After Joliot’s initial interrogations in England by Alsos agents, he returned to London on a number of visits and met occasionally with Sir John Anderson, who, by that time, had become Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sometime in November of 1944, Joliot discussed atomic energy and France’s position in this field with General de Gaulle. Shortly after this we learned with dismay how much knowledge Joliot had managed to acquire of our own atomic effort.
The circumstances that made this possible go back to 1939, when a group of French scientists, working under Joliot’s leadership, had patented a number of inventions that they claimed would provide means for controlling the energy of the uranium atom. They assigned their rights in these patents to the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, an agency of the French Government.
One of Joliot’s assistants in this work was Hans von Halban. In June of 1940, when France was collapsing under the German onslaught, von Halban had left for England, taking with him the entire French supply of heavy water, a number of scientific papers, and a verbal commission from Joliot to act for the Centre in attempting to obtain the best possible terms to protect future French interests in the atomic field. He apparently engaged in prolonged negotiations with the British to this end, for it was not until September, 1942, that he finally entered into a formal agreement with representatives of the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and the Imperial Trust for the Encouragement of Scientific and Industrial Research.
Under the terms of the agreement, von Halban and Kowarski assigned to the British their own rights in the French patents and promised to ask Joliot to try to persuade the Centre to assign its collective rights as well. In return, the British would offer to the Centre certain rights in a series of other patents in this same field.
At the same time, the British employed von Halban and three of his associates from the Centre, eventually, as I have said, assigning them to the laboratories of the Tube Alloys Project in Montreal. By 1944, a number of other Centre scientists had left France to join the Free French Provisional Government in Algiers. The French working in the Montreal laboratories maintained contact with their former colleagues in North Africa and, through them, with their former leader, Joliot, who remained in Paris throughout the German occupation.
In August, 1943, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill signed the Quebec Agreement, one clause of which specifically stated: “that we will not either of us communicate any information about Tube Alloys to third parties except by mutual consent.” Sir John Anderson was the British representative in drafting this agreement. As far as I could ever learn, neither he nor any other British representative mentioned the arrangement that was already in effect with the French through von Halban.
We first learned of the British-French arrangements when Sir John Anderson mentioned it in discussing with Ambassador Winant his desire to give certain information to the French. Mr. Winant requested an aide-mémoire on the whole matter. As soon as he received it he transmitted it immediately to Washington. Those of us who had been closely associated with the British throughout our joint venture were amazed by this first indication of their obligations to a third party. It was clear that the Chancellor felt it necessary to placate Joliot and also that the British felt themselves obligated to disclose to Joliot certain information concerning the progress that we had achieved in atomic research. We then made every possible effort to learn more about the British-French agreement, the exact conditions of which were still completely unknown to us. In the meantime, on the basis that Anderson was thoroughly cognizant of the purpose of the Quebec Agreement, having helped to prepare its text, I continued to object strongly to his stand.
Earlier, in November of 1944, the British had asked that von Halban be permitted to visit London. I had consented, provided that he would not be allowed to go on to the Continent, and the British had agreed. However, immediately upon von Halban’s arrival in London, the question of his seeing Joliot was raised. Sir John felt that to prevent their meeting would raise serious political controversy. He went on to express his opinion that Joliot was interested only in the commercial aspects of atomic energy, that he already knew most of what we had done, which was not true at that time, and that von Halban was an honorable man who could be trusted. Winant, who had been brought into the matter without warning and consequently was not fully informed, was persuaded by the Chancellor that the status quo with the French must be maintained at all costs and that von Halban was an appropriate agent for this task. Under the circumstances, Winant’s decision was understandable; he erred only in neglecting to secure approval from Secretary Stimson, who was the representative of the President in all matters pertaining to atomic energy.
Thus, on December 3, when Bundy and I telephoned the Ambassador to express our concern lest von Halban might be permitted to visit the Continent, we were surprised and distressed to learn that he had been in Paris with Joliot since November 24.
After Mr. Winant had given in to Sir John and consented to von Halban’s departure, events had moved at a swift pace. Winant agreed that von Halban could report to Joliot on his negotiations with the British that had culminated in the 1942 agreement, that he should attempt to persuade Joliot not to press France’s demands for admission to partnership in the atomic project at that time, and that he should ascertain the status of his patents under the new French Government. The British then furnished von Halban with a written agenda —a “barest outline”—of some of the courses we were pursuing and sent him on his way to Paris.
Upon his return to London, von Halban was closely questioned by my agents about his discussions with Joliot and it became obvious, as we had expected, that he had not held the conversation within the bounds of any “barest outline.” Vital information relating to our research had been disclosed—information that had been developed by Americans with American money, and that had been given to the British only in accordance with interchange agreements subsidiary to the Quebec Agreement. It confirmed facts that Joliot might have suspected, but which he otherwise could not have known. This information had always been scrupulously regarded as top secret.
At the long conference Secretary Stimson and I had with the President on December 31, 1944, we discussed the French problem in detail. Mr. Roosevelt remarked that obviously Ambassador Winant had been deceived, and stated categorically that he himself had no knowledge of any British-French agreement involving atomic energy.
When we finally obtained a copy of their 1942 agreement with von Halban we could see that the British had obtained nothing more than the hope that von Halban might succeed in convincing the Centre to assign its rights. The French patents in question, which were on file in Australia, we felt would be ineffective in the United States.
At about the same time we learned that the British considered most of the French scientists in Canada to be representatives of the French Committee for National Liberation. They were not primarily British Civil Servants, as we had understood, but had been employed under an agreement that could be terminated whenever “their scientific position in the French Government Service” made it desirable. We discovered, in fact, that one of them, Gueron, had been on the French Government’s payroll throughout his service in Montreal.
It should be re-emphasized that the American Government had no knowledge of the British obligations prior to this time. Dr. Bush did recall that the British had once asked him to use his influence with the Patent Office to have the French patents accepted. He had flatly refused, however, and knew nothing more of the matter except for what Sir John had written to him on August 5, 1942: “I am glad to say that we have now concluded an agreement with Halban and Kowarski whereby we have acquired all their rights in their invention. We have also taken positive steps, which we believe will be successful, to acquire the rights of the other French inventors associated with these inventions.” No other mention was made here or elsewhere of the French Government or any of its agencies.
In December, 1942, Conant had learned from Michael Perrin, of the British Tube Alloys Project in Washington, that the British were dealing with von Halban on his patents, but were encountering difficulties growing out of what Perrin called von Halban’s grand ideas on the future of France. Again, there had been no indication of any commitments to the French Government.
I cannot help but feel that the British should have disclosed to us, prior to the Quebec Agreement, any arrangements that they had previously entered into with third parties. Had they done so, we could have arrived at an understanding concerning the obligations that had been assumed by the United Kingdom, and we could have adopted a joint policy relating to any future problems that might grow out of such agreements. Had this been done, our difficulties at the end of 1944 would have been avoided.
Having effected a breach in the Quebec Agreement, Joliot proceeded to exploit it. He met with the Chancellor in February, 1945, and made it clear to Sir John that, while France had no immediate desire to press the issue, if she were not eventually admitted to full collaboration with the United States and Britain in the project, she would have to turn to Russia.
Thus, France acquired a bargaining power out of all proportion to anything to which her early patents entitled her. She was enabled to play power politics with our accomplishments and to bring, or threaten to bring, Russia into the picture. The United States was forced to sit quietly by while a large measure of the military security that we had gone to such pains to maintain was endangered and prematurely compromised by the actions of other governments over which we had no control.
In May of 1945, the French Government instructed Joliot to begin work on an atomic energy project. Joliot turned to his colleague, Pierre Auger, who had been working in the Montreal laboratories. Anticipating our concern, the British hastened to assure us that Auger would not participate in the actual work, but would limit his activities strictly to putting the French back on the right line if they made any serious errors. While Dr. Chadwick and I were both confident of Auger’s integrity, we realized that naturally his greatest loyalty was to his own country.
We continued to watch developments in France closely, but by this time the end of our labors was in sight and our approach to the security of such information as was involved would soon be radically altered. Nevertheless, one of the first aspects of the project that we brought to President Truman’s attention after he assumed office was the breach in the Quebec Agreement which grew out of the British-French liaison.
My sole source of satisfaction in this affair came from a remark made by Joliot to an employee of the United States Embassy in Paris: while the British had always been most cordial to him and had given him much information, he said, he got virtually nothing from the Americans he encountered.