The period known officially as the Battle of Britain lasted just 114 days, from July 10 to October 31, 1940. Like all battles, the events in it are confused, and tracing its course is not made easier by the apparent lack of a master plan by the Luftwaffe High Command. This notwithstanding, four distinct phases are discernible, although considerable overlap exists between them, and they are not clear cut.
The initial German aim was to gain air superiority over the English Channel and southern England in order to give Operation Sealion, the proposed invasion of the British mainland, a chance of success. Later in the Battle, it seemed that the Germans hoped that England would capitulate to air power alone, thus rendering invasion unnecessary.
The first phase consisted of probing attacks designed to test and weaken the defences while the main body of the Luftwaffe deployed into position to mount an all-out assault. Mostly they consisted of attacks on British convoys around the south and east coasts, coupled with massive fighter sweeps over south-eastern England. The convoys, which made up the bulk of the targets during this early period, were vital to the British economy of the period. Mainly they carried coal and bulk raw materials. They could not be withdrawn without placing an unacceptably heavy load on the vulnerable rail network. The convoys had to be defended, but if the German fighter sweeps could be identified in time, they were not intercepted; the attrition inevitably attendant upon such operations worked in favour of the British at no risk to themselves.
The second phase commenced during the second week in August, with heavy bombing attacks on airfields and radar stations in the south of England. These were intended to destroy RAF Fighter Command as an effective force.
The third phase came when the main weight of the German assault was switched to London on September 7, with the twofold intention of forcing the British fighters into the air, and of cowing the civilian population. Major daylight attacks on the metropolis continued until the end of the month. At the same time, heavy night raids on London commenced, adding to those already in progress against major industrial centres and ports, such as Liverpool, in the north-west of England.
The fourth phase commenced after Operation Sealion had been cancelled late in September. The main weight of the assault was switched to the night bombing offensive, which continued long after the Battle was officially over. Daylight activity during this final period was, with a few exceptions, confined to fighter sweeps and fighter-bomber raids.
The Battle officially opened on July 10, 1940. The month had started with a few German probing attacks and reconnaissance sorties. Then, on July 4, the Germans started to get into their stride with major attacks on convoys, and the naval base at Portland, on the south coast. German fighter sweeps over south-eastern England were also started on this day.
Operations during the first nine days of the month were hampered by poor weather, with heavy cloud and thunderstorms. This was a bad period for British squadron commanders; Sqn Ldrs Cooke of No. 65 and Joslin of No. 79 were both killed, while Sqn Ldr George Lott of No. 43 was wounded.
The first major raid of the official Battle of Britain took place during the morning of July 10, when the convoy codenamed ‘Bread’ was detected by a reconnaissance Dornier Do 17P of 4(F) 121 when rounding the North Foreland in Kent. Six Spitfires of No. 74 Sqn (Hornchurch) intercepted at about 1100hrs, but were outnumbered by the Luftwaffe escort, an entire Gruppe (20 + aircraft) of Bf 109s (I/JG 51). The Dornier crash landed at Boulogne heavily damaged. Two Spitfires were hit and force landed, one at Hornchurch, the other at Manston. A little later, Bf 109s in Staffel strength (between 8 and 12 aircraft) swept over the Dover area. Spitfires of No. 610 Sqn intercepted, but scored no victories. Sqn Ldr Smith was hit in this encounter and force landed at Hawkinge.
Then, at 1350hrs, over 70 German aircraft were sighted approaching the convoy. This force was composed of about 24 Do 17Zs of I/KG 2, escorted by some 24 Bf 110s of ZG 26, and two dozen Bf 109s of I/JG 3 and JG 51. About 30 British fighters intercepted – Hurricanes of Nos. 32 (Biggin Hill), 56 (North Weald operating from Manston) and 111 Sqns (Croydon), and Spitfires of No. 74 Sqn. These were joined in the closing phase of the action by six Spitfires of No. 64 Sqn (Kenley). While No. 56 tackled the 109s, No. 111 opened with what was to become its trademark during the Battle, a squadron strength head-on pass at the bombers.
A confused dogfight ensued. German losses were three Dorniers shot down or crash landed and one damaged; three 110s shot down and two damaged; and three 109s shot down or crash landed and one damaged. British losses during this action were one Spitfire which crash landed at Lympne, one Hurricane lost in a collision with a Dornier, two more crash landed, one of which was a writeoff, and two damaged. One British pilot was lost in this action. This rate of exchange was very acceptable to Fighter Command, but it would not always be maintained. More significant, although less spectacular, was the fact that only one ship in the entire convoy was sunk.
In the West, Luftflotte 3 had been active. At much the same time, Ju 88s of KG 51 raided both Swansea and Falmouth. The attacks were not intercepted, and a munitions factory at Swansea was hit. At this time No. 10 Group of Fighter Command did not yet exist; it was inaugurated in late July.
Poor weather conditions restricted activity during the next week, although a few convoy attacks were mounted. It improved on July 19, by which time there were no fewer than nine convoys at sea. The day started with the usual Luftwaffe reconnaissance snoopers, one of which was shot down off the coast near Brighton. Just after 0800hrs, four Do 17s of an unidentified unit attacked the Rolls-Royce aero engine works at Glasgow, causing heavy damage. They were not intercepted.
No. 141 Defiant Squadron had moved south a few days earlier and, operating from Hawkinge, was patrolling in mid-Channel off Folkestone in the early afternoon when attacked by Bf 109s from III/JG 51. The unwieldy British turret fighters were outclassed and six were shot down, with the loss of 10 crewmen killed and two wounded. JG 51 lost just one aircraft and pilot. The disaster might have been complete had it not been for the arrival of No. 111 Squadron, who fought an inconclusive engagement with the Messerschmitts.
Several other actions were fought on this day, and more casualties were suffered by Nos. 1, 32, 43, 64, 145 and 603 Squadrons. Eleven British fighters were lost and four damaged against German air combat losses of two 109s shot down and two damaged, and a Heinkel He 111 and a Dornier 17P shot down. This was a black day for Fighter Command.
A quiet few days followed, thunderstorms all over southern England developing on July 20. Then three nights later a seemingly small but very significant event took place. Flying Officer Ashfield and his crew, Pilot Officer Morris and radar operator Sergeant Leyland, flying a radar-equipped Blenheim of the Fighter Interception Unit, shot down a Do 17Z of I/KG 3 at night. This was the first ever interception made using airborne radar.
Better weather on July 20 and 25 signalled the return of hard, if relatively small-scale fighting. Dorniers attacked a convoy in the Straits of Dover during the morning of July 24. They were intercepted by six Spitfires of No. 54 Sqn, who succeeded in spoiling the bombers’ aim but little else. In return, three Spitfires were damaged, one of which force landed: the effectiveness of the German air gunners is often underrated.
Later in the morning, 18 more Dorniers, this time escorted by about 40 Bf 109s of II and III/JG 26, approached another convoy in the Thames Estuary. Spitfires of Nos. 54 and 65 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept; at the same time No. 610 Sqn was ordered to patrol the Dover area to cut off the retreat. A sharp clash ensued, JG 26 losing three aircraft, including that of the II Gruppe Kommandeur, Hauptmann Noacke. No. 54 Sqn lost one Spitfire shot down, with eight-victory ace Johnny Allen killed; another force landed but was later able to return to base, three were damaged, and one written off after a forced landing out of fuel.
As JG 26 withdrew at low level, a sweep by III/JG 52 coming in to cover it was bounced by No. 610 Sqn. In the fracas that followed, JG 26 lost four Bf 109s including those of the Kommandeur, Hptmn von Houwald, and Oblt Erlich, the Staffelkapitaen of 8 Staffel, who it is believed fell to the guns of Colin Gray of No. 54 Sqn. This was a bad time for German fighter leaders, as just four days earlier Major Riegel, the Gruppe Kommandeur of I/JG 27 had been killed, while in the next four days casualties included Oblt Keidel, Staffelkapitaen of 8/JG 52, and the Luftwaffe’s leading scorer. Major Werner Mölders, the Geschwader Kommodore of JG 51, was shot down and severely wounded by Flt Lt John Webster of No. 41 Sqn on July 28. He spent a month recovering from his injuries.
Meanwhile the weather worsened. Heavy thunderstorms on the afternoon of the 27th curtailed operations. So severe were they that the fighter airfields at Westhampnett and Martlesham Heath were flooded and put out of action for two or three days. The summer of 1940 was far from the endless sunshine of legend, but the storms cleared the air for the next few days and convoy attacks resumed.
Dover was raided during the early morning of July 29, the German force consisting of 48 Ju 87 dive bombers from IV (Stuka)/LG 1, II/StG 1, and II/StG 4, escorted by the Bf 109s of JG 51, about 80 strong. Eleven Spitfires of No. 41 Sqn were scrambled from Manston to intercept, and a dozen Hurricanes of No. 501 Sqn from Hawkinge. Four of the Stukas were shot down; one crash landed and one was damaged, while JG 51 lost two fighters, plus another which crash landed in France. One Spitfire was shot down, while no fewer than four others crashed on landing back at Manston, fortunately without injury to the pilots. A 501 Sqn Hurricane suffered relatively minor damage, the others were unscathed, but No. 56 Sqn, which joined the fray later, lost one Hurricane and a second was damaged. Two British pilots were killed in this action.
One of the two convoys in the area was attacked by a low level force of either Dorniers or Ju 88s, or it may have been a mix of both, from KG 76, while the other, which was off Harwich, was attacked by the fighter-bomber trials unit, Erprobungsgruppe 210, making its operational début. This unit, which was to carry out some of the most spectacular raids during the next few months, was not very successful on this occasion, claiming just two ships hit, and returning with one Bf 110 damaged by a Hurricane of No. 151 Sqn. Its escort, Bf 110s of II/ZG 26, damaged two of No. 151’s Hurricanes, which force landed safely.
August commenced quietly, with adverse weather hampering operations. On the first day of the month, Air Chief Marshal Dowding increased the establishment of pilots by beefing-up the notional strength of each squadron, thus creating a paper deficiency of 134. Had he not done this, the pilot deficiency would have been just 40 on this date. With the benefit of hindsight, this was a very shrewd move, as it gave him leverage to demand the transfer of pilots from other Royal Air Force commands.
So quiet were these opening days of August that the only Fighter Command combat casualties during the first four days were a Hurricane of No. 145 Sqn shot down by a Henschel Hs 126, and a Spitfire of No. 616 Sqn damaged by return fire from a Ju 88, both on August 1. The Germans were not so lucky, losing four He 115s, one Hs 126, three Ju 88s, two Do 17Zs, one Do 17P and one He 111. Several others force landed after operational missions. A few skirmishes took place on August 5 but, in spite of good weather, no major attack developed. The Luftwaffe was conserving its strength for Adler Tag, or ‘Eagle Day’, provisionally set for August 10. During this period, both sides lost more aircraft and crewmen in flying accidents than in combat.
The pot started coming to the boil on August 8. Fighter sweeps by elements of JGs 3, 26, 51, 53 and 54 during the late morning were engaged by Spitfires of Nos. 41, 64, 65 and 610 Sqns. Honours were roughly even; four Spitfires being shot down and three pilots killed, a fifth force landed and a further two were damaged. A Blenheim of No. 600 Sqn was also lost. German losses were a single Bf 109 shot down, four more that crash landed in France, and a sixth badly damaged.
Meanwhile, convoy ‘Peewit’, consisting of 29 vessels including Royal Navy escorts, and protected by its own balloon barrage, was attacked by small units of Stukas during the morning as it sailed westward in the Channel. A heavy cloud base at 2,500 feet (760m) combined with the balloons to thwart the attackers, and patrolling British fighters held them at bay with no loss to either side.
Further down the Channel the weather was clearer: Luftflotte 3, which had already been in action against another convoy near Weymouth, launched a mass attack on ‘Peewit’ as it neared the Isle of Wight. Fifty-seven Ju 87s of StG 2, 3 and 77, escorted by 20 Bf 110s of V(Z)/LG 1 and about 30 Bf 109s from II and III/JG 27 were detected by Ventnor radar and intercepted before reaching the ships by 30 Spitfires and Hurricanes drawn from Nos. 145, 257 and 609 Sqns. An intense dogfight took place, joined in its later stages by the Hurricanes of No. 238 Sqn, They were unable to prevent the Stukas attacking the convoy, which scattered, thus reducing the balloon cover, and took heavy losses in consequence.
At about 1630hrs, Luftflotte 3 returned in force to where ‘Peewit’ was reassembling off St. Catherine’s Point. This time there were 82 Ju 87s escorted by 68 Bf 109s and 110s. No. 10 Group had kept a constant fighter presence over the convoy, and Nos. 43 and 145 Sqns were scrambled to intercept in sufficient time to gain both height and position, and launched a devastating attack, although this was not enough to save the shipping from further losses.
British losses in the day’s convoy actions were heavy: 13 Hurricanes were lost, one force landed, and three more were damaged, while one Spitfire was lost and a further two damaged. No fewer than 12 pilots were killed, and three slightly hurt; all of them in Hurricanes. No. 145 Sqn fared worst, losing five aircraft and pilots, two of them in the early morning action. Luftwaffe losses were also heavy. Eight Bf 109s, one 110, and seven Ju 87s were lost. Five more Ju 87s force landed, and two 109s, five 110s, and six 87s suffered various degrees of damage. Of these, one 109, two 110s, and three 87s were past repair. Bf 110 casualties were relatively light, because they had adopted their standard tactic of going into a defensive circle when attacked. (Later, Goering ordered this to be renamed the offensive circle; the change passed unnoticed by RAF Fighter Command!) Two Gruppe Kommandeurs ended in the water on this day; Hptm Werner Andres of III/JG 27 and Hptm Plewig of II/StG 77.
There was no major activity on August 9, although the Luftwaffe flew many reconnaissance sorties, and a few bombs were dropped by single aircraft and small formations. They were taking a breather before Adlerangriffe, the all-out assault planned for the next day. It was not realised in Britain that the ‘Peewit’ battles of August 8 were not planned, but had been very much ad hoc ventures at a target of opportunity. But when August 10 dawned, thundery squalls combined with an adverse weather forecast caused a postponement. Numerous reconnaissance and minelaying sorties were flown, but surprisingly neither side suffered combat casualties, the last day for many weeks that this would happen.
Sunday, August 11, dawned fine, and the first attack came from Jagdbomberflieger, or Jabos, of EprGr 210, which raided Dover harbour. This was followed by three Luftwaffe fighter sweeps in quick succession, then a series of incursions by German fighters in Staffel strength over Kent and Sussex. Combat was generally refused by the British, but some inconclusive skirmishes took place.
At 0945hrs, Ventnor radar detected a large build-up near Cherbourg, France. This emerged as 54 Ju 88s of I and III/KG 54, and 20 He 111s of KG 27, escorted by 60-plus Bf 110s of II and III/ZG 2, and about 30 Bf 109s of III/JG 2. it was the biggest raid yet seen, and a total of 74 Hurricanes and Spitfires from eight squadrons were scrambled as the German formation moved inexorably towards Portland naval base. Many of the British fighters became entangled with the escorts, and fighter losses were high on both sides.
Things would have been worse for the Germans had it not been for the arrival of more Bf 109s from JG 27 to cover the withdrawal. The Zerstörers’ defensive circle failed to save them on this occasion; they lost six aircraft, including that of Major Ott, the Gruppe Kommandeur of I/ZG 2, and five more were damaged.
Meanwhile, the Jabos of EprGr 210 were busy again, this time leading eight Dorniers of 9/KG 2 against convoy ‘Booty’, off Harwich. They were met by elements of Nos. 17, 74, and 85 Sqns, who handled them roughly, despite the efforts of their escorts, the Bf 110s of I/ZG 26.
As they withdrew, a further raid was building up. About 45 Dorniers of II and III/KG 2, accompanied by a handful of Stukas and escorted by 109s, headed for another convoy in the Thames Estuary. They were intercepted by Spitfires of No. 74 Sqn. Nos. 54 and 111 Sqns also attempted to engage, but rapidly deteriorating weather conditions rendered further action abortive.
German combat losses on the day were 15 Bf 109s, 10 Bf 110s, one Do 17Z, six Ju 88s, two Ju 87s, and two He 59s. In addition, one Bf 109, two 110s, and one Ju 88 force landed on return, while one Bf 109, five 110s and five Do 17s returned in various states of disrepair. British losses were also heavy; six Spitfires and 21 Hurricanes were shot down; a further Spitfire and four Hurricanes force landed; two Spitfires and nine Hurricanes were damaged. This was not an adequate exchange rate. Even worse, 26 RAF pilots were missing, a rate that could not long be sustained by Fighter Command.
German fighter sweeps started the ball rolling on the morning of August 12, followed by the most serious development yet; a coordinated attack on the British coastal radar chain. This was carried out by EprGr 210, commanded by Hptm Walter Rubensdorffer, who attacked Dover, Pevensey, Rye and Dunkirk in quick succession. They were difficult targets, and though the first three were temporarily put off the air, no lasting damage was done.
Minor convoy attacks followed, and a few aerial skirmishes took place. But at 1145hr Poling radar detected a 200-plus German force south of Brighton. It was the Ju 88s of KG 51, escorted by the Bf 110s of ZG 2 and 76, plus top cover of about two dozen Bf 109s from JG 53. As this armada steamrollered its way westwards, 58 fighters were scrambled to meet it. Somewhere off Selsey Bill, the German formation split into two groups. The larger of the two raided Portsmouth, causing heavy damage to both the town and naval installations, while the other struck at Ventnor radar, putting it out of action for many weeks. KG 51 paid heavily, with 10 Ju 88s shot down, two force landed in France, and a further two damaged. The Geschwader Kommodore, Oberst Dr Fisser, paid for his success at Ventnor with his life.
In the afternoon came another serious development; fighter airfields in England were attacked for the first time. Manston was hit by EprGr 210 at about 13.00hrs; this was followed by a raid by Dorniers of KG 2, although these were identified as Heinkels in the station diary. In the late afternoon, Lympne and Hawkinge were damaged by Ju 88s of II/KG 76. On all three airfields, the damage was heavy but not critical. The day ended with heavy bombing raids on several Kent coastal towns.
By contrast with the events of the previous two days, Adler Tag was an anticlimax. The initial raid was to have been by 74 Dorniers of Oberst Johannes Fink’s KG 2, escorted by about 60 Bf 110s of ZG 26, which was commanded by the wooden legged veteran of WW I, Hans Joachim Huth.
In the event, weather conditions forced a postponement, but Fink was not informed in time, and he pressed on through the cloud banks unescorted. His targets were the naval base at Sheerness and the Coastal Command airfield at Eastchurch. By a strange coincidence, Spitfires of No. 266 Sqn and a flight from No. 19 Sqn were based there, this being about the only time in the Battle that fighters were present on this airfield. KG 2 was intercepted by Nos. 74, 111 and 151 (North Weald) Sqns, but now the clouds became the Dorniers’ shield, and losses were light.
Meanwhile, other units had missed the postponement order. Fighter sweeps were mounted by I/JG 2, while Ju 88s of KG 54 crossed the coast to strike at Odiham and Farnborough airfields; neither of them operated by RAF Fighter Command. A combination of interception (by fighters from Tangmere and Northolt) and bad weather rendered this attack abortive. Yet another shambles was enacted further west when the Bf 110s of I/ZG 2 flew out to rendezvous with more Ju 88s of KG 54, which had by now learned of the postponement. The only rendezvous for the Zerstörers was with two squadrons of British fighters off Portland.
One of the most interesting points of this day’s operations was that most of the radar stations were back on the air; only Ventnor was still out, and this fact was concealed by transmitting dummy signals, while the gap in the coverage was partly closed by a mobile radar set.
During the afternoon the weather improved, and radar detected raids on a wide front approaching the south coast. The various fomations involved were 120 Ju 88s of KG 54 and LG 1, escorted by 30 Bf 110s of V/LG 1 to the west, and 77 Ju 87s drawn from II/StG 2 and StG 77 escorted by a mass of Bf 109s from JG 27 on the east side. Sweeping ahead of the bombers came 30 Bf 109s of III/JG 53. On reaching the Dorset coast they were intercepted by No. 609 Sqn, losing three aircraft.
Most of LG 1 penetrated as far as Southampton by about 1600hrs, and caused heavy damage to both the docks and the city, although the Spitfire factory at Woolston emerged unscathed. Luftwaffe intelligence thought it made bombers! The remainder of LG 1’s Ju 88s headed for the airfield at Andover. Meanwhile the Ju 88s of KG 54 attacked Portland, but were intercepted by Nos. 152, 213 and 601 Sqns. At the same time, some of the Ju 87s made for Middle Wallop when they were intercepted by the Spitfires of No. 609 Sqn, who were returning to base low on fuel and ammunition.
Shortly after 1700hrs, Ju 87s of II/StG 1 struck at Rochester, Kent, where Short Bros manufactured bombers, but failed to find the target. Intercepted by Hurricanes of No. 56 Sqn, they turned back, jettisoning their bombs. Meanwhile, Ju 87s IV(St)/LG 1 badly damaged the Coastal Command airfield at Detling, near Maidstone, demolishing the Operations block and all the hangars. A fighter sweep in strength by JG 26 gave cover in the area at this time.
The scoreboard was in favour of the British on this day. Six Bf 109s, nine Bf 110s, five Ju 87s, seven Ju 88s, six Do 17s and one He 111 were shot down, while three 109s, nine 110s and three 88s force landed in France. Of these, three 110s and one 88 were written off. On the British side, 12 Hurricanes and one Spitfire were lost, two of each force landed; and eight Hurricanes and three Spitfires were damaged. A heartening feature was that only three RAF pilots were killed, and two wounded severely enough to take them off strength. This was in stark contrast to the events of August 11.
As darkness fell (after 2200hrs) on August 13, the night offensive started, with bombers roaming the length and breadth of the British Isles, bombing targets as far apart as Norwich, Aberdeen, Swansea, Liverpool, and Belfast, where Short Bros’ bomber factory was hit. Otherwise there was little damage except to the rail network.
Daylight raids continued the next morning, although hampered by poor weather. Middle Wallop was hit by three Heinkels of KG 55 but they lost their Geschwaderkommodore Oberst Alois Stoeckl, a poor return for a damaged hangar.
The weather forecast for Thursday August 15 was not good, and major operations were postponed, while Reichsmarschall Goering summoned a conference of his senior commanders. A rapid improvement in conditions allowed the planned operations to proceed by late morning, the order for the attack being given by Oberst Paul Deichmann, Chief of Staff of II Fliegerkorps, in the absence of anyone more senior.
The raid traces on the British radar displays were so large that it became impossible to distinguish between individual formations. First into the fray were the Ju 87s of II/StG 1 and IV(St)/LG 1, attacking Hawkinge and Lympne. Heavy damage was caused at both airfields, and Lympne was put out of action for three days. Even more serious was the fact that power supplies to the radar stations at Dover, Rye, and Foreness were cut, putting them off the air for several hours. Nos. 54 and 501 Sqns intervened, but were overrun by the escorting 109s. As the German aircraft withdrew, Manston was strafed by Bf 110s of II/ZG 76.
At this point, events shifted to the north-east. In the early afternoon, the Newcastle/Sunderland area was raided by 65 He 111s of KG 26 escorted by 34 Bf 110s of I/ZG 76 from Norway, while airfields in Yorkshire were attacked by 50 unescorted Ju 88s of KG 30 from Denmark. Both raids were detected well out to sea, and fighters from 72, 605 and 609 Sqns intercepted them. German losses (eight He 111s, eight Ju 88s, eight 110s) were too heavy to be borne, and mass daylight attacks by Luftflotte 5 were never again tried.
Back in the south-east, further raids took EprGr 210 (mix of bomb-carrying 110s and 109s) to the fighter airfield at Martlesham Heath, reducing its operational effectiveness for the next few days. Next 88 Dornier 17s of KG 3 headed for Rochester and Eastchurch, joining with a strong fighter escort en route consisting of over 130 Bf 109s drawn from JG 51, 52 and 54. At the same time, 60 Bf 109s of JG 26 carried out a fighter sweep over Kent. No fewer than seven British squadrons were directed against this raid, but failed to penetrate the screen of escorts. Short Bros’ aircraft factory, making Stirling bombers, was hard hit. Amid the confusion, small formations from KG 1 and KG 2 attacked Hawkinge and other targets, under cover of a Bf 109 fighter sweep by I/LG 2. Fighting was both heavy and confused.
Meanwhile, far to the West, two raids were plotted, one approaching Selsey Bill, the other approaching Portland. The first consisted of about 60 Ju 88s, escorted by 40 Bf 110s. Attacked by four British squadrons in turn, they penetrated the defences and attacked airfields at Middle Wallop, Odiham, and Worthy Down, causing little damage, although two hangars were hit at Wallop. Further westwards, Stukas strongly escorted by Bf 109s and 110s were attacking Portland again, opposed by one Spitfire and two Hurricane squadrons.
The day was far from over. Back in Kent, various Dornier units were taking full advantage of the general confusion, while JG 26 Bf 109s mounted a fighter sweep in the area. One Dornier Gruppe was headed for the sector station at Biggin Hill, while the indefatigable EprGr 210 was to raid another sector station at Kenley. These were the first attacks launched at these vital targets.
Edging around to come in from the north, Rubensdorffer led his men into the attack, but the sun was low and visibility hazy. The airfield that he actually attacked was Croydon, a few miles from Kenley, and the Hurricanes of No. 32 Sqn from Biggin Hill were waiting to greet him. One hangar was destroyed and two others damaged; many buildings were hit, and Croydon was rendered non-operational for two days. EprGr 210 paid a heavy price, however, losing five Bf 110s and a 109; Rubensdorffer himself went down in Sussex.
Meanwhile the Dorniers heading for Biggin Hill had also boobed, raiding West Malling instead, causing considerable damage. West Malling was a fighter airfield, but did not effectively become operational until the last day of the Battle, and so the effects of this raid were unimportant.
On August 15, usually described as the hardest fought day of the Battle, the Luftwaffe flew 2,199 sorties and was opposed by 974 Fighter Command sorties. The fighting was intense, and casualties were heavy. German losses totalled 75, including those that returned but were written off. They were seven Bf 109s; no fewer than 28 Bf 110s (six from EprGr 210, eight from I/ZG 76 in the north-east, and another 12 from II and III/ZG 76 in the south); six Ju 87s, 17 Ju 88s, including eight from I and II/LG 1 in the south and seven from KG 30 in the north-east; 12 He 111s, eight of them from KG 26 in the north-east; three Do 17s, and one each He 59 and Arado Ar 196.
It was also another bad day for Gruppen Kommandeurs. In addition to Hptm Rubensdorffer of EprGr 210, Restemeyer of I/ZG 76 and Dickore of III/ZG 76 went down, while Brunstellin of I/JG 51 and von Wechmar of I/KG 3 were wounded.
British losses totalled 29, including those written off, or 30 if a Blenheim shot down by a friendly fighter is included. The split was 21 Hurricanes against eight Spitfires. Thirteen RAF pilots lost their lives; seven were wounded; while three ended up as prisoners of war. Eight Hurricanes and two Spitfires force landed, while 13 Hurricanes and three Spitfires were damaged.
The next day followed fairly much the same pattern but at a reduced intensity; only 1,715 Luftwaffe sorties were mounted. Many airfields were raided, but with the exception of Manston, and Tangmere, which was badly hit, they had little bearing on the Battle. A day of quiet then followed, as though both sides were gathering strength for a further effort.
Sunday, August 18 was another day of hard fighting, with about 800 Luftwaffe sorties in daylight matched by 886 Fighter Command sorties. This did not mean that the same numerical balance was achieved in the air. In the south, where the bulk of the action took place, the British fighters were still outnumbered in individual actions.
At lunchtime, Luftflotte 2 launched a heavy coordinated attack on the sector stations at Kenley and Biggin Hill. Kenley was badly hit; three of its four hangars were destroyed and its operations room was put out of action. The nine Dorniers of low-flying specialist Staffel 9/KG 76 caused heavy damage during this raid, but was almost wiped out while doing so; only two aircraft, both damaged, returned to base.
The raid on Biggin Hill made a mess of the adjoining golf course but achieved little else. It was, however, the first in a series where Biggin Hill was raided daily and sometimes twice a day for an extended period, and was nearly put out of action. Croydon and Manston were also hit on this day.
Further down the coast another huge multiple raid was launched by Luftflotte 3, aimed at Thorney Island, Gosport and Ford airfields, and Poling radar station. Like the earlier incursion, this series of raids was strongly opposed by defending fighters, who took a heavy toll of the slow Stukas.
Later in the afternoon, Luftflotte 2 launched another major attack, this time against the sector stations of Hornchurch and North Weald. Defending fighters were up in force and action was joined, but then deteriorating weather obscured the target area and forced the bombers to turn back.
The loss ratio was not so far in the British favour on this day, but the Bf 109s had taken a beating with 18 lost. Most significant of all were the losses of the Bf 110s, Goering’s famed Zerstörers, 17 of which were struck off charge, and the Stukas, of which 18 were lost. From this point on, Zerstörer operations were restricted, while the dive bombers were withdrawn from the battle altogether. British losses were 26 Hurricanes and five Spitfires written off, for 10 pilots killed.
The weather broke during the afternoon of August 18, and it remained poor, with heavy cloud and rain for the next few days. This gave the opposing commanders time to think. Goering issued instructions that the bombers must be escorted more closely. Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, commanding Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group, arranged for help to be given by the neighbouring Nos. 10 and 12 Groups when requested.
Meanwhile, the occasional German incursion was made. A large fighter sweep over Kent on August 19 was recognised in time and ignored by the defenders. Cloud cover allowed small formations of bombers to penetrate over England on harassing raids, with airfields as the prime targets. The night offensive continued, with raids on centres including Liverpool, Sheffield, Derby, Coventry and Hull.
The weather improved on August 24, and heavy raids resumed, although apparently with a little more circumspection than had previously been shown. Airfields at Hornchurch, North Weald and Manston were again targets. Manston, with its proximity to France and Belgium, was the favourite alternative target for the Luftwaffe and, although well equipped with underground shelters, thanks to its Royal Navy origins, was rapidly becoming unusable. The Defiants of No. 264 were operating from there, and on this day they were badly mauled. A heavy raid on Portsmouth took place in the late afternoon. That night over 100 aircraft were tracked heading in over London, and bombs were dropped in the City, Finsbury, Bethnal Green, Stepney and East Ham, among other places. This was a new and sinister turn of events.
RAF Bomber Command attacked Berlin on the night of August 25/26 as a reprisal for bombs that had fallen on London. This was the first in a series of events that was to provoke the Germans into switching their attack to London. But at this moment that could not be foreseen. During the day, the pattern persisted as before. Continued attacks on the British fighter airfields were beginning to tell as damage accumulated.
The pace began to slacken on August 27, when no major raid was mounted, despite clear skies in the afternoon. Something else was afoot. The single-seater fighter units of Luftflotte 3 had begun to move into the Pas de Calais, which meant that massive escorts for the bombers could be provided in the Luftflotte 2 area. Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group, concerned at certain plotting inadequacies that had become evident, introduced a scheme whereby formation leaders would radio a situation report on sighting the enemy and before engaging.
During the morning of August 29 all was quiet, then in mid-afternoon radar plots showed a build-up behind Calais. This proved to be a handful of bombers, covered by an estimated 650 fighters drawn from JG 3, 26, 51, 52 and 54; and ZG 26 and 76. No. 11 Group put 13 fighter squadrons up; first into contact were the Hurricanes of No. 85, who were told to disengage, and the other squadrons held back. There was literally no point in risking a massive fighter battle when realistically only bombers could cause serious harm.
The fine weather persisted, and the attacks on airfields continued, mingled with fighter sweeps and attacks on other targets. Rarely were the German intentions clear from the radar plot. A lucky hit on the electric grid supplying the radar stations put Beachy Head, Whitstable, Rye, Fairlight, Foreness, Pevensey and Dover off the air for a few hours on August 30. On this day, Fighter Command sorties reached 1,054 which was their peak during the Battle.
Activity was very high on the next day also, the Luftwaffe mounting 1,450 sorties opposed by 987 by Fighter Command. During the next few days, North Weald, Biggin Hill, Kenley, Hornchurch, Tangmere, Eastchurch, Croydon, Detling and Debden were all attacked, some many times. Biggin Hill in particular was badly damaged, and the third raid of the day on September 1 saw a direct hit scored on the Ops room. A temporary Ops room was set up in the village. For a few days, only one squadron could be based there. In an attempt to halt the incessant raids the Station Commander, Group Captain Grice, took the drastic step of having what remained of the hangars demolished, reasoning that from the air they still looked valid targets.
The cumulative effect of the damage on many airfields was rapidly becoming critical. Had it got much worse, the only solution would have been to pull the fighter bases back beyond the range of the escort fighters. This was to be avoided if at all possible, as in the event of an invasion the reaction time from airfields farther back would have been longer, while the endurance of the British fighters over the German bridgehead would have been much less.
Casualties among British squadron and flight commanders had been heavy. Aircraft reserves were still adequate, but the standard of replacement pilots was low. Extensive redeployment of squadrons was a feature of the first two weeks of the month. Attacks on factories producing fighters started now, a little late in the day. Brooklands was raided on September 2, but the Vickers works producing Wellington bombers was hit instead of the Hurricane factory.
Defence of the invaluable sector airfields was difficult. Often the RAF had little or no prior indication of the Luftwaffe target, and No. 11 Group fighter squadrons scrambled only when it was clear that a raid including bombers was imminent and that the radar plot was not just a decoy. With large formations moving in before splitting into several individual raids, interception was a nightmare. Exhaustion was fast setting in among the pilots of Fighter Command, who were outnumbered and had often to cede height and position to the enemy.
Fairly typical of the problem was a midday raid on September 4, when 70-plus He 111s and Do 17s crossed the coast between Hastings and Dover, escorted by about 200 Bf 109s. They then split to attack five targets between Reigate and Canterbury, and nine British squadrons met them, with varying degrees of success. Meanwhile, a small force of Bf 110s, including some Jabos, was reported north of Guildford at low level, having penetrated thus far unnoticed. They were then intercepted by nine Hurricanes of No. 253 Sqn and badly mauled, but the survivors reached their target at Brooklands, but again hit the Vickers factory rather than the Hawker site.
As part of this general raid, which had the defenders running about in all directions, EprGr 210 attacked the radar station at Poling, but were intercepted, losing their new Kommandeur, Hptm von Bolternstern. The entire series of attacks was coordinated to exploit the factor of confusion.
Losses this day were nearly equal, the Germans losing six Bf 109s, 13 Bf 110s, most of them on the ill-fated Jabo sortie, and one He 111. British losses were six Hurricanes and nine Spitfires, with nine pilots killed. A further four Hurricanes and two Spitfires force landed.
The margin was closing. What the RAF desperately needed was some respite for the fighter airfields, and some pressure taken off the British pilots. Further heavy fighting took place on September 5 and 6, but on the very next day, from a most unlikely source the respite came.
The day (September 7) started much as any other, with German reconnaissance aircraft snooping about, and being harassed by defending fighters. But then activity died away until shortly before 1600hrs. Hermann Goering had taken personal command of his much vaunted Luftwaffe and, throwing subtlety to the winds, launched the largest raid ever. No fewer than 348 bombers escorted by 617 fighters started across the intervening water. Twenty-one British squadrons were scrambled to meet them, but their controllers were in a quandary. Guessing which were the targets was an impossible task. It looked like an all-out attack designed to smash No. 11 Group. Expecting the assault on airfields to continue, most squadrons were ordered into positions to protect the vital sector stations and other likely targets such as the Thameshaven oil refinery.
The inevitable result was that comparatively few British fighters made contact before the first wave of bombers reached London, and these were swiftly embroiled with the escorting Bf 109s. Led by Oberst Fink’s Dorniers of KG 2, the juggernaut rolled on, and bombs rained down on the docks from Rotherhithe to Tower Bridge. By the time that Fighter Command realised what was happening, and vectored the remaining British squadrons towards it, the German Goliath had bombed and was on its way home, leaving behind roaring conflagrations and a pall of smoke darkening the sky.
Nor was the ordeal over. Shortly after 2000hrs, the second wave of bombers came up the Estuary, guided by raging fires on the ground. For the next eight hours they stoked them up, leaving the fire fighting services almost helpless due to the sheer scale of the devastation.
But that day, September 7, had seen the combat début of the No. 12 Group ‘Big Wing’ from Duxford. Consisting of Nos. 242 and 302 Hurricane and No. 1 Spitfire squadrons, and led by the indomitable Douglas Bader, its purpose was to meet force with force; numbers with numbers. Bader’s idea was that his wing of 36 fighters should be scrambled early and meet the enemy forward in the Maidstone/Canterbury area. A mass assault would disrupt the enemy formation and leave it an easier target for the single squadrons of No. 11 Group. In practice it was never to be used in this manner. 11 Group asked for reinforcements only when the situation was getting desperate, and the Duxford Wing was inevitably scrambled late as a result.
The Wing was often criticised as taking too long to form up. In practice, Bader used to set course immediately after take-off, without first orbiting base, and climb out on course throttled back just enough to allow the others to join up. From the scramble order to 20,00ft (6,100m) over the Thames Estuary took little longer for the Wing than for a single squadron. On September 7, they scrambled late and were caught on the climb by the escorting 109s. They were thus denied the chance of making a mass attack on an unbroken Luftwaffe formation.
The fact that much of the combat had been between fighters was reflected in the relative casualties. Just 13 German bombers were shot down plus two more which force landed. At least four of these were not involved in the main daylight raid. By contrast, the Bf 109s lost 16; the Bf 110s eight, plus two more that force landed.
Six Spitfires and 17 Hurricanes were lost, but another 12 of the former and five of the latter force landed in varying states of disrepair. Eleven other fighters suffered damage. When one considers that many aircraft that force landed took many weeks, if not months, to repair, it can be seen that in material terms, Fighter Command had slightly the worst of things. Another 19 British pilots were out of the Battle, 14 of whom were killed.
Sunday September 8 was relatively quiet as the Luftwaffe rested from their exertions. For the first time, No. 11 Group used paired squadrons for an interception, Nos. 253 and 605 combining to attack one of the handful of small raids mounted. As dusk fell, the night assault on London resumed. It was to continue every night for the next seven weeks.
On the next day, the German invasion date was fixed as September 20, but the executive order had to be given as early as September 11. Time was running out for the Germans.
Daylight activity continued at a moderate level during September 9, with airfields and aircraft factories the main targets, then a break in the weather brought relief to the defenders.
A black day for Fighter Command was September 11, with combat losses exceeding those of the Luftwaffe. Two major coordinated attacks by the Luftwaffe were launched, both in the afternoon. The first, comprising He 111s of KG 1 and KG 26, headed up the Thames Estuary towards London, with a fighter escort 200 strong. The defending squadrons made little impression on the escorts at first and lost heavily; some of them had been scrambled too late and were caught on the climb. As on the 7th, the Bf 110s formed a holding pattern in the Croydon area, while the single-seaters ran themselves low on fuel. As a result, the Heinkels were quickly left without an escort and suffered in consequence, losing 10, plus four more which force landed in France while a further 120 were damaged.
Meanwhile Luftflotte 3 mounted a raid on Portsmouth and Southampton, causing little damage. Luftwaffe combat losses for the day totalled 21, and another six force landed. Of these, only four were Bf 109s, although a fifth crashed as a result of a midair collision over France. Collisions were not that unusual; four Ju 87s were lost to this cause on a training mission also. Six Spitfires and nineteen Hurricanes were lost and a further six fighters crash landed. Twelve pilots were killed and four severely injured. This was an exchange rate that Fighter Command could not afford.
Activity during the next two days was minimal, due to adverse weather conditions, but picked up a little on September 14, when radar stations and some south coast towns were attacked. Once again, the decision to launch Sealion was deferred, this time until the 17th.
Then came the day now celebrated as ‘Battle of Britain Day’; Sunday, September 15, 1940. Extensive redeployment had taken place in Fighter Command during the previous few days, with fresh units replacing tired and depleted ones. The lessening of attacks on their airfields, and the low rate of aerial activity over the past few days had allowed the British pilots to rest. Some squadrons in the battle area even managed to devote time to training their replacement pilots; a rare luxury during that hectic summer. When Sunday, September 15 dawned, a reconstituted and rested British fighter force awaited the day’s events . . .
As on many other days, the action was slow to develop. Not until nearly 1100hrs did a massive raid build up behind Calais, as the German bombers joined formation and awaited the arrival of their fighter escort. The first wave, consisting of Dorniers of KG 3 and III/KG 76 crossed the British coast near Dungeness at about 1130hrs, with a strong fighter escort.
Air Vice Marshal Park was to make extensive use of paired squadrons on this day; no fewer than 10 of his 21 squadrons operated in pairs against this first raid. The remainder of the No. 11 Group squadrons were quickly airborne, and reinforcements were on the way from No. 10 Group to the west, and No. 12 Group to the north, this last consisting of the ‘Big Wing’ from Duxford, now five squadrons strong, and led by the fire-eating Douglas Bader.
The first British units to engage were the two Spitfire squadrons from Biggin Hill; Nos. 72 and 92, who intercepted near Maidstone. They were quickly joined by other units, and a large whirling battle commenced. As the German formation lumbered towards London, its escort fighters were peeled away from the bombers, and ran low on fuel. So fierce was the opposition that by the time that the leading bomber formations reached the outskirts of London, their fighter escorts had vanished.
They were then confronted with the awesome sight of the Duxford Wing in perfect formation, three squadrons of Hurricanes covered by two squadrons of Spitfires 5,000 feet (1,525m) higher. At the same time, half a dozen other squadrons from No. 11 Group approached from all sides, and a huge mêlée developed. Some German bombers jettisoned their loads at random; others were hunted all over the London suburbs, and their bombing runs spoiled.
Damage was widespread, although little of military value was hit. Spitfires and Hurricanes were elbowing each other out of the way in order to get a shot in. For once they had numbers on their side. Shortly after noon, the German armada was streaming back down the Thames Estuary and across the coast of Kent in extreme disarray.
Back on the other side of the Channel, the Luftwaffe prepared for the next stage. Two hours later they tried again, preceded by a fighter sweep. Again they met with fierce resistance, and huge dogfights developed. If anything, the level of confusion was even higher than in the earlier action. The Duxford Wing had come forward again, but this time had scrambled late. They were hit by 109s before they could get at the bombers and split up.
Faced with the unrelenting attacks by the British fighters, many bombers jettisoned their loads more or less at random and headed homewards. By I600hrs, all that remained were smoking wrecks littering south-eastern England. Two further raids took place on the day. He 111s of III/KG 55 made an ineffective attack on Portland, while EprGr 210, making its first appearance for several days, raided the Spitfire factory at Woolston.
The BBC announced that evening that 183 German aircraft had been shot down on the day. The actual combat loss was 56. Twelve more had force landed, and ten had limped home damaged, often with dead or wounded crewmen on board. In detail, 22 Bf 109s, three Bf 110s, 19 Do 17s, nine He 111s, and three Ju 88s had been destroyed. The force landed figures were three 109s, three Do 17s, five He 111s and one Ju 88. British losses totalled 27: 20 Hurricanes and seven Spitfires, with five and two force-landed respectively. The ratio of damaged aircraft was high; 12 Hurricanes and four Spitfires. Pilot losses were 12 killed, one prisoner of war, and four severely injured.
In terms of the scoreboard, September 15 was not exceptional, although it was thought to be at the time. The reason for the overclaiming, which it must be said was equally rife in the Luftwaffe, lay in the high level of confusion, where several fighters would take a shot at a single aircraft in a very short space of time. In several individual actions, the British outnumbered the Germans, which increased the probability of this happening.
The true importance of September 15 lay in the morale of the two opposing air forces. For the first time, many of the British fighter squadrons had a positional advantage over the Germans; for the first time many of them fought with numbers on their side. By contrast, the Luftwaffe, and especially the fighter arm, were becoming disenchanted with their commanders. The refrain for many days past had been that the Royal Air Force was reduced to its last 50 Spitfires. On September 7, the defences had been fairly ineffective, and victory at last looked as though it might be in sight. Then on September 15, they had been met by a revitalised force. Not only were the British fighting harder than ever, but there seemed to be more of them than ever before. The Germans felt themselves outnumbered and beset on all sides. Suddenly victory looked farther away than ever. To the British, September 15 felt like a great victory. The mood had changed on both sides.
Adverse weather restricted operations during the next few days, although a small daylight raid on London was mounted on September 18. The night bombing campaign continued unabated. On September 19, the invasion was quietly cancelled, although the British had no way of knowing this at the time. The Reichsmarschall directed that airfields and aircraft factories were again to be the priority targets, and many German bomber units redeployed westwards from September 25. There were two days of intensive fighting before the month ended; on September 27 and 30.
September 27 started with the usual reconnaissance sorties, then a formation of Bf 110 Jabos escorted by 109s raided southern England in what appeared to be a fairly purposeless incursion. Intercepted, they lost eight of their number. This was followed by the Ju 88s of I and II/KG 77 heading for London who, due to an error in timing, came in unescorted. They were met by 10 squadrons of RAF fighters and very roughly handled, losing 12 aircraft before Bf 109s came to their rescue. Fierce fighter battles were fought as a result of both these actions. In the west, Luftflotte 3 launched a raid on the Bristol Aeroplane Company works at Filton with EprGr 210, which lost four Bf 110s, including that of their third Kommandeur in six weeks, Hptm Martin Lutz, and ZG 26, which lost seven aircraft. Total German casualties for the day were 54: 18 Bf 109s, 21 Bf 110s and 15 Ju 88s were written off. Two further Ju 88s crashed after a midair collision over France. British losses totalled 28: 15 Spitfires and 13 Hurricanes were written off and yet others force landed. More seriously, 20 RAF pilots were killed and a further five badly hurt.
September 30 started with fine weather, and two raids estimated as 200-plus headed for London. Intercepted, they turned back, and a ferocious fighter battle took place. Heinkels of I and II/KG 55 launched a raid on the Westland Aircraft factory at Yeovil in the afternoon, turning back after losing four of their number. Sixteen Spitfires and Hurricanes were lost on this day, but only four pilots were killed. Total German losses amounted to 44 aircraft written off, including 28 Bf 109s; a resounding success for the British fighters.
Early October saw a distinct shift in the emphasis of the Luftwaffe attacks. While the night offensive was to continue until May 1941, with London, Liverpool, Coventry and other industrial centres as the main targets, the mass daylight attacks virtually ceased, and were largely replaced with nuisance raids by Bf 109 Jabos. The rationale behind this was to keep the defenders extended and weaken them if possible, pending a resumption of the offensive in the spring of 1941. As had been found earlier in the Battle, the British fighters would not rise to oppose a sweep by Bf 109s alone, and it was no longer a viable proposition to use bombers as Lockvogel, or bait. Only bombs on England could get the defences to react, and bomb-laden Bf 109s could immediately revert to being fighters once they had dropped their load.
The month of October started cloudy with little activity, although fighter sweeps over south-eastern England included a handful of Bf 109E-7 Jabos of LG 1.This was to set a new pattern. The Luftwaffe High Command had issued instructions that one Gruppe in every Jagdgeschwader was to be so equipped for Jabo operations. This did not do much for the morale of the Jagdflieger. It also posed RAF Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group a different problem inasmuch as the Jabos would come in very fast and very high and, realistically only the Spitfire squadrons could catch them. The Hurricane, good though it was lower down, simply did not have the performance at 25,000ft (7,620m).
Things remained fairly quiet until October 7, when a plethora of small raids and sweeps were mounted over the south-east and south coasts. Portsmouth and Yeovil were raided. The Yeovil raid was expensive for the Luftwaffe: their losses on this mission amounted to seven Bf 110s of II and III/ZG 26, and a Ju 88 of II/KG 51. Things would have gone even worse with them had it not been for the arrival of 109s to cover their withdrawal.
Much the same pattern continued, interspersed with bad weather breaks when daylight operations became minimal. Damage caused by the Jabos was light, the average 109 pilot being unable to obtain the same results as the highly trained specialists of EprGr 210. That the strain was beginning to tell on both sides there can be no doubt, as shown during this period by the spate of operational accidents, due to a combination of fatigue and bad weather.
Fighting flared up again on October 15, and some vicious little skirmishes developed over the Thames Estuary. The Jagdflieger had marginally the better of the action, losing 10 Bf 109s and a Ju 88, for four Spitfires and eight Hurricanes. Several British fighters force landed. Two other German losses on this day were Bf 110 night fighters of NJG 1 and NJG 2, both shot down during the hours of darkness by British bombers. Also on this night, Greater London was badly hit, with 512 civilians killed, nearly 1,000 injured, and an estimated 11,000 made homeless. Most of the major rail termini, at Waterloo, Victoria, Liverpool Street and Paddington, were badly damaged in this raid, and rail services were severely disrupted.
Daylight activity during the rest of October slowly petered out. October 21 was a foul day with little activity. It was notable because for the first time in a very long while, Fighter Command suffered no combat casualties, an occurrence repeated on October 23 and 24. October 26 was notable only for the belated entry of the Italians into the battle, when 16 Fiat BR 20s of the Regia Aeronautica made a half-hearted raid on Harwich.
Some indication of the strain on Fighter Command at this late stage was the fact that no fewer than 1,007 sorties were flown on October 27, for very little result. The raids were by Jabos, plus small formations and even single bombers trying to penetrate the defences under cover of cloud. The targets were mainly airfields, ranging from Hawkinge in Kent to Driffield in Yorkshire, The scoreboard for this day was seven Bf 109s, two Ju 88s, two He 111s and one Do 17 lost, plus two 109s force landed, set against four Spitfires and four Hurricanes written off. Poor weather conditions persisted until the last day of the month, when there were no combat casualties on either side, although two Dorniers of III/KG 76 were lost over France when they ran out of fuel after a mission.
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The Battle of Britain has now been under the intense scrutiny of historians and others for half a century. Aided by hindsight, they have been able to raise various controversial issues. Criticism is all too easy for those who come after. To touch on but one issue, it is known that both sides overclaimed by a considerable amount. No one who has not experienced air fighting can possibly imagine the confusion. Neither can they judge. Relative scores are an effect, not a cause. What is clear is that the Battle of Britain was won by Fighter Command because it defeated the Luftwaffe in the battle to control the air over southern England.