Operation Nimrod was an almost unqualified success: of a total of 26 hostages, two had been killed (in both cases by the terrorists), five had been released before the assault and 19 had been rescued. The police had done a superb job obtaining the release of a handful of hostages while keeping the remaining ones alive through prolonged negotiation. COBR, too, functioned extremely effectively, as Whitelaw acknowledged in his memoirs: ‘My first impression was that I had to hand a first-class and highly efficient organization which appeared to have assembled at the drop of a hat. Once again I was struck by the immense administrative efficiency of our senior servants.’ The gas board, for instance, immediately complied with the request for the creation of ambient noise in Princes Gate. So, too, did the Airports Authority, when Rose requested low-flying aircraft over the scene to conceal the work of technicians and engineers seeking to embed listening devices in the walls of the embassy.
1 Perched on the roof, assault teams abseil down the rear of the building, in the course of which a trooper inadvertently breaks a window with his boot, arousing the terrorists’ suspicions that something is amiss.
2 As a diversionary tactic, SAS explosives experts lower a powerful charge through the central glass dome, detonating it moments before simultaneous assaults are launched against the front and rear of the embassy.
3 A team leader’s abseil rope becomes snarled, abruptly halting his descent, suspending him helplessly above the second-floor rear balcony, and thus obliging the other members of his team to forego the use of frame charges and smash their way through the windows with hooligan bars. Stun grenades set fire to the curtains and carpet, causing flames to emerge from the windows and burn the entangled trooper.
4 An assault team crosses into the garden, smashes its way through the french doors leading into the library and proceeds to clear the ground floor and cellar, which are discovered unoccupied.
5 Crossing from an adjacent building, an assault team detonates frame charges against the armoured windows on the front balcony, throws in stun grenades and enters the building amidst billowing smoke.
6 While PC Lock and the terrorist leader, Oan, are locked in mortal combat in a room on the first floor, an SAS trooper from the front assault team bursts in, warns the constable off and shoots Oan with a burst from his MP5.
7 One of the rear assault teams, shooting dead one terrorist as he flees towards the front of the embassy, reaches the telex room, where three terrorists have managed to kill one hostage and injure two others only moments before. The SAS men dispatch two terrorists with automatic fire but fail to recognise the presence of the third, who masquerades as a hostage and retains possession of a hand grenade.
8 The female hostages, discovered unguarded in a room on the second floor, are hurriedly joined with their now liberated male counterparts and manhandled downstairs for evacuation out of the rear of the embassy.
9 Clutching a hand grenade and still concealed amongst the hostages as they are hustled downstairs, the undetected terrorist from the telex room is recognized by Staff Sergeant Pete Winner who, unable to open fire for fear of inflicting casualties on the hostages or his colleagues, strikes the terrorist on the back of the head with the butt of his weapon, causing his victim to tumble to the base of the stairway where other SAS men riddle him with machine-gun fire.
10 (Not visible) Frightened and confused, the rescued hostages emerge into the garden at the rear of the embassy, where their SAS escort place them face down on the ground, securetheirwrists, andidentifythem, thus discovering and arresting the only surviving terrorist of the original six.
Fire damage caused by the detonation of the frame charge placed against the front balcony window. The siege was probably nearing its conclusion when this photograph was taken.
As for Whitelaw himself, he was later praised by de la Billière:
[I had regarded] Willie Whitelaw as no more than a jovial, avuncular figure. Now I had reason to change my opinion. From the start he handled those difficult meetings with calm, incisive authority, which reminded everyone present that during the Second World War he had served with distinction as an officer in the Scots Guards. Never autocratic, he let people have their say, yet always brought a discussion to an end with a firm decision, leaving nothing in the air.
Success could be measured in other terms, as well. British authorities had conceded very little: while they did broadcast the terrorists’ message, they never supplied the requested Arab mediators, and thus avoided handing the initiative over to others who might have made concessions unauthorized by Downing Street. In the end, the siege was not a drawn-out affair and safe conduct for the gunmen was never supplied. Nor did the Government rush to employ force. The Cabinet Office was initially concerned with longer-term contingency plans and with the possible international repercussions. But it is essential to understand that the primary objective of such an operation is to secure the unconditional safe release of the hostages through peaceful persuasion. This was the rationale behind the long and sometimes frustrating exchanges between the police negotiators and the terrorists. But it was undoubtedly worth pursuing as the procedure had been successfully used on previous occasions and was well practised within the police.
As he had promised, Whitelaw did not interfere in the execution of the actual assault, quite properly devolving authority to those best equipped to direct and carry it out. Similarly, the Prime Minister, in choosing not to appear at COBR meetings and having delegated authority to the Home Secretary, did not interfere in the business of the committee he chaired. As de la Billière put it, ‘a supreme commander – civilian or military – must delegate authority if he is to get the best out of his people.’
Nor did the Army exceed its legal brief by operating outside its authority, as de la Billière explained: ‘The chain of command was complex but clearly defined. As always in the United Kingdom, police primacy remained absolute: the Army could act only if the Home Secretary authorized it to do so.’ And that is precisely what happened. In short, much of the success of the operation rested on the fact that civil–military relations remained on a proper footing throughout, with all levels respecting the chain of command and accepting that, having confidently devolved authority downwards, all those involved were to be allowed to carry out their tasks without interference.
There were, of course, those who criticized the government for not using force earlier, but Whitelaw outlined why patience and forbearance were the watchwords of the day:
The critics thought that the SAS should have been sent in much earlier. I believe that this criticism ignores the main objective in handling such incidents, which must always be the release of the hostages unharmed but without conceding the terrorists’ demands. Therefore all efforts at peaceful persuasion must be exhausted. That is the task of the police negotiators. If they fail, and before force is used, all the possible consequences of action by the SAS or other troops must be accepted before the order for their deployment is given.
Those who give the orders have to recognize that troops have an immensely difficult role when used in the twilight area between peace and war, euphemistically described as action in support of the civil power… All too often the immediate benefit of the troops’ action is quickly forgotten. Then, after considerable delay, come the legal proceedings accompanied by accusations of excessive force and unnecessary loss of life. These in turn increasingly expose the Government, which has been protecting its citizens, and its troops to substantial criticism at the bar of the world media. As a result wicked and violent organizations achieve propaganda success and increased financial support. All these repercussions may seem tiresome… But free nations do not have that option since they proclaim, rightly, that they are upholding freedom under the law. They cannot pick and choose when to do so themselves.
William (Willie) Whitelaw, the Home Secretary, according to whom, ‘The SAS operation had been a complete and dramatic success. This said much for their professional skill and courage.’ (Getty)
When, however, the options had been truly exhausted and the negotiating phase had come to an end, the SAS, armed with the requisite skills, training, courage and weaponry had done the rest. More significantly the SAS dealt with a number of unexpected problems throughout the course of the raid.
1. During the ascent at the rear of the building, one abseiler broke a window with his boot, alerting the terrorists of the attack and obliging the teams at the rear of the building to open the assault before the team on the first-floor front balcony was ready to detonate its explosive charge. However, the mistiming of the assault did not in fact jeopardize the operation; surprise was not unduly compromised and both teams made successful entries into the embassy.
2. Sergeant Tommy Palmer became caught in his rope, receiving serious burns from a fire that broke out as Red Team made a forcible entry. This incident rendered impossible the ability of the team on the ground to blow in the rear ground-floor windows as intended, being unable to use explosives for fear of injuring their stricken comrade. The soldier concerned suffered first-degree burns to his feet and legs, which were left dangling in front of the flames emerging from the second-floor window. However, he was rapidly cut down by other members of his team who successfully entered the embassy and reached the telex room. It is worth noting that Palmer continued the assault despite the fact that he had to remove his protective hood once it caught fire and he had no protection from smoke and CS gas. After the raid he was treated for his burns injuries at St Stephen’s Hospital in Fulham and made a full recovery.
3. Palmer’s MP5 jammed in the act of firing at a terrorist. However, he was able to successfully chase down the terrorist and use his pistol.
4. As a result of the carpets having been doused with an inflammable substance by the terrorists, fire broke out when the assault teams detonated explosive charges against the front first-floor windows. Stun grenades thrown into both the front and rear windows of the embassy may also have contributed to the outbreak of fire. The fires rapidly communicated with the drapes, spreading the flames and endangering the lives of those within. Although the SAS were unaware of the presence of what appeared to be kerosene, there was perhaps no alternative to the use of explosives to facilitate entry into a structure fortified by armoured glass. In any event, success was achieved with such rapidity that the occupants of the building suffered no injuries as a result and the flames were brought under control by the fire brigade in the aftermath of the assault.
Tom the Fijian (top right), his rope jammed in the harness clog, suspends helplessly just moments before flames emerge from the window to engulf his legs. On the extreme left Tommy Palmer has just arrived on the second-floor balcony, still attached to his abseil rope. Note the torch mounted on the MP5 held by the trooper beside him.
The success of the operation may also be attributed to a major error on the part of the terrorists. They had failed to deploy any effective booby traps, tripwires or other countermeasures to prevent forcible entry. Nor had they, as they claimed, rigged the building with high explosives. Had they done so, large-scale injury and death may have resulted. The inexperience of the terrorists therefore played a part in their downfall, as did their failure to kill the hostages once the assault had started. Indeed, as the assault played out on live television on a bank holiday and in front of a huge audience, the stunning success of the SAS captured the imagination of the world. It is easy to forget that the result could have just as easily been a massive propaganda victory for the hostage-takers if heavy casualties had resulted.
The potentially disastrous moment when the operation went badly – though not irretrievably – wrong. The abseiler at top right is Tom the Fijian, his full descent prevented by his rope having jammed in the harness clog. Suspended in this position, his legs dangle amidst the flames while the trooper below him tries to cut him down. The abseiler on the extreme left is Tommy Palmer, bareheaded after he was obliged to cast off his gas hood and respirator after they caught fire. He has just spotted a terrorist in the room setting the carpet alight. Seconds after this photo was taken Palmer jumped into the room, took a bead on the terrorist and squeezed the trigger, only to hear the ‘dead man’s click’: a first round stoggage. He therefore drew his pistol, chased the man down the corridor, and shot him in the head, just as the terrorist was about to pull the pin on a grenade and lob it into the Telex Room amongst the male hostages. For this act Palmer was awarded the Queen’s Gallantry Medal.
Despite the overwhelming success achieved by the SAS, the raid brought unwanted public attention to a hitherto virtually unknown regiment of the British Army. As one soldier who took part, known only as ‘J’, recalled,
Princes Gate was a turning point. It demonstrated to the powers that be what the Regiment could do and just what an asset the country had, but it also brought a problem we wished to avoid: the media spotlight. In addition, for the first few years after the siege selection courses were packed with what seemed like every man in the British Army wanting to join the SAS. We just couldn’t cope with the numbers who were applying, and so we had to introduce extra physicals on the first day just to get rid of the wasters. The same problem affected R Squadron, the reserve, and the sergeant in charge was overwhelmed with recruits. (Crawford, The SAS at Close Quarters, p. 79)
Specifically, while membership of 22 SAS is possible only by the transfer of serving personnel from existing Army units, the Territorial regiment, 21 SAS, was swamped by hundreds of aspirants outside the gates of their Headquarters in the Kings Road, ‘all’, according to de la Billière, ‘apparently convinced that a balaclava helmet and a Heckler & Koch sub-machine gun would be handed to them over the counter, so that they could go off and conduct embassy-style sieges of their own.’ The numbers rapidly declined when, in the first phase of training, the CO, Keith Farnes, put them on a running track and watched as all but a handful collapsed in exhaustion. In short, success brought instant publicity, which was never courted.
For the SAS the rescue of the embassy hostages justified the years of training and vindicated those who had long defended the need for the regiment’s continued existence. Wild notions by conspiracy theorists that the regiment, in its counterrevolutionary role, might somehow seek to overthrow the civilian government, were shown to be laughable. Success, moreover, did much to counter the negative image that had been actively propagated by the IRA for several years prior to the raid.
Its role, as originally outlined by Stirling, could carry on as before because the regiment would remain intact; specifically, the result of the siege fully justified the establishment of the Special Projects Team, which carried out the assault with a surprisingly small number of men, for only about 30 to 35 actually took a direct part. In addition, there was a five-man command group consisting of the OC of B Squadron, the squadron Sergeant-Major, the intelligence officer, and two signallers. There was also a reserve team of eight troopers who were not committed to the assault. A politically fragile situation with potentially disastrous consequences was defused in a matter of minutes, and thus the seven years of careful thought, analysis, rehearsal and training were shown to have been worthwhile.
There were no adverse legal consequences for the SAS as a result of the assault; as discussed, immediately after the raid the soldiers sealed their weapons in bags, labelled them and turned them over to the police, who held them until a coroner’s inquiry could be held. The following morning, detectives flew to Hereford, where they spent thirty-six hours interviewing and taking statements from members of the team to create an exhaustive record of where and when every shot had been fired. At the inquest held some months later four soldiers, identified only by letters and avoiding photographers, gave evidence. At the trial of the surviving terrorist, the same questions were asked to determine if excessive force had been used. De la Billière observed that:
On the day there was no time for the luxury of reflection: Mike Rose’s brief was to rescue the hostages alive, and he and his team did it brilliantly. Nevertheless, at the inquest we were concerned that if the evidence failed to justify what we had done, our people could hit trouble.
In the event, this did not happen, but the possibility that it could emphasized an important point: just because a Minister authorizes a soldier to do something, that man may not break the law. A Minister had no right to set aside the law; nor does the Brigadier or the Commanding Officer of the SAS. In fighting terrorism, we repeatedly put our soldiers into very difficult positions: on the one hand they are being told to combat terrorism in the streets, but on the other they are still subject to the law of the land, and may not shoot anyone except under precisely defined circumstances. If we had gone into the Iranian Embassy earlier before the terrorists killed anyone, and provoked the death of hostages by starting a battle, we should have been in grave trouble.
Sim Harris gingerly makes his way across to the balcony of the adjoining building. (Corbis)
What can be said of the mindset and expectations of the terrorists? It appears that the hostage-takers had been poorly briefed by their handlers about the irresolution they were likely to encounter on the part of the British government. The gunmen seem to have nurtured completely unrealistic expectations of success. Judging by the extent of their shopping in the weeks prior to the attack on the embassy, there is no doubt that they expected to return safely to Iraq. They were not highly trained; only their leader, Oan, could speak English tolerably well, and he would make use of the Pakistani journalist to translate much of his statements into English. The extent to which the terrorists’ minders in Iraq properly prepared them for the operation is not known, but it seemed an amateurish affair. All evidence suggests the terrorists thought the operation would be over in 48 hours, with the police doing nothing, the government inept and the risk to the gunmen minimal. Their cause would be widely publicized, they would receive at least a modicum of diplomatic recognition – albeit perhaps fleeting – from the Arab ambassadors who were to mediate with them, and make an unhindered journey back to Iraq where, presumably, they expected rewards and recognition for their achievement.
They did not appear to have had any military training, for, according to the hostages, they handled their grenades with dangerous incompetence, and they appeared not to have been briefed about the consequences of taking the life of a hostage – an act which invariably signals the end of any possibility of further useful negotiation with the authorities. In short, the murder of a hostage reduced the options to just two: prison or death in a shoot-out.
It is important to recognize that in the background of the siege lay political problems separate from the military ones facing the SAS as it planned an assault. The lives of the American hostages in Iran were possibly at stake just as were those of the Iranian hostages in London. Quite apart from the original motives behind the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran, Iranian officials were persuaded that the siege in London was nothing more than an American-backed plot to pressure Iran into releasing its American prisoners, now that American military means had failed to rescue them. In such a situation, it was plausible that the British Embassy in Tehran, or British nationals in Iran, might be taken prisoner, or that the American diplomats would be harmed or put on trial. All this must be seen in the context of the failed attempt by US Special Forces to rescue the American hostages only weeks before the embassy siege in London when, on the night of 24–25 April, Delta Force lost eight killed and several helicopters destroyed in the attempt.
Iranian propaganda was already heightening tension, with radio broadcasts in Tehran falsely claiming that the hostages in London had smuggled out a note declaring their willingness to die as martyrs for the Islamic Revolution. If that martyrdom came as a result of a bungled British police or military operation, the government in Tehran might take action against Westerners accordingly. Thus, much more hung on the outcome of the siege apart from the lives of the hostages themselves: the competence of the British government and, specifically, Margaret Thatcher’s credibility, the lives of the American hostages in Iran and the possible escalation of tensions – even open hostilities – between the USA and Iran, already operating at a high pitch.
The success of the operation was a stark warning to other potential hostage-takers that London was not a safe area for such activity. As Whitelaw later wrote in his memoirs, ‘We in Britain had shown the world that we were prepared to take a stand against terrorists, and indeed to defeat them. There can be no greater deterrent to future action than that.’ The successful outcome of the crisis also increased overseas demand by police and counter-terrorist units for information about SAS training and techniques. The British government duly took advantage of this, sending SAS teams abroad to train their counterparts in friendly countries, a task which strengthened political ties and benefited the Treasury.
Above all other consequences of the raid must stand its impact on the minds of the millions of people watching the drama unfold on live television. This cannot be underestimated, for it created a degree of pride perhaps unseen since VE Day. That feeling of course defied measurement, but it was pervasive, forming the subject of many a conversation and filling columns of newspaper editorials. In short, success for the SAS had translated itself into success for the nation as a whole. As the Prime Minister related in her memoirs: ‘Wherever I went over the next few days, I sensed a great wave of pride at the outcome; telegrams of congratulation poured in from abroad: we had sent a signal to terrorists everywhere that they could expect no deals and would extort no favours from Britain.’
The nation as a whole experienced a rush of patriotism, precisely at a time when it needed it most: the USA had just failed to rescue its diplomats held illegally in Iran; the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan only months before, leaving the West powerless to respond; the IRA’s campaign of terrorism in Northern Ireland showed no signs of abatement; at home, inflation was rising and industrial action was commonplace. All these events left the impression, when coupled with the seizure of the Iranian Embassy in London, that the West was impotent and on the decline. The successful outcome of the assault burst this bubble in a matter of minutes and restored the pride of millions in their nation.