Wendy Elgersma Helleman
Historically, the theme of “Hellenization” is rooted in post-exilic Judaism under the Hellenistic rulers, the successors of Alexander the Great upon his early demise (323 bce). Third-century bce Maccabeans saw Hellenization as a threat and corruption of Jewish belief and custom. Taking their cue from the Maccabean revolt, and assuming a strong contrast between Judaism and Hellenism, nineteenth-century historians depicted early Christianity as a (Hegelian) synthesis of these two elements (Hengel 1980: 52). Judaism was associated with “authority” or “revelation” and “particularity,” while Hellenism was thought to represent “reason” and “universality” (Martin 2001: 33–34). Hellenism was regarded both negatively as a temptation to paganizing (Jaeger 1961: 107), and positively for contributing to the “universal” character of Christianity.
Adolf von Harnack’s classic statement of this approach to Hellenization (Harnack 1904; 1961; 1978) was especially influential for incorporating anti-Catholic use of the theme from sixteenth-century reformers as they sought to take Christianity back to an earlier, simpler expression of the faith (ad fontes) (Bryan 2002: 149–153). Hellenization, and particularly Platonism, took the blame for many objectionable aspects of the Roman Catholic tradition (Smith 1990: 7–9, 13, 7–20). More recently another German scholar, Martin Hengel (1974; 1980; 1989), questioned the basis of Harnack’s position by claiming that even before the Maccabean revolt, Palestinian Judaism was Hellenized almost as much as was Diaspora Judaism. Hengel’s position is now widely accepted as a “new orthodoxy” in scholarship (Collins 1989: 227).
The present essay examines Martin Hengel’s contribution against the background of Harnack’s work. While recent scholarship on relevant topics (like Gnosticism) has undermined crucial features of Harnack’s approach, central views on the repudiation of dogma are maintained. We note particularly the rejection of dogmatics by proponents of contextual theology who consider this discipline unnecessary and irrelevant for the expansion of Christianity in the “two-thirds” world.
The term “Hellenization” is based on the Greek verb hellênizein, “to speak Greek accurately” (Hengel 1980: 76–77, 158; Jaeger 1961: 6, 107). The noun hellênismos represents the process of accepting or incorporating aspects of Greek culture (education, sports, or a lifestyle focused on the theatre and stadium). Hellas was the name Greeks used for their own territory; Hellên their mythical first ancestor. Within the Hellenistic kingdoms a degree of cultural pride accompanied the process of “Hellenization”; the Greeks regarded themselves as agents of civilization, designating those who did not speak Greek as barbaroi, literally, those who speak an unintelligible barbar, and are therefore backward and uncivilized (Hengel 1980: 55–56). Hellenism represented education, good government, and an aristocratic lifestyle.
Using a policy established by Alexander himself, Hellenistic rulers founded cities and assigned mercantile and military colonial settlements where the ruling class remained carefully segregated from the subject population (Hengel 1980: 53, 55–56, 59). Among cities established by Alexander the Great, Alexandria may be regarded as a model of the Hellenistic colonizing policy; it was founded at the mouth of the Nile (331 bce). The ruling Hellenes used local people to do their work, but did not make it easy for them to gain civic rights (Hengel 1974: 1.25–27; 1980: 60). In Alexandria, the Jews presented a “third force” between Greek citizens and the native population. We know of Jews who acquired a Greek education in the gymnasium (ephebate), adopted Greek names, and learned the language to work as bilingual officials in responsible administrative positions (Hengel 1980: 58, 60, 62). The Hellenized population was united by use of the Greek koinê; Greek-speaking rulers usually did not bother to learn the local language (Hengel 1980: 76).
For the Hellenization of Judaism in pre-Maccabean Palestine (333–175 bce) Hengel acknowledged scarce documentation, and the need to extrapolate from otherwise unexplained phenomena (1980: 51–52). Yet he affirmed adoption of Greek ways by the Jerusalem aristocracy, and rejected a sharp distinction between Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism (Hengel 1974: 1.311; Millar 1978: 9). Important factors include early favorable reports on the Jews by Greek writers like Theophrastus (Momigliano 1975: 85) and Hecataeus (Hengel 1974: 1.255–256); the Tobiad romance (Josephus, Antiquities 12.4.1–11; Hengel 1974: 1.269–272); translation of Torah as the Greek Septuagint, allegedly by 72 Palestinian Jewish elders (ca. 270 bce) (Hengel 1974: 1.102; Bickerman 1988: 101–16); and the virtual equation of Torah with traditional Greek wisdom, as in Ben Sira (ca. 180–175 bce) (Feldman 1977: 375–376; Hengel 1974: 1.131–153; Millar 1978: 9).
Under the Ptolemies, third-century bce Palestine remained relatively peaceful and prosperous, witnessed by archeological finds of coins and trade materials (Hengel 1974: 1.32–57). With Seleucid rule in the second century bce, Hengel notes significant change for Syria and Palestine. In return for contribution to the royal treasury, the Seleucids granted some cities the status of a Greek polis, ruled by an aristocratic gerousia (Sanhedrin) (Hengel 1974: 1.23–27; 1980: 64). Although Greek education through the gymnasium may not have been established in Jerusalem before 175 bce, since it involved pagan rites (Feldman 1977: 378), Hengel argues that a Greek political constitution assumes a class of “Hellenes” with a lifestyle focused on the gymnasium, stadium and theatre (Hengel 1980: 64–66; Grabbe 1992: 1.149–153).
The Maccabean revolt was motivated by interference with traditional Jewish custom (Torah and food laws, Sabbath, sacrifices, circumcision) under the Seleucid ruler Antiochus IV Epiphanes; he also made demands on the temple treasury, and insisted on the Jews honoring Olympian Zeus as Theos Epiphanes, the deity with whom he identified himself (Millar 1978, 10–20). The role of Jewish Hellenizers in establishing this cult provoked a strong reaction from Maccabeans; they demanded removal of the gymnasium and nudity in sports, re-establishing circumcision as sign of the covenant (1 Macc. 1:11–15). For these events Hengel (1974: 1.287) considered the role of Jewish Hellenizers more significant than that of Antiochus (2 Macc. 4:7–14).1 Other scholars (Millar 1978, 3,5) have focused on royal orders and royal officers interfering with temple rites (2 Macc. 6.1–2). Millar (1978: 10–20) pointed to Antiochus’ invasion of Egypt (169/8 bce) as motivation for his persecution of Jews.
Were the Maccabeans seeking political dominance, more than religious freedom (as Hengel argued)? The question is not really appropriate, since antiquity knew a far closer intertwinement of politics and religion than is now commonly assumed.2 Palestinian Jews continued using the Greek language, and accepted Greek educational institutions. Nor did Maccabean rulers interfere with cities governed by a Greek constitution, imposition of taxes, or traders using the crossroads position of Palestine (Grabbe 1992: 1.149–150). Examination of Hengel’s position by outstanding scholars like Millar and Feldman has raised questions of detail, without dislodging his basic thesis that Hellenization of Judaism did not end with the Maccabean revolt; it simply took on more subtle forms (Collins 1989: 227; Hill 1992; Hurtado 2008: 73–74; Maston 2012: 273–274).
Hengel’s position on Palestinian Judaism as Hellenistic Judaism has important implications for early Christianity: Hellenization was a factor from the beginning. This undermines a longstanding view of early Christianity as a type of Hegelian synthesis of East (Hebraic Palestinian Jews) and West (Hellenized Diaspora Jews and Gentiles). Indeed, Hengel argued for Hellenized Judaism as a praeparatio evangelica for the Messiah (Hengel and Lichtenberger 1981).
For use of hellênizein in the New Testament, we note recent use of Hengel’s approach to recognize that the Pauline distinction between Hellenists and Hebrews probably differentiated varying emphases within Judaism.3 Just as the term Hellênistês refers to those of Greek descent, and (Diaspora) Jews known for using Greek, or exhibiting a Greek lifestyle, so also the term Hebraios (as in Acts 6:1), indicating Jewish descent and strict observance of the law, may represent believers adopting a traditional Jewish lifestyle (Walton 2012: 315).
What then of early Christianity? To begin with, we recognize the ongoing impact of Harnack’s position on Hellenization from his work on the history of dogma and the expansion of early Christianity, in spite of its reliance on the outdated nineteenth-century contrast between Judaism and Hellenism. The present essay seeks to discover why Harnack’s conception has defied critical changes in scholarship. We turn briefly to three key moments in that discussion: (1) Logos theology; (2) Gnosticism as acute Hellenization; and (3) gradual Hellenization of the Christian Church reacting to Gnosticism.
The gospel of John presented Jesus as the Logos, the Word: “In the beginning was the Word.” In his defense of Christianity Justin Martyr (Apology, 2.10) used that statement to claim Jesus as the Truth far superior to philosophical truth claims of Greek thinkers: “philosophers and legislators . . . did not have complete knowledge of the reason (logos) which is Christ.” In the Old Testament God had spoken in creation, but in the New Testament this Word became incarnate, as the full revelation of God (Apology, 2.6, 8; Harnack 1961: 2.220–221). Identifying Jesus with the Logos, Justin presented him in terms familiar to a Greco-Roman audience, while adding a new layer to the meaning of logos for speech and reason, or (since Heraclitus and the Stoics) a rational principle active in uniting the cosmos (Chadwick 1967: 77; Helleman 2002: 137–138; 2005: 7–10).
In Justin’s apologetic strategy Harnack (1978: 203–204) recognized the beginning of Christian thought aligning itself with a Greek school of philosophy (Harnack 1961: 1.14–16, 20; Rowe 1994: 80–81). Harnack regarded Justin’s adaptation of Greek logos thought as a positive kind of Hellenization, using the tools of the opponent to defeat them, and thus preparing for the ultimate triumph of Christianity (1961: 1.22).4 Even so, he was concerned about the impact of “the spirit of Greek philosophy.” For Harnack (1961: 1.17) this meant a crucial turn in the history of Christianity, namely, the beginning of Christian dogma (Rowe 1994: 79–80).
A far more negative form of Hellenization arose with Gnosticism and its radical use of philosophical concepts to represent religious themes. Harnack (1961: 1.227–228) identified this “acute Hellenization” as secularization (Verweltlichung) of the gospel (Rudolph 1987: 31–32). Gnostics accented the Docetic Jesus (divine, but lacking an ordinary human body) (Rudolph 1987: 157–158).5 At issue is the relationship of body and soul, flesh, and spirit (Latourette 1975: 122–123).
If Harnack’s designation of Gnosticism as philosophical appears surprising, we need to remember that his interest was aroused by the recent publication of Pistis Sophia (Rudolph 1987: 27–28). And he relied heavily on second-century “heresiologists” Irenaeus and Tertullian, who identified links between Gnostic groups and Greek schools of philosophy (Rudolph 1987: 9–12). Moreover, Harnack focused on communities associated with Valentinus and Basilides, characterized by a teacher–student relationship more typical of a philosophical school (Rudolph 1987: 215).
Perception of Gnosticism changed dramatically with the 1945 discovery of a library of gnostic manuscripts hidden in clay pots at Nag Hammadi (Ferguson 2003: 301–306; Rudolph 1987: 34–44).6 The documents are characterized by revelatory and esoteric pronouncement, mythologizing exposition, and reflection on Old Testament themes, especially Genesis. The term gnôsis, for which the movement is named, refers not to philosophical, but soteriological knowledge, needed to elude enslavement to cosmic powers (Pelikan 1971: 81–82; Rudolph 1987: 55–56).
As a result of these developments, scholars have effectively abandoned the philosophical characterization of Gnosticism. They recognize superficial acquaintance with Greek philosophy, used to gain credibility in that cultural environment (Armstrong 1978; Carroll 1994, 293–300). Few scholars now regard Gnosticism as a heretical form of Christianity, although both Simone Pétrement and Edwin Yamauchi (Yamauchi 1994: 46–47) still support that view (Desjardins 1994a: 66). Many accept an essentially independent origin within the Hellenistic world (Yamauchi 1994: 29–30, 44), or they follow Quispel and Birger Pearson in seeking its roots in (sectarian) Judaism (Desjardins 1994b; Helleman 1994: 437–438). Harnack’s key statement on Gnosticism as acute Hellenization and secularization of the gospel has been largely abandoned.
Outstanding early Christians like Irenaeus successfully rejected the gnostic interpretation of Jesus Christ. But the church also formulated the “rule of faith” as a standard for acceptable teaching, to combat gnostic thought. And it determined the “apostolic succession” of church leaders from the earliest time. Indeed, hierarchical structures were streamlined, and bishops gained more authority. Harnack deplored such determination of teaching, worship, and discipline as incipient elements of Roman Catholicism.
Harnack also noted accentuation of Justin Martyr’s adoption of Greek philosophical terms to express Christian teachings conceptually. Although the Gnostics had rejected an authoritative role for the Old Testament, the church maintained the authority of these Scriptures through an allegorizing approach in interpretation (Harnack 1961: 1.224–125, 227–228). Harnack understood the church’s reaction to Gnosticism as a dialectical struggle against Hellenism in which dogma, defined as the “spirit of Greek philosophy at work on the soil of the Gospel,” appeared as an even more dangerous form of Hellenization (Harnack 1961: 1.17, 227–228; Rowe 1994: 82–84). In its negation Gnosticism had gained a subtle victory over the church. As it characterized the defense against Gnosticism, Hellenization carried the high cost of intellectualization of Christianity through Greek philosophy. And loss of freedom through institutionalization meant displacement of personal experience of the gospel (Harnack 1978: 211–212; Rowe 1994: 84–85).
For Harnack, Christianity was transformed from a living faith to a matter of authoritative dogma, as statements to which one must give assent (Harnack 1978: 204, 207; Rowe 1994: 79–80, 82–84). In his historical work on Christian dogma Harnack sought to redress such a problem (Rowe 1994: 85–86). He wanted the churches of the Reformation to keep alive the true New Testament faith, as the essence of the gospel.
Throughout the twentieth century we note echoes of Harnack’s concern for a vibrant living faith and his rejection of an intellectualist, doctrinally accented Christianity, as well as a scholastic view of truth (equating faith with intellectual understanding), as in the work of Leslie Dewart (1966).7 At the same time considerable effort has been devoted to refuting Harnack’s understanding of Greek philosophy (Rowe 1994: 88–90). And we note the romantic idealization of his approach to early Christianity, focused on the experience of simple trust, as a pure evangelical and a-temporal “essence” of Christianity, serving as foil for the metaphysical speculation of dogmatic theology (Harnack 1978: 204–205, 236–237; Helleman 1994: 437).
The 2006 Regensburg address of Pope Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University,” may be regarded as part of an ongoing attempt to refute Harnack’s program of “dehellenization.” Arguing for the integration of reason (logos) with God’s very own nature, and the harmony of biblical understanding with the best of Greek philosophical inquiry, Pope Benedict (2006: 707–708, 710) sought to reclaim a “critically purified Greek heritage.”8 The Pope’s intentions were derailed by vigorous Muslim response to his remarks on Islam, but a number of Catholic scholars have tried to recover his argument for the role of theology in the university (2006: 709).9
Even without fully accepting the Pope’s agenda on reason and faith, we recognize the important outstanding issue of Harnack’s position on dogmatic theology. That view still carries weight in missiological reflection on systematic theology as an unnecessary complication of the simple gospel message. Of course, strong negative associations for dogmatics in our time are only partly due to Harnack; we also note the role of post-modern relativism and “political correctness,” where any claim to truth is considered arrogant, and any claim to authority inherently “oppressive” (Sauter 2007a: 61). Even so, Harnack’s verdict on “dead orthodoxy” has deeply influenced anti-intellectualist rejection of anything “dogmatic.” And this presents a challenge for the Christian Church using the historic creeds to support its presence and work in our world. With Schrodt (1978: 335–339),10 Hengel (Hurtado 2008: 75) and others, Rowe (1994: 91) has responded by pointing to the symbolic value of the creeds formulated in the “rule of faith” to oppose gnostic positions.
Contextual theology presents us with one form of contemporary theologizing which continues to show the impact of Harnack’s verdict on Hellenization as intellectualization of the faith. In the well-known essay, “The Gospel as Prisoner and Liberator of Culture” (1996a, originally published in 1982), Andrew Walls presented a visitor from outer space who comes down to observe various phases in the history of Christianity. What one age finds important is neglected by the next. On the second descent this visitor discovers Nicene Christianity, or the Hellenistic/Roman phase (Walls 1996a: 3–4). And in the discussion of the Nicene gathering we find language distinctly reminiscent of Harnack’s focus on intellectual expression of truth for the genesis of orthodoxy from codification of right belief, stated propositionally (Walls 1996b: 18–19). The Greek character is revealed in a degree of arrogance with respect to these statements; the imperial aspect of Hellenized Christianity is seen in its close association with centers of political power.
Such an understanding of Hellenized Christianity is serves a specific purpose in a discussion of indigeneity, or contextual theology, a modern form of theologizing focused on socio-economic and political realities which typically values doing over thinking (Sauter 2007b:106). Dogmatics is viewed as the result of intellectualist academic concerns (Sauter 2007b: 113). Appreciating the local, situational character of theologizing, contextual theology favors plurality. Hellenized Christianity is regarded as but one form of Christianity among others, and its theological concerns reduced to historical interest (Walls 1996a: 10).
In a significant recent discussion of the issue, Gerhard Sauter (2007b) recognizes popularization of the term “context” in repudiation of the legacy from European and North American colonial powers (2007b: 102). But he notes a problematic transfer of the definition of “context” (for the linguistic context in which a text is embedded) to the surrounding circumstance, as a determinant of interpretation (2007b: 102–103,105). What the text says, then, is not as important as what it can mean under certain circumstances. Witness to biblical truth is mediated by analysis of the given situation (2007b: 107).
If Walls has made positive use of contextual theology, it is also clear that for him the indigenizing principle does not have the last word. For he recognizes the “pilgrim principle” as a universalizing factor which values the ultimate significance of Jesus Christ, fostering community and historical continuity with all Christians (Walls 1996a: 6–7). And Walls notes parallels from early Christianity in the relationship of new African Christians to their non-Christian past.11 But there is a tension between the indigenizing and pilgrim principles (1996a: 14). The gospel proclaims God’s acceptance of Christians as they are, conditioned by time, place, and socio-cultural circumstances (1996a: 7–8). But God’s transformation of the convert to become what he wants, typically results in pushing that Christian to be out of step with their own culture, for Christianity itself means adopting and incorporating conceptions from its earliest days (1996a: 8–9, 11).
How then should we evaluate the theme of “Hellenization,” and appreciate the phase of Christianity when things “Greek” were dominant? There was a time when the majority of Christians spoke Greek, and Greek was the language of the great early ecumenical councils: Nicea, Constantinople, and Chalcedon. Early New Testament manuscripts were written in Greek, not in Hebrew or Aramaic, the languages familiar to Jesus. Today many read the Scriptures in their mother tongue. The Bible is and remains God’s Word, whatever the language. It is not necessary to hear God’s Word in Greek. Yet, when it comes to translation effort and close exegetical work, the Greek New Testament has a special role. The Greek Septuagint translation of the Old Testament is also special, as the version most frequently used for Old Testament quotations in the New.
Many aspects of the long-standing position on “Hellenization” in the history of Christianity owed to Harnack have been superseded by the new understanding of Gnosticism given with the Nag Hammadi manuscripts, and through the recent work of Martin Hengel. We also realize that these new approaches have not undermined Harnack’s understanding of Hellenization and the influence of Greek philosophy, as the key to the history of dogma and intellectualization of the faith. In redressing what he considered harmful in the history of dogma, Harnack was incredibly successful, perhaps more than he might have anticipated. Overtones of authoritative pronouncement connected with the concept of dogma are now widely considered intolerable, even within faith communities.
Even so, recent scholarship does point to modification of such a negative appreciation of dogmatics in the teaching ministry of the church, particularly in an affirmation of communal searching of the Scriptures to reach consensus on its meaning (Sauter 2007a: 55–56).12 The teachings most universally accepted by Christians world-wide are rooted in the early ecumenical councils, beginning with the Nicene Council of 325 ce, called to address the Arian interpretation of Christ. It was attended by some three hundred bishops from all regions of the Roman Empire, east and west. They affirmed his nature as fully divine. After centuries of persecution, the church had suddenly been given legal status, and its leaders were surprised to find the emperor Constantine now looking to Christianity as the key to unity and renewed morale in the empire. In the face of schism (Donatists, Melitians) and heretical views (Arians), he had called the council primarily to safeguard the unity of the church itself. This is why the example of Walls’ visitor at the Nicene council is unfortunate (Walls 1996a; 3–4); it ignores the significance of this first empire-wide gathering of the Christian Church only recently emerging from centuries of oppression as an illegal body in the empire.
In subsequent years it became clear that if the emperor called a council, and used the power of the state to implement its decisions, he also had the power to undo its work. Bishops learned of the influence wielded by those working close to the centers of power. And later debates around critical terms like homoousion (same in essence) or physis (nature) to describe the person of Christ, do not make for edifying reading. There is some justification for Harnack’s critique of theological discussion turned into political manoeuvring. Many key terms in the debates had their roots in philosophy, and may well have contributed to an intellectualizing of the faith. But “dead” or “dry” these dogmas certainly were not. And to blame all the problems which arose on “Hellenization” requires considerable stretching of the evidence.
If these early councils serve to characterize the Greek or Hellenized phase of Christianity, we would call for special appreciation of their contribution in the history of Christianity. They represent the only occasion that the entire church, from East and West, was able to meet and achieve a degree of unanimity on important issues. Decisions on questions like the deity and humanity of Christ followed on decades of discussion. This is also the reason why the conclusions of these early councils carry an authority quite unlike decisions of any later Christian councils.