters of 83 and 156 Squadrons, 22 Halifaxes of 35 Squadron, and 21 Stirlings from 7 Squadron. The target was Münster and the attack was a large-scale H2S trial to give new crews experience of using the equipment. The raid also had the dual task of experimenting with a new three-colour system to improve Newhaven attacks. Thirty-three of the force carried markers or flares, while those behind acted as the bombing force. After the first wave dropped their TIs, they all carried out a second run to bomb themselves. Accurate marking was reported and the raid was over in ten minutes, but post-attack photography showed significant damage to the city’s railway installations and surrounding residential area.
Cologne had not been touched since the start of the Battle of the Ruhr, but on 16/17 June, the first of four attacks in the space of three weeks took place. One hundred and fifty Lancasters of 1 and 5 Groups were led into battle by 42 heavies from 8 Group. Sixteen of the PFF, equipped with H2S, were ordered to drop sky-markers on the target, which was cloud-covered. The attack did not go well, with several H2S sets going unserviceable combined with a late start to the marking. One hundred aircraft tried to bomb but this was scattered, while the remainder, because of the deteriorating weather, turned for home. On the surface, the raid would appear to have been a failure, although several significant buildings were hit. This was of no consolation to the fourteen Lancasters that were lost, including four from 8 Group.
Two operations were flown by the same PFF aircraft on the same night for the first time on 19/20 June. The first main target was the Schneider armaments factory at Le Creusot, involving 290 bombers from 3, 4, 6 and 8 Groups. The plan was for the PFF to drop flares over the factory and the main force were briefed to identify and attack the target rather than bombing on TIs. Two runs were to be made at approximately 5,000 ft, each dropping two small sticks of bombs because of the size of the target. By now though, the vast majority of crews were almost indoctrinated into bombing on TIs and many had great difficulty in making a visual identification of the factory. All bombed within three miles of the target, but being so small, only 21% of the bombs actually hit the Schneider works. A section of 52 PFF bombers, 26 of them H2S-equipped, then split off from the main force and headed 4 miles further south, to attack the electrical transformer at Montchanin. The H2S aircraft which dropped flares over Le Creusot, did the same again over the transformer and once again, the smaller main force were ordered to visually identify the target. Unfortunately, the majority mistook the target for the Henrie Paul iron and bronze works. Allegedly some of the crews did identify the correct target but still bombed on the lead aircraft’s TIs.
No.5 Group made use of four 97 Squadron Lancasters on an interesting raid on the Zeppelin works at Freidrichshafen on 20/21 June. The raid was to be controlled by a single senior pilot and would go on to be known as the Master Bomber technique, which had its roots in the Dams raid back in May. No.5 Group, who were operating 56 Lancasters, provided the Master Bomber who, for this pioneering raid was Gp Capt L. C. Slee. However, en route, Slee’s aircraft developed engine trouble and he had to hand over to the Deputy Master Bomber, Wg Cdr G. L. Gomm, OC 467 Squadron. Like Le Creusot, the raid was intended to be carried out at only 5,000 ft, but with the moon shining brightly and heavier flak defences than expected, Gomm ordered the force to climb higher to nearly 15,000 ft. Only one PFF Lancaster, flown by Flt Lt J. Sauvage managed to drop his TIs, but these were within 200 yards of the target. The attack was made in two parts: the first, all controlled by the Deputy Master Bomber, was to bomb Sauvage’s TIs, while the second was a timed DR run from a point on the shore of the Bodensee. Approximately 10% of the bombs dropped hit the small factory and further damage was caused to various industrial sites, which was a good result considering the complexities of the operation. Two of the 97 Squadron Lancasters were badly mauled by flak while over the target, but the ace in the hole for the attack was that it continued onwards to North Africa, outwitting a large force of night-fighters which were ready for them on the return journey. Fifty-two of the force, including two 97 Squadron Lancasters made the return via an attack on La Spezia on 23/24 June, once again without loss.
It was a different story over Krefeld on 21/22 June, although on this occasion the force involved was considerably larger. Some 705 aircraft were detailed on what was to be an epic raid, including twelve Mosquitoes equipped with the new ‘K’ Oboe. Eight of the Mosquitoes carried the normal load of three red TIs and one LB (Long Burning) red TI. The remaining four were carrying three red TIs, a single red LBTI and a time-delayed single red TI. The latter was set to start burning five minutes after hitting the ground as a precaution should the special equipment fail, which was still a common problem. Another fail-safe, if the initial marking failed, was 31 H2S bombers who were ordered to drop yellow TIs; no chances were being taking by 8 Group, with so many aircraft involved. The 37 backers-up were then briefed to drop their green TIs on the reds or the yellows. The marking was near perfect by the Oboe Mosquitoes and this was accurately backed-up by all, but one of the PFF heavies. The raid was divided up into six waves, the raid lasting from approximately 0130hrs to 0239hrs. The bombing was as good as the marking and 619 aircraft bombed on the markers dropping 2,306 tons, three-quarters of them within three miles of the centre of Krefeld. A fire quickly raged across the centre of the city, completely gutting 47% of the built-up area. A total of 1,056 people were killed, 4,550 more were injured and 5,517 houses were destroyed, which resulted in 72,000 losing their homes. The firestorm that quickly developed eventually resulted in 9,000 of 11,000 acres of the city lying in ruins. It was a truly devastating raid.
The full moon period was not quite over when the raid was flown and 30 of the 44 bombers lost that night were brought down by night-fighters. It was a particularly rough night for 8 Group, with twelve bombers lost, all of them experienced H2S crews. These losses highlighted a problem for Bennett that never went away; send too few crews and risk a lack of marking or send too many, exposing more senior crews, as in this case, to an unnecessary level of danger. Six of those lost over Krefeld were part of the ‘insurance’ backers-up for the Oboe Mosquitoes and their loss was little more than a waste of aircrew and aircraft. The night was particularly bad for 35 Squadron who lost six aircraft with eighteen crew killed and sixteen becoming POWs. Krefeld was a highly successful attack for 8 Group but was also at the greatest expense to men and machines since the group’s formation.
It was now the turn of the Elbefeld half of Wuppertal to be attacked after the Barmen half was successfully destroyed back in May. A total of 630 aircraft set out on 24/25 June but even with good accurate PFF marking, a classic creepback raid quickly developed. It is thought that this could be put down to the recent pressure being endured by the aircrews and high losses also being incurred. Despite the bombing stretching into the western parts of the Ruhr, it was later estimated that 94% of Elbefeld had been destroyed and local reports stated that more bombs had fallen than on the previous Barmen raid. However, Bomber Command’s high losses continued to mount with another 34 aircraft lost, including seven from 8 Group. This was the first time that 7 Squadron flew the Lancaster in anger and it also lost its first machine on this raid. Lancaster III LM327, being flown by ‘B’ Flight Commander Wg Cdr R. G. Barrell DSO DFC & Bar was attacked by a night-fighter of II./NJG3 being flown by Oblt Raht. All attempted to abandon the crippled machine but unfortunately Barrell’s parachute failed to open and he plunged to his death. Two others in this experienced crew, who were all about to finish their second tour of operations, were killed but three survived to become POWs and Plt Off H. J. Hudson DFM evaded capture. Barrell was the third flight commander that 7 Squadron had lost in a single week. The squadron’s conversion to the Lancaster was very protracted and it would continue to fly the Stirling into mid-August 1943.
No.105 Squadron and its Mosquito IVs, with their Merlin engines warming through, on display for the press at Marham. (Aeroplane, via Author)
Si placet necamus (We destroy at will) was a very appropriate motto for the activities of 139 Squadron who served with 8 Group from June 1943 to the war’s end and beyond. (via Author)
A second trip to Cologne during the Battle of the Ruhr was planned on 28/29 June, with 608 aircraft taking part. The raid was destined to encounter a procession of setbacks but still managed to deliver the heaviest raid of the war so far on the city. Firstly, conflicting weather reports meant that the PFF had to prepare a dual plan, one for a clear target and the second far less reliable sky-marking in the event of a cloud-covered raid. It was the latter conditions that were found by the lead PFF aircraft, twelve of which were Oboe Mosquitoes, although five had to turn back with technical problems before reaching Cologne. Of the remainder, only six were able to drop markers, beginning seven minutes late and only intermittently. It was a recipe for a disastrous raid but the main force still delivered a devastating attack which included the destruction of 43 industrial, six military and no less than 6,368 other buildings. Casualties included 4,377 killed, over 10,000 injured and at least 230,000 left homeless.
July 1943 – The Battle of the Ruhr ends and the Battle of Hamburg begins
Another 635 aircraft arrived over Cologne again on 3/4 July, this time targeting the more industrial area, east of the Rhine. The PFF ground-marking, carried out by 13 Oboe Mosquitoes was extremely accurate and the backing-up equalled it, allowing the main force to perform another heavy raid. Twenty factories and at least 2,200 houses were completely destroyed and 80 more industrial buildings were seriously damaged. The night also saw the first use of the Wilde Sau (Wild Boar) technique by a new German fighter unit called Jg300, based at Deelen in Holland. Using the Fw190 and Bf109 the technique involved attacking the bomber force over the target using any form of illumination available, such as searchlights, TIs or fires on the ground to expose the enemy aircraft. Jg300 worked closely with the local flak units who would be instructed not to fire above a certain height, so the Wild Boar aircraft could operate without being shot down by their own side. Of the 30 Bomber Command machines lost that night, twelve were claimed by Jg300, although these had to be shared with the local flak unit who also claimed twelve! At least four bombers claimed that they were shot at by other friendly aircraft but these attacks would have come from Jg300, without the crews realising.
There were only the north-western and south-western areas of Cologne left to bomb when a smaller force of 282 Lancasters and six Mosquitoes of 1, 5 and 8 Groups returned again on 8/9 July. The Mosquitoes, faced with thick cloud cover, carried out very accurate Oboe sky-marking which the main force was able to bomb. Another nineteen industrial targets and 2,381 houses were destroyed, killing over 500 civilians. Losses were lower with seven Lancasters lost, including another from 97 Squadron brought down by a 5./NJG1 night-fighter at Bassenge in Belgium.
Since joining 8 Group on 1 June, 105 Squadron had been training hard to bring its Oboe skills up to speed. It had already had a taste of operations but, over Gelsenkirchen on 9/10 July, it would provide Oboe sky-marking alongside 109 Squadron for the first time. The two 105 Squadron crews on this historic raid for the unit was ‘A’ Flight commander Sqn Ldr W. W. ‘Bill’ Blessing and his navigator Fg Off G. Muirhead in DK333 and Fg Off W. Humphrey with his navigator Flt Sgt E. Moore in DZ485, who joined eight Mosquitoes of 109 Squadron. It was not to be an auspicious beginning – the Oboe equipment failed to operate in five of the ten aircraft taking part and a sixth dropped its sky-markers in error ten miles north of Gelsenkirchen. Local reports thought that the raid was meant for the neighbouring towns of Bochum and Wattenscheid, with only a handful of bombs falling on Gelsenkirchen.
The final Ruhr raid took place on 13/14 July when 374 aircraft attacked Aachen. This was an interesting raid, once again affected by the weather. A strong tail wind had brought the first waves of the main force right up behind the PFF, resulting in them dropping their bombs within minutes of the TIs igniting. This meant that a large amount of bombs were dropped accurately in a very short space of time. The result was described locally as a ‘Terrorangriff of the most severe scale’ and, from above, Aachen seemed to burst instantly into flames.
The only operation flown on 14/15 July was the beginning of regular ‘nuisance’ raids, which would become the calling card of the all-Mosquito Light Night Striking Force (LNSF). While sketchy, the LNSF was not officially recognised until early 1944, but 139 (Jamaica) Squadron was definitely both its founding member and most successful unit. Used by Bennett as a multi-purpose squadron, either to drop Window (Hamburg onwards) in front of a main force or to bomb independently, the squadron set the tone for all future members of the LNSF. The squadron moved from Marham to Wyton on 4 July and its first operation from its new home took place on 14/15 July. Eight aircraft made the long trip to Berlin, evaded all defences and successfully bombed the German capital. Unfortunately, the squadron suffered its first loss but possibly not to enemy action when Mosquito IV DZ515, flown by Fg Off R. Clarke and his navigator, Flt Sgt E. J. Thorne, crashed into the North Sea on the homeward journey. It was destined to lose more aircraft than any other Mosquito squadron to serve in 8 Group.
No.35 Squadron appropriately led an all-Halifax force from 4 Group in an attack on the Peugeot factory in Montbéliard on 15/16 July. The factory was in the middle of the town of Sochaux, close to the Swiss border and it was vital that the marking was accurate, to avoid French civilian casualties. Despite a clear moonlit night and very weak defences, the TIs were dropped at just 6,000 ft, but landed 700 yards beyond the factory. Local reports claim that just 30 bombs fell on the factory and over 600 more came down in the town, killing 123 civilians and injuring 336. Only 5% of the factory was damaged and production continued as normal the following day. It was not 8 Group’s finest hour.
Because of the increasing number of Mosquito squadrons joining 8 Group, it was decided that it needed its own training unit. On 1 July, 1655 MTU (Mosquito Training Unit) moved from Finmere and 2 Group control to Marham, which was one of the reasons for moving 139 Squadron to Wyton. Warboys was used as a satellite and it is possible that Downham Market was also briefly used for this purpose.
Since the end of May 1943, Harris had been circulating orders to his group commanders telling them to prepare for a series of heavy raids on Hamburg. This important city, with its port and high population, had already been attacked 98 times; none of the attacks were heavy or particularly successful. Having escaped the ‘1000-bomber’ raids flown in 1942, it was now time for Hamburg to feel the full might of Bomber Command. The first raid of 791 aircraft was planned for the night of 24/25 July, with 8 Group once again taking the lead. Far beyond the range of Oboe, it was up to the H2S aircraft to mark the target which, being a port, was a good shape for the system. This raid would also be the debut for Window, a simple but effective method of creating a false reading on the enemy’s ground Würzburg and airborne Lichtenstein airborne radar sets. Window was made from strips of coarse paper exactly 27 cms long and 2 cms wide, with a thin strip of aluminium foil stuck to one side. It had been available from April 1942, but the fears of senior Bomber Command staff that the Luftwaffe would copy it to use on raids against Britain, never materialised. It was a terrible decision not to introduce it into service earlier and it is estimated that 2,200 aircraft were lost during this period, many of them through German radar-assisted defences. During the six raids that made up the Battle of Hamburg it was also estimated that Window saved over 100 aircraft which could have been lost to radar defences.
The plan by the PFF for this major raid on Hamburg was for a Newhaven combining H2S marking and PVM. If the latter could not identify the aiming point, Blind Markers would be brought in to drop yellow TIs. The ‘belt and braces’ plan did not stop there. The backers-up were briefed to drop on the PVMs red TIs or failing this, the MPI of the H2S yellow TIs. Another new player used for the first time on this raid was the Re-centerers. These crews were ordered to keep the raid as concentrated as possible; a very dangerous undertaking, exposing the aircraft to several passes over the target. The raid started reasonably well, although the TIs were a little scattered, but mainly around the city centre. Despite 8 Group’s efforts, a very fast 6-mile-long creepback began but being so large, nearly all of the bombing spread itself across the city. In just 50 minutes, 728 of the bombers had dropped 2,284 tons, causing severe damage across the centre and north-western districts of the city. Over 1,500 people were killed, making this the heaviest raid inflicted by Bomber Command so far outside of the range of Oboe. Mainly thanks to Window, losses were light, with twelve bombers lost and 8 Group were lucky to escape with just one 35 Squadron Halifax written off at Graveley without injury to the crew.
Hamburg was given a brief reprieve on 25/26 July when 705 aircraft set course for Essen. One 83 Squadron Lancaster ‘Q’ had the privilege of carrying the commander of the US 8th Air Force, Brig Gen F. Anderson, as an observer during this successful raid. The Krupps works in particular suffered its worst raid of the war, along with 51 other industrial buildings. The following morning, Doktor Gustav Krupps suffered a stroke, from which he never recovered, but this was a blessing in disguise because it saved him from being charged with war crimes during the post-war trials. Anderson described the raid as ‘One of the most impressive sights I have ever seen’ and as Q-Queenie landed safely back at Wyton, there were many sighs of relief. This did not stop Anderson flying as an observer on the following raid as well.
One of the worst raids of the war for the German population was unleashed on 27/28 July when 787 bombers returned to Hamburg. On arrival over the target the PFF discovered that several fires were still burning from the raid two nights earlier and this was where most of the Hamburg fire crews were still working. This was the first of many factors that would see Hamburg experience a ‘firestorm’ of such magnitude that it would result in two thirds of the city’s surviving population fleeing. The PFF marking was all dropped 2 miles east of the planned aiming point, which was supposed to be the city centre. Despite this, the marking was concentrated and well backed-up and very little bombing crept back. A total of 729 aircraft managed to drop 2,326 tons of bombs, the vast majority of which fell within an area only 2 miles long and a mile wide. The weather conditions, which were incredibly mild, coupled with low humidity and a lack of recent rainfall, made the centre of Hamburg a tinderbox. Large fires took hold in the Hammerbrook, Hamm and Borgfeld districts and as they grew, all competed for oxygen, creating a firestorm of epic proportions. The local fire service could do little as they were trapped and those who tried to tackle the fires in the eastern half of the city, found the roads blocked by the bombing. From above, the crews watched as a cloud of smoke rose up to over 20,000 ft and one member of 83 Squadron described the scene: ‘It was a most unholy sight lit up by raging fires’. The fire continued to burn intensely for three hours and approximately 40,000 people died in what was mainly a residential area, many by carbon monoxide poisoning when the air was sucked out of their basement shelters. Following this devastating attack, 1,200,000 people wisely left the city as they were not prepared to suffer any more from the raids which would inevitably keep coming.
The third major attack of the Battle of Hamburg took place on 29/30 July and was opened by three 8 Group Mosquitoes which dropped Window a few minutes before the main force of 774 aircraft arrived. The marking was all by H2S again, but fell 2 miles further east than planned, in an area just south of the devastation caused by the previous attack. On this occasion it was not a problem because a large 4-mile creepback spread itself across the city into the Wandsbeck, Barmbeck, Uhlenhorst and Winterhude districts which had not been hit before. A total of 707 of the main force dropped 2,318 tons of bombs which caused some fires, but not on the scale of the earlier raid. With the majority of the population now evacuated, civilian casualties were considerable lower, but improved Wild Boar techniques took their toll on Bomber Command and 28 failed to return, with 8 Group in particular suffering high losses. One 7 Squadron Lancaster was lost, two Halifaxes from 35 Squadron and two Lancasters each from 97 and 156 Squadrons. Out of the 49 aircrew reported missing, only three from 35 Squadron survived to become POWs.
The Mosquito IV Srs 2 was capable of carrying four 500 lb bombs as displayed here by these 105 Squadron armourers. (Aeroplane via Author)
There was a large overlap between the end of the Battle of the Ruhr and the beginning of the Battle of Hamburg. The 273-strong raid on Remscheid on 30/31 July was seen as the last official Ruhr attack. The raid was marked by Oboe which was, for the first time, continuously available throughout the raid. This reflected in the accuracy of the bombing of such a small force which managed to destroy 83% of the town with just 871 bombs.
August 1943 – Peenemünde and the long road to Berlin begins
Thanks to a very large thunderstorm over Germany, Hamburg escaped relatively unscathed on 2/3 August. Of the 740 aircraft that took part, several were lost through severe icing, turbulence and possibly lightning strikes, including one Halifax from 35 Squadron. On a more positive note, although it still involved the loss of an aircraft, it was the beginning of the end of a three-year relationship between 7 Squadron and the Stirling. Plt Off W. E. Stenhouse in Stirling I R9260, one of 105 of the type taking part in this raid, had to return early to Oakington, with a misfiring port outer engine. As the bomber touched down, the undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft was written off, becoming the last Stirling loss for 7 Squadron. Since introducing the bomber to RAF service in 1940, the squadron had lost 120 of them in a range of accidents and incidents.
With a full-moon period now approaching, a switch to Italian targets could not have been better timed. Italy was already under pressure to capitulate since President Roosevelt had offered them favourable terms while, in stark contrast, General Eisenhower threatened heavy bombing from the air, if they did not. It was up to Bomber Command to carry out Eisenhower’s threat and the first of several raids, began on 7/8 August. A total of 197 aircraft from 1, 5 and 8 Groups were detailed to bomb Genoa, Milan and Turin. The latter attack was led by Gp Capt J. H. Searby of 83 Squadron acting as Master Bomber. All but two of the bombers taking part claimed to have bombed one of three cities, although the Turin operation was the least successful of the three.
A much larger force of 504 aircraft returned to Milan on 12/13 August and encouraged by good PFF marking, caused a great deal of damage throughout the city. Simultaneously, a 152-strong raid was taking place over Turin which at the time was described by the crews taking part as ‘heavy and concentrated’. While post-attack reports from Turin only describe a handful of people being killed or injured, it was undoubtedly Milan’s worst raid of the war. Of the 1,174 people who were killed in air raids in Italy during August 1943, the vast majority of them were killed in Milan this night.
Milan was hit again on 14/15 August, this time with a 140-strong all-Lancaster force from 1, 5 and 8 Groups causing further damage to the city. The following night another all-Lancaster force claimed very concentrated bombing on the city, although on this occasion, seven aircraft failed to return. The final raid of this latest, and what would become the last, Italian bombing campaign of the war, took place on Turin on 16/17 August. A total of 154 aircraft from 3 and 8 Groups claimed to have bombed the centre of the city and successes included hits on the Fiat works and the Royal Arsenal.
Intelligence received by the British in June 1943, under the auspices of Operation Crossbow, revealed that the Germans were advancing at an alarming rate in their efforts to produce rocket-powered unguided weapons. Maps, sketches and reports provided by a pair of Polish cleaners working at the German Research Establishment at Peenemünde showed drawings of a ‘rocket assembly hall’, an ‘experimental pit’ and at least one ‘launching tower’. It was clear that the V-1 and V-2 projects were reaching a critical point and it was imperative that development of both weapons had to be destroyed, or at least disrupted.
It was also clear that only Bomber Command had the ability to attack such a small target and the first phase of Crossbow, Operation Hydra, was planned for the night of 17/18 August. The sensitivity of the target was exemplified by the fact that only the COs of the squadrons taking part knew the routes and basic details of the raid. Even the armourers were not given particulars of bomb loads until after 1300 hrs. The raid itself featured several ‘firsts’, including the first use of an MB (Master Bomber) for a full-scale Bomber Command raid. This task was given to Acting Gp Capt J. H. Searby, who was the station commander of Warboys at the time. He would be flying an 83 Squadron Lancaster from Wyton, a unit he also had been in command of since May 1943. Searby’s role in controlling and guiding the raid would become a significant factor in its ultimate success.
A total of 596 aircraft were tasked with bombing Peenemünde, made up of 324 Lancasters, 218 Halifaxes and 54 Stirlings. The plan was to attack three separate A/Ps in three waves; the points were the scientists’ and workers’ accommodation, the main rocket factory and the experimental station. Both Red Spot Fire TIs and ‘shifters’ were used for the first time by 8 Group on this raid. ‘Shifters’, as the name suggests, were employed to re-mark, or shift, the bombing to the original A/P, or to a new one.
The raid took place in moonlight conditions with perfect visibility and the first wave had little difficulty finding the target. The defending flak was light and no enemy night-fighters had been seen en route or near Peenemünde. This could be credited to a successful diversion by 139 Squadron who sent eight Mosquitoes to Berlin. This was where the enemy fighter controllers thought that the main raid was going to take place. It was thanks to this ‘spoof’ raid that the first two waves of the attack escaped unmolested by night-fighters, but it would be a different story for the third wave from 5 Group.
It was not the best of starts for the attack when the first TIs fell too far south onto a forced labour camp. This was quickly turned around through the combined efforts of Searby and the ‘shifters’ but not before the labour camp was obliterated, killing up to 600 foreign workers, the majority of whom were Polish. After this serious error, the raid developed into an accurate attack and, by the end of it, approximately 560 aircraft claimed to have bombed one of the three A/Ps with 1,800 tons of bombs, of which 85% were HE. While no crucial equipment was totally destroyed, several senior scientists were killed and sufficient damage was caused to stall the V-Weapon projects for almost two months. This may not sound very long, but it did also make German senior staff reconsider their plans to move the establishment into a more obscure inland location. This move was already in the planning stage before the attack but once this had happened, the process was accelerated. By October 1943, the entire production operation was moved to Mittelwork and this crucial delay may have saved the Allies and, in particular, Britain, from an even larger V-1 and later V-2 attack.
By the time the third wave of bombers were carrying out their run over Peenemünde, every available night-fighter from as far south as the Ruhr, was redirected towards the north German coast. The night was so clear the bomber crews could see the fighters closing in on them from all directions, apart from below. It was from this position that the Luftwaffe operated, for the first time, a pair of night-fighters fitted with Schräge Musik. This was a simple but effective system and was among others, fitted to the Bf110G-4 where a pair of 20mm MG FF/M machine guns were positioned in a near vertical position, behind the pilot. While the crews were fending off fighters from all directions, a pair of Bf110s slipped under the bomber stream and in short order shot down six bombers between them. A further 34 bombers failed to return, the vast majority from that final wave and virtually all from 5 and 6 Group who lost twelve out of 57 aircraft taking part producing an alarmingly high casualty rate of 19.7%.
Group Captain J. Searby, who carried out the role of the Master Bomber, for the first time over Peenemünde on 17/18 August 1943. (via Author)
For 8 Group, the night was a total success from the start, with good marking and a well-orchestrated raid, thanks to Searby and the efforts of his crews. Losses were low for the group, with just two Halifaxes from 35 and 405 Squadron lost; the latter being the first aircraft brought down. As a footnote to the Peenemünde raid, despite the fact that the Germans had shot down 40 bombers, the chief of the Luftwaffe general staff, General H. Jeschonnek, was distraught about the attack. Not only had he ordered Berlin’s defences to open fire on their own aircraft that night, he had totally miscalculated where the raid was going to take place. Already facing relentless pressure from Hitler and Göring about his ability to defend the Reich, Jeschonneck committed suicide on 18 August.
On 19/20 August, 139 Squadron made another long-distance foray to Berlin, losing another Mosquito from the small force of eight aircraft taking part. The I.G Farben factory in Leverkeusen was attacked again on 22/23 August without loss to 8 Group. The Oboe guided raid found thick cloud over the target and the vast majority of bombs fell wide of the target although partial success could be claimed, as most of them caused serious damage in Düsseldorf.
Arthur Harris now decided the time was right for another large raid on Berlin which had not been attacked en masse since March 1943. Much faith had been put in H2S and his senior staff were convinced that the crews who had been operating it during the previous months, had now gained enough experience to pinpoint and attack a major inland city. It was obvious that the pressure was building on 8 Group to help deliver a devastating blow on the German capital, which was probably the most unpopular of all targets throughout the entire war.
This would be another Master Bomber controlled raid, but this time the task would be undertaken by Wg Cdr J. E. ‘Johnny’ Farquier, the CO of 405 Squadron. Ottawa-born Farquier was a highly experienced pilot, having gained over 3,000 flying hours before the war began. During the Peenemünde raid he was Deputy Master Bomber and flew 17 times over the target, guiding the waves of bombers into the aiming points; a task he undertook so well he was awarded the DSO for his actions in September 1943. The raid would be the largest assault on Berlin so far, with 727 aircraft made up of Lancasters, Halifaxes, Stirlings and 17 Mosquitoes taking part. The latter were used for marking the route to target although this did not stop a large batch of aircraft deviating from the briefed course as they approached Berlin. Ahead of the main force, the PFF as usual led the way but, frustratingly, the H2S failed to identify the centre of Berlin and lead aircraft proceeded to mark an area on the southern outskirts of the city. Flak and defending fighters were prevalent and the first of many victims of the night belonged to 8 Group. Lancaster III JA678 flown by OC ‘B’ Flight, Sqn Ldr C. J. Lofthouse OBE, DFC was shot down by night-fighters near Oranienburg, although all eight crew managed to jump to safety before becoming POWs. The eighth crew member was Gp Capt A. H. Willetts DSO, Oakington’s Station Commander. Willetts was no stranger to flying with his crews which he did, not only from a morale perspective but also to gain experience himself of flying on a raid over Germany. This policy of senior RAF officers flying on operations was deeply frowned upon and this would be the last time a senior commander from Bomber Command would undertake such a mission.
By the time the last aircraft had bombed, approximately 575 claimed to have dropped on a TI despite the fact that the bulk of the attack had fallen outside of Berlin. It would have been impossible for those crews following behind to tell the difference between a TI or a fire on the ground as fires in the residential areas of Lankwitz and Lichterfeld took hold. Further damage was caused to industrial targets in Mariendorf, Marienflede and Templehof, all of which were located south of the planned attack on the city. Some bombs did, more by accident than design, fall in the city centre into the ‘government quarter’ where it was later recorded that not a single building in the Wilhelmstrasse was undamaged. Despite the fact the marking was inaccurate, Berlin recorded its worst raid of the war so far, with 2,611 individual buildings destroyed or damaged, as well as no less than twenty vessels sunk on the city’s canals. Casualties were high as well, with 854 people killed, although the vast majority of these were caught out in the open before taking cover in their air raid shelters.
Continued faith in the power of H2S was shown again on 27/28 August when 674 aircraft, including an all ‘Y’ equipped PFF aircraft, set out for Nuremburg. En route, 47 PFF aircraft were ordered by the MB to check their equipment by dropping a single 1,000 lb bomb on Heilbronn. Only 28 managed to carry out this order which, according to later reports, fell in the northern part of the town and was presumed to be an attack on an industrial area of Heilbronn. On arrival over a cloud-free Nuremburg, the initial PFF marking was accurate, but a creepback developed very quickly which, despite the efforts of the MB (of whom only 23% of crews taking part claimed to hear his broadcasts) and the re-centerers, could not be halted. A large number of bombs fell outside the town and local reports stated only that the bombing was scattered across the south-eastern and eastern suburbs. Plt Off R. King and his 83 Squadron crew had great difficulty in placing their visual marker in the right place and were forced to descend to 14,000 ft to drop it. At this height they were now at the mercy of the flak and after dropping their TIs and HE were hit by light flak which damaged the hydraulics. On return to Wyton, only one wheel would come down but King managed to carry out a good crash landing without injury to the crew.
Up until now, both Monchengladbach and Rheydt had escaped a serious attack from Bomber Command but on 30/31 August this was about to change. A large force of 660 aircraft of all types was despatched for a ‘double attack’ on both towns led by the PFF. In good visibility, Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes of 109 Squadron led the way and accurately marked the centre of Monchengladbach for the first stage of the attack to begin. Twenty-two minutes into the attack, the Mosquitoes diverted their marking to the centre of Rheydt, where the remainder of the attack was carried out with exemplary accuracy. Later described as ‘a model’ of good PFF marking, extensive destruction and fire damage was caused to both towns. In Monchengladbach alone, over 1,000 buildings were destroyed, nearly 20% of them industrial, while in Rheydt, considerable damage and disruption were caused to the large marshalling yards there.
It was a busy night for the PFF’s Mosquitoes who were also flying an operation to St Omer that night. The first of many small raids into northern France to bomb ammunition dumps had begun, all flown by OTU crews so as to give them the experience of bombing on PFF markers before they were posted to a front-line squadron. The target was a large bomb dump at Foret d’Éperlecques, north of St Omer and crews from 26, 29 and 33 OTUs, all flying Wellingtons, were taking part. They were led by six Oboe Mosquitoes and six Halifaxes of 8 Group and the attack was successful, with at least one large explosion witnessed by several crews. However, two crews from 26 and 29 OTU were lost, the latter having to ditch owing to an engine fire.
The month ended with another long haul to Berlin, with 622 aircraft taking part, plus a handful of Mosquitoes once again marking the route. On the night of 31/1 September, the Germans successfully employed the use of ‘fighter flares’ for the first time. The flares were not only dropped along the bomber route into the target but also on the way, giving the enemy night-fighters the opportunity to hunt at will within the bomber stream. Combined with the increasingly efficient searchlight co-operation which worked especially well over the target, it resulted in 47 bombers being shot down, including three from 8 Group. Many bombers were shot down before they reached the target and, combined with an inaccurate weather report, this raid was by far the worst since the introduction of the TI method. The marking was dropped south of the city centre but the psychological effect of the enemy fighters resulted in the vast majority of the main force bombing early and a creepback developed that was 30 miles long!
The PFF were very lucky this night to have got away with just three casualties; one of these being the loss of Lancaster III JA916 of 97 Squadron being flown by the unit’s CO, Wg Cdr K. H. Burns DFC. When just minutes from the target, the Lancaster was attacked head on by an Fw190 which set the whole of the port wing on fire. Without hesitation, Burns ordered his crew to bail out although his bomb-aimer paused and asked if he could jettison the bombs. Burns quickly replied ‘No, leave ’em be and I’ll aim the kite where they’ll do some good’. Once he was sure his crew had left, Burns trimmed the bomber nose down but just as he was leaving his seat, the bombs exploded, blowing the Lancaster to pieces. Incredibly, three and half hours later Burns woke to find himself lying under some pine trees. As the pain started to creep into his body, he discovered that his right hand and half of his forearm was missing but it felt normal without any pain coming from it. Despite discomfort from his right ankle and foot he stood up to find that his ripcord had not been pulled and barely enough of his parachute had opened to slow his descent. Realising he quickly needed help because of the large amount of blood he had lost, he staggered across a field and lay down near a signal box where he was eventually found. Doctors later discovered that one of his lungs had also collapsed and the other was saved by the ripcord being wrapped around his neck! He was treated well by the German doctors but when he was later moved to Dulag Luft he complained of back pain. It was discovered that this was broken as well and when the resident German doctor asked why this had not been picked up earlier, he was told that the X-ray department had been destroyed by the RAF! Wg Cdr Burns was later repatriated, fitted with a false arm and returned to flying duties.
Late 1943 – 500 lb bombs being prepared for the Mosquitoes of 139 Squadron, at Wyton. (via Author)
September 1943 – Varying targets
Owing to the high loss rate of the Stirling and Halifax on recent trips to Berlin, the operation on 3/4 September was to be an all-Lancaster affair. No. 8 Group would also supply four Mosquitoes to drop ‘spoof’ route flares to put the enemy night-fighter off the scent. A force of 316 Lancasters were detailed for this attack, of which 81 were from 8 Group, made up of 55 Markers and 26 Supporters. Approaching the city from the north-east, bombing was concentrated on the industrial area of Charlottenburg, Wedding and Siemensstaddt which had not suffered a serious attack before. Many factories were hit and utilities, including a major water and electrical works, were put out of action. Some 422 people were killed and if Goebbels, Berlin’s Gauleiter, had not ordered the evacuation of all children and adults not engaged in war work, the casualty list would have been higher. The loss of 22 Lancasters on this trip, which equated to an unsustainable 7%, technically meant that the raid was a failure. As predicted, 8 Group took another beating with 7 Squadron losing three Lancasters, plus one each from 97 and 156 Squadrons.
There were clear skies over Mannheim on the night of 5/6 September, giving Pathfinders the opportunity to perform a copybook Newhaven raid. This would be a double attack which would involve Ludwigshafen as well. Route-marking flares guided a force of 605 bombers to a point 5 miles south of Luxembourg, from which a direct run to target was made. The Pathfinders took a slightly different route over Kaiserslautern, 34 miles west of Mannheim, making a timed run to the AP which was positioned on the eastern edge of the town centre. The marking was extremely accurate and the hand-picked crews at the front of this big raid dropped their bombs directly onto them, getting the 40-minute raid off to an excellent start. The inevitable creepback of bombing fell directly into the centre of Mannheim causing total devastation and what few post-attack records that were taken simply record ‘a catastrophe’. Ludwigshafen suffered almost as badly, with the local fire departments having to deal with nearly 2,000 individual fires, with at least three of them described as ‘fire areas’. For Bomber Command the raid was a total success, although another 34 bombers failed to return. No.8 Group lost a Lancaster from 83 and 156 Squadron and 405 Squadron lost its last Halifax in action before fully converting to the Lancaster.
Over the next few days, several heavy-bomber Pathfinder squadrons were stood down but the Mosquitoes were still hard at work. The bombers were back in action again on 15/16 September, leading a medium-sized raid against the Dunlop rubber factory at Montluçon, central France. All the major bomber groups contributed to this raid, with the exception of 5 Group, which was becoming an increasingly common thing as the Lincolnshire-based squadrons continued their own agenda. A total of 369 aircraft took part, including another five 8th Air Force B-17s, all under the control of MB, Wg Cdr D. F. E. C. Deane. The raid was an outstanding success and virtually every building in the factory was either destroyed or damaged.
It was to France again on 16/17 September for a similar raid to that staged on Montluçon, but this time without a Master Bomber. In fact, for some unknown reason, this effective technique was not re-established until the spring of 1944. The same four bomber groups contributed another 335 aircraft and again, five more B-17s joined for the experience. This time the target was the strategically important railway yards at Modane, not far from the Italian border. However, the success of Bomber Command’s last big raid was not repeated and poor marking resulted in a weak attack.
There was no let up for the Mosquitoes, with further small attacks against Berlin, Cologne and Emden on the same night as a large raid on Hannover was launched. It had been two years since this city had been attacked but Bomber Command were taking no chances and two divisionary raids were also organised, both flown by 8 Group. Some 711 bombers took part in the main raid, again including five 8th Air Force B-17s, who were on their first night raid into Germany. The marking was a little off-target, thanks to the winds being much stronger than forecast. The concentrated bombing fell within an area that was approximately two to five miles south-south-east of the city centre, although several fires in this area were started and several industrial buildings were damaged. As the main raid progressed, 21 Lancasters and eight Mosquitoes carried out an effective spoof on Oldenburg. Large bundles of Window, flares and TIs gave the impression that a much larger raid was about to unfold. Twelve more 8 Group Mosquitoes also attempted a similar spoof on Emden and it is believed that the combined efforts of the two diversionary attacks did reduce the loss rate, which still stood at 26 aircraft.
Fg Off V. Brammer (in cockpit) and his 7 Squadron crew at Oakington in the summer of 1944 after they had completed an operational tour with 8 Group. (Mike Garbett and Brian Goulding collection)
It was a return to Mannheim on 23/24 September, with the intention of destroying the northern part of the city which had escaped the previous raid. Good weather allowed the PFF to organise a Newhaven attack and those crews and the front of the raid, managed to drop their PVMs directly onto the aiming point. Of the 628 bombers taking part, almost 500 dropped their bombs on the aiming point, with only the rear wave creeping back, but still causing damage to the I.G. Farben factory in the northern suburbs of Ludwigshafen. The devastation in Mannheim was meticulously recorded and although only 102 people were killed, a further 25,000 were bombed out of their homes. Such was the success of this raid, Sir Arthur Harris decided that a third heavy attack against the city was unnecessary until further notice.
Once again 8 Group provided 21 Lancasters and eight Mosquitoes on a diversionary raid but, on this occasion it was not successful because the target, Darmstadt, was little more than 20 miles from Mannheim. Those few German night-fighters who were duped by the diversion could see where the main attack was occurring and quickly headed towards the main force. A large proportion of the 32 bombers lost this night were night-fighter victims, including one of the two Lancasters lost from 97 Squadron.
A total of 678 aircraft returned to Hannover to make amends for the attack five nights earlier. Once again the wind played its part and the attack developed five miles north of the city centre aiming point. However, at least 582 bombers performed the most concentrated piece of bombing during the whole of 1943. Over an area of just 15 square miles, a record-breaking 130 tons per square mile was dropped, flattening the Brink district of Hannover. While this was obviously not the objective, the main force had performed impeccably, while the spot light was once again on the PFF. The group was redeemed though by the blind bombing of the Supporters, who dropped their bombs directly onto the aiming point.
The now traditional diversionary raid was more successful than the last. Some 21 Lancasters and six Mosquitoes attacked Brunswick, causing considerable damage and managing to draw several night-fighters away from the main raid as well. In the case of Lancaster III LM345 of 405 Squadron, this tactic was a little too successful as it fell victim to a night-fighter. Sqn Ldr L. E. Logan DFC RCAF and his crew managed to bail out and survive to become POWs, except Flt Sgt G. L. Watts who managed to evade capture.
Nine other PFF Mosquitoes also did their bit to draw away a few night-fighters during a diversion to Emden but 38 bombers still failed to return from Hannover, four of them from 8 Group. No.35 Squadron lost a Halifax, while 7, 156 and 405 Squadrons lost a Lancaster apiece, the latter being the first loss since fully converting to the type.
The month ended on a high for 8 Group, with a Musical Parramatta to Bochum on 29/30 September. This Oboe-assisted raid involved 352 bombers and, after the lead Mosquitoes dropped their red TIs accurately into the centre of the town, these were bolstered by a concentrated group of green TIs by the backers-up. This superb piece of marking encouraged the main force to drop over 1,000 tons of HE into the middle of the town with devastating results. This was a total success for 8 Group which was marred by the loss of four of its aircraft. One of these was Mosquito IX LR506 of 105 Squadron which was the first example of this new mark flown by the unit. Virtually within sight of their home airfield at Marham, the Mosquito crashed near West Raynham, killing the navigator, Plt Off L. Hogan DFM.
October 1943 – High price for a new target
Before we look at the first raid of October 1943, the activities of the 83 Squadron armourers at Wyton are worth studying. It was not uncommon for the senior staff to change their mind about which target was going to be visited that night and 1 October was no exception. Each raid would not only dictate the amount of fuel taken, but also the bomb load would change from target to target, making the armourers’ job one of the toughest on the station.
On this particular day, the aircrew had been on standby all morning when the call came through to prepare thirteen aircraft to Stuttgart. The usual long and complicated process of preparing for the night’s raid began but, as the armourers prepared to bomb-up, the plan was changed to Hagen. At this point, the Flight Sergeant in charge of the operation disappeared to the Sergeants’ Mess, where he could express his opinion out of earshot. Just as all the aircraft had been de-bombed, at 1500 hrs, Stuttgart was back on again! Unbelievably, after all the aircraft were bombed-up again, the target was switched back to Hagen and probably for the sake of the armourers alone, was finally kept that way. To quote 83 Squadron’s ORB ‘On regaining their sanity, the armourers de-bombed again and visited the chapel for prayers’!
The raid on Hagen went like clockwork for 8 Group which, on this occasion, also included 1 and 5 Groups. A total of 243 Lancasters and eight Mosquitoes found the target cloud-covered but, thanks to some exceptional Oboe sky-marking, the bombing was accurate. Unbeknown to the crews, at least 46 industrial companies were destroyed, including a factory which produced accumulator batteries for U-boats. As the Hagen raid was coming to an end, twelve more 8 Group Mosquitoes were attacking a steelworks at Witten on a training sortie. Eight Mosquitoes managed to bomb Witten while two others, whose equipment had failed, added to the devastation in Hagen.
On 2/3 October, 294 Lancasters of 1, 5 and 8 Groups, with a pair of 8th Air Force B-17s tagging along, attacked Munich. Despite taking part again in another large multiple group raid, the Lancasters of 5 Group almost operated independently which, on this occasion, did not work well. Despite visibility being very good, the first wave of PFF marking was not up to its usual standard. It was, however, placed generally in the centre of the city and the early waves of bombers caused a great deal of damage in the south and south-east of Munich. No.5 Group was bringing up the rear on this raid and employed its ‘time-and-distance’ bombing method, ignoring the PFF marking. A 15-mile creepback developed along the route into the city, with a huge waste of bombs falling harmlessly in open fields. A total of 339 buildings in Munich had been destroyed, with 191 people dead, but it could have been so much worse.
The first of two trips to Kassel during the month was planned for the night of 3/4 October. A force of 547 aircraft, of which 80 were Mosquitoes and Lancasters from 8 Group, set off towards a hazy target. The ground haze was so bad that the H2S blind-markers overshot the A/P and the visual markers could not get a good enough view of the target. These conditions were perfect for the Luftwaffe to drop a trail of decoy flares, which took nearly a third of the main force away from the intended target. Of the aircraft that did attempt to bomb near the A/P, many of them fell in the western suburbs, small towns and villages on the outskirts of Kassel. This was not all bad for the attacking bombers because at least seventeen major factories were seriously damaged – three of them were high-priority targets. The suburb of Wolfshangar also took a pounding and a large ammunition dump to the north at Irlingshausen was also hit. One of the largest of its kind in Germany, the site erupted in a violent explosion, drawing in more bombers. At least 84 buildings were destroyed in the military complex which was pockmarked with craters, one of them over 300 ft in diameter.
A separate diversionary raid was staged again by 8 Group, with ten Mosquitoes attacking Hannover. Twelve more took part in the first of many attacks on the Knapsack power station near Cologne and four flew a Mk.II Oboe trial to Aachen; all the Mosquitoes returned safely.
The next trip to Frankfurt on 4/5 October would be the last Bomber Command raid in which the USAAF would take part. It was also the first serious raid on Frankfurt of the war and a combination of clear weather and good marking dealt the city a bitter blow. The eastern half and the inland docks were particularly heavily hit and the post bombing report described both as a ‘sea of flames’. The diversionary raid against Ludwigshafen was larger than normal at 66 bombers, mainly because of 1 Group’s participation. While the marking and bombing were not up to usual standard, it looks like it did draw some attention from the main raid because just thirteen bombers were lost from the 406 taking part. Unfortunately for 8 Group, three of them were theirs. Two Lancasters, one each from 97 and 156 Squadrons were lost with their crews over Germany, while Halifax II HX148 of 35 Squadron crash-landed. The Halifax with Flt Lt D. R. Wood at the controls had been badly damaged by flak over the target after having been coned and hit repeatedly for nearly five minutes. One engine was knocked out as Wood set course for home and a second failed as he crossed the Dutch coast. The third engine failed over the channel and it was while attempting a single engine approach into Biggin Hill that the final motor gave up and the bomber crashed not far from the airfield’s perimeter. Luckily all escaped, although four of the aircrew were injured.
Worthy of mention are the activities of a single 8 Group Mosquito on 4/6 October which was carrying out the first operational trail of the G-H blind bombing system. While it was unsuccessful on this occasion, this radio-navigation system would become another weapon in Bomber Command’s armoury.
The Hannover raid on 8/9 October would be the last Bomber Command raid for the Wellington. The 26 ‘Wimpies’ that took part in this raid were all very lucky to make it home unscathed, because the German night-fighter controllers guessed the target correctly very early on, despite the largest diversionary raid organised so far. A total of 504 bombers set course for Hannover and, before reaching the target, the enemy night-fighters were weaving in and out of the stream, despatching victim after victim. Despite this, the clear conditions produced good marking, with the TIs glowing brightly in the centre of the city for the first time. The creepback was contained to just two miles, resulting in the worst attack on Hannover of the war. Several key industrial targets, including the Continental rubber factory and the Hanomag machine works, had been severely damaged.
To counter Bomber Command success, the night-fighters had done their work well and 27 aircraft failed to return. No.8 Group had taken it on the chin, with five aircraft lost, made up of two 7 Squadron Lancasters, a 35 Squadron Halifax, plus a Lancaster apiece from 97 and 156 Squadrons. Once again the 35 Squadron’s loss was an epic tale, where the crew were lucky to make it back to friendly soil. Badly shot up by a night-fighter not far from the East Anglian coast, Fg Off M. M. Muller and his crew in Halifax II HR777 desperately tried to reach the emergency landing field at Woodbridge. Missing it completely and momentarily lost after the attack, but convinced they were over England, the bomber crash landed. All seven crew escaped with injuries after their bomber caught fire at Bridge Farm, Bradfield, near North Walsham. Over Gemany it was a grimmer tail for the pilot of 97 Squadron Lancaster III JB174 after the bomber was hit by flak. Plt Off G. D. Nicholl RCAF was over the target when a violent explosion removed the nose of the Lancaster and a large section of the port wing. The main fuselage immediately caught fire and the bomber began to enter an unrecoverable spin. Nicholl was unable to communicate with his crew because the initial blast had ripped off his flying helmet and he must have hoped that they were all making their escape. Although Nicholl would not have known it at the time, the rest of his crew perished in the crippled Lancaster while he was lucky and survived to become a POW.
The destruction of Hannover continued again on 18/19 October, with an all-Lancaster force of 360 aircraft taking part. Unfortunately, the target was cloud covered and the PFF were unable to accurately mark the centre of the city. Most of the bombing fell in open countryside which was a disappointing end to the series of raids on this target.
Things did not improve a great deal with the next raid on a new target and it was a particularly rough night for 8 Group. Up until now, Leipzig had not been seriously attacked with a sizeable force of bombers, but on the night of 20/21 October, 358 Lancasters from 1, 5, 6 and 8 Groups attempted to make amends. This was one of the furthest targets taken on in force since the beginning of the war. It was a 1,100-mile round trip for the 8 Group aircraft and they were the closest of all the Bomber Command groups. The weather on this operation was described in records as ‘appalling’ which is just about all that was recorded about this unsuccessful raid. Bombing was simply described as scattered and of the 271 Lancasters that did manage to bomb, no reports of any serious damage were ever made. To add insult to injury, another sixteen Lancasters failed to return, unfortunately including six more from 8 Group, and of the 42 aircrew missing, only four survived to become POWs. The same night the PFF Mosquitoes were out in force, with 28 of them attacking Berlin, Cologne, Brauweiler and Emden. It did not all go their way either, with two from 139 Squadron failing to return back to Wyton.
With over a week of October 1943 left to run, Bomber Command flew its last major raid of the month with a large force being sent to Kassel. It would be the most devastating raid on this city and once again Bomber Command would pay a very high price for their success.
A total of 569 bombers made up of 322 Lancasters and 247 Halifaxes set course for Kassel unaware that the German night-fighter controllers had successfully predicted the target very early on. On arrival over Kassel, the PFF marking was carried out blind using H2S, but some sharp-eyed visual markers realised that they had overshot the target and the marking was skilfully moved to the centre of the city. Despite a batch of German decoy markers diverting a few bombers, the main force accurately bombed the city centre, resulting in one of the most devastating attacks on a German city since Hamburg’s firestorm back in July. A smaller firestorm did begin in Kassel but not as powerful as in Hamburg. The damage was extensively recorded and the statistics are difficult to comprehend. Sixty-three per cent of the city’s living accommodation was rendered unliveable, with 155 industrial buildings including three Henschel aircraft factories seriously damaged and 78 public buildings, 38 schools, 25 churches and 16 military and police buildings destroyed. Bodies were still being recovered at the end of November, by which time the toll had reached 5,599; a third of these were unidentifiable.
November 1943 – Battle of Berlin begins
It had been ten days since Bomber Command had been out in force and, to make amends, a large raid was organised against Düsseldorf, with a larger than usual diversion against Cologne. Düsseldorf was by far the larger attack with 589 aircraft taking part, including 38 Lancaster IIs from 3 and 6 Groups, all equipped with H2S. This would be the first time H2S was used on a large scale but unfortunately the equipment was still not up to the task.
The bulk of this raid fell on the centre of Düsseldorf, but deteriorating recordkeeping by the Germans does not allow a clear picture to be built of how successful this raid was. The Cologne diversion with 52 Lancasters and ten Mosquitoes, all from 8 Group, was excellent in all respects. Reports from Cologne describe the raid as accurate, with almost all the bombs falling in the city centre. Only seven people on the ground were killed, which gives an idea of how deserted Germany’s big cities were becoming. All aircraft involved returned safely.
It was an all-Mosquito night again on 5/6 November, with 26 taking part in small attacks on Bochum, Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Hannover and Leverkusen. The latter would claim another 105 Squadron Mosquito and an experienced crew. Flt Lt J. Gordon DFC and his navigator Fg Off R. G. Hayes DFC were only 30 miles from touching down at Marham, when they inexplicably crashed into a field at Road Green Farm, Hempnall.
Seven Oboe Mosquitoes attacked Cologne and Duisburg on 8/9 November and, the following night, another eighteen headed for the Ruhr. The target was the blast furnaces at Bochum and a steelworks at Duisburg. All escaped unscathed except Mosquito IV DZ492 of 109 Squadron which was hit by flak near the target. The crew, Plt Off R. E. Leigh and Plt Off J. Henderson, were unaware of how much damage had been caused until they crash-landed at Wyton. Just as the Mosquito touched down, the entire rear fuselage, tail and all, gracefully detached itself from the rest of the aircraft, without injury to either crew.
Formed at Oakington on 12 November 1943, 627 Squadron was one of three squadrons transferred to 5 Group in April 1944. The squadron saw out its days at Woodhall Spa. (via Author)
On 10/11 November, 313 Lancasters from 5 and 8 Groups set course for the Modane railway yards again. The PFF marking was very challenging once more, with the target being located in a valley with sides rising to over 11,000 ft. As in the previous attack, the marking seemed to overshoot and concentrated on the railway station. However, a creepback managed to cause serious damage to railway yards and 200 aircraft returned with target photos showing that their bombs had landed within one mile of the target. One interesting phenomena which was reported by the crews was a bizarre echoing and re-echoing off the mountain sides of their own bombs exploding.
A French target was tackled on 11/12 November when 124 Halifaxes and ten Lancasters attacked the marshalling yards in Cannes. Of this force, eighteen Halifaxes and the ten Lancasters were provided by 8 Group which, on approaching the target, set to work preparing a Newhaven attack from 5,000 ft. The TIs were concentrated but the yards managed to escape the worst of the bombing while the repair shops were damaged by blast. Many French people were out on the streets watching the spectacle, which took a turn for the worse when several bombs fell in the suburb of La Bocca and a village by the name of d’Agay. The German propaganda machine seized the opportunity to describe the RAF flyers as ‘pure savages’ in a local newspaper. The raid was a total success although four Halifaxes failed to return, three of them from 35 Squadron. Two were brought down on the homeward leg back over France by night-fighters. The third Halifax, HR929, being flown by Fg Off J. R. Petrie-Andrews DFC, DFM, had an engine failure en route, but still continued to the target and bombed successfully. Rather than turning back, Petrie-Andrews opted to continue on across the Mediterranean rather than risk being shot down by a night-fighter over France and, at best, a long stretch in a POW camp. As the fuel ran out, a perfect ditching was carried out off the Sardinian coast and, after the seven aircrew had spent a few hours in their dinghy, they were rescued by an Allied ship.
No. 8 Group gained another unit on 12 November, when 627 Squadron was formed at Oakington. The core of the unit was formed from ‘C’ Flight of 139 Squadron, so it was days before it became operational with its Mosquito IVs. This latest addition to the 8 Group armoury was another crucial jigsaw piece that would bolster the harrying and diversionary antics of the Mosquitoes. While not officially stated as such, the LNSF had been born.
The Mosquitoes were at it again on 13/14 November, with nine bombing Berlin and eight, using Oboe, hitting the blast furnaces at Bochum, again all without loss. Ten more Mosquitoes attacked Dusseldorf and three bombed Bonn on 15/16 November, but on this occasion one aircraft was lost from both raids.
The Mosquitoes continued this spell of attacks on 16/17 November, with another 21 attacking Cologne, Gelsenkirchen and Krefeld, while the rest of Bomber Command enjoyed a few days stand down. However, Bennett did not pass the full privilege to 8 Group, stating in signal to all PFF squadrons that they could be required at a moment’s notice.
While the rest of Bomber Command enjoyed a few days’ rest, 8 Group were called upon, at Bennett’s suggestion, to carry out an H2S blind-bombing raid using TIs against Ludwigshafen on 17/18 November. The scientists who had designed H2S had been complaining that their equipment was not being used to its full potential and 8 Group would be perfect to test the boffins’ theories. A separate batch of operations by 21 Mosquitoes was already planned for the same night on Berlin, Bochum, Duisburg and Bonn. The latter target would have a dual role as a diversionary raid for the 66 Lancasters and 17 Halifaxes that would attack Ludwigshafen. On approaching the target, the German defenders fruitlessly started lighting decoy TIs and laying a smoke screen, both of which would be ineffective when H2S was employed. While not fully confirmed, the attack was a success with several fires started within the target area and at least two large explosions seen. Thanks to the four Mosquitoes and their little diversion, the night-fighters were drawn away from the main force and, as the heavy bombers approached their target, they saw the contrails of the enemy rushing to protect Bonn.
Bomber Command and Arthur Harris, in particular, were now ready to take on their biggest challenge of the war so far. Harris was convinced that an all-out attack on Berlin would bring Germany to its knees. In a letter written to Churchill on 3 November, Harris wrote, ‘We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the USAAF will come in on it. It will cost between 400–500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war.’ Harris based his theory on the devastation that had been caused on Hamburg by 7,000 tons of bombs after just four attacks. Sixteen were planned against Berlin, but they would be spread over four months while the mayhem caused in Hamburg was compressed into just ten days. Berlin, though, was a much larger city and, despite the colossal tonnage that would be dropped on it, the damage caused by previous attacks would almost act as fire break. As the campaign developed, the effectiveness of Bomber Command continued to decline, as the night-fighters and increasingly efficient ground defences, took their toll. Half of Harris’s prophecy in the Churchill letter would come true – the alarmingly high price that Bomber Command would pay.
The Battle of Berlin began on the night of 18/19 November, with 440 Lancasters and four Mosquitoes taking part. At the same time, the biggest diversionary raid of the war so far was also taking place, with 395 aircraft attacking Mannheim and Ludwigshafen; this raid would prove a little too successful for many of the crews.
The Berlin force found the city covered in cloud and the PFF had no choice but to mark and bomb blindly. The attack was also hindered by only eleven aircraft having a serviceable H2S and the marking that did take place quickly faded under the thick cloud; even skymarking did not work. However, the backers-up kept marking the target as best they could and at least 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped across the city. Large fires were started and four industrial targets were destroyed. Very few night-fighters were encountered as they appear to have been sent to deal with the Mannheim raid. As a result, only nine Lancasters were lost, including two from 8 Group.
Meanwhile, the Mannheim force also found its target covered in cloud and, despite a valiant attempt to mark the target, the bombing was scattered. Several industrial targets were still hit, including the Daimler-Benz car factory, whose production output dropped by 90% for ‘an unknown period’. The night-fighters were in abundance on this raid and several scored multiple kills, mainly against Halifaxes and Stirlings. Some 23 bombers were lost, a dozen of them Halifaxes, including a 35 Squadron machine, nine Stirlings and a pair of Lancasters, including 7 Squadron’s Lancaster III JA970. The latter was an experienced crew flying the last operation of their tour. None of the 8 Group’s crews survived.
At the start of this raid there was much excitement at Gransden Lodge which had drawn in the Canadian press because of a single 405 Squadron machine. All eyes were on Lancaster X KB700 named the ‘Ruhr Express’, which was the first Canadian-built Lancaster to enter front-line squadron service. It would be an inauspicious first operation for KB700, which returned early with a technical problem. The ‘Ruhr Express’ only flew one more operation with 405 Squadron before it was transferred to another Canadian unit, 419 Squadron at Middle St George. The bomber was written off after its 49th operation; all the more frustrating because it was being planned for the Lancaster to return to Canada after its 50th!
The next raid on Berlin would set records and see the end of an era as Bomber Command’s Stirlings flew their last operations over Germany. A total of 764 aircraft, the largest force despatched on a raid to the German capital so far, headed east, in appalling weather, on 22/23 November. The weather was poor en route but this did not bother the crews as the vast majority of enemy night-fighters were kept on the ground because of it.
It was the most successful raid on Berlin of the war but, with regard to losses, it was one of the worst for 8 Group who lost seven of the 26 aircraft that failed to return. Two were from 7 Squadron, one from 83 Squadron and two each from 97 and 156 Squadrons. Forty-five aircrew were lost and only four from 97 Squadron, Lancaster III JB238, survived to become POWs. Compare these figures to those killed on the ground which were at least 2,000 people, including 500 in a shelter at Wilmersdorf.
A smaller force of 383 aircraft headed for Berlin again the following night, strangely flying the exact same route as they had the previous evening. It would be a night of ‘spoofing’ and decoying, in an attempt to deceive the German controllers, despite the fact that they had identified the intended target very early. Fake communications by German-speaking controllers in England, both male and female achieved some more confusion. Eight Mosquitoes took part in this trip as well and several of them dropped ‘spoof’ fighter flares north of the bomber stream which also drew a few enemy fighters away.
The target was once again cloud-covered, so Wanganui was employed, combined with a good concentration of TIs. The PFF’s efforts this night were almost irrelevant, because the bulk of the 303 aircraft that bombed could not avoid the temptation of the eleven big fires that were still burning from the night before. A large amount of additional destruction was caused, although the exact details were hard to record by those on the ground, who were still coming to terms with the effects of the previous attack. One of several high-priority targets hit was the Rheinmental Borsig works which built tanks, torpedoes, bombs, shells and fuses. At least 45% of the factory was destroyed.
The first of many Canadian-built Lancasters was KB700, the ‘Ruhr Express’, which began operations with 405 Squadron on 18/19 November 1943. (via Author)
The loss statistics for 8 Group this night were even worse than the previous raid. Of the 20 Lancasters lost, nine of them were Pathfinders. No.7 Squadron suffered the most, with two bombers and their crews lost near the target but Fg Off P. K. B. Williams and his crew in Lancaster III JA971 did manage to make it almost back to Oakington. Hit by flak over the target, which was described as light by many crews because so many night-fighters were operating over the city, both elevators were shot away. On approaching Oakington, Williams ordered five of his crew to bail out, rather than risk trying to land the bomber with such crucial control surfaces missing. With just the pilot and navigator onboard, the bomber turned north and was totally abandoned to its fate and crashed at Welney Wash. All of the crew landed safely none the worse for the experience. No.83 Squadron had a bad day as well, losing its commanding officer Wg Cdr R. Hilton DSO, DFC and Bar, along with his crew in Lancaster III JB284. The bomber was hit by flak and crashed in the target area.
On 26/27 November, 443 Lancasters and seven Mosquitoes were mustered for another attack on Berlin. A more substantial diversion of 157 Halifaxes and 21 Lancasters also attacked Stuttgart, but both forces appeared as one until the formation reached Frankfurt. This manoeuvre proved quite effective, as the German controllers thought that Frankfurt was the main target, right up to the last moment.
Unusually, the weather over Berlin was clear and, after a long approach from the south, the PFF marked an area six to seven miles north-west of the city centre. The majority of the force did bomb that area but for even those who did not, their bombs still fell within the sprawl of Berlin. A total of 38 war production-related factories were destroyed and the now wholesale destruction of housing and public buildings continued. One of the latter that was hit was the Berlin zoo which had already been bombed on 22/23 November. Very few animals were housed here now since, like the human population, they had been evacuated to other zoos in Germany but many of those that remained were killed in this attack At least one example of leopard, panther, jaguar and various apes had made their escape, though, only to be hunted and shot in the streets.
December 1943 – Nightmare over Berlin
The first of six major bombing raids that would take place during this month because of poor weather, was organised for the night of 2/3 December. A total of 650 aircraft was due to take off but because of poor flying conditions, the total was brought down to 458 aircraft, which included eighteen Mosquitoes and fifteen Halifaxes, the remainder were all Lancasters.
Setting course directly to Berlin, this should have been a straightforward raid but, unfortunately, the weather forecast issued to the crews was far from accurate. High winds kept pushing the bombers to the south and by the time the stream made it to Berlin, the majority bombed up to 15 miles from the A/P. Some damage was caused across Berlin but this would be a successful night for the enemy, in particular the night-fighter crews. Not only did Berlin’s increasingly effective decoy system draw many bombers off, but the German controller also picked up very early where they were going. Night-fighters were waiting over Berlin in abundance and by the end of this poor operation, 40 aircraft, an alarming 8.7% of the force, had been shot down, including seven from 8 Group.
The weather continued to hinder progress during the month, but many crews would have been relieved to have a break. They probably did not expect it to last an unprecedented two weeks though. In the meantime, the Mosquito operations continued with increasing strength, with attacks on Duisburg and Leverkusen, 25 of them taking part in the latter. One of the biggest Mosquito raids so far, took place on 12/13 December when twenty headed for Essen, nine went to Dusseldorf and a single machine to Osnabrück. Bomber Command and, in particular 8 Group, were finding the Mosquito to be the perfect weapon for keeping up the pressure on the enemy without the risk factor involved in sending larger and more vulnerable bombers to targets deep into Germany. While the Mosquito attacks would continue to increase, they would never replace the big raids.
It was back to the grindstone for Bomber Command when Berlin was again the target on 16/17 December. A force of 483 Lancasters and ten Mosquitoes took a direct route to Berlin over Holland and northern Germany. From the Dutch coast onwards, the bombers had to contend with night-fighters all the way to the target, then even more were waiting for them near Berlin. Before the force had reached Hannover, at least ten bombers had already been shot down. However, the bombers fought back this night and five night-fighters were claimed as shot down, including one by Flt Lt L. C. Kingsbury RNZAF, who was only on his second PFF operation with 7 Squadron. The Lancaster was intercepted by an Fw190 north of Brunswick which attacked from the starboard quarter and opened fire at 350 yards. Kingsbury instantly reacted and pushed the bomber into a diving turn causing the cannon fire to pass harmlessly above the Lancaster. Now exposed to Kingsbury’s air gunners, Fg Off E. G. Bedwell and Sgt E. Parr reacted as quickly as their skipper and opened fire on the enemy fighter sending it earthwards in flames and out of control. The fighter disappeared through 10/10ths cloud which was no thinner when the force arrived over Berlin. The PFF dropped a good concentration of Wanganui flares and the majority of the bombing fell within the limits of the city, causing a great deal of damage. The sustained bombing of Germany’s capital had now rendered over a quarter of its living accommodation uninhabitable.
The same night, the first of a long list of attacks on flying-bomb sites in northern France began: 26 Stirlings and nine Lancasters from 617 Squadron were led by a dozen Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes from 8 Group. The operation involved two separate raids on targets near Abbeville, with the Stirlings attacking Tilley-le-Haut and the Lancasters, a site in a wood at Flixecourt. Neither was successful. The Mosquitoes were unable to get any closer than 450 yards for the Stirling raid and no closer than 350 yards for the Lancasters. The latter, carrying 12,000 lb bombs, dropped them to within 100 yards of the markers, but this was of no significance for a target as small as a V-1 launching site.
The PFF led a total force of 650 Lancasters, Halifaxes and Mosquitoes to Frankfurt on 20/21 December, having been briefed that the target would be free of cloud. The raid did not go well from the start, having been picked up by the German controllers after leaving the English coast. The force was accurately plotted all the way to the target and a large number of individual combats took place. One of these involved a 7 Squadron Lancaster III being flown by Fg Off D. W. Field which came under a sustained attack by a night-fighter over Holland. The hydraulic system was damaged, neither bomb door would open and both turrets were unserviceable, forcing Field to turn back for Oakington. Before the English coast was regained, the bomber was attacked again, which knocked out the port inner engine. Now without flaps and with a jammed undercarriage, Field did not relish the idea of making a belly-landing back at base with a full bomb load. While over Suffolk, Field gave the order to bail out and the bomber crashed two miles north-west of Halesworth.
Meanwhile, as the main force approached the target, the PFF found the target to be covered by up to 8/10ths cloud and the planned Newhaven ground-marking was abandoned. While the main force waited for the alternative, the Germans on the ground were quick to respond, lighting the Hensenstamm decoy fire site five miles south-east of the city. The enemy’s decoy proved to be effective but the bomber force was so big and by now so strung out that the resulting creepback still fell across the city, causing a large amount of damage which changed a potentially disastrous raid into a reasonably successful one.
The night-fighters did not relent as the force turned for home and another Pathfinder crew were lucky to make it home. Plt Off G. P. R. Bond in his 156 Squadron Lancaster was intercepted three times during the flight back to Warboys. The first attack took place just as they left the target but the rear gunner, Flt Sgt R. Underwood gave the attacking Fw190 a three-second burst and no more was seen of him. The second attack came not long after and it was the turn of Plt Off C. H. Moon in his mid-upper turret to try and deter the attacking Ju88. The crew of the twin-engine fighter were made of sterner stuff and returned with accurate fire, wounding Moon in the lung and shoulder, as well as putting a hole in the port outer fuel tank, before breaking away below the Lancaster. Less than a minute later, the Ju88 returned, sensing that this bomber was for the taking but, at a range of 400 yards, Underwood opened up with another three-second burst, striking the enemy fighter, forcing it to break off its attack. Not giving up, the Ju88 pilot attacked for a third time, opening fire from extreme range and the continuous stream of fire eventually struck the Lancaster’s starboard outer engine, setting it on fire. The starboard tyre was also punctured and further rounds buckled the wheel before Underwood managed to hit the Ju88 again, just as Bond dived the Lancaster to port. By now, two of Underwood’s four .303in Brownings had jammed and the Ju88 crew must have been aware that defensive fire had stopped coming from the mid-upper turret. The final attack came from the stern but as the Ju88’s fire passed below the bomber, Bond pulled the aircraft up in a corkscrew and immediately responded to Underwood’s call to dive to starboard. At the same time Underwood gave the Ju88 another burst and this was finally enough to convince the German fighter to give up the fight. Ten minutes later, another night-fighter tried its luck but, by now, Underwood had cleared his guns and gave the enemy a determined response from all four Brownings. The enemy disappeared without firing a shot. Nursing the damaged bomber home, Bond carried out a near perfect landing at Warboys despite the damaged undercarriage. Plt Off Moon survived and eventually fully recovered from his wounds.
It was an eventful night for Sqn Ldr J. Sale and his crew in their 35 Squadron Halifax III HX328. Sale was tasked with being one of the PVMs that night and, after making five attempts to find the AP, flying lower and lower each time, eventually dropped his bombs at just 5,000 ft above the target. Retaining the TIs, Sale set course for Graveley and was one of the lucky few who was not harassed by an enemy night-fighter. However, as the bomber circled the airfield to land, one of the TIs exploded setting the rear turret and a wing on fire, filling the Halifax with smoke. Turning away from the airfield, Sale opened the throttles and climbed to 2,000 ft at which point he ordered his crew to bail out. Sale then trimmed the bomber and prepared to leave when he turned around to be faced with a very embarrassed Flt Lt R. L. Lamb, the mid-upper gunner, holding his burned parachute. Without hesitation or any thought for his own safety, Sale jumped back into his pilot’s seat and turned back towards Graveley as fast as the burning bomber would travel. The bomber touched down, by now pouring flame and, with great skill, Sale steered the Halifax as far away as possible from any buildings. Lamb and Sale were out of the bomber before it stopped rolling and, after running at least 200 yards in full flying kit, threw themselves flat on their faces as HX328 ripped itself apart behind them. It was one of those classic moments as both stood up, brushed themselves down and calmly and, more importantly without injury, headed for the Officers’ Mess.
No. 8 Group and the vast majority of Bomber Command made the most of a few days off over the festive season. It was, as expected, the Mosquitoes that started the proceedings off again, when ten attacked Duisburg, nine Düsseldorf and one to Cologne on 28/29 December without loss.
Lessons learned resulted in a more complex route to Berlin on 29/30 December when 712 bombers flew a long approach from the south, below the Ruhr, and then within 20 miles of Leipzig, turned north for Berlin. To add to the German controllers’ headache this night, eight Mosquitoes carried out a spoof raid on Magdeburg, six more to Dusseldorf, five to Leipzig and three to Leverkusen. Night-fighters were sent to all of the Mosquito spoof locations and by the time the main force was over Berlin, very few were to be seen. Once again poor weather en route to the target also kept many night-fighters on the ground. An excellent display of sky-marking was carried out by the Pathfinders, with most of the bombing falling in the south and south-eastern districts of the city. Those crews arriving late over the target described a smoke plume that rose to over 16,000 ft and fires could still be seen glowing from 200 miles away. Only two bombers out of the 20 aircraft lost were from 8 Group.
The year ended with another attempt on a flying-bomb site which had been missed earlier in the month. Six PFF Mosquitoes led ten 617 Squadron Lancasters on 30/31 December but, once again, the markers were 200 yards off target and the ‘Dambusters’ dropped their bombs directly onto them. Yet again the target was untouched.