As had occurred in 1967, the Marine Corps’ senior leadership found itself at odds with the MACV commander, General Westmoreland, on the conduct of the war. Like the enemy leadership, the Marines believed the path to victory lay with winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people. Westmoreland continued to feel that the quickest path to success involved the destruction of the military forces of the VC and NVA. In the end, Westmoreland’s opinion prevailed.
At the same time, the Marines and Westmoreland engaged in debating the conduct of the war in 1968. There would be conflicting opinions on just what the New Year would hold for the Marines in I Corps. There were also rumours that the North Vietnamese government was interested in peace initiatives.
However, there were also reports of a growing enemy presence throughout I Corps. Adding to the confusion, the MACV’s published intelligence estimates stated that enemy numbers had decreased; the opposite of what the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported.
Westmoreland remained upbeat, stating in early January 1968: ‘The year [1967] ended with the enemy increasingly resorting to desperation tactics in attempting to achieve military/psychological victory; he has experienced only failure in these attempts . . . The friendly picture gives rise to optimism for increased successes in 1968.’
One point of contention between Marine leadership and Westmoreland at the start of 1968 centred on a small military base located in the far north-west corner of I Corps. Named Khe Sanh, the base bordered the neighbouring country of Laos. The NVA staged forces there, and had established major infiltration routes into South Vietnam. The enemy major infiltration routes into South Vietnam were collectively referred to as the ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail’.
In October 1966, under pressure from Westmoreland, a Marine company occupied Khe Sanh. Previously a small team of US Army Special Forces soldiers and a South Vietnamese militia unit occupied the site, beginning in 1962. The site also had a small airfield built by the French military in the 1950s. Following the Marines’ arrival at Khe Sanh, the US Army soldiers and the South Vietnamese militiamen moved to a nearby location.
Friendly Numbers
At the beginning of 1968, the III MAF, under the command of Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, directly oversaw approximately 100,000 men. These included two reinforced Marine divisions and supporting elements, plus a single US Army division. Cushman also had temporarily attached 3,000 Marines of the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet’s two Special Landing Forces (SLFs).
General Leonard F. Chapman, 24th commandant of the Marine Corps between 1968 and 1972, stated in 1968 that there were three kinds of Marines, ‘those in Vietnam, those who had just come back from Vietnam, and those who were getting ready to go to Vietnam.’
Not under direct III MAF control but located within I Corps were various allied units. These included a brigade of South Korean Marines as well as two ARVN infantry divisions. The ARVN also had within I Corps an independent infantry regiment and two airborne battalions from their general reserves. These various units totalled 34,000 men. The ARVN also oversaw within I Corps another 46,000 lightly-armed men organized into militia-style groups, referred to as ‘Regional Forces’ and ‘Popular Forces’.
On 24 April 1967, a Marine patrol operating outside the defensive perimeter of Khe Sanh engaged a large force of NVA troops, prompting the enemy’s first attack on the base; that attack proved unsuccessful. In response, the Marines sent in reinforcements to seize some of the enemy-occupied hills circling the base. The operation lasted until May 1967, and is known as the ‘Hill Battles’.
In June 1967, due to ever more enemy contacts, additional Marines were dispatched to Khe Sanh. There was now an entire Marine infantry battalion defending the base. Between August and early December of 1967, a lack of enemy contacts led to the transfer of some of the troops at the base to other roles.
As contact with enemy forces in the vicinity of Khe Sanh grew in mid-December 1967, a second Marine infantry battalion found itself committed to the base’s defence. On 21 December 1967, a five-day sweep outside the base’s perimeter revealed evidence of a growing enemy build-up. On 2 January 1968, MACV intelligence reports indicated the presence of two NVA divisions, and possibly a third, in the area around Khe Sanh.
Enemy Unit Organizations and Numbers
A full-strength NVA division had a personnel strength of about 10,000 men, with most divided among its three infantry regiments of 2,500 men each. NVA regiments were further broken down into three infantry battalions. Vietcong main force units were typically organized along the same lines as those of the NVA. Enemy regiments and battalions, like those of the Marines, were seldom at full strength when in the field due to a number of reasons including combat losses and illnesses.
On the evening of 2 January 1968, an alert Marine sentry spotted what appeared to be six Marines outside the concertina wire that surrounded Khe Sanh. When they failed to identify themselves, he opened fire, killing five and wounding the sixth, who managed to escape. The Marines examined the five corpses in Marine uniforms. Documents on their bodies showed them to be NVA senior regimental officers.
Following the 2 January incident, General Westmoreland ordered two additional Marine infantry battalions sent to Khe Sanh. The additional Marines brought the force defending the base to the size of a reinforced infantry regiment of approximately 6,000 men. To show his support, the senior ARVN general that operated within I Corps committed an understrength ARVN Ranger battalion to the base.
In addition to the five infantry battalions assigned to defend Khe Sanh, there were three batteries of 105mm howitzers and a single battery of 155mm howitzers and 4.2in mortars. Also assigned to its defence were a variety of armoured vehicles including five tanks. As a back-up for the protection of Khe Sanh, Westmoreland transferred to I Corps two US Army divisions, the initial elements of the first arriving on 19 January.
An NVA junior officer captured on 20 January revealed an imminent major assault on Khe Sanh. The Marines on site went on high alert. That same day, the NVA mounted an attack on one of the Marine-held hills outside the base without seizing the position.
On 22 January, Khe Sanh came under heavy mortar, artillery and rocket attacks that destroyed its main ammunition dump. From a Marine Corps Historical Center publication comes this description of what then transpired:
The dump erupted in a series of blinding explosions which rocked the base and belched thousands of artillery and mortar rounds into the air. Many of these maverick projectiles exploded on impact and added to the devastation. Thousands of rounds were destroyed and much of this ammunition ‘cooked off’ in the flames for the next 48 hours. In addition, one enemy round hit a cache of tear gas [CS gas], releasing clouds of the pungent vapor which saturated the entire base.
Despite constant pounding by artillery for seventy-seven days, the NVA never mounted a significant attack on the Marines’ defensive positions inside Khe Sanh’s perimeter. However, they did attempt to capture some Marine-held locations outside the base but without success.
The only successful NVA breach of the Khe Sanh defensive perimeter occurred on 21 February, when the NVA launched a series of attacks against an understrength ARVN Ranger battalion holding a sector of the base’s defensive lines. No doubt the NVA saw the ARVN unit as the weakest link in Khe Sanh’s defences. However, even if the NVA attack had been successful, which it was not, the Marines had already established their own defensive lines behind the ARVN battalion.
The aerial supply effort that supported Khe Sanh during its long siege did not come without cost. On 10 February a Marine C-130 bringing in fuel was just about to land when it was struck by enemy anti-aircraft fire. A description of what then occurred appears in an extract from a Marine Corps Historical Center publication: ‘With flames licking at one side, the stricken craft careened off the runway 3,100 feet from the approach end, spun around, and was rocked by several muffled explosions. The C-130 then began to burn furiously. Crash crews rushed to the plane and starting spraying it with foam.’
Status Report on the NVA
The FMP/Pac staff had prepared a report in early January 1968 on the NVA’s perceived strengths and weaknesses. The report began by listing it as ‘one of the best in South-East Asia.’ Recognizing the high morale of the NVA as a whole, the report stated that the typical soldier viewed ‘. . . the present conflict as one which has existed for two generations, and he has no great expectations that it will end soon, thus all of his actions are tempered by patience.’
On the negative side, the report listed the NVA’s ‘archaic logistical support system’ and their ‘. . . inability to exploit any tactical opportunity calling for the rapid deployment of units and material.’ The report also noted that after crossing the DMZ and experiencing the immense firepower that the Marines could inflict in battle, the typical NVA soldier’s morale tended to deteriorate the longer he spent in action. That belief came from statements made by NVA prisoners of war.
The Dien Bien Phu Remake
With the NVA having cut the only land route to Khe Sanh in the autumn of 1967, the Marines at the base had to depend on aerial resupply. It was at this point that the resemblance to the successful Viet Minh two-month siege and eventual victory over the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 began. In turn, this attracted the attention of both the American and foreign press. Hence, both American military and political prestige quickly became intertwined with keeping Khe Sanh from falling into enemy hands. American President Johnson became fixated on the base’s day-to-day status.
The crash crews saved some of the flight crew and passengers, but six died in the crash. Thereafter landings by Marine C-130s were suspended. Instead, US Air Force C-130s received the assignment of bringing in supplies to Khe Sanh without landing on the base’s airfield.
The US Air Force C-130s employed three different types of drop systems at Khe Sanh. One was referred to as the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES); another as the Ground Proximity Extraction System (GPES). However, due to the typically poor weather conditions around Khe Sanh, the majority of supplies were delivered by para-drops.
Bulk commodities, such as food rations and ammunition, were suitable for para-drop delivery but many other more fragile items such as medical supplies were not. US Air Force twin-engine, prop-driven C-123 Providers, along with Marine helicopters, therefore took on the job of landing and delivering these much-needed supplies. They also flew out the wounded and refugees trying to escape the fighting. Both the C-123s and helicopters took losses from these sorties.
By mid-March, the Marines at Khe Sanh noticed an exodus of NVA units from the area. However, the NVA continued to maintain enough of their forces near the Marine base to still pose a threat. For example, on 23 March Khe Sanh was struck by 1,109 artillery rounds. However, with the reduction in enemy numbers, the base commander began pushing Marine and ARVN patrols ever further out from the defensive perimeter.
On 30 March a six-man Marine patrol discovered an entrenched NVA company on a small hill just outside the Khe Sanh defensive perimeter. Quickly driven off by heavy enemy fire, the Marine patrol called in supporting fire. A Marine company then assaulted the NVA position, in the aftermath dislodging the enemy from their bunkers with grenades, satchel charges and flame-throwers. A final count showed 115 NVA dead for the loss of 3 Marines killed and 15 wounded.
As early as 26 January, General Westmoreland began formulating plans for a combined US Army and Marine relief force to break the NVA siege of Khe Sanh by both land and air assaults. Unfortunately, that plan had to be put off due to a large-scale enemy countrywide offensive operation that began on 30 January.
Relief of Khe Sanh was reconsidered on 28 February by the III MAF commander. When finalized, it received the name Operation PEGASUS and began on 1 April. On 6 April a US Army infantry unit arrived in Khe Sanh by helicopter as the relief force’s leading element. On 8 April the first US Army ground unit reached the base, reopening the only land route to the area. That event marked Khe Sanh’s official relief. Operation PEGASUS concluded on 15 April.
The MACV claimed without any real evidence that during the seventy-seven-day siege of Khe Sanh they accounted for some 10,000 to 15,000 enemy dead. Official North Vietnamese historical publications on the fighting around the base do not list their casualties. They do claim to have killed 13,000 American military personnel during the siege. The Marines stated that they had about 300 killed with approximately 2,500 wounded.
On 1 June, despite all the official statements made by various US Army and Marine generals (no doubt under duress) of the importance of keeping Khe Sanh open at all costs, the decision came to abandon it and much of the surrounding area to the NVA as it was a logistical and manpower drain on the III MAF.
US Army General Creighton Abrams replaced General Westmoreland on 11 June as directed by President Johnson. Westmoreland did not want the abandonment of Khe Sanh announced until he had left South Vietnam. It took until 5 July before the last Marine convoy departed the base after either destroying or salvaging whatever remained.
An interesting change occurred with Abrams’ takeover of the MACV. Instead of Westmoreland’s beloved search-and-destroy missions which were foisted on the III MAF, Abrams unveiled a new plan for populated areas that he referred to as ‘clear and hold’, which embraced what the Marines had been recommending since their arrival in South Vietnam. However, the American military never had enough ground forces in the area.
Westmoreland had seen the threat posed to Khe Sanh as an essential first part in the NVA’s attempt to outflank I Corps’ two northernmost provinces. He believed that by holding the base at all costs, it would divert ever more of the enemy forces to the surrounding area. Once significant elements of the NVA had taken positions around Khe Sanh, Westmoreland had planned to employ American airpower to destroy them, making it the decisive battle of the Vietnam War.
In his book Khe Sanh 1967–1968: Marine Battles for Vietnam’s Vital Hilltop Base, published in 2005, Gordon L. Rottman suggested the two understrength NVA divisions (approximately 20,000 men including support troops) that surrounded Khe Sanh had the opposite goal: ‘Was the [NVA] plan to actually overrun the base . . . or was it merely to surround the base and draw and hold Free World forces there?’
A US Air Force historical monograph titled Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh published in 1973 observed that ‘. . . the North Vietnamese made no attempt to cut off Khe Sanh’s water supply or to tunnel beneath the defensive works. Nor was there any evidence of an extensive network of siege trenches until the third week of February.’
Marine Brigadier General Lowell E. English, assistant division commander of the 3d Marine Division, had stated in 1967: ‘When you’re at Khe Sanh, you’re not any place really . . . You could lose it, and you wouldn’t have lost a damn thing.’ The South Vietnamese president at the time had expressed to Westmoreland his belief that Khe Sanh was only ‘a diversionary effort’ by the NVA.
On 30 January 1968, the enemy launched a well-coordinated, countrywide offensive operation on the cusp of the Vietnamese New Year holiday, hence the name ‘Tet Offensive’. Involving almost 80,000 soldiers, NVA and Vietcong forces targeted the political infrastructure of the South Vietnamese government. ARVN and American military bases and the American Embassy in Saigon also came under attack.
American and ARVN intelligence services had had indications that the enemy might attack during Tet, but failed to grasp its massive scope. Westmoreland saw it as a feint to distract him from the siege of Khe Sanh and the battle for the control of the DMZ, which he believed remained the enemy’s primary goals. It did not take long before Westmoreland’s command staff at the MACV deduced it was the opposite.
American military leadership considered the Tet Offensive a severe tactical defeat; an opinion also held by the NVA due to extremely high losses. However, on a strategic level, the enemy succeeded in demoralizing the American public. Constantly reassured in print and broadcast on how well the war was going, the American public was rapidly disillusioned. Of interest is the fact that this had not been one of North Vietnam’s goals. Instead, their primary target had been the demoralization of the South Vietnamese public.
Despite the fighting going at Khe Sanh in January 1968, the enemy remained active within other areas of I Corps during that same month, including another rocket attack on the Da Nang air base on the nights of 2 and 3 January. Those attacks accounted for three aircraft: one Marine and two US Air Force. By the end of the same month, enemy troop concentrations were detected by both Marine and US Army reconnaissance flights in areas surrounding the Da Nang air base.
Lieutenant Colonel Davis, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines knew something big was going to happen on 27 January and explained why. ‘[We] . . . began to take fewer casualties from surprise firing devices [mines] or booby traps and began to suspect that enemy troops unfamiliar with the terrain might be attempting to move into this sector.’ The Marine officer quickly notified his division headquarters.
Having killed a VC soldier on 29 January, a Marine patrol found documents on the corpse indicating what military targets would be of value to an attacking force in the Da Nang area. A very reliable Marine intelligence source stated that a massive enemy attack would begin no later than 30 January.
The Marines throughout the Da Nang area were on high alert when the Tet Offensive began within I Corps in the early-morning hours of 30 January. The enemy started with a massive rocket and mortar attack on the Da Nang air base, followed by two enemy assaults by small sapper units. Both penetrated its defensive perimeter, but were beaten off with the Marines taking minimal casualties.
One Marine would recall in a Marine Corps Historical Center publication his impressions of the fighting that broke out when trying to repel the constant enemy attacks: ‘The sounds of the [artillery], the rockets, the mortars, the grenades combined with the eerie swaying of the illumination on their [flare] parachutes created a hellish vision. Never before or since have I been in such an acute state of fear.’
To counter the constant enemy attacks between 29 January and 14 February, the 1st Marines Division sent out several reconnaissance elements. One occupied a mountaintop position outside of the Da Nang air base, which spotted a large column of enemy soldiers estimated at 500 men. The immediate object of heavy artillery and aerial support, the enemy formation was hard hit.
A subsequent Marine intelligence report stated that an entire enemy battalion had been destroyed during a critical time during the Tet Offensive. The 1st Marine Division commander sent a message to III MAF headquarters in which he stated: ‘Never have so few done so much to so many.’
In the opinion of both the Marines and the North Vietnamese, the various attacks against the Da Nang air base during the Tet Offensive proved poorly executed. In a captured enemy after-action report, the writer mentioned that his unit ‘commander did not know . . . [the] situation accurately . . . and that orders were not strictly obeyed.’ A Marine after-action report noted that the NVA 2nd Division’s approach to Da Nang air base was ‘along a single axis of advance so that his eventual target was easily identifiable.’
In the same Marine after-action report, the authors remained puzzled why the enemy, once arrived near the Da Nang air base, ‘made no further attempts at maneuver even when being hunted by Marine and ARVN units, and when engaged, seldom maneuvered, except to withdraw’.
Some postulated that the Da Nang air base attack was carried out to divert attention from their planned attack on the undefended South Vietnamese city of Hue, also located within I Corps. At least one Marine general thought it was the other way around.
When the enemy attacked Hue in the pre-dawn hours of 31 January, no Marine combat units were in the city. The closest units were located 7 miles outside of the city at the Phu Bai air base. These consisted of a Marine 1st Division support facility and a headquarters unit. The latter oversaw three understrength infantry battalions. The bulk of the division’s assets had been assigned to guard the Da Nang air base as the III MAF perceived no threat to Hue.
An ARVN division had the responsibility for Hue’s security. Unfortunately, its commander had also dismissed any idea that the enemy would mount an attack on the city. Hence, none of the ARVN division’s infantry battalions were operating near the city. Only the division’s headquarters resided within the city’s limits, along with an MACV compound that housed the ARVN division’s Marine, US Army and Australian advisers.
The enemy had massed three NVA regiments of about 5,000 men, a rocket battalion and a variety of local Vietcong units to capture Hue. The VC infiltrated the city under the cover of the vast throng of South Vietnamese civilians arriving to visit relatives during the upcoming holiday celebrations. The Vietcong were to prepare a path for the NVA regiments into the city limits. Before the sun rose on 31 January, the enemy had successfully occupied a great deal of Hue.
With the attack on Da Nang air base in full swing and other enemy attacks reported throughout I Corps and beyond, the call from the MACV compound to the III MAF for help against the attack on Hue was not considered a pressing problem. The III MAP, therefore, ordered the Marine headquarters unit at Phu Bai to send an infantry company into Hue too. The Phu Bai air base itself came under enemy rocket and mortar fire on 31 January.
On entering the Hue city limits, the Marine infantry company, along with four medium tanks picked up along the way, ran into a wall of enemy fire. A second Marine infantry company, sent in response to the first company’s calls for help, quickly found itself also pinned down by enemy fire. The Marine leadership of the III MAP still had no idea of the massive scale of the enemy’s attack on the city.
It took numerous reports from Marines fighting for their lives for the III MAP Marine leadership to realize the seriousness of what had taken place in the city. A Marine general commented in a Marine Corps Historical Center publication: ‘Early intelligence did not reveal the quantity of enemy involved that we subsequently found were committed to Hue.’ Finally, on 1 February, both Marine and ARVN senior leadership grasped what had happened in Hue and sent in sufficient forces to retake those parts of the city in enemy hands.
The Marines eventually committed three infantry battalions to recapturing their assigned portion of Hue. In contrast, the AVRN put fifteen infantry battalions into the fight for the city. It was a matter of national pride for the South Vietnamese government that they play the major part in retaking Hue. US Army units also contributed to the fighting around Hue but did not reach the city until 25 February.
A Marine captain in Hue observed: ‘Street-fighting is the dirtiest type of fighting I know.’ A Marine fire team leader agreed, ‘it’s tougher in the streets’ but also went on to remark, ‘it beats fighting in the mud . . . You don’t get tired as quickly when you are running, and you can see more of the damage you’re doing to the enemy because they don’t drag off their dead.’
The Marine infantry battalions had support from lightly-armoured Ontos fighting vehicles, armed with six 106mm recoilless rifles. The 1st Marine regimental commander commented that during the battle ‘if any single supporting arm is to be more effective than all others, it must be the 106mm recoilless rifle, especially on the Ontos.’ Hard, vicious fighting in Hue demanded innovative solutions:
Unable to position their [recoilless rifle] to knock out a machine gun that blocked the battalion’s advance, [its crew] took their 460-pound recoilless rifle [inside a building] . . . and we fired it with a lanyard where we knocked out the objective – we kind of knocked out the building that the 106 was in too, but it didn’t hurt the gun, once we dug it out.
Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham Jr commented on the use of tanks in the recapture of Hue: ‘You couldn’t put a section of tanks down one of those streets. The moment a tank stuck its nose around the corner of a building it looked like the Fourth of July.’ The tanks themselves soon became known as ‘rocket magnets’ due to the enemy’s widespread use of anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)-launchers.
By 6 February a Marine lieutenant colonel in Hue noticed the enemy’s resistance to his battalion’s advance slacking and later commented: ‘He [the NVA] seemed to lose his stomach for the fight . . . once we started rolling . . . the main force sort of evaporated . . . and left some local force – rinky dinks . . . when his defense crumbled, it crumbled.’ By the next day, as the Marine infantry battalions advanced further into what had been the NVA defensive positions, they found both bodies and equipment left behind.
The ARVN declared Hue secure on 26 February, even though scattered fighting in and around the city would continue for another three weeks. The Marines had announced the city secure the day before. However, it took until 5 March before Operation HUE CITY officially came to an end. The Marines claimed they accounted for almost 2,000 enemy killed during the fighting.
Marine losses during Operation HUE CITY came in at 142 dead and approximately 1,005 wounded. A Marine rifleman commented on an issue that bothered him: ‘. . . the stink – you had to load up so many wounded, the blood would dry on your hands. In two or three days you would smell like death itself.’
Beginning in April, the 3d Marine Division became aware of an enemy build-up by an NVA division in the eastern portion of the DMZ. This posed a threat to the Marines’ main logistical base at the port of Dong Ha. The Marines therefore brought in both infantry and supporting tanks. The fiercest fighting, which began on 29 April, developed at a village not too far from Dong Ha, named Dai Do, that the enemy had managed to slip into without notice and had quickly fortified.
As the ARVN proved unable to take the village of Dai Do or prevent other enemy actions aimed at Dong Ha, Marines from the 3d Marine Division responded. In trying to oust the enemy from Dai Do, a Marine lieutenant remembered: ‘The enemy counter-attack dwarfed the fighting that had gone before in intensity and volume.
The Tet Series
The initial Tet Offensive ran from 30 January until 28 March. The second in the same series took place between 5 May and 15 June and received the name ‘Mini-Tet’. The final enemy offensive of the year and considered part of the Tet series began on 17 August and continued until 23 September. It would be referred to by the American military by several different names, including the ‘Phase III Offensive’, ‘The Third Offensive’ or ‘The Autumn Offensive’. However, the second and third in the series of Tet Offensive operations did not come close to matching the scale of the first.
I recall seeing banana trees and the masonry wall of a hooch cut down by the [NVA] automatic weapon fire. The bushes to our front seemed to be alive with heavily camouflaged NVA soldiers.’
By the time the fighting at Dai Do ended on 3 May, the Marines had suffered 81 dead and about 300 wounded. However, the battle was not over, as the NVA division continued to press the attack until the end of May in the general area of Dong Ha until all were eventually repulsed. From a Marine Corps Historical Center publication appears the following passage:
In many respects, questions still remain about the intent of the enemy. Obviously, the thrust of the 320th [enemy division] was part of the overall NVA so-called ‘mini-Tet offensive’ that the enemy attempted in May to initiate country-wide, a somewhat ‘poor man’s imitation’ of the January-February Tet offensive.
On 20 May 1968, Major General Raymond G. Davis became commander of the 3d Marine Division. A Second World War veteran and Korean War Medal of Honor winner, General Davis had some firm ideas on how his division could improve its combat capabilities. The first would be restoration of unit integrity, meaning there would be no more mixing and matching of infantry battalions and infantry companies between infantry regiments under normal operating conditions.
Second, General Davis had been very impressed by the US Army’s 1st Airmobile Division use of its large inventory of helicopters to move quickly over the varied terrain of South Vietnam and at the same time keep the enemy off-balance.
General Davis’s desire to emulate the US Army’s new airmobile division abilities came at an opportune moment. At the time he took command the Marine Corps had finally acquired enough helicopters of sufficient lifting power to match that of the US Army in the theatre.
With the new fleet of helicopters, General Davis could shift his troops from the much-despised defensive posture forced on them by such situations as Khe Sanh and take the offensive to the enemy. So, beginning in the summer of 1968, the Marines of the 3d Division began fanning out across the northernmost province of I Corps. Thus, they attacked the enemy in what were long considered safe havens. By the end of the year, the NVA could no longer deal with the fast-moving Marines and withdrew the bulk of their forces back across the DMZ or into their sanctuaries in Laos.
In the central province of I Corps, the Da Nang air base and large civilian population remained a key enemy target. Even as the Marines of the 1st Division prepared for their next offensive operation, the enemy would be doing the same. The Marines beat them to it with Operation ALLEN BROOK that began on 4 May. It badly disrupted a large NVA assault planned for 5 May on the Da Nang air base as part of mini-Tet.
Fire Support Bases
An essential aspect of the success of the 3d Marine Division’s new-found enhanced mobility would be another tactical innovation referred to as Fire Support Bases (FSBs). From a Marine Corps Historical Center publication is the following explanation of the concept of an FSB: ‘A rapidly constructed artillery position defended by a minimum of infantry. The infantry and tactical elements within the protective fan of the artillery FSB. The FSB themselves offer overlapping artillery support to each other and protection for several landing zones.’
The concept of FSBs would allow the Marines of the 3d Division to operate throughout their zone of operation with constant protective fire from artillery. By the end of 1968, the 3d Marine Division had carved out more than 140 temporary FSBs from jungle mountain hilltops. So successful did the concept of FSBs become that it would soon be employed throughout South Vietnam.
In spite of not mounting a ground attack on Da Nang air base in May, the tempo of enemy rocket attacks did increase. In conjunction with Operation ALLEN BROOK, the Marines of the 1st Division began another operation named MAMELUKE THRUST that, like the former, acted as spoiling attacks on areas near the Da Nang air base that might harbour NVA concentrating sites.
In a Marine Corps Historical Center publication, a Marine corporal who had taken part in Operation MAMELUKE THRUST recalled finding himself at a Hospital Company after being wounded several times. When a doctor enquired what was wrong with him:
I said, ‘Well, I got stabbed in the back, I got bit in the arm, I got shrapnel in the chest, and I got shot in the leg.’ He couldn’t believe it until he looked at it. He thought it was kinda funny. I wasn’t in a mood to laugh at it.
Operation MAMELUKE THRUST ran from 19 to 24 May, while Operation ALLEN BROOK continued until 24 August as by that time the enemy had withdrawn. The latter would return to the area in increasing numbers in early September to prepare for their final Tet series offensive operation against the Da Nang air base and the city of Da Nang.
The Marines concluded that the third and last major attack on the Da Nang air base would begin on 23 August, which it did. The NVA’s and VC’s spirited assaults were, as so often before, beaten off with high losses. By 31 August the final Tet series offensive had spent itself. In the weeks that followed, running into September, the Marines conducted only mopping-up operations.
With the advent of the north-east monsoon rains in October, both sides decreased their activities for the remainder of the year. Rather than large-scale offensive operations, the enemy turned to small-scale assaults on weakly-defended targets, as well as rocket and mortar attacks on both military and civilian targets.
Some significant events took place outside of South Vietnam in 1968 that would influence the Marine Corps’ further participation in the Vietnam War. The first occurred on 13 May when American and South Vietnamese government representatives sat down in Paris, France with their North Vietnamese counterparts. The purpose was to seek a peace agreement to bring an end to the fighting. The peace talks quickly broke down, but were restarted on 1 November.
On 5 November, Richard M. Nixon, who had campaigned on the promise to end the Vietnam War with ‘peace and honor’, was elected president of the United States. He took office in January 1969. In December the number of enemy-initiated attacks had fallen to the lowest level over the previous two years. At the end of December, the III MAF claimed to have accounted for 31,691 enemy dead. The cost to the Marines came to 4,618 dead and 29,320 wounded, making it the costliest year of the Vietnam War for the Marine Corps.
At the beginning of 1968, the typical Marine had to deal with endless rain brought on by the yearly monsoon in South-East Asia that made his life miserable. Little did he care that the enemy had suffered endless defeats since America’s large-scale military intervention had begun in 1965. By the beginning of 1968, estimates of the enemy losses came in at approximately 88,000 men since 1965. (USMC)
Marines are shown here dealing with the rain and wishing they were back home. By the beginning of 1968, there had appeared a degree of inter-service dissent between the US forces. The senior US Army officers at the MACV believed that the Marines under the III MAF were not pulling their full weight in the conflict. (USMC)
In this photograph we see four-star General Robert E. Cushman as commandant of the Marine Corps. As a three-star lieutenant general, he had commanded the III MAF throughout 1968. With his headquarters located at the Da Nang air base, his authority had extended 220 miles from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the north to the southern border with II Corps overseen by the US Army. (USMC)
Pictured here is a US Army M107 175mm self-propelled gun at one of the Marine Corps’ bases used to provide long-range fire support to the KSCB in 1967 and 1968. From the muzzle of the gun to the rear of its firing mechanism it had a length of almost 36ft. It fired an HE round weighing 147lb out to a maximum range of 25 miles (44,000 yards), making it the longest-range artillery piece employed during the Vietnam War. (USMC)
Beginning in April 1967 through to May 1967 the III MAF set about seizing the hills around the KSCB to prevent the NVA using them to emplace their artillery. The fighting that involved these terrain features became known as the ‘Hill Battles’ and were company- and battalion-sized actions. Marine losses during the Hill Battles came in at 155 killed and 425 wounded. (USMC)
The continuing infiltration of large NVA units down the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and into South Vietnam in 1967 proved to be a major concern to Westmoreland. To interdict the NVA he ordered the III MAF to increase its force levels at the Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) and the surrounding area. As seen on this map, the KSCB was located at the extreme north-western corner of South Vietnam. (USMC)
In this map, we see the KSCB and its relationship to other locations such as the DMZ and Laos. Marine bases at ‘Camp Carroll’ and the ‘Rock Pile’ had US Army M107 175mm self-propelled guns. These weapons were employed to dominate the surrounding area including the KSCB. Route 9 was a one-lane dirt road and the only supply line to the KSCB and was routinely cut by the NVA. (USMC)
In this map, we see the location of the KSCB and its relationship to Highway 9 and the small village of Khe Sanh seized by the NVA on 21 January 1968. Also identified is the US Army Lang Vei Special Forces Camp that fell to the NVA on 7 February 1968. The KSCB existed on a small triangular plateau dominated by large hills that formed part of a mountain range named the Annamites in Laos. (USMC)
With Westmoreland’s continued insistence on the strengthening and enlargement of the KSCB, the Marine units assigned began the process of heavily fortifying the base. The first step would be making sandbags as pictured here. In December 1967, the Marines became aware that instead of passing down the Ho Chi Minh Trail near the KSCB the NVA units were staying in the area. (USMC)
Typical of the fighting bunkers erected by the Marines at the KSCB at the beginning of 1968 is the example pictured here. Note the firing port. After a visit by the III MAP commander to the KSCB, he ordered that all bunkers had enough overhead cover capable of withstanding a direct hit by an 82mm mortar round. To strengthen their bunkers, the Marines used damaged portions of the airstrip’s steel matting. (USMC)
A picture of the sandbagged defensive positions along the western perimeter of the KSCB in early 1968. Fortification material proved to be in short supply as the trees in the surrounding area had metal fragments embedded in them from artillery and air strikes and could not be cut. The Marine positions around the KSCB consisted of mutually-supported strongpoints. (USMC)
Marines are shown here erecting a concertina razor wire entanglement around the KSCB. Because razor wire is relatively lightweight and inexpensive, it can go up quickly. Easily breached by enemy artillery fire, it is rapidly repairable. To deter enemy engineers (sappers) from breaching the concertina razor wire entanglements surrounding the KSCB, the Marines booby-trapped them. (USMC)
For the defence of the KSCB, there were eighteen 105mm towed howitzers with an example pictured here. Fifteen were emplaced within the combat base with three others positioned on one of the Marine-occupied hills surrounding the KSCB. There were also six of the 4.2in (107mm) mortars assigned to defend the KSCB as well as towed 155mm howitzers. (USMC)
A map of the KSCB and the locations of the defending units with the airfield outlined in black. The Marines in some places around the combat base emplaced metal drums containing a mixture of gasoline and diesel fuel. When and if the NVA attacked, the Marines would set off the fuel-filled drums with plastic explosives, creating a wall of flame that would no doubt discourage the most determined attackers. (USMC)
Also contributing to the defence of the KSCB in 1968 were 106mm recoilless rifles as pictured here. Their accuracy was such that they could hit pinpoint targets, including something as small as a single enemy sniper. Besides anti-tank and HE rounds, the weapon could fire the XM546 Beehive round that contained 8,000 arrow-like flechettes. (USMC)
Here a Marine is aiming with the optical sighting scope on his 106mm recoilless rifle. When a target is acquired, he pulls a trigger that fires a special .50 calibre phosphorus tracer round from a single-shot barrel bolted to the 106mm recoilless rifle. The .50 calibre round has the same trajectory as the 106mm recoilless round and if on target the gunner fires the larger round. (USMC)
To strengthen the defences at the KSCB, the US Army supplied two of its twin 40mm self-propelled gun M42A1s; a preserved example is pictured here. Each of its two 40mm automatic cannons could fire 120 rounds per minute (rpm) for a combined total of 240 rpm. Also the US Army contributed two unarmoured trucks each armed with a quad .50 calibre M55 armour-protected powered mount. (Pierre-Olivier Buan)
At the beginning of 1968, the 1st MAW consisted of 15,000 men and 400 aircraft in South Vietnam. Of that number, approximately half were fixed-wing aircraft such as the A-4 Skyhawks pictured here, and the other half helicopters. Continuing problems for the 1st MAW during the Vietnam War were both a shortage of pilots and mechanics with the necessary skills to maintain the aircraft. (USMC)
A Marine pilot of an A-4 Skyhawk examines a hole made in the wing of his aircraft by an NVA anti-aircraft gun while flying in support of the KSCB. Due to the thick foliage covering the terrain around the combat base and poor flying conditions, plus night-time aerial strikes, it proved very difficult for Marine aviation and the USAF to properly assess the effectiveness of their sorties. (USMC)
A relatively unknown fixed-wing aircraft in the Marine Corps inventory during the Vietnam War was the KC-130 four-engine transport pictured here configured for the air-to-air refuelling role. They also were employed to fly supplies and reinforcements throughout the Western Pacific. They played an important part in the re-supply of the KSCB. (USMC)
The NVA began a massive artillery, rocket and mortar attack on the KSCB on 21 January 1968. The enemy would continue to shell the combat base during the entire seventy-seven-day siege. This forced the Marines on site to spend a great deal of their time under some cover, as are those pictured here. The Marines estimated that the NVA fired approximately 11,000 rounds into the KSCB and surrounding positions. (USMC)
Among the many weapons with which the NVA bombarded the KSCB was the Soviet-designed and built Model 1938 120mm mortar. Placed into Red Army service during the Second World War, it fired a 35lb HE round out to a maximum range of approximately 4 miles (7,040 yards). Due to its size and weight, it was a towed weapon. (Vladimir Yakubov)
A modern artillery piece supplied to the NVA during the Vietnam War and employed against the KSCB was the 152mm gun/howitzer M1955 pictured here. It was also designated the D-20 and weighs approximately 12,500lb. Developed during the late 1940s it was first seen in Soviet Army service in 1955. The maximum firing range was 11 miles (19,360 yards). (Pierre-Olivier Buan)
The second longest-range artillery piece employed by any combatant during the Vietnam War would be the 130mm field gun M1954 pictured here. A Soviet-designed and built artillery piece from the 1950s, it weighed in at 17,000lb and had a maximum range of 17 miles (29,920 yards). The extremely long barrel seen in this picture was 22ft 2in in length. (Pierre-Olivier Buan)
Among the Marine Corps’ helicopters that flew in supplies to the KSCB during the siege is the gas-turbine-engine-powered CH-53 series seen here. The original ‘A’ version first arrived in South Vietnam in December 1966. Among the other roles it assumed, it replaced the CH-37 for recovery of downed helicopters. (USMC)
For whatever reasons the ARVN had not thought that the NVA/Viet Cong would mount a major assault on Hue, the former Imperial Capital of Vietnam. That proved erroneous and as part of the countrywide Tet Offensive, beginning on 31 January 1968, enemy forces took control of most of the city with little ARVN resistance. The map shown here illustrates the various key locations in the city. (US Army)
An all-too-common event during the Vietnam War would be the ceremony seen here, honouring those Marines who died in the service of their country. By the time the seventy-seven-day siege of the KSCB officially lifted on 8 April 1968, the Marines had taken approximately 300 killed with 2,500 wounded. NVA losses were estimated between 10,000 to 15,000 men. (USMC)
In an official Marine Corps photo taken in Hue, following the enemy capture of the city, is a knocked-out ARVN M41 light tank. The ARVN committed eleven battalions of troops to the recapture of the city. As Hue fell within the III MAP area of responsibility, three Marine infantry battalions were committed to capturing a portion of the city. Four US Army infantry battalions would also take part. (USMC)
The first two Marine infantry companies sent to Hue encountered extremely stiff enemy resistance. On that first day, the Marines lost ten men killed and fifty-six wounded. Pictured here are Marines in Hue, carefully checking out their surroundings. One of the two has a radio with the antenna folding downward. (USMC)
On 1 February 1968, the Marines once again pushed into Hue with two companies supported by a tank. That attack quickly came to a halt when an enemy recoilless rifle knocked out the supporting tank. At that point, there remained little information on just how large a force the Marines were facing. Marine infantrymen in Hue are hugging a wall for protection from enemy fire. (USMC)
A Marine armed with an M60 machine gun is seen engaging the enemy during the Battle for Hue. The fighting in the city started with the Marines trying to secure individual buildings. However, the enemy was so determined to hold their positions that the fighting quickly reverted to room-to-room combat. (USMC)
A Marine Corps’ sniper takes part in the Battle for Hue. In a US Army manual on urban combat appears this extract on the importance of snipers: ‘In open terrain, snipers slightly influence operations. In UO [urban operations], snipers – well-concealed, positioned and protected – can take on significance disproportionate to their combat capability in other situations.’ (USMC)
If a single 106mm recoilless rifle could be effective in the urban combat that took place in Hue, then six firing at one time had to be even better. The first Multiple 106mm Self-Propelled Rifle M50A1 vehicles, known as the ‘Ontos’, reached Hue on 2 February 1968. Despite being only thinly-armoured and having to be reloaded from the outside, they were highly thought of by the Marines fighting in Hue. (USMC)
Besides using explosive charges to bore through the walls of enemy-held buildings, the Marines also employed 3.5in rocket-launchers to blast holes through courtyard and building walls. Another building-busting weapon would be the 106mm recoilless rifle seen here being humped by a group of Marines. (USMC)
A Marine M60 machine-gun team in action in Hue. Offensive urban operations are considered to be one of the most challenging operations that an infantry force can undertake. The density of urban structures can require the attacking force to have three to five times greater personnel density than for a similar mission conducted in open terrain. (USMC)
Marines in Hue are seen here evacuating a wounded comrade. By its very nature, urban combat can result in increased casualties. From a US Army manual on urban combat appears this passage: ‘The urban terrain provides numerous advantages to the urban defender; higher casualties occur among troops on the offensive, where frontal assaults may be the only tactical options.’ (USMC)
Here a Marine is employing his 40mm M79 single-shot grenade-launcher to engage the enemy in a building in Hue with high-angle fire. Urban combat can be very time-consuming due to the need for initial reconnaissance of the objective(s) and the physical and mental stress it can impose on the attackers. Having to deal with the needs of the urban population can also hinder operational timelines. (USMC)
A Marine rifleman fighting in Hue has adopted for use a Second World War Submachine Gun, Calibre .45 M1, best known to most by its unofficial nickname as the ‘Tommy Gun’ or ‘Thompson’. One can assume that it’s a captured Viet Cong weapon as the NVA soldiers typically had more modern small arms. It could have also been a left-behind South Vietnamese police weapon. (USMC)
An M67A1 flame-thrower tank in Hue. It can be identified by the thicker and shorter barrel than seen on the M48A3 medium tanks armed with a 90mm main gun. An important task in urban combat is to separate the local civilian population from combatants. Field commanders must also do their best to minimize collateral damage if at all possible. (USMC)
In urban combat, the enemy often has the advantage of interior lines. The defending enemy can reinforce or reposition their units using concealed routes such as sewer systems. Such transit routes can allow the defending enemy to appear behind the attacking force’s front lines. This calls for the attackers to maintain stay-behind forces to deal with such a threat. (USMC)
An enemy soldier who fell in combat during the Battle for Hue. For the attackers in urban combat environments the corpses of the dead, be it the enemy or the local civilians, can quickly pose a serious health risk to all concerned. That and the breakdown of the local sewer systems only adds to the complexities of urban combat. (USMC)
Field commanders in urban combat situations have to deal with the often heavy logistical demands of their personnel in the front lines. Ideally, the supporting elements are closely following the attacking force. The weak links are the roads and bridges that lead back to the logistical supply bases. Pictured here is a bridge in Hue destroyed by the enemy. (USMC)
Another favourite weapon among the Marines fighting in Hue was their 81mm mortar, as shown here during the fighting. One Marine officer commented that ‘If you put enough 81 rounds on top of a building, pretty soon the roof falls in.’ He then went on to state that the orders from his commanding officer were ‘if we even suspected that the enemy were in a building to blow it down.’ (USMC)
A Marine officer wrote on 5 February 1968 that he lacked enough men to perform the jobs assigned in Hue. He also went on to state that it was ‘an extremely rough day’ with the battalion sustaining nineteen casualties and advancing only 75 yards. He remembered: ‘The going was slow. We would go at maybe a block. We fought for two days over one building.’ (USMC)
A picture of an M48A3 medium tank during the Battle for Hue. The Marine riflemen welcomed tank firepower in Hue. The downside of tank support going back to the Second World War for Marine riflemen is that they tend to attract a lot of fire due to the threat they pose to the enemy. They have been referred to by many in the field as ‘bullet or artillery magnets’. (USMC)
The Marine Corps M48A3 tank pictured here during the Battle for Hue sports a spacer ring under the original machine-gun-armed cupola equipped with nine large periscopes. Its purpose was to improve the tank commander’s vision without having to expose his head or upper torso out of the top of his cupola. Vehicles so equipped were referred to as the M48A3 (Mod B) tanks. (USMC)
Marine replacements are seen here heading to Hue. It took until 2 March 1968 before the Battle for Hue was officially over. Marine losses in the fighting came in at 142 dead and 1,100 wounded. Total allied casualties, including US Army units and South Vietnamese military forces, were approximately 600 dead with 3,800 wounded. (USMC)
Seen here in South Vietnam is a Marine Corps O-1C Observation plane officially nicknamed the ‘Bird Dog’. It had initially entered Marine Corps and US Army service in the 1950s. It performed a wide variety of roles such as target acquisition for artillery units and liaison work as well as a forward air control (FAC) aircraft supplementing the jet-powered versions. (USMC)
The Marine Corps’ replacement for the O-1 Bird Dog would be the OV-10A, officially nicknamed the ‘Bronco’. Its official designation when initially conceived in 1962 was ‘light armed-reconnaissance aircraft’ with the first production example arriving in South Vietnam in July 1968. The USAF and US Navy would also employ the aircraft during the Vietnam War. (USMC)
The Marines pictured here are examining captured enemy weapons. On the right-hand side of the picture, a Marine is holding a 7.62mm AK-47 with the Marine on the left-hand side of the photograph clutching a Soviet-designed 7.62mm RPD light machine gun. The Marine in the centre is wearing the new camouflage tropical uniform introduced in late 1968. (USMC)
For the III MAF, the beginning of 1968 had been a momentous one with the extended seventy-seven-day siege of the KSCB that ran into early April 1968. It was followed by the massive Tet Offensive that began on 31 January 1968 and continued into early March of that year. The enemy did not let up and in May 1968 launched a ‘Mini-Tet’ with Marines in continuous combat throughout I Corps. (USMC)
One of the lesser-known fighting vehicles deployed by the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War was the XM733 pictured here. Developed from the standard M116 marginal terrain vehicle, the Marine Corps ordered ninety-three of them as an amphibious assault vehicle armed with a .50 calibre machine gun. This XM733 has an experimental Aerojet XM174 40mm grenade-launcher. (USMC)
The Marine riflemen pictured here are carrying away captured enemy 12.7mm machine guns. Draped over the chests of the two Marines in the foreground are cotton bandoliers containing twenty-round magazines for M16 rifles. Marine infantrymen in South Vietnam tended to dislike their uniform accoutrements and often traded for those used by the US Army and ARVN infantrymen. (USMC)
A Marine rifleman in South Vietnam has dispensed with the issued sling for his M16 rifle and replaced it with a makeshift example. Note that he does not have his flak jacket zipped up; doubtless because of the quick heat build-up it created. On the other hand, such a practice badly reduced the amount of protection it offered. (USMC)
A Marine examines his flak vest that deflected a possible bullet fragment. The first six months of 1968 proved the costliest of the Vietnam War for the Marine Corps, accounting for almost one-quarter of all those killed during the conflict. In those six months, 3,339 Marines died. During that period the 3d Division averaged about 220 killed per month and another 1,250 wounded per month. (USMC)
The very high loss rate of lower-ranking Marine riflemen in the first few months was of great concern to General Cushman, the commander of the III MAF. He informed the 1st and 3d divisions’ commanders in May 1968 that ‘we are suffering too many Marine casualties – particularly KIA [killed in action].’ He attributed that to a misplaced reliance on ‘do-or-die assaults’. (USMC)
General Cushman emphasized to his divisional commanders in May 1968 that more reliance be placed upon the support arms such as artillery and air support to reduce casualties. In response, the commandant of the Marine Corps felt that such a change in war fighting ‘could lead to a degradation and even the loss’ of the Marine Corps’ traditional ‘‘can-do’’ offensive spirit’. (USMC)
A Marine rifleman appears here with a captured enemy soldier who is being questioned by an ARVN interpreter. The flurry of concern over the very high losses incurred by the Marines from January to May 1968 in South Vietnam became less of an issue beginning in June 1968 due to the inaction of the NVA from June 1968 to most of August 1968. (USMC)
On 24 August 1968, the enemy mounted the third of their Tet Offensives by firing upon twenty-seven different military installations and South Vietnamese cities. Their primary target would be the Da Nang air base, but their attacks were beaten off. Pictured here is a Marine with an M60 machine gun slung across his shoulder. (USMC)
On 5 November 1968 Richard Nixon, pictured here, won the American election for the office of president. He ran on a platform of ending the war in Vietnam as public opinion in the country was then heavily against continued involvement. How he planned to end the war in South-East Asia he did not divulge. Nixon assumed the office of president on 20 January 1969. (DOD)