PREFACE
1. For the most comprehensive and widely cited example of this debate, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003).
3. See John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990).
4. At the November 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference in Washington, D.C., former secretary of defense Robert McNamara said that during the Cuban Missile Crisis, “President Kennedy lucked out. . . . We didn’t believe the nuclear danger was anywhere close to what we learned 29 years later. We lucked out.” See remarks by Robert McNamara at the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference November 8, 2005, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005conference/presentations/Talk_Of_Nation_2.pdf.
6. Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute for International Studies, 2004), p. 3.
1. BUILDING THE BOMB
2. The Frisch/Peierls Memoranda of March 1940, in Robert Serber, The Los Alamos Primer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 79–88.
3. Frisch/Peierls Memoranda, p. 82.
4. Frisch/Peierls Memoranda, p. 81.
5. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 25–26.
6. Cited in Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 369.
7. Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb (South Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth Press, 2002,), p. x.
8. Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 448.
9. Gerard J. DeGroot, The Bomb: A Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 37.
10. Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, p. 3.
11. The speed of light in a vacuum is 186,282 miles per second or 299,792 kilometers per second. The squares of these are 34,700,983,524 and 89,875,243,264.
13. Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, p. 11. Each fission occurs in about 10-8 seconds.
14. Serber, Los Alamos Primer, p. 57.
15. Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 363.
17. The plutonium core inside modern warheads has been estimated to have a radius of approximately 5cm. See Steve Fetter, Valery A. Frolov, Oleg F. Prilutsky, and Roald Z. Sagdeev, “Appendix A: Fissile Material and Weapon Design,” Science & Global Security, vol. 1 (1990): 225–302.
18. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press), p.117
20. Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, “Invasion Most Costly,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute 121, 8 (August 1995): 51–56.
21. J. Samuel Walker, “Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 2 (April 2005). See also J. Samual Walker, “The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update,” in Michael J. Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
22. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, revised and expanded edition (East Haven, Conn.: Pluto Press, 1985), pp. 19, 287. See also Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (London: HarperCollins, 1995).
23. See for example Martin Sherwin, The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Knopf, 1975), pp. 194, 220–238.
24. Barton J. Bernstein, “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January 1995): 135.
2. CONTROLLING THE BOMB
1. These and other citations are from “Report of the Committee on Political and Social Problems,” Manhattan Project Metallurgical Laboratory, University of Chicago, June 11, 1945 (Franck report). See also Jane Vaynman, “Nuclear Time Capsule,” Carnegie Endowment proliferation analysis, June 2, 2005, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17023.
2. Len Weiss presents an excellent detailed history of these proposals in “Atoms for Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 6 (November/December 2003), pp. 34–44.
3. Cited in David Holloway, Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb 1939–1945 (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, 1979), p. 41.
4. Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Disarmament Movement Through 1953 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 254.
5. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p.133.
6. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 94.
7. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 416.
8. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 122.
9. Cited in Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 132.
10. The most significant information, particularly the implosion bomb design, came from Klaus Fuchs, a German-born British physicist working at Los Alamos. See Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 15.
11. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 220. The U.S. project took four years and nine months, from October 1941, when Roosevelt decided to pursue the atomic bomb, to the July 1945 Trinity test. Russia took four years from the start of the full-scale industrial project in August 1945 to the test in August 1949.
12. From Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva (Moscow: Terra, 1991), cited in David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 164.
13. Conant to Stimson, January 22, 1947, Stimson Papers, box 154, folder 18, cited in Martin J. Sherwin, “How Well They Meant,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, no. 7 (August 1985): 14.
3. RACING WITH THE BOMB
1. Whereas fission bombs are limited in destructive yield by the ability to keep the uranium or plutonium cores compressed as the force of the fission reactions blows them apart, fusion bombs use the heat of a fission bomb to fuse atoms of hydrogen together. The yield of these thermonuclear devices is limited only by the amount of fuel (deuterium or tritium compounds) that can be packaged in the warhead.
2. Barton J. Bernstein, “Truman and the H-Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1984): 13.
4. Albert Einstein, “Arms Can Bring No Security,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 6, no. 3 (March 1950): 71.
5. In advanced nuclear designs, the power of the primary itself is often “boosted” by placing deuterium and tritium within the atomic device. These materials are typically injected as a gas into the center of the uranium or plutonium before the nuclear chain reaction is initiated. As the chain reaction begins to release energy, some of the energy compresses and heats these lighter atoms, causing then to fuse together. These thermonuclear reactions release additional energy and neutrons, and the neutrons cause additional fission reactions, thereby accelerating the ongoing fission chain reaction, increasing the energy output and efficiency of the boosted device.
6. David Fischer, History of the IAEA (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997), p. 32.
7. Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower the President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 104.
8. President Eisenhower, “Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” December 8, 1953, in Congressional Research Service, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1994), p. 15.
10. Bertrand Goldschmidt, in Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley, and Charles K. Ebinger, eds., Atoms for Peace: An Analysis after 30 Years (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 111, 117.
11. Leonard Weiss, “Atoms for Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 6 (November/December 2003): 41.
12. Of these sixteen, they assessed five as “likely” to do so.
14. John F. Kennedy, “Face-to-Face: Nixon-Kennedy,” Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy, Third Joint Television-Radio Broadcast, October 13, 1960, available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/60–3rd.htm.
16. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “Bush’s Thousand Days,” Washington Post, April 24, 2006.
17. Robert McNamara, In Retrospect (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 341.
18. Though the U.S. nuclear arsenal continued to grow through the first half of the 1960s, the rate of growth was significantly slower.
19. John F. Kennedy, “Address Before the General Assembly.”
21. Glenn Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1971), pp. 355–56.
23. David Fischer, Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and the Prospects (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 6–7.
24. Director of Central Intelligence, “National Intelligence Estimate 100–2-58,” July 1, 1958 (approved for release July 2004), p. 2.
25. Director of Central Intelligence, “National Intelligence Estimate Number 4–3-61,” September 21, 1961, p. 9.
26. The Gilpatric Committee was formally titled the “President’s Task Force on Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.”
27. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, p. 141.
28. George Bunn, “The World’s Nonproliferation Regime in Time,” IAEA Bulletin 46, no. 2 (2004).
29. Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 276.
30. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, p. 278.
31. “Atom Treaty Hit Again by Thurmond,” Washington Post, February 11, 1969.
32. “Stennis Criticizes A-Treaty,” Washington Post, February 28, 1969.
33. Paul Boyer, Fallout (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998).
35. Lewis M. Simons, “A-Blast Temporarily Muffles Gandhi Critics,” Washington Post, May 20, 1974.
36. Thomas Halsted, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons—Is the Dam About to Burst?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 31, no. 5 (May 1975): 8–11.
37. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 190.
38. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 191.
40. Richard Perle, Newsweek, February 18, 1983, as cited in Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 179.
41. Cited in FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue, p. 88.
42. FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue, p. 109.
43. Gerard J. DeGroot, The Bomb (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 307.
44. Irving Kristol, “It Wasn’t Inevitable,” American Enterprise Institute, On The Issues, June 2004.
45. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. 482, 495, cited in Lawrence Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, vol. 3 of The Struggle Against the Bomb (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), p 308.
46. New York Times, October 28, 1992, cited in Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 308.
47. Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 8.
48. The ten countries known to have nuclear weapons or believed to be seeking them are the United States, Russia, Great Britain, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Iran.
49. The eleven countries with ballistic missiles that can travel more than 1,000 kilometers are China, France, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, United States.
4. WHY STATES WANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS—AND WHY THEY DON’T
1. Britain, China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States all have nuclear weapons. North Korea claims to have a “nuclear deterrent.” Iran claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only, though many suspect that it is intended to produce weapons.
2. Director of Central Intelligence, “Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other Than the US and UK,” National Intelligence Estimate Number 4–3-61 (September 21, 1961), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/.
3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C. B. MacPherson (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), pp. 186, 188.
4. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), October 22, 1964, cited in John Wilson Leis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 2.
5. Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 1998): 42.
6. Secretary of State George P. Shultz, quoted in Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security (Winter 1996/97): 57.
7. Richard K. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited,” Security Studies (Spring/Summer 1993): 100–22. Betts acknowledges that pygmies and paranoids can be threatened by either conventional or nuclear rivals.
8. Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today (December 1995–January 1996): 4.
9. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 361.
11. Betts does not include Israel in this category, though it appears to meet the definition better than any other state.
12. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 10.
14. Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, pp. 259–61.
15. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era, International Organization (Spring 1992): 467–91.
16. Glenn Chafetz, “The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation: An Alternative to the Neorealist Perspective,” Security Studies (Spring/Summer 1993): 133–34.
18. Zachary Davis, “The Realist Nuclear Regime,” Security Studies (Spring/Summer 1993): 80.
19. Some scholars, most notably Kenneth Waltz, argue that rival states sharing a common border are more secure with nuclear weapons than without them. Waltz provides an example of this dynamic: “The Soviet Union and the United States, and the Soviet Union and China, were hostile enough; and the latter pair shared a border. Nuclear weapons caused China and the Soviet Union to deal cautiously with each other.” Even smaller nuclear powers can establish credible deterrence. Waltz argues that “nuclear weapons lessen the intensity as well as the frequency of war among their possessors. For fear of escalation nuclear states do not want to fight long and hard over important interests—indeed, they do not want to fight at all. Minor nuclear states have even better reasons than major ones to accommodate one another and to avoid fighting.” Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 12, 37.
20. Quoted in Chafetz, “The End of the Cold War,” p. 136.
21. Jonathan D. Pollack and Mitchell B. Reiss, “South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 261. This case study is based primarily on the research of Pollack and Reiss and of Reiss himself in Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 78–108.
23. Pollack and Reiss, Without the Bomb, p .262.
25. Cited in Pollack and Reiss, Without the Bomb, p. 263.
26. Pollack and Reiss, Without the Bomb, p. 107.
27. See Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Richard Tanter, “South Korea’s Nuclear Surprise,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 2005): 40–49.
28. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” p. 73.
31. See Wilfrid Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 150, n. 46.
32. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 476.
34. Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, vol. 2 of The Struggle Against the Bomb (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 392.
35. Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid.”
38. Mohamed ElBaradei, Statement at the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, November 7, 2005.
39. Chafetz, “The End of the Cold War,” p. 128.
40. Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies (Spring/Summer 1993): 198.
41. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” p. 64.
42. Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, p. 240.
43. Quoted in Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 138.
44. Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, p. 138.
46. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” p. 199.
47. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” p. 65.
49. Much of this brief case study relies on the work of George Perkovich in India’s Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) and of Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?”
50. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 6. See also Jon B. Wolfsthal, “Asia’s Nuclear Dominoes?” Current History (April 2003): 172.
51. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 1.
52. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” p. 202.
53. Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid.”
54. K. Rangaswami, “Leaders Reject Demand for Atom Bomb,” Hindu, November 9, 1964, p. 1, as cited in Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 74.
55. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 74.
56. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” p. 66.
57. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 152.
58. Neena Vyas, “India: BJP in Govt. to Exercise N-Option,” The Hindu, January 14, 1998.
59. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 412.
60. For a comprehensive history of these movements, see Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, 3 vols. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993–2003).
61. Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 324.
64. Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” in Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point, p. 219.
66. Ibid., pp. 221, 229. See also Reiss, Without the Bomb, p. 117.
67. Ibid., p. 241. The most foreseeable changes would be to the regional security environment, including a North Korean nuclear weapons test, a Chinese nuclear arms buildup, and/or aggressive Chinese military action.
68. Cited in Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 757.
69. Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 19. Also see chapter 1 in this book for details on the role of the British MAUD report in development of the atomic bomb.
70. General Advisory Committee to the U.S. Atomic Energy Agency, “Majority Annex to The GAC Report of October 30, 1949,” available at http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Hydrogen/GACReport.shtml. A number of prominent atomic scientists served on the GAC, including, J.Robert Oppenheimer (chairman), James B. Conant, Enrico Fermi, and Isidor Rabi. The report of the commission was presented to David E. Lilienthal, president of the Atomic Energy Commission, which at the time was responsible for developing and controlling nuclear weapons and energy.
71. Cited in Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, pp. 751–52.
72. Cited in Bradley A. Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Security Studies (Spring 1995): 480.
73. Cited in Bundy, Danger and Survival p. 211.
75. Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Security Studies (Spring/Summer 1993): 40.
76. Peter D. Zimmerman, “Technical Barriers to Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies (Spring/Summer 1993): 348.
77. Michael May, “Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand,” American Scientist (November–December 1994): 530.
80. Ken Fireman, “Iraq Weapons Debate: CIA Report Contradicts Administration Assessment,” Newsday, October 26, 2003.
81. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). See also David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Iran’s Next Steps: Final Tests and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant,” Institute for Science and International Security Issue Brief, January 12, 2006, available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/irancascade.pdf.
82. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 66.
83. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 67.
84. Jeffrey Chamberlin, “Comparisons of U.S. and Foreign Military Spending: Data from Selected Public Sources,” Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2004, available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32209.pdf.
85. William J. Weida, “The Economic Implications of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence,” in Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 519.
86. Cited in Schwartz, Atomic Audit, p. 4.
87. Joseph Cirincione, “Lessons Lost,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 2005): 47. This figure is based on the 1996 estimate in Schwartz, Atomic Audit. It has been updated to account for nuclear weapons spending in the past ten years, and has been converted from 1996 dollars to 2006 dollars.
88. Flynt Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,” New York Times, January 23, 2004.
89. Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, p. 320.
90. Nicola Clark, “Libya Signs Energy Exploration Deal with Shell,” New York Times, March 26, 2004.
91. Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, p. 321.
92. Scott MacLeod and Amany Radwan, “10 Questions for Muammar Gaddafi,” Time, January 30, 2005.
93. Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, p. 373. See also Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 91–92.
94. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 93–105.
98. Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith. Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 227.
99. Jan Prawitz, “From Nuclear Option to Non-Nuclear Promotion: The Sweden Case,” Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Research Report 20, 1995, pp. 13–14.
100. Arjun Makhijani, Stephen I. Schwartz, and William J. Weida, “Nuclear Waste Management and Environmental Remediation,” in Schwartz, Atomic Audit, p. 355.
101. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 322. In 1995, he estimated U.S. environmental costs at $30 billion to $100 billion, and Soviet costs at $300 billion.
102. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” p. 85.
5. TODAY’S NUCLEAR WORLD
1. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 3.
2. Calculations are based on the following deployed strategic warhead totals: 1986 combined total of 22,526 (U.S.—12,314, U.S.S.R.—10,212); 2006 combined total of 8,835 (U.S.—5,021, U.S.S.R.—3,814).
3. Linton Brooks, Richard Lugar, and Sam Nunn, “Examining Nuclear Threats Past and Present” Talk of the Nation,National Public Radio broadcast, recorded November 8, 2005, at the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference.
4. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004), p. 15.
5. Brent Scowcroft, “A Critical Nuclear Moment,” Washington Post, June 24, 2004.
7. Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute for International Studies, 2004), p. 14.
8. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2005), p. 12.
9. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 58.
10. Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 9.
12. “IAEA Illicit Nuclear Trafficking Facts and Figures,” available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/Fact_Figures.html. It is important to note here that the database includes all incidents involving “unauthorized acquisition, provision, possession, use, transfer or disposal . . . whether intentional or not, including those that are both successful and unsuccessful.”
13. Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (2001), available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm. See also Bunn, “The Demand for Black Market Fissile Material.”
14. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier note that only 46 percent of Russia’s nuclear material has been secured through U.S.-Russian cooperative programs. However, these security measures have been completed in 75 percent of the sites that house these materials. The U.S. Defense and Energy departments are working to upgrade security at 112 of the estimated 150–210 nuclear weapons storage sites. Of these, 50–60 percent have received “quick fix” or “rapid upgrades,” while only 15–20 percent have received their full set of intended security measures. See Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005, pp. 32–37.
15. David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, “Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials,” Institute for Science and International Security (August 2005).
16. Jack Kelley, “Terrorists Courted Nuclear Scientists,” USA Today, November 15, 2001.
17. David Albright and Holly Higgins, “A Bomb for the Ummah,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 53.
18. Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, “2 Nuclear Experts Briefed Bin Laden, Pakistanis Say,” Washington Post, December 16, 2001.
19. It is widely accepted that for terrorists seeking to construct a nuclear device, highly-enriched uranium is preferable to plutonium. As explained in chapter 1, there are two basic nuclear weapon designs: the gun type and the implosion type. The gun-type design is the least complex and only uses uranium. So for any terrorist group seeking an improvised nuclear device, it would be easiest to design and construct a gun-type device using highly enriched uranium. For a more detailed explanation, see Ferguson and Potter, Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 131.
20. Albright and Kramer, “Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials.”
23. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 115.
26. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 4.
27. William Potter, remarks during panel on “The New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 2005, available at www.ProliferationNews.org.
29. Richard Cheney, remarks on Meet the Press, NBC television broadcast, March 16, 2003.
30. For detailed discussions of the nuclear histories, capabilities, and strategic thinking of each of these states, see Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
31. Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again,” International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 59–88.
33. “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004, pp. 39–40.
35. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 17.
6. THE NEW U.S. POLICY
1. See, for example, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
2. Immanuel Kant, Kant’s Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss and trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 1970), p. 113, cited in Michael W. Doyle, “Liberal Internationalism: Peace, War, and Democracy,” available at: http://nobelprize.org/peace/articles/doyle/.
3. Cited in Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy (November/December 2004): 55.
7. John Bolton, “A Legacy of Betrayal,” Washington Times, May 12, 1999.
11. National Security Council, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 1.
12. Thomas Donnelly, “The Top Ten Questions for the Post-9/11 World,” American Enterprise Institute National Security Outlook, July 23, 2004.
14. National Security Council, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.
15. John Bolton, remarks to Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2004.
17. At their February 2005 meeting in Bratislava, Slovakia, Bush and Putin emphasized the importance of protecting nuclear material. In July 2005, the two countries resolved a liability dispute that had been holding up a program to eliminate 68 tons of weapons-grade plutonium.
20. “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” September 30, 2004, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/. In its key findings, the report concludes, “Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf war. ISG [Iraqi Survey Group] found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the program.” On Iraq’s chemical weapons program, the report states, “ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991.” On the biological weapons program, it concludes, “ISG judges that Baghdad abandoned its existing BW program [by late 1995] . . . ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW program.” The report comes to the same conclusion regarding Iraq’s Scud missile program: “The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence that Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles . . . after 1991.”
21. For example, see Michael A. Ledeen, “Syria and Iran Must Get Their Turn,” National Post, April 7, 2003. Ledeen writes, “There is no more time for diplomatic ‘solutions.’ The United States will have to deal with the terror masters [Iran and Syria], here and now. Iran, at least, offers Americans the possibility of a memorable victory, because the Iranian people openly loath the regime, and will enthusiastically combat it, if only the United States supports them in their just struggle. . . . It’s time to bring down the other terror masters.” See also R. James Woolsey and Thomas G. McInerney, “The Next Korean War: Using the Military is an Option. Here’s How It Can Be Done,” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2003. Woolsey and McInerney write, “We must be prepared to win a war, not execute a strike. U.S. and South Korean forces have spent nearly half a century preparing to fight and win such a war.”
22. Between October 2002 and March 2003, the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) found a few old cluster bombs capable of holding chemical weapons and several 155-mm shells containing mustard gas produced over fifteen years earlier. UNMOVIC also supervised the destruction of several dozen al-Samoud II ballistic missiles, which exceeded the allowed range by 30 kilometers.
23. Hans Blix, former executive director of UNMOVIC, told an international nonproliferation conference in June 2004, “A continuation of the inspections, as desired by the majority of members of the Security Council, would have allowed visits to all sites suspected by national intelligence agencies and would have yielded no weapons of mass destruction because there were none. The intelligence agencies, I trust, would have been more impressed with these results than with the information they had, in many cases from defectors who were interested not in inspection, but in invasion.” Statement available at http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/2004conference/speeches/blix.htm. In a March 2003 report to the UN Security Council, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei came to an equally strong conclusion about the lack of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program: “the IAEA has found to date no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. . . . The IAEA’s detailed knowledge of Iraqi capabilities . . . should enable us, barring exceptional circumstances, within a few months, to provide the Security Council with an objective and through assessment of whether Iraq has revived or attempted to revive its nuclear weapons programme.” Statement available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIraq/wp_res1284.shtml.
24. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “George Bush’s Suicidal Statecraft” International Herald Tribune, October 13, 2005.
25. Porter J. Goss, “DCI’s Global Intelligence Challenges Briefing,” Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005. See also Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005.
27. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge and Washington, D.C.: Harvard University and Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2005), pp. 30–32. See also “NNSA Expands Nuclear Security Cooperation with Russia,” National Nuclear Security Administration Fact Sheet, October 2005, available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2005/NA-05-FS03.pdf.
28. “Officials Fear New Terrorist Attacks,” Associated Press, February 17, 2005.
29. Brazil, Iran, and South Korea have all announced their intentions to enrich their own uranium. In January 2006, Urkaine likewise expressed interest in domestic uranium enrichment.
30. Presidents Bush and Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in June 2002. Now, for the first time since the negotiated threat reduction process began with SALT in the early 1970s, there are no plans for additional agreements. Under SORT, both sides are required to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012. Under the proposed START III agreement, negotiated by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in 1997, each side would have drawn down to similar numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2007, five years earlier than envisioned under SORT. START III would also have provided a framework for discussions on reductions in tactical nuclear weapons and dismantlement of warheads. See Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 204–5, 209–11.
31. In September 2004, former Pentagon director of operational test and evaluation, Philip Coyle, told a Washington audience, “The [anti-missile] system being deployed [in Alaska] has no demonstrated capability against a real attack and is missing most of its major elements.” Philip Coyle, “The Problems and Prospects of the New Alaska Missile Interceptor Site: Ten Fallacies About Missile Defense,” available at http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2484&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=6&from_page=index.cfm. In April 2005, a group of twenty-two physicists, including nine Nobel laureates, came to an identical conclusion in a letter to Senator John Warner (R-Va.): “The GMD [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] system has no demonstrated capability to defense against a real attack, even from a single warhead unaccompanied by countermeasures.” The letter is available at http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/missile_defense/scientists-letter-to-john-w-warner-on-missile-defense.html.
32. Robert L. Gallucci, “The Proposed U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 26, 2006, hearing on “U.S.-India Atomic Energy Cooperation: Strategic and Nonproliferation Implications.”
33. Richard N. Haass, “Regime Change and Its Limits,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2005): 70.
34. John M. Spratt, “Stopping a Dangerous Drift in U.S. Arms Control Policy,” Arms Control Today 33, no. 2 (March 2003).
38. Council of the European Union, EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Brussels, December 10, 2003, p. 6.
7. THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT PROLIFERATION
2. In 1987 the Soviet Union deployed 2,380 long-range missiles and China approximately 20. The number declined to 797 by 2006 (777 Russian; 20 Chinese).
4. See Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 57–82.
8. Ivan Oelrich, “Missions for Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War,” Occasional Paper No. 3, Federation of American Scientists (December 2004): 3.
14. John Barry, Evan Thomas and Sharon Squassoni, “Dropping the Bomb,” Newsweek, June 25, 2001, p. 28.
15. Director of Central intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate Number 4–3-61, “Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other Than the US and UK,” September 21, 1961, p. 5.
18. Janne E. Nolan, “Preparing for the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,” Arms Control Today, November 2000, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_11/Nolan.asp. For a detailed treatment of the 1994 review, see also Janne Nolan, An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
19. For an example of how this dynamic played out, see Joseph Cirincione, “Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense Debate,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1997).
20. Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 97.
24. George Perkovich, Jessica Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller and Jon Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). Available for download at http://www.CarnegieEndowment.org/strategy.
27. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 154.
29. “Diplomacy’s Fleeting Moment in Korea,” New York Times, January 3, 2006, p. A18.
8. NUCLEAR SOLUTIONS
1. For an excellent discussion of why nuclear terrorism is unlikely, see Robin M. Frost, “Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11,” Adelphi Paper 378, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: December, 2005).
4. Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Knopf, 2005), p. 349.
5. These recommendations are elaborated in George Perkovich Jessica Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 83–125.
6. Sam Nunn, remarks to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, November 14, 2002.
7. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives, (Cambridge and Washington, D.C.: Harvard University and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2005), p. 9.
8. Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005, pp. 30–33.
10. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 65.
12. James Dao, “Nuclear Material Secretly Flown From Serbia To Russia for Safety,” New York Times, August 23, 2002.
13. C. J. Chivers, “Prague Ships Its Nuclear-Bomb Fuel to Russian Storage.” New York Times, September 28, 2005.
14. “Acceleration of Removal or Security of Fissile Materials, Radiological Materials, and Related Equipment at Vulnerable Sites Worldwide,” Interim Report, Unclassified Summary, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA, 2005).
15. “Highly Enriched Uranium Transferred to Russia from Czech Republic” U.S. Department of State, September 27 2005.
16. Interim Report, Unclassified Summary, NNSA (2005).
17. The Baker-Cutler report of 2001 recommended that funding for nuclear threat reduction programs in Russia should be tripled in order to meet materials security goals. See Appendix A of Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, “A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia,” U.S. Department of Energy Russia Task Force, January 10, 2001, available at http://www.stimson.org/ctr/pdf/BakerCutlerReport2001.pdf.
19. See Graham Allison, The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004).
21. John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, Ernest Moniz, and Daniel Poneman, “Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,” Survival 46, no. 4 (Winter 2004–2005): 69.
24. “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/640, February 22, 2005.
25. “Putin Proposes Access to Nuclear Energy for All Countries,” RIA Novosti, January 25, 2006.
26. “Russia’s Nuclear Centre Proposal Solves Global Security Problems,” ITAR-TASS, January 25, 2005.
27. Deutch et al., “Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,” p. 68.
28. Deutch et al., “Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,” p. 68
29. “Wolfowitz Comments Revive Doubts Over Iraq’s WMD,” Associated Press, May 30, 2003.
30. Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance, pp. 94, 97.
31. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), pp. 16–17.
32. Uranium hexafluoride is fed into centrifuges for enrichment, but this compound is too volatile to ship. The uranium, however, could be converted to uranium tetraflouride (on step down in the conversion process) and shipped. This is an expensive, inelegant, but possibly politically acceptable solution.
33. Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance, p. 39.
34. See for example, the excellent suggestions made by Sally Horn, a State Department representative to the NPT Review Conference in May 2005, summarized in Joseph Cirincione, “No Easy Out,” Carnegie Analysis, May 24, 2005, available at http://www.ProliferationNews.org.
35. J. Robert Oppenheimer, “The International Control of Atomic Energy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1946).
36. Andrew Mack, “Peace on Earth? Increasingly, Yes,” Washington Post December 28, 2005, p. A21.
38. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss, eds.,The Nuclear Tipping Point: Global Prospects for Revisiting Nuclear Renunciation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), cited in Universal Compliance, p. 130.
AFTERWORD: THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
2. Bill Roggio, “Suicide Attack at Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Complex,” Long War Journal, December 10, 2007.
3. Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Nuclear Threat,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2007.
4. Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, “The Saga of a Bent Spear: Six Nuclear Missiles Were Flown Across America,” Washington Post, September 23, 2007, p. A1.
5. Robert Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2008,” NDRC Nuclear Notebook, The Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2008.
7. Warren Strobel, “Cheney at Center of Struggle to Manage N. Korea Talks,” Knight-Ridder News Service, December 20, 2003.
8. Blaine Harden, “N. Korea Misses Deadline, but U.S. Response Is Restrained,” Washington Post, January 1, 2008, p. A7.
9. Glenn Kessler, “Conservatives Assail North Korea Accord: Deal Could Get Nation off Terrorism List,” Washington Post, February 15, 2007, p. A1.
10. “Agreeing to the Same Framework,” National Review, February 14, 2007.
11. “Faith-Based Nonproliferation: We’ll Believe It When Kim Jong Il Hands Over His Plutonium,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2007.
12. See for example, interview with John Bolton, “Is North Korea Giving Up Nuclear Weapons?” CNN.com, February 12, 2007, available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0702/12/sitroom.03.html; Joshua Muravchik, “Bomb Iran: Diplomacy Is Doing Nothing to Stop the Iranian Nuclear Threat; a Show of Force Is the Only Answer,” Los Angeles Times, November 19, 2006; William Kristol, “It’s Our War: Bush Should Go to Jerusalem—and the U.S. Should Confront Iran,” Weekly Standard, July 24, 2006; and Karen De-Young, “U.S. Keeps Pressure on Iran But Decreases Saber Rattling,” Washington Post, February 11, 2007, p. A18.
13. Harden, “N. Korea Misses Deadline,” p. A7.
14. President Bush went beyond the intelligence findings at a news conference in November 2002, claiming that “contrary to an agreement they had with the United States, they’re enriching uranium, with the desire of developing a weapon.” (quoted in Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Softens Its Claim North Korea Is Enriching Uranium: Some Experts Say Data That Led to Crisis Are Possibly Mistaken,” Washington Post, March 1, 2007).
15. Joseph DeTrani, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, 110th Cong., 1st sess., February 27, 2007.
18. National Intelligence Estimate, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007, p. 6.
19. Joseph Cirincione, “Controlling Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 2006, p. 80.
20. Joseph Cirincione, “The Clock’s Ticking: Stopping Iran Before It’s Too Late,” Arms Control Today, November 2006, pp. 18–19.
21. Norman Podhoretz, “The Case for Bombing Iran,” Commentary, June 2007.
22. Charles Krauthammer, “The Tehran Calculus,” Washington Post, September 15, 2006.
23. Interview with Deborah Solomon, “The Diplomat,” New York Times Magazine, November 4, 2007.
24. National Intelligence Estimate, “Iran,” p. 8.
25. Joseph Cirincione and Andrew Grotto, “Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for Resolving the Nuclear Crisis with Iran,” Center for American Progress, March 2007, p. 26.
27. Robert Kagan, “Time to Talk to Iran,” Washington Post, December 5, 2007, p. A21.
28. “Looking at America,” New York Times, December 31, 2007, p. A17.
29. Moisés Naim, “A Hunger for America,” Washington Post, January 2, 2008, p. A13.
30. George Perkovich, with Deepti Choubey, Rose Gottemoeller, Jessica T. Mathews, and Sharon Squassoni, “2007 Report Card on Progress,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007, p. 5.
31. Laurent Pirot, “French Offer Saudi Nuclear Energy Help,” Los Angeles Times, January 13, 2008.
33. Ercan Yavuz, “Spent Fuel from Turkey’s Future Plants Becoming Hot Commodity,” Today’s Zaman, January 15, 2008; Erdal Saglam, “Ambitious Nuke Plans Revealed,” Turkish Daily News, January 15, 2008.
34. John McCain, “An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (November/December 2007): 31.
35. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (November/December 2007): 12–13.
36. The winning argument was that no hearings had been held on the CTBT since 1999, therefore it was impossible to declare that there was a “sense of the Senate” in favor of ratification.
37. Quoted in Jeffrey Laurenti and Carl Robichaud, eds., Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: New Prospects for Security Against Weapons Threats (New York: Century Foundation, 2007), p. 9.
39. Margaret Beckett, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom, remarks at Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, June 25, 2007, available at http://www.ProliferationNews.org.