Conclusion
Rescuing Reality
In November of 2011, as I awaited the results of our study, the following occurred:
1. A new paper came out in a peer reviewed journal, once again detecting differences between liberals and conservatives that appear rooted in the brain. In it, a group of Italian researchers found that conservatives, more than liberals, showed an “automatic selective attention for negative stimuli.”
What does that mean? In one experiment, liberals and conservatives were shown a series of positive and negative words that were presented in different colors, either red or blue. When asked to identify a given word’s color, conservatives appeared more distracted by the negative words (like “vomit,” “horrible,” “disorder,” and “disgust”), and thus performed more poorly at the color-identification task.
It is hard not to wonder: Is the word “liberal” also a negative stimulus for conservatives, one that triggers strong automatic and affective responses? And do liberals respond equally automatically and rapidly to the word “conservative”?
The authors weren’t shy in linking their findings back to prior research on conservatives’ vigilance and responses to threat—and thus, to the amygdala. Indeed, these past studies had informed and guided the design of their experiments.
2. In early November, I released a draft cover image of this book, and a brief description of its subject matter, online. Conservatives then rapidly attacked this negative stimulus, charging that I was practicing a form of “new eugenics” and that the book—not yet in print, not yet even finished—depicts them as “genetically/mentally/psychologically inferior.”
This is incorrect, as anyone reading these pages knows. It is also more than a little inflammatory—not unlike wrongly charging that the health care bill creates “death panels.”
What’s more, not having read the book, there is no way conservatives could actually know whether their charge about it was true or not. But they made the charge anyway—and one conservative blogger in particular, the top climate “skeptic” Anthony Watts, featured it along with an image of an “abnormal” brain from the 1974 Mel Brooks film Young Frankenstein.
3. On the day before Thanksgiving, we finally had all of our data from the study, and Everett rushed to analyze it so that we could report our findings in these pages.
The ultimate result, as you’ve seen, is that in an experiment that tried to take what we know about well-documented liberal and conservative differences, and combine it together with what we know about processes of biased reasoning, we appeared to confirm some expectations, disconfirm others, and also to find something new. The last was most intriguing: Conservatives just weren’t spending as much time reading our essays, a tendency that may be related to less Openness or curiosity. This possibility needs to be further studied. The result is striking and, if real, might explain a lot.
So we examined our data, adjusted our beliefs and hypotheses accordingly—and started to contemplate new research possibilities.
How is all this connected?
Clearly, research on the psychology of ideology, and on the differences between liberals and conservatives, is here to stay. In fact, it is moving into a new stage, one in which these well documented differences are taken as the starting point, and then experiments are designed to figure out what they actually mean in different, increasingly realistic contexts. One of those contexts will of course involve the processing of inconvenient or threatening information—whether political or otherwise.
This trajectory of research cannot be stopped. It cannot be put back in the box. It is too intriguing, and too important.
Indeed, the research has already established some strong findings, such as the relationship between liberalism and Openness. And it is probing further into areas of uncertainty—for example, concerning the left, the right, and motivated or defensive reasoning.
An accurate depiction of the current state of knowledge, as it bears on the thesis of this book, might be this: We know liberals overall are more Open, and conservatives are less so, with all that entails. So we know this difference probably helps to explain much about our political battles over what’s true. But at the same time, there is still a great deal to learn about how these differences play out in the real live political and media world.
In particular, following on our latest results, I wonder whether stronger group or “team” affiliations play a role in driving conservatives’ biased reasoning about politics in particular. We know conservatives tend to be more intense in their loyalty and dedication to their group. And if that group is the “Republicans,” maybe this helps to explain their willingness to double down on certain wrong beliefs that are politically vital to the party. They’re defending their “band of brothers,” so to speak.
It is also clearly going to be important to get a better understand of the relationship between conservatives reacting rapidly and automatically on the one hand, and their engaging in more elaborate defensive reasoning processes on the other—especially, in the latter case, when they are politically sophisticated. In other words, we need to know much more about how liberals and conservatives, respectively, rely on System 1 and System 2.
New studies can help tease this out. But of course, most of these studies will be designed by academic liberals, who naturally want to gain a better understanding of the dysfunctional nature of our politics. Consequently, there is every reason to expect that conservatives will lash out and attack these findings. They’ll assume it’s just another case of liberal academia bashing them—and so may dismiss a growing body of solid knowledge with a wave of the hand.
Such a defensive reaction, ironically, would be a highly un-nuanced way of understanding what the science actually suggests.
If anything, I come out of a yearlong immersion in this research with a newfound admiration for conservatives. No, I don’t think they’re very good at getting the facts right in politicized and contested areas. And I think I know a lot more about why. But the same knowledge suggests that conservatives are much better than liberals at other things—like, say, showing determination, leadership, loyalty, perseverance—and that liberals have a great deal to learn from them.
Despite this, however, research on the science of our politics will probably continue to be attacked by the very same people who, in a less polarized context, would make for very loyal allies, teammates, friends.
But for those who are Open to what I’m saying, I think we are now prepared to attempt—very tentatively—to sketch a “nature” meets “environment” account of the conservative denial of reality. Multiple factors seem at play; things can go very differently because of any single one of them. And by no means is our knowledge complete. But the big picture, I suspect, may ultimately look something like this.
First, there is “nature” or “psychology,” which is probably partially influenced by our genes. These, acting through individual cells (especially in our brains), help to create a variety of propensities and traits, such as personalities or dispositions. Some of these have latent ideological implications, and may predispose us towards the adoption of beliefs that “feel” right to us—religious beliefs and political beliefs, among others. We are not really aware of this happening—it just does.
Next, there is the “environment” in which we grow up. We do not enter it as a blank slate, but we’re certainly influenced by it. Here, we’re shaped by our families (political beliefs expressed by our parents, whether the lawn has a Republican or Democrat sign at election time), our schools, our churches, our peers. This early environment interacts with our genes and who we are, as our experiences change and shape our brains—and so we develop an identity and a view of the world.
Now, both our personalities and the context in which we’ve grown up have tilted us towards adopting some beliefs more than others.
Third, there is the overarching political context—the region and country in which we live, the era, the political structures in existence, the communication technologies in use. These control the kinds of ideas we’re exposed to, as well as how much choice we have in the information we consume and the ideas we embrace. For instance, in some communities—the white South—there is greater social pressure to adopt a Republican ideology, whether or not one has a personality or disposition with which this ideology is very consistent. Ideological choice is thus constrained by social desirability factors imposed by the group or community, sometimes subtly, and sometimes more overtly.
Now our personalities, the context in which we’ve grown up, and broader societal factors have all tilted us towards adopting some beliefs more than others.
There are also large scale events—like 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the Great Recession—which cause powerful emotions (fear, empathy) in the population and can cause ideological shifts or conversions. Slower political changes over time can do the same. In this complex way, ideologies are formed, sets of beliefs are assembled—and then, sometimes, they are challenged.
At this point, our core natures or personalities once again condition how we respond. But so do all the ties and commitments we’ve made, the tone of conversation we’ve learned, the political context and the communication technologies—all of which may make it easier, or harder, for us to reinforce our beliefs. Also at play are factors like the time we have available to pay attention to a given topic or issue, and the time we’ve spent engaging with it in the past, getting up to speed, learning to care and to have arguments and responses.
All of this shapes whether we fight the facts, or whether we shift our views more flexibly. So in no way is it a simple story. And in no way is it determinism.
But it looks as though some of these factors, working together, have created a vast amount of ideologically driven misinformation on the political right today. Among these factors, personalities and psychological needs (authoritarianism, the need for closure) seem important, but so do levels of political engagement or knowledge, and divergent communication and information channels. And so does the tone of discourse and the standards of acceptable political behavior, which are strongly influenced by political elites.
What’s new about this book is its synthesis of a large body of evidence suggesting that despite the contribution of so many disparate factors, “nature”—more specifically, psychology and personality—still seem to shine through.
But given that that is the case, how should we respond to this reality—that people are who they are, that conservatism itself is part of human nature, and that people fight back vigorously to defend their beliefs, and intellectually sophisticated conservatives perhaps most of all?
First, the very same body of science suggests a variety of interventions that actually work to change people’s minds, at least to an extent. Recent research by Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, for instance, has shown that if you want to make people less defensive and biased, a technique called “self affirmation” holds great promise. What is self-affirmation?
Before hitting people with inconvenient facts in a recent motivated reasoning study, Nyhan and Reifler first had their subjects write a short essay describing something good about themselves—a moment when their core values or identities led to a positive outcome. Something they could be proud of.
This exercise, the study showed, brought about an overall debiasing and less defensive responses. And not surprisingly: Because motivated reasoning is an emotional process, you can’t expect to short circuit it with reason or arguments. Rather, only by lessening emotion and defensiveness—causing partisans to disarm—can you establish a conversation or exchange of information that is unthreatening.
On a person-to-person level, such an approach will assuredly work far better than getting into a shouting match. And that is how we ought to be having conversations—calmly and interpersonally, if honest give-and-take is the goal.
In such situations, it is also vitally important to demonstrate that there is common ground before broaching anything controversial, and to frame the information to be shared in a non-threatening manner. In another study, for instance, Dan Kahan and his colleagues found that conservatives were more open to the science of global warming if it was framed as supporting the expansion of nuclear power—but very closed to the science if it was framed as supporting traditional pollution controls, which fly in the face of their values.
All of this has profound implications for liberals, and scientists, who hold Enlightenment values and want to share their knowledge. These thinkers tend to be wedded to the idea that facts ought to win the day, that the truth emerges from vigorous clashes and debates of ideas. And that approach might very well work among people who share the same Enlightenment values, and honor and respect academic and scientific norms.
But matters are very different when you are trying to communicate with someone who does not share your Enlightenment values—or indeed, with the public at large. Here, the tacit assumptions of those who think “facts” and “reason” are the way to convince people are actually likely to be a hindrance to success.
Such are some scientific ways of trying to communicate and persuade—but liberals and scientists should not get overoptimistic about the idea of convincing conservatives to change their most deeply held beliefs. There are far too many factors arrayed against this possibility at present—not only the psychology of conservatism itself, but our current political polarization, by parties and also by information channels.
You can’t have an unemotional conversation when everything is framed as a battle, as it currently is. Our warfare over reality, and for control of the country, is just too intense. This unending combat is terribly destructive for America, and I don’t really know of any good way to bring an end to it.
Actually, that’s not quite right: I don’t know of a way to stop it that conservatives would actually agree on. But if conservatives were interested in compromise, an olive branch, then this might be a way to achieve it.
Imagine that liberals and conservatives were to agree to a truce, based on a joint acceptance of the body of science surveyed in this book. Both sides would respectfully conclude from this science that liberals and conservatives both have different strengths and weaknesses, which come out in separate situations.
Liberals are better at getting at the truth in complex, nuanced situations—as are their psychological brethren, scientists. And that’s in significant part because they have the dispositions and personalities for it—they tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty, and they like engaging in deep and taxing thinking. So part of the truce would require conservatives to recognize that if you want knowledge, you must go to a person (or better yet, group of persons, like the scientific community) that is adept at determining what it actually is. You don’t just get to make it up for yourself and deny what actual experts say, because you’re sure you’re right.
But conservatives are clearly better at being decisive, sticking to a course, being unwavering. So part of the truce would require liberals to recognize that conservatives must play a critically important role in a variety of leadership positions, in making sure that choices get made—provided that they heed liberals and lead in a reality-based fashion. I am not talking about going to war with Iraq based on misinformation, and being unswervingly convinced that this is a good idea. Rather, I am talking about something like, say, leading a patriotic campaign to make America the best nation in the world at dealing with climate change and adopting clean energy technologies.
This may sound a little Kumbaya—but I am serious in my view that our politics would be vastly more healthy if we acknowledged our strengths and weaknesses, and showed one another some deference in our respective areas of strength. I want to have liberals around to tell me what is true, but I want conservatives on my team, and to help me be decisive, effective, and stay the course.
To see as much, consider a few recent examples of conservative strength and liberal weakness. As I was completing this book, the nations of Europe were trying to patch together yet another plan to fix their gigantic debt problems, after “kicking the can down the road” for months and months. And Occupy Wall Street protesters were engaging in chaotic and largely incoherent protests, thus probably assuring that they’ll never be as politically effective as the right wing movement with which they’re so often compared: The Tea Party.
To my mind, these are very different but related examples of inadequate psychological conservatism. Europe needed one decisive shock and awe plan to fix everything—one big blast from a really big bazooka—rather than endless dithering and summits.
And Occupy Wall Street needed a clear agenda that directly advanced the electoral hopes of President Obama and the Democratic Party—for that is the only way there will ever be progress on behalf of the 99 percent, and against the one.
But were either Europe’s “leaders,” or Occupy Wall Street’s “leaders,” aware that psychological liberalism was their problem, and that they needed to go against their instincts? I doubt it.
The point is that conservatism and liberalism alike represents core parts of human nature, and each has many virtues and benefits. That’s why the notion that studying the psychology, neuroscience, or even the genetics of left-right differences will lead to a “new eugenics” is so silly and misinformed. Why would you want to try to breed away character traits that are so vital and beneficial, and such a central part of who we are?
My current suspicion—though I know the science is inadequate to prove it—is that we probably evolved to have the capacity to be both “conservative,” and also to be “liberal,” because both are really beneficial to us. The problem in modern times, and in the United States today, is that we’ve gotten terribly confused, and put these two sides of ourselves in opposition. Which is disastrous. They need to be operating together, rather than at cross purposes.
But as I said, I don’t expect conservatives to actually listen to me.
So instead of telling conservatives how they might fare better—for instance, start heeding reality-based former allies like Bruce Bartlett and David Frum—let me instead tell my fellow liberals how they might. After all, liberals are very open to new ideas and to change—and change is very much what they need.
So here’s the advice, liberals: You need to be way more conservative. And I don’t mean that a policy sense, but in a psychological one.
First, liberals need to be more “conservative” whenever conservatives are being unyielding, as they have so often been of late—and indeed, as they are more inclined to be. It simply makes no sense to try to compromise with someone who won’t compromise. It just weakens your negotiating position, especially when it is expected that liberals will be the ones who ultimately flinch in a game of chicken.
More generally, liberals need to be more “conservative” not in the substance of their ideas, but in how they strive to make them a reality. In politics and in advocacy alike, liberals need to show much more unity, much less fractious dissent and infighting, much more loyalty and shared purpose.
Take liberals and President Obama. He’s the best hope they’ve got—in fact, the only one. And yet for many, the constant instinct is to find flaws with him; and liberals are vastly less committed to devotedly supporting him than the Tea Party is to attacking him.
Why? Because they’re liberals. It certainly doesn’t help that some of them can draw more attention to themselves, and stand out from the crowd, by coming up with novel and ingenious ways of bashing a president from their own party.
But guess what, liberals: Obama needs you right now. He needs your trust, your devotion. You ought to try to show him the same loyalty that conservatives showed George W. Bush, and forget about that little issue where he didn’t do things precisely as you would have liked. You should defer to his judgment, and give him . . . your faith.
And yes, I am fully aware that it sounds icky. But that’s precisely the point—this is about going against your instincts, instincts that, in this case, impair your effectiveness.
The same lesson applies across liberal land. Dear environmental groups: Stop fighting amongst yourselves over petty differences. You have vast resources, yet you hardly get the most out of them. You try to let a thousand flowers bloom, and occupy ever more specialized and technocratic niches—and then you wonder why you fail.
And note: Becoming more unified does not just mean just holding a meeting where all your leaders get together and have long conversations. It means coming up with one unified plan, one singular purpose, and then pushing it as if there was no other choice and everything depends on it. The way conservatives would.
Here’s the thing, liberals: We have a key advantage over conservatives. We heed reality, and are willing to change. So we can course-correct if we’re going in the wrong direction, and do so based on the best available information.
In this case, the best information points to an inconvenient truth. It suggests that we have an inherent tendency, which we rarely even recognize, to be politically ineffectual—because we’re too busy differentiating ourselves from one another, highlighting our differences rather than our similarities, lingering in uncertainty rather than being decisive, attacking our own teammates rather than finding common cause, and trying to communicate complicated, nuanced facts rather than clear and motivating messages.
But because we’re flexible, we can also change this. And in the process, we can stay a step ahead of conservatives.
Let me suggest that we start conquering this not-always-advantageous side of our natures right away—though we should probably share a few drinks first. That would definitely help make us more unified.
Conservatives and liberals aren’t the only ones who ought to heed the research described in these pages. So should two other broadly liberal groups: Journalists and fact checkers on the one hand, and what I’ll call “liberal contrarians” on the other.
Journalists and fact checkers: You need to take seriously the notion that what appears to be true might be just that. Republicans today really are more doggedly misinformed about politics and economics (tax policy, healthcare reform), about science (evolution, global warming), and so on. Indeed, there is a very good reason for this; and not a reason that is demeaning, or relies on the dubious assertion that that Republicans are somehow bad people, or less intelligent.
No: Perhaps they respond differently to information than do liberals—thanks to different psychologies, different media channels, or some combination of these and other factors. Perhaps they cling more strongly to wrong beliefs, out of deference to authority, unity with the group, and simple searching for closure. Perhaps they need to do so.
This book takes seriously the idea—increasingly difficult to deny—that in the aggregate, Republicans and Democrats really think about facts, about reality itself, differently. And it has sought to explain how such a misadventure could come about, drawing on the best scientific tools available to aid in such an account.
Because after all, if this idea of differential approaches to reality is true, then that really matters. It has dramatic consequences for policy; but perhaps even more momentous implications still for the tone and the assumptions we bring into political “debates.” In particular, an “on the one hand, on the other hand” approach to journalism and the adjudicating of facts may simply be intellectually irresponsible. It may be just a ruse to go about this in a bipartisan way, if one side is getting it wrong all the time and the other is not.
So here’s an idea: Let’s give up on this silly notion of media “balance.” Let’s acknowledge upfront that Fox is a misinformation machine. Let’s stop pretending that Jon Stewart is as misleading as the station he loves to criticize, or that a half-Pinocchio statement by President Obama is equivalent to the latest rewriting of history by Sarah Palin.
And—this will be the hardest of all—let’s cover our politics in a psychologically informed way. When we see liberals acting incoherent and disorganized (e.g., Occupy Wall Street), let’s remark on why that is. When we see conservatives exhibiting authoritarian responses and applauding the death penalty and executions, let’s explain why that is.
And now, let me turn to the liberal contrarians. You know who you are. I’m talking about people who are not actually conservative, but really enjoy puckishly attacking their fellow liberals all the time.
Their behavior, ironically, is itself a psychologically liberal one, and a part of the Open personality. Liberal contrarians want to be noticed. They want to be seen as different. So they try to make waves.
I’ll acknowledge that this can be a fun game sometimes, and it’s one I’ve played myself. But when it comes to the modern politicized denial of reality by conservatives, it is long past time for liberal contrarians to stop claiming that somehow the two sides are equal, a “pox on both their houses,” and so on. The evidence just doesn’t support it. Not remotely. Liberal contrarians can be allowed a measure of dilettantism, but at some point, they too must cop to reality.
And as for defending reality itself? That’s the trickiest thing of all.
As I’ve suggested, refuting conservative falsehoods does only limited good. There are more than enough conservative intellectuals out there to stand up “refute” the refutations, leading to endless, fruitless arguments. And for the general public, those unconvinced or undecided, sound and fury over technical matters is off-putting, and leaves behind the impression that nobody knows what is actually true.
Rather, liberals and scientists should find some key facts—the best facts—and integrate them into stories that move people. A data dump is worse than pointless; it’s counterproductive. But a narrative can change heart and mind alike.
And here, again, is where you really have to admire conservatives. Their narrative of the founding of the country, which casts the U.S. as a “Christian nation” and themselves as the Tea Party, is a powerful story that perfectly matches their values. It just happens to be . . . wrong. But liberals will never defeat it factually—they have to tell a better story of their own.
The same goes for any number of other issues where conservative misinformation has become so dominant. Again and again, liberals have the impulse to shout back what’s true. Instead, they need to shout back what matters.
The book you’ve just read represents a year of work by an anti-authoritarian, need for cognition, Open and Conscientious liberal. In it, I’ve made a large number of factual and interpretive claims. The unavoidable question—given motivated reasoning—is, how do I know I’m right?
The best answer I can give is the following: Because I’m willing to be wrong. Because my beliefs are tentative, and because I understand and respect uncertainty, scientific and otherwise.
Indeed, not only am I willing to be wrong about anything in this book: I’m sure I am wrong about something somewhere. In fact, I modified my own views in the course of this project, thanks to Everett Young. Our experiment forced me to question whether there are really across the board motivated reasoning differences in liberals and conservatives, at least of a sort that extend beyond politics.
So do I engage in motivated reasoning? Of course. It would be foolish, naïve, and hubristic to claim some sort of unique exemption from human nature.
But I have also checked my facts and interpretations repeatedly, strived for accuracy, and familiarized myself with the most serious counterarguments that I am aware of and could find. And still, this is where I stand:
- Liberals and conservatives are different, in ways that can be measured and that really matter;
- This has everything to do with our divide over reality and the facts (where it helps to explain why liberals tend to be right);
- Accepting this reality has monumental implications for how we conduct political debates and, indeed, for the future of our perilously divided country.
Am I wrong about any of this? If so, you will have to show me where. I will strive to listen.
In conclusion, then: I am a liberal, self-described, self-examined, and hopefully self-aware. I am willing to update my beliefs and to change—and I see this willingness as a virtue, a characteristic I strive to possess.
In the end, then, the best I can say is this:
I believe that I am right, but I know that I could be wrong. Truth is something that I am driven to search for. Nuance is something I can handle. And uncertainty is something I know I’ll never fully dispel.
Notes
261 “automatic selective attention for negative stimuli” Luciana Carrago et al, “Automatic Conservatives: Ideology-Based Attentional Asymmetries in the Processing of Valenced Information,” PLoS One, Vol. 6, No. 11, November 9, 2011. Available online at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3212508/.
262 rapidly attacked Chris Mooney, “Conservatives Attack and Misunderstand a Book They Haven’t Read . . . a Book About Flawed Conservative Reasoning,” November 10, 2011. Available online at http://www.desmogblog.com/conservatives-attack-and-misunderstand-book-they-haven-t-read-book-about-flawed-conservative-reasoning.
262 Anthony Watts Chris Mooney, “Anthony Watts and Defensive Reasoning: Three Episodes,” November 16, 2011. Available online at http://www.desmogblog.com/anthony-watts-and-defensive-reasoning-three-episodes.