This is a mix of traditional footnotes and overview source notes. The source notes cut across chapters. For example, source note 1 describes the various sources for quotes from Rudy Giuliani, Bernard Kerik, Richard Sheirer, and Tom Von Essen. The first time each of these four is quoted, a summary of source note 1 is cited again. Most of the rest of the quotes from the four do not refer to a source note. There are several other source notes like 1 that cover multiple sources or frequently cited material. We do not footnote them every time we use them. If a quote comes from a source interviewed by the authors, it usually does not get a source note. A source note is used with an interviewed subject only in instances when the reader might be confused about whether or not the quote comes from an interview. If the material is adequately sourced in the text, it also does not get a source note. The source notes do not attempt to cover every new fact in the book, only those that appear to require deeper sourcing or explanation.
CHAPTER 1
1. Rudy Giuliani, Tom Von Essen, Richard Sheirer, and Bernard Kerik, all of whom were employed at Giuliani Partners for most of the last four years, declined to be interviewed. Their frequent quotes are drawn from media sources, as well as Giuliani’s book Leadership (Miramax, 2002), Von Essen’s book Strong of Heart (HarperCollins, 2002), and Bernard Kerik’s book Lost Son (HarperCollins, 2001). Some quotes are drawn from speeches that we obtained or covered—for example, Von Essen’s appearance at a Las Vegas convention for Motorola or Giuliani’s question-and-answer session with Mexico City businessmen. Von Essen, Sheirer, and Kerik also testified at a public hearing of the 9/11 Commission on May 18, 2004, and Giuliani on May 19. In addition to their public testimony, Giuliani testified privately before commission staff on April 20, 2004, Von Essen on April 7, Kerik on April 6, and Sheirer on April 7. The memorandums for the record (MFRs) of the confidential commission interviews are not verbatim transcripts but, rather, notes marked by commission staff as “100 percent accurate.” Usually, where quotation comes from the private testimony, it is described in the text as a statement made to commission staff or investigators. Internal commission documents prepared before the public testimony of each of these men are also sometimes quoted.
2. Zack Zahran was interviewed by the authors.
3. Eric Levine was interviewed on the BBC Eyewitness series.
4. The National Institute of Standards and Technology, a subdivision of the U.S. Department of Commerce, is still conducting a study examining the collapse of 1, 2, and 7 World Trade Center. Its final report on 1 and 2 WTC, issued in 2005, was over 10,000 pages long. Its preliminary reports were also thousands of pages. Much the evacuation data in the book is drawn from its studies, and it is cited on issues ranging from the radios to command and control. We have attended its periodic New York briefings, interviewed several members of the investigating team, and visited its headquarters in Maryland, reporting on a two-day public session there. Its press representative, Michael Newman, has responded in writing to most of our e-mailed questions. We have also interviewed the director of the study, Shyam Sunder.
5. Much of the information about President Bush’s movements on 9/11 is taken from Scott Pelley’s interview with the president, 60 Minutes II, September 10, 2003. Some of the details, including precise times, are derived from many other media sources. 6. Christopher Anderson’s George and Laura: Portrait of an American Marriage (HarperCollins, 2002).
7. Giuliani, Von Essen, Sheirer, and Kerik documents and testimony.
8. Jonathan Alter, Newsweek, September 27, 2001.
9. “Person of the Year,” Time, December 31, 2001.
10. Tom Roeser, Chicago Sun-Times, September 10, 2005.
CHAPTER 2
1. Sam Caspersen granted a four-hour interview and requested that he be allowed to review the typed-up notes of the interview. When he got the notes, he responded with a detailed, 18-page, point-by-point assessment, and in some cases, revision of his comments. He is quoted frequently here, either from the interview notes or from his written response. We have tried to include any caveats he added in the text, but it was not always possible. For example, his letter confirmed his belief that OEM did not have a direct impact on the rescue/evacuation operation, but added that one OEM official “was contacting hospital officials in order to gear them up for what was thought to be the imminent arrival of thousands of injured civilians and first responders.” Caspersen says that the OEM staff at the command center also contacted 20 predesignated representatives of different agencies “and asked them to respond asap to OEM headquarters.” They were en route to the center, Caspersen says, when it was evacuated at 9:30.
2. Paul Browne is referring to the brilliant documentary film made by Jules and Gedeon Naudet, shot mostly in the North Tower lobby. It is also the source of the Sheirer statement to Von Essen about another plane.
3. Giuliani, Von Essen, Sheirer, and Kerik documents and testimony.
4. Naudet documentary.
5. Giuliani, Von Essen, Sheirer, and Kerik documents and testimony.
6. Memorandums for the record (MFRs), written by 9/11 Commission staff after private interviews, are also cited in the text for Edward Plaugher, the Arlington County fire chief, taken on October 16, 2003; Alan Reiss, the World Trade Center director for the Port Authority, November 3, 2003; and Jerome Hauer, former director of the office of Emergency Management, March 30, 2004. All three also testified at the commission’s public hearings in May 2004.
7. A high-ranking executive in the mayor’s office recalled former police commissioner Safir using this term at a critical meeting about the command center, but the executive declined to be identified by name. Direct calls to Safir’s security consulting company, and a written request to Safir publicist Howard Rubenstein, did not result in an interview.
8. Never Forget, by Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias (HarperCollins, 2002), contains oral history interviews of Joe Pfeifer, Jay Jonas, Tom Von Essen, Bernard Kerik, Joe Esposito, Billy Butler, and Hector Santiago that are cited at various points in this text.
9. John Peruggia’s oral history was taken by the Fire Department on October 25, 2001.
10. Giuliani, Von Essen, Sheirer, and Kerik documents and testimony.
11. Jerry Hauer, the first director of the office of Emergency Management, did five extended interviews and also supplied the agendas, correspondence, and other documents related to his meetings with Mayor Giuliani from 1996 through 1999. Lou Anemone, the chief of the department at the NYPD, granted an extensive interview and supplied detailed records from the NYPD exchanges with OEM regarding command and control issues. Both turned over copies of proposed protocols and matrixes.
12. The World Trade Center Task Force report was issued in March 1995 by Fire Commissioner Howard Safir and Department of Buildings Commissioner Joel Miele. The study was initially authorized in March 1993 by fire commissioner at the time, Carlos Rivera, and buildings commissioner at the time, Rudolph Rinaldi.
13. In addition to preparing memos for departmental use, Chief Anthony Fusco wrote and organized a lengthy overview of the 1993 response that was initially published in WNYF, the official publication of the FDNY. After that extended review was published in September 1993, Fusco and colleagues also published another compendium of articles in Fire Engineering magazine in December 1993.
14. Philip Zelikow appeared on National Public Radio on September 2, 2004.
15. The Mongello and Larsen quotes are taken from 102 Minutes by Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn (Times Books, 2005), and their work in the New York Times, as well as the book, has informed this section on Stairway A.
16. Sheirer was elevated to assistant commissioner at the Fire Department while David Dinkins was mayor, so he could not openly participate in the Giuliani campaign in 1993. The commissioner who promoted him, Carlos Rivera, wound up endorsing Giuliani and resigning during the campaign.
17. The Chris Young story is derived from Dwyer and Flynn’s book, 102 Minutes. In addition to the USA Today stories, the Fusco after-action reports, FDNY elevator expert John Hodgens, Elevator World editor Bob Caporale, the National Institute of Standards and Technology report, and chief mechanic James O’Neill contributed to this account.
18. John Lehman said this in an interview with the authors.
19. Sam Caspersen said that the Safety division “is a backwater where black sheep are put within the department” and that “officers come out of the ranks with no special background.” He also said there’s no written standard operating procedure for the division and that “new officers ride around with an old chief and pick up orally how to do the job.”
20. Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge (HarperCollins, 2003), which recounts the extraordinary story of Bucca, who made it to the 78th floor of the South Tower and died in the collapse.
21. The National Institute of Standards and Technology came up with these numbers, though others question them.
22. Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, in 102 Minutes, described the use of these evacuation chairs and only cited instances when Port Authority employees were brought down in them. Dwyer and Flynn also initially reported the Beyea/ Zelmanowitz story.
23. Fink and Mathias, Never Forget.
24. Zelikow interview, NPR, September 2, 2004.
25. Dwyer and Flynn reported Walsh’s warning.
26. Port Authority police chief Morris was quoted in Newsday, January 23, 2002.
27. Alfredo Fuentes, American by Choice (Fire Dreams Publishing, 2004).
CHAPTER 3
1. In addition to court records and U.S. Senate and House of Representatives hearing transcripts, the description of the 1993 bombing is derived from “Two Seconds Under the World,” by Jim Dwyer et al. (Crown Publishers, 1994), and The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, by Charles Shields (Chelsea House, 2001).
2. A campaign aide who requested that he not be identified described the Giuliani trip toward the trade center in February 1993. Another campaign aide recounted how they ridiculed Dinkins’s lack of leadership in the aftermath of the 1993 bombing.
3. The authors interviewed Pete Caram.
4. The authors have reviewed a tape of this session; this is also Bratton’s memory as relayed by John Miller, who was his spokesman for most of the time that Bratton was NYPD commissioner. At the time of a two-hour interview with Miller in 2005, he was Bratton’s spokesman at the Los Angeles Police Department. Miller is currently the chief spokesman for the FBI. His closeness to Bratton, even after Miller left the NYPD, continued for at least a decade, and Miller said he could speak for Bratton on this history. Bratton’s own autobiography, Turnaround (Random House, 1998), contains no reference to terrorism, though it is largely an account of his NYPD years.
5. This total is drawn from internal law firm documents. A Newsday story in 1993 investigated some of these questionable clients and revealed the 1991 memo.
6. Fitzgerald is the only one named who did not talk to us. But David Kelley and Mary Jo White, both of whom served as U.S. attorney in the Southern District and were very close to Fitzgerald, said they did not believe Fitzgerald ever briefed or was asked to brief Giuliani or anyone else at City Hall.
7. An FBI spokesman, a commission source, the NYPD’s Browne, and Chief of Department Lou Anemone also indicated they believe the number of detectives assigned to the terrorism task force remained largely unchanged, at a level of 16 or 17, throughout the Giuliani years.
8. The Schwartz documents, as well as many other documents cited throughout this book, were obtained from the Giuliani archive maintained by the New York City Department of Records and Information Services.
CHAPTER 4
1. Jerry Hauer, Lou Anemone, and John Miller confirmed that Freeh personally briefed Giuliani on specific terrorist events or threats.
2. The three executive directors of the authority for almost all of the Giuliani years, Stan Brezenoff, George Marlin, and Robert Boyle, were interviewed and agreed about this. Top deputies at the authority, including Tony Shorris and others who asked not to be identified, said the same thing.
3. George Marlin, executive director of the Port Authority, provided access to many key authority documents covering the 1994–1997 period.
4. Laura Weinberg, whose husband, Richard Aronow, worked in the Port Authority legal department before dying in an elevator, where he was trapped on his way to work.
5. Savas and Steisel recalled these discussions.
6. A comprehensive search of the Giuliani records maintained at the municipal archives uncovered no other reference to the impact of the 1993 bombing on the trade center or Port Authority.
7. Boyle and McLaughlin recounted these contacts.
8. Tom Robbins revealed this chat room conversation in a series of Village Voice stories that eventually led to Harding’s indictment and conviction.
9. Rob Polner, a Newsday reporter, saw Dyson leaving with the Rolodex.
10. The authors submitted a freedom-of-information request in 2003 to the Department of Buildings requesting all records related to 1, 2, and 7 WTC. Over the course of three visits to the department, we reviewed thousands of department documents. We did the same with the Fire Department.
11. Ibid.
12. The National Institute of Standards and Technology documented the lack of refireproofing that occurred in the towers, as well as the yearly pace of the project. It also established the effect of primer paint on the adhesive strength of the fireproofing.
13. NIST reported that the fourth stairway was not raised at this meeting.
CHAPTER 5
1. 9/11 Commission staff memorandums for the record (MFRs).
2. Ibid.
3. Hauer and Anemone interviews and documents.
CHAPTER 6
1. In response to a freedom-of-information request, the Department of Citywide Administrative Services, the office of Management and Budget, the Department of City Planning, and the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York turned over hundreds of documents related to the rental and construction of space at 7 World Trade Center for the Emergency Operations Center. Con Ed and its attorneys also supplied some records. The office of Emergency Management, which trained all city agencies in how to back up records particularly with regard to Y2K, claimed it lost all its records on 9/11. Though city officials were quoted in the New York Times in 2002 as saying that they’d received a Justice Department grant to do an after-action report on OEM’s response that day, adding that the report would be completed soon, a city attorney said that he believed no such report exists, and OEM stopped returning messages.
2. Glenn Pymento and Richard Ramos were deposed as part of the lawsuit brought against the city by Con Edison and its insurers, as was Hauer.
3. Silverstein’s daughter married her partner in a televised ceremony and wrote a book with her partner.
4. Pymento and Ramos deposition.
5. A high-ranking executive in the mayor’s office quoting Safir, who declined to be interviewed.
CHAPTER 7
1. City Comptroller William Thompson, in response to several freedom-of-information requests, and the Fire Department turned over most of the documents cited in this chapter. Some, particularly those involving the Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications, were obtained from the municipal archives. Warren Stogner of General Electric/Ericsson also supplied some records.
2. Jack Newfield and Wayne Barrett, City for Sale: Ed Koch and the Betrayal of New York (HarperCollins, 1989).
3. Steven Gregory, Don Stanton, and Robert Scott, the three FDNY officials who are still at the department and were involved with the radio decisions, declined to be interviewed. Another decision maker, Tom Fitzpatrick, who is now with Giuliani Partners, also declined to be interviewed. Stanton’s father, who was involved in radio purchases for Emergency Medical Services, could not be located. 4. Ibid.
5. The Chief, a newspaper for municipal workers, reported on this meeting in June 2001.
6. The Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications, through its attorneys, maintains that no records of Deborah Spandorf’s seven years at the department exist, explaining that she communicated mostly by e-mail.
7. At the end of an extended telephone interview, Marian Barell suggested we call again after we completed our reporting. Asked about why she’d moved out to Illinois, so close to Motorola headquarters, after retiring from Motorola, she simply insisted she had nothing to do with Motorola. She did not mention that she had remarried. Her new husband, Robert Barnett, a top Motorola executive, answered the phone when we called again and said that Motorola’s national press office would handle any further questions, including any concerning his marriage. When Steve Gorecki, the press officer for Motorola, was asked if it was usual for the company to handle personal press questions about an ex-employee like Barell, who’d left years earlier, he said no. Detailed questions were e-mailed to Gorecki about a wide range of Motorola matters, as well as the delicate timing questions of the Barnett/Barell relationship, and the company declined to answer them. Barnett’s former wife, Kathleen, said she knew nothing about when her former husband had met Marian Barell, adding that she did not have any information about another woman in her ex-husband’s life when she sought the divorce. Nor has she learned of any since, she said.
8. Harte declined to be interviewed. Several calls to Ahmed and Weinberg at their Motorola offices, and at Weinberg’s home, went unreturned. Gino Menchini, the most recent DOITT commissioner, agreed to an interview and then canceled.
9. Though detailed questions about this possible conflict were sent to Arnold & Porter, they got back to us and specifically declined to answer any of them.
CHAPTER 8
1. Gail Collins, “New York Notes 8 Million Survivors in Need of Affection,” New York Times, September 17, 2001.
2. Juan Gonzalez, “Fallout,” The New Press, 2002.
3. William Langewiesche’s American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center (North Point, 2002) was a critical guide to life at Ground Zero.
4. Stephanie Armour, “Health Problems Plague Ground Zero Workers,” USA Today, March 3, 2003.
5. On September 29, the mayor suggested that the rescue phase of the operation was over, but no change was made in the actual management of the site. Giuliani said that the reality was that the city no longer “expected to find anybody alive,” but added that the city would “conduct the operation in the same way” because “we are doing the same thing we would do to recover someone alive as to recover human remains.” The Fire Department remained the incident commander at the site, running the operation. It wasn’t until October 31 that the Department of Design and Construction (DDC) was nominally named the coincident commander with the FDNY, and testimony in the pending Ground Zero lawsuits indicates that even that appointment did not change site management. The search for body parts, overseen by the FDNY with separate NYPD and Port Authority units conducting their own operations, was in effect a continuation of the rescue phase. Giuliani told Fox News, “It really doesn’t matter if you describe it as a rescue effort.” In Von Essen’s book, he indicates that the conversion to a recovery/demolition/cleanup/reconstruction phase never happened, and, in an interview, DDC Commissioner Ken Holden agreed. Holden also testified in a pending Ground Zero lawsuit that “no one ever told me I was an incident commander and I don’t know what an incident commander is.” Holden’s deputy Mike Burton added in his own court deposition in 2005 that a deputy mayor did tell him that DDC was to serve as co-incident commander. He said that all it meant was that he and a fire chief held joint daily meetings rather than sending representatives to the separate meetings they previously hosted.
6. Maggie Haberman, “Hizzoner Hits Hardhat Holiday Gripe,” New York Post, November 24, 2001.
7. Dr. Philip Landrigan wrote an article in the American Journal of Industrial Medicine called “Lessons Learned: Worker Health and Safety Since September 11, 2001,” published in 2002.
8. Dr. Michael Weiden read a statement in October 2003 that he jointly prepared with Dr. Kerry Kelly and Dr. David Prezant for the Congressional Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. Kelly is the FDNY’s chief medical officer and Prezant and Weiden are top assistants in the department’s Bureau of Health Services.
9. Bruce Lippy, “Respiratory Protection at the World Trade Center: Lessons From the Other Disaster,” The National Clearinghouse for Worker Safety and Health Training. www.wetp.org/wetp/wtc/Respiratoruse.pdf
10. Juan Gonzalez, “A Toxic Nightmare at Disaster Site,” New York Daily News, October 26, 2001.
11. Francesca Lyman, “Messages in the Dust: What Are the Lessons of the Environmental Health Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11?,” National Environmental Health Association publication, September 2003.
12. In a January 2004 interview with EPA regional communications director Bonnie Bellow, she said that Whitman “felt so strongly about the need for the use of respirators” that she made these midnight calls “while watching CNN covering Ground Zero workers without respirators on.”
13. Michelle Goldstein memo to Deputy Mayor Robert Harding, re: “Legislative Alternatives to Limit the City’s Liability relating to 9/11/01,” undated.
14. Bruce Lippy, “Cleaning Up After 9/11: Respirators, Power and Politics,” Occupational Hazards, May 29, 2002.
15. William Langewiesche, “American Ground.”
16. As quoted in Never the Same, a documentary by Jonathon Levin.
17. Ginger Adams Otis, “Assembly Seeks to Help Those Injured on 9/11,” The Chief, September 2, 2005.
18. Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, undated.
19. Gary Shaffer, New York City assistant corporation counsel, supplied these numbers, as the city prepared papers to file in these cases.
20. Anthony DePalma, “Many Who Served on 9/11 Press Fight for Compensation,” New York Times, May 13, 2004.
21. Ridgely Ochs, “Ailments, Struggles of 9/11 EMT Who Died Not Unique,” Newsday, September 4, 2005.
CHAPTER 9
1. Late Show with David Letterman, CBS transcript, September 17, 2001.
2. Sam Smith, “Furor over WTC Lies,” New York Post, July 18, 2004. The Post article relied on the findings of the New York Law and Justice Project, which posted its full freedom of information response from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation on its website between January 22, 2002 and June 4, 2004. This posting revealed the unreleased results of the New York City Department of Environmental Protections tests. These findings are now frequently cited in the litigation against the city and the EPA, the federal agency that coordinated the DEP and all other air and dust sampling.
3. “EPA’s Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement,” office of Inspector General, Report No. 2003-P-00012, August 21, 2003.
4. Andrew Schneider, “NY officials Underestimate Danger,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 13, 2002.
5. The EPA Inspector General’s report is the primary source for much of the asbestos and toxin data here.
6. Juan Gonzalez, Fallout (New Press, 2002).
7. New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health, submitted to the City Council, March 2002.
8. Lyman, “Messages in the Dust.”
9. David Newman, an industrial hygienist with NYCOSH, quoted in “Cleaning Up After 9/11: Respirators, Power and Politics,” Occupational Hazards, May 29, 2002.
10. The EPA IG report described the city’s instructions to the public.
11. Lyman, “Messages in the Dust.”
12. The EPA IG report contained the city’s response, submitted by Kenneth Becker, an assistant corporation counsel. The report also contained the FEMA statements about the city’s position on a cleanup program.
13. Ibid.
14. Gonzalez, Fallout.
15. Muszynsky was interviewed by the authors.
16. Lyman, “Messages in the Dust.”
17. The same day that Judge Batts held Whitman personally liable, another judge in the same courthouse, Alvin Hellerstein, declined to find her liable in a case with some similarities to the Batts case. Both decisions are currently on appeal.
18. Sally Ann Lederman, et al., “The Effects of the World Trade Center Event on Birth Outcomes among Term Deliveries at Three Lower Manhattan Hospitals,” Environmental Health Perspectives, December 2004. Anthony M. Szema, et al., “Clinical Deterioration in Pediatric Asthmatic Patients After September 11, 2001,” Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, March 2004.
19. Shao Lin, et al., “Upper Respiratory Symptoms and Other Health Effects Among Residents Living Near the WTC Site After September 11, 2001,” American Journal of Epidemiology, September 15, 2005.
20. Lyman, “Messages in the Dust.”
21. Kristen Lombardi, “Dusted: Long after 9/11, Some People Say the Dust is Still Making Them Sick,” Village Voice, September 6, 2005.
CHAPTER 10
1. Jack Newfield, The Full Rudy: The Man, the Mayor, the Myth (Nation Books, 2003).
2. William Cunningham, communications director for Mayor Bloomberg, said the mayor and ex-mayor talked just a couple of times during the first few months of 2002. Bloomberg also didn’t feel compelled to continue Giuliani initiatives. The New York Times noted that he eliminated the Vacancy Decontrol Board, which Giuliani had used to control city hiring; axed a deal to sell a building near the United Nations; and was reconsidering a lease of city land in Brooklyn to one of Giuliani’s political supporters. A spokesman called the decisions “a reflection of changing needs and priorities in difficult times.”
3. Giuliani’s loyalty to old associates extended beyond City Hall. One of his oldest friends, Father Alan Placa, was employed by Giuliani Partners after he was suspended as a priest during the child molestation scandal.
4. Michael Hess told the New York Times in December 2004 that Bear Stearns was not working out, and the Times said the relationship “might soon be abandoned” (Eric Lipton, December 4, 2004).
5. Edward Iwata, “Giuliani’s Firm’s Deal to Advise Company Raises Questions,” USA Today, March 17, 2005.
6. Eric Lipton of the New York Times mentions this incident in a February 22, 2004, story, which was one of the few serious analyses of Giuliani Partners. Many of the points Lipton made are reflected here.
7. Laurence Pantin, a Mexico City–based reporter, covered the videoconference for us and taped the exchange.
8. Daniela Gerson reported the negative response to Giuliani Partners in the New York Sun, April 11, 2005.
9. Ben Smith, “Really Rich Rudy,” New York Observer, April 4, 2005.
10. While Dempsey credited Nextel with “making their best effort” to respond to NYPD complaints, that clearly wasn’t the case nationally. A top Nextel executive said in 2003 that over the years, the company had resolved only 30 of some 700 interference complaints across the country. Dempsey also said that the city’s interagency frequency, the 800-megahertz system set up by the office of Emergency Management, started to experience interference in the late ’90s. “The FCC suggested they buy new equipment,” Dempsey recalled. The NYPD was experiencing this Nextel interference even though its radios were operating on 470 megahertz. Dempsey said the interference was “strictly power” and that Nextel sites were “saturating our receivers with pure signal.”
11. On September 16, 2001, Roz Allen, an attorney with Arnold & Porter representing the city, sent an e-mail to the FCC saying that “Nextel agreed to coordinate cells on wheels (COWs) and other temporary base stations with the city and the utilities,” adding that “without this coordination, it is highly probable that Nextel would disrupt these other critical communications.” This indicated that the 7,000 phones Nextel delivered to Ground Zero immediately after 9/11 were a cause of concern to the city because of potential interference with other public safety communications there. The same concerns about phones like Nextel’s prompted Agostino Cangemi, the DOITT general counsel, to testify at a Senate Subcommittee on Communications hearing in March 2002 that the city was monitoring the 800-megahertz frequencies closely in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. This monitoring, said Cangemi, “was especially important because of the many temporary wireless facilities, including COWs, being deployed.”
12. “I cannot imagine a heavier time,” a Nextel official said of its September 11 call volume in news accounts the next day.
13. The city began filing these interference complaints only in 2002, partly in response to the Nextel spectrum proposal. Clearly, as Dempsey says, interference was occurring prior to 2002, but the city wasn’t filing complaints. In a 2002 submission to the FCC, the city said: “New York City’s public safety frequencies are plagued with interleaving and interference problems caused by commercial carriers. The record to date strongly suggests that while a channel reshuffling may well mitigate interference, reshuffling alone is unlikely to eliminate interference.” Since this submission was a comment filed with the Nextel spectrum application, it was a clear reference to the unique interleaving effect Nextel had on public safety communications. This interleaving occurs because Nextel frequencies were literally mixed in with police and fire frequencies.
14. The half billion dollars in public safety rebanding costs was the initial offer, and is expected to grow to more than a billion. In addition, Nextel is doing rebanding that affects private users. The agreement with the FCC provides that whatever Nextel doesn’t spend on rebanding or get FCC credit for, it must pay to the government, up to the estimated value of the new spectrum. Opponents of the plan have charged that the true value of the new spectrum is greater than the estimate. Since this deal was done without the usual public auction, the market did not determine the spectrum’s value.
15. Dispatch Monthly, 2002 coverage of the APCO national convention.
16. Tony Carbonetti, a Giuliani political aide at City Hall with no known background in public safety communications, actually became the chair of a subcommittee of the FCC’s Media Security and Reliability Council. Fitzpatrick was a member of another subcommittee.
17. Eric Lipton, in the New York Times on February 22, 2004, reported the $15 million in stock options.
18. Within months of the FCC approval of the Nextel deal, Sprint acquired it. Sprint had filed papers with the FCC opposing Nextel’s plan, pointing out that the “primary causer of interference” would be rewarded with “an unwarranted spectrum grab.”
19. Melinda Ligos, “Private Sector: Moving in on New York Lawyers,” New York Times, February 15, 2004.
20. “At Home with Judith Giuliani,” Avenue, November 2003.
21. Thomas Maier, “Adviser to Ridge, Adviser to Business Partners,” Newsday, December 11, 2004.
CHAPTER 11
1. Craig Bildstien, “The Cherie Effect,” The Advertiser (Adelaide, Australia), February 10, 2005.
2. Suzanne Wilson, “Giuliani Dinner Fails to Meet Charity Goal,” Calgary Herald, October 25, 2002. 3. “The Note,” ABC News, March 31, 2005.
4. Associated Press, April 2, 2005.
5. “Rudy and the Right,” New York Post, February 10, 2006.
6. Wayne Barrett, “Romancing the Right,” Village Voice, February 15, 2000.
7. “What Price Success?,” Tampa Tribune, February 24, 2002.
8. Joyce Purnick, “Busy Being an Icon,” New York Times, September 5, 2002.
9. Raleigh News & Observer, November 4, 2003.
10. Houston Chronicle, March 30, 2005.
CHAPTER 12
1. Kevin Culley, the fire captain assigned to OEM, said they heard over the radio that the eagle was heading in and they got a laugh out of the code name for Giuliani.
2. Esposito and Dunne have described their own movements in interviews; Esposito’s was published in Never Forget by Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias.
3. Bernard Kerik’s private testimony before the 9/11 Commission staff, April 6, 2004.
4. 9/11 Commission report.
5. The National Institute of Standards and Technology found that there were only 17,400 people in the towers, with approximately 15,000 surviving. It also determined that almost all the survivors began their evacuations within three minutes of the crash in the North Tower and six minutes in the South Tower.