Chapter 20

‘Baba’s’ box

The process is not new but is generally effective: all you need is a simple box and diplomatic accreditation. Add a handful of thugs and someone with basic medical knowledge and voila! Now you can forcibly repatriate an individual and engage in continued and discreet discussions. But this does not always work and sometimes work and prying customs officers or untimely revelations about the location of the secret box are enough to derail the entire operation.

This is how President Nasser’s secret service agents were surprised at Rome airport, when they were about to load a trunk containing a spy whom they intended to question. This was not the first time that this spy trunk, which was designed to carry a passenger in the most comfortable conditions without the inconvenience of brutal porters, had been used by Nasser’s agents. There is also no doubt that similar modes of transportation have been devised by other intelligence agencies.

The misadventures of Umaru Dikko immediately spring to mind, proving that even the best intelligence can fail and that agents can be caught with their hands in the cookie jar!

The incident took place in the centre of London, in a well-to-do area. On a day in July 1984, an African man stepped out of his fine residential complex. He was wearing the traditional dress of a long white robe, with a hat, while his thick glasses gave him a distinguished air. Scarcely had he walked two paces down the road when a canary yellow van pulled up alongside. Several men jumped out, seized him, and threw him into the back of the vehicle which sped off immediately. It was impossible to resist, especially when this rather small man was faced with such sturdy and determined men.

The kidnap had been successful. However, there were two rather odd details about what had happened. Firstly, the colour of the van: if you are conducting a kidnapping on a road, surely you would use a more discreet vehicle! Another issue was that the incident took place right outside the victim’s home. A friend or family member could have seen what happened and alerted the authorities - which is exactly what happened. The African man’s secretary was at the window and witnessed the kidnapping, then naturally called the police.

The kidnapped man was called Umaru Dikko. A former Nigerian government minister, he had been instrumental in the election of President Shehu Shagari, who had won the first democratic election in 1979 after years of military dictatorship. However, in 1983, a few months before Dikko’s kidnapping, Shagari had been the victim of a coup and the military was now back in power. As usual, they had promised to restore democracy once order had been returned and politics had been cleaned up but in reality, a real dictatorship was established. Putsch after putsch followed and it was not until 1999 that a return to the polling booths took place. But that is another story, and recent news confirms that the situation in Nigeria is still chaotic.

Umaru Dikko was very close to Shagari when the military seized power and had to flee his country in extraordinary circumstances. Knowing that he was a wanted man, at first he spent a few days hiding out in the capital city of Lagos. After somehow managing to obtain a cassock, he disguised himself as a priest and crossed the border with Togo on a moped. He fled to Amsterdam before later settling in London, finding refuge with his country’s former colonial power as many other Nigerians had done when forced to flee their homeland.

Firstly, a few basic facts need to be addressed. While the Nigerian people themselves lived in great poverty, the country itself was actually very rich. Nigeria is one of the true giants of Africa; with a population of well over 100 million it is also the largest oil producer on the continent. Yet oil rarely leads to the happiness of a country, mainly due to the corruption it causes; and as it forms a country’s main resource, the wealth it generates can often fluctuate as prices go up and down. On the other hand, if the country does not have the facilities to process the oil, then it becomes highly dependent on help from abroad. The oil revenues also have to be strictly controlled so as to avoid too much debt and when prices fall there is a temptation to appeal to international lenders. Nigeria was a victim of its own wealth, especially in early 1980: under the leadership of President Shagari, oil suddenly lost 60 per cent of its value.

Dikko’s nickname was ‘Baba’, which means ‘Old’ in Yoruba, although at the time, he was not even fifty. However, the name probably stems from the respect that he inspired. ‘Baba’ originally came from northern Nigeria and had been educated at a school for the country’s elite. He afterwards left for London where he gained a mathematics degree and for a time, worked for the BBC.

Dikko had been interested in politics from early on: in London he had been the leader of an organisation of Nigerian students and later, when he returned to his home country, he was appointed commissioner of public finances for his state (Nigeria is a federal state). He gradually climbed up the ranks; however, the turning point in his life came when he met the future president, Shagari, who became his brother-in-law. It should also be mentioned that his own brother was later appointed advisor for oil affairs: a key position in Nigeria.

When Shagari was elected president, it was natural that Dikko was also at the heart of power and became the Transport and Aviation Minister. However, this position concealed the true nature of his duties: in reality, Dikko was the Number Two in the regime. So much so, in fact, that some compared his power to that exercised by Jacques Foccart under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. Dikko was now a power broker and a very influential figure, the president even entrusted him with the task of organising his next election campaign. Yet it was another of his prerogatives that began to attract attention.

Rice is a traditional part of the Nigerian diet, but the country is not self-sufficient and therefore has to import large quantities of wheat, the import and distribution of which was not to everyone’s satisfaction. President Shagari thus decided to create a special body to address this issue, which he rather pompously called ‘Task Force on Rice’. The group’s aim was to bring the trade to order and to stabilise it. Dikko was responsible for leading this new government agency and had to regulate the imports that were worth tens of millions of dollars. This meant that he was now in charge of signing the contracts with the importers.

There was a great temptation to help oneself or to bribe the producers and transporters - especially as Dikko was also the Transport Minister. ‘Baba’ was slowly building up an immense fortune, which some even estimate was up to a billion pounds. This systematic corruption, which also benefitted the ruling party, was one of the reasons that pushed the military into action and to expel Shagari.

Dikko therefore had good reason to flee his country when the military seized power, because he was afraid he would have to answer for his embezzlement. Exiled in London, he was quick to make very hostile statements against the new powers in Nigeria, which he accused of being undemocratic. What is more, he announced his intention to meet with other exiled opponents and coordinate a retaliation against the military. In an interview he even spoke about bringing a jihad against them and hoped to raise the Muslim population in northern Nigeria, where Islam was the majority religion.

The new leaders in Nigeria did not request his extradition from London, no doubt because of the lengthy procedure. Yet the Nigerian military were in a relative hurry and wanted to get their hands on Dikko’s wealth: the tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars that he had accumulated were certainly of interest to them! If they could get hold of Dikko, then they would be able to get his bank account information, even if they had to do it the hard way. Then it would be time to put him on trial and most likely execute him afterwards.

Le Monde¹⁰⁸

It is said in Lagos that this man is worth $1.4bn. Alhadji Umaru Dikko, the most wanted man in Nigeria following the coup of 31 December 1983, which ended the civilian regime of Shegu Shagari, had been deemed a scapegoat and the symbol of the corruption that has plagued the Nigerian government. There were several reasons for this...

Dikko was the brother-in-law of President Shagari and the Transport and Aviation Minister in the last civilian government. He was also the ‘Number Two’, or even according to some, the actual ‘Main Man’ in Nigeria.

The organiser behind the head of state’s electoral campaign during the presidential elections on 6 August 1983, he was equally responsible for the elections campaigns of the presidential party, the NPN (National Party of Nigeria).

Mr Dikko was also responsible for coordinating the import of all Nigerian food products and no significant contract could be signed without his approval, or at least without some juicy commission being collected along the way.

Lagos states that Mr Dikko’s fortune is essentially built on embezzlement and bribery: notably through the rice import contracts.

The powers in Nigeria thus decided to remove Dikko in order to uncover his secrets. This was a mission that fell to the secret service as it would mean an illegal operation in a foreign country with which it maintained good relations, although there was sometimes tension between the two capitals. Like all former colonial powers, the British still had a tendency to think that Nigeria still, in part, belonged to them.

The operation, which had to be conducted on foreign soil, was especially delicate as the English did not want any illegal activity taking place in their country. A serious incident had recently occurred in front of the Libyan Embassy, when a British policewoman had been murdered by someone inside. It was a case that had shaken public opinion and provoked outrage because the embassy personnel were able to leave the building freely as they were protected by diplomatic immunity.

In this context, the Nigerian authorities were forced to walk on eggshells. Their main difficulty was that although they had a secret service, its agents were not competent enough to organise such an operation in a European country where the police were particularly effective. They decided they needed help and completely unexpectedly, turned to Tel Aviv.

The Israelis had certainly helped to organise and train the secret services of several African countries, but after the Six Day War and the occupation of the Territories, most states in the continent broke off their diplomatic relations with Israel. Nevertheless, informal ties still remained, including business relationships, with dozens of Israeli companies being well-established in Nigeria.

Four Israeli agents were directly responsible for conceiving and carrying out the Dikko operation. They were naturally assisted by Nigerians who were already in London, or had been sent there especially for the occasion. However, their first task was to locate the former minister.

Dikko, who had good reasons to fear for his life, was of course in hiding and those who wanted to get to him had to engage in a real treasure hunt in order to find him in a city the size of London. Such a challenge required mobilising a large work force and the help of a solid organisation. After serious investigations, especially within the African community, Dikko was finally tracked down and the surveillance could now begin: it was important to know everything about his habits before intervening. On 5 July 1984, the group finally took action under the conditions described at the beginning of the chapter.

Once the secretary had raised the alarm, Scotland Yard went into action and began searching for the yellow van. At the same time, ports, train stations and airports were put on the alert.

Stanstead Airport is also a cargo airport and is located around 30 miles north of London. The day before the kidnap took place, a Nigerian cargo plane had landed there, and now its holds were empty. The pilot claimed that he was to transport several crates of diplomatic documents from the Nigerian embassy back to Lagos. Nothing unusual up to this point. However, by order of the British police, the Nigerian security agents on board were not allowed to leave the airport premises. London also suspected the Nigerian military of wanting to take back those who had found refuge in Great Britain.

This fear suggests that the British had relatively accurate intelligence, even if they did not know that Dikko was being specifically targeted. Nevertheless, three hours after the Nigerian politician’s abduction, a yellow van appeared at the gates of Stanstead Airport. A Nigerian citizen brandishing a diplomatic passport got out and demanded entry, saying that he had to load two cases onto the cargo plane that had landed the day before. The van was allowed in and the border police even allowed them to load the cases into the hold of the Nigerian 707 plane. This was certainly strange, given that Scotland Yard had already sent out a clear description of the van.

In fact, the police and the British customs officers were aiming to catch the Nigerians in the act. Under the pretext that he had heard a strange noise coming from one of the cases, a customs officer entered the hold and requested that the two large crates be unloaded. The crates themselves were addressed to Nigerian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which meant that they should have been protected due to their diplomatic status. In theory, however, there was nothing to prevent a customs officer from exercising his curiosity, providing it was legitimate. In many cases this often led to the discovery of weapons or even drugs concealed in diplomatic bags.

The two boxes were unloaded and taken to a hangar where they were opened in the presence of a representative from the Nigerian embassy. The first one contained Dikko, who was unconscious and appeared to have been drugged. But he was not alone! Next to him was a man with a syringe in his hand, who was later proved to be an Israeli anaesthetist who was supposed to inject a new dose of neuroleptic in case the prisoner woke up prematurely. Furthermore, to avoid suffocation this honourable practitioner was also charged with inserting a tracheal tube into the prisoner: it was clear that Dikko was intended to arrive in Nigeria alive, not dead. In the second box were two men, who coincidentally, were also Israeli citizens!

Libération¹⁰⁹

[The newspaper firstly reported that this kidnapping case occurred at a time when relations between the Thatcher government and the military in Lagos were quite delicate.]

Even before the outbreak of this case, Britain had been the target of violent attacks from Lagos. On Thursday, the second-in-command of the military regime accused Britain of having exploited Nigeria and serving as a ‘refuge’ for Nigerian ‘fugitives’ who were responsible for the country’s economic crisis.

Yet it will be harder for the Iron Lady to be as brutal with Nigeria as she was with Colonel Gaddafi. An influential member of the Commonwealth, Nigeria is also a major economic partner: it is the tenth export market for Britain and its main market outside of Europe and the United States.

The case also reveals the choices of the military powers in Lagos, who are currently engaged in a wave of anti-corruption trials. Many ministers, governors, senior officials in the former regime have received very heavy prison sentences from private military tribunals, without the chance of appeal. A decree has fixed a minimum prison sentence of twenty-two years, with the maximum being life imprisonment. Britain had already indicated that it would refuse to extradite Umaru Dikko if he was to be tried under such conditions.

After the discovery of the two men in the other box, it appeared that three Israelis were involved. It was obvious that other agents were involved in the abduction, but they had taken the precaution of disappearing as soon as the operation appeared to have been successful. They were not to know that the boxes would be opened at the airport.

In total, Scotland Yard had got their hands on a dozen people of various nationalities. For their part, the Israelis claimed that they were mercenaries who had been charged by wealthy Nigerian businessmen to capture Dikko and bring him home. The continued to stick to this story and consequently laid no implications against Israel or the Nigerian government. This suited London as there was no wish to throw oil on the fire and cause a serious diplomatic crisis.

Yet the fire burned briefly between Britain and its former colony and the renewed tension led to the temporary retention of a British plane at Lagos airport: a simple retaliatory action by an upset military. Taking care not to directly accuse the Nigerian authorities, London was content to issue a diplomatic protest, although this still resulted in a mutual recall of their respective ambassadors.

Israel was not concerned in any way, even if it was established that the kidnappers had links to Mossad. Later on, during the trial, their defence (a famous British lawyer) was able to declare that the Israelis had most definitely had nothing to do with the whole affair.

However, London chose to accept the version given by the ‘mercenary’ Israelis. Yet behind the scenes there was a severe critical analysis of documents between the British counterintelligence and the heads of Israeli intelligence. Nevertheless it was the foot soldiers who were to pay for what seemed an unfriendly act - particularly inexcusable on British soil! In 1985, following a trial where the prosecutor was careful to avoid topics that might cause offence, such as the official involvement of the authorities in Lagos, or the involvement of Mossad, the anaesthetist and two other Israelis were sentenced to ten years imprisonment. A warning to those who chose to settle their own business in the UK...

The role of the doctor must attract attention: by taking part in such an operation, the practitioner was certainly failing in his Hippocratic oath. A well-respected doctor in his field, he defended himself by saying that he believed he was committing an act of patriotism by rendering service to his country. This could be seen as a quasi-confession of the Jewish state’s participation in the affair through the actions of its famous secret service.

Although it is likely that Mossad did act in this capacity, why did they do it? The Israelis had already intervened and helped out other foreign services before: they had played a role in the Ben Barka Affair, the Moroccan politician who had led an organisation of Third World countries that was not favourable to Israel. They had also collaborated with South African agencies and their contribution in the Iran-Contra affair was essential. However, on each of these occasions they only acted if they felt it was in their own interests to do so. If Mossad saw fit to give a helping hand to the Nigerians, it was so that Israel could benefit from one way or another.

In which case, the first assumption must be that it had something to do with oil. Indeed, Nigeria was one of Israel’s major suppliers of the black gold. Israel could legitimately believe that the change of regime in Nigeria would have negative consequences on existing oil agreements between the two countries. When Israeli leaders learned that Lagos intended to recover Dikko and his fortune by whatever means, they could have been tempted to offer their services and experience. It must be remembered that one of Mossad’s most spectacular operations was the capture of Adolf Eichmann and his extradition to Israel. In return for their help, they might easily have asked Nigeria to continue to provide them with oil.

However, it is unlikely that oil was Israel’s primary motivation: if Mossad had indeed been involved in such an important case - nothing less than maintaining the oil supply to the country - then the operation would have been carried out much more professionally. Its agents would have made sure they did not commit as many mistakes, as well as making sure that their partners did likewise. The hiring of the canary yellow van in particular, was not a decision made by the Israelis, but by the Nigerians. If Mossad were involved then their agents were not in charge of the operation. This was because the secret service chiefs believed that Israel’s main interests should not be put at risk.

The reality is much more trivial. There were numerous Israeli companies doing business in Nigeria and a number of them were unable to recover the money they had committed to the country or loaned to the Nigerian state. Hence the idea of helping Lagos get its hands on Dikko, and his especially on his stolen money, in the hope that these entrepreneurs would be compensated through Dikko’s fortune.

Among the companies in question was a major construction firm that depended on Israel’s main trade organisation, Histadrut. There was also a Swiss consortium led by a Jewish capitalist who was very close to the Israeli Right, so close in fact that he had funded a conservative ally of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and therefore a man whom the Israeli leadership owed a great deal. This shipping magnate also had personal reasons to resent Dikko: he owned a large portion of the rice market and it was his business that channelled this essential nutrient into Nigeria. He had therefore been in business with Dikko over its import, and after having received the large shipments, Dikko had failed to pay him for its transportation. The bills amounted to millions of dollars and it would not have been hard for this friend of the Israeli authorities to convince Prime Minister Begin to lend him a small Mossad unit. However, we cannot exclude the idea that the Mossad agents, reluctant at the idea of working for private interests, did not take their mission seriously, thus explaining the clumsiness, if not the blunders.

Among those wanted by Scotland Yard for their involvement in the Dikko affair was the London director of the national air carrier, Nigerian Airways, who had been in hiding for several days. He would eventually leave Britain - also by hiding in a box - thus proving that such a means of transportation was not as unique as it might have first seemed.

Le Monde¹¹⁰

Since the coup of 31 December which put an end to the ‘democratic’ civil regime of Mr Shagari, the authorities in Lagos have repeatedly asserted that it was the rampant general corruption under the previous administration which was the main cause of the current crisis.

Mr Dikko has been designated as the symbol of this corruption and the Nigerian military have sworn to obtain his extradition. A billionaire, the former Transport Minister was certainly able to enrich himself by fraudulent means as a result of his responsibilities. Like several hundred personalities from the former regime who are now in Nigerian prisons awaiting trial for embezzlement, he was able to take advantage of a system that was set up to be abused. He had never hidden his intention to use ‘every means and every weapon’ to overthrow the government of General Buhari.

Beyond the personality of Mr Dikko, the affair also illustrates the headstrong policies that seem to dominate Nigeria. The trials taking place in Lagos only exist to divert public opinion away from the difficulties facing the government in their attempt to overcome the economic crisis.