In 1966, the III MAF gained the 1st Marine Division, although elements of the division had been in South Vietnam since July 1965. The bulk of the division arrived in-country between January and June 1966 and was stood up in July 1966. The III MAF assigned it responsibility for the security of the three southernmost provinces of I Corps in October 1966.
At the same time that the 1st Division took over the responsibility of the three southernmost provinces of I Corps, the 3d Marine Division took on sole responsibility for the two northernmost provinces of I Corps. Elements of the 5th Marine Division were also deployed to South Vietnam to reinforce both the 1st and 3d Marine divisions. By the end of 1966, the III MAF had 66,000 men.
As the numbers of Marines in I Corps grew, in 1966 the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), overseen by US Army four-star general William C. West-moreland, wanted the majority of III MAF’s assets immediately devoted to conducting large-scale ‘search-and-destroy’ operations. These were intended to take place in the relatively unpopulated mountainous and jungle-covered hinterlands of I Corps’ five provinces where the enemy supposedly resided.
Westmoreland believed throughout his command during the Vietnam War that if enough of the enemy were killed, the rest would be forced to concede. Search and destroy became the standard operating practice of US Army divisions based in the II and III Corps areas under his direct control. He turned over pacification programmes to the South Vietnamese government and military, even after stating that they were not up to the task.
Senior Marine commanders felt from the beginning of 1966 that their resources would be better devoted to initially conducting small-scale unit security and pacification programmes. These were to take place along the densely-populated coastal regions of I Corps. The intended goal was to eliminate the VC cadre that lived among the rural communities and encourage inhabitants to support the South Vietnamese government.
In a US military pamphlet appears this description of the cadre and their role in a typical South Vietnamese village: ‘. . . trained, dedicated, hard-core Communist leaders and military officers . . . a cadre’s role can best be described as a combination priest, policeman, and propagandist’.
Colonel George W. Carrington, Jr, the 3d Marine Division G-2 (intelligence officer), wrote in January 1966 regarding the importance of security and pacification programmes:
. . . to reassure the villagers that they were safe, supported and protected, US Marines undertook a most demanding pattern of intensive, multiple, day-and-night, tedious patrol activity. The incredible total of man-hours devoted to this end and the sincere, compassionate, and dedicated manner in which thousands of Marines did their duty were never understood or appreciated by outsiders.
Marine Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, a specialist in counter-insurgency and the commander of the Fleet Marine Force/Pacific (FMF/Pac), the command level above the III MAF, stated his opinion on the importance of security and pacification programmes: ‘There was no virtue at all in seeking out the enemy in the mountains and jungles, that so long as they stayed there, they were a threat to nobody, that our efforts should be addressed to the rich, populous lowlands.’
Krulak went on to state that if the enemy did leave the security of their hinterland bases and moved towards the populated coastal regions, ‘they can be cut up by our supporting arms [artillery and aviation], the Marines are glad to take them on . . . but the real war is among the people and not among the mountains.’
General Vo Nguyen Giap, a senior commander of the NVA, confirmed Krulak’s stance, writing: ‘The primary emphasis is to draw American units into remote areas and thereby facilitate control of the population of the lowlands.’
The III MAF’s plan of battle for 1966, under General Walt’s command, called for securing I Corps’ coastal regions as well as conducting the search-and-destroy operation that Westmoreland wanted. III MAF’s initial search-and-destroy operation, begun on 11 January, received the name Operation MALLARD. Unfortunately, the enemy formations that the plan sought to engage and destroy were nowhere to be found, except in small numbers. Operation MALLARD ended on 17 January.
At the end of 1965, Westmoreland had ordered the III MAF, in conjunction with the ARVN, to begin offensive operations along the border area between the southernmost province of I Corps and the northernmost province of II Corps, overseen by the US Army. The purpose was to stop an enemy build-up in that region. Receiving the name Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I, it took place between 28 January and 17 February 1966.
On 20 February Operation DOUBLE EAGLE II began and ran through to 1 March. In neither operation were enemy forces encountered in the large numbers expected, as the majority had withdrawn before the Marine/ARVN operations. The Marines claimed 324 enemy killed with the loss of 24 Marines. Lieutenant General Krulak concluded that, as had apparently happened during other Marine operations, the enemy had advance notice due to security breaches.
Krulak described several years later the poor impression that continuous search-and-destroy operations made on the South Vietnamese rural population, as the Marines ‘would come in, comb the area and disappear; whereupon the VC would resurface and resume control.’
Operation DOUBLE EAGLE was followed by Operation UTAH, a combined Marine/ARVN endeavour. It lasted from 4 to 7 March. In this case, the NVA decided to stand and fight. The Marines claimed they accounted for 600 enemy dead and 7 captured. Marine losses came in at 98 killed and 278 wounded. The ARVN reported losses of 30 dead and 120 wounded.
From mid-May to early June of 1966, South Vietnam was wracked by severe religious and political strife, centred on the city of Da Nang and surrounding areas, bringing a temporary halt to ARVN military and pacification operations throughout the country.
At a number of points during the internal strife, rebel ARVN forces threatened local Marine units. In the end, the Marine leadership convinced the rebel leadership that this would not end well for them and the rebels backed down. A Marine officer much later expressed his fears to the Marine command when he stated:
If we’d got ourselves in a position with the government forces fighting the local forces up there [Da Nang], and particularly if we had been caught in the middle of it and there’d been any significant US casualties, I have a feeling that the US Government would have probably pulled out of the war right then and there.
The III MAF launched a pacification sweep-and-clear operation named Operation LIBERTY in and around the Da Nang air base. With limited ARVN support, it took place between 7 and 27 June. The enemy offered only minimal resistance, with the highest number of Marine losses attributed to mines.
From a publication titled Small Unit Actions in Vietnam: Summer of 1966 appears this passage on the weaponry with which a Marine patrol went into battle:
The Marines wore helmets and flak jackets. Each rifleman carried 150 rounds of ammunition and two or more hand grenades. The men of the two machine-gun crews were draped with belts of linked cartridges totaling 1,200 rounds. The two 3.5-inch rocket-launcher teams carried five high-explosive (HE) and five white phosphorus (WP) rockets. Four grenadiers carried twenty-eight 40mm shells apiece for their stubby M79s. Sergeant Cunningham had given six LAAWs [sic] to some riflemen to provide additional area target capability. Artillery and mortars were on call.
In response to reports of a large NVA formation south of the Da Nang air base in early June, the III MAP ordered an extensive series of reconnaissance operations to pinpoint its locations. These missions involved Marines from either a division’s reconnaissance battalion or a Force Command reconnaissance company. Both deployed behind enemy lines via helicopters. Whereas divisional reconnaissance units performed short-range tactical missions, those from the Force Command were intended for longer-range strategic purposes.
In the Medal of Honor citation of Gunnery Sergeant Jimmie E. Howard, platoon leader, Company C, First Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division appears this extract describing his bravery on 16 June when his platoon, located on a mountain-top observation post (dubbed Hill 485), was attacked after midnight by an enemy battalion:
Reacting swiftly and fearlessly in the face of the overwhelming odds, G/Sgt. Howard skillfully organized his small but determined force into a tight perimeter defense and calmly moved from position to position to direct his men’s fire. When fragments of an exploding enemy grenade wounded him severely and prevented him from moving his legs, he distributed his ammunition to the remaining members of his platoon and proceeded to maintain radio communications and direct air strikes on the enemy with uncanny accuracy . . . G/Sgt. Howard was largely responsible for preventing the loss of his entire platoon.
When discovered by the enemy, or having completed their assignments, reconnaissance units were to be evacuated by helicopter. If required, they could be reinforced by a quick reaction team of varying sizes to aid in evacuation, as would be the case for Gunnery Sergeant Howard’s platoon. A total of fifteen men in Howard’s platoon received Silver Stars and two received the Navy Cross. The Battle for Hill 485 was part of a larger endeavour labelled Operation KANSAS that ran from 13 to 22 June.
Beginning in early July 1966, Marine reconnaissance units began reporting the ever-growing presence of the NVA on the south (Marine) side of the DMZ. Prisoners captured by the ARVN confirmed this, indicating that the forces were of an NVA division. In response, the III MAF organized Operation HASTINGS to coincide with an ARVN operation unfolding south of the Marine operation. Operation HASTINGS began on 15 July and continued until 3 August.
The Marines of Operation HASTINGS, encountering the NVA main force, experienced fierce resistance, as reported in this passage by Staff Sergeant John J. McGinty:
. . . we starting getting mortar fire, followed by automatic weapon fire from all sides . . . they were blowing bugles, and we could see them waving flags . . . ‘Charlie’ [the enemy] moved in waves with small arms right behind the mortars, and we estimated we were being attacked by a thousand men. We just couldn’t kill them fast enough.
After heavy fighting on 18 July and the NVA’s terrible losses from Marine supporting arms, the NVA became less interested in tangling with the Marine infantry units for a few days while they regrouped. There would be more bloody encounters between the Marines and the NVA on 24 and 25 July, with the last occurring on 28 July. With the conclusion of Operation HASTINGS, the Marines reported killing more than 700 enemy troops and capturing 17.
Marine casualties were also high – 126 killed and 448 wounded. Captain Robert J. Modrzejewski, receiving a Medal of Honor for his actions in repulsing numerous enemy attacks on his unit on 15 July, stated in the aftermath of the engagement: ‘Our company was down from 130 to 80, and I had kids who were hit in five or six places.’ ARVN losses were reported as twenty-one killed and forty wounded during their nearby but separate search-and-destroy operation.
Upon the conclusion of Operation HASTINGS, General Walt, III MAP commander, summed up his opinion of the NVA based on what had transpired:
We found them well-equipped, well-trained, and aggressive to the point of fanaticism. They attacked in mass formations and died by the hundreds. Their leaders had misjudged the fighting ability of US Marines and ARVN soldiers together; our superiority in artillery and total command of the air. They had vastly underestimated. . .our [helicopter] mobility.
Despite the success of Operation HASTINGS, General Westmoreland, MACV commander, believed that large NVA units still existed south of the DMZ and had to be addressed by the III MAF. This led to Operation PRAIRIE, which involved numerous reconnaissance Marine detachments sent to locate and engage these NVA units.
Operation PRAIRIE began on 3 August 1966. Three days later, the NVA started to react to the operation by going after a five-person reconnaissance team. The scope and ferocity escalated as more and more troops were fed in on both sides, only winding down four weeks later. The Marines claimed 200 enemy dead, while losing 37 killed and 130 wounded. The fighting picked up again the following month.
An impression of the fighting of late September appears in Captain Roger K. Ryman’s appraisal of the Marines’ foe, the NVA:
Their fire discipline remained excellent. Invariably they’d pick just the right piece of terrain, where it was so narrow that we couldn’t maneuver on the flanks, and they’d dig in and wait for us in the bottleneck. Sometimes they’d let the point man go by and then let us have it.
Marine Colonel Alexander D. Cereghino commented on the engagements in which he took part during the 1966 phase of Operation PRAIRIE: ‘At the beginning of Prairie we were fighting well-trained and well-equipped soldiers. At the end, we were running into poorly-equipped young soldiers and frustrated commanders.’
In spite of the fierce fighting during Operation PRAIRIE in 1966, the Marines of the III MAP took pride in knowing that they had prevented the NVA from establishing a major operating base south of the DMZ. Operation PRAIRIE itself would continue into December 1966, and then into early 1967 at a much reduced level of activity. The reason: the north-east monsoon season that lasted from October 1966 until March 1967.
A critical factor that allowed the Marine ground forces to prevail over the enemy in 1966 was their aerial support, both helicopter and fixed-wing. Marine helicopters flew over 400,000 sorties that year, with 75 per cent in support of the III MAP. Fifty-two helicopters were lost, with thirty-nine of those considered combat losses.
Not Going as Planned
In spite of the Marines’ and US Army’s 1966 successes in blunting their enemies’ operations, the overall war was not going well for the American military. Robert S. McNamara, the civilian Secretary of Defense considered one of the early architects of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, had visited South Vietnam in 1966 and on 14 October 1966 he reported his impressions from that visit to American President Lyndon Johnson: ‘There is no sign of an impending break in enemy morale, and it appears that he can more than replace his losses . . . Pacification is a bad disappointment . . . full security exists nowhere – not even behind Marine lines and in Saigon; in the countryside, the enemy almost completely controls the night.’
The fixed-wing assets of Marine aviation in 1966 flew over 60,000 sorties. Of that number, 43,000 were in direct support of the III MAP. The other 17,000 sorties were flown by Marine aviation in support of the Seventh Air Force campaign over both South and North Vietnam, as well as the neighbouring country of Laos. The Seventh Air Force was the Air Component Command of the MACV. The cost to Marine aviation in 1966 came to fifty-one aircraft.
With the beginning of 1967, the 1st Marine Division found itself hard-pressed for manpower as it would be involved in a three-pronged war effort. At the infantry company level and below, it conducted untold thousands of patrols. These sought to deter enemy attacks on friendly industrial and military sites within the three southernmost provinces of I Corps, as well as protect the civilian population residing in the coastal regions.
Second, the 1st Marine Division tried to provide as much support as possible for the South Vietnamese government’s efforts to neutralize the enemy’s political/military infrastructure in I Corps’ coastal regions. Well aware of the threat posed, the enemy constantly interfered with South Vietnamese government ‘Revolutionary Development Teams’. The American CIA established the original programme in 1964.
Last, the 1st Marine Division went about conducting infantry battalion-sized or more extensive operations against VC main force units that might pose a threat to the three southernmost provinces of I Corps. The first four of these – labelled Operation DESOTO, DECKHOUSE VI, UNION and UNION II – all took place between January and June 1967.
Such was the demand for additional Marines during these operations that the US Army tasked its 23rd Infantry Division, better known as the ‘Americal’ Division, with responsibility for security in the two southernmost provinces of I Corps, allowing the 1st Marine Division to concentrate in the central province of I Corps. This restructuring, called ‘Task Force Oregon’, took place between April and September of 1967. The III MAF, despite the 23rd being a US Army unit, had oversight over the 23rd’s operations.
A description of fighting during Operation UNION II in June 1967 appears in this extract from the Medal of Honor citation of Captain James Albert Graham:
Company F, a leading company, was proceeding across a clear rice paddy area 1,000 meters wide, attacking towards the assigned objective, when it came under fire from mortars and small arms which immediately inflicted a large number of casualties. Hardest hit by the enemy fire was the 2nd platoon of Company F, which was pinned down in the open paddy area by intense fire from two concealed machine guns. Forming an assault unit from members of his small company, Captain Graham boldly led a fierce assault . . . forcing the enemy to abandon the first machine gun . . . Resolute to silence the second machine gun, which continued its devastating fire, Capt. Graham’s small force stood steadfast in its hard-won enclave.
In June 1967, Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman replaced Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt as the III MAF commander. Cushman had served as the deputy commander of III MAF between April and May 1967 and, like Walt, he was a highly-decorated veteran of the Second World War.
In spite of their heavy losses during January through to June 1967, the enemy never wavered in their commitment to complete victory. They continued to send more troops into the three southern provinces in I Corps to battle the US Marine 1st Division, US Army 23rd Division and ARVN divisions.
In early July 1967, a VC main force unit mounted a successful attack on a large South Vietnamese prison located within I Corps. They managed to breach the jail’s defences and freed 1,196 military and political prisoners.
On 14 July, the enemy fired fifty long-range 122mm rockets into the Da Nang air base, destroying ten aircraft and damaging another forty. The Marines, in response, enlarged their defensive belt around the air base. The number of Marine overflights was also significantly increased, to detect and destroy enemy rocket teams. In spite of these measures, the rocket attacks still continued.
The deputy commander of MACV, Major General Raymond L. Murray, remarked on the complications posed by rockets: ‘It [the enemy rocket capacity] was constantly on everybody’s mind. With a relatively minor investment in men and equipment, the NVA could keep an entire Marine division occupied.’
After detecting an NVA regiment operating in the southernmost province of I Corps in late July 1967, plans were quickly put forward to engage and destroy it, in conjunction with the ARVN mounting a companion operation. The 1st Marine Division portion received the name Operation COCHISE and began on 8 August, continuing until 28 August. The combined Marine/ARVN operations forced the NVA regiment to relocate, but it retained its fighting capability.
At the beginning of September 1967, the NVA returned in divisional strength. In response, the Marines mounted Operation SWIFT on 4 September. During the first few days of the operation, the NVA engaged various Marine infantry units and inflicted severe losses. As almost always, it proved to be the Marine supporting arms that turned the tide of battle.
Operation SWIFT ended on 15 September, only to be followed by numerous other operations of varying sizes throughout I Corps that continued until the end of 1967. Many aimed to protect Da Nang air base simply by keeping the enemy far enough away so that their rocket teams could not strike it.
An example of what the 1st Marine Division encountered in their efforts to clear their portion of I Corps occurred when a Marine infantry company took on the assignment of seizing an NVA fortified village during Operation ESSEX. It unfolded between 6 and 17 November. Describing the incident in 1981, Lieutenant Colonel Gene W. Bowers stated:
The [Marine] assault was well coordinated and executed, maintaining continuous fire superiority over the enemy until the assault line reached the bamboo hedgerow on the periphery of the village. Eight taut strands of US[-type] barbed wire were unexpectedly encountered woven among the bamboo stalks. As the Marines fought to break through the barrier, .50 caliber machine-gun fire from 800 meters on the right flank and 800 meters on the left flank commenced enfilading, grazing fire down the line of barbed wire as 60mm, 82mm and 4.2in mortar rounds began impacting in the [rice] paddy before the village. Our platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Robert W. Miller, Jr, was killed and both platoon sergeants were severely wounded. The assault faltered, and the Marines took cover, protected by small inter-paddy dikes.
In the two relatively unpopulated northern I Corps provinces that faced the DMZ, the 3d Marine Division found itself as anticipated engaged in large-scale battles with elements from more than four NVA divisions. These began in January 1967 and grew in scope and intensity in the summer and autumn.
General Westmoreland had outlined the threat to the northernmost provinces of I Corps in a 13 September 1966 message to his US Navy counterpart: ‘The seriousness of the threat underscores the importance and urgency of utilizing all practicable means to prevent the enemy from generating a major offensive designed to liberate the provinces in question and to inflict maximum casualties.’
According to the Marines, during August 1996 through to January 1967, Operation PRAIRIE accounted for 1,397 enemy soldiers killed and 27 captured. Marine losses came in at 239 dead and 1,214 wounded.
Due to the success of Operation PRAIRIE, I Corps decided to mount Operation PRAIRIE II, in conjunction with local ARVN units, on 1 February 1967. Running until 18 March, like its namesake, its goal was the destruction of any NVA forces operating south of the DMZ.
Due to an increasingly massive build-up of enemy forces and their artillery north of the DMZ, the 3d Marine Division obtained permission (for the first time) on 25 February to deliver artillery fire across the DMZ. The action resulted in heavy NVA counter-battery artillery fire beginning on 27 February.
NVA ground units also began mounting operations south of the DMZ in response. In one engagement they successfully ambushed a Marine column. In 1981 then Marine Major Robert F. Sheridan recounted a brief description of the events leading to an NVA ambush of his unit:
We were ordered to proceed . . . knowing full well we were walking into a hornets’ nest. Based on the number of enemy forces we had already encountered and the vast amount of equipment, new weapons and ammunition, we knew we were outnumbered and outgunned . . . We left the perimeter . . . and within 200 yards we came upon a huge radio complex. The trail was narrow, and we could not disperse our troops. One could almost smell the enemy force.
As the Marines poured more assets into the battle, they eventually gained the advantage in firepower, pushing the NVA into withdrawal. In the closing stages of Operation PRAIRIE II, the Marines came across enemy mass grave sites. The Marines claimed 694 enemy troops killed and 20 captured, while 93 Marines died in the fighting, with another 483 wounded.
On 19 March the Marines along the DMZ began Operation PRAIRIE III, which continued until 19 April. At one point the NVA attacked a Marine company command post guarded by a platoon of infantry. In the Medal of Honor citation of Second Lieutenant John Paul Bobo appears the following passage:
When an exploding enemy mortar round severed Lieutenant Bobo’s right leg below the knee, he refused to be evacuated and insisted upon being placed in a firing position to cover the movement of the command group to a better location. With a web belt around his leg serving as a tourniquet and with his leg jammed into the dirt to curtail the bleeding, he remained in his position and delivered devastating fire into the ranks of the enemy attempting to overrun the Marines. Lieutenant Bobo was mortally wounded while firing his weapon into the main point of the enemy attack.
By the time Operation PRAIRIE III ended, the Marines had once again pushed the NVA back across the DMZ. In the process, they claimed an enemy body count of 252 killed and 4 captured. The Marine losses were 56 dead and 530 wounded.
Despite the NVA’s failed attempts to push across the DMZ in early 1967, they continued to build up and push ever larger forces south across the DMZ into South Vietnam during the summer and autumn of that year.
On 10 May, a worrying event occurred for Marine aviation. An A-4 Skyhawk was taking part in a ground-support mission along the South Vietnamese side of the DMZ. It encountered enemy surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that brought the aircraft down. Before this event, Marine pilots had met only various types of anti-aircraft guns in South Vietnam.
Following Operation PRAIRIE III, the Marines began Operation PRAIRIE IV. The NVA also went on the offensive at the same time, trying on 13 May to overrun an important Marine position at Con Thien, less than 2 miles from the DMZ.
The enemy’s attack on Con Thien included an ambush of the joint Marine and US Army relief column. Despite the NVA’s best efforts, Marine supporting fire-power again proved their undoing and resulted in their loss of 197 men killed and 8 captured. The Marines listed 44 of their own killed and 110 wounded.
The Marines had not been allowed to enter the DMZ for fear that they might mistakenly cross it. This greatly hampered effective operations as it allowed the NVA a buffer zone in the DMZ that was safe from American attack. The day after the NVA’s initial attack from the buffer zone against Con Thien, the American government lifted the ban.
To take advantage of the change in rules, the Marines planned divisional-sized operations to begin on 18 May in conjunction with an ARVN division. The aim was to clear the NVA from the former buffer area. To prevent civilian losses, the South Vietnam National Police evacuated approximately 12,000 non-combatants from the field before the start of various operations.
Instead of a single name, the new operations aimed at clearing out the former buffer zone of the NVA would receive individual names reflecting a variety of geographic areas and different Marine and ARVN units; hence there was Operation HICKORY, Operation LAM SON 54, Operation BELT TIGHT and Operation BEAU CHARGER.
The last of the operations concluded on 28 May. Estimated enemy losses came in at 789 killed and 37 captured. Recorded Marine casualties were 142 dead and 896 wounded. The ARVN listed 22 killed and 122 injured. Both sides’ claims of the number of enemy losses often proved overstated to appear more successful than was actually the case.
Following the various operations aimed at clearing the NVA from the buffer zone, the participating Marine and ARVN units joined in finishing off Operation PRAIRIE IV, which officially ended on 31 May 1967. NVA losses came in at 508 dead and 8 captured, with friendly casualties placed at 164 killed and 1,240 wounded.
To keep the enemy on the run, the day after Operation PRAIRIE IV ended, Operation CIMARRON began with the same Marine and ARVN units sweeping the same area. However, the NVA had wisely decided that they had suffered enough and through to 2 July, the last day of Operation CIMARRON, they offered little resistance. There then began Operation BUFFALO.
As Operation BUFFALO unfolded, the NVA mounted a significant offensive against Con Thien once again. An important outpost for US forces, its capture by the enemy would be a decisive victory as it would open up a key route for the NVA to insert into South Vietnam 35,000 troops already staged on the north side of the DMZ.
The NVA’s second significant attempt to seize Con Thien began near the outpost at the beginning of Operation BUFFALO. Two Marine infantry companies unknowingly walked into a large-scale enemy ambush and ran into a firestorm of enemy fire. When the Marines attempted to take cover from the intense fire, the enemy employed flame-throwers to force them into the open where their small-arms fire decimated the now-exposed Marines.
In hurried support of the two hard-hit Marine infantry companies, Marine aviation dropped 90 tons of ordnance in the first few hours. A Marine staff sergeant later stated: ‘I asked for napalm as close as 50 yards from us; some of it came in only 20 yards away. But I’m not complaining.’ Besides Marine artillery and tanks, US Navy destroyers added their firepower to the battle. When the fighting finally concluded with a Marine withdrawal, the Marines had lost 84 dead, 190 wounded and 9 missing. Enemy losses were unknown.
In answer to the ever-present threat from Marine aviation, the enemy moved more SAMs into the area south of the DMZ, accounting for another Marine jet fighter on 6 July. Enemy artillery fire from across the DMZ also became more accurate during this time as demonstrated on 7 July with a direct hit on a Marine command post. It was determined to be a 152mm high-explosive (HE) round that had struck and penetrated the well-protected bunker.
As had happened so many times before, Marine supporting arms broke the back of the NVA summer offensive operation against the base at Con Thien. This had been the enemy’s most substantial push across the DMZ up until that time, with the enemy calling it quits on or around 8 July 1967. Operation BUFFALO concluded on 14 July 1967. The Marines claimed they had accounted for 1,290 enemy soldiers killed and 2 captured. Marine losses came in at 159 killed and 345 wounded.
The McNamara Line
Under discussion at the highest levels of the US government since March 1966 was the idea of creating some unmanned barrier system along the southern boundary of the DMZ, including mines and various types of sensors, to help contain the NVA. Marine aviation would support this defensive line. The man behind the concept was Robert S. McNamara, the civilian Secretary of Defense.
A senior US Navy admiral pointed out on 13 September 1966 the disadvantage of installing an unmanned defensive line along the DMZ: ‘. . . a barrier system must be tended; if not, it could be breached with ease, while the flow of men and the material to the VC/NVA continued.’
The commander of the 3d Marine Division agreed, saying that the entire concept was ‘absurd’. In the end, on 15 September 1966, the barrier system, now to include Marine-manned strongpoints, was ordered built.
Extremely costly to construct, the barrier system went by several official names but eventually came to be known, unofficially, by the Marines as the ‘McNamara Line’. The emphasis on its construction began to wane in January 1968, and officially ended in October 1968 as other more pressing concerns arose.
The McNamara Line ended up as a costly failure and proved to be a burden on the manpower and equipment of the III MAP – especially the 3d Marine Division – at a very trying time.
Lieutenant General Cushman, appointed the commander of the III MAP in June 1967, recalled in 1982: ‘. . . really got in a fit with some of the engineer [US Army] colonels that would come roaring up from Saigon to see how the fence was doing and . . . I’d say ‘‘Well it’s going fine, go up and take a look’’, which they always did. Always had a few people around, but we just weren’t going out getting everybody killed building that stupid fence.’
One unnamed Marine officer stated his opinion of the McNamara Line and its value: ‘With these bastards [the NVA], you’d have to build the [barrier] zone all the way to India, and it would take the whole Marine Corps and half the [US] Army to guard it; even then they’d probably burrow under it.’
The NVA would not give up on Con Thien. The Marines had their first indication that the enemy was going to try again in late August 1967, as the intensity of NVA artillery and rocket fire significantly increased with the primary target being Con Thien. The enemy required a propaganda victory before the north-east monsoon season began.
On 3 September, the NVA once again crossed the DMZ in force, with their main thrust to the south and south-east of Con Thien. The Marines beat these attacks back in hard fighting, requiring the largest concentration of firepower during the Vietnam War in support of a single division. Taking part in this demonstration of American military muscle, besides Marine Corps supporting arms, were US Air Force planes including B-52 bombers.
Despite enduring an unheard-of amount of punishment, the enemy threat to Con Thien continued until the end of December 1967. An example of NVA persistence is described in this extract by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Studt in 1981, representing the fighting in late October during the closing stages of Operation KINGFISHER:
From before dusk . . . until almost 0200 in the morning, we were under almost continuous attack by both direct and indirect fire, and our perimeter was hit again and again by ground attacks . . . The wounded were being accumulated in the vicinity of my CP [command post], which consisted of foxholes, and the suffering was a cause of anguish. After several attempts to medevac them by helicopter were aborted due to intense enemy fire, we came up with the plan that on signal every man on the perimeter would open fire on known or suspected enemy positions . . . for a few minutes with an intense volume of fire. During this brief period, a volunteer pilot . . . succeeded in zipping into the zone and removing our emergency medevacs. The [trick] . . . probably would have not worked again.
Concerned about the continuing threat posed by the NVA to the DMZ, General Westmoreland deployed a 1st Cavalry Division brigade to the area around the Da Nang air base in October 1967. This allowed the III MAF commander to move a 1st Marine Division regiment to the northernmost province of I Corps in support of the hard-pressed 3d Marine Division. The repositioning of the 1st and 3d Marine divisions in the autumn of 1967 closer to the DMZ to foil predicted 1968 NAV offensives would become known as Operation CHECKERS.
Despite the 3d Marine Division’s hard-won success in turning back the NVA divisions’ two significant attempts to cross the DMZ into South Vietnam in 1967, there was no pursuit by I Corps divisions back across the line to finish off those retreating divisions. US government policy at the time did not allow such actions for fear of provoking a hostile reaction from the Red Chinese and Soviet governments and a possible widening of the conflict.
Marine Brigadier General Louis Metzger, who later became assistant commander of the 3d Marine Division, later expressed the disdain that he and other Marines had had for the policy of not being able to pursue retreating enemy across the DMZ in the summer and fall of 1967:
It has long been my belief that the most significant aspect of operation along the DMZ was the publicly-stated United States policy that US Forces would not enter North Vietnam. This allowed the enemy to deploy his forces across the DMZ at the time and place of his choosing, and to withdraw to a sanctuary when it suited his convenience; to utilize his artillery against US positions and bases while at the same time denying the Marines the most effective means of destroying the enemy weapons.
Victory is Just around the Corner
General Westmoreland, MACV commander, stated in November 1967: ‘Infiltration will slow; the Communist infrastructure will be cut up and near collapse; the Vietnamese Government will prove its stability, and the Vietnamese army will show that it can handle the Vietcong; United States units can begin to phase down.’
In turning back enemy incursions across the DMZ in 1967, the 3d Marine Division suffered a large number of casualties, especially during the fighting around Con Thien, which totalled 956 men. Losses for the year totalled approximately 5,000 dead and wounded. Marine Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, commander of FMF/Pac, and his US Navy counterpart agreed that such a loss rate was not sustainable.
Krulak would go on to state that the enemy’s purpose in 1967 was as follows:
. . . to get us as near to his weapons and to his forces as possible, drench us with high-angle fire weapons, engage us in close and violent combat, accept willingly a substantial loss of life for the opportunity to kill a lesser number of our men, and to withdraw into his North Vietnam sanctuary to refurbish.
A Marine Corps M48A3 medium tank disembarks from a US Navy landing craft. The bulk of the 1st Marine Division arrived in South Vietnam during the first half of 1966. The division would be stood up in July 1966 and assigned the security of the three southernmost provinces of I Corps. In October 1966, the 3d Marine Division took responsibility for the two northernmost provinces of I Corps. (USMC)
In South Vietnam, the III MAF served under the oversight of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Its commander from August 1964 through to 1968 would be US Army four-star General William C. Westmoreland, pictured here. He firmly believed that American military forces could win the Vietnam War by attrition, using its firepower advantage over the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA). (US Army)
By January 1966, the NVA had three divisions as seen from this map in South Vietnam. It had also begun amassing large numbers of troops and equipment just north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam. Westmoreland wanted the III MAF to concentrate on the destruction of NVA divisions in I Corps, rather than the Marine preference for concentrating on pacification efforts. (USMC)
Marine three-star Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, pictured here, was a veteran of both the Second World War and the Korean War, and a specialist in counter-insurgency warfare. During the Vietnam War he oversaw the Fleet Marine Force/Pacific (FMF/Pac). In that command slot Krulak could only exercise administrative command of the III MAF, such as selecting its personnel, replacements and so forth. (USMC)
As the III MAF grew in size later during 1965 and 1966, it devoted increasing resources to pacification efforts aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people. In just the area around the Da Nang air base, there were 150,000 civilians within 81mm mortar range. One reliable way of convincing the local population of the Marines’ good intentions was by providing medical care. (USMC)
Due to the ebb and flow of the III MAF’s combat operations in I Corps, the rural population often had to be uprooted. Once in resettlement camps, they lacked access to food, clothing and shelter. To ease their suffering, the Marines contacted private charitable organizations to donate the much-needed items. Pictured here is a Marine helping a civilian to transport a sack of rice. (USMC)
The III MAF operations were hampered in early 1966, as were the enemy’s, by heavy monsoon rains that ran roughly from October 1965 to the following March in central South Vietnam. In this picture, a rain-soaked Marine is wearing a US Navy wet-weather parka and using an AN/PRC-25 field radio. The makeshift tent appears to consist of rubberized ponchos tied together. (USMC)
Waiting for orders is a no doubt very wet and miserable Marine rifleman keeping watch on his surroundings, armed with an M14 rifle. Of note is that the Marine pictured here is not wearing his M1 steel helmet. Rather, he is wearing only the fibre lining from his helmet for protection from the elements. Around his waist is the 1961 rifle belt and accoutrements supported by the M1941 belt suspenders. (USMC)
Loaded, the M14 rifle pictured here in the arms of two Marine infantrymen weighed 10.7lb and fired a powerful 7.62mm round with an effective range of up to 500 yards. The Marine in the foreground, besides carrying a binoculars case, is wearing on his waist belt an M1956 universal small-arms ammunition pouch. (USMC)
The M14 seen in the hands of this Marine rifleman during the Vietnam War was a semi-automatic weapon. In theory each Marine fire team had a single man armed with a selective-fire version of the rifle labelled the M14A1. It had a practical rate of fire in fully-automatic mode of sixty rounds per minute. The M14 rifle series would be the American military’s last so-called ‘battle rifle’ or ‘full-power combat rifle’. (USMC)
A Marine rifleman with his M1911A1 .45 calibre automatic pistol at the ready. Typically, the only enlisted men authorized with handguns were those assigned to crew-served weapons. The Marine pictured here is wearing the M1955 body armour unofficially nicknamed the ‘flak vest’. The Marine Corps had first issued body armour to its men during the Korean War. (USMC)
Humping a crate of ammunition, this Marine rifleman has two M26 fragmentation grenades attached to his flak vest. The grenade had a smooth sheet-metal body and a serrated wire coil within, which broke into many fragments upon detonation. The blast radius of the M26 came in at approximately 33ft. (USMC)
The Viet Cong and NVA soldiers were supplied with a variety of Soviet and Chinese-built weapons. Pictured here, a Marine holds up for the photographer a Soviet-supplied RKG-3 anti-tank grenade. Once thrown at its intended target, a parachute would pop out from the base, orientating it so that the ‘top’ would point to the armoured fighting vehicle. On striking, a firing pin would travel ‘up’ the handle to the detonator. (USMC)
Not always able to depend on a reliable supply of hand grenades or mines, the Viet Cong became masters of creating a wide array of improvised explosive devices. In this picture, we see an improvised hand grenade made from a discarded soda can. The explosives that filled such weapons came from unexploded American ordnance scavenged from battlefields. (USMC)
Seen here in South Vietnam is a Marine Corps Self-Propelled M109 155mm Howitzer. The original plans for the vehicle called for it to replace all the towed M114A1 155mm howitzers in the Marine 1965 divisional TO&E. However, funding shortfalls prevented that from occurring and resulted in only one battery in the division being equipped with it. (USMC)
The interior of a Marine Corps Self-Propelled M109 155mm Howitzer in South Vietnam. The M109 was crewed by six men: vehicle commander, gunner, driver and three ammunition-handlers. The shirtless crew reflects the fact that there was no onboard air-conditioning system. The vehicle was constructed of thin welded aluminium armour offering protection only from some types of small-arms fire and artillery fragments. (USMC)
A Marine Corps M53 155mm self-propelled gun during the Vietnam War. Classified as a heavy artillery piece, it was not organic to the Marine divisional level but allocated from the next higher command level, referred to as ‘Force Troops’. It had appeared in Marine Corps’ service after the Korean War. The vehicle rode on various components of the M47 and M48 medium tanks. (USMC)
The counterpart of the M53 155mm self-propelled gun in Marine Corps’ service was the M55 8in (203mm) self-propelled howitzer pictured here. It had the same chassis and turret as the M53. The weapons, in theory, could be interchanged between vehicles. The 8in howitzer lacked the 155mm gun’s range but proved to be more accurate. (Author’s collection)
The 8in self-propelled howitzer M110 shown here replaced the M55 8in (203mm) self-propelled howitzer in Marine service during the Vietnam War. The 8in howitzer’s thick barrel was 17ft 10in in length and weighed 8,490lb. It could fire a 229lb HE round out to a maximum range of approximately 27,000 yards. (Author’s collection)
Found at both Marine divisional and Force Troop level were reconnaissance elements. Those of the latter, known as ‘Recon Marines’, had a superior skill set compared to those at the divisional level. In the field, Marine reconnaissance members tended to be face-painted as is seen in this photograph and wore short-brim headgear, unofficially nicknamed ‘boonie hats’, instead of helmets. (USMC)
The Viet Cong guerrillas often had to make do with whatever small arms were available, as seen here with the man in the foreground of the photograph armed with an American-made Browning automatic rifle (BAR) M1918A2. Their diverse mixture of small arms came from a wide variety of sources including the Soviet Union and Red China, plus captured French and ARVN small arms. (USMC)
Shown here are three interesting submachine guns captured from the Viet Cong by the Marines. The uppermost is a Soviet PPS-42 dating from the Second World War. The weapon in the middle is, of course, the famous German MP 40, and the weapon on the bottom the K-50M. The latter was a Viet Cong modified version of the Red Chinese Army Type 50 submachine gun. (USMC)
Here, a young Marine displays small arms captured from the Viet Cong. In either hand he is holding a French-designed and built MAT-49 submachine gun that had first appeared in French Army use in 1949. The weapon on the left is a Second World War Soviet-designed Model 1944 carbine. The Red Chinese Army post-war-built copy became the Type 53. (USMC)
Pictured here is a Soviet-designed and built Tokarev Model TT-33 automatic pistol captured by the Marine Corps in South Vietnam. Fitted with an eight-round detachable box magazine, the pistol’s mechanism is based on the American-designed and built M1911 automatic pistol. Whereas the American weapon fired a .45 calibre round, the Tokarev fired a 7.62mm round. (USMC)
Among the many types of enemy weaponry captured by the Marines during the Vietnam War was the Soviet-designed and built LPO-50 man-portable flame-thrower. Weighing in at approximately 50lb, it contained about 21lb of fuel fired in short bursts out to a range of between 55 to 76 yards. Like all man-portable flame-throwers, the weapon’s accuracy depended on the range to a target and wind conditions. (USMC)
Marines are posing here with a captured enemy 82mm mortar and ammunition. Note the Marine on the left-hand side of the photograph demonstrating the method by which the enemy transported mortar rounds. The weapon itself is Soviet-designed and built and first saw service in the Second World War. It bore the designation 82-BM-37. (USMC)
In this staged photo, a South Vietnamese civilian has been pressed into portraying a Viet Cong soldier hiding inside a tunnel. He is holding a Soviet-designed SKS semi-automatic carbine. Those possessed by the Viet Cong and NVA were either original Soviet-built examples or Red Chinese copies. It was a semi-automatic weapon only. (US Army)
In another staged shot, a South Vietnamese civilian has been made up to look like an NVA soldier with a 7.62mm AK-47 assault rifle. As with the SKS carbine, those employed by the enemy were either original Soviet-built examples or Red Chinese copies designated the Type 56-1. The Chinese copy had a permanent folding bayonet underneath the muzzle, which the Soviet-built example did not. (US Army)
The American-designed and built replacement for the M14 rifle during the Vietnam War would be the M16 selective-fire rifle pictured here in the hands of a wounded Marine. They first appeared in Marine Corps’ service in South Vietnam in 1967. Unlike the M14 that fired a much larger 7.62mm round, the M16 was chambered to fire a smaller 5.56mm round. (USMC)
Due to production issues, the M16 rifle’s initial entry into service during the Vietnam War proved a disaster. It had not helped that the manufacturer of the weapon had stressed that it did not need cleaning. Once that misconception had been cleared up, the Marines (and US Army soldiers) were issued with cleaning kits and directed to clean their weapons as often as possible. (USMC)
For many of the older generation of Marines that had trained on the large and heavy M1 Garand rifle and then the M14 with the typical wooden stocks, the much smaller and lighter plastic-like M16 reminded them of a toy gun. This resulted in the unofficial nickname of the ‘Mattel’ after the well-known toy company of the day. (USMC)
Here a Marine rifleman is comparing the size of a captured AK-47 with his M16 rifle. The M16 was originally issued with a twenty-round box magazine that was later replaced with a thirty-round version to match the thirty-round magazine capacity of the AK-47. In 1969 the M16 was, in turn, the re-designed and improved M16A1 rifle. (USMC)
The Marine Corps had relied on a variety of different Landing Vehicles Tracked (LVTs) to transport its men from ship to shore during the Second World War. In the early 1950s, the Marines took into service a family of new LVTs, one of which would be the LVTP5 pictured here. The letter prefix ‘P’ in the vehicle’s designation stood for ‘personnel’. (USMC)
Two LVTP5s during the Vietnam War. Most Marines felt safer riding on top of the vehicles due to the fear of enemy mines exploding against the vehicle’s gasoline tanks located in its floor. The vehicle’s sole armament consisted of a small one-man turret armed with a .30 calibre machine gun. The 8,600lb amphibious tractor had a three-man crew and could transport up to twenty-five men from ship to shore or up to thirty-five men on land. (USMC)
Another variant in the LVTP5 series would be the LVTH6 (‘H’ for ‘Howitzer’) pictured here. Armament consisted of a turret-mounted 105mm howitzer and a coaxial .30 calibre machine gun. The vehicle’s mission involved providing fire support for the other variants in the series during landing operations. The thickest armour on the vehicle would be 25mm on the front of the turret. (Patton Museum)
To recover disabled LVTP5s, a recovery version of the vehicle would be built and receive the designation LVTR1 (‘R’ for ‘recovery’). There were also a small number of engineering versions of the LVTP5 constructed to clear minefields and beach obstacles labelled the LVTE1. They have a large full-width mine plough mounted on the front of the vehicle, as seen in this Vietnam War photograph. (USMC)
The Marine Corps M48A3 medium tanks pictured here had diesel engines and entered service in late 1964. Armament consisted of a 90mm main gun and several machine guns. Appreciated by those who served in them in South Vietnam was its thick lower hull armour that protected its crew from the majority of enemy mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). (USMC)
Seen here in service with the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War is the M67A2 flame-thrower tank. Based on the M48A3 medium tank, the vehicle’s 90mm main gun was replaced by a flame gun tube. That tube had a phony blast deflector and bore an evacuator to disguise its purpose. (USMC)
To perform maintenance on the Marine Corps’ armoured vehicles during the Vietnam War, the Marines employed the heavy recovery vehicle M51 pictured here. It has just removed the engine of an M48A3 medium tank. Based on the chassis of the M103 heavy tank series, production of the M51 began in 1954 and ended the following year with 187 units completed (104 initially for the Marine Corps). (USMC)
The preferred close-support aircraft of the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War proved to be the A-4 Skyhawk pictured here. It was small and very manoeuvrable, making it a harder target for enemy anti-aircraft gunners to acquire and hit, and it could deliver a wide variety of weapons ranging from bombs to napalm. The biggest drawback was its limited payload of approximately 3,000lb. (USMC)
A total of eleven Marine Corps squadrons flew the F-4 Phantom between 1965 and 1973 during the Vietnam War. The majority of the squadrons flew from land air bases such as Da Nang and Chu Lai in South Vietnam, as well as the Nam Phong air base in Thailand. The aircraft’s most potent bomb was the 1,000lb Mk. 83 employed primarily against enemy underground facilities. (USMC)
As useful as the A-4 Skyhawk was in the close-support role for the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War, the much larger and heavier F-4 Phantom II pictured here was considered a more versatile aircraft. Primarily designed as an interceptor in the air-to-air role, its payload capacity of up to 8,000lb made it extremely useful in the secondary role of close support. (USMC)
Here in the foreground is a Marine F-4 Phantom II and in the background an A-4F Skyhawk during the Vietnam War. The latter has a dorsal hump that contained extra avionics. It also received a more powerful engine. A total of 147 units of the A-4F came off the assembly lines. Eventually, the majority of A-4Es employed in South Vietnam were brought up to the A-4F standard. (USMC)
In 1967 the first squadron of Marine A-6 Intruders arrived in South Vietnam. As the only allweather/night-attack aircraft in the Marine Corps’ inventory, it performed numerous interdiction missions over North Vietnam and South Vietnam as well as Laos. With a payload capacity of approximately 18,000lb, it could carry a wide variety of weapons as seen in this picture. (US Navy)
A variant of the F-4 Phantom II series that first showed up in South Vietnam in Marine Corps’ service in 1966 would be the RF-4 pictured here at the Da Nang air base. The prefix letter ‘R’ in the designation stood for ‘reconnaissance’. The RF-4 would be the replacement for the RF-8A photo reconnaissance plane based on the F-8 Crusader interceptor. (USMC)
The bulk of the 1st MAW spent its time during the Vietnam War at the massive Da Nang air base pictured here. The revetments provided a degree of protection from enemy mortar and rocket fire. The French first built an airfield near the city of Da Nang in the 1930s. During the American military’s time in South Vietnam, it housed both Marine and USAF squadrons. (USAF)
As American military air power proved to be the most dangerous threat, the Viet Cong and NVA targeted the Da Nang air base as often as possible with ground attacks as well as mortar and rocket attacks. A Marine is shown here posing with a captured single-round, reloadable 122mm rocket-launcher unit designed and built for the NVA by the Soviet Union. The NVA labelled it the DKZ-B rocket artillery-launcher. (USMC)
Here a Marine provides a size comparison to a captured Soviet-designed and built 122mm rocket supplied to the NVA. The rocket was 6.2ft in length and weighed 121lb. The high-explosive warhead came in at 41lb. It took a crew of three to carry a DKZ-B rocket artillery-launcher unit. The range was approximately 12,000 yards. (USMC)
Seen here is a damaged Marine Corps’ A-6 Intruder at the Da Nang air base after an NVA rocket attack. Besides the Soviet-supplied 122mm DKZ-B rocket artillery-launcher, the NVA was supplied with a Soviet 140mm rocket. It was 3.5ft in length, weighed 88lb and possessed a range of approximately 11,000 yards. (USMC)
The replacement for the Marine Corps’ piston-engine-powered UH-34s in South Vietnam would be the CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter, some of which are pictured here. The first examples arrived in the country in March 1966. Powered by two gas turbine engines, it in theory could carry up to seventeen passengers, not counting the three-man crew. (USMC)
Shown here lifting off with a stripped-down UH-34 helicopter is the massive Marine Corps’ CH-37. The twin-engine helicopter had first entered service with the Marines in 1956. By the time of the Vietnam War, the piston-engine helicopter had become obsolete as more powerful gas-turbine-engine-powered helicopters replaced it in service. (USMC)
Design problems with the original CH-46A Sea Knight helicopter that had caused loss of life in South Vietnam led to the introduction of the re-designed and improved ‘D’ model in 1967. The Sea Knight helicopter series had two 51ft-diameter rotors that overlapped each other at the centre of the aircraft’s fuselage as pictured here. (USMC)
In the late 1950s, the Marine Corps decided that it needed a new gas-turbine-engine-powered helicopter to replace its piston-engine-powered OH-43D Huskies. In 1962, the decision was made to acquire a modified version of the US Army UH-1B Iroquois, better known by its unofficial nickname of the ‘Huey’. The Marine Corps’ Hueys received the designation UH-1E, with an example pictured here. (USMC)
The Marine Corps had at one point tried to come up with a gunship version of the UH-34 for use in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, the helicopter’s design did not lend itself to that role. More successful in that role would be the Marine UH-1E. In this picture, the crew chief/door gunner of a UH-1E gunship is checking over its fixed forward-firing machine guns and 2.75in rocket pod. (USMC)
Posing for the photographer is a Marine sniper in South Vietnam armed with an M40 bolt-action sniper rifle. It had been adopted by the Marine Corps in great haste in 1966 and was essentially a slightly modified version of a commercial hunting rifle. Warping of the original walnut stock during the Vietnam War led to subsequent versions having fibreglass stocks. (USMC)
One of the more macabre practices of both the Marine Corps and US Army during the Vietnam War would be the so-called ‘body count’. It was instituted by the American civilian Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who served from 1961 until 1968. He felt that only quantitative observations, such as enemy bodies, could provide a true picture of the measure of success in the Vietnam War. (USMC)
A tracked but unarmoured vehicle employed by the Marine Corps in South Vietnam would be the Amphibious Cargo Carrier M76 seen here and officially nicknamed the ‘Otter’. The Marine Corps adopted it in the 1950s as the replacement for the Second World War-era M29 Weasel. During the Vietnam War, some crews attached thin sheet plates to the vehicle for a bit of protection. (USMC)
A Marine rifleman poses alongside an enemy defector who had volunteered to aid them in their fight against his former comrades. The enemy defectors were part of a Marine Corps’ plan implemented in South Vietnam in 1966 referred to as the ‘Kit Carson’ programme. Such was its success that it would be adopted by the US Army the following year. (USMC)
The M60 machine gun pictured here, firing a 7.62mm round, would be the American military’s replacement for the air-cooled .30 calibre Browning machine guns of the Second World War. The designers of the M60 incorporated elements of two German weapons of the Second World War into its design. Due to its weight and size, its unofficial nickname became the ‘Pig’. (USMC)
A door gunner on a UH-34 is armed with an M60 machine gun and wears a lightweight fire-resistant flying overall. The helmet is a former pilot’s headgear modified for use with the helicopter’s internal intercom system. As helicopter door gunners proved very vulnerable to enemy small-arms ground fire during landing and take-offs, they often wore flak vests. (USMC)